108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yao, Sr. vs. People

G.R. No. 168306. June 19, 2007.*
WILLIAM C. YAO, SR., LUISA C. YAO, RICHARD C. YAO, WILLIAM C. YAO JR., and
ROGER C. YAO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETRON
CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP., and its Principal, SHELL
INT’L PETROLEUM CO. LTD., respondents.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Requirements Before a Search Warrant May Be
Validly Issued.—Article III, Section 2, of the present Constitution states the requirements before a
search warrant may be validly issued, to wit: Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particu-
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
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Yao, Sr. vs. People
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (emphasis
supplied). Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides with more
particularity the requisites in issuing a search warrant, viz.: SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Same; Same; A search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of probable cause;
Meaning of Probable Cause; The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts,
data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present; Reliable
information if insufficient.—According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be
issued only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant means such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place to be searched. The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or
information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. The applicant or
his witnesses must have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commission of
the offense being complained of. “Reliable information” is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not
enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.
Same; Same; The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of the
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.—
Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish probable cause. It should
be borne in mind that the determination of probable cause does not call for the application of the
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the
term implies, “probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial.
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Yao, Sr. vs. People
Same; Same; Rules in the Examination of the Complainant and his Witnesses When Applying
for a Search Warrant; Although there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should
conduct his investigation, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive not
merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma.—As to whether the form and
manner of questioning made by Judge Sadang complies with the requirements of law, Section 5
of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, prescribes the rules in the examination
of the complainant and his witnesses when applying for search warrant, to wit: SEC.
5. Examination of complainant; record.—The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. The searching questions
propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge.
Although there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should conduct his investigation, it
is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
Same; Same; A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community; The executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant.—The longstanding rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.
Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched
with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been issued, and when he
knows
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Yao, Sr. vs. People
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit.
Same; Same; When may a search warrant be said to particularly describe the things to be
seized; The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching au-thorities.—A search
warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search
and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the of-
fense for which the warrant is being issued. While it is true that the property to be seized under a
warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet
the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.
The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise it would
be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know
exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, however, the articles subject of
the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view,
between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles
described as a class or specie would suffice.
Same; Same; The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is directed; It is sufficient that the person against whom
the warrant is directed has control and possession of the property sought to be seized.—Even if
we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA from that of the petitioners, the
effect will be the same. The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control
or possession of the property sought to be seized. Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the
properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the search
warrants is still valid.
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Yao, Sr. vs. People
Same; Same; A.M. 02-1-06-SC is not applicable in the present case because it governs only
searches and seizures in civil actions for infringement of intellectual property rights.—
Petitioners’ reliance on Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, is not tenable. As correctly observed
by the Solicitor General, A.M. 02-1-06-SC is not applicable in the present case because it governs
only searches and seizures in civil actions for infringement of intellectual property rights. The
offense complained of herein is for criminal violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of
Republic Act No. 8293.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cacho and Chua Law Offices for petitioners.
Villaraza and Angangco for private respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr., and Roger C. Yao pray
for the reversal of the Decision dated 30 September 2004,2 and Resolution dated 1 June 2005, of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 79256,3affirming the two Orders, both dated 5 June
2003, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Cavite City, relative to Search Warrants No.
2-2003 and No. 3-2003.4 In the said Orders, the RTC denied the petitioners’ Motion to Quash
Search Warrant5 and Motion for
_______________
1
Rollo, pp. 8-28.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente with Associate Justices Eugenio S.
Labitoria and Rebecca De Guia Salvador, concurring; Id., at pp. 30-45.
3
Id., at pp. 48-49.
4
Penned by Judge Melchor Q.C. Sadang; Id., at pp. 105-110.
5
Id., at pp. 78-88.
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VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 113
Yao, Sr. vs. People
the Return of the Motor Compressor and Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Refilling Machine.6
The following are the facts:
Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION
(MASAGANA), an entity engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG products. Private
respondents Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas
Shell) are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Their LPG
products are sold under the marks “GASUL” and “SHELLANE,” respectively. Petron is the
registered owner in the Philippines of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its
LPG products. It is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors
to refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its trademarks. Pilipinas
Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks,
symbols, or designs of its principal, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited (Shell
International), including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL device in connection with the
production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only corporation in the
Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute
SHELLANE LPG containers and products.7
On 3 April 2003, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca)
filed two applications for search warrant with the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, against
petitioners and other occupants of the MASAGANA compound located at Governor’s Drive,
Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City, for alleged violation of Section 155, in relation
to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as “The Intellectual Property Code of
the Philippines.”8
_______________
6
Id., at pp. 97-98.
7
Records, pp. 4-83.
8
Rollo, pp. 51-54 and 61-63.
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114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
The two applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that per information, belief, and
personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing, selling, offering for sale
and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames,
trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the
rights of the said entities.
 In his two separate affidavits9 attached to the two applications for search warrant, Oblanca
alleged:

1. “1.[That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”) received a

letter-complaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on
behalf of among others, [Petron Corporation (PETRON)] and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (PSPC), the authorized representative of Shell International Petroleum
Company Limited (“Shell International”), requesting assistance in the investigation and,
if warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain persons and/or establishments
suspected of violating the intellectual property rights [of PETRON] and of PSPC and
Shell International.
2. 2.[That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was
assigned as the NBI agent on the case.
3. 3.[That] prior to conducting the investigation on the reported illegal activities, he reviewed
the certificates of trademark registrations issued in favor of [PETRON], PSPC and Shell
International as well as other documents and other evidence obtained by the investigative
agency authorized by [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International to investigate and cause
the investigation of persons and establishments violating the rights of [PETRON], PSPC
and Shell International, represented by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. Certified copies of the
foregoing trademark registrations are attached hereto as Annexes “A” to “E.”
4. 4.[That] among the establishments alleged to be unlawfully refilling and unlawfully selling
and distributing [Gasul LPG and] Shellane products is Masagana Gas Corporation
(“MASAGANA”). Based on Securities and Exchange Commission Records,
MASAGANA has its principal office address at 9775 Kamagong Street, San

_______________
9
Id.
115
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 115
Yao, Sr. vs. People

1. Antonio Village, Makati, Metro Manila. The incorporators and directors of MASAGANA
are William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr., and Roger
C. Yao. x x x.
2. 5.I confirmed that MASAGANA is not authorized to use [PETRON and] Shellane LPG
cylinders and its trademarks and tradenames or to be refillers or distributors of [PETRON
and] Shellane LPG’s.
3. 6.I went to MASAGANA’s refilling station located at Governor’s Drive, Barangay
Lapidario, Trece Martires City (sic), Cavite to investigate its activities. I confirmed that
MASAGANA is indeed engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale and/or distribution of
[Gasul and] Shellane LPG cylinders. I found out that MASAGANA delivery trucks with
Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612, WTE-527, XAM970 and WFC-603 coming in and out of
the refilling plant located at the aforementioned address contained multi-brand LPG
cylinders including [Gasul and] Shellane. x x x.
 4. 7.[That] on 13 February 2003, I conducted a test-buy accompanied by Mr. Bernabe C.
Alajar. After asking the purpose of our visit, MASAGANA’s guard allowed us to enter
the MASAGANA refilling plant to purchase GASUL and SHELLANE LPGs. x x x. We
were issued an order slip which we presented to the cashier’s office located near the
refilling station. After paying the amount x x x covering the cost of the cylinders and their
contents, they were issued Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated February 13, 2003. We were,
thereafter, assisted by the plant attendant in choosing empty GASUL and SHELLANE 11
kg. cylinders, x x x were brought to the refilling station [and filled in their presence.] I
noticed that no valve seals were placed on the cylinders.

[That] while inside the refilling plant doing the test-buy, I noticed that stockpiles of multi-branded
cylinders including GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders were stored near the refilling station. I
also noticed that the total land area of the refilling plant is about 7,000 to 10,000 square meters.
At the corner right side of the compound immediately upon entering the gate is a covered area
where the maintenance of the cylinders is taking place. Located at the back right corner of the
compound are two storage tanks while at the left side also at the corner portion is another storage
tank. Several meters and fronting the said storage tank is where the refilling station and the office
are located. It is also in this storage tank where the elevated blue water tank depicting
MASAGANA CORP. is located.
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116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
About eleven (11) refilling pumps and stock piles of multi-branded cylinders including Shellane
and GASUL are stored in the refilling station. At the left side of the entrance gate is the guard
house with small door for the pedestrians and at the right is a blue steel gate used for incoming
and outgoing vehicles.
8. [That] on 27 February 2003, I conducted another test-buy accompanied by Mr. Bernabe C.
Alajar. x x x After choosing the cylinders, we were issued an order slip which we presented to the
cashier. Upon payment, Cash Invoice No. 56398 was issued covering the cost of both GASUL
and SHELLANE LPG cylinders and their contents. x x x Both cylinders were refilled in our
presence and no valve seals were placed on the cylinders.”
Copies of the photographs of the delivery trucks, LPG cylinders and registration papers were also
attached to the aforementioned affidavits.10
Bernabe C. Alajar (Alajar), owner of Able Research and Consulting Services Inc., was hired
by Petron and Pilipinas Shell to assist them in carrying out their Brand Protection Program. Alajar
accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance of and test-buys at the refilling plant of
MASAGANA. He also executed two separate affidavits corroborating the statements of Oblanca.
These were annexed to the two applications for search warrant.11
After conducting the preliminary examination on Oblanca and Alajar, and upon reviewing
their sworn affidavits and other attached documents, Judge Melchor Q.C. Sadang (Judge Sadang),
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, found probable cause and correspondingly
issued Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003.12 The search warrants commanded any peace
officer to make an immediate search of the MASAGANA compound and to seize the following
items:
_______________
 10
Records, pp. 45-58.
11
Rollo, pp. 58-60 and 67-69.
12
Id., at pp. 70-73.
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VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 117
Yao, Sr. vs. People
Under Search Warrant No. 2-2003:

1. a.Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing the tradename “SHELLANE,”

“SHELL” (Device) of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and
other devices owned by Shell International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
2. b.Machinery and/or equipment being used or intended to be used for the purpose of
illegally refilling LPG cylinders belonging to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
bearing the latter’s trade-name as well as the marks belonging to Shell International
Petroleum Company, Ltd., enumerated hereunder:

1. 1.Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;

2. 2.Compressor/s (for pneumatic refilling system);
3. 3.LPG hydraulic pump/s;
4. 4.LPG refilling heads/hoses and appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
5. 5.LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and handles and levers;
6. 6.LPG weighing scales; and
7. 7.Seals simulating the shell trademark.

1. c.Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts, purchase orders, and all other books of
accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to the production, sale and/or distribution
of the aforesaid goods/products.
2. d.Delivery truck bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks,
and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or intended to be used
for the purpose of selling and/or distributing the above-mentioned counterfeit products.

Under Search Warrant No. 3-2003:

1. a.Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing Petron Corporation’s (Petron)

tradename and its tradename “GASUL” and other devices owned and/or used exclusively
by Petron;
2. b.Machinery and/or equipment being used or intended to be used for the purpose of
illegally refilling LPG cylinders belonging to Petron enumerated hereunder;

1. 1.Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;

2. 2.Compressor/s (for pneumatic filling system);

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118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
 1. 3.LPG hydraulic pump/s;
2. 4.LPG filling heads/hoses and appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
3. 5.LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and handles levers;
4. 6.LPG weighing scales; and
5. 7.Seals bearing the Petron mark;

1. c.Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts, purchase orders, and all other books of
accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to the production, sale and/or distribution
of the aforesaid goods/products; and
2. d.Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612 and WFC-603, hauling trucks,
and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used for the purpose of
selling and/or distributing the above-mentioned counterfeit products.”

Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Oblanca and several NBI operatives immediately
proceeded to the MASAGANA compound and served the search warrants on petitioners.13 After
searching the premises of MASAGANA, the following articles described in Search Warrant No.
2-2003 were seized:

1. “a.Thirty-eight (38) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
2. b.Thirty-nine (39) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
3. c.Eight (8) filled 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell International
Petroleum Company, Ltd.;

_______________
13
Id., at pp. 74-77.
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VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 119
Yao, Sr. vs. People

1. d.Three (3) empty 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
2. e.One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system.”

Pursuant to Search Warrant No. 3-2003, the following articles were also seized:

1. “a.Six (6) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders without seal, bearing Petron’s tradename and its
trademark “GASUL” and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
2. b.Sixty-three (63) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petron’s tradename and its
trademark “GASUL” and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
 3. c.Seven (7) tampered 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petron’s tradename and its trademark
“GASUL” and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
4. d.Five (5) tampered 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petron’s tradename and its trademark
“GASUL” and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron with tampered
“GASUL” logo;
5. e.One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system; and
6. f.One (1) set of LPG refilling machine.”

On 22 April 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003
and No. 3-200314 on the following grounds:

1. “1.There is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant and the conditions for
the issuance of a search warrant were not complied with;
2. 2.Applicant NBI Agent Ritchie N. Oblanca and his witness Bernabe C. Alajar do not have
any authority to apply for a search warrant. Furthermore, they committed perjury when
they alleged in their sworn statements that they conducted a test-buy on two occasions;

_______________
14
Id., at pp. 78-89.
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120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People

1. 3.The place to be searched was not specified in the Search Warrant as the place has an area
of 10,000 square meters (one hectare) more or less, for which reason the place to be
searched must be indicated with particularity;
2. 4.The search warrant is characterized as a general warrant as the items to be seized as
mentioned in the search warrant are being used in the conduct of the lawful business of
respondents and the same are not being used in refilling Shellane and Gasul LPGs.”

On 30 April 2003, MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion for the
Return of Motor Com-pressor and LPG Refilling Machine.15 It claimed that it is the owner of the
said motor compressor and LPG refilling machine; that these items were used in the operation of
its legitimate business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its business interests.
On 5 June 2003, the RTC issued two Orders, one of which denied the petitioners’ Motion to
Quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003, and the other one also denied the Motion for
the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine of MASAGANA, for lack of
merit.16
With respect to the Order denying the petitioners’ motion to quash Search Warrants No. 2-
2003 and No. 3-2003, the RTC held that based on the testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar, as well
as the documentary evidence consisting of receipts, photographs, intellectual property and
corporate registration papers, there is probable cause to believe that petitioners are engaged in the
business of refilling or using cylinders which bear the trademarks or devices of Petron and
Pilipinas Shell in the place sought to be searched and that such activity is probably in violation of
Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293.
 It also ruled that Oblanca and Alajar had personal knowledge of the acts complained of since
they were the ones who
_______________
15
Id., at pp. 97-99.
16
Id., at pp. 105-110.
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VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 121
Yao, Sr. vs. People
monitored the activities of and conducted test-buys on MASAGANA; that the search warrants in
question are not gen-eral warrants because the compound searched are solely used and occupied
by MASAGANA, and as such, there was no need to particularize the areas within the compound
that would be searched; and that the items to be seized in the subject search warrants were
sufficiently described with particularity as the same was limited to cylinder tanks bearing the
trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE.
As regards the Order denying the motion of MASAGANA for the return of its motor
compressor and LPG refilling machine, the RTC resolved that MASAGANA cannot be
considered a third party claimant whose rights were violated as a result of the seizure since the
evidence disclosed that petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA and that they conduct their
business through the same juridical entity. It maintained that to rule otherwise would result in the
misapplication and debasement of the veil of corporate fiction. It also stated that the veil of
corporate fiction cannot be used as a refuge from liability.
Further, the RTC ratiocinated that ownership by another person or entity of the seized items is
not a ground to order its return; that in seizures pursuant to a search warrant, what is important is
that the seized items were used or intended to be used as means of committing the offense
complained of; that by its very nature, the properties sought to be returned in the instant case
appear to be related to and intended for the illegal activity for which the search warrants were
applied for; and that the items seized are instruments of an offense.
Petitioners filed Motions for Reconsideration of the assailed Orders,17 but these were denied
by the RTC in its Order dated 21 July 2003 for lack of compelling reasons.18
_______________
17
Records, pp. 223-233.
18
Rollo, p. 112.
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122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
Subsequently, petitioners appealed the two Orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals via a
special civil action for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.19 On 30 September 2004,
the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the Orders of the RTC.20 It adopted in
essence the bases and reasons of the RTC in its two Orders. The decretal portion thereof reads:
“Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to disturb the assailed Orders of the
respondent judge. Grave abuse of discretion has not been proven to exist in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders both
dated June 5, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.”
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, but this
was denied in its Resolution dated 1 June 2005 for lack of merit.22
Petitioners filed the instant petition on the following grounds:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESIDING

JUDGE OF RTC CAVITE CITY HAD SUFFICIENT BASIS IN DECLARING THE
EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NBI AGENT

(RITCHIE OBLANCA) CAN APPLY FOR THE SEARCH WARRANTS
NOTHWITHSTANDING HIS LACK OF AUTHORITY;
_______________
19
Id., at pp. 113-131.
20
Id., at pp. 30-45.
21
Id., at pp. 132-139.
22
Id., at pp. 48-49.
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VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 123
Yao, Sr. vs. People
III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

REQUIREMENT OF GIVING A PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE
SEARCHED WAS COMPLIED WITH;

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

APPLICATIONS AND THE SEARCH WARRANTS THEMSELVES SHOW NO
AMBIGUITY OF THE ITEMS TO BE SEIZED;

V.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

COMPLAINT IS DIRECTED AGAINST MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION, ACTING
THROUGH ITS OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, HENCE MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION
MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AS THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT WHOSE RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE SEIZURE.23
Apropos the first issue, petitioners allege that Oblanca and Alajar had no personal knowledge of
the matters on which they testified; that Oblanca and Alajar lied to Judge Sadang when they
stated under oath that they were the ones who conducted the test-buys on two different occasions;
that the truth of the matter is that Oblanca and Alajar never made the purchases personally; that
the transactions were undertaken by other persons namely, Nikko Javier and G. Villanueva as
shown in the Entry/Exit Slips of MASAGANA; and that even if it were true that Oblanca and
Alajar asked Nikko Javier and G. Villanueva to conduct the test-buys, the information relayed by
the latter two to the former was mere hearsay. 24
Petitioners also contend that if Oblanca and Alajar had indeed used different names in
purchasing the LPG cylinders, they should have mentioned it in their applications for search
_______________
23
Id., at p. 17.
24
Id., at p. 18.
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124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
warrants and in their testimonies during the preliminary examination; that it was only after the
petitioners had submitted to the RTC the entry/exit slips showing different personalities who
made the purchases that Oblanca and Alajar explained that they had to use different names in
order to avoid detection; that Alajar is not connected with either of the private respondents; that
Alajar was not in a position to inform the RTC as to the distinguishing trademarks of
SHELLANE and GASUL; that Oblanca was not also competent to testify on the marks allegedly
infringed by petitioners; that Judge Sadang failed to ask probing questions on the distinguishing
marks of SHELLANE and GASUL; that the findings of the Brand Protection Committee of
Pilipinas Shell were not submitted nor presented to the RTC; that although Judge Sadang
examined Oblanca and Alajar, the former did not ask exhaustive questions; and that the questions
Judge Sadang asked were merely rehash of the contents of the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar.25
These contentions are devoid of merit.
Article III, Section 2, of the present Constitution states the requirements before a search
warrant may be validly issued, to wit:
“Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (emphasis supplied).”
_______________
25
Id., at pp. 19-21.
125
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 125
Yao, Sr. vs. People
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides with more
particularity the requisites in issuing a search warrant, viz.:
“SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.”
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant means such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.26
The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or information
personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present.27The applicant or his
witnesses must have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense being complained of. “Reliable information” is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not
enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.28
Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting trademark infringement,
thus:
_______________
26
Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 218 Phil. 754, 767; 133
SCRA 800, 813 (1984).
27
Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. v. Español, G.R. No. 156804, 14 March 2005, 453
SCRA 360, 371.
28
Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, 13 September 2004, 438 SCRA
224, 235.
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126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
“SEC. 155. Remedies; Infringement.—Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of
the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory
steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant
feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce
upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts
stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual
sale of goods or services using the infringing material.”
As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered
trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which
is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be considered
as trademark infringement.
In his sworn affidavits,29 Oblanca stated that before conducting an investigation on the alleged
illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the certificates of trademark registrations issued
by the Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell; that he
confirmed from Petron and Pilipinas Shell that MASAGANA is not authorized to sell, use, refill
or distribute GASUL and SHELLANE
_______________
29
Records, pp. 4-83.
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VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 127
Yao, Sr. vs. People
LPG cylinder containers; that he and Alajar monitored the activities of MASAGANA in its
refilling plant station located within its compound at Governor’s Drive, Barangay Lapidario,
Trece Martires, Cavite City; that, using different names, they conducted two test-buys therein
where they purchased LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE; that the
said GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders were refilled in their presence by the MASAGANA
employees; that while they were inside the MASAGANA compound, he noticed stock piles of
multi-branded cylinders including GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that they
observed delivery trucks loaded with GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders coming in and out
of the MASAGANA compound and making deliveries to various retail outlets. These allegations
were corroborated by Alajar in his separate affidavits.
In support of the foregoing statements, Oblanca also submitted the following documentary and
object evidence:

1. “1.Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 44046 for “SHELL
(DEVICE)” in the name of Shell International;
2. 2.Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 41789 for “SHELL (DEVICE)’
in the name of Shell International;
3. 3.Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 37525 for “SHELL (DEVICE)
in the name of Shell International;
4. 4.Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. R-2813 for “SHELL” in the
name of Shell International;
5. 5.Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 31443 for “SHELLANE” in the
name of Shell International;
6. 6.Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 57945 for the mark “GASUL”
in the name of Petron;
7. 7.Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. C-147 for “GASUL
CYLINDER CONTAINING LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS” in the name of Petron;
8. 8.Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 61920 for the mark “GASUL
AND DEVICE” in the name of Petron;

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128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People

1. 9.Certified true copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Masagana;

2. 10.Certified true copy of the By-laws of Masagana;
3. 11.Certified true copy of the latest General Information Sheet of Masagana on file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission;
 4. 12.Pictures of delivery trucks coming in and out of Masagana while it delivered Gasul and
Shellane LPG;
5. 13.Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated 13 February 2003 issued by Masagana for the Gasul and
Shellane LPG purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;
6. 14.Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPG’s covered by Cash Invoice No. 56210
purchased from Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;
7. 15.Cash Invoice No. 56398 dated 27 February 2003 issued by Masagana for the Gasul and
Shellane LPG purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar; and
8. 16.Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPG’s covered by Cash Invoice No. 56398
purchased from Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar.”30

Extant from the foregoing testimonial, documentary and object evidence is that Oblanca and
Alajar have personal knowledge of the fact that petitioners, through MASAGANA, have been
using the LPG cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and SHELLANE without permission from
Petron and Pilipinas Shell, a probable cause for trademark infringement. Both Oblanca and Alajar
were clear and insistent that they were the very same persons who monitored the activities of
MASAGANA; that they conducted test-buys thereon; and that in order to avoid suspicion, they
used different names during the test-buys. They also personally witnessed the refilling of LPG
cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and SHELLANE inside the MASAGANA refilling plant
station and the deliver-
_______________
30
Records, pp. 46-83.
129
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 129
Yao, Sr. vs. People
ies of these refilled containers to some outlets using minitrucks.
Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish probable cause. It
should be borne in mind that the determination of probable cause does not call for the application
of the rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
As the term implies, “probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial.31
The fact that Oblanca and Alajar used different names in the purchase receipts do not negate
personal knowledge on their part. It is a common practice of the law enforcers such as NBI agents
during covert investigations to use different names in order to conceal their true identities. This is
reasonable and understandable so as not to endanger the life of the undercover agents and to
facilitate the lawful arrest or apprehension of suspected violators of the law.
Petitioners’ contention that Oblanca and Alajar should have mentioned the fact that they used
different names in their respective affidavits and during the preliminary examination is puerile.
The argument is too vacuous to merit serious consideration. There is nothing in the provisions of
law concerning the issuance of a search warrant which directly or indirectly mandates that the
applicant of the search warrant or his witnesses should state in their affidavits the fact that they
used different names while conducting undercover investigations, or to divulge such fact during
the preliminary examination. In the light of other more material facts which needed to be
established for a finding of probable cause, it is not difficult to believe that Oblanca and Alajar
failed to men-
_______________
31
People v. Choi, G.R. No. 152950, 3 August 2006, 497 SCRA 547, 556.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
tion that they used aliases in entering the MASAGANA compound due to mere oversight.
It cannot be gainfully said that Oblanca and Alajar are not competent to testify on the
trademarks infringed by the petitioners. As earlier discussed, Oblanca declared under oath that
before conducting an investigation on the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed
the certificates of trademark registrations issued by the Philippine Intellectual Property Office in
favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. These certifications of trademark registrations were attached
by Oblanca in his applications for the search warrants. Alajar, on the other hand, works as a
private investigator and, in fact, owns a private investigation and research/consultation firm. His
firm was hired and authorized, pursuant to the Brand Protection Program of Petron and Pilipinas
Shell, to verify reports that MASAGANA is involved in the illegal sale and refill of GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders.32 As part of the job, he studied and familiarized himself with the
registered trademarks of GASUL and SHELLANE, and the distinct features of the LPG cylinders
bearing the same trademarks before conducting surveillance and test-buys on MA-
SAGANA.33 He also submitted to Oblanca several copies of the same registered trademark
registrations and accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance and test-buys.
As to whether the form and manner of questioning made by Judge Sadang complies with the
requirements of law, Section 5 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
prescribes the rules in the examination of the complainant and his witnesses when applying for
search warrant, to wit:
“SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record.—The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
_______________
32
Rollo,pp. 55-57 and 64-66.
33
Id.
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VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 131
Yao, Sr. vs. People
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted.”
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the
discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should
conduct his investigation, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive,
not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma. The judge must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification
of the application.34
 After perusing the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the preliminary examination, we found
the questions of Judge Sadang to be sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and
perfunctory.35 The testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar were consistent with each other and their
narration of facts was credible. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:
“This Court is likewise not convinced that respondent Judge failed to ask probing questions in his
determination of the existence of probable cause. This Court has thoroughly examined the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken during the investigation conducted by the respondent
Judge and found that respondent Judge lengthily inquired into the circumstances of the case. For
instance, he required the NBI agent to confirm the contents of his affidavit, inquired as to where
the “test-buys” were conducted and by whom, verified whether PSPC and PETRON have
registered trademarks or tradenames, required the NBI witness to explain how the “test-buys”
were conducted and to describe the LPG cylinders purchased from Masagana Gas Corporation,
inquired why the applications for Search Warrant were filed in Cavite City considering that
Masagana Gas Corporation was located in Trece Martires, Cavite, inquired whether the NBI
Agent has a sketch of the place and if there was any distinguishing sign to identify the place to be
searched, and
_______________
34
Supra note 31 at pp. 555-556.
35
Records, pp. 91-129.
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
inquired about their alleged tailing and monitoring of the delivery trucks. x x x.”36
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who
conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his
witnesses, the findings of the judge deserves great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such
findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear
dictates of reason.37 We find no compelling reason to disturb Judge Sadang’s findings herein.
Anent the second issue, petitioners argue that Judge Sadang failed to require Oblanca to show
his authority to apply for search warrants; that Oblanca is a member of the AntiOrganized Crime
and not that of the Intellectual Property Division of the NBI; that all complaints for infringement
should be investigated by the Intellectual Property Division of the NBI; that it is highly irregular
that an agent not assigned to the Intellectual Property Division would apply for a search warrant
and without authority from the NBI Director; that the alleged letter-complaint of Atty. Bienvenido
Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco Law Office was not produced in court; that Judge Sadang
did not require Oblanca to produce the alleged letter-complaint which is material and relevant to
the determination of the existence of probable cause; and that Petron and Pilipinas Shell, being
two different corporations, should have issued a board resolution authorizing the Villaraza and
Angangco Law Office to apply for search warrant in their behalf.38
We reject these protestations.
The authority of Oblanca to apply for the search warrants in question is clearly discussed and
explained in his affidavit, viz.:
_______________
36
Rollo, p. 41.
 37
Supra note 31 at p. 559.
38
Rollo, pp. 21-22.
133
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 133
Yao, Sr. vs. People
“[That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received a letter-
complaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on behalf of among
others, Petron Corporation (PETRON) [and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), the
authorized representative of Shell International Petroleum Company Limited (SHELL
INTERNATIONAL)] requesting assistance in the investigation and, if warranted, apprehension
and prosecution of certain persons and/or establishments suspected of violating the intellectual
property rights of PETRON [and of PSPC and Shell International.]
11. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was
assigned as the NBI agent on the case.”39
The fact that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime Division and not that of the
Intellectual Property Division does not abrogate his authority to apply for search warrant. As
aptly stated by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the provisions on search
warrant under Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which specifically
commands that the applicant law enforcer must be a member of a division that is assigned or
related to the subject crime or offense before the application for search warrant may be acted
upon. The petitioners did not also cite any law, rule or regulation mandating such requirement. At
most, petitioners may only be referring to the administrative organization and/or internal rule or
practice of the NBI. However, not only did petitioners failed to establish the existence thereof, but
they also did not prove that such administrative organization and/or internal rule or practice are
inviolable.
Neither is the presentation of the letter-complaint of Atty. Somera and board resolutions from
Petron and Pilipinas Shell required or necessary in determining probable cause. As heretofore
discussed, the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish probable cause. It can also be presumed
_______________
39
Records, p. 3.
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
that Oblanca, as an NBI agent, is a public officer who had regularly performed his official
duty.40 He would not have initiated an investigation on MASAGANA without a proper complaint.
Furthermore, Atty. Somera did not step up to deny his letter-complaint.
Regarding the third issue, petitioners posit that the applications for search warrants of Oblanca
did not specify the particular area to be searched, hence, giving the raiding team wide latitude in
determining what areas they can search. They aver that the search warrants were general warrants,
and are therefore violative of the Constitution. Petitioners also assert that since the MASAGANA
compound is about 10,000.00 square meters with several structures erected on the lot, the search
warrants should have defined the areas to be searched.
The longstanding rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the
locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.41
Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officer’s prior knowledge
as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where
the
_______________
40
Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 131, Section 3. Disputable presumptions.—The following
presumptions are satisfactory if un-contradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
41
Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 397 Phil. 892, 907-908; 344 SCRA 36, 53 (2000).
135
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 135
Yao, Sr. vs. People
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been issued, and when he
knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit.42
The search warrants in question commanded any peace officer to make an immediate search
on MASAGANA compound located at Governor’s Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Mar-tires,
Cavite City. It appears that the raiding team had ascertained and reached MASAGANA
compound without difficulty since MASAGANA does not have any other offices/plants in Trece
Martires, Cavite City. Moreover, Oblanca, who was with the raiding team, was already familiar
with the MASAGANA compound as he and Alajar had monitored and conducted test-buys
thereat.
Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was no need to
particularize the areas to be searched because, as correctly stated by Petron and Pilipinas Shell,
these structures constitute the essential and necessary components of the petitioners’ business and
cannot be treated separately as they form part of one entire compound. The compound is owned
and used solely by MASAGANA. What the case law merely requires is that, the place to be
searched can be distinguished in relation to the other places in the community. Indubitably, this
requisite was complied with in the instant case.
As to the fourth issue, petitioners asseverate that the search warrants did not indicate with
particularity the items to be seized since the search warrants merely described the items to be
seized as LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE without specifying
their sizes.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which
_______________
42
Supra note 26 at p. 765.
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Yao, Sr. vs. People
the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described
are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.43
While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described
therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be
specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The law does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt
on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are
looking for. Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so
invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those
described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or specie
would suffice.44
Measured against this standard, we find that the items to be seized under the search warrants in
question were sufficiently described with particularity. The articles to be confiscated were
restricted to the following: (1) LPG cylinders bear-ing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE;
(2) Machines and equipments used or intended to be used in the illegal refilling of GASUL and
SHELLANE cylinders. These machines were also specifically enumerated and listed in the search
warrants; (3) Documents which pertain only to the production, sale and distribution of the
GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and (4) Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527,
XAM-970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances
being
_______________
43
Bache & Co. (Phils.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 148 Phil. 794, 811; 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971).
44
Al-Ghoul v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 759, 770; 364 SCRA 363, 372 (2001).
137
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 137
Yao, Sr. vs. People
used or intended to be used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders.45
Additionally, since the described items are clearly limited only to those which bear direct
relation to the offense, i.e., violation of section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293, for which the
warrant was issued, the requirement of particularity of description is satisfied.
Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.
Finally, petitioners claim that MASAGANA has the right to intervene and to move for the
return of the seized items; that the items seized by the raiding team were being used in the
legitimate business of MASAGANA; had no right to seize them under the guise that the same
were being used in refilling GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that there being no
action for infringement filed against them and/or MASAGANA from the seizure that the raiding
team of the items up to the present, it is only fair that the seized articles be returned to the lawful
owner in accordance with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC.
It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an entity
separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers. However, when the notion of
legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the
law will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in the case of two corporations
merge them into one.46 In other words, the law will not recognize the separate corporate existence
if the corporation is being used pursuant to the foregoing unlawful objectives. This non-
recognition is sometimes
_______________
45
Records, pp. 45-58.
46
Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals and Collector of Internal Revenue, 110
Phil. 751, 756-757; 1 SCRA 160, 165 (1961).
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yao, Sr. vs. People
referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity or disregarding the fiction of
corporate entity. Where the separate corporate entity is disregarded, the corporation will be
treated merely as an association of persons and the stockholders or members will be considered as
the corporation, that is, liability will attach personally or directly to the officers and
stockholders.47
As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of MASAGANA, are utilizing the latter
in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus, petitioners
collectively and MASAGANA should be considered as one and the same person for liability
purposes. Consequently, MASAGANA’s third party claim serves no refuge for petitioners.
Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA from that of the
petitioners, the effect will be the same. The law does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is
directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.48 Hence, even if, as
petitioners claimed, the properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a separate entity, their
seizure pursuant to the search warrants is still valid.
Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor, LPG refilling machine and the GASUL and
SHELL LPG cylinders seized were the corpus delicti, the body or substance of the crime, or the
evidence of the commission of trademark infringement. These were the very instruments used or
intended to be used by the petitioners in trademark infringement. It is possible that, if returned to
MASAGANA, these items will be used again in violating the intellectual property
_______________
47
Umali v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89561, 13 September 1990, 189 SCRA 529, 542.
48
Supra note 26 at p. 766; p. 812.
139
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 139
Yao, Sr. vs. People
rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell.49 Thus, the RTC was justified in denying the petitioners’
motion for their return so as to prevent the petitioners and/or MASAGANA from using them
again in trademark infringement.
Petitioners’ reliance on Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC,50 is not tenable. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, A.M. 02-1-06-SC is not applicable in the present case because
it governs only searches and seizures in civil actions for infringement of intellectual property
rights.51 The offense complained of herein is for criminal violation of Section 155 in relation to
Section 17052 of Republic Act No. 8293.
_______________
49
Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141, 148 (1940).
50
RE:PROPOSED RULEONSEARCH AND SEIZURE INCVIL ACTIONS
FORINFRINGEMENT OFINTELLECTUALPROPERTYRIGHTS.Section 20.—Failure to file
complaint.—The writ shall also, upon motion of the expected adverse party, be set aside and the
seized documents and articles returned to the expected adverse party if no case is filed with the
appropriate court or authority within thirty-one (31) calendar days from the date of the issuance of
the writ.
51
RE:PROPOSED RULEONSEARCH ANDSEIZURE INCVIL ACTIONS FOR
INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS. Section 1. Coverage.—This
Rule shall govern the provisional seizure and impounding of documents and articles in pending
and intended civil actions for the purpose of preventing infringement and preserving relevant
evidence in regard to [the] alleged infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known
as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, Article 50 of the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, otherwise known as TRIPS and other related laws and
international conventions (emphasis supplied).
52
Republic Act No. 8293, Section 170. Penalties.—Independent of the civil and administrative
sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years
and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts
mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189, Revised Penal
Code.) (Emphasis supplied.)
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manaya vs. Alabang Country Club, Incorporated
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79256, dated 30 September 2004 and 1 June 2005, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.