CASE1

TAÑADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET. AL.

FACTS:
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party (NP) elected respondents Cuenco &
Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (ET) upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP
member. The two seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the
Constitutional mandate under Sec. 2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party (CP) Senator Tañada.

Petitioner alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the
Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET are reserved for minority senators duly nominated
by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No.
4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Tañada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent
Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of
preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made permanent after a judgment
to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the
appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is
without cause of action since Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They
contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.

ISSUES:

1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter and WON Cuenco and Delgado are lawful members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.

HELD: With regard to the first issue, the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the foregoing issue. The Court
said that political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. In other words, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.

In the foregoing issue, the Court is to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by
the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias,a member and
spokesman of the party, having the largest number of votes in the Senate, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party
having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political
question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Such power is however subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate jurisdiction of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity of the proceedings in connection therewith.

Now on the second issue, the Court finds that Cuenco and Delgado have not been duly elected
Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal since their appointment was not in conformity of the mandates of
the Constitution. Hence, they are not entitled to act as Members of the ET.
Case 3
63 PHIL 143
FACTS: 

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Angara and the respondents were candidates for the position of
members of the National Assembly for the First District of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and shortly thereafter, he took his
oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file
election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua, one of the respondents, filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against Angara and prayed, among other things, that Ynsua be declared elected Member
of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted a resolution stating that the last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. 

Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission SOLELY
as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and excludes from said jurisdiction the
power to regulate the proceedings of said election protest and that the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case. 

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy and Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted beyond its jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of the protest filed.

RULING:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. In case of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional body which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof. It should be
noted however that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments. What it is upholding is not its supremacy but the supremacy of the
Constitution.

Moreover, the Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance of the function assigned to it by the Constitution. The grant of power to the Electoral
Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly carries with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed.

Hence, the Supreme Court can only intervene for purposes of allocating the constitutional boundaries
separating the powers of the Electoral Commission and the National Assembly and that the Electoral
Commission acted within its jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the electoral protest filed by the
respondent.
Case 5
Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national referendum,
which will be under the exclusive supervision and control of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on 16
October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays"). Twenty day after, he issued P.D. 1031 which provided
for the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in barangays.
On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, filed a petition for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the
referendum; to declare without force and effect P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033, which stated the questions to be
submitted to the people, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as P.D. 1031,
insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum. They contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no such grant to the President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. Consequently, the referendum has no constitutional
or legal basis. The Solicitor General contended that the issue raised is political in nature and therefore, is
beyond the judicial cognizance of the Court. He furthered that at this stage of the transition period, only the
incumbent president has the authority to exercise constituent power and that the referendum is a step
towards normalization.
Issue: Whether or not the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution and
whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.

Held: The Court ruled that political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not with the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of
the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether, therefore, the constitutional
provision has been followed or not is a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves but by the
Supreme Court, who is vested with judicial power.

However, the petition was dismissed as the Court finds that the President possesses power to propose
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the
ratification of his proposals by the people.
Case 6: Tañada v. Angara

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators
via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are
the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market”
espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for
granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held: In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our
own laws.

What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or
viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction
over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said
international body. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows
withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not
economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free
choice.

Therefore, the Court dismissed the instant petition.

On September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines
under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Constitutional Convention approved its Proposed Constitution.
The next day, the President of the Philippines issued PD No. 73, which submitted the proposed Constitution
for ratification by the people.

Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, et. al, to enjoin said respondents or
their agents from implementing PD No. 73, contending that said Presidential Decree has no force and effect as
law because the calling of such plebiscite is, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress and that there
is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed, there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.

While the case was being heard on January 17, 1973, President Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1102
which announces the ratification of the proposed Constitution by an overwhelming majority vote of the
people. Javellana assailed the validity of said Proclamation and filed a case to restrain respondents from
implementing any provision of the proposed Constitution not found in the present Constitution, alleging,
among others, that the President has acted in excess of its jurisdiction when he announced the immediate
implementation of the new Constitution.

The Issue:
Whether or not the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or in
other words, is the issue a justiciable or a political question and whether or not the proposed Constitution has
been validly ratified.

Ruling:
The Court declared that the petition is a justiciable one. Inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by
the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an
approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in
negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935
Constitution been complied with.

On the second question of validity of the ratification, the Court also held that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance
with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

HOWEVER, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Case 14: Lansang V. Garcia

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, while Liberal Party was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda,
Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 1971, two hand
grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were
killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of
habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political
power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a
warrant. 

Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a)
that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government
was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-
August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension,
because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are
too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may
inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court
resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues: 

Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon
the courts and upon all other persons. 

Held:  The courts finds that the Proclamation No. 889 of the President is valid because the requisites for the
suspension of writ of habeas corpus are present, that there must be “invasion, insurrection or rebellion,
imminent danger thereof” and public safety must require said aforementioned suspension.

            The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President is justifiable due to the
acts of subversion and violence committed on the August 21, 1971, by lawless elements.

However, pursuant to the principle of the separation of power underlying our system of government,
the Executive is only supreme in his own sphere. The judiciary department has the authority to determine
whether or not the legislature or the executive had gone beyond their constitutional limits. Therefore, the
Supreme Court had the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual bases in the light of the
requirements of the constitution. The determination of the President of the existence of such bases was
neither absolute nor binding upon the courts.