White Et Al-2008-Management and Organization Review

Management and Organization Review 4:2 225–256
doi: 10.1111/j.1740-8784.2008.00107.x
Employment and Market Innovation in Chinese

Business Group Affiliated Firms: The Role of
Group Control Systems
Robert E. White1, Robert E. Hoskisson1,

Daphne W. Yiu2 and Garry D. Bruton3
1
Arizona State University, USA, 2Chinese University of Hong Kong, China, and 3Texas Christian
University, USA
ABSTRACT Prior research has suggested a number of potential benefits to firm

membership in business groups. These benefits include availability of capital and other
resources not readily accessible in an open market, the facilitation of entrepreneurship,
plus information and risk sharing advantages. We suggest that another important benefit
is the assistance of group control systems in helping the firm to manage conflicting
pressures in the institutional environment and facilitate coevolution of these conflicting
pressures. To empirically demonstrate the relevance of this viewpoint, we examine the
case of China where business groups facilitate institutional transition, actively balancing
market pressures to increase levels of innovativeness in firms with institutional pressures
emanating from the government to maintain high employment levels. Using data from
a broad sample of more than 1,000 Chinese affiliate firms in more than 200 business
groups, we find that government policy, ownership and managerial mindset influence
the political goal of maintaining high employment levels, while interdependence among
group affiliate firms is related to lower employment levels. However, while government
ownership and the government managerial mindset were negatively related to market
innovation activities, group financial and cultural control systems positively affected the
tendency of affiliate firms to focus on market innovation.
KEYWORDS business groups, China, control systems, innovation, institutional theory
INTRODUCTION
Business groups are collections of firms[1] bound by formal and informal ties
(Granovetter, 1994) that are often the dominant form of business organization
in emerging economies (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).
As the importance of these economies and their firms has increased in the global
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Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
226 R. E. White et al.
economy, so has the scholarly interest in business groups (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau,
& Wright, 2000). In spite of increased research on business groups, there are still
many unresolved questions about the role of business groups in these institutional
settings. One of the most salient of these questions is ‘the role business groups
play in economic development’ (Keister, 2000, p. 44). In one of the earliest
studies, Leff (1978) suggested that business groups allow firms to access resources
such as capital and skilled labour that would otherwise be difficult to obtain on
the open market due to conditions of market failure. Other scholars have focused
on the group as a transmitter of critical information, a facilitator of entrepre-
neurial activity, or a risk manager for affiliate firms (Guillén, 2000; Keister, 2000;
Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Leff, 1978, 1979). Because
of the active role of governments in emerging economies, researchers have also
suggested that the interplay between government, the business group, institu-
tional pressures and the response to such pressures is critical for understanding
the business group phenomenon (Fisman, 2001; Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998).
In this study, we propose that one of the most important roles of business groups
in such contexts may be to provide a micro-institutional setting where the affiliate
firms are partially protected from the undesirable effects of government sponsored
institutional changes. We further propose that groups help affiliate firms adapt to
the pressure through facilitating change in the cognitive maps of the key executives
on the one hand and, at times, resist such change on the other. We argue that this
cognitive change occurs primarily through group controls systems. Our conception
is both distinct from and complementary to existing institutional explanations
which couch the business group as an organizational mechanism useful in over-
coming institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000a; Leff, 1978, 1979). As
we explain below, we see business group control systems as being important in
assisting group affiliated firms to coevolve relative to the institutional pressures they
experience in their environment.
China presents a prime setting to gain a better understanding of these issues
since the emergence of the Chinese business groups is a direct result of China’s
Economic Reform, which has included a dedicated effort to transfer control of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the government to newly emerging business
groups known as qiye jituan (Keister, 1998). Chinese business groups face the
difficult task of balancing market demands with government policy demands as the
economy transitions from a planned economy to a more market based system. As
Child (2000, p. 56–57) states:
The macro question is whether the logics of efficiency and economic rationality
will guide Chinese enterprise reform, rather than embedded political and insti-
tutional norms. This conflict essentially comes down to how the concept of a
socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics is to be interpreted. At the
micro level, the question is whether the future direction of enterprise reform will
© 2008 The Authors
Employment and Market Innovation 227
reflect strategic and operational needs rather than a desire to retain political
control and placements.
In the marketplace, Chinese business groups must compete with increasing

numbers of technologically advanced foreign and domestic competitors, while in
the political arena they face pressure from the government to maintain high
employment levels so as to avoid substantial unemployment and possible social
unrest (Scott, 2002). Given this position, group affiliates face the challenge of
determining the extent to which they will adopt strategies focused on innovative-
ness or oriented toward maintaining employment level. Accordingly, in this study,
we examined how differences in factors of government influence affect these
potential pressures. Similarly, we examine how different organizational influences
– specifically, business group internal control mechanisms – induce group affiliates
to emphasize employment and market innovation[2] investments.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to
institutional theory by suggesting that business group control systems – including
strategic, financial and cultural controls – can play an important role in helping
affiliated firms to manage institutional pressures. Most of the literature suggests that
institutions influence the development of organizations in a somewhat deterministic
way (North, 1990). We suggest that organizations can be active agents in the change
process, helping shape institutional pressures in a coevolutionary fashion (Krug &
Hendrischke, 2008; Lewin & Volberda, 1999). Second, it builds on the work of
Keister (2002) and Mahmood and colleagues (Chang, Chung, & Mahmood, 2006;
Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004) in exploring factors affecting innovation in business
group affiliated firms. Using our institutional perspective, we claim that the business
group’s control systems foster incentives that facilitate either market innovation or
employment objectives. Additionally, the study contributes to the literature empiri-
cally. While there are a number of explanations for the role of the business group in
assisting affiliate firms (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002), as Keister notes, ‘very few
studies have provided adequate empirical evidence that such relationships exist’.
Much of the scholarly work on the economic effect of business groups is ‘speculative’
(Keister, 2000, p. 47). We tested our ideas using a broad sample of more than 1,000
Chinese affiliate firms in more than 200 business groups.
We begin by defining the business group and providing a brief overview of the
development of business groups in China. Then, we theorize that government
influence factors and organizational influence factors such as the intensity of group
control systems will have significant bearing on the tendency of group affiliated
firms to pursue strategies focused on increasing market innovation or maintaining
employment. This theoretical approach has strong relevance for Chinese public
policy-makers since the strategic outcomes of the large business groups we
examine, when taken in the aggregate, have the potential to influence the direction
of economic development in China.
© 2008 The Authors
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Leff (1978, p. 663) describes a business group as a collection of firms, ‘which

transacts in different markets but which does so under common entrepreneurial
and financial control’, and in which ‘[p]articipants are people linked by relations of
interpersonal trust, on the basis of a similar personal, ethnic, or communal back-
ground.’ In a similar vein, Khanna and Rivkin (2001, p. 47–48) speak of a business
group as a collection of firms which ‘are bound together by a constellation
of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action.’
According to China’s National Statistics Bureau, a business group is officially
defined as a group of legally independent entities that are partly or wholly owned
by a parent firm and are registered as affiliated firms of that parent firm (cf. Keister,
2000). The Chinese business group often involves cross-ownership among affiliate
firms, is frequently involved in several industries and is often spread across multiple
regions of the country.
The formation of business groups in China is a direct result of the Economic
Reform that began in 1979. The Chinese government’s objective has been to
develop a socialist market economy – a market based economy with capitalist
features and Chinese socialist characteristics simultaneously. In other words, the
country’s leadership has sought to make fundamental changes to China’s economic
structure without disturbing the country’s socialist political system (Scott, 2002).
Seeing that large firms are central to the fast growth of late industrializing econo-
mies, the Chinese government implemented a plan to reform large state-owned
enterprises into modern giant industrial corporations that could compete in the
global market. Beginning in the 1980s, China started to decentralize control of
many government businesses from government bureaus to nascent business groups
and began allowing firms to acquire ownership stakes in other ventures (Keister,
1998). This trend came into full bloom in the mid-1990s and continues today, with
Chinese officials making a conscious effort to emulate aspects of the chaebol of
Korea and the keiretsu of Japan (Keister, 2000; Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Hong,
2004; Nolan & Wang, 1999). The state’s active role in forming business groups is
partly due to a reform in China’s fiscal policy under which local governments
became the residual claimants in the flow of tax revenues and were similarly
responsible for local economic development (Oi, 1992; Walder, 1995a). As such,
business groups are a major source of local government revenue to support local
economic development and social welfare (Wong, 1992).
While changes in the Chinese economy contemporaneous with the birth of
Chinese business groups have provided greater leeway for group affiliated firms to
act in an entrepreneurial, market oriented manner, many of them still face pressure
from the government to maintain employment levels. As parts of the Chinese
bureaucracy have been pushing for growth, flexibility and better incentives for
producers (Zhang & Zhang, 1987), other (and sometimes the same) government
© 2008 The Authors
Government influence
Government employment
policy
Strategic objectives
Government ownership
Government managerial
mindset Firm employment
level
Organizational influence
Market innovation
Group control systems
•Strategic controls
•Financial controls
•Cultural controls
Group interdependence
Figure 1. Conceptual model
elements have had difficulty fully relaxing their control over business enterprises.
As Scott (2002, p. 75) reports:
The Chinese state is attempting to carve out a more autonomous arena to
support economic development. This is a daunting undertaking, given its size
and scope of influence, which penetrates every arena of social life. Making the
process more difficult is the desire of Chinese leaders to retain unchallenged
political control at the same time that they encourage economic autonomy and
the development of a free market. Whether these two goals are compatible
remains to be determined.
The crux of the issue for decision-makers in business groups is how to achieve
economic growth while maintaining employment levels that are viewed as neces-
sary for social stability. As illustrated in Figure 1, our theoretical model hypoth-
esizes that government influences and business group characteristics (i.e., group
control systems and group interdependence) affect the degree to which business
group affiliates pursue each of the two strategic objectives of market innovation and
maintaining employment.
We note that we envision the relationship between employment and market
innovation as a partial, rather than a complete, trade-off. In the long run, firm
innovation may drive higher firm employment levels. In the short term, however,
we expect that a scarcity of firm resources can lead to a trade-off between spending
on innovation and employment.
Conflicting Pressures during Institutional Transition:

Employment vs. Market Innovation
One of the fundamental goals of national governing coalitions is the maintenance of
political support (Shleifer, 1998). In democratic societies, this tendency often mani-
© 2008 The Authors
fests itself through policies that are aimed to gain electoral support through pleasing
the populace. In China, while there is no electorate, per se, the government
recognizes the importance of maintaining a level of contentedness in the population.
A critical element of both political stability and social welfare during an eco-
nomic transition is the maintenance of employment levels (Eden & Lenway, 2001).
In China, under socialist rule, state-owned firms have provided not just income to
employees, but other important ancillary services including housing, health care,
children’s schooling, retirement income and unemployment insurance (Keister,
2000; Steinfeld, 1998). Because state-owned enterprises have played such a signifi-
cant social welfare role, the Chinese government has built up political capital
among SOE employees over time. The loss of political goodwill and legitimacy
that would be caused by widespread layoffs makes the government hesitant to
shut down even very poorly performing enterprises (Brandt & Zhu, 2000). As noted
earlier, government desire for high employment also impacts private Chinese
firms, with those not complying risking the withholding of necessary government
controlled resources or permits. Thus, employment demands from political insti-
tutions have the potential to strongly influence firm strategy (Groves, Hong,
McMillan, & Naughton, 1994; Lenway & Murtha, 1994).
For example, D’Long International Strategic Investment, one of the largest
business groups in China, was recently referred to China Hurarong Asset Man-
agement Corporation, a state-run company set up to dispose of bad loans at banks.
China Huarong will oversee the reorganization of D’Long, which includes many
state-run enterprises and affiliate firms. The government’s decision to get involved
‘highlights [the central government’s] concern over the case’s potential impact on
financial – and possibly social – stability’ (Chen, Murphy, & Dolven, 2004).
Although there is concern about social stability, Chinese authorities are also
concerned about innovation and advancements stemming from market innovation
activity, which fuel future economic growth (Franko, 1989). Indeed, the difficulty of
innovating at a sufficient pace to fuel adequate economic growth has been blamed
as one of the key reasons for the breakdown of central planning in the Soviet Union
and other socialist economies (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003; Qian & Xu, 1998).
In China, economic reform has focused on improving innovation efforts as a
significant dimension of the transition from planned to market economy (Jefferson,
Rawski, & Zheng, 1997). In part, this is due to a central objective of developing large
industrial corporations as competitive as those in the developed economies. To
accomplish this policy objective, innovativeness is crucial and, as a result, is highly
valued in business groups. Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argued that in transition
economies, where weak institutions fail to support economic growth, a strong
central government can play a role in fostering growth. They further argued that
the Chinese central government was more fully in control of the reforms and thus
was able to create a better policy focus among central and local government entities
than was Russia, which had a more decentralized approach. Thus, while high
© 2008 The Authors
employment has been one major concern of Chinese government officials, another
important matter has been the need for innovativeness among Chinese firms.
In China, SOEs are widely recognized as at the technical frontier and as the
most innovative in their product lines (Jefferson, Rawski, & Zheng, 1994). Thus,
larger government owned firms are more likely to devote a significant portion of
their cash flow to innovation activities because of the slack available through looser
budgetary constraints. However, these firms are also likely to have lower produc-
tivity ratios due to higher employment levels. This view of innovativeness and
employment is consistent with a recent finding that small enterprises have better
labour productivity than large state-owned firms, but spend less on long-term firm
development such as innovation because they are subject to tighter budgetary
constraints (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005).
The above discussion suggests that there should be a positive relationship
between increases in market innovation investments and firm size as indicated by
employment levels. But the relationship in large Chinese enterprises may be more
complex than indicated above. The impact of the government on the business
group does not stop once the business group is formed but can continue to be quite
strong depending on government employment policy, who owns the business
group and who leads the business group. For example, one study of partially
privatized firms (those that have been through an IPO) reported that almost 28
percent of the affiliate companies’ CEOs were ‘politically connected’, meaning
they were currently politically affiliated with a government agency or were
ex-government bureaucrats (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007).
Another set of issues that make the relationship more complex is the fact that the
formation of business groups is also a corporatization programme that aims to
separate corporate management from government administration (i.e., govern-
ment officials who ran the bureaus and factories in the past). Thus, a second set of
factors that impact the relationships are those organizational influences that are
associated with corporations, including the group’s control systems and inter-
dependence among affiliate firms. North (1990, p. 5) suggests that organizations
can be ‘a major agent of institutional change’, although there is limited empirical
evidence regarding the impact of business groups’ organizational characteristics on
affiliate firms’ strategic behaviours in emerging economies (Keister, 2000). We
intend to shed more light on business groups’ organizational influences in this
coevolutionary process. The next section develops hypotheses on the effects of
government and organizational influences on employment and market innovation
in group affiliated firms.
Government Influence
Three ways in which the government affects group affiliated firms in the Chinese
context are through government employment policy, government ownership and
the managerial mindset of the group leadership.
© 2008 The Authors
Government policy. To uphold the socialist objectives of employment protection, the
government has instituted policies that are designed to promote higher employ-
ment levels in firms. Therefore, to win local government support for business
proposals, firms often establish a ‘no layoff’ policy (Clifford, 2003). Such govern-
ment policies encourage many firms to retain unneeded human assets and firms
may be subject to sanctions if they fail to maintain employment at a given level.
The expenditures on unnecessary or redundant human resources make it more
difficult for these firms to invest resources in market innovation activities. Firms in
transition economies already are characterized by low levels of slack resources
(Bruton & Rubanik, 2002). If available resources are expended on redundant
human resources, expenditures in other domains necessarily have to be curtailed.
Thus, as firms come under more pressure to conform to employment policies, it is
expected that, all other things being equal, employment levels will increase and
market innovation activity will decrease due to a lack of slack resources (Nohria &
Gulati, 1996).
Hypothesis 1a: Government influence via employment policies will be positively related to affiliate
firms’ employment levels.
Hypothesis 1b: Government influence via employment policies will be negatively related to
affiliate firms’ market innovation activity.
Government ownership. In large businesses owned and controlled by the state, the
government has the authority to hire and fire key managers and to grant or retain
key resources necessary for firm performance. Such government power would
encourage managers to conform to the wishes of governmental officials to maintain
high employment levels. Additionally, Shleifer (1998) notes that governments
throughout the world routinely transfer benefits to political supporters by mandat-
ing excess employment at state-controlled organizations. Thus, we expect that as
government ownership in Chinese firms increases, there will be a higher likelihood
that the firm will house economically unnecessary employees (Shleifer & Vishny,
1994). To illustrate the extent of such redundancy, the core firm of the Northeast
Electricity Group had 100,000 employees in the mid-1990s, of which, it was
estimated, only 25 percent were necessary for efficient operation (China Economic
Yearbook, 1996).
As firms employ larger numbers of redundant employees, they will be left with
lower discretionary fund levels to use on new product development. This shift of
funds can also be affected by soft budget constraints associated with government
ownership. Kornai (1979) defines a soft budget constraint as occurring when a firm
with chronic losses does not fail and go out of business due to intervention by a
supporting party (known as the ‘S-organization’). Such support can come directly
from the government or indirectly through loans from government controlled
© 2008 The Authors
lending institutions. Soft budget constraints, while less pronounced in recent years
(Child & Tse, 2001), continue to exist in China (Balfour, 2004).
Without soft budget constraints, the firm must ultimately please the market, or
it will not receive the resources needed to continue operations. However, when soft
budget constraints are present, the focus of management turns from the market
toward the government. Thus, the profit motive is attenuated, market price signals
are dulled and ‘rather than wooing customers, sellers concentrate more on winning
the favor of potential S-organizations’ (Kornai et al., 2003, p. 1,105). In such
a condition, the innovativeness of organizations understandably is decreased
(Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000).
Consistent with the expectations of Tsui and Lau (2002) that government owned
firms are less innovative than privately owned firms, we expect that firms with
significant government ownership will focus more on maintaining employment
than on increasing innovation. Even when larger firms have more resources
for innovation (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005), we argue that increasing government
ownership will slant those resources toward employment at the affiliate firm level.
Accordingly, we hypothesize.
Hypothesis 2a: Government influence via group ownership will be positively related to affiliate
firms’ employment levels.
Hypothesis 2b: Government influence via group ownership will be negatively related to affiliate
firms’ market innovation activity.
Government managerial mindset. Government affects business groups through the atti-
tudes and mindsets of former government employees. Prahalad and Bettis (1986,
p. 490) argued that firms exhibit a dominant general management logic which
consists of ‘the way in which managers conceptualize the business and make critical
resource allocation decisions – be it in technologies, product development, distribu-
tion, advertising, or in human resources management.’ Through employment and
training in socialist bureaucratic organizations, managers, to some extent, become
imprinted with the dominant logic of the organization (i.e., the state). However,
the management practices that dominate in the government context may be highly
inappropriate for the increasingly marketized and competitive Chinese economy. As
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) point out, mental maps developed through experience in
one business can be applied inappropriately in other businesses. In this case, it is
expected that business group managers who have been imprinted with the govern-
ment ‘logic’ may not push affiliate firms to meet the demands of an economy that
is moving toward a free market system. As Weick (1998, p. 551) points out, the
temptation for managers in such situations can be ‘to fall back on well-rehearsed
fragments to cope with current problems even though these problems don’t exactly
match those present at the time of the earlier rehearsal.’
© 2008 The Authors
In addition to the issue of dominant logic, Fan et al. (2007) pointed out that there
may be more direct incentives to maintain and increase employment levels for
more politically connected managers of Chinese SOEs. It is important for the
politically oriented manager to improve the employment rate because it helps build
the fiscal and social welfare of the region and builds political capital with other
politicians. Achieving these objectives may increase the politically connected man-
ager’s income and promotion opportunities, even if it dissipates the efficiency of the
enterprise in the long run.
Whether due to direct incentives, because of a tendency to fall back to the old
ways of doing things, or perhaps simply due to a lack of understanding of the
importance of market innovation related activities to provide a solid basis for future
firm growth, such managers may have a higher acceptance of the firm as welfare
mechanism and, thus, be more likely to keep redundant employees on the payroll.
At the same time, they are less likely to appreciate the importance of focusing on
innovation, favouring instead the legacy method of firm survival – reliance on the
government, rather than on the market (Kornai et al., 2003).
Hypothesis 3a: Government influence via government managerial mindset will be positively
related to affiliate firms’ employment levels.
Hypothesis 3b: Government influence via government managerial mindset will be negatively
related to affiliate firms’ market innovation activity.
We examine next two organizational characteristics of business groups that may

influence both employment and market innovation. These characteristics are
group control systems and interdependence as perceived by group affiliated firm
managers.
Organizational Influence
We focus on two means by which the business group can influence an affiliate
firm’s orientation and emphasis: its control system and the affiliate firms’ interde-
pendence with each other.
Business Groups’ Control Systems

Control systems are the means by which management controls and directs the
organization’s efforts. As such, control systems have an important influence on a
firm’s orientation toward different business outcomes (Hoskisson, Hill, & Kim,
1993). There are several important functions specifically impacted by an organi-
zation’s control system including the determination of strategic direction, co-
ordination of effort, motivation of employees and monitoring of performance
© 2008 The Authors
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Goold & Quinn, 1990; Hambrick & Snow, 1989).
The orientation of the firms implementing those control systems (Cardinal, Sitkin,
& Long, 2004) will determine the particular impact obtained. In China, the various
control system aspects are important because of the policy objective of corporati-
zation to help Chinese firms to be more competitive in world markets. In this
institutional environment, management must choose the extent to which the firm
will adopt a reactive or a proactive approach to the development of the market
economy. As a result, management will establish not only performance expecta-
tions, but also patterns of internal conduct, processes of gathering relevant external
information and other measures designed to increase the likelihood that the busi-
ness acts according to their expectations. Major categories of controls that may be
implemented include strategic, financial and cultural (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson,
1992; Ouchi, 1980). Thus, control systems become a major means by which
business groups manage the institutional pressures toward employment and market
innovation. These three types of control are examined below.
Strategic control. This involves the development of an understanding and agreement

by group and affiliate firm executives on each party’s respective strategic position-
ing. Such control can have an influence on affiliate firm managers in Chinese
business groups’ efforts to pursue market innovation. The pursuit of market inno-
vation, whether it is the development of new products or the opening of new
markets, involves a relatively high level of risk to the manager. This is particularly
true in the Chinese context where, during the era of Mao Zedong (the pre-reform
era), there was virtually no entrepreneurial activity taking place. The result is that,
today, there is no widespread model of entrepreneurial behaviour in the society to
encourage risk taking and, similarly, to help managers understand the role of
failure (Peng, 2000).
As Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) suggest, affiliate firm managers can be protected
from failure when there is an understanding and agreement between group and
affiliate firm managers on the firm’s strategic direction. Thus, an emphasis on
strategic control can encourage affiliate firm managers to undertake more risky
strategies such as market innovation because the risk is shared with group head-
quarters executives. As a result, it is expected that an emphasis on strategic control
would be associated with higher levels of affiliate firm market innovation. Strategic
control focused on firm performance would likewise reorient the mindsets of
managers, leading the firm to rationally reduce redundant employee levels to meet
market competitive success levels. Thus, we offer the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4a: Group level strategic control will be negatively related to affiliate firms’ employ-
ment levels.
Hypothesis 4b: Group level strategic control will be positively related to affiliate firms’ market
innovation activity.
© 2008 The Authors
Financial control involves the use of objective, financial oriented performance
criteria, such as return on assets or sales growth, to evaluate the performance of
affiliate firm managers (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). In the litera-
ture, an overreliance on financial control has been criticized for a tendency to
create undue focus in the short term and to decrease the willingness of managers
to take calculated risks that would be in the best interests of the firm (e.g., Hoskisson
& Hitt, 1988). Generally, however, financial control is recognized as an important
aspect of any organization’s control structure without which the firm’s effectiveness
could be jeopardized (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
In the Chinese context, given the general lack of focus on operating results,
particularly in SOEs (Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2002), it is unlikely that an empha-
sis on financial control would unduly bias managers toward short-term results.
Additionally, financial control is a direct way to overcome problems associated
with soft budget constraints by forcing a higher degree of fiscal discipline, encour-
aging a more effective capital allocation process and creating incentives for
Chinese managers to decrease the number of redundant employees, freeing up
resources which will enable the firm to pursue needed development projects. Thus,
financial control is expected to be negatively related to employment levels, thus
freeing resources for market innovation. Through financial control, the govern-
ment may be able to indirectly overcome the weaknesses in the existing institu-
tional infrastructure and establish more market-oriented incentives, thereby
creating an incentive for a reduction of redundant employees.
Hypothesis 5a: Group-level financial control will be negatively related to affiliate firms’ employ-
ment levels.
Hypothesis 5b: Group-level financial control will be positively related to affiliate firms’ market
Cultural control involves establishing trust and shared values among group affiliate
firms in order to reduce uncertainty regarding internal transactions (Chu, 2001).
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue that the impact of cultural control comes in part
from the fact that such control can help create a positive feeling for the organiza-
tion and motivate employees to work harder to maximize firm value. Such control
also helps to reduce monitoring costs since there is common understanding among
employees on what they are attempting to accomplish (Cardinal et al., 2004).
There are several aspects of cultural control that have been employed in China
(Shaw, 1996). Biggart and Hamilton (1992, p. 472) argue that ‘Asian economies
espouse different institutional logics from Western economies, ones rooted in
connectedness and relationships’. Part of this connectedness is seen in guanxi (con-
nections between individuals and organizations). In China, guanxi affects all types of
businesses, including business groups. Such connectedness is built on personal and
© 2008 The Authors
organizational relations (Boisot & Child, 1999; Park & Luo, 2001) and becomes a
strong guide to behaviour that is acceptable since there are significant ramifications
for not maintaining one’s obligations related to guanxi. As a result these ties, or
guanxi, are essentially a form of cultural control (Ouchi, 1980).
Another aspect of cultural control is demonstrated through a stronger com-
mitment to shared responsibility by individuals within an organization (Boisot &
Child, 1988). This emphasis is apparent in decision-making within Asian, not only
Chinese, firms where there is a greater reliance on decision-making by the collec-
tive group rather than on individual decision-making (Biggart & Hamilton, 1992).
Findings show the result of this strong orientation toward collectivism in Asia and
China in particular is that, if organizations seek to force individuals to work alone
rather than in groups, their performance drops (Earley, 1993).
Guanxi and the emphasis on the collective group can put pressure on the group
to repay support that is received from others in the group (Park & Luo, 2001). As
a result, making significant changes to firm level employment can be more difficult
because affiliate firm managers will be hesitant to make decisions that negatively
impact other affiliate firms in the group where they have relationships and which
may have supported them in past decisions. Thus, higher levels of cultural control
may lead to an increased sense that obligations of providing continuous employ-
ment and, concomitantly, a wide range of employee services must be continued.
We expect that the stronger the emphasis on cultural control, the higher firm
employment levels will be.
Alternatively, the government’s decision to build internationally competitive
business groups by emphasizing innovativeness results in strong pressures within
the business group to support those efforts. The relationships created from cultural
control among individual managers and affiliate firms may act to encourage those
views. The isolation that affiliate firms may suffer from being an outlier due to the
emphasis on shared responsibility may act to further encourage the support of
innovation. Therefore, an emphasis on cultural control could also be expected
to increase market innovation activity. Accordingly, we position the following
hypotheses as competing hypotheses.
Hypothesis 6a: Group level cultural control will be positively related to affiliate firms’ employ-
ment levels.
Hypothesis 6b: Group level cultural control will be positively related to affiliate firms’ market
Interdependence among Affiliate Firms

Interdependence refers to the inherent attribute of relationships among organiza-
tional units and the extent of cooperation among member firms to perform a task
© 2008 The Authors
(Thompson, 1967). Interdependencies between business units can foster economic
efficiencies and reduce transaction costs among multiple unit businesses ( Jones &
Hill, 1988). One of the aims of China’s economic reform has been to achieve better
allocation of resources in the economy. Flows of resources and products have long
been obstructed by the boundaries separating different administrative and bureau-
cratic jurisdictions ( Jefferson & Rawski, 1995). The business group structure serves
the political purpose of allowing firms to more easily transact across what can be
essentially different economic fiefs, providing a means for member firms to
exchange and share resources that are more costly when acquired from the market,
due to underdeveloped market institutions. Thus, central government initiated
business groups act as a means of assuaging market inefficiencies and overcoming
some of the country’s shortcomings in institutional structure (Meyer & Lu, 2005).
Through the integration of related assets, firms achieve synergies, enhance
competitiveness and receive financial benefits through reduced transaction costs
(Chatterjee, 1986, 1992). Such benefits often come from economies of scope (where
engaging in multiple activities is more efficient than engaging in fewer activities) and
from economies of scale (where larger production size or volume provides increased
efficiencies) (Brush, 1996). Often, both economies of scope and scale are partially
realized through reduced head counts. O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998), for
example, found that layoffs occur more often in related vs. unrelated acquisitions,
probably due to redundancies following horizontal acquisitions that have over-
lapping businesses. As such, we expect that firms in groups with higher levels of
interdependence between firms will have lower employment levels in affiliate firms.
Interdependence is also predicted to be positively related to affiliate firms’
pursuit of market innovation activity. The major barriers to conducting market
innovation activities are high development costs and risks due to market un-
certainty in the transition economy context. Business groups with higher levels of
interdependence will generate more scope economies that result from the sharing
of common distribution channels, advertising, market intelligence and technology
(Chatterjee, 1992). As a result, group interdependence from scope economies
provide significant cost savings ( Jones & Hill, 1988) and risk sharing for affiliate
firms to conduct market innovation activities. Also, related diversified firms that
have high levels of interdependence have been discovered to have higher levels of
R&D expenditures than more broadly diversified firms (Hoskisson & Johnson,
1992). Thus, we expect group interdependence to be positively related to market
Hypothesis 7a: Group interdependence will be negatively related to affiliate firms’ employment
levels.
Hypothesis 7b: Group interdependence will be positively related to affiliate firms’ market
© 2008 The Authors
METHOD
Sample
This study involved the collection of data from the largest five member firms of
each of the 250 largest business groups in China. We concentrate on the largest
groups because, as Tsui and Lau (2002) indicate, government political influence is
not applied uniformly among Chinese firms of different sizes, with the central
government, in particular, focusing most closely on the largest business groups.
Given our interest in political influence, we feel this sample is most appropriate in
testing our hypotheses. Furthermore, large business groups have the most signifi-
cant impact on the future growth and development of an increasingly market
oriented economy. Despite our focus on the largest business groups, the size of the
affiliate firms in the groups ranged from quite small (six employees) to quite large
(more than 80,000 employees).
With the assistance of China’s National Statistics Bureau (NSB), the research
team administered a total of four different surveys. The two archival surveys (one
at the group level and one at the affiliate firm level) focused on collecting firm
accounting and financial information, which is reported by the surveyed firms
annually to the Statistics Bureau. The two perceptual surveys (one at the group
level and one at the affiliate firm level) focused on collecting strategy and control
information. This information was provided by the CEO or delegated top manager
of the surveyed firm. To reduce the possibility of misunderstanding of survey items,
the questionnaire was translated and back-translated to ensure clarity and appro-
priate translation. Data were collected between December, 1998, and February,
1999. Of the questionnaires which were sent out by the NSB, 1,172 were returned
for a 91 percent response rate. Due to the importance of groups’ control systems in
our analysis and the fact that organizational controls typically require some period
of time before fully taking effect, we dropped from the sample: (i) business groups
formed after 1998; (ii) affiliate firms formed after 1998; and (iii) affiliate firms that
joined their business group after 1998. After deleting cases with missing informa-
tion, the final sample size was 1,038 group affiliated member firms from 246
groups. The average number of firms per group was 4.22.
Dependent Variables
As mentioned above, the data of the study comes from four different surveys –
archival surveys at both the business group and affiliate firm level and perceptual
surveys at both the business group and affiliate firm levels. In Table 1, we have
indicated the survey from which each of our variables was taken. The unit of
analysis is at the affiliate firm level and so almost all of the study measures are at the
affiliate firm level, although government ownership and managerial mindset
are measured at the group level, as are some of the control variables. For the
© 2008 The Authors
dependent variables, market innovation was measured by a perceptual scale while
employment level is taken from the archival survey. For the independent variables,
two of the government influence variables were taken from the archival survey
and one was from the perceptual survey. All four business groups’ control system
variables are perceptual measured at the affiliate firm level. Details of each of the
variable are provided next.
Market innovation was constructed from three indicators, each measured percep-
tually on a seven-point response scale, with one indicating the biggest decrease and
seven the biggest increase: (i) increase (decrease) in firm R&D expenditures in the
last three years; (ii) increase (decrease) in the number of new products brought
to market in the last three years; and (iii) increase (decrease) in market develop-
ment expenditures in the past three years. Because our study is cross-sectional, we
decided to use perceptions of change over a three-year period in order to capture
variance in the innovation activities of affiliate firms. The reliability of this scale is
alpha = 0.77.
Employment level was computed by taking the natural logarithm of the reported
number of employees. However, this variable is designed to capture not absolute
levels of employment, but redundant employment. To do this, the models with firm
employment level as the dependent variable also include the natural logarithm
of sales as a control variable. Controlling for firm sales renders our employment
variable a reasonable proxy for the idea of overemployment.
Independent Variables
Two items from the perceptual survey were used to measure the influence of
government employment policy on the firm, namely the extent to which the affiliate’s
diversification strategy was impacted by: (i) central government policies encourag-
ing employment of the largest number of workers possible; and (ii) local govern-
ment policies encouraging employment of the largest number of workers possible.
The two items were measured along a seven-point scale, where one indicates a
small extent and seven indicates a large extent). The inter-item correlation is 0.81.
Getting accurate data on Chinese firm ownership can often be difficult (Delios,
Wu, & Zhou, 2006). Since ownership information at the firm level was not avail-
able, we used the percentage of direct government ownership of the firm’s group as
a suitable proxy for government ownership. Government ownership of the group will
allow the government a level of control over group level actions and policies, which
will then impact individual affiliate firms.
Government managerial mindset was operationalized as the number of department
heads at the group level who were previously employed in government agencies.
Strategic control was a measure obtained through a perceptual scale adapted from
Hill et al. (1992). Indicator variables include the extent to which the group head-
quarters: (i) understands the industry in which the member firm competes; (ii)
© 2008 The Authors
understands the strategy of the member firm; (iii) understands the strategy of the
principal competitors of the member firm; and (iv) jointly develops strategic initia-
tives with the member firm. The items were measured on a seven-point scale, with
one indicating a low level and seven representing a high level of strategic control.
The alpha coefficient is 0.87.
Financial control was also obtained from a perceptual scale adapted from Hill et al.
(1992). The measure is a composite of the extent to which affiliate firms are judged
on: (i) sales; (ii) profit growth; (iii) return on assets; and (iv) profit. It should be noted
that the four items are not measures of affiliate firm performance. Rather, they
represent the extent to which affiliate firms perceive their respective group parents
use these four financial indicators for evaluation purposes. These items were
measured on a seven-point scale, with one indicating a low level and seven repre-
senting a high level of financial control. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.74.
Indicator variables of our cultural control construct included the extent to which
affiliate firms are judged on: (i) maintaining the affiliate’s reputation within the
group; (ii) complying with a strong group culture; (iii) maintaining trusting rela-
tionships within the group; (iv) maintaining cordial relationships with other man-
agers in the group; and (v) participating in social activities with other managers
from the group’s affiliated businesses. As with the other two control scales, mea-
surement was along a seven-point scale, with one and seven representing, respec-
tively, low and high levels of the variable. The alpha coefficient is 0.82.
In previous studies, the entropy measure of diversification ( Jacquemin & Berry,
1979; Palepu, 1985) or a simple count of SIC codes has often been used as a proxy
for the level of relatedness within a multi-unit business. However, the group interde-
pendence construct takes stock of the level to which synergies are actually being
realized across businesses. A four-item scale of group interdependence was devel-
oped, which measures the degree to which member firms across the business
group: (i) shared R&D resources; (ii) shared marketing information resources; (iii)
jointly conducted marketing sales or shared advertising resources; and (iv) jointly
used market distribution channels. Items were measured on a seven-point scale,
with one indicating high levels of independence and seven representing high levels
of interdependence. The alpha coefficient is 0.89
Control Variables at the Affiliate Firm Level

Larger firms sometimes have more slack resources, which allows for higher spend-
ing on market innovation or maintaining employee head counts. Thus, as noted
above, the natural logarithm of the affiliate firm sales was included as a control
variable for firm size where employment level was the dependent variable.
Use of debt can have a dramatic effect on the ability of the firm to increase market
innovation activity and to maintain high employment levels. To overcome the
potentially confounding effects of this, the natural logarithm of debt was included
© 2008 The Authors
in the models. All other things being equal, it should be expected that a firm with
high return on assets would have more organizational resources to expend on
market innovation and/or employment. Return on assets (ROA) was calculated as
profit divided by total assets and included as a control. One potential reason that
some firms may have lower levels of firm employment is that they possess more
efficient operations. Asset turnover (sales/total assets) measures the efficiency of the
firm’s assets in generating sales. It may also systematically affect market innovation
since distribution intense firms (those that tend to have higher turnover) may also
be firms that are less involved in innovation oriented activities. As firms become a
part of business groups, there may be a systematic impact on market innovativeness
and employment levels over time. Thus, the years in group that each member firm
had been with its present group is included as a control variable.
Finally, the context of an emerging economy is characterized by gradual market
liberation. Some industries are still fully protected by government while others are
gradually opened for market competition. As a result, we control for the level
of industry competitiveness. Following the China Industry Development Report (1999), we
measured the extent of market competitiveness of the industry in which each
member firm is located. A value of one indicates that the industry is a state
monopoly, a value of two refers to an industry that is semi-open to competition and
three means that the industry is fully open.
Control Variables at the Group Level

Due to the possibility that group age may have some systematic effect on firm market
innovation and employment levels, the number of years since the group was
formed was included as a control variable.
In addition to the group interdependence variable, which measures the degree
to which synergies are identified and exploited across the affiliate firms of the
group, the entropy measure of product diversification was included to provide infor-
mation on the raw breadth of the product markets across which the group spanned.
This group-level measure gauges the level of product diversification within the
group at the four-digit SIC code level. It is calculated as follows, where Pi is the
share of the ith segment in the total sales of the group and ln(1/Pi) is the weight
given to each segment (Palepu, 1985):
n
DT = ∑ Pi ⋅ ln (1 Pi ).
i =1
When member firms of a single group are located in close proximity to one
another, there is greater opportunity to share resources. This, in turn, may affect
overall employment levels or market innovation activity. As such, geographic disper-
sion is measured by a count of the number of geographic regions that are located
within a business group.
© 2008 The Authors
Because of the influence that foreign ownership could potentially have on the
pressures to pursue market innovation and employment, we included the percent-
age of group foreign ownership as a control variable (Henisz & Zelner, 2005). This
variable may also serve as a proxy for independent firms in China, which would be
not associated with a business group.
Construct Validity
To assess construct validity of our dependent and independent variable, we per-
formed a confirmatory factor analysis on the six perceptual measures of market
innovation, strategic control, financial control, cultural control, interdependence
and government employment policy. All items loaded cleanly (factor loadings <0.5)
on the intended construct. Overall fit for the confirmatory factor model was good,
with CFI of 0.95, TLI of 0.95 and RMSEA of 0.05.
Inter-rater Reliability
Although groups vary widely in the extent to which they use control systems, there
can also be differences within groups, with controls being applied differentially to
a group’s affiliates based on factors such as affiliate age, size, or importance. Thus,
we must use firm level measures (i.e., perceptions) of group control systems in
testing our hypotheses. However, to establish that groups do vary in overall pat-
terns of control system usage, we tested for between group differences on each of
these perceptual measures of group control systems. We found all ICC(1) scores
statistically significant at the 0.001 level. We also computed eta2, which measures
the proportion of a measure’s variance that is at the between group level (Klein &
Kozlowski, 2000). The eta2 values for our measures were 0.31 for strategic control
(F = 1.48, p < 0.001), 0.33 for financial control (F = 1.60, p < 0.001), 0.34 for
cultural control (F = 1.64, p < 0.001) and 0.36 for interdependence (F = 1.84,
p < 0.001). Taken together, these tests show that affiliates of the same group
perceived the group’s control systems similarly, with some variations between firms
likely due to both perceptual differences and to substantive differences in the
amount of control applied to each firm within the group.
Analysis
Hypothesis tests were conducted using a structural equation model in Mplus.
Because we have the same set of variables predicting two different outcomes (i.e.,
firm employment level and market innovation) and the two dependent variables
are conceptually related, we allowed the error terms to be correlated across equa-
tions, similar to a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model.
© 2008 The Authors
RESULTS
The means, standard deviations and correlations of the variables included in our
analysis are presented in Table 1. It may be helpful to provide a brief interpretation
of some of the major variables in Table 1. For example, group age is 5.46.
Although this may seem young, it is important to remember that many of the
groups were recently created due to the government reform program. Geographic
dispersion is 1.66 which means that the business groups covered more than one
and a half provincial regions in China. Government ownership is 0.712, indicating
that, on average, a government entity owns more than 72 percent of each group.
Overall, the groups used a higher level of financial control (mean of 5.88 on a
seven-point scale) with their affiliates, relative to the other two forms of controls.
The structural equation model results showed an acceptable level of overall fit,
with CFI of 0.946, TLI of 0.930 and RMSEA of 0.038. The c2 for the model was
935.9 with 370 degrees of freedom. All indicators in our analysis loaded on their
constructs at acceptable levels (>0.50). Full results are shown in Table 2.
Results of Hypothesis Tests

Hypotheses 1a, 2a and 3a predicted that government influence on the group (via
government policy, government ownership and government mindset) would
be positively related to group- member firm-employment levels. We found that
all three of these variables were positive and statistically significant. Accordingly,
Hypotheses 1a, 2a and 3a were supported.
Hypotheses 1b, 2b and 3b predicted that the same three government influence
variables would be negatively related to firm market innovation activity. Our
model indicates that, while government employment policy was not significantly
related to market innovation, government ownership and government mindset
were negatively and statistically significant. Thus, while Hypothesis 1b was not
supported, Hypotheses 2b and 3b show support for the government influence
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4a predicted that group strategic control would be negatively related
to firm employment level, while Hypothesis 4b suggested a positive relationship
between strategic control and firm market innovation. However, strategic control
was not significant for either employment level or market innovation. Therefore,
Hypotheses 4a and 4b were not supported.
Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted that financial control would be negatively
related to firm employment levels but positively related to market innovation. Our
analysis did not find a significant relationship between financial control and firm
employment level. Thus, Hypothesis 5a was not supported. However, financial
control was found to be statistically significant and positively related to market
innovation, thus providing strong support for Hypothesis 5b.
© 2008 The Authors
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable Data source Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Employment level Affiliate archival 6.42 1.83 1.00

Market innovation Affiliate perceptual 5.07 1.33 0.15 1.00
Sales Affiliate archival 9.21 2.08 0.64 0.19 1.00
Debt Affiliate archival 9.30 2.04 0.61 0.07 0.80 1.00
Return on assets Affiliate archival 0.02 0.14 -0.07 0.12 0.10 -0.05 1.00
Years in group Affiliate archival 4.63 4.10 0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.13 0.05 1.00
Industry competitiveness Industry Report 1.96 0.79 0.18 0.10 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 1.00
Asset turnover Affiliate archival 0.87 1.24 -0.14 0.02 0.13 -0.18 0.08 0.00 -0.02 1.00
Group age Group archival 5.46 3.69 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.35 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
Product diversification Group archival 0.83 0.50 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.07 -0.06 0.20 1.00
Geographic dispersion Affiliate archival 1.66 1.11 0.10 -0.06 0.05 0.09 -0.04 0.12 -0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.08 1.00
Foreign ownership Group archival 0.06 0.12 -0.08 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.15 1.00
Govt. employment policy Affiliate perceptual 2.58 1.92 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 1.00
Govt. ownership Group archival 71.19 34.09 0.10 -0.16 -0.04 0.03 -0.10 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.22 -0.11 0.14 -0.46 0.04 1.00
Govt. managerial mindset Group archival 2.72 7.33 0.13 -0.10 0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.15 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.03 1.00
Strategic control Affiliate perceptual 5.30 1.45 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.03 -0.12 0.03 0.06 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
Financial control Affiliate perceptual 5.88 1.18 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.39 1.00
-0.10 -0.14 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
Employment and Market Innovation
Cultural control Affiliate perceptual 5.12 1.39 -0.02 0.20 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 -0.06 0.08 0.11 0.46 0.45 1.00
Group interdependence Affiliate perceptual 2.98 1.89 -0.06 0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.11 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.11 -0.07 0.24 0.11 0.26 1.00
Notes:
Correlations with an absolute value of 0.080 or above are significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Correlations with an absolute value of 0.061 or above are significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
N = 1,038.
© 2008 The Authors

245

Table 2. Model results of government and business group influences on firm employment level and
market innovation activities
Firm employment level Market innovation activities
Affiliate level control variables

Sales 0.55**** 0.44****
Debt 0.14**** -0.26****
Return on assets -0.02 0.04
Asset turnover -0.16**** -0.11***
Years in group -0.04 -0.06*
Industry competitiveness 0.18**** 0.07**
Group-level control variables
Group age -0.03 0.03
Product diversification -0.02 0.03
Geographic dispersion 0.06*** -0.01
Foreign ownership -0.01 0.00
Independent variables
Government employment policy (H1a†, H1b) 0.05** 0.05
Government ownership (H2a, H2b) 0.06** -0.14****
Government managerial mindset (H3a, H3b) 0.07*** -0.10***
Strategic control (H4a, H4b) 0.01 -0.04
Financial control (H5a, H5b) 0.02 0.20****
Cultural control (H6a, H6b) -0.01 0.11**
Group interdependence (H7a, H7b) -0.05** 0.05
Model fit statistics
c2 935.94 (370 d.f.)****
CFI 0.95
TLI 0.93
RMSEA 0.04
Notes:
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; **** p < 0.001; all two-tailed tests.
†
H1a; Hypothesis 1a, etc.
CFI, comparative fit index; TLI, Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation.
Hypotheses 6a and 6b were positioned as competing hypotheses such that

cultural controls would be positively related to either firm employment levels or
market innovation. Hypothesis 6a was not supported, as no statistically significant
relationship was found between cultural control and firm employment. However,
Hypothesis 6b received support, as cultural control was found to be positively
related to market innovation.
Hypothesis 7a predicted that group interdependence would be negatively
related to firm employment levels. Our model indicated that group interdepen-
dence was negatively related to firm employment. Therefore, Hypothesis 7a
received support. We found no significant effect of interdependence on innovation.
Thus, Hypothesis 7b was not supported.
© 2008 The Authors
DISCUSSION
In this study, we found that all three government influence factors increased firm
employment levels, while both government ownership and government manage-
rial mindset among the group leadership produced lower market innovation. Thus,
our study suggests that increased government influence leads to negative results for
the firm with regard to market innovation, a finding mirrored in recent work by
Nee, Opper, and Wong (2007).
We also found that group affiliated firms with stronger group financial and
cultural controls reported higher levels of market innovation, while affiliate firms
experiencing higher group interdependence reported lower employment levels
relative to their firm size. These results are net of the influence of governmental
level pressures for increasing employment level. Our perspective is distinct from
institutional arguments centred on institutional voids (e.g., Khanna & Palepu,
2000a; Leff, 1978, 1979) in that we focus on the role of business group control
systems in directing the activities of affiliates, rather than on the benefits brought by
group internal markets. In other words, our perspective is concerned with how the
business group can either buffer affiliate firms from institutional pressures, or foster
change in affiliate firms relative to these pressures. As such, we suggest that these
control systems add value by examining the organizational aspects of business
groups which facilitate the coevolution of institutional forces and organizations.
Additionally, focusing on group control systems also allows us to identify which
structural elements of business groups affect affiliate firm activities or performance,
an area that has been identified as ripe for further research (Keister, 2000).
In discussing our perspective, we highlighted the paradox faced by business
groups operating in this context, namely the need to pursue a growth orientation
through market innovation while facing government influence to maintain levels of
employment. While we did not find evidence to support all of our hypotheses, we
did find support for the overall contention that government influence and organi-
zational influences through business group characteristics have a significant rela-
tionship with firm level outcomes of employment level and market innovation
activities. Such evidence lends credence to our contention that business groups’
control systems play an important role in managing institutional pressures and
fostering coevolution between such institutional pressures and organizational evo-
lution at the affiliate firm level. Business groups, as a hybrid organizational form
that lies between markets and formal hierarchies (Haveman & Rao, 2006), foster
coevolution of institutions and organizations (i.e., affiliated firms).
The results indicate that none of the three types of business group control
systems have a significant effect on employment level. One explanation is that
business group influences are more removed (compared with government influ-
ences) from the political conflict associated with employment decisions. However,
another possible explanation of this finding is that the negative impact of control
© 2008 The Authors

systems on employment may be masked by the benefits that some firms receive
from the government to maintain employment levels. Alternatively, it may be that
the effect of control systems on employment levels is contingent on the amount of
government influence faced by the firm and the group. For example, it may be
that, when government influence over the firm is high, these control systems push
affiliate firms to maintain high employment levels, while, in the absence of strong
government influence, stronger control systems are related to lower employment.
We leave these issues to future research.
As hypothesized, higher levels of group interdependence are found to be related
to lower employment levels in affiliate firms, although interdependence was not
found to have a significant effect on market innovation. This pattern of results
suggests that, while interdependence among affiliate firms results in significant cost
savings by lowering levels of employment redundancy, this greater efficiency
doesn’t necessarily allow more resources to be devoted to market innovation
activities. Overall, these results suggest that Chinese business groups do play an
important role in managing the coevolutionary processes between old and new
institutions, between market innovation and those institutional forces focused on
higher levels of employment.
Of the seven independent variables we examined, only strategic control failed to
show a significant relationship to either of our two dependent variables. This last
result is somewhat surprising given the importance that strategic control has shown on
a range of firm outcomes in more developed country contexts. While strategic
control may indeed have no influence on employment and innovation outcomes,
we speculate that the effect of strategic control on these outcomes may instead be
contingent on government influence levels. In other words, whereas we assumed
that higher strategic control would be directed toward the objectives of lowering
employment levels and increasing market innovation, it may be that when government
influence is high, the strategic objective becomes maintaining high employment levels
and market innovation is of less importance. Thus, a more in-depth analysis of who
controls the group’s strategic objectives may be necessary before the effect of
strategic control on innovation and employment can be ascertained. Future research
should be directed at addressing this important issue.
Limitations and Future Research

Since the present study focuses solely on the Chinese context, our specific findings
may not be generalizable to other emerging economies, especially as these other
economies face somewhat different institutional pressures, perhaps not related to
employment levels. However, to the extent that business groups in other develop-
ing nations face conflicting and changing institutional pressures, our results suggest
that the control systems of the groups in these nations could play an important role
in fostering coevolutionary processes among affiliate firms facing diverse institu-
© 2008 The Authors
tional pressures. It would be beneficial to investigate the role of business group
control systems in other developing economies as a coevolutionary agent.
A second limitation of our study concerns the cross-sectional nature of our data,
which prevents us from drawing strong causal links between variables. Hopefully,
this study provides a good foundation for more rigorous future studies. Our results
and suggestions regarding conflicting institutional pressures and how group con-
trols facilitate coevolution may provide substantive propositions for longitudinal
research.
Additionally, this study does not directly ascertain the quality of the market
innovations that are taking place in the affiliate firms. Qian and Xu (1998) argue
that, in economies that are centrally planned, a great proportion of the innovation
is driven not by the market but by central government officials. This, however, can
often result in a lower overall level of innovation quality (Qian & Xu, 1998). Thus,
while financial control and cultural control at the group level are promoting higher
levels of innovation in their affiliate firms, future research should examine the types
or quality of innovations being generated within the context of competing govern-
ment pressures for both employment and innovation.
Another limitation relates to the perceptual nature of our market innovation
variable. While other researchers have also used perceptual measures in assessing
some aspects of firm innovation (e.g., Sarkar, Echambadi, & Harrison, 2001;
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), we would have preferred to use an archival
operationalization of this construct. Unfortunately, we did not have access to
objective information on two of the three indicators of market innovation (i.e., new
products brought to market and market development expenditures) and we found
that many firms were unwilling or unable to provide objective information on
research and development expenditures. However, we believe that our measure is
a good first step toward stronger future operationalizations of this construct.
Finally, our government ownership variable is measured at the business group rather
than affiliate firm level. While this is not ideal, since group affiliated firms are partly
or wholly owned by the parent firm in a business group in China, we expect the
influence of state control at the group level will be transmitted to the affiliate firms.
Even with our imperfect proxy, the government ownership variable is consistently
significant in the hypothesized direction. We expect that an affiliate level owner-
ship measure would show even stronger effects.
We see many possible avenues for future extensions of the model we tested. For
example, in this study we focused on two factors that can strongly impact business
group performance in China: firm employment and market innovation. Future
research might study the effect of government intervention on other business group
behaviours such as firm growth or internationalization. Research more directly
linking government influence to group control systems and characteristics would
also be a useful addition to the literature. Despite the often well-meaning intentions
of government intervention into the economic realm (e.g., seeking to increase
© 2008 The Authors
general welfare through higher employment levels), there are often adverse con-
sequences that may overwhelm any direct positive benefits. For example, too much
concern for social stability may impede the momentum of the institutional tra-
nsition toward a more market based economy. While we focused our study on a
period of time (the late 1990s) when there was a high level of tension between
market and state oriented institutional pressures, an updated examination may
reveal a different picture. However, by focusing on a time period of conflicting
institutional pressures, our study makes a meaningful contribution to a theoretical
understanding of institutional change.
Contributions
This study contributes to theory and the empirical literature in several ways. First,
a variety of theoretical explanations exist to explain how business group member-
ship may benefit the affiliate firm. We suggest that one important role – thus far
overlooked in the literature – is the business group’s role in helping the affiliate firm
to manage the conflicting institutional pressures that it faces. In making this
observation, we contribute to institutional theory. For example, our research
suggests that group control systems foster commitment to emphasize market inno-
vation, while at the same time group interdependence enables firm affiliates to
reduce employment levels in the face of pressure to retain redundant employees.
While much work has been devoted to explaining institutional pressures on firms,
less research has been devoted to how firms may effectively respond to that pressure
and foster or hinder institutional change (Oliver, 1991). As Peng notes, ‘how
organizations strategize during fundamental institutional transitions still remains
largely unknown’ (Peng, 2003, p. 277: original emphasis). In China and other
emerging economies, this process of responding to institutional change is compli-
cated by the fact that the firm can face multiple conflicting institutional logics at the
same time (Keister, 2002). Our study suggests that the control systems associated
with business groups may play an important role in the institutional response for
many emerging economy firms. As such, our study contributions to the nature of
how institutional environments and organizations coevolve (Baum & Singh, 1994).
Second, we contribute to the business group literature by exploring factors
affecting innovation activities in business group affiliated firms. Prior research in
this area has generally relied on an institutional voids framework in explaining the
ability of business groups to improve affiliate firm innovativeness. For example,
Mahmood and Mitchell (2004) speak of the ‘innovation infrastructure’, including
superior finances, talent and technology which business groups provide their affili-
ate firms. Similarly, Chang et al. (2006) rely on institutional holes arguments in
their work linking the profitability and technology of sister firms to the ability of a
focal affiliate firm to be innovative. Our research builds on this work but suggests
that the strength of group control systems have a significantly positive influence on
© 2008 The Authors
affiliate firms’ innovation activities. Our work indicates the possibility that even
after the institutional environment in a country has developed significantly, busi-
ness groups could be beneficial for affiliate firm innovation, at least in business
groups that have adopted stronger control systems.
Finally, our findings contribute to the political economy of innovation literature.
Particularly in emerging economies, governmental policies can have a significant
impact on firm strategies, including the adoption of innovation related strategies
(Amsden, 1989). In our study, we find that both government ownership and a government
managerial mindset among group administrators have consistently negative effects on
firms’ innovation activities. This finding corroborates Keister’s (2002) finding that
government influence (i.e., having a Communist Party secretary as firm general
manager) significantly retarded the adoption of a piece-rate wage system, a type of
organizational innovation. Our work builds on Keister’s not only by examining a
different type of innovation (market innovation, as opposed to organizational innova-
tion), but also by examining a greater number of potential state influences on firm
innovativeness. While China has gradually been reducing its ownership stakes in
business groups (Keister, 2000), governmental units retain significant equity stakes
in many groups. Additionally, the close relationships between business and gov-
ernment at many levels suggest that there will continue to be movement of former
government employees into firm and group leadership roles (Walder, 1995b;
Walder, Li, & Treiman, 2000). As a result, our findings suggest that many business
group affiliates may continue to face challenges related to poor innovativeness for
some time to come.
Policy Implications
Our work has important implications for Chinese government policy. One of the
results of this study is that, while government influence can be beneficial from the
standpoint of helping the government to meet its goal of maintaining high levels of
employment, this same influence works against market innovation. This trade-off
must be kept in mind by government officials as they seek to balance these policy
objectives. Thus, government officials should be aware that the policy of encour-
aging the formation of business groups should be expected to have positive con-
sequences in terms of higher market innovation, but potential negative societal
consequences in terms of lower employment.
CONCLUSION
Our perspective of the role of business groups enriches other perspectives empha-
sized in current business group studies. Our examination of the control systems
used by business groups in pursuing key organizational outcomes provides a richer,
more complex understanding of how business groups can be used as a micro-
© 2008 The Authors
institutional tool to manage the political and economic priorities which may be in
conflict in transition economies. As such, business groups facilitate the coevolution
of institutional pressures and organizational objectives during this time of change.
Hopefully, our study has contributed to a greater understanding of how business
groups function in this capacity and to comprehending more fully the effects of
business groups both on their affiliate firms and on their respective economies.
NOTES
The work described in this article was supported by grants from the Research Grants Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Project No. CUHK4092/98H). We would like to thank
Jean-Philippe Bonardi, Brian Boyd, Mauro Guillén, Tarun Khanna Witold Henisz, Gerry Keim and
participants at the Alliance Edge Conference at Queens University for their helpful comments on
earlier versions of this paper.
[1] Whenever we use the term ‘firm’ in this paper, we are referring specifically to the affiliate firm
rather than the business group.
[2] Collectively, R&D and other market development activities are referred to in this paper as
market innovation (Schumpeter, 1934). We are concerned with this variable at the affiliated firm
level.
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Robert E. White (rew@asu.edu) is a doctoral candidate in strategic

management at Arizona State University. His research interests include
corporate governance, corporate political activity and entrepreneurship.
Robert E. Hoskisson (robert.hoskisson@asu.edu) currently holds the
W. P. Carey Chair in Strategic Management at the W. P. Carey School of
Business at Arizona State University. He received his Ph.D. from the
University of California, Irvine. His research focuses on corporate and
international diversification strategies; corporate governance; corporate
entrepreneurship and innovation; acquisitions and divestitures; business
groups and strategies of emerging economy firms; and cooperative strategy.
Daphne W. Yiu (dyiu@cuhk.edu.hk) is an assistant professor of
management at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. She received her
Ph.D. in management from the Price College of Business, University of
Oklahoma. Her research interests include international diversification
strategy, business groups, corporate entrepreneurship, corporate governance
in transition and emerging economies.
Garry D. Bruton (g.bruton@tcu.edu) holds the Fehmi Zeko Faculty
Fellowship at Texas Christian University. He has published or has
forthcoming over 60 academic articles in leading journals including SMJ,
AMJ and JIBS. Professor Bruton is the incoming editor for the Academy of
Management Perspectives and current President of the Asia Academy of
Management.
Manuscript received: January 18, 2007

Final version accepted: March 18, 2008
Accepted by: Doug Guthrie
© 2008 The Authors

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Management and Organization Review 4:2 225–256

Employment and Market Innovation in Chinese

Robert E. White1, Robert E. Hoskisson1,

ABSTRACT Prior research has suggested a number of potential benefits to firm

KEYWORDS business groups, China, control systems, innovation, institutional theory

© 2008 The Authors

In the marketplace, Chinese business groups must compete with increasing

Leff (1978, p. 663) describes a business group as a collection of firms, ‘which

Figure 1. Conceptual model

Conflicting Pressures during Institutional Transition:

We examine next two organizational characteristics of business groups that may

Business Groups’ Control Systems

Strategic control. This involves the development of an understanding and agreement

Interdependence among Affiliate Firms

Control Variables at the Affiliate Firm Level

Control Variables at the Group Level

Results of Hypothesis Tests

Variable Data source Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Employment level Affiliate archival 6.42 1.83 1.00

© 2008 The Authors

Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Firm employment level Market innovation activities

Affiliate level control variables

Hypotheses 6a and 6b were positioned as competing hypotheses such that

© 2008 The Authors

Limitations and Future Research

© 2008 The Authors

© 2008 The Authors

© 2008 The Authors

© 2008 The Authors

Robert E. White (rew@asu.edu) is a doctoral candidate in strategic

Manuscript received: January 18, 2007

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