In the case of Caong vs Regualos (G.R. No.

179428):

It is acknowledged that an employer has free rein and enjoys a wide latitude of
discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to
instill discipline on his employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, if
warranted, upon erring employees. This is a management prerogative. Indeed, the
manner in which management conducts its own affairs to achieve its purpose is within the
management’s discretion. The only limitation on the exercise of management prerogative is that
the policies, rules, and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be
fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to the
offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.

Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has the inherent right to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work
supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of
employees. The only limitations to the exercise of this prerogative are those imposed by labor
laws and the principles of equity and substantial justice. (Peckson vs. Robinsons Supermarket
Corporation, GR. NO. 198534)

Thus, the employer must comply with the twin requirements imposed by law for an employee’s
dismissal to be considered valid, to wit: (1) the dismissal must be for a valid or authorized
cause; (2) the employee must be afforded due process.

Procedural due process in labor law requires the employer to give the employee two
notices. The first is the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is being sought along with the opportunity for the employee to air his
side, while the second is the subsequent notice of the employers’ decision to dismiss him. More
particularly, Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides for the standards of due process to be substantially observed in cases of termination of
employment, to wit:

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of

due process shall be substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article

282 of the Labor Code:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the

ground or grounds for termination, and giving the said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee

concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or
rebut the evidence presented against him.
 (iii) A written notice of termination served on the
employee, indicating that upon consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.

For termination of employment as defined in Article 283 of the Labor Code, the
requirement of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a
written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment at least thirty days before effectivity of
the termination, specifying the ground or grounds for termination.

If the termination is brought about by the completion of a contract or phase thereof, or

by failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in the case of
probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the
employee within a reasonable time from effective date of termination.

Accordingly, in termination of employees, it is the management alone that determines the

wisdom of the termination but must rest assured that they will comply the twin requirement
and due process shall be strictly and fully observed. In the case of De Ocampo vs. NLRC
(GR.NO. 101539), it states that:

“In the same case, We ruled that "(t)he characterization of (petitioners') services as no longer
necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, was an exercise of business
judgment on the part of (private respondent) company. The wisdom or soundness of such
characterization or decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor
Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious
action is not shown" (ibid, p. 673).

In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as part of the company's cost-saving

program, the services rendered by the mechanics became redundant and superfluous, and
therefore properly terminable. The company merely exercised its business judgment or
management prerogative. And in the absence of any proof that the management
abused its discretion or acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the court will not
interfere with the exercise of such prerogative. “

Hence, the labor court only determines and decides cases if such termination is tainted with
arbitrariness and grave abuse of discretion.

NOTE:

Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the following cases:

1. Unfair labor practice (ULP) cases;

2. Termination disputes (or illegal dismissal cases);
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-
employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of the Labor Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for employees compensation not included in the next succeeding paragraph,
social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-
employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim
for reinstatement;
7. Wage distortion disputes in unorganized establishments not voluntarily settled by the
parties pursuant to Republic Act No. 6627;
8. Enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non-compliance by any of the
parties pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code, as amended;
9. Money claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract, involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages as provided by Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as
amended by R.A. No. 10022;
10.Contested cases under the exception clause of Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended
by R.A. 7730; and
11.Other cases as may be provided by law.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 101539 September 4, 1992

CECILE DE OCAMPO, WILFREDO SAN PEDRO, REYNALDO DOVICAR, BIEN MEDINA,

CESAR ABRIOL, ARTEMIO CASTRO, LARRY ALCANTARA, MICHAEL NOCUM, JESUS DEO
JR., PUBLEO DARAG, EDUARDO BINO, EDUARDO VELES, ERVIN DAVID, PROTACIO
PEREZ, NOEL VICTOR, ELENO DACATIMBAN, ANTONIO BERNARDO, CARLITO VICTORIA,
TIMOTEO MIJARES, ALEX RAMOS, REYNALDO CRUZ, MODESTO MAMESIA, DOMINGO
SILARDE, RENATO PUENTAS, RENE VILLANUEVA, MARCELO DELA CRUZ and HERNANDO
LEGASPI, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BALIWAG MAHOGANY
CORPORATION, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This Petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the resolution issued by the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission on July 8, 1991, in Certified Case No. 0548 entitled "In Re:
Labor Dispute at Baliwag Mahogany Corporation," affirming with modification its previous decision
dated October 23, 1990, declaring the union officers and/or members who participated in the illegal
strike staged on February 6, 1990 to have lost their status of employment; and directing private
respondent Baliwag Mahogany Corporation to pay separation pay to certain employees and to
reinstate without backwages all union Members not found to have committed prohibited acts.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioners Cecile de Ocampo, Wilfredo San Pedro, Reynaldo Dovicar, Bien Medina, Cesar Abriol,
Artemio Castro, Larry Alcantara, Michael Nocum, Jesus Deo, Jr., Publeo Darag, Eduardo Bino,
Eduardo Veles, Ervin David, Prostacio Perez, Noel Victor, Eleno Dacatimban, Antonio Bernardo,
Carlito Victoria, Timoteo Mijares, Alex Ramos, Reynaldo Cruz, Modesto Mamesia, Domingo Silarde,
Renato Puertas, Rene Villanueva, Marcelo dela Cruz and Hernando Legaspi are employees of private
respondent Baliwag Mahogany Corporation. They are either officers or members of the Baliwag
Mahogany Corporation Union-CFW, the existing collective bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees in the company. Private respondent Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is an enterprise
engaged in the production of wooden doors and furniture and has a total workforce of about 900
employees.

In 1988, private respondent Baliwag Mahogany Corporation (company) and Baliwag Mahogany
Corporation Union-CFW (union) entered into a collective bargaining agreement containing, among
other things, provisions on conversion into cash of unused vacation and sick leaves; grievance
machinery procedure; and the right of the company to schedule work on Sundays and holidays.

In November, 1989, the union made several requests from the company, one of which was the cash
conversion of unused vacation and sick leave for 1987-1988 and 1988-1989.

Acting on the matter, the company ruled to allow payment of unused vacation and sick leaves for
the period of 1987-1988 but disallowed cash conversion of the 1988-1989 unused leaves.

On January 3, 1990, the company issued suspension orders affecting twenty (20) employees for
failure to render overtime work on December 30, 1989. The suspension was for a period of three (3)
days effective January 3, 1996 to January 5, 1990.

On the same day, the union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of unfair labor practice
particularly the violation of the CBA provisions on non-payment of unused leaves and illegal
dismissal of seven (7) employees in November, 1989.

On January 13, 1990, the company issued a notice of termination to three (3) employees or union
members, namely, Cecile de Ocampo, Rene Villanueva and Marcelo dela Cruz, of the machinery
department, allegedly to effect cost reduction and redundancy.

The members of the union conducted a picket at the main gate of the company on January 18,
1990.

On the same day, the company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with prayer for injunction
against the union, Cecile de Ocampo, Wilfredo San Pedro and Rene Aguilar.

An election of officers was conducted by the union on January 19, 1990. Consequently, Cecile de
Ocampo was elected as president.

During the conciliation meeting held at National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on
January 22, 1990 relative to the notice of strike filed by the union on January 3, 1990, the issue
pertaining to the legality of the termination of three (3) union members was raised by the union.
However, both parties agreed to discuss it separately.

Subsequently, in a letter dated January 28, 1990, the union requested for the presence of a NCMB
representative during a strike vote held by the union. The strike vote resulted to 388 votes out of
415 total votes in favor of the strike.

Consequently, the union staged a strike on February 6, 1990.

On February 7, 1990, the company filed a petition to assume jurisdiction with the Department of
Labor and Employment.
On February 16, 1990, the company filed an amended petition, praying among other things, that the
strike staged by the union on February 6, 1990 be declared illegal, there being no genuine strikeable
issue and the violation of the no-strike clause of the existing CBA between the parties.

The Secretary of Labor in an order dated February 15, 1990, certified the entire labor dispute to the
respondent Commission for compulsory arbitration and directed all striking workers including the
dismissed employees to return to work and the management to accept them back.

The company filed an urgent motion for assignment of a sheriff to enforce the order of the
Secretary.

In an order dated February 22, 1990, the Secretary of Labor directed Sheriff Alfredo Antonio, Jr., to
implement the order.

On February 23, 1990, the sheriff, with the assistance of the PC/INP of San Rafael, removed the
barricades and opened the main gate of the company.

Criminal complaints for illegal assembly, grave threats, and grave coercion were filed against Cecile
de Ocampo, Timoteo Mijares, Modesto Mamesia and Domingo Silarde by the local police authorities
on February 24, 1990.

On February 25, 1990, the company caused the publication of his return to work order in two (2)
newspapers, namely NGAYON and ABANTE.

In its letter dated February 27, 1990, the union, through its President Cecile de Ocampo, requested
the Regional Director of DOLE, Region III to intervene in the existing dispute with management.

Meanwhile, the company extended the February 26, 1990 deadline for the workers to return to work
until March 15, 1990.

The respondent Commission rendered a decision on October 23, 1990, declaring the strikes staged
on January 18, 1990 and February 6, 1990 illegal, the dispositive portion of which provides as
follows, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The strike staged on January 18, 1990 is hereby declared illegal and all
employees who participated therein are reprimanded therefor or an further
warned that future similar acts shall be dealt more severely;

2. The strike staged on February 6, 1990 is hereby declared illegal and the
Union officers/members are deemed suspended from March 15, 1990 the last
deadline of the company for them to report to the date of promulgation of
this Decision. In short, the Union officers/members are ordered reinstated to
their positions but without backwages;.

3. Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is hereby directed to immediately reinstate

Cecile de Ocampo, Rene Villanueva and Marcelo dela Cruz to their former
 positions without loss of seniority rights to pay them full backwages for the
period from January 17, 1990 to March 15, 1990 only;

4. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is hereby directed to immediately

reinstate Alex Ramos, Ronaldo Cruz, Fernando Hernandez, Renato Puertas,
Hernando Legaspi to their former positions and to pay them backwages from
date of dismissal to March 15, 1990 only;

5. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is hereby exonerated of the charge of

unfair labor practice;

6. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed to pay its employment the

cash equivalent of unused sick leaves for year 1989;

7. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed to remit to the Union the

dues for the month of January 1990.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 68-69)

Such decision prompted the company to file a motion for reconsideration substantially on the ground
that public respondent seriously erred in not dismissing the employees particularly the union
officers, who participated in the illegal strike.

In its supplemental motion for reconsideration, the company contended that as a result of the strike,
it failed to meet the purchase orders for the quarter valued at fifteen million pesos.

Petitioners filed an opposition to the company's motion for reconsideration and subsequently a
supplemental comment/opposition to motion for reconsideration.

On December 13, 1990, the respondent Commission directed the Labor Arbiter to receive evidence
on the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration and additional evidence on the issues already
passed upon and to submit a report thereon.

On July 8, 1991, the respondent Commission rendered a resolution affirming with modification the
decision dated October 23, 1990, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of October 23, 1990 is

hereby MODIFIED, to wit:

1. The strike staged on February 6, 1990 is hereby declared illegal and the
Union officers/members who participated in said strike committed prohibited
acts are deemed to have lost their status of employment, to wit:

1. Cecile de Ocampo
2. Wilfredo San Pedro
3. Reynaldo Aguilar
4. Bren Medina (Bien Medina)
5. Cesar Abriol
6. Artemio Castro
 7. Larry Alcantara
8. Melie Nocum (Michael Nocum)
9. Jesus Deo, Jr.
10. Publeo Darag
11. Eduardo Bino
12. Eduardo Vices (Eduardo Veles)
13. Abroin David (Ervin David)
14. Protacio Perez (Prostacio Perez)
15. Celso Sarmiento
16. Neol Vicbon (Noel Victor)
17. Alano Dacatimban (Eleno Dacatimban)
18. Antonio Bernardo
19. Carlito Victoria
20. Timoteo Mijares
21. Alex Ramos
22. Reynaldo Cruz
23. Modesto Manesia
24. Domingo Silarde
25. Renato Puertas
26. Hernando Legaspi

2. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed to pay Cecile de Ocampo,

Rene Villanueva and Marcelo Cruz separation pay computed at one month
per year of service in addition to one month pay as indemnification pay for
lack of notice (Art. 283, Labor Code).

3. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed to pay Alex Ramos,

Reynaldo Cruz, Renato Puertas, Hernando Legaspi separation pay computed
at one (1) month per year of service in addition to backwages limited to six
(6) months.

4. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed to reinstate but without

backwages all Union members not found herein to have committed
prohibited acts nor found to have accepted settlement from it nor have
voluntarily left the Company for reasons of their own.

5. All other findings in the questioned Decision are affirmed.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 45-47)

Hence, this present petition raising three (3) issues, to wit:

1. Whether or not there is legal basis for declaring the loss of employment
status by petitioners on account of the strike in respondent Company.

2. Whether or not the dismissals of petitioners Cecile de Ocampo, Rene

Villanueva, and Marcelo dela Cruz from their positions by the company on the
ground of redundancy was done in good faith.
 3. Whether or not respondent NLRC acted correctly in allowing respondent
company to submit additional evidence in support of its Motion for
Reconsideration and in giving credence to the said evidence despite the fact
that the same were not newly-discovered evidence as defined under the
Rules of Court. (Rollo, p. 11)

After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioners insist that there is no specific finding by the respondent commision regarding the
particular participation of the individual petitioners in the supposed acts of violence or commission of
prohibited acts during the strike such as denial of free ingress to the premises of the company and
egress therefrom as well as illegal acts of coercion during the February, 1990 strike.

The Solicitor General disagrees and claims that it is undisputed that the union resorted to illegal acts
during the strike arguing that private respondent's personnel manager specifically identified the
union officers and members who committed the prohibited acts and actively participated therein.

Moreover, the Solicitor General maintains that the illegality of the strike likewise stems from the
failure of the petitioners to honor the certification order and heed the return-to-work order issued by
the Secretary of Labor.

Answering this contention, the petitioners argued that their failure to immediately return to work
was not impelled by any malicious or malevolent motive but rather, by their apprehension regarding
their physical safety due to the presence of military men in the factory who might cause them harm.

The law on the matter is Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, to wit:

Article 264. (a) Prohibited activities. (a) ––

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the

President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving
the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an

unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

The clear mandate of the aforequoted article was stressed in the case of Union of Filipro Employees
v. Nestle Philippines, Inc. (G.R. Nos. 88710-13, December 19, 1990, 192 SCRA 396, 411) where it
was held that a strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the
second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as Amended and the Union officers and members,
as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an
illegal act.
Unrebutted evidence shows that the individual petitioners defied the return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor issued on February 15, 1990. As a matter of fact, it was only on February 23,
1990 when the barricades were removed and the main gate of the company was opened. Hence,
the termination of the services of the individual petitioners is justified on this ground alone.

Anent the contention that the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion when it allowed
the presentation of additional evidence to prove the loss suffered by the company despite the fact
that they were mere afterthoughts and just concocted by the company, time and again, We
emphasize that "technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use
every and reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process" (Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 80600, March 21,
1990, 183 SCRA 451, 457).

Turning to the legality of the termination of three (3) of the individual petitioners, petitioners
contend that the company acted in bad faith when it terminated the services of the three mechanics
because the positions held by them were not at all abolished but merely given to Gemac
Machineries.

On the contrary, the company stresses that when it contracted the services of Gemac Machineries
for the maintenance and repair of its industrial machinery, it only adopted a cost saving and cost-
consciousness program in order to improve production efficiency.

We sustain respondent Commission's finding that petitioners' dismissal was justified by redundancy
due to superfluity and hence legal.

We believe that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an
employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirement of the
enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a
position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over hiring of workers,
decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The employer had no legal obligation to keep in its
payroll more employees, than are necessary for the operation of its business. (Wiltshire File Co., Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82249, February 7, 1991; 193 SCRA 665,672).

The reduction of the number of workers in a company made necessary by the introduction of the
services of Gemac Machineries in the maintenance and repair of its industrial machinery is justified.
There can be no question as to the right of the company to contract the services of Gemac
Machineries to replace the services rendered by the terminated mechanics with a view to effecting
more economic and efficient methods of production.

In the same case, We ruled that "(t)he characterization of (petitioners') services as no longer
necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, was an exercise of business judgment
on the part of (private respondent) company. The wisdom or soundness of such characterization or
decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so
long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown" (ibid, p.
673).

In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as part of the company's cost-saving program,
the services rendered by the mechanics became redundant and superfluous, and therefore properly
terminable. The company merely exercised its business judgment or management prerogative. And
in the absence of any proof that the management abused its discretion or acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the court will not interfere with the exercise of such prerogative.

Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of administrative bodies are entitled to great weight,
and these findings are accorded not only respect but even finality when supported by substantial
evidence (Family Planning Organization of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 75987, March 23, 1992, p. 7 citing Asian Construction and Development
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 85866, July 24, 1998, 187 SCRA 784,
787). Hence, the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts is not for this Court now to re-examine.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is clear that the assailed resolution of the respondent
Commission is not tainted with arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the resolution of the respondent
Commission dated July 8, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 198534 July 3, 2013

JENNY F. PECKSON, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET CORPORATION, JODY GADIA, ROENA SARTE, and RUBY
ALEX,Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 dated June 8, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109604 affirming the Decision3 dated February 25,
2009 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-09316-
06/NLRC LAC No. 002020-07, which upheld the Dismissal4 by the Labor Arbiter (LA) on May 30,
2007 of Jenny F. Peckson's (petitioner) complaint for constructive dismissal.

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

The petitioner first joined the Robinsons Supermarket Corporation (RSC) as a Sales Clerk on
November 3, 1987. On October 26, 2006, she was holding the position of Category Buyer when
respondent Roena Sarte (Sarte), RSC’s Assistant Vice-President for Merchandising, reassigned
her to the position of Provincial Coordinator, effective November 1, 2006. Claiming that her new
assignment was a demotion because it was non-supervisory and clerical in nature, the
petitioner refused to turn over her responsibilities to the new Category Buyer, or to accept her
new responsibilities as Provincial Coordinator. Jody Gadia (Gadia) and Ruby Alex (Alex) were
impleaded because they were corporate officers of the RSC.

In a memorandum to the petitioner dated November 13, 2006,6 the RSC, through Sarte,
demanded an explanation from her within 48 hours for her refusal to accept her new
assignment despite written and verbal demands. Sarte cited a company rule, Offenses Subject
to Disciplinary Action No. 4.07, which provided that "[d]isobedience, refusal or failure to do
assigned task or to obey superior’s/official’s orders/instructions, or to follow established
procedures or practices without valid reason" would be meted the penalty of suspension.
The petitioner ignored the 48-hour deadline to explain imposed by Sarte. On November 23,
2006, Sarte issued her another memorandum,7 reiterating her demand to explain in writing
within 48 hours why she persistently refused to assume her new position, and warning her that
this could be her final chance to present her side or be deemed to have waived her right to be
heard.

In her one-paragraph reply submitted on November 27, 2006,8 the petitioner stated that she
could not accept the position of Provincial Coordinator since she saw it as a demotion. As it
turned out, however, on November 9, 2006, the petitioner had already filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal9 against RSC, Sarte, Gadia and Alex (respondents).

On November 30, 2006, Sarte issued an instruction to the petitioner to report to RSC’s
Metroeast Depot to help prepare all shipping manifests for Cagayan de Oro and Bacolod, but as
witnessed by RSC employees Raquel Torrechua and Alex, she did not obey as
instructed.10 Again on December 8, 2006, Sarte issued a similar instruction, citing the need for
certain tasks from the petitioner in preparation for the coming Christmas holidays, but the
petitioner again refused to heed.11

As culled from the assailed appellate court decision,12 the petitioner argued before the LA that
the true organizational chart of the RSC showed that the position of Category Buyer was one
level above that of the Provincial Coordinator, and that moreover, the job description of a
Provincial Coordinator was largely clerical and did not require her to analyze stock levels and
order points, or source new local and international suppliers, or monitor stock level per store
and recommend items for replenishment, or negotiate better items and discounts from
suppliers, duties which only a Category Buyer could perform. She also claimed that she was
instructed to file a courtesy resignation in exchange for a separation pay of one-half salary per
year of service.

The respondents in their position paper denied the correctness of the organizational chart
presented by the petitioner. They maintained that her transfer was not a demotion since the
Provincial Coordinator occupied a "Level 5" position like the Category Buyer, with the same
work conditions, salary and benefits. But while both positions had no significant disparity in the
required skill, experience and aptitude, the position of Category Buyer demanded the traits of
punctuality, diligence and attentiveness because it is a frontline position in the day-to-day
business operations of RSC which the petitioner, unfortunately, did not possess.

The respondents also raised the petitioner’s record of habitual tardiness as far back as 1999, as
well as poor performance rating in 2005. In addition to her performance rating of "2.8" out of
"4.0" in 2005 equivalent to "below expectation," the petitioner was found to be tardy in June
and July 2005, 13 times, and for the entire 2005, 57 times; that she was suspended twice in
2006 for 20 instances of tardiness and absences from July to September 2006 alone.13 We also
note that the petitioner was suspended for seven (7) days in September and October 2005 for
deliberately violating a company policy after she was seen having lunch with a company
supplier.14

In her affidavit,15 respondent Sarte denied that the reassignment of the petitioner as Provincial
Coordinator was motivated by a desire to besmirch the name of the latter. She asserted that it
was made in the exercise of management prerogative and sound discretion, in view of the
nsitive position occupied by the Category Buyer in RSC’s daily operations, vis-à-vis the
petitioner’s "below expectation" performance rating and habitual tardiness.

In dismissing the petitioner’s complaint, the LA in its Decision16 dated May 30, 2007 ruled that
job reassignment or classification is a strict prerogative of the employer, and that the petitioner
cannot refuse her transfer from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator since both positions
commanded the same salary structure, high degree of responsibility and impeccable honesty
and integrity. Upholding the employer’s right not to retain an employee in a particular position
to prevent losses or to promote profitability, the LA found no showing of any illegal motive on
the part of the respondents in reassigning the petitioner. The transfer was dictated by the need
for punctuality, diligence and attentiveness in the position of Category Buyer, which the
petitioner clearly lacked. Moreover, the LA ruled that her persistent refusal to accept her new
position amounted to insubordination, entitling the RSC to dismiss her from employment.

A month after the above ruling, or on June 22, 2007, the petitioner tendered her written
"forced" resignation,17wherein she complained that she was being subjected to ridicule by
clients and co-employees alike on account of her floating status since the time she refused to
accept her transfer. She likewise claimed that she was being compelled to accept the position of
Provincial Coordinator without due process.

On appeal, the NLRC in its Decision18 dated February 25, 2009 sustained the findings of the LA.
It agreed that the lateral transfer of the petitioner from Category Buyer to Provincial
Coordinator was not a demotion amounting to constructive dismissal, since both positions
belonged to Job Level 5 and between them there is no significant disparity in terms of the
requirements of skill, experience and aptitude. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the NLRC
found that the position of Provincial Coordinator is not a rank-and-file position but in fact
requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment, as well as appropriate
recommendations to management to ensure the faithful implementation of its policies and
programs; that it even exercises influence over the Category Buyer in that it includes
performing a recommendatory function to guide the Category Buyer in making decisions on the
right assortment, price and quantity of the items, articles or merchandise to be sold by the
store.

The NLRC then reiterated the settled rule that management may transfer an employee from
one office to another within the business establishment, provided there is no demotion in rank
or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges, and the action is not motivated by
discrimination or bad faith or effected as a form of punishment without sufficient cause. It ruled
that the respondents were able to show that the petitioner’s transfer was not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial, but was prompted by her failure to meet the demands of
punctuality, diligence, and personal attention of the position of Category Buyer; that
management wanted to give the petitioner a chance to improve her work ethic, but her
obstinate refusal to assume her new position has prejudiced respondent RSC, even while she
continued to receive her salaries and benefits as Provincial Coordinator.

On petition for certiorari to the CA, the petitioner insisted that her transfer from Category Buyer
to Provincial Coordinator was a form of demotion without due process, and that the
respondents unjustifiably depicted her as remiss in her duties, flawed in her character, and
unduly obstinate in her refusal to accept her new post.
In its Decision19 dated June 8, 2011, the CA found no basis to deviate from the oft-repeated
tenet that the findings of fact and conclusions of the NLRC when supported by substantial
evidence are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even finality, and are
thus deemed binding.20

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court

Now on petition for review to this Court, the petitioner maintains that her lateral transfer from
Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was a demotion amounting to constructive dismissal
because her reassignment was not a valid exercise of management prerogative, but was done
in bad faith and without due process. She claims that the respondents manipulated the facts to
show that she was tardy; that they even surreptitiously drew up a new organizational chart of
the Merchandising Department of RSC, soon after she filed her complaint for illegal dismissal, to
show that the position of Provincial Coordinator belonged to Job Level 5 as the Category Buyer,
and not one level below; that the company deliberately embarrassed her when it cut off her
email access; that they sent memoranda to her clients that she was no longer a Category
Buyer, and to the various Robinsons branches that she was now a Provincial Coordinator, while
Milo Padilla (Padilla) was taking over her former position as Category Buyer; that for seven (7)
months, they placed her on floating status and subjected her to mockery and ridicule by the
suppliers and her co-employees; that not only was there no justification for her transfer, but the
respondents clearly acted in bad faith and with discrimination, insensibility and disdain to make
her stay with the company intolerable for her.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

This Court has consistently refused to interfere with the exercise by management of its
prerogative to regulate the employees’ work assignments, the working methods and the place
and manner of work.

As we all know, there are various laws imposing all kinds of burdens and obligations upon the
employer in relation to his employees, and yet as a rule this Court has always upheld the
employer’s prerogative to regulate all aspects of employment relating to the employees’ work
assignment, the working methods and the place and manner of work. Indeed, labor laws
discourage interference with an employer’s judgment in the conduct of his business.21

In Rural Bank of Cantilan, Inc. v. Julve,22 the Court had occasion to summarize the general
jurisprudential guidelines affecting the right of the employer to regulate employment, including
the transfer of its employees:

Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has the inherent right to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work
supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of
employees. The only limitations to the exercise of this prerogative are those imposed by labor
laws and the principles of equity and substantial justice.
While the law imposes many obligations upon the employer, nonetheless, it also protects the
employer’s right to expect from its employees not only good performance, adequate work, and
diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. In fact, the Labor Code does not excuse
employees from complying with valid company policies and reasonable regulations for their
governance and guidance.

Concerning the transfer of employees, these are the following jurisprudential guidelines: (a) a
transfer is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or salary without
break in the service or a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank or
salary; (b) the employer has the inherent right to transfer or reassign an employee for
legitimate business purposes; (c) a transfer becomes unlawful where it is motivated by
discrimination or bad faith or is effected as a form of punishment or is a demotion without
sufficient cause; (d) the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.23 (Citations omitted)

In Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation v. NLRC,24 it was held that the exercise of
management’s prerogative concerning the employees’ work assignments is based on its
assessment of the qualifications, aptitudes and competence of its employees, and by moving
them around in the various areas of its business operations it can ascertain where they will
function with maximum benefit to the company.

It is the employer’s prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees’
qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its
business operations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the
company. An employee’s right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his
position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer
him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor
prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries,
benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive
dismissal.

As a privilege inherent in the employer’s right to control and manage its enterprise effectively,
its freedom to conduct its business operations to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.26 We
agree with the appellate court that the respondents are justified in moving the petitioner to
another equivalent position, which presumably would be less affected by her habitual tardiness
or inconsistent attendance than if she continued as a Category Buyer, a "frontline position" in
the day-to-day business operations of a supermarket such as Robinsons.

If the transfer of an employee is not unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to him, and it

does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits and other
privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.

As we have already noted, the respondents had the burden of proof that the transfer of the
petitioner was not tantamount to constructive dismissal, which as defined in Blue Dairy
Corporation v. NLRC,27 is a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, or an offer involving a demotion in rank and diminution of pay:
The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of
discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should
not be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a
subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. In particular, the employer
must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the
employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and
other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s
transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal, which has been defined as a quitting
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer
involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay. Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when
an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable
to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued employment.

Thus, as further held in Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation,28 when the transfer of an
employee is not unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a
demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges, the employee
may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.29

But like all other rights, there are limits to the exercise of managerial prerogative to transfer
personnel, and on the employer is laid the burden to show that the same is without grave
abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play.30 Indeed,
management prerogative may not be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an
undesirable worker.31

Interestingly, although the petitioner claims that she was constructively dismissed, yet until the
unfavorable decision of the LA on May 30, 2007, for seven (7) months she continued to collect
her salary while also adamantly refusing to heed the order of Sarte to report to the Metroeast
Depot. It was only on June 22, 2007, after the LA’s decision, that she filed her "forced"
resignation. Her deliberate and unjustified refusal to assume her new assignment is a form of
neglect of duty, and according to the LA, an act of insubordination. We saw how the company
sought every chance to hear her out on her grievances and how she ignored the memoranda of
Sarte asking her to explain her refusal to accept her transfer. All that the petitioner could say
was that it was a demotion and that her floating status embarrassed her before the suppliers
and her co-employees.

The respondents have discharged the burden of proof that the transfer of the petitioner was
not tantamount to constructive dismissal.

In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC,32 a machinist who had been employed
with the petitioner company for 16 years was reduced to the service job of transporting filling
materials after he failed to report for work for one (1) day on account of an urgent family
matter. This is one instance where the employee’s demotion was rightly held to be an unlawful
constructive dismissal because the employer failed to show substantial proof that the
employee’s demotion was for a valid and just cause:

In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer
and demotion of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business
necessity. Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer
must be able to show that such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the
employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and
other benefits. Failure of the employer to overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s
demotion shall no doubt be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. x x x.33 (Citation
omitted)

In the case at bar, we agree with the appellate court that there is substantial showing that the
transfer of the petitioner from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to her. The petitioner failed to dispute that the job classifications of
Category Buyer and Provincial Coordinator are similar, or that they command a similar salary
structure and responsibilities. We agree with the NLRC that the Provincial Coordinator’s position
does not involve mere clerical functions but requires the exercise of discretion from time to
time, as well as independent judgment, since the Provincial Coordinator gives appropriate
recommendations to management and ensures the faithful implementation of policies and
programs of the company. It even has influence over a Category Buyer because of its
recommendatory function that enables the Category Buyer to make right decisions on
assortment, price and quantity of the items to be sold by the store.34

We also cannot sustain the petitioner’s claim that she was not accorded due process and that
the respondents acted toward her with discrimination, insensibility, or disdain as to force her to
forego her continued employment. In addition to verbal reminders from Sarte, the petitioner
was asked in writing twice to explain within 48 hours her refusal to accept her transfer. In the
first, she completely remained silent, and in the second, she took four (4) days to file a mere
one-paragraph reply, wherein she simply said that she saw the Provincial Coordinator position
as a demotion, hence she could not accept it. Worse, she may even be said to have committed
insubordination when she refused to turn over her responsibilities to the new Category Buyer,
Padilla, and to assume her new responsibilities as Provincial Coordinator and report to the
Metroeast Depot as directed. This was precisely the reason why the petitioner was kept on
floating status. To her discredit, her defiance constituted a neglect of duty, or an act of
insubordination, per the LA.

Neither can we consider tenable the petitioner’s contention that the respondents deliberately
held her up to mockery and ridicule when they cut off her email access, sent memoranda to her
clients that she was no longer a Category Buyer, and to the various Robinsons branches that
she was now a Provincial Coordinator on floating status and that Padilla was taking over her
position as the new Category Buyer. It suffices to state that these measures are the logical
steps to take for the petitioner’s unjustified resistance to her transfer, and were not intended to
subject her to public embarrassment.

Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which labor officials’ findings rest.

Finally, as reiterated in Acebedo Optical,35 this Court is not a trier of facts, and only errors of
law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA.
Questions of fact are not entertained, and in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater
force.

Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.36 Thus:

Judicial Review or labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which its labor officials' findings rest. As such, the findings of facts and
conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even
clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. This Court finds no basis for deviating from said doctrine without any clear
showing that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of
substantiation. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed.

xxxx

As earlier stated, we find no basis for deviating from the oft espoused legal tenet that findings
of facts and conclusion of the labor arbiter are generally accorded not only great weight and
respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, without any clear showing that such findings of fact, as
affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation. More so, when passed upon and upheld by
the Com1 of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon us and will not normally be
disturbed; x x x.37(Citations omitted)

It is our ruling, that the findings of fact and conclusion of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC, are
supported by substantial evidence, as found by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 8, 2011
in CA-G.R. SP No. 109604 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice