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DBS Asian Insights

Japan
DBS Group Research • May 2015

What is Ahead
for Abenomics?
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Japan
What is Ahead
for Abenomics?
Ma Tie Ying
Economist
DBS Group Research
matieying@dbs.com

Produced by:
Asian Insights Office
DBS Group Research
asianinsights@dbs.com
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05 Introduction

06 Modest Recovery in 2015-16

Ups and Downs for Growth

Inflation’s Fall and Rise

Watching the BOJ

09 QE Is Not the Panacea

Small Real Effects

Winners and Losers

12 Fiscal Consolidation Has a Long Way to Go

2020 Target

Public Deleveraging – A Potential Drag on Growth

There Is No Magical Fix

14 Tackling Tough Structural Challenges

Reforms Are Not Easy

16 Impact of Abenomics on Asia

External Trade

Weak Yen and FDI Fears

Portfolio Capital Flows

20 Conclusion
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Introduction

J
apan has been drifting in the economic doldrums for years, beset by falling
productivity, waning competitiveness, deteriorating fiscal imbalances, and bedevilling
deflationary pressures.

Against this, the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won office in late 2012
with a pledge to put the economy back on a path of growth. It launched its ambitious
“Abenomics” programme made up of flexible fiscal policies and bold monetary expansion
led by quantitative easing (QE) on a massive scale.

The results have been mixed. Some progress has been made. But there have also been
setbacks and many complications, such as a general slowdown across the globe and a
plunge in oil prices.

To date, Japan’s economic recovery has been modest, but it is also fragile. And that
fragility has been a problem for the pace of Abe’s reform push. When the government
raised the national sales tax rate by a few percent in 2014, growth collapsed dramatically
and the economy fell into recession. Abe called, and subsequently won, a snap election,
but only after he postponed plans for a second sales tax hike until 2017. Delaying this
key revenue stream, however, could set back the government’s aim of achieving fiscal
consolidation by 2020.

Things get even trickier when reform goes beyond policy management. To change and
prosper, Japan must overcome some deeply ingrained societal and structural barriers, and
attitudes.

With its ageing population and low birth rate, the proportion of productive workers
among Japan’s people is shrinking year by year. To beat this, older workers may have
to be pressed into keeping their jobs for longer, and more women encouraged to enter
the workforce. Immigration – strictly limited by a country that sees itself as a largely
homogenous society – might have to be opened up for skilled foreign labour. And, the
long cherished Japanese ideal of having a job-for-life might have to go.

This report examines some of the big issues, prospects, and challenges facing the world’s
third largest economy.

To change and prosper, Japan must

overcome some deeply ingrained societal
and structural barriers, and attitudes
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Modest Recovery in 2015-16

Ups and Downs for Growth

P
rime Minister Abe took office in December 2012 and introduced Abenomics
to revive the Japanese economy. GDP growth rose to 1.6% in 2013 on
the back of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. But after a sales
tax hike in 2014, growth fell quickly and sharply to 0% (Diagram 1).

Diagram 1: Japan’s GDP growth

% YoY 2012 Post-quake
12 recovery
2009-10 Post-
2013 Introduction
9 crisis recovery
of Abenomics
6

-3

-6

-9
2008 Global 2011 Japan 2014 Sales tax
-12
Financial Crisis earthquake hike
-15
1Q01 1Q03 1Q05 1Q07 1Q09 1Q11 1Q13
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg

A modest economic recovery is expected in 2015-16, with annual GDP growth projected
to be 1%. There should be no disruption from further fiscal policy tightening for this
period as the government has postponed the second phase of its sales tax hike until 2017.

Since October 2014, the BOJ’s QE expansion has boosted the stock market and weakened
the Japanese yen. Both should bring about positive effects. This rise in equity prices should
lift sentiment and create wealth for consumers. A weaker yen should boost corporate
profits for export-oriented manufacturers, enabling them to increase capital spending and
raise employee wages.

Inflation’s Fall and Rise

On the prices front, the consumer price index (CPI) inflation rose marginally to 0.4% in
2013 and crept higher to 1.3% in 2014 (excluding the sales tax, Diagram 2). But this was
the wrong type of inflation for Japan’s needs, as it was mainly due to increases in import
costs brought about by a weak yen.
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Diagram 2: Japan’s CPI inflation

% YoY
2014 Sales tax hike
4
CPI incl. sales tax
3 CPI excl. sales tax
2008 Oil price shock
2 2013 Abenomics,
yen depreciation
1

-1
2015 Oil price
-2 2009 Global recession, oil slump
price collapse
-3
Jan 01 Jan 03 Jan 05 Jan 07 Jan 09 Jan 11 Jan 13 Jan 15
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg

Inflation is expected to fall far below the 1% mark this year before ticking up in 2016. The
slump in global oil prices has offset the inflationary impact of a weak yen, pushing down
CPI figures to virtually 0% since the start of the year. Without a significant rebound in oil
prices, CPI growth could stay around 0% through the rest of 2015.

Prices, however, should go up in the medium term. Ultimately, the fall in oil prices should
be beneficial for the Japanese economy as it should improve the terms of trade, boost
corporate profits for importers, and lift the real incomes of consumers. If GDP growth
reverts to the trend rate in 2015-16, as has been forecast, aggregate demand will increase,
the negative output gap will be closed, and wage-driven inflation will rise with a time lag.

Watching the BOJ

The BOJ is paying closer attention to medium term price developments rather than short-
term price fluctuations. Theoretically, a recovery in real economic activities and a rise in
wage growth should bolster inflation expectations and the medium-term prices trend.
This would allow the BOJ to maintain the status quo on monetary policy and refrain from
further easing.

In reality, however, a prolonged period of weak (actual) CPI figures could negatively
impact people’s psychology and expectations. Low oil prices, if they persist, would

…a prolonged period of weak (actual)

CPI figures could negatively impact
people’s psychology and expectations
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suppress consumer prices. Moreover, if low oil prices were associated with weakness in
global demand, Japan’s exports outlook would be dampened. That would be a drag on
economic recovery and wage growth. Under such a scenario, the BOJ would face greater
pressures to ease policy in order to bolster growth and inflation expectations.

Regardless of whether the BOJ pursues extra easing, its policy is looser than its peers. The
size of the BOJ’s balance sheet expanded to an equivalent of 61% of GDP at the end of
2014. That was a big rise compared with 34% two years ago, and in stark contrast with
the 20% to 25% level seen in the US and the Eurozone (Diagram 3). Based on the BOJ’s
current pace of QE, its total assets to GDP ratio could rise further to as much as 90%
by the end of 2016. Divergent monetary policies and negative yield spreads between
domestic and global markets would probably encourage capital outflows from Japan.
That, in turn, would put downward pressure on the yen in 2015-16.

Diagram 3: G3 central banks – scale of the balance sheets

% of GDP
70 Fed
ECB
60
BOJ

50

40

30

20

10

0
1Q01 1Q03 1Q05 1Q07 1Q09 1Q11 1Q13
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg
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QE Is Not the Panacea

B
old monetary policy is a major part of Abenomics and so the BOJ introduced a
new QE programme in April 2013. It set monetary base as the operating target
and established an explicit goal of achieving 2% inflation within two years. The
BOJ initially kept the pace of QE at 60-70 trillion yen per annum. That allowed
it to double the outstanding size of base money between the end of 2012 and the end
of 2014. In October last year, it announced an expansion of the easing programme and
accelerated the pace of QE to 80 trillion yen per annum.

These bold measures by the BOJ have impressed investors and created announcement
effects in the financial markets. Equity prices surged strongly and the yen fell sharply.
Compared with the end of 2012, the Nikkei benchmark stock index is now up by 100%
and the yen is 50% weaker against the US dollar.

Small Real Effects

But the effects of QE need to flow into the real economy. The BOJ is hoping that the
public’s inflation expectations will increase so consumers are encouraged to save less and
spend more. In this way, the economy would be able to return to a virtuous cycle of rising
prices and rising demand.

It is worth noting that the saving ratio among Japanese households has been falling
sharply and persistently over the past two decades, from 10% in early-1990s to 2% in
early-2010s. Much of this is due to a rapidly ageing population. The weakness in Japan’s
consumer spending in recent years was not caused by high savings, but by the stagnancy
of income / wage growth.

To be sure, without a rise in wage growth, consumers could still increase spending via
increasing borrowings. If inflation expectations increase, consumers should have stronger
incentives to borrow and to invest in riskier assets. The problem here is that higher inflation
expectations could also lead to a rise in nominal market interest rates, keeping the real
capital costs from declining.

...the impact of QE on Japan’s credit

market has been small and limited

So far, the impact of QE on Japan’s credit market has been small and limited. In the past
two years, Japanese banks expanded their loan portfolios by a total of 41 trillion yen –
equivalent to a modest annual growth rate of 3%. Due to aggressive asset purchases
by the BOJ, the banks have been obliged to cut their holdings of Japanese government
bonds. But they have continued to accumulate risk-free assets in the form of liquid
reserves placed at the BOJ, instead of lending out (Diagram 4).
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Diagram 4: Japanese depository institutions – composition of the balance sheets

JPY trn
800 Assets: currency & deposits
Assets: debt securities
700 Assets: loans

600

500

400

300

200

100
Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 Jan 13 Jan 14
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg

According to the central bank’s balance sheet, the outstanding size of current deposits
placed by financial institutions increased by 131 trillion yen between December 2012 and
December 2014. In comparison, there was a 142 trillion yen expansion in the BOJ’s total
assets during the same period (Diagram 5). In other words, more than 90% of the QE
funds were parked in the banks’ accounts instead of being injected into the real economy.

Diagram 5: The BOJ – composition of the balance sheet

JPY trn
300 Assets: Govt securities

270 Liabilities: Current deposits

Liabilities: Banknotes issued
240
210
180
150
120
90
60
30
0
Jan10 Jan11 Jan 12 Jan13 Jan14 Jan 15
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg
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Winners and Losers

Despite the limited transmission effects for the economy as a whole, Japan’s QE
programme has created side effects with winners and losers. For instance, the weak yen
has boosted export revenues for large manufacturers. But it had also elevated the cost of
imports for domestically-oriented small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs). Similarly, financial
asset holders have fared well from the stock market’s rally. However, wage earners and
pensioners have lost some purchasing power as a result of currency weakness and the
rise in living costs.

The value of the yen has swung from overvalued to undervalued. The yen was excessively
strong during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. But now the US dollar is trading at around
the 120 yen mark, which is about where it was in 2007. Looking ahead, the benefits and
costs of further yen weakness will need to be reassessed.
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Fiscal Consolidation Has a Long

Way to Go

A
flexible fiscal policy is another important component of Abenomics. The
clearest demonstration of this has been in the government’s handling of its
controversial sales tax hike. In order to reduce the budget deficit and restore
public debt to a sustainable path, the government raised the sales tax in April
2014, from 5% to 8%. But when this triggered a short-term economic contraction, the
authorities postponed a second-stage hike (from 8% to 10%) from October 2015 until
April 2017.

2020 Target
The sales tax hike is widely seen as a key source of revenue for Japan, and a way to cut
the budget deficit and restore public finances. The delay of its second phase certainly
means a slowdown in the country’s fiscal consolidation process. In fact, even if the next
sales tax hike were to be implemented as scheduled, it would remain challenging for the
government to achieve the fiscal consolidation target by the 2020 fiscal year.

Lifting the sales tax from 5% to 10% would generate tax revenues worth an estimated 10
trillion yen a year. This is too small to cover the primary fiscal deficit, which registered 16
trillion yen in the latest fiscal year prior to the tax hike. Not to mention the government’s
expenses on interest repayments, which amounts to around 20 trillion yen per year.

In another change to fiscal policy, the government wants the corporate tax rate cut
progressively from the 2015 fiscal year. It hopes this can revive investment growth and
therefore, broaden the tax base. However, a comparatively high tax rate is not the only
factor impeding investment in Japan. There are many structural barriers in place that
restrict investment.

Public Deleveraging – A Potential Drag

on Growth
Japan’s public debt is already the highest in the world. Public debt to GDP ratio has risen
in the past two years from 231% in end-2012 to 241% in end-2014, notwithstanding
the implementation of experimental tax reforms under Abenomics (Diagram 6). This ratio
is likely to continue rising through the rest of this decade. Eventually that could generate
concerns over public debt sustainability and sovereign credit risks.

So far, the government has shown the flexibility to manage fiscal consolidation at a gradual
pace. This is because ample domestic savings have been able to finance public debt and
keep yields low. However, this is changing as Japan’s population ages. The country’s gross
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Diagram 6: Japan’s public and private debt

% of GDP
250 Government debt
Corporate debt
Household debt
200

150

100

50
1Q01 1Q03 1Q05 1Q07 1Q09 1Q11 1Q13
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg

saving ratio has fallen steadily in the past two decades – from 30% in the early 1990s to
19% in the early 2010s. With the demographics deteriorating in the coming years, the
domestic savings pool is likely to shrink further. Eventually this will lead to a rise in the
ratio of foreign financing. A higher participation of foreign investors in the Japanese yen
debt market will imply the risk of higher yields, which could in turn accelerate the process
of public deleveraging and negatively impact the real economy.

There Is No Magical Fix

The optimists argue that public debt dynamics should automatically improve, because the
BOJ’s QE should reflate the economy and boost nominal GDP. This argument does not
take into account a possible rise in bond yields triggered by higher inflation expectations.
A synchronous rise in inflation, nominal GDP, and nominal interest rates cannot help
reduce the debt load. A meaningful improvement in the debt dynamics will, essentially,
require a sustainable rise in real GDP.

Moreover, there will be a limit on how many assets the BOJ can buy to maintain its reflation
policy. Due to the aggressive QE programme under Abenomics, the BOJ has boosted its
bond holdings to 25% of outstanding Japanese government bonds, significantly higher
than the ratio of 10% two years ago. Based on the current pace of QE, the BOJ will
own 40% of government bonds by the end of 2016. A persistent and rapid rise in the
bond ownership ratio could fuel investors’ concerns about public debt monetisation, and
raise the risks of capital outflows and financial destabilisation. This will eventually put
constraints on the BOJ’s monetary policy.
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Tackling Tough Structural Challenges

S
tructural headwinds have been weighing on the Japanese economy for a long
time. The country’s potential growth has fallen to less than 1% since the 2000s,
sharply down from more than 4% in the 1980s (Diagram 7). The ageing of the
population has resulted in the shrinking of the domestic consumer market. This
has dampened incentives for Japanese firms to invest in the home market and prompted
them to explore opportunities in emerging economies overseas. Due to the rise in
overseas production ratio, the depreciation of the yen during the last two years failed to
lift domestic output and investment growth proportionately.

Diagram 7: Japan’s long-term GDP growth trend

%YoY
8

-2

-4

-6
1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013

Source: CEIC, Bloomberg

Productivity has also been weakened by insufficient market openness and rigid labour
market regulations. Weak productivity helped to explain why Japanese companies have
been hesitant to raise base wages, notwithstanding the increase in their profits and the
government’s push for wage hikes. From a long-term perspective, the ageing population
will bring about a shortage of labour supply and a structural increase in wage costs.
Without a pickup in productivity growth, unit labour costs would increase and trade
competitiveness would be eroded.

Reforms Are Not Easy

It is widely agreed that Japan needs comprehensive reforms to prevent a further decline
in its growth potential and a loss in competitiveness. In reality, however, reforms are
not easy to enact. Essentially, many of the structural issues are deeply rooted in Japan.
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Comprehensive reforms may induce significant social and cultural changes, which could
encounter resistance, not only from vested interest groups, but also the general public.

For instance, to tackle the challenge of the ageing population, the government would
need to encourage a higher birth rate, increase the labour participation of women and
older people, and open up immigration policies to bring in more foreign workers. To
do this would require a major shift in conservative and traditional attitudes among the
Japanese people.

To do this would require a major shift

in conservative and traditional attitudes
among the Japanese people

The same goes for other reforms. To boost productivity, Japanese companies and workers
would have to abandon many long-held ways and accept the lifting of many barriers
against foreign investment. To make the labour market far more flexible, Japan’s lifetime
employment system and seniority-based pay system would have to be scaled right back.

The government has proposed a long-term growth strategy under Abenomics – the so-
called “Third Arrow”. Its focus is on bringing market-friendly measures, such as cutting
corporate tax to boost investment and providing financial incentives to spur research
and development. But little has been done on profound reforms such as immigration,
investment access, and labour market deregulation.

Given that public resistance to drastic policy changes is potentially high, it is understandable
that the authorities prefer a cautious and gradual approach. As such, it would take a long
time for reforms to be fully implemented and to engender positive results in the economy.
There is a significant risk that the country’s potential growth will continue to decline for
the rest of this decade, because of these intrinsic drags.
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Impact of Abenomics on Asia

External Trade

W
hen Abenomics was introduced two years ago, there was widespread
concern that a much-depreciated yen would dramatically boost Japanese
exports at the expense of the trade competitiveness of other Asian
countries, particularly South Korea.

Diagram 8: Japan & Korea – export volume index

Jan 2010=100
180 Japan
170 Korea
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 Jan 13 Jan 14 Jan 15
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg

It was true that the fall in the value of the yen has boosted the export revenues of
Japanese firms. Measured by the volumes, however, Japan’s exports have continued to
move sideways. They have also underperformed in comparison to Korean exports by
a wide margin (Diagram 8). In terms of the market share in global trade, Japan’s has
declined, while South Korea’s has remained steady (Diagram 9).

Diagram 9: Leading exporters in world merchandise trade

2011 2012 2013

Rank Value Share Rank Value Share Rank Value Share
(USD bn) (%) (USD bn) (%) (USD bn) (%)
China 1 1898 10.4 1 2049 11.1 1 2209 11.7
US 2 1480 8.1 2 1546 8.4 2 1580 8.4
Germany 3 1472 8.1 3 1407 7.6 3 1453 7.7
Japan 4 823 4.5 4 799 4.3 4 715 3.8
Korea 7 555 3.0 7 548 3.0 7 560 3.0
Hong Kong 12 456 2.5 10 493 2.7 9 536 2.8
Singapore 14 410 2.2 14 408 2.2 14 410 2.2
Taiwan 18 308 1.7 18 301 1.6 20 313 1.7
India 19 305 1.7 19 294 1.6 19 305 1.6
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics
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As it has turned out, competitiveness does not just depend on exchange rates. It is also
dependent on wage costs, productivity, and non-price factors, such as technology,
product quality and brand. In order to enhance core competitiveness, Japanese firms
will need to spend the profits they make from a weak yen in the right areas, such as
technology advancement, innovation and human resource development. It will be a long-
term process, and success is not guaranteed.

Weak Yen and FDI Fears

There were also fears that a weak yen would see a decline in Japan’s foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the region. But these concerns, too, were overstated. The annual FDI
flows from Japan to emerging Asia amounted to 3.8 trillion yen in 2014, close to the 3.9
trillion yen level in 2013 and exceeding the 2.7 trillion yen in 2012 (Diagram 10). Japan’s
investment in China has declined due to political tensions, but that has been offset by an
increase in FDI to ASEAN countries.

Diagram 10: Japan’s outward FDI

JPY trn
14 Total FDI

12 FDI in Asia

10

0
1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg

In fact, FDI flows from Japan to emerging Asia have maintained a general uptrend during
the past three decades, except for the periods of 1999-2001 and 2009-2010 when the
region entered a severe economic downturn due to unexpected shocks. To Japanese
firms, emerging Asia offers an attractive business prospect because of its relatively
superior growth performance and high investment returns. Although Asia’s GDP growth
has come off the peak in recent years, its growth gap with Japan has remained positive
and significant.
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Moreover, the gap between emerging Asia’s economic size and Japan’s is widening.
The sum of Asia-10 GDP has surpassed Japan’s GDP since 2005. And the ratio between
the two has risen further to 2.0 in 2010 and 3.6 in 2014 (Diagram 11). The enormous
market size and potential demand in Asia should be enough to entice Japanese corporate
investors in the foreseeable future.

Diagram 11: Asia-10 & Japan – GDP gaps

nominal value, USD trn ratio, X times

18 4.0
Asia 10 / Japan (RHS)
16 3.5
Asia 10
14 Japan 3.0
12
2.5
10
2.0
8
1.5
6
1.0
4

2 0.5

0 0.0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Source: CEIC, Bloomberg
Note: Asia-10 represents Greater China, Korea, ASEAN 5, India

Note: Asia 10 represent Greater China, Korea, ASEAN 5, India

Portfolio Capital Flows
Many had also expected that the BOJ’s QE would induce more capital outflows from Japan
to other parts of the region. In reality, Japan’s investment in foreign equities and bonds
decreased at the initial stage when the new QE was introduced in 2013 (Diagram 12).
Compared with FDI, short-term financial investment is more susceptible to the exchange
rate movements. The rapid depreciation of the yen in 2013 prompted Japanese investors
to sell overseas financial assets, in order to convert them into the yen to take profits. As
the decline of the yen became gradual in 2014, Japanese investors started to reconsider
overseas investment opportunities and portfolio capital outflows increased again.

As long as there is not another round of foreign exchange fluctuations, Japan’s outward
portfolio investment should continue to increase. This should not be associated with the
BOJ’s QE per se.
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Diagram 12: Japan’s outward portfolio investment

JPY trn
25
Total
20
Asia

15

10

-5

-10
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Source: CEIC, Bloomberg

On the fundamental front, the negative growth and interest rate differentials between
Japan and the rest of the world should provide sufficient incentives for Japanese investors
to invest abroad.

Note that in order to enhance the return performance, the Government Pension
Investment Fund has adjusted its investment strategy for the next five years, reallocating
portfolios towards domestic equities, foreign equities and foreign bonds. This could serve
as a guide for the entire pension funds industry (which manages assets of 340 trillion yen
in total). That should lead to a more significant rise in portfolio capital outflows in the
coming years.
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Conclusion

S
o what lies ahead for Abenomics and the Japanese economy? From the short-term
cyclical perspective, it will likely stay on a modest recovery path in 2015-16, thanks
to a loose monetary policy and the postponement of fiscal consolidation.

A continued improvement in aggregate demand, employment and wage growth will

increase the chances of the economy climbing out of deflation. That said, the inflation
numbers are still likely to miss the BOJ’s ambitious target of 2% by a wide margin.

Further ahead, the downside risks facing the economy remain significant for the medium
to long term. A resumption of the sales tax hike implementation and fiscal policy tightening
could disrupt the recovery and trigger a temporary economic contraction in 2017. Further
afield, attention should also be given to the possibility of rising interest rates and higher
risk premium, due to a further shrinking of the domestic savings pool and deterioration
of the sovereign credit profile.

In order to achieve a sustainable recovery and preserve investor confidence, it will remain
crucial for the authorities to enact the supply-side reforms to directly revive the country’s
growth potential. Much still depends on the “Third Arrow” of Abenomics, i.e., the
progress of structural reforms to address the ageing population and the weakening of
productivity and competitiveness.

Among all the uncertainties for the longer term, a clear trend is that Japanese companies
and institutional investors will continue to explore opportunities in other parts of Asia in
an active manner. Relatively fast growth, high yields and expanding market size would
make emerging Asia increasingly attractive as an investment destination in the coming
years.

Much still depends on the

“Third Arrow” of Abenomics
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