G.R. No.

132362 June 28, 2001

PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated 30 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33982, "Pio Barretto
Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Perfecto A. Laguio, et al.," which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner, as
well as its Resolution dated 14 January 1998 denying reconsideration.

On 2 October 1984 respondent Honor P. Moslares instituted an action for annulment of sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against the Testate Estate of Nicolai Drepin represented by its Judicial Administrator Atty. Tomas Trinidad and petitioner Pio Barretto
Realty Development Corporation. Moslares alleged that the Deed of Sale over four (4) parcels of land of the Drepin Estate executed in favor of
the Barretto Realty was null and void on the ground that the same parcels of land had already been sold to him by the deceased Nicolai Drepin.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27008 and raffled to respondent Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., RTC-Br. 18, Manila.

On 2 May 1986 the parties, to settle the case, executed a Compromise Agreement pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder -

1. The Parties agree to sell the Estate, subject matter of the instant case, which is composed of the following real estate properties,
to wit:

a. Three (3) titled properties covered by TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 505411 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal, with a total area of 80 hectares, more or less, and

b. Untitled Property, subject matter of (a) Land Registration Case No. 1602 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro
Manila, with an area of 81 hectares, more or less,

subject to the following situations and conditions, to wit:

a. If plaintiff Honor P. Moslares x x x buys the property, he is under obligation, as follows:

1. To reimburse and pay Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, represented by Anthony
Que, its capital investment of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, and

2. To pay the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, represented by the Judicial Administrator, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, the
sum of One Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P1,350,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency

b. If defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, represented by Mr. Anthony Que x x x continue[s] to buy
the property, it shall pay for the interests of plaintiff Honor P. Moslares:

1. The sum of One Million (P1,000.000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency to plaintiff Honor P. Moslares personally
and

2. Pay to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, through the Judicial Administrator, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, the balance of
the agreed purchase price subject to negotiation and verification of payments already made.

2. In the event that plaintiff Honor P. Moslares buys the Estate and pays in full the amount of Three Million (P3,000,000.00)
Philippine Currency to defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, and the full sum of One Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P1,350,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, through Atty. Tomas Trinidad, defendant Pio
Barretto shall execute the corresponding Deed of Conveyance in favor of plaintiff Honor P. Moslares and deliver to him all the titles
and pertinent papers to the Estate.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto hereby sign this Compromise Agreement at Manila, Philippines, this 2nd day of May
1986 x x x x x x x x x x x x

On 24 July 1986 the trial court rendered a decision approving the Compromise Agreement.2 However, subsequent disagreements arose on the
question of who bought the properties first.

It must be noted that the Compromise Agreement merely gave Moslares and Barretto Realty options to buy the disputed lots thus implicitly
recognizing that the one who paid first had priority in right. Moslares claimed that he bought the lots first on 15 January 1990 by delivering to
Atty. Tomas Trinidad two (2) PBCom checks, one (1) in favor of Barretto Realty for P3 million, and the other, in favor of the Drepin Estate
for P1.35 million.

But petitioner Barretto Realty denied receiving the check. Instead, it claimed that it bought the properties on 7 March 1990 by tendering a
Traders Royal Bank Manager's Check for P1million to Moslares, and a Far East Bank and Trust Company Cashier's Check for P1 million and a
Traders Royal Bank Manager's Check for P350,000.00 to Atty. Tomas Trinidad as Judicial Administrator of the Estate. However, Moslares and
Atty. Trinidad refused to accept the checks.
Consequently, Barretto Realty filed a motion before the trial court alleging that it complied with its monetary obligations under
the Compromise Agreement but that its offers of payment were refused, and prayed that a writ of execution be issued to compel Moslares and
Atty. Trinidad to comply with the Compromise Agreement and that the latter be directed to turn over the owner's duplicate certificates of title
over the lots.

On 10 May 19903 Judge Laguio, Jr. ordered that "a writ of execution be issued for the enforcement of the decision of this Court for the parties
to deposit with this Court, thru the City Treasurer's Office of Manila, their respective monetary obligations under the compromise agreement
that had been executed by them x x x x"

Reacting to the order, Atty. Trinidad for the Estate filed an urgent motion to hold the execution in abeyance on the ground that there was
another case involving the issue of ownership over subject lots pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. Moslares in turn filed a
motion for reconsideration while Barretto Realty moved to amend the order since the lower court did not exactly grant what it prayed for.

On 14 June 1990, ruling on the three (3) motions, Judge Laguio, Jr., issued his Order -

Considering Defendant Judicial Administrator's urgent motion to hold in abeyance x x x the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration,
and the Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.'s opposition to both motions x x x this Court finds the two motions without
merit and are accordingly, denied.

As regards Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.'s ex-parte motion to amend order x x x the same is hereby granted and the deputy
sheriff of this Court is allowed to deliver to the parties concerned thru their counsels the bank certified checks mentioned in par. 2 of
the motion (underscoring ours).4

On 20 June 1990 Deputy Sheriff Apolonio L. Golfo of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila, implemented the order by personally delivering the checks issued
by Barretto Realty in favor of Moslares and the Estate to Atty. Pedro S. Ravelo, counsel for Moslares, and to Atty. Tomas Trinidad, respectively,
as recorded in a Sheriff's Return dated 25 June 1990.5

However, on 17 September 1993, or more than three (3) years later, Moslares filed a Motion for Execution alleging that he bought the lots
subject of the Compromise Agreement on 15 January 1990 and that he paid the amounts specified as payment therefor. He asked that Barretto
Realty be directed to execute a deed of conveyance over subject lots in his favor. In a Supplement to his motion Moslares contended that the
previous tender of the checks by Barretto Realty did not produce the effect of payment because checks, according to jurisprudence, were not
legal tender.

Respondent Judge granted Moslares' Motion for Execution. Consequently, on 8 November 1993 Barretto Realty was ordered to execute a deed
of conveyance over the subject lots in favor of Moslares.

Aggrieved, Barretto Realty moved for reconsideration alleging that respondent Judge could no longer grant Moslares' motion since the prior
sale of subject lots in its favor had already been recognized when the court sheriff was directed to deliver, and did in fact deliver, the checks it
issued in payment therefor to Moslares and Atty. Trinidad.

On 7 December 1993 respondent Judge granted the motion of Barretto Realty for reconsideration and ruled -

Considering the motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution filed by defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc.,
dated 16 November 1993, together with the plaintiff's comment and/or opposition thereto, dated 18 November 1993, and the
movant's reply to the opposition etc., dated 20 November 1993, this Court finds the motion well taken. The record shows that on 10
May 1990, a writ of execution was issued by this Court for the parties to deposit with the Court, thru the City Treasurer's Office of
Manila, their respective monetary obligations under the compromise agreement that they had executed, and that it was only
defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc. that had complied therewith, per the return of this Court's deputy sheriff, Apolonio L.
Golfo, dated June 25, 1990. Such being the case, Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc., is the absolute owner of the real
properties in question and the issue on such ownership is now a closed matter.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc.'s motion for reconsideration etc., dated November 16, 1993, is hereby
granted; this Court's order, dated November 8, 1993, is reconsidered and set aside, and the writ of execution of the same date
against Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc. is ordered quashed (underscoring ours).6

Within a reglementary period Moslares moved to reconsider insisting that Barretto Realty's payment by check was not valid because (a) the
check was not delivered personally to him but to his counsel Atty. Pedro Ravelo, (b) the check was not encashed hence did not produce the
effect of payment; and, (c) the check was not legal tender per judicial pronouncements. Barretto Realty opposed the motion, but to no avail. On
11 February 1994 respondent Judge granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside his Order of 7 December 1993. Judge Laguio ruled
that Barretto Realty's payment through checks was not valid because "a check is not legal tender and it cannot produce the effect of payment
until it is encashed x x x x the check in question has neither been negotiated nor encashed by the plaintiff."7 At the same time, however,
Moslares' alleged payment of P3,000,000.00 on 15 January 1990 intended for Barretto Realty but delivered to Atty. Tomas Trinidad was
likewise decreed as not valid because the latter was not authorized to accept payment for Barretto Realty.

Invoking interest of justice and equity, respondent Judge resolved to: (a) set aside its ruling contained in its order of 7 December 1993 that
"(d)efendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc., is the absolute owner of the property in question and the issue on such ownership is now a
closed matter;" (b) order the plaintiff (should he desire to exercise his option to buy the real property in question) to pay defendant Pio
Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc., the sum of P3,000,000.00 within five (5) days from notice thereof by way of reimbursement of the latter's
capital investment; and, (c) order defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, Inc., to pay the plaintiff (in the event the latter
should fail to exercise his said option and the former would want to buy the real property in question) the sum of P1,000,000.00.

But Moslares failed to exercise his option and pay the amount within the five (5)-day period granted him. Instead, he filed a Supplemental
Motion to Pay praying that he be given additional seven (7) days within which to do so. Barretto Realty opposed and invoked par. 3 of the Order
of 11 February 1994 granting it the option to buy the lots in the event that Moslares should fail to pay within the period given him. Barretto
Realty prayed that the P1 million cashier's check still in Moslares' possession be considered as sufficient compliance with the pertinent
provision of the court's order. Later, Barretto Realty offered to exchange the check with cash. When Moslares did not appear however at the
designated time for payment on 10 March 1994 before the Branch Clerk of Court, Barretto Realty filed a motion for consignation praying that it
be allowed to deposit the P1,000,000.00 payment with the cashier of the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Respondent Judge however failed to act on the motion as he went on vacation leave. For reasons which do not clearly appear in the record,
Judge Rosalio G. dela Rosa, Executive Judge of the RTC, Manila, acted on the motion and granted the prayer of Barretto Realty.8 Upon the
return of respondent Judge Laguio from his vacation, petitioner Barretto Realty immediately filed a motion for his inhibition on the ground that
he had already lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as evident from his "seesaw" orders in the case. On 28 March 1994 respondent
Judge denied the motion for his inhibition. Moslares for his part moved for reconsideration of Executive Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March
1994.

On 15 April 1994, in a Consolidated Order, respondent Judge Laguio set aside the questioned order of Executive Judge dela Rosa on the ground
that the motion for consignation should have been referred to the pairing judge of Branch 18, Judge Zenaida Daguna of Branch 19. Respondent
Judge further ruled that the questioned order was premature since there were pending motions, namely, Moslares' Supplemental Motion to
Pay dated 1 March 1994, and Motion to Deposit dated 9 March 1994 which were both filed earlier than Barretto Realty's Motion for
Consignation which however remained unresolved.

Respondent Judge Laguio found Moslares' motions meritorious and granted them. Moslares was thus given a non-extendible grace period of
three (3) days within which to pay the P3,000,000.00 to Barretto Realty. Moslares then deposited the amount with the Branch Clerk of Court of
Br. 18 within two (2) days from receipt of the order of respondent Judge, and on 25 April 1994 filed a motion for the Clerk of Court to be
authorized to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in his favor.

On 2 May 1994 Barretto Realty filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of respondent Judge dated 28 March 1994 and 15 April 1994 on the ground that they
were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Meanwhile, on 12 October 1994 or during the pendency of the petition, respondent Judge granted Moslares' motion and authorized the Clerk
of Court to execute the deed of conveyance in his favor. The implementation of the order however was enjoined by the Court of Appeals on 9
December 1994 when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction barring the issuance of the writ until further orders from the court.

In its Petition and Memorandum petitioner specifically alleged that respondent Judge's Orders of 8 November 1993,9 11 February 1994,10 15
April 1994,11 and 12 October 199412were all issued with grave abuse of discretion as the trial court had no more jurisdiction to issue such orders
since the Compromise Agreement of 2 May 1986 which was the basis of the decision of 24 July 1986 had already been executed and
implemented in its favor way back on 20 June 1990.

Petitioner likewise contended that the Order of 28 March 199413denying petitioner's motion for inhibition was void because it did not state the
legal basis thereof; that respondent Judge displayed obvious bias and prejudice when he issued "seesaw" orders in the case; and, that the bias
in favor of Moslares was apparent when respondent Judge granted the former another three (3)-day period within which to pay the P3 million
notwithstanding the fact that Moslares failed to comply with the original five (5)-day period given him. With respect to Executive Judge dela
Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994, petitioner contended that there was no rule of procedure prohibiting the Executive Judge from acting on an
urgent motion even if the pairing judge of the judge to whom the case was raffled was present.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the denial by respondent Judge of the motion for his inhibition was not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Aside from the fact that judges are given a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether
to voluntarily recuse themselves from a case, which is not lightly interfered with, the appellate court however observed that the orders and
resolutions issued by respondent Judge in the five (5) years he had been presiding over Civil Case No. 84-27008 indicated that they were not
uniformly issued in favor of one or the other party. As petitioner itself aptly described, respondent Judge's actuations in the case "seesawed"
between the parties.

On the matter of the validity of Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994 granting petitioner's motion for consignation, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the order was precipitate and unauthorized not only because the motion did not comply with the requisites for litigated motions but
also because Judge dela Rosa had no judicial authority to act on the case. His duties as Executive Judge were purely administrative and did not
include acting on a case assigned to another judge.

With respect to the two (2) writs of execution, one dated 10 May 1990 in favor of petitioner, and the other dated 11 February 1994 in favor of
respondent, the Court of Appeals ruled -

Lastly, anent the existence of two writs of execution, first one for petitioner and the second for Moslares which the former has
repeatedly cited as capricious and whimsical exercise of judicial discretion by respondent Judge, the records reveal that on 10 May
1990 a writ of execution was issued in favor of the petitioner upon its motion. For reasons of its own, petitioner did not pursue its
effective and fruitful implementation in accordance with the decision based on a compromise agreement, spelling out the respective
monetary obligations of petitioner and Moslares. Hence, after the lapse of at least one year, Moslares filed a motion for execution of
the same decision x x x x [I]t cannot be said that respondent Judge issued two conflicting orders sans any legal basis. What really
happened was that the matter of the first order granting execution in favor of petitioner was repeatedly put at issue until the order
of the court dated 11 February 1994 x x x x Observedly, the said order was never elevated by petitioner to the appellate courts.
Instead, he agreed with it by filing a "Manifestation and Motion" on 01 March 1994 praying that theP1 Million Cashier's Check still in
the possession of Moslares be considered compliance with paragraph 3 of that order x x x x

On 14 January 1998 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred (a) in concluding that petitioner did not pursue the effective and fruitful implementation of
the writ of execution dated 10 May 1990 in its favor, (b) in not setting aside Judge Laguio's Orders dated 11 February 1994, 15 April 1994 and
12 October 1994 as patent nullities, and, (c) in disregarding jurisprudence declaring that cashier's or manager's checks are deemed cash or as
good as the money they represent.
We grant the petition. Final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correct
errors which are clerical in nature. They become the law of the case and are immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or
incorrectness.14 Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose
are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.15 The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some
definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.16

It is not disputed, and in fact borne by the records, that petitioner bought the disputed lots of the Drepin Estate subject matter of
the Compromise Agreement ahead of Moslares and that the checks issued in payment thereof were even personally delivered by the Deputy
Sheriff of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge dated 14 June 1990 after tender was refused by Moslares and the Drepin
Estate. Respondent Moslares never raised the invalidity of the payment through checks either through a motion for reconsideration or a timely
appeal. Hence, with the complete execution and satisfaction of the Decision dated 24 July 1986 which approved theCompromise Agreement,
Civil Case No. 84-27008 became closed and terminated leaving nothing else to be done by the trial court with respect thereto.17 As petitioner
correctly contended, the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that petitioner did not pursue the fruitful and effective implementation of
the writ of execution in its favor. As already stated petitioner paid for the lots through the court-sanctioned procedure outlined above. There
was no more need for the Drepin Estate, owner of the lots, to execute a deed of conveyance in petitioner's favor because it had already done
so on 10 October 1980. In fact the disputed lots were already registered in petitioner's name under TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541 as a
consequence thereof. That was also why in the penultimate paragraph of the Compromise Agreement it was provided that in the event
respondent Moslares bought the lots ahead of petitioner Barretto Realty the latter, not the Drepin Estate, was to execute the corresponding
deed of conveyance and deliver all the titles and pertinent papers to respondent Moslares. There was therefore nothing more to be done by
way of fruitful and effective implementation.

Clearly then respondent Judge Laguio no longer had any jurisdiction whatsoever to act on, much less grant, the motion for execution and
supplement thereto filed by Moslares on 17 September 1993 or more than three (3) years later, claiming that he had already bought the lots.
The fact that the check paid to him by Barretto Realty was never encashed should not be invoked against the latter. As already stated, Moslares
never questioned the tender done three (3) years earlier. Besides, while delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is
encashed, the rule is otherwise if the debtor was prejudiced by the creditor's unreasonable delay in presentment. Acceptance of a check
implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment. If no such presentment was made, the drawer cannot be held liable
irrespective of loss or injury sustained by the payee. Payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as
conditional payment will be discharged.18

Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Laguio's Order dated 8 November 1993 which granted private respondent's motion for execution
thus nullifying the 1990 sale in favor of petitioner after he had in effect approved such sale in his Order of 14 June 1990 and after such order
had already become final and executory, amounted to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, for which reason, all further orders stemming therefrom are also null and void and without effect.19

The principle of laches does not attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.20 The fact that petitioner invoked par. 3 of
the Order of 11 February 1994 praying that its P1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares' possession be considered sufficient payment of the
disputed lots, could not be cited against it. For one thing, petitioner from the very start had always consistently questioned and assailed the
jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain respondent's motion for execution filed three (3) years after the case had in fact been executed.
Secondly, estoppel being an equitable doctrine cannot be invoked to perpetuate an injustice.21

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 June 1997 and 14 January 1998, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of respondent Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio Jr. dated 11 February 1994 in Civil Case No. 84-27008,
setting aside his earlier ruling of 7 December 1993 which had declared petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation as the absolute
owner of the real properties in question, and all subsequent proceedings culminating in the Order of 12 October 1994 authorizing the Clerk of
Court, RTC-Manila, to execute a deed of conveyance over subject properties in favor of respondent Honor P. Moslares, are
declared NULL and VOID for want of jurisdiction.

Consequently, petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation is declared the absolute owner of the disputed properties subject
matter of the Compromise Agreement dated 2 May 1986 as fully implemented by the Deputy Sheriff, RTC-Br. 18, Manila, pursuant to the final
and executory Order dated 14 June 1990 of its Presiding Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 160855 April 16, 2008

CONCEPCION CHUA GAW, petitioner,

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 and Resolution2 denying the
motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a Complaint for Sum of Money in favor
of the plaintiff.

The antecedents are as follows:

Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises3 namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and
Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc
Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his only surviving
heirs. At the time of Chua Chin’s death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20.4
On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-
Heir5 (Deed of Partition, for brevity), wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof will pertain to
the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided among
Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00 each.6 In said document, Chan Chi and the six children
likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.

In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00
which they will use for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable within six (6)
months without interest.7 On June 7, 1988, respondent issued in their favor China Banking Corporation Check No. 2408108 for P200,000.00
which he delivered to the couple’s house in Marilao, Bulacan. Antonio later encashed the check.

On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration
of P255,000.00 in favor of respondent.9

Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent within the designated period. Respondent sent the
couple a demand letter,10 dated March 25, 1991, requesting them to settle their obligation with the warning that he will be constrained to take
the appropriate legal action if they fail to do so.

Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the RTC. The complaint alleged that
on June 7, 1988, he extended a loan to the spouses Gaw for P200,000.00, payable within six months without interest, but despite several
demands, the couple failed to pay their obligation.11

In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw contended that the P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioner’s share in the
profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one of her family’s businesses. According to the spouses, when they transferred residence to Marilao, Bulacan,
petitioner asked respondent for an accounting, and payment of her share in the profits, of Capital Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood
Industries Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber. They claimed that respondent persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego her demand as it
would offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To insure that she will defer her demand, respondent
allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber.12

In his Reply, respondent averred that the spouses Gaw did not demand from him an accounting of Capitol Sawmills Corporation, Columbia
Wood Industries, and Hagonoy Lumber. He asserted that the spouses Gaw, in fact, have no right whatsoever in these businesses that would
entitle them to an accounting thereof. Respondent insisted that the P200,000.00 was given to and accepted by them as a loan and not as their
share in Hagonoy Lumber.13

With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended Compulsory Counterclaim) wherein they insisted that petitioner, as one
of the compulsory heirs, is entitled to one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy Lumber, which the respondent has arrogated to himself. They claimed that,
despite repeated demands, respondent has failed and refused to account for the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver her share
therein. They then prayed that respondent make an accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver to petitioner her one-sixth
(1/6) share thereof, which was estimated to be worth not less than P500,000.00.14

In his Answer to Amended Counterclaim, respondent explained that his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber
when the heirs executed the Deed of Partition on December 8, 1986. In turn, he became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought it
from Chua Sioc Huan, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990.15

Defendants, in their reply,16 countered that the documents on which plaintiff anchors his claim of ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were not
true and valid agreements and do not express the real intention of the parties. They claimed that these documents are mere paper
arrangements which were prepared only upon the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could reach and sign a final and binding agreement,
which, up to such time, has not been executed by the heirs.17

During trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section 10, Rule 132. On direct examination,
respondent testified that Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese citizens.
He narrated that, initially, his father leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his father
constructed the two-storey concrete building standing thereon. According to respondent, when he was in high school, it was his father who
managed the business but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, managed Hogonoy Lumber together
with their other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school, but he stopped when he
got married and found another job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating.18

On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other
stockholders on January 1, 1991. He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed
by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed
of Sale dated August 1, 1990. 19

On re-direct examination, respondent stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in
cash. He also paid the purchase price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a separate receipt as he
merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas, Valenzuela. Although he maintains several accounts at Planters
Bank, Paluwagan ng Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the amount in the
house because he was engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public market. 20

On December 10, 1998, Antonio Gaw died due to cardio vascular and respiratory failure.21

On February 11, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgement ordering defendant Concepcion Chua Gaw to pay
the [respondent] the following:
 1. P200,000.00 representing the principal obligation with legal interest from judicial demand or the institution of the complaint on
November 19, 1991;

2. P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

3. Costs of suit.

The defendants’ counterclaim is hereby dismissed for being devoid of merit.

SO ORDERED.22

The RTC held that respondent is entitled to the payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with interest. It noted that respondent personally issued
Check No. 240810 to petitioner and her husband upon their request to lend them the aforesaid amount. The trial court concluded that
the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the respondent from his own funds and not remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber
nor petitioner’s advance share in the profits of their parents’ businesses.

The trial court further held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership
of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to respondent, was never impugned. Although respondent failed to produce the originals of the
documents, petitioner judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even acknowledged her signature thereon, thus
constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. As for the Deed of Sale, since the contents thereof have not been put in issue, the non-
presentation of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its contents. Also, the parties to the
documents themselves do not contest their validity. Ultimately, petitioner failed to establish her right to demand an accounting of the
operations of Hagonoy Lumber nor the delivery of her 1/6 share therein.

As for petitioner’s claim that an accounting be done on Capitol Sawmill Corporation and Columbia Wood Industries, the trial court held that
respondent is under no obligation to make such an accounting since he is not charged with operating these enterprises.23

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court erred (1) when it considered the amount ofP200,000.00 as a loan
obligation and not Concepcion’s share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber; (2) when it considered as evidence for the defendant, plaintiff’s
testimony when he was called to testify as an adverse party under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; and (3) when it considered
admissible mere copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of Sale to prove that respondent is now the owner of Hagonoy Lumber.24

On May 23, 2003, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. 25 The appellate court found baseless the petitioner’s argument that the RTC should
not have included respondent’s testimony as part of petitioner’s evidence. The CA noted that the petitioner went on a fishing expedition, the
taking of respondent’s testimony having taken up a total of eleven hearings, and upon failing to obtain favorable information from the
respondent, she now disclaims the same. Moreover, the CA held that the petitioner failed to show that the inclusion of respondent’s testimony
in the statement of facts in the assailed decision unduly prejudiced her defense and counterclaims. In fact, the CA noted that the facts testified
to by respondent were deducible from the totality of the evidence presented.

The CA likewise found untenable petitioner’s claim that Exhibits "H" (Deed of Sale) and Exhibit "I" (Deed of Partition) were merely temporary
paper arrangements. The CA agreed with the RTC that the testimony of petitioner regarding the matter was uncorroborated — she should have
presented the other heirs to attest to the truth of her allegation. Instead, petitioner admitted the due execution of the said documents. Since
petitioner did not dispute the due execution and existence of Exhibits "H" and "I", there was no need to produce the originals of the documents
in accordance with the best evidence rule.26

On December 2, 2003, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.27

Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following errors:

I. THAT ON THE PRELIMINARY IMPORTANT RELATED ISSUE, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED IN THE
APPLICATION AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RULE ON EXAMINATION OF ADVERSE PARTY OR HOSTILE WITNESS UNDER SECTION
10 (d) AND (e) OF RULE 132, CAUSING SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE LOWER COURT’S APPEALED DECISION’S OBJECTIVITY,ANNEX "C".

II. THAT ON THE IMPORTANT LEGAL ISSUE RELATIVE TO THE AFORESAID TWO OPPOSING CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER,
CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED UNDER THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION ANNEX "C" AND THE
QUESTIONED DECISION OF MAY 23, 2003 (ANNEX "A") AND THE RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 2, 2003, (ANNEX "B") IN DEVIATING
FROM AND DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ENJOINING COURTS NOT TO OVERLOOK OR MISINTERPRET
IMPORTANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND WHICH ARE OF
GREAT WEIGHT AND VALUE, WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE RESULT OF THE CASE AND ARRIVE AT A JUST, FAIR AND OBJECTIVE
DECISION. (Citations omitted)

III. THAT FINALLY, AS TO THE OTHER LEGAL IMPORTANT ISSUE RELATIVE TO CLAIM OR OWNERSHIP OF THE "Hagonoy Lumber"
FAMILY BUSINESS, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED ON THE REQUIREMENTS AND CORRECT
APPLICATION OF THE "BEST EVIDENCE RULE" UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. 28

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTC’s treatment of the respondent’s testimony as adverse witness during cross-
examination by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Petitioner argues that the adverse witness’ testimony elicited during cross-examination
should not be considered as evidence of the calling party. She contends that the examination of respondent as adverse witness did not make
him her witness and she is not bound by his testimony, particularly during cross-examination by his own counsel.29 In particular, the petitioner
avers that the following testimony of the respondent as adverse witness should not be considered as her evidence:
 (11.a) That RESPONDENT-Appellee became owner of the "HAGONOY LUMBER" business when he bought the same from Chua Sioc
Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990 (EXH.H);

(11.b) That the "HAGONOY LUMBER," on the other hand, was acquired by the sister Chua Sioc Huan, by virtue of Extrajudicial
Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in favor of a Co-Heir (EXH. I);

(11.c) That the 3 lots on which the "HAGONOY LUMBER" business is located were acquired by Lu Pieng from the Santos family under
the Deed of Absolute Sale (EXH. J); that Lu Pieng sold the Lots to Chua Suy Lu in 1976 (EXHS. K, L, & M.); that Chua Siok Huan
eventually became owner of the 3 Lots; and in 1989 Chua Sioc Huan sold them to RESPONDENT-Appellee (EXHS. Q and P); that after
he acquired the 3 Lots, he has not sold them to anyone and he is the owner of the lots.30

We do not agree that petitioner’s case was prejudiced by the RTC’s treatment of the respondent’s testimony during cross-examination as her
evidence.

If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondent’s testimony as adverse witness during cross-
examination by his own counsel, it constitute a harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.

In the first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the other is only significant in determining
whether the party on whose shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. In
civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece
of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of
evidence is then determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually
presented it.31

That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be bound by the former’s testimony. The fact
remains that it was at his instance that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach
an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,32 except by evidence of his bad character.33 Under a rule
permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch for the witness’ veracity, he is nonetheless bound
by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.34

A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latter’s testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by
introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.35 A rule that provides that the party calling an
adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that
the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.36 This, the petitioner failed to do.

In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondent’s testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his
sole property. The petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Chua Siok Huan
was only temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to
Chua Siok Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning
Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim over the business.

Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented.37 All the parties to the case, therefore,
are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.38 As already mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the
entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital
consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the apposite probative
weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence
becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony.

Significantly, the RTC’s finding that the P200,000.00 was given to the petitioner and her husband as a loan is supported by the evidence on
record. Hence, we do not agree with the petitioner’s contention that the RTC has overlooked certain facts of great weight and value in arriving
at its decision. The RTC merely took into consideration evidence which it found to be more credible than the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of the petitioner.

At this juncture, we reiterate the well-entrenched doctrine that the findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court are accorded
great respect, even finality, by this Court. Only errors of law, not of fact, may be reviewed by this Court in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.39 A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the
findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record.40 There is no reason to apply the
exception in the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the trial court. These findings are
buttressed by the evidence on record. Moreover, the issues and errors alleged in this petition are substantially the very same questions of fact
raised by petitioner in the appellate court.

On the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was really a loan, it is well to remember that a check may be evidence of indebtedness.41 A check, the
entries of which are in writing, could prove a loan transaction.42 It is pure naiveté to insist that an entrepreneur who has several sources of
income and has access to considerable bank credit, no longer has any reason to borrow any amount.

The petitioner’s allegation that the P200,000.00 was advance on her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber is implausible. It is true that
Hagonoy Lumber was originally owned by the parents of petitioner and respondent. However, on December 8, 1986, the heirs freely renounced
and waived in favor of their sister Chua Sioc Huan all their hereditary shares and interest therein, as shown by the Deed of Partition which the
petitioner herself signed. By virtue of this deed, Chua Sioc Huan became the sole owner and proprietor of Hagonoy Lumber. Thus, when the
respondent delivered the check for P200,000.00 to the petitioner on June 7, 1988, Chua Sioc Huan was already the sole owner of Hagonoy
Lumber. At that time, both petitioner and respondent no longer had any interest in the business enterprise; neither had a right to demand a
share in the profits of the business. Respondent became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber only after Chua Sioc Huan sold it to him on August
1, 1990. So, when the respondent delivered to the petitioner the P200,000.00 check on June 7, 1988, it could not have been given as an
advance on petitioner’s share in the business, because at that moment in time both of them had no participation, interest or share in Hagonoy
Lumber. Even assuming, arguendo, that the check was an advance on the petitioner’s share in the profits of the business, it was highly unlikely
that the respondent would deliver a check drawn against his personal, and not against the business enterprise’s account.

It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale were acknowledged before a Notary Public. The notarization of a
private document converts it into a public document, and makes it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.43 It is entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face.44 A notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to its due execution, and documents acknowledged
before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. Such a document must be given full force and effect absent a strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects recognized by law.45 A public document executed and
attested through the intervention of a notary public is, generally, evidence of the facts therein express in clear unequivocal manner.46

Petitioner, however, maintains that the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale in
violation of the best evidence rule. In addition, petitioner insists that the Deed of Sale was not the result of bona fide negotiations between a
true seller and buyer.

The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,47 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other
substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original.48 Moreover, production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production.49

Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed;
hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution and
admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.50 As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution
when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules.51 The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not express
the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of
counsel.52 Apparently, the petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous agreement
that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.

An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence
of the intention of the parties.53 The parties’ intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post
facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract.54 Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.55

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 dated May 23, 2003
and Resolution dated December 2, 2003 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 123567 June 5, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal by accused Roberto Tongko from the Decision of the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 156 finding him guilty of estafa under Article
315 (2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced to suffer twenty seven (27) years of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify Carmelita v.
Santos by way of actual damges in the sum of P100,000.00 and to pay the cost of suit.

Accused was charged under the following Information:

That on or about the 20th day of August, 1993, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of deceit and false pretenses committed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraudulent acts, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make or draw and issue to one, Carmelita Santos to apply on account or for value, the check described below:

BANK CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT

Phil. Amanah Bank 203729 12-20-93 P10,000.00

Phil. Amanah Bank 203730 12-20-93 10,000.00

Phil. Amanah Bank 203731 12-20-93 10,000.00

Phil. Amanah Bank 203732 12-20-93 10,000.00

Phil. Amanah Bank 203733 12-20-93 10,000.00

Phil. Amanah Bank 203738 12-20-93 10,000.00

Phil. Amanah Bank 203739 12-20-93 10,000.00

Phil. Amanah Bank 203740 12-20-93 10,000.00

Phil. Amanah Bank 203741 12-20-93 10,000.00

said accused well knowing at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face amount of such check upon presentment which check when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"
and despite the lapse of three (3) banking days from receipt of notice that said check has been dishonored, the accused
failed to pay said payee the face amount of such check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof, to the damage
and prejudice of said Carmelita Santos in the total amount of P100,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Accused pled not quilty and underwent trial.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 21, 1990, accused opened savings and current account with Amanah Bank. 1 In the
morning of August 20, 1993, Marites Bo-ot brought the accused to the office of Carmelita V. Santos at Room 504 Pacific Place, Pearl Drive,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City to borrow money. 2 The accused asked for P50,000.00 to be paid not later than December 1993. 3 He assured
Santos that his receivables would come in by November 1993. He persuaded Santos to give the loan by issuing five (5) check, each in the sum
of P10,000.00, postdated December 20, 1993 and by signing a promissory note. 4 The promissory note was co-signed by Bo-ot. In the
afternoon of the same date, the accused returned to Santos and borrowed an additional P50,000.00. Again, he issued five (5) checks, each
worth P10,000.00 postdated December 20, 1993. He also signed a promissory note together with Bo-ot. 5

On September 14, 1993, Amanah Bank closed accused's current account for lack of funds. On October 19, 1993, accused himself requested
for the closing of his savings account. 6

Santos did not present accused's checks to the drawee bank on their due date upon the request of accused himself. 7 Instead, the checks
were presented on March 1, 1994 but were dishonored as accused's accounts had been closed. 8 Accused was informed that his checks had
bounced. He promised to make good the checks. He failed to redeem his promise, hence, the case at bar. 9

The accused testified for himself. Nobody corroborated his testimony. He admitted the evidence of the prosecution but alleged that the
postdated checks were issued a day or two after he signed the promissory notes. 10 Obviously, he was relying on the defense that the checks
were in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

As aforestated, the trial court convicted the accused. He appealed to this Court and changed his counsel. 11 He now contends:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE TEN (10) POSTDATED CHECKS (EXHS. "C" TO "L") BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSTITUTED FRAUD WHICH INDUCED THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO EXTEND THE
LOANS. IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE INDUCEMENT WAS THE EXECUTION OF THE TWO (2) PROMISSORY
NOTES AS WELL AS THE CO-SIGNING THEREOF BY MA. THERESA DEL ROSARIO BO-OT (WHO INTRODUCED ACCUSED-
APPELLANT TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT), IN A JOINT AND SEVERAL CAPACITY.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE POST-DATED CHECKS WERE IN PAYMENT OF PRE-EXISTING
OBLIGATIONS.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF ESTAFA AS CHARGED, AND IN IMPOSING A
STIFF PRISON TERM OF 27 YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, A PENALTY "TOO HARSH AND OUT OF PROPORTION" AS
TO BE VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

The appeal is without merit.

Estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 4885, has the following elements: (1)
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to
cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.

To avoid the first element, appellant contends that he was able to borrow P100,000.00 from Santos due to the promissory notes he co-
signed with Bo-ot and not due to the postdated checks he issued. We reject this contention. Firstly, this contention was contrived only after
appellant's conviction in the trial court. The records show that appellant did not raise this defense in the trial court. He cannot fault the trial
court for failing to consider a defense which he never raised. Secondly, Santos is the best person who can testify on what induced her to lend
P100,000.00 to the appellant. Santos categorically declared that it was the issuance of postdated checks which persuaded her to part with
her money. We quote her testimony, viz.: 12

Q What happened to those checks you mentioned in the promissory note?

A When presented to the bank they were all returned by the bank for reason, account closed.

Q Before this was deposited to the bank when the accused came to your office and loaned
money from you, what was his representation if any to you?

A That his collection will come in by Nov. 1993 and also the checks issued to me will be definitely
funded on the date that it will become due.

Q Were you persuaded as a result of the statement of the accused that these checks will be good
that you parted away the amount?

A Yes, sir.

There is likewise no merit to the submission of appellant that his postdated checks were in payment of a pre-existing obligation. Again, we
note appellant's change of theory in foisting this argument. In the trial court, appellant testified that he issued the postdated checks, thru
Bo-ot, a day or two after he obtained the P100,000.00 loan from Santos. 13 The falsity of the uncorroborated claim, however, is too obvious
and the trial court correctly rejected it. The claim cannot succeed in light of Santos' testimony that the issuance of said checks persuaded her
to grant the loans. A look at the two promissory notes will show that they bear the date August 20, 1993 and they referred to the postdated
checks issued by the appellant. There could be no reference to the postdated checks if they were issued a day or two after the loans. In this
appeal, however, appellant offers the new thesis that since the checks were postdated December 1993, ergo, they were issued in payment
of the P100,000.00 he got from Santos on August 20, 1993. The postdating of the checks to December 1993 simply means that on said date
the checks would be properly funded. It does not mean that the checks should be deemed as issued only on December 1993.

Lastly, appellant contends that the penalty of twenty seven (27) years of reclusion perpetua is too harsh and out of proportion to the crime
he committed. He submits that his sentence violates section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. We are not persuaded. In People v. de la Cruz, 14 we held that ". . . the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
apply to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete . . . for instance those
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like . . ." InPeople
v. Estoista, 15 we further held:

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."

The legislature was not thoughtless in imposing severe penalties for violation of par. 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
The history of the law will show that the severe penalties were intended to stop the upsurge of swindling by issuance of bouncing
checks. It was felt that unless aborted, this kind of estafa ". . . would erode the people's confidence in the use of negotiable
instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the
undermining of the banking system of the country." 16The Court cannot impugn the wisdom of Congress in setting this policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated January 16, 1996 of the RTC of Pasig City, Br. 156 in Criminal Case No. 106614 convicting appellant is
affirmed. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 85419 March 9, 1993

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL, plaintiff-petitioner,

Yngson & Associates for petitioner.

Henry A. Reyes & Associates for Samso Tung & Asian Industrial Plastic Corporation.

Eduardo G. Castelo for Sima Wei.

Monsod, Tamargo & Associates for Producers Bank.

Rafael S. Santayana for Mary Cheng Uy.

On July 6, 1986, the Development Bank of Rizal (petitioner Bank for brevity) filed a complaint for a sum of money against respondents Sima Wei
and/or Lee Kian Huat, Mary Cheng Uy, Samson Tung, Asian Industrial Plastic Corporation (Plastic Corporation for short) and the Producers Bank
of the Philippines, on two causes of action:

(1) To enforce payment of the balance of P1,032,450.02 on a promissory note executed by respondent Sima Wei on June
9, 1983; and

(2) To enforce payment of two checks executed by Sima Wei, payable to petitioner, and drawn against the China Banking
Corporation, to pay the balance due on the promissory note.

Except for Lee Kian Huat, defendants filed their separate Motions to Dismiss alleging a common ground that the complaint states no cause of
action. The trial court granted the defendants' Motions to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, * to which the petitioner Bank,
represented by its Legal Liquidator, filed this Petition for Review by Certiorari, assigning the following as the alleged errors of the Court of
Appeals:1

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS HEREIN.

(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 13, RULE 3 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT ON
ALTERNATIVE DEFENDANTS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO HEREIN DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:

In consideration for a loan extended by petitioner Bank to respondent Sima Wei, the latter executed and delivered to the former a promissory
note, engaging to pay the petitioner Bank or order the amount of P1,820,000.00 on or before June 24, 1983 with interest at 32% per annum.
Sima Wei made partial payments on the note, leaving a balance of P1,032,450.02. On November 18, 1983, Sima Wei issued two crossed checks
payable to petitioner Bank drawn against China Banking Corporation, bearing respectively the serial numbers 384934, for the amount of
P550,000.00 and 384935, for the amount of P500,000.00. The said checks were allegedly issued in full settlement of the drawer's account
evidenced by the promissory note. These two checks were not delivered to the petitioner-payee or to any of its authorized representatives. For
reasons not shown, these checks came into the possession of respondent Lee Kian Huat, who deposited the checks without the petitioner-
payee's indorsement (forged or otherwise) to the account of respondent Plastic Corporation, at the Balintawak branch, Caloocan City, of the
Producers Bank. Cheng Uy, Branch Manager of the Balintawak branch of Producers Bank, relying on the assurance of respondent Samson Tung,
President of Plastic Corporation, that the transaction was legal and regular, instructed the cashier of Producers Bank to accept the checks for
deposit and to credit them to the account of said Plastic Corporation, inspite of the fact that the checks were crossed and payable to petitioner
Bank and bore no indorsement of the latter. Hence, petitioner filed the complaint as aforestated.

The main issue before Us is whether petitioner Bank has a cause of action against any or all of the defendants, in the alternative or otherwise.

A cause of action is defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another. The essential elements are: (1)
legal right of the plaintiff; (2) correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.2

The normal parties to a check are the drawer, the payee and the drawee bank. Courts have long recognized the business custom of using
printed checks where blanks are provided for the date of issuance, the name of the payee, the amount payable and the drawer's signature. All
the drawer has to do when he wishes to issue a check is to properly fill up the blanks and sign it. However, the mere fact that he has done these
does not give rise to any liability on his part, until and unless the check is delivered to the payee or his representative. A negotiable instrument,
of which a check is, is not only a written evidence of a contract right but is also a species of property. Just as a deed to a piece of land must be
delivered in order to convey title to the grantee, so must a negotiable instrument be delivered to the payee in order to evidence its existence as
a binding contract. Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which governs checks, provides in part:

Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of
giving effect thereto. . . .

Thus, the payee of a negotiable instrument acquires no interest with respect thereto until its delivery to him.3Delivery of an instrument means
transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another. 4Without the initial delivery of the instrument from the drawer to the
payee, there can be no liability on the instrument. Moreover, such delivery must be intended to give effect to the instrument.

The allegations of the petitioner in the original complaint show that the two (2) China Bank checks, numbered 384934 and 384935, were not
delivered to the payee, the petitioner herein. Without the delivery of said checks to petitioner-payee, the former did not acquire any right or
interest therein and cannot therefore assert any cause of action, founded on said checks, whether against the drawer Sima Wei or against the
Producers Bank or any of the other respondents.

In the original complaint, petitioner Bank, as plaintiff, sued respondent Sima Wei on the promissory note, and the alternative defendants,
including Sima Wei, on the two checks. On appeal from the orders of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court, petitioner Bank alleged that its cause
of action was not based on collecting the sum of money evidenced by the negotiable instruments stated but on quasi-delict — a claim for
damages on the ground of fraudulent acts and evident bad faith of the alternative respondents. This was clearly an attempt by the petitioner
Bank to change not only the theory of its case but the basis of his cause of action. It is well-settled that a party cannot change his theory on
appeal, as this would in effect deprive the other party of his day in court.5

Notwithstanding the above, it does not necessarily follow that the drawer Sima Wei is freed from liability to petitioner Bank under the loan
evidenced by the promissory note agreed to by her. Her allegation that she has paid the balance of her loan with the two checks payable to
petitioner Bank has no merit for, as We have earlier explained, these checks were never delivered to petitioner Bank. And even granting,
without admitting, that there was delivery to petitioner Bank, the delivery of checks in payment of an obligation does not constitute payment
unless they are cashed or their value is impaired through the fault of the creditor.6 None of these exceptions were alleged by respondent Sima
Wei.

Therefore, unless respondent Sima Wei proves that she has been relieved from liability on the promissory note by some other cause, petitioner
Bank has a right of action against her for the balance due thereon.

However, insofar as the other respondents are concerned, petitioner Bank has no privity with them. Since petitioner Bank never received the
checks on which it based its action against said respondents, it never owned them (the checks) nor did it acquire any interest therein. Thus,
anything which the respondents may have done with respect to said checks could not have prejudiced petitioner Bank. It had no right or
interest in the checks which could have been violated by said respondents. Petitioner Bank has therefore no cause of action against said
respondents, in the alternative or otherwise. If at all, it is Sima Wei, the drawer, who would have a cause of action against her
co-respondents, if the allegations in the complaint are found to be true.

With respect to the second assignment of error raised by petitioner Bank regarding the applicability of Section 13, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
We find it unnecessary to discuss the same in view of Our finding that the petitioner Bank did not acquire any right or interest in the checks due
to lack of delivery. It therefore has no cause of action against the respondents, in the alternative or otherwise.

In the light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petitioner's complaint is AFFIRMED insofar as the second
cause of action is concerned. On the first cause of action, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for a trial on the merits, consistent with this
decision, in order to determine whether respondent Sima Wei is liable to the Development Bank of Rizal for any amount under the promissory
note allegedly signed by her.

SO ORDERED