Lee Ward-The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America (2004)

The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America
With in-depth analysis of political philosophy and careful attention to

historical context, this study locates the philosophical origins of the
Anglo-American political and constitutional tradition in the philo-
sophical, theological, and political controversies in seventeenth-century
England. By examining the quarrel between the proponents of the doc-
trine of natural liberty and the champions of divine right theory, this
study identifies the source of modern liberal, republican, and conserva-
tive ideas about natural rights and government in the seminal works of
the Exclusion Whigs Locke, Sidney, and Tyrrell and their philosophical
forebears Hobbes, Grotius, Spinoza, and Pufendorf. This study illu-
minates how these first Whigs and their diverse eighteenth-century in-
tellectual heirs such as Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, Hume, Blackstone,
Otis, Jefferson, Burke, and Paine contributed to the formation of Anglo-
American political and constitutional theory in the crucial period from
the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution and the creation
of a distinctly American understanding of rights and government in the
first state constitutions.
Lee Ward is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Campion Col-

lege, University of Regina. He was a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Pro-
gram on Constitutional Government at Harvard University. He has
published articles on early modern and ancient political thought and
has received several academic honors including the Bradley Teach-
ing Fellowship (Kenyon College), the Fordham University Disserta-
tion Fellowship, the Ontario Graduate Scholarship, and Brown and
McNiece Scholarships (University of Toronto).
The Politics of Liberty in England
and Revolutionary America
LEE WARD
Campion College
University of Regina
published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
cambridge university press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, uk
40 West 20th Street, New York, ny 10011-4211, usa
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vic 3207, Australia
Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa
http://www.cambridge.org

C Lee Ward 2004
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2004
Printed in the United States of America
Typeface Sabon 10/12 pt. System LATEX 2ε [tb]
A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Ward, Lee, 1970–
The politics of liberty in England and revolutionary America / Lee Ward
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
isbn 0-521-82745-0
1. Political science – Great Britain – Philosophy – History – 17th century.
2. Political science – Great Britain – Philosophy – History – 18th century.
3. Political science – United States – Philosophy – History – 17th century.
4. Political science – United States – Philosophy – History – 18th century.
5. United States – History – Revolution, 1775–1783 – Causes. 6. Liberty.
I. Title.
ja84.g7w37 2004
320 .01–dc22 2003068725
isbn 0 521 82745 0 hardback

For Ann, kaloskagathos
Contents
Acknowledgments page ix
Introduction: Reexamining the Roots of Anglo-American

Political Thought 1
part one: the divine right challenge to natural liberty

1 The Attack on the Catholic Natural Law 23
2 Calvinism and Parliamentary Resistance Theory 48
3 The Problem of Grotius and Hobbes 71
part two: the whig politics of liberty in england

4 James Tyrrell: The Voice of Moderate Whiggism 105
5 The Pufendorfian Moment: Moderate Whig
Sovereignty Theory 133
6 Algernon Sidney and the Old Republicanisms 152
7 A New Republican England 172
8 Natural Rights in Locke’s Two Treatises 209
9 Lockean Liberal Constitutionalism 247
10 The Glorious Revolution and the Catonic Response 271
11 Eighteenth-Century British Constitutionalism 305
part three: the whig legacy in america

12 British Constitutionalism and the Challenge of Empire 327
13 Thomas Jefferson and the Radical Theory of Empire 351
14 Tom Paine and Popular Sovereignty 375
vii
viii Contents
15 Revolutionary Constitutionalism: Laboratories of

Radical Whiggism 396
Conclusion 426
Bibliography 433
Index 451
Acknowledgments
This project grew out of my dissertation at Fordham University. My teach-

ers Mary Nichols and Michael Zuckert have generously offered me their
support, friendship, probity, and wisdom throughout my studies and career.
Without them this book simply would not have been possible, and I am
deeply grateful for their mentorship. I would also especially like to thank
Paul Rahe, whose careful and imaginative reading of my manuscript made
the revision process a challenging and invaluable experience and made this
a deeper and richer study by his great contribution. Michael Davis, H. T.
Dickinson, David Nichols, Paul Seaton, and Vickie Sullivan also helped me
either by reading versions or parts of the manuscript or by otherwise of-
fering their expertise. All remaining errors and shortcomings are, of course,
entirely my own.
For the many stimulating conversations about political philosophy at the
Tinker and Hatch Lake, I thank my friends and colleagues at Fordham,
especially David Alvis, Susan Benfield, Patrick Bernardo, Natalie Fuehrer,
Paul Howard, Harold Kildow, Carly Kinsella, Paul Kirkland, Erin Larocca,
Sara McDonald, Paul Seaton, Bryan Smith, Flagg Taylor, and Scott Wolland.
While working on this book, I was fortunate to be a part of the Department of
Political Science at Kenyon College. I cannot imagine a better place to teach,
write, and think about political philosophy than Gambier, Ohio. I thank
my wonderful students at Kenyon for making every class a real joy and the
superb librarians at the Kenyon College Library for their expert help. My
colleagues in Political Science, especially Pam Jensen, Fred Baumann, Tim
Spiekerman, Kirk Emmert, Devin Stauffer, Dana Jalbert-Stauffer, and Ron
Lee, I cannot thank enough for their friendship and support.
I would also like to thank my editor at Cambridge University Press, Lewis
Bateman, for his unstinting support for this project and his editorial assistant,
Sarah Gentile, for her expert advice and guidance. Fordham University and
the Bradley Foundation provided generous financial support while I was
working on this project, for which I am very grateful. I would also like to
ix
x Acknowledgments
thank the editors of Interpretation for their permission to use parts of an

earlier article on Sidney in Chapters 6 and 7.
To my mother, Catherine, my father, Charles, and my brother, Sean Ward,
I offer my love and gratitude for their unwavering support over the years
and hope my efforts prove worthy of them.
To Ann Ward, my wife, friend, and colleague, I owe everything.
Introduction
Reexamining the Roots of Anglo-American
Political Thought
This project is as an effort to address some of the problems contempo-

rary political theorists and intellectual historians have encountered in writ-
ing about the Anglo-American political tradition. At least since the demise
of Marxist and progressive methods of interpretation, with their empha-
sis on subrational interests and economic and material forces as the major,
if not only, motivational springs for political and constitutional thought
and practice, scholars of the Anglo-American tradition have largely agreed
on one fundamental interpretive and conceptual premise: ideas matter.1
The broad, almost universal, consensus among scholars of the field is that
early modern Anglo-American thought is defined by a set of principles and
deeply held commitments to certain notions of government and law, rights
and citizenship. It is now generally assumed that Anglo-American political
thinkers and actors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries operated
within a distinctive framework, or perhaps distinct frameworks, with es-
tablished categories of thought, ideological assumptions, and philosophical
premises.
The bad news, or at least the other side of this overarching “supercon-
sensus,” is the deep contentiousness that has characterized the study of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-American thought in the past
four decades. Ideas matter, but as we have come to realize, scholarly inter-
pretations of these ideas may matter even more. The deepest fault line in
contemporary scholarship on Anglo-American thought lies in the divide be-
tween the liberal and republican, or Lockean and civic humanist, schools of
interpretation. This by now familiar, perhaps all too familiar, dispute pits
different interpretive lenses often in search of comprehensive paradigms for
understanding our political and constitutional tradition. A typical feature
1 For the classic example of the progressive school of interpretation in America, see Charles
Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York: Macmillan, 1935, orig. pub
1913): esp. chs. 5–7.
1
2 Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America
of the liberal-versus-republican debate is the dispute over the dominance,

the relative importance, or even the existence of one or the other system of
thought in Anglo-American early modernity.
The roots of the current debate go back at least as far as the middle of the
last century. At that time, numerous distinguished scholars like Louis Hartz,
Carl Becker, Clinton Rossiter, and Richard Hofstadter established a “liberal”
consensus regarding the dominant mode of thought in the Anglo-American
political and constitutional tradition.2 These scholars agreed that the pre-
vailing mode of political discourse and constitutional theory in America
was profoundly shaped by the overwhelming influence of Lockean-liberal
ideas at the time of the Founding. This assertion of a dominant Lockean-
liberal paradigm in American political thought mirrored the work of po-
litical theorists studying the early modern period such as Leo Strauss and
C. B. MacPherson, who proclaimed that early modernity marked the tri-
umph of Lockean-liberal notions of rights and government over the classical
and Christian assumptions and principles of the premodern era.3 The distinc-
tive features of this liberal consensus in the fields of both Anglo-American
and early modern studies were an assertion of the centrality of individual
natural rights, an instrumentalist or conventionalist understanding of gov-
ernment as a product of human artifice designed and directed to the securing
of rights, and a statement of the importance of private property rights and the
unleashing of essentially selfish and materialist passions channeled through
the political and economic institutions of a competitive, individualistic, and
capitalist society. In sum, early liberal modernity peaked in Locke, and Locke
was America’s philosopher.
The liberal consensus began to unravel in the late 1950s and 1960s when
a body of scholarship emerged questioning the alleged univocity of Lockean
liberalism (“Locke et praetera nihil”) in the Anglo-American tradition.
Robert Shalhope coined the phrase “republican synthesis” to describe this
2 For the seminal statements of the liberal consensus, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition
in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955): pp. 3–86; Carl Becker, The Declaration of
Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York: Knopf, 1942, orig pub. 1922);
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage, 1957): pp. v–xi, 3–
17 and Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953). While
Rossiter did identify Locke as “primus inter pares” among the formative thinkers in America,
it is important to note that he also did much to identify the influence of Opposition Whigs
and “continental libertarians” on Anglo-American thought (cf. pp. 358–9).
3 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953): esp.
ch. 5 (though, note Strauss’ identification of classical and premodern elements of the British
Constitution in “German Nihilism,” Interpretation, 26, 3 [Spring 1999]: pp. 353–78, esp.
pp. 372–3) and C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to
Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). For a recent study that follows the Strauss–
MacPherson path, see Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Rebacca Balinski,
trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): esp. ch. 4.
Introduction 3
diverse, but interrelated, body of work.4 Caroline Robbins’s classic Eight-

eenth Century Commonwealthman began the process of dethroning Locke
by identifying him as only one of many figures in a diffuse stream of re-
publican thought in Britain from the civil war and interregnum periods
to the late-eighteenth-century radicals like Burgh, Priestley, and Price.5 In
Robbins’ analysis, long-neglected thinkers like Harrington and Sidney, as
well as Trenchard and Gordon, took on new importance as influential voices
in the English radical and libertarian traditions. Robbins’ work was an im-
petus to other scholars and initiated a largely salutary correction to the
monolithic Lockean-liberal consensus. J. G. A. Pocock, spurred in part by
Hannah Arendt’s rediscovery of classical republican politics, took Robbins’
analysis to another level. In a vast collection of articles culminating in the
monumental The Machiavellian Moment, Pocock identified a civic humanist
republican tradition of thought originating in the city-states of Renaissance
Italy. He argued that this civic humanist mode of thought, with its empha-
sis on mixed government, civic virtue, property as instrumental to citizen-
ship, and the importance of participatory politics, was transmitted to the
Anglo-American world via Machiavelli and his English followers, most no-
tably Harrington. It was from this civic humanist tradition, Pocock argued,
that Anglo-American thought inherited and developed a profoundly anti-
Lockean and anti-individualist notion of liberty. This idea of liberty hear-
kened back to the classical Aristotelian ideal of citizenship as the fulfillment
of the human personality through common political discourse and action.
At some points, Pocock even suggests that civic humanism was more than
a competing paradigm with Lockean liberalism – that it was actually the
dominant political philosophy in eighteenth-century America.6 The impact
of Robbins and Pocock’s work on the study of American political thought
was enormous.
Bernard Bailyn, for example, while not an advocate of the classical re-
publican or civic humanist interpretation, plays down the significance of
Locke in the formation of the eighteenth-century Whig mind by identify-
ing Robbins’ English Commonwealthmen as the chief inspiration behind the
pre-Revolutionary American idea of liberty. It was in the subtradition of
“Opposition” or radical “Country” party Whigs epitomized by Trenchard
4 Robert Shalhope, “Towards a Republican Synthesis,” William and Mary Quarterly, 20 (January
1972): pp. 49–80.
5 Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen (New York: Atheneum, 1968).
1959).
6 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Re-
publican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975): pp. 545–7 and J. G. A.
Pocock, “Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Interdisciplinary His-
tory, 3 (1972): p. 122. Cf. Quentin Skinner, “Machiavelli,” Great Political Thinkers (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992): pp. 3–100 and Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
and Gordon’s Cato’s Letters, rather than primarily in Locke, that Bailyn dis-
covered the most important and comprehensive statements on liberty and
power, and virtue and corruption, in Revolutionary America.7 For Bailyn,
the English radical opposition Whigs provided the conceptual frame of ref-
erence for American Whigs regarding the most important questions about
government and liberty. Gordon Wood went further than Bailyn, and even
Pocock, in developing the classical republican influence on Anglo-American
thought. Like Pocock, and in contrast to Bailyn, Wood found the great al-
ternative to Lockean-liberal interpretations of eighteenth-century American
thought to be a tradition of republicanism rooted in classical antiquity. In
Wood’s formulation of the republican hypothesis, American Whigs were es-
sentially classical republicans dedicated to an idea of community as a natural
organic whole in which sacrifice of individual self-interest for the sake of the
common good lay at the core of their notion of virtue. The deep tension
between republican virtue and liberal individualism, which Pocock identi-
fied in the Whig distrust of commerce, becomes, in Wood’s reinterpretation,
open warfare, as Wood’s classical republican Whigs are now seen as staunch
anticapitalists and anti-individualists.8 For both Wood and Pocock, political
liberty – the public share in government – is the central classical assumption
underlying eighteenth-century Whig thought.
Thus, the crux of the liberal–republican debate centered on two pivotal is-
sues. While the proponents of the republican interpretation were by no means
monolithic in their positions (indeed, the term “republican synthesis” may
itself be misleading), they did share a common tendency to de-emphasize, or
at least seriously question, the once thought formative influence of Lockean-
liberal thought on the Anglo-American tradition. For Bailyn, Wood, and
Pocock, other voices such as Machiavelli, Harrington, and the Opposition
Whigs gained a prominence hitherto unseen in the field. The other major
question at issue between the liberal and republican schools was the status
of premodern, especially classical, thought in the eighteenth-century Anglo-
American world. On one point at least the proponents of the liberal and
republican theses were in agreement: Locke was thoroughly modern, and
7 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1967): esp. p. 34. Bailyn’s findings emerged almost contemporaneously with
John Dunn’s influential article claiming that Locke’s Two Treatises were not nearly as important
or even as widely read as was previously thought. See John Dunn, “The Politics of Locke in
England and America,” in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, John Yolton, ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1969): pp. 56, 80.
8 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–87 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1969): pp. 29, 53, 58, 60, 417. For his part, Wood sees the end of this
classical politics in America and the ideological victory of liberalism occurring at the time of
the enactment of the U.S. Constitution. For an argument that sees the classical republican
influence extending well into the nineteenth century via the Jeffersonians, see Lance Banning,
The Jeffersonian Persuasion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).
Introduction 5
so is liberalism. Pocock and Wood, for example, argued that it was not
from Locke’s modern natural rights theory that the Whigs in England and
America learned the fundamentals of government, but rather from the classi-
cal Romans and Greeks. It was from this classical source transmitted through
the Italian civic humanists that the Whigs developed their most formative
ideas about constitutionalism, virtue, property, and citizenship.
In the past two decades, following a steady republican onslaught, Locke
and liberalism have made something of a comeback. In the wake of the
bygone era of “Locke et praetera nihil” and the “omnia praeter Lockem”
spirit of the republican school, another generation of scholars arose to chal-
lenge the newly minted republican orthodoxy– it was Locke redivivus.9
These scholars such as Joyce Appleby, Steven Dworetz, Isaac Kramnick,
Thomas Pangle and John Patrick Diggins contested the republican interpre-
tation on several counts. Thomas Pangle and Steven Dworetz argued that the
republican interpretation overstated the importance of nonliberal thought in
the eighteenth-century Anglo-American tradition while systematically mut-
ing and neglecting unmistakably Lockean modes of thought and discourse.10
Both Dworetz and Pangle attacked the civic humanist or non-Lockean cre-
dentials of Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s Letters, a central text in the Whig
canon of Robbins, Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock. If, as the neoliberal school
argued, Cato’s Letters and other English Whig writings are fundamentally
Lockean, then it was not civic humanism that was transmitted to the colonies
via Cato and the others, but rather Locke, albeit in somewhat modified
form.11 Joyce Appleby argued that it was the Lockean account of the origins
of government to which American Whigs turned during the imperial crisis
with Britain in the 1760s and 1770s. Whatever traces of classical republican-
ism there may have been in eighteenth-century America, she claims, disap-
peared with the demise of the Federalists and the rise of the thoroughly Lock-
ean liberal philosophy of individualism and capitalism she associates with the
Jeffersonians.12 Isaac Kramnick looks to late-eighteenth-century British rad-
icals like Priestley, Price, Paine, and Burgh to illustrate the formative impact
of Locke on the political thought of the period. By uncovering the Lockean
roots of late-eighteenth-century British radicalism, Kramnick observed an
9 For “Locke et praetera nihil,” see Pocock, “Virtue and Commerce,” p. 107. “Omnia praeter
Lockem” is the catchy phrase, I believe, coined by Steven Dworetz in The Unvarnished
Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1990): p. 23.
10 Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, and Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
11 Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, pp. 10, 89 and Pangle, Spirit, pp. 30–3 (though note John P.
Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics [New York: Basic Books, 1984]: pp. 19–20 for a
republican reading of Cato’s Letters).
12 Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790’s (New
York: New York University Press, 1984): pp. 8–9, 14, 21–3.
underlying continuity of liberal thought from at least the 1760s on.13 John
Patrick Diggins, in his study The Lost Soul of American Politics, regretfully but
firmly confirms the centrality of Locke’s teaching of economic individualism
for the shaping of American political discourse. While Diggins bewailed the
demise of the alternative nonliberal stream of American political thought,
which he identifies with Calvinist Protestantism rather than classical republi-
canism, he nonetheless confirmed the great importance of Lockean liberalism
in forming the American mind.14
In many respects, the neo-liberal Locke redivivus school is no more united
than the republican synthesis it sought to correct or replace. It was not al-
ways the same Locke who appeared to reclaim his place on the stage. One
essentially Hobbesian Locke would not have much truck with another the-
istic Locke. Likewise, the bourgeois capitalist Locke was not identical to the
radical dissenting Protestant Locke. Where the new Lockean-liberal school
did stand together, however, was in their criticism of the republican revi-
sionists’ tendency to mute or silence what the neoliberals took to be Locke’s
enormous influence on the Anglo-American tradition. They often attacked
what they took to be weak (or nonexistent) evidence of classical influences
on eighteenth-century Anglo-American thought.15 And they questioned the
coherence of forming a republican paradigm out of materials – that is, books
and authors – deeply penetrated by the pervasive spirit of Lockean liberalism.
Thus, the state of the debate in the wake of the republican revision and
the liberal restoration is one of stalemate. Despite the fundamental differ-
ences between the two schools of interpretation, there is, however, almost
universal agreement on at least one central question. One legacy of the
republican revision of the old liberal consensus and the recent liberal re-
sponse is the general concurrence regarding the importance of understanding
the roots and character of English Whig political philosophy. In a sense, the
liberal–republican debate has become an interpretive battle over the heart
and soul of Whiggism. This is not to suggest that there are no other important
elements in eighteenth-century Anglo-American thought such as Protestant
theology or British constitutional custom and practice, but rather to observe
the obvious and yet controversial influence of Whig thought in the period.
The overwhelming evidence supplied by the republican and liberal revision-
ists suggests that English and American Whigs in the eighteenth century read,
studied, quoted, plagiarized, and digested the works of both Locke and the
radical Opposition Whigs. Is Whiggism essentially liberal or republican? Is
Locke a Whig? Is there any reasonable basis to identify a Whig “canon”
that excludes or marginalizes Locke? Does it make sense to speak of two
competing, even contradictory, strains of thought emerging from the same
13 Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1990): esp. pp. 35–40, 172–85.
14 Diggins, Lost Soul, pp. 5, 14, 17, 30.
15 See especially Pangle, Spirit, pp. 28–9.
Introduction 7
root in late-seventeenth-century England? These are the questions that con-

front us, along with a growing suspicion that the stark liberal–republican
dichotomy in the current debate in Anglo-American thought rests largely on
distinctions and assumptions foreign to the subject matter itself.
I believe Lance Banning’s 1992 restatement of the liberal–republican de-
bate can help guide us through the conceptual minefields facing the contem-
porary student of Anglo-American early modern thought. Banning, himself
a veteran of the liberal-versus-republican interpretive wars, observed that
the most important legacy of republican and liberal revisionist scholars has
been to show the deep complexity in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Anglo-American thought. Unfortunately, he argued, they have often not paid
enough attention to the subtleties of each other’s positions. While criticiz-
ing Pocock for perhaps going too far in the direction of minimizing Locke’s
influence, Banning also noted that the republican revision properly under-
stood should be seen not as a replacement for, but as a vital supplement to,
scholarship demonstrating the Lockean-liberal dimension in the tradition.16
Republican scholarship, in this view, brought to light important, but previ-
ously neglected, writers, ideas, and modes of thought. Banning observed that
by illuminating the part, we often cast a shadow on the whole. By identifying
diverse strains of thought and constructing paradigms based on this process
of speciation, scholars have broken into disputing parts principles and ideas
that often coexisted in a distinctive combination in the eighteenth-century
Anglo-American Whig mind. Banning suggests that one approach to under-
standing the distinctive combination of liberal and republican elements in the
Whig intellectual and political tradition is “to start with further exploration
of its origins in seventeenth century England.”17
In a number of important respects, this study reflects Banning’s sugges-
tions and concerns.18 First, we will examine the origins of the Whig politics
of liberty in late-seventeenth-century England. Through detailed analysis of
the major Whig Exclusion era tracts by James Tyrrell, Algernon Sidney, and
John Locke, we will observe the emergence of distinctively liberal and re-
publican modes of thought and discourse. Why start with the Exclusionists?
On the one hand, it seems to be the most natural place to begin. It was
during the Exclusion crisis that the uniquely modern term “Whig” made
its first appearance in the political lexicon of the tradition.19 On a more
16 Lance Banning, “The Republican Interpretation: Retrospect and Prospect,” in The Republican
Synthesis Revisited: Essays in Honor of George Athan Bilias, Milton M. Klein, Richard D.
Brown, and John Hench, eds. (Worcester: American Antiquarian Society, 1992), pp. 156,
171–2.
17 Ibid., p. 176.
18 Of course, this is not to suggest that Lance Banning envisioned with his suggestion my specific
approach in this study.
19 The classic study of the political and social dynamics of the Exclusion crisis is J. R. Jones, The
First Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678–1683 (London: Oxford University Press,
1961). A recent and generally insightful study of this period is found in Mark Kishlansky, A
fundamental level, the major Exclusion era writings of Tyrrell, Sidney, and
Locke mark the first time three distinctive voices in the English libertarian
mold were raised against a common enemy. It is often forgotten amid the
contemporary clamor over competing paradigms that the “conservative” or
“moderate” Whiggism of Tyrrell, the “republicanism” of Sidney, and the
“liberalism” of Locke all entered the world at the same time, battling in
common cause against Robert Filmer’s defense of divine right monarchy,
which was republished by the Tories during the turbulent days of the Exclu-
sion crisis.20 Perhaps by understanding what it was that united the Exclusion
Whigs – their opposition to seventeenth-century divine right absolutism – we
may be in a better position to understand and account for the various strains
of Whiggism that characterized the following century.
At this point, I should explain the principles of selectivity in my approach
to the study of Exclusion period Whig thought and writings. In contrast to
the historiographical methodology of Caroline Robbins and Bernard Bailyn,
for example, who have elaborated the writings of innumerable figures in
the Anglo-American tradition, this study focuses in its central part on the
formative impact of three major tracts from among the vast collection of
Exclusion Whig writings. However, this methodological approach is not id-
iosyncratic. The basis for the selection of Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke rests
on three criteria. First, Patriarcha, Non Monarcha, the Discourses Concern-
ing Government, and the Two Treatises of Government evince, as I hope to
demonstrate, a level of philosophical sophistication and depth that make
them not just pieces d’occasion, but rather serious works of political theory
in their own right. While an understanding of the historical context in which
Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke operated in the late 1670s and early 1680s provides
invaluable insights regarding their motivations, assumptions, and rhetorical
strategies, the works selected for special attention possess a degree of intellec-
tual rigor and ideological clarity that surpassed that of the vast majority of the
over 200 hastily crafted pamphlets and equally expeditious responses by the
Monarchy Transformed (London: Oxford University Press, 1996). While Locke’s Two Treatises
and Sidney’s Discourses were not published until after the Exclusion crisis (in 1690 and 1698,
respectively), whereas Tyrrell’s Patriarcha, Non Monarcha was published during the crisis in
1681, it is now generally agreed, thanks to the pathbreaking research of Peter Laslett and
Richard Ashcraft, that all three of these works were composed wholly or in large part during
the period 1679–82. See Peter Laslett, introduction to Locke’s Two Treatises of Government
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): pp. 52–64 and Richard Ashcraft, Revo-
lutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986).
20 Banning, “Republican Interpretation,” p. 155. For Tyrrell as a “conservative” Whig, see
Robbins, Commonwealthmen, pp. 73–4; and for a sample of Sidney’s characterization as a
“republican,” see Zera Fink, The Classical Republicans (Chicago: Northwestern University
Press, 1962) and Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 422. While the literature identifying
Locke as a “liberal” is truly enormous, and will be the subject of Chapters 8 and 9 of this
study, one interesting presentation of a nonliberal Locke to note is James Tully, A Discourse
on Property: Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
Introduction 9
protagonists in this period.21 Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke distill and articulate
logical premises and philosophical principles typically implicit or inchoate
in the works of their Whig associates. Second, I argue that the three Whig
thinkers on whom I focus in Part Two are uniquely representative of the
underlying philosophical and ideological strains among the Whigs. While
Tyrrell’s moderate constitutionalism reflected the political vision of most
English Whigs at the time and long afterward, Sidney and Locke developed
arguments for natural rights and popular sovereignty that took Whiggism in
different and competing directions. These alternative directions, moreover,
emerged as species of thought deriving their particular character from the
logical thrust of the basic Whig position in the Exclusion Crisis. Tyrrell,
Sidney, and Locke exemplify differing and discrete arguments that are still
identifiably Whiggish.
Third, the selectivity of my approach is validated by the judgment of the
historical development of the Anglo-American tradition in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Historically, Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke were among
the most influential Whig writers working (as opposed to publishing) in the
earliest stages of the formation of the Whig ideology. The initial impact of
Tyrrell’s work during the Exclusion era, and the notoriety of Locke and
Sidney’s work in the years following the Glorious Revolution, ensured their
prominence in the pantheon of early Whig champions of limited government.
Whereas Tyrrell’s moderate Whig argument represented the core of English
Whiggism in the eighteenth century, among radical Whigs in England and
America Locke and Sidney became the widely accepted authorities on the
fundamental principles of popular resistance, political obligation, and con-
stitutional government. Thus, the selection of these major Whig thinkers and
their works as a kind of fulcrum for this study is justified by their degree of
theoretical sophistication, their representative quality of important strains
of Whig thought, and their historical legacy and impact.
The second element of Banning’s restatement of the current debate that in-
forms this study is his suggestion to resist the temptation to create “Kuhnian”
paradigms or mutually exclusive interpretive syntheses. This study takes to
heart Aristotle’s caution to the student of political things not to expect the
same degree of precision in moral and political studies as in the mathemat-
ical and natural sciences.22 Imagine this study as an archeological project
of exploration into the very foundations of early modern Anglo-American
21 For good general surveys of the Exclusion pamphlet literature, see O. W. Furly, “The Whig
Exclusionists: Pamphlet Literature in the Exclusion Crisis, 1679–81,” Cambridge Historical
Journal, vol. 13, issue 1 (1957): pp. 19–36 and Charles D. Tarlton, “The Exclusion Con-
troversy, Pamphleteering, and Locke’s Two Treatises,” The Historical Journal, vol. 24, no. 1
(March 1981): pp. 49–68.
22 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, H. H. Rackham, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1934): 1094b12–28. Cf. Thomas Engeman, “Liberalism, Republicanism, and Ideol-
ogy,” Review of Politics, 55 (Spring 1993): p. 331.
political thought. Locke, Sidney, and Tyrrell each had access to the same
theoretical and intellectual resources in the philosophical milieu of late-
seventeenth-century England in their critique of divine right, yet they created
substantially different edifices in response to the divine right challenge to the
principle of natural liberty. Rather than following a synthesizing or paradig-
matizing impulse, this study adopts a syncretic approach. The three major
Exclusion Whig champions produced distinct but frequently intersecting and
overlapping arguments. As such, we will illuminate the deep complexity and
diverse streams of reasoning inherent in the Whig tradition. Only by dig-
ging down to the very roots of Whig thought will we find the materials
necessary to reconcile the different strands of this early modern philosophy
into the complex heterogeneous whole it originally was. We are faced with
the prospect that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English and American
Whigs could and did draw on much richer theoretical and philosophical
resources than our prevailing paradigms will admit.
In my attempt to gain a fuller understanding of the Anglo-American po-
litical tradition by reexamining the classic Whig texts of the late seventeenth
century, this study builds on a number of previous efforts. Paul Rahe’s land-
mark Republics Ancient and Modern traced the origins and development of re-
publicanism from Greek antiquity until the early American Republic.23 In his
breathtaking coverage and careful treatment of over 2,000 years of ancient
and modern political and constitutional thought, Rahe demonstrated the
profound conceptual and philosophical differences between classical thought
and the early modern successors of the republican ideal. Rahe challenged
prevailing assumptions about the republican project and exposed the deep
antagonism of modern theorists such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and
Madison toward the classical republican principles of moral education and
distributive justice.24 Rahe’s work illuminated the formative impact early
modern political theory had on the republican dimension of the Anglo-
American political and constitutional tradition.
Jerome Huyler’s Locke in America also went a considerable distance
to point beyond the confining paradigms characterizing the contemporary
liberal–republican debate. He argued persuasively that Lockean liberalism
and classical republicanism were not antithetical modes of thought for
eighteenth-century American Whigs. In the Opposition Whig classic Cato’s
Letters, Huyler discovered a carefully crafted synthesis of Lockean individu-
alism and natural rights, on the one hand, and the “Old Whig” constitutional
republicanism of Algernon Sidney, on the other. This synthesis of liberal and
republican elements was ready made for digestion into the bloodstream of
23 Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).
24 See ibid., esp. Book II, “New Modes and Orders in Early Modern Thought.”
Introduction 11
pre-Revolutionary America.25 A third important study, and one to which this

project is deeply indebted, is Michael Zuckert’s Natural Rights and the New
Republicanism. Zuckert drew on a vast knowledge of the seventeenth-century
natural rights and natural law tradition to illuminate distinct but related and
connected strands of Whig thought. Zuckert examined Cato’s Letters and
made the same connection between the Lockean-liberal philosophy of nat-
ural rights and the Whig republican political science that Huyler identified.
However, Zuckert identified both a distinctly Lockean form of Whiggism
and a separate brand of Whig thought he associated with the philosophi-
cal authority of Hugo Grotius.26 Zuckert argued that it was Grotius who
was the inspiration and guiding light for most English Whigs, while Locke’s
influence penetrated only on the margins of eighteenth-century English po-
litical discourse, though ultimately finding a home in the American colonies.
Rahe’s, Huyler’s, and Zuckert’s findings compel the contemporary student
of the Anglo-American tradition to look anew and with fresh eyes at the rich
and complex veins of argumentation and theoretical principles underlying
the Whig politics of liberty.
The Whig Politics of Liberty

This study is at once broader and more focused than most previous efforts
to understand the origins of Anglo-American thought. This study is more
focused than many of its predecessors in the sense that I pay primary atten-
tion to examining the philosophical foundations of Anglo-American early
modernity. This is not intended to deny or diminish the importance of his-
torical, economic, or theological influences in the formation of Whig political
thought, but rather to focus on one very important influence that has not been
properly understood or fully appreciated hitherto. Thus in Part One of this
study I examine the relation of Whig thought to the ideas of its predecessors
in the great natural liberty tradition of the seventeenth century. The central
element in the Whig critique of divine right in the Exclusion tracts was the
response to Filmer’s rejection of the doctrine of natural liberty. In his bold
and uncompromising assertion of the English divine right position, Filmer,
the “most prominent royalist theorist” in England, systematically countered
every major form of this natural liberty school extant in mid-seventeenth-
century Europe.27 The natural liberty tradition was by no means uniform in
every, or even most respects, but all the adherents to the principle of natural
liberty agreed on the premise that human beings are naturally free and equal,
25 Jerome Huyler, Locke in America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995): pp. 224–46.
26 Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994): esp. chs. 4, 5, and 7–9.
27 Mark Goldie, “The Reception of Hobbes,” in Cambridge History of Political Thought, J. H.
Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): p. 595.
and that the particular form of government for a given people is the prod-
uct of consent. Filmer assaulted this tradition with guns blazing, leveling
scathing criticisms of the Catholic natural law, Calvinist politics and theol-
ogy, English civil war era parliamentary contractarianism, and Hobbesian
and Grotian natural jurisprudence. Thus, in critiquing Filmerian divine right,
the Whigs explicitly defended the principle of natural liberty associated with
these schools of thought. The political thought of Filmer’s Whig critics, then,
emphatically did not emerge from an intellectual and philosophical vacuum.
Each of the major Exclusion Whigs attacked divine right; however, they
each did so in defense of a particular understanding of the doctrine of nat-
ural liberty. By carefully examining the arguments of Tyrrell, Sidney, and
Locke, I have found that the most fundamental source for Whig thought
was the philosophic principles of early modern natural jurisprudence. There
is, I admit, a paradox at the origin of the Whig politics of liberty. The natural
liberty tradition that preceded the Whigs may be broken into two general
camps. The first was the anti-absolutist strain typically associated with the
later scholastic, Calvinist, and parliamentary radical thought of the English
Civil War period. These arguments tended to rest on either a classical natural
teleology, the Christian understanding of the divine ordination of political
power, or a combination of these elements. For these philosophical and the-
ological partisans of natural liberty, absolute monarchy was antithetical to
God’s and/or nature’s plans for human flourishing.
The Whigs Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke, however, generally eschewed this
respectable anti-absolutist tradition and the classical and Christian assump-
tions underlying it. They turned rather to the second camp of the seventeenth-
century natural liberty tradition: modern natural jurisprudence.28 Herein lies
the paradox. The two most influential natural law and natural rights theorists
of the period prior to the Whigs were Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes.
Yet these thinkers produced theories of right more or less consistent with
absolutist models of political legitimacy. Grotius and Hobbes presented ar-
guments that offered no necessary or even easy connection between natural
rights and the principle of limited government so dear to the Whigs. Thus,
the first Whigs present a complicated relation to their forbears in the natu-
ral liberty tradition eschewing a bona fide anti-absolutist tradition in favor
of a modern natural jurisprudence with at least a dubious connection to
limited constitutionalism. This study will try to demonstrate how and why
28 My argument runs counter to that of scholars such as Tierney and Oakley, who maintain that
the language, and to some extent the logic, of modern natural rights derive from the medieval
period (see, for example, Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights,
Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150–1625 [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997]:
pp. 5, 8, 54–69 and Francis Oakley, The Politics of Eternity: Studies in the History of Medieval
and Early-Modern Political Thought [Leiden: Brill, 1999]: pp. 217–48 dealing with Locke). In
contrast I argue that seventeenth-century modern natural rights theory represents more than
simply a modification of earlier concepts of right and law; rather, it marks a decisive break
from the theological and classical foundations of the medieval concept of natural justice.
Introduction 13
the Whigs came to square the natural rights circle and develop principles of
natural jurisprudence consistent with limited government.
In other respects, this study is considerably broader than similar efforts.
For example, it is surprising, given the enormous scholarly attention paid to
Locke over the years, that there is still a relative paucity of thematic treat-
ments of Locke’s Two Treatises in their proper context, in bas relief as it
were, in comparison and contrast with the contemporaneous offerings of
other influential Whigs such as Tyrrell and Sidney.29 On a more fundamen-
tal level, however, the present study demands that we expand even further
the analytical horizons traditionally employed in investigating the theoret-
ical foundations of the Anglo-American tradition. A principal aim of this
study is to demonstrate the seminal influence of seventeenth-century natural
jurisprudence on the formation of the early modern Anglo-American mind.
I propose that Whig philosophy represented the political instantiation in the
English-speaking world of intellectual forces that are fully intelligible only in
the context of the massive civilizational changes in the West introduced by the
European Enlightenment. The key development in the formation of the Whig
politics of liberty, and eighteenth-century Anglo-American thought generally,
was the infusion of the concepts, premises, and categories of seventeenth-
century continental natural jurisprudence into the fundamental debate over
English constitutional theory and practice in the Exclusion and Glorious
Revolution periods. This was the critical point when the Whig political phi-
losophy that shaped the eighteenth-century Anglo-American mind was first
conceived.
The transformative impact of modern natural law and natural rights phi-
losophy on the essential structure of political and moral reasoning in the
Anglo-American world not only radically altered the constitutional land-
scape of late-seventeenth-century England. The theoretical and ideological
aftereffects of the political revolution in 1680s England extended far in time
and space, providing the philosophical touchstone for the way British and
American Whigs articulated their deepest moral and political commitments
up to and beyond the American Revolution. In order to fully appreciate
the palpable connection between the ideas produced during what Jonathan
Scott calls “England’s Troubles” in the 1600s and the renewed series of im-
perial “troubles” that culminated in American independence, we must un-
earth the complex and multifarious character of Whig political philosophy
in the context of the great natural liberty tradition of seventeenth-century
Europe.30
29 Notable exceptions are Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics; Julia Rudolph’s welcome recent study
of Tyrrell, Revolution by Degrees: James Tyrrell and Whig Political Thought in the Late Seventeenth
Century (New York: Palgrave, 2002); and Martyn P. Thompson, Ideas of Contract in English
Political Thought in the Age of John Locke (New York: Garland, 1987): esp. chs. 6–10.
30 Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth Century English Political Instability in European
Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Thus, in Part Two of this study I examine the genesis of the three strains of
Whig thought that came to define the various dimensions of Anglo-American
modernity: Tyrrell’s conservative restorationism, Sidney’s modern republi-
canism, and Locke’s liberalism. Each of these distinct strains of thought
originated in the same source, namely, the modification of key principles of
early modern natural jurisprudence and the introduction of these modified
notions of natural rights and natural law into British constitutional and po-
litical discourse. The results of this process of modification differ, however,
in each case.
Tyrrell’s moderate Whig restorationism relies on the philosophical author-
ity of the celebrated German jurist Samuel Pufendorf. Tyrrell inaugurated the
distinctive subtradition of Whig thought that understood Britain’s balanced
and mixed constitution as the product of a contextualized social compact
blending elements of custom, history, and prescription with inherent natural
law obligations. The moral and political implications of this Pufendorfian
formulation of compact and natural law were antithetical both to divine right
monarchy and to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The moderate Whig ar-
chitects of the Glorious Revolution settlement of 1689 such as James Tyrrell,
William Atwood, and Gilbert Burnet would set a deeply conservative stamp
on British constitutional thought for the coming century by their rejection of
the radical principles of popular sovereignty, the dissolution of government,
and the right of revolution in favor of the more conservative principles flow-
ing from their natural law-based idea of constitutional sovereignty. They
understood sovereignty in terms of the Pufendorfian dictum that the essence
of law is to be the command of a superior, and as such they rejected popular
sovereignty, or the extra-constitutional supreme power of the people, turning
instead to the idea of sovereign power as the product of compact and law. In
the moderate Whig conception of liberty so deeply influenced by Pufendorf,
political liberty and civil order could be secured only by the complex and
balanced set of institutions enshrined in the British Constitution.
Sidney offered a modern republican version of radical Whig thought. In
contrast to Tyrrell and the moderate Whigs, he held popular sovereignty to
be the logical and moral implication of natural liberty and equality. Sidney’s
commitment to republicanism derived from a populist conception of the
proper form of government for securing liberty. He criticized England’s
mixed monarchical system as an obsolete legacy of the country’s feudal past,
and favored rather a constitutional reordering based on the goal of establish-
ing the radical legislative supremacy of a democratized parliamentary system
marked by more equal and numerous representation, frequent elections, and
the rotation of delegates. Sidney argued for what we will call a “reflection
theory” of sovereignty, whereby the sovereign power in any constitutional
order must reside in the representative legislative body, which alone among
institutions can mirror or reflect the popular will. Sidney advanced classical
republican notions of virtue and hostility to monarchy and heredity, but he
Introduction 15
incorporated the ideals of the old republicanism in the language and logic
of modern natural jurisprudence. The conceptual model that best helps us
understand Sidney’s new republicanism is that provided by the Dutch re-
publican theorist Benedict Spinoza. The heart of Sidney’s republicanism is,
as it was for Spinoza, an attempted synthesis of Machiavellian republican-
ism and Hobbesian natural rights theory on the basis of the quintessentially
Spinozist reflections on the natural order of power relations. In a sense,
Sidney employs a Spinozist understanding of power and the naturalness of
democracy in order to republicanize Hobbes with elements from Machiavelli
and liberalize Machiavelli with Hobbesion natural rights theory. The final
product of Sidney’s republicanism is a complex mixture of philosophical ele-
ments that breaks radically from the tradition of classical republicanism and
moves in the direction of a distinctly modern democratic understanding of
republicanism.
One goal of this study is to help us understand what is distinctively
Lockean in the Anglo-American political tradition. Locke’s radical Whiggism
rests on a liberal individualist theory of government and natural rights. He,
like Sidney and in contrast to Tyrrell, is a partisan of popular sovereignty.
Locke’s liberalism, however, derives from the individualist core of his phi-
losophy. For Locke, government is a product of consent directed to the se-
curing of certain individual natural rights, most significantly property. While
the Lockean theory of rights is not opposed to republicanism as a legitimate
form of government, the individualist core of Lockean-liberal philosophy is
consistent with a variety of models of limited government. Lockean consti-
tutionalism was consistent with mixed constitutionalism, including mixed
monarchy, and went far in developing a sophisticated theory of the sep-
aration of powers that included a crucial role for executive prerogative.
Moreover, Locke’s principle of sovereignty did not necessarily share Sidney’s
populist premises. Sidney propounded a view of sovereignty that stressed the
need for government to reflect the public will and popular consent directly
and continuously through democratic institutions. For Locke, on the other
hand, the derivation of political power from the people logically means that
the people can delegate their authority to a number of constitutional bodies,
including the kind of dispersed and balanced system of sovereignty typi-
cal in mixed and compound governments. The theoretical core of Lockean-
liberal constitutionalism represents his most important innovation of the
seventeenth-century natural liberty tradition, namely, his argument for po-
litical individualism that maintained that all political power originates in the
natural executive power of individuals and can return or devolve to this orig-
inal source in the event of a dissolution of government. Locke thus supplied
the individualist basis of liberal constitutionalism.
The radical Whig assertion of popular sovereignty in the people’s right to
alter or abolish their form of government was anathema to the Pufendorfian
moderate Whig philosophy of Tyrrell and the moderate Whigs who helped
craft the Glorious Revolution settlement and came to dominate British po-
litical and constitutional thought in the eighteenth century. In the last two
chapters in Part Two, we will examine the development of British constitu-
tionalism from the Glorious Revolution to the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury, paying particular attention to the gradual consolidation of the moderate
Whig interpretation of the constitution and the marginalization of radical
Whig arguments in Britain. In 1680 there was a very wide variety of opin-
ions on the British political spectrum ranging from divine right monarchists
on the right to radical republicans on the left. Through the course of the
century following the Glorious Revolution, however, Britain experienced a
process of ideological convergence toward the conservative moderate Whig
understanding of sovereignty and rights. Republican and liberal ideas were
soon marginalized in Britain after 1689, while hard-core divine right royal-
ists after 1714 gradually accepted the principles of a balanced constitution
and absolute legal sovereignty residing in king-in-Parliament. In my analy-
sis of eighteenth-century British constitutional thought, I demonstrate that
the British regime eulogized by Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, and even the
skeptic David Hume was the compound balanced government rooted in the
principles of seventeenth-century conservative natural law. So complete was
this moderate Whig intellectual hegemony in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century that when Britain’s preeminent authority on the constitution,
William Blackstone, affirmed the “supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncon-
trolled” sovereignty of a Parliament that can make or alter any law it chooses,
scarce a voice in Britain demurred. Thus, when the British public and politi-
cal leaders confronted colonial resistance to parliamentary sovereignty in the
1760s and 1770s, they understood the dispute in terms of the conservative
philosophical principles of rights and sovereignty derived from Pufendorf a
century earlier.
Part Three of this study will trace the development of Whig thought in the
context of the British Empire, and analyze the role of Whig philosophy in
the American Revolution and the first experience of constitution making in
the early American Republic. The central argument in Part Three is that the
philosophical origins of the American Revolution lay in the unraveling of the
complex fabric of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-American nat-
ural jurisprudence that pitted American radical Whigs against their British
moderate Whig cousins. The legacy of the Whig politics of liberty was inher-
ently multifarious, complex, and characterized by internal ideological ten-
sions between not only, or even primarily, a liberal and a republican strain,
but also between radical principles, on the one hand, and the more conser-
vative principles of the moderate Whigs, on the other. The defining feature
of Anglo-American thought in the eighteenth century was the gradual coa-
lescing of the various elements of radical and moderate Whiggism into two
competing interpretations of the meaning of liberty and constitutionalism.
The philosophical origins of the imperial crisis that produced the American
Introduction 17
Revolution lay in the mirror image of parallel processes of ideological con-

vergence on either side of the Atlantic as moderate Whig philosophy and the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty gradually became the dominant con-
stitutional philosophy of eighteenth-century Britain, whereas radical Whig
principles and the doctrine of popular sovereignty emerged as the central po-
litical creed in the American colonies. During the imperial crisis of 1763–76
leading up to American independence, the cultural, historical, and intellec-
tual bonds of unity between American and British Whigs frayed fatally in the
face not only of political events but, more importantly, with the increasing
awareness of the fundamental philosophical differences within the broader
parameters of Anglo-American Whig political philosophy.
While republican and liberal ideas about popular sovereignty may have
been out of step with the conservative temper of eighteenth-century Britain,
these ideas took deep root in the American colonies. There the long ex-
perience of self-government and benign neglect from the mother country
encouraged Americans to see their colonial assemblies as a reflection of pop-
ular sovereignty rather than merely subordinate legislatures governed by
the supreme authority in Britain. The colonists read voraciously Locke and
Sidney, and the radical Whig classic Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s Letter’s –
books that had become pretty much déclassé in eighteenth-century Britain.
This produced a remarkable paradox during the imperial crisis whereby
British and American Whigs interpreted the same events and institutions in
Anglo-American political history in substantially different terms. For exam-
ple, the colonists held traditional British liberties like habeas corpus and
jury trials not as products of custom and prescription but as individual nat-
ural rights, and saw the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as a popular revolu-
tion against tyranny. These interpretations had been thoroughly rejected in
Britain by the second half of the eighteenth century. Thus, Americans and
British Whigs were talking past each other throughout much of the imperial
crisis, using similar terms and concepts from the common Whig political lex-
icon and often citing the same historical and legal precedents, but supplying
them with different meanings rooted in competing philosophical ideas about
the political, constitutional, and moral implications of natural liberty.
The imperial crisis of 1763–76 was primarily a dispute among Anglo-
American Whigs over the early modern idea of rights and sovereignty. The
British position rested on the idea of absolute legal sovereignty in Parlia-
ment. Even the colonies’ biggest supporters in Westminster, such as the
Pittite and Rockhamite Whigs including the conservative Edmund Burke,
affirmed the principle, if not the prudence, of parliamentary sovereignty
over the colonies. For their part, the colonists were committed to popular
sovereignty and insisted that the only legitimate legislative power lay in their
own assemblies. I argue that the major event in this period was the gradual
radicalization of the philosophical premises of the colonial position. Early
colonial spokesmen like James Otis and John Dickinson qualified their case
for popular sovereignty with both an emotional desire to keep the colonies in
the British Empire and an intellectual commitment to many of the conserva-
tive philosophical principles underlying the moderate Whig interpretation of
the British Constitution. However, in three successive chapters of Part Three,
I demonstrate how the American position become radicalized throughout
the course of the imperial crisis as colonial spokesmen such as Jefferson and
Paine rejected practically the last traces of this moderate Whig philosophy
in America and reconceptualized both the empire and the right of colonial
self-government almost entirely in terms of radical Whig philosophy.
By 1776 the idea of popular sovereignty that Americans had inherited
from the radical fringe in early-seventeenth-century England was in the pro-
cess of becoming virtually the sole legitimate philosophy of government in
the colonies. The final chapter of this study will conclude with an analysis of
the philosophical and ideological impact of radical Whig ideas on the pro-
cess of constitution making in the American states in the period following
independence. The first state constitutions were to some extent the labora-
tories of radical Whig philosophy in which the drafters experimented and
innovated with liberal and modern republican principles of representation,
separation of powers, and popular sovereignty. In the first wave of consti-
tution making in 1776 many states, most notably Pennsylvania, adopted
radical republican systems characterized by strong, even unicameral, legis-
latures regulated by annual elections and broad representation and a very
weak executive and judiciary. In this respect, the first revolutionary consti-
tutional framers demonstrated their philosophical indebtedness to Sidney
and his understanding of Whig modern republicanism. The second wave of
state constitution making in America saw a shift toward the Lockean-liberal
model of government, with New York and Massachusetts institutionalizing
a clear separation of powers with a bicameral legislature, an independent
executive with veto power, and more formidable judiciaries. This parceling
out of constituent power and the innovation of popular ratifying conven-
tions was, I contend, a demonstration of the modified Lockean philosophy
underlying the American idea of divided sovereignty. The framers of the first
state constitutions thus began the perhaps definitively American long-term
process of blending and harmonizing the liberal and republican elements of
their Whig philosophical inheritance.
This picture of the distinct and interpenetrating strands of thought
characterizing early modern Anglo-American thought belies the Kuhnian
paradigms too often constructed in contemporary work on the history of
early modern political thought. I believe this study can illustrate that English
and American Whigs in the formative seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
sang a common song of liberty with several different voices and parts.
part one
THE DIVINE RIGHT CHALLENGE

TO NATURAL LIBERTY
Robert Filmer is usually remembered by posterity, if at all, as the ideolog-

ical and philosophical nemesis of early English Whigs, most notably James
Tyrrell, Algernon Sidney, and John Locke. There is, however, much more to
Filmer’s thought than what is suggested by the charred remains left to history
by his polemical mauling at the hands of the Whigs. On one level, Filmer
is conspicuous as the direct target of attack for the Whigs. In the minds of
many Whigs, Filmer’s work embodied all too clearly everything that was
mistaken and dangerous in English royalism. For this reason alone, Filmer
is an important figure in the development of early modern political thought.
In order to understand the first Whigs and their intellectual descendants, the
serious student of the period must pay careful attention to Filmer. However,
Filmer should be regarded as more than just a hapless polemical foil for his
more talented Whig antagonists. As we shall see, Filmer’s arguments for di-
vine right monarchy and political absolutism in the turbulent years from the
1630s to the 1650s provided the intellectual nerve of the mainstream royal-
ist and Tory position in England well into the eighteenth century. Filmer’s
passionate and articulate defense of the principles of passive obedience, in-
defeasible hereditary right, and royal supremacy echoed through much of
the Tory literature at the time of Exclusion and well beyond.
In order to understand Filmer’s importance as a political thinker, it is im-
portant to consider both the substance of his argument and the historical
context in which he wrote. Born in 1588 under the shadow of a looming
Spanish invasion, Filmer grew up in a victorious England seemingly as-
sured of its national independence, hopeful for the end of religious con-
troversy with the broad acceptance of the Elizabethan church settlement,
and confident in its monarchy after the successful and peaceful accession of
James Stuart to Elizabeth’s throne in 1603.1 As a promising scion of the
1 For a good biographical treatment of Filmer, see Johann Somerville’s introduction to his
edition of Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Works (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991): pp. ix–xxiv.
19
20 The Divine Right Challenge to Natural Liberty
Kentshire gentry, young Robert Filmer established strong connections to the

higher Anglican clergy and to the court, marrying Anne Heton, the daugh-
ter of the bishop of Ely, in 1618 and receiving a knighthood the following
year. No doubt Filmer’s arch-royalist sympathies were securely planted in
his formative years in association with the court and clergy. However, the
optimism of the later Elizabethan age would not last, and Filmer’s lifelong
commitment to the sanctity of throne and altar would be the cause of great
anxiety, disappointment, and even persecution throughout the course of
his later life. He witnessed the disintegration of the tenuous Elizabethan
church settlement, lived through decades of bitter conflict between crown and
Parliament that culminated in rebellion, civil war, and regicide, and died a
bitter old royalist under the rule of the Commonwealth in 1653. Filmer’s
works were written in response to the dramatic events of this period and
stand, at least in his view, as a painful chronicle of England’s political, con-
stitutional, and religious woes in the first half of the seventeenth century.
The causes of the deep political instability in Filmer’s age were twofold:
religious and constitutional.2 First, a bitter religious and theological contro-
versy plagued the reign of the first two Stuart kings. This controversy pri-
marily took two forms. On the one hand, seventeenth-century Englishmen
feared the specter of Catholic power. In the context of Counter-Reformation
Europe, English national independence, tied since the Tudor era to the idea
of a national Protestant Church, seemed under threat both from foreign
invasion by or interference by Spain and later France, and from domestic
Catholic opponents to the crown. The memory of the Spanish Armada and
later the failed Gunpowder plot of 1605 seared into the English political con-
sciousness. The bitter controversy over the Oath of Allegiance for Catholic
subjects between James and the supporters of papal power, both foreign and
domestic, only confirmed the suspicion about Catholicism for many English-
men, including Filmer, who came to see in Catholic natural law doctrines
the principle of anarchy itself. As Filmer put it: “the only point of Popery
is the alienating and withdrawing of subjects from their obedience to their
prince, to raise sedition and rebellion.”3 On the other hand, the most in-
tractable source of religious division in Filmer’s England was the failure of
the Elizabethan church settlement to produce religious uniformity among
Protestants. The deep cleavages within English Protestantism over the cor-
rect form of church government and the right of individual conscience that
widened throughout the reign of Charles I would prove even more dangerous
2 For good general overviews of the ideological and historical context of the period in which
Filmer lived and wrote, see Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth Century En-
glish Political Instability in European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
Johann P. Somerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640 (London: Longman, 1986)
and Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
3 Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, pp. 132–3.
The Divine Right Challenge to Natural Liberty 21
to political order than the Protestant–Catholic controversies during James’

rule. Politically active dissenters exercised significant influence in Parliament
and the wider society. The Calvinists of various hues in England and Scotland
consistently frustrated and opposed royal efforts to impose religious unifor-
mity through such measures as the Laudian reforms of the 1630s. Moreover,
among the dissenters or Puritans, English royalists perceived dangerous ar-
guments supporting the principle of resistance to monarchical power tak-
ing root and proliferating at an alarming rate. During Filmer’s lifetime, the
Elizabethan ideals of the essential unity between church and state and royal
supremacy in the constitution disintegrated under the pressure of bitter the-
ological disputes that would in time contribute greatly to the causes of the
civil war.
The constitutional parallel to the religious divisions in Filmer’s England
was the bitter and durable struggle for power between the crown and Parlia-
ment. For the most part, during James’ reign, the wily Scot tempered his pub-
lic pronouncements advancing claims of divine right and royal supremacy
with a prudent dose of political pragmatism, rarely pushing his contests with
Parliament to the constitutional point of no return. Charles, his less politic
son, did, however, invite serious and bitter disputes with Parliament. His
decision to rule without calling Parliament for eleven years, the attempt to
circumvent the parliamentary power of supply through excise and customs
measures, and his failed effort to impose religious uniformity on the prickly
and combative Scots represented to many in the nation an intolerable exercise
and extension of royal prerogative. Parliament’s measures to curtail execu-
tive power and to assert its own constitutional muscle culminated in a series
of measures intended to limit the crown’s authority in the turbulent years
immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1642. To most English royal-
ists like Filmer, the bitter constitutional disputes of Charles’ reign signified
nothing less than an attempt by Parliament to subvert the crown’s position as
governor. In the theoretical arguments for mixed regime theory and the no-
tion of ancient constitutionalism used to support Parliament’s claims, Filmer
and his royalist compatriots saw a danger not only to the power and sanctity
of the crown, but also to the hierarchical social, political, and religious fabric
binding the entirety of English society.
The true source of these various religious and constitutional challenges
to monarchical power in England was, according to Filmer, a single perni-
cious principle: the doctrine of the natural liberty of humankind. In Filmer’s
view, this single proposition resting on the idea that all human beings are
naturally free and equal, and thus that consent to form government was
the unifying thread, the philosophical core, of the various arguments chal-
lenging monarchical authority. Catholic conspirators, Puritan resisters, and
parliamentary demagogues were all inspired by numerous versions of the
doctrine of natural liberty then extent, and indeed flourishing, in England
and the rest of Europe. The grand aim then of Filmer’s project was nothing
less than to refute this idea that had produced such dangerous consequences
not only for the English monarchy, but more importantly for the princi-
ple of monarchy itself. In Part One, we will analyze Filmer’s assault on the
three most important strains of the natural liberty doctrine in his time: the
later scholastic natural law theory of the Jesuit Cardinals Francisco Suarez
and Roberto Bellarmine, the mixed regime and Calvinist resistance theories
of the parliamentary contractarians of the civil war period, and finally, the
natural jurisprudence of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes. Each of these
distinct schools of thought served, in Filmer’s view, to obscure the proper
understanding of the individual’s due submission and obligation to obey po-
litical, especially monarchical, authority. It was, as we shall see in Part Two,
the first Whigs’ critique of Filmer’s systematic animadversions against the
natural liberty theories of the first half of the seventeenth century that inau-
gurated a new, distinctly Whiggish, form of political and constitutional the-
ory. In defending the principle of natural liberty against Filmer’s attacks, the
Whigs modified this principle in significant and in some cases radical ways.
Filmer unwittingly (and presumably much to his eternal chagrin) became
the critical conduit through which the Whigs would establish the distinctly
modern form of the doctrine of natural liberty that would come to define
the Anglo-American tradition for the next century.
With respect to the substance of Filmer’s argument, much more will be
said in the following discussion. However, at this point, it would be helpful
to introduce briefly the main feature of Filmer’s political thought. Filmer’s
response to the various versions of the natural liberty doctrine was essentially
a form of political theology rooted in the tradition of Martin Luther. Filmer’s
approach to political issues may be stated simply: the Bible, not nature or
unassisted human reason, is the only authoritative guide for political and
moral matters. This extreme sola scriptura position informed Filmer’s deep
political conservatism and his support for the supremacy of the monarch in
religious affairs. The Bible, in his view, not only failed to support the idea
of natural liberty, but any uncorrupted reading of Scripture clearly demon-
strated the natural and fundamental human subjection to political and patri-
archal authority. In Filmer’s interpretation of Adam’s creation in Genesis, the
divine establishment of absolute monarchy was unmistakably apparent. It
was the essentially theological bases of Filmer’s argument that distinguished
his position from that of the politique Bodin or his fellow English royalist
Hobbes. It was, moreover, Filmer’s theological foundation that directed and
animated his assault on the proponents of natural liberty. In a particularly
striking way, Filmer proposed that the only means to counteract what he
took to be the prevailing libertarian trend in intellectual fashion in his day
and to remedy England’s political and constitutional woes was by recourse
back to the first things simply.
1
The Attack on the Catholic Natural Law
In 1613 a book was officially condemned and ceremonially burned in

London. An English king and a Spanish cardinal were the chief actors in
the latest installment of a by now protracted dispute at the highest levels
of civil and ecclesiastical government. James I’s dramatic denunciation of
Francisco Suarez’s Defensio Fidei Catholicae framed the momentous struggle
over competing claims of authority. On the one side was a king who claimed
that his power derived originally and directly from God. And on the other
side was a Jesuit scholastic defending the pope’s claim to a divinely ordained
right to depose heretical civil rulers. This dispute brought to a head a long-
simmering controversy over the English Oath of Allegiance, which required
English Catholics to renounce papal pretensions in temporal politics.1 For
the better part of a decade following the enactment of the oath by Parlia-
ment in 1606, Jesuit thinkers including Suarez, Roberto Bellarmine, and the
Englishman Robert Parsons had criticized James’ claim to rule by divine
right, even as James and his supporters, such as John Hayward and William
Barclay, just as vehemently affirmed the king’s right against the claims of
papal supremacy.
While it is a long way from the Jesuit College at Coimbra to the streets of
Revolution-era America, this inauspicious Counter-Reformation backdrop
is a fitting point of departure for the study of the philosophical foundations
and historical development of the modern politics of liberty. The dispute over
regal and papal authority in early-seventeenth-century England had impli-
cations extending far beyond the acrid smell of burning pages in London.
As we shall see, this theologico–political controversy raised important ques-
tions about the fundamental issues of our understanding of political life such
1 See Francis Oakley, The Politics of Eternity: Studies in the History of Medieval and Early-Modern
Political Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1999): pp. 193–4) for a discussion that puts the English contro-
versy in the broader European context of disputes between the papacy and political authority
such as the contemporaneous Venetian Interdict.
23
as the principle of consent, the legitimacy of popular resistance to political

authority, and the philosophical underpinnings of the doctrine of natural
liberty. In important respects, Robert Filmer, the divine right opponent of
the Whigs at the end of the seventeenth century, would reintroduce a conflict
first engaged many years before.
Filmer’s account of his own activity in the opening section of his classic
Patriarcha provides an unusually candid glimpse into his motivation and aims
in this book. He presents this work as a refutation of the “new, plausible and
dangerous” tenet of the natural liberty of humankind.2 He ascribes this doc-
trine primarily to the Catholic scholastics denounced by James I. Concerning
these opponents, he speculates whether their ideas “be more erroneous in
divinity or dangerous in policy.” Filmer’s observation here points to the cen-
tral theme of Patriarcha.3 It is Filmer’s contention that there is a direct and
palpable connection between theology and politics, between a notion “first
hatched in the schools” and the political doctrine of natural liberty and le-
gitimate resistance to monarchical authority. It is from the writings of one
such “schoolman,” the Jesuit Cardinal Bellarmine, that Filmer draws what
he calls “the strength of all that I ever read or heard produced for the nat-
ural liberty of the subject.”4 The passages that attract Filmer’s fire contain
Bellarmine’s argument that civil power
[i]s immediately in the whole multitude, as in the subject of it. For this power is by
the divine law, but the divine law hath given this power to no particular man. If the
positive law be taken away, there is left no reason why amongst a multitude (who
are equal) one rather than another should bear rule over the rest. . . . It depends upon
the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a king, or consul, or other
magistrate; and if there be a lawful cause, the multitude may change the kingdom
into an aristocracy or democracy.5
Thus, the central propositions of the Catholic doctrine of natural liberty that
Filmer identified with the Jesuits Bellarmine and Suarez are: (1) the natural
condition of humanity is one of equality and liberty, (2) political authority in
general derives from the ordination of divine law, but the particular form of
government for a people is the product of consent, (3) government as such
may be understood as a form of contract, and (4) the “multitude” may alter
or rescind the political contract under certain conditions so as to reconstitute
the regime or replace the rulers as they deem fit. It is in the light of Filmer’s
professed horror about the theological and political consequences of this
2 Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann Somerville, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991): p. 2.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5 Ibid., p. 5 and Roberto Bellarmine, De Laicis, Kathleen Murphy, trans. (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1928), III, IV: 25–7.
The Attack on the Catholic Natural Law 25
doctrine of natural liberty that the Adam of Genesis emerges as the central
figure in the divine right drama.
The Adamite Thesis

Filmer’s response to the Catholic natural law doctrine of natural liberty was
rooted in the Genesis account of the creation of Adam. The characteristic el-
ements of Filmer’s political teaching, the arguments that would come to con-
stitute the core of English Toryism – such as the divine ordination of political
power, the doctrine of passive obedience, and indefeasible hereditary right –
derived from his contention that “the lordship which Adam by creation had
over the whole world, was as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of
any monarch which hath been since the creation.”6 Filmer grounds this claim
on his interpretation of the broader scriptural teaching regarding creation:
just as God has dominion over all earthly creatures as their source, so Adam
has dominion over his progeny as their source.7 This source-based logic and
its tendency to collapse the supernatural and the mundane pervades Filmer’s
reading of Scripture and provides the basis for his tracing the subordination
of children to parents down to the first parent, Adam, the surrogate begetter
of the human world. In Adam’s creation, Filmer found the origin of gov-
ernment in the first exercise of power demonstrated over his offspring. The
crucial twist in Filmer’s argument, however, is that Adam’s sovereignty did
not in any real sense depend on the recognition or even the existence of his
progeny but rather in the simple revealed truth of his sole creation.8 Political
rule does not, according to Filmer, derive from consent. In God’s creation of
Adam, He established the paradigmatic pattern for rule by indicating that
“neither Eve nor her children could either limit Adam’s power or join oth-
ers with him in the government.”9 By this creation of one man alone and
the generation of all humankind from this one source, Filmer argues, the
biblical teaching on the origin of political power is immediately apparent.
The subjection of Adam to God and the derivation of every human being
from Adam as the primal source reveal the two signal facts about political
power – hierarchy is imprinted in the structure of the created order, and this
hierarchy denotes the natural subjection of all human beings, a subjection
that is impervious to human initiative or alteration.
The argument that to have a source is to be under subjection and obli-
gation to that source forms the guiding hermeneutical principle of Filmer’s
scriptural exegesis. From the primal demonstration and example of rule in
6 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 7.
7 Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994): p. 44.
8 Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 187–8.
9 Ibid. p. 192.
the first father, Adam, Filmer derives the teaching that the Israelite patriarchs
and indeed all biblical rulers had by right of fatherhood a royal authority
over their children, inasmuch as by his birth everyone “becomes a subject to
him that begets him.”10 Filmer proceeds to employ the patriarchal principle
both to trace the lineage of the political authority of all the biblical rulers
back to the original source in Adam and to discover the very nature of au-
thority and subjection in the character of creation itself. For example, from
Paul’s injunction in Romans 13 that “every power be subject to the higher
powers,” Filmer draws two specific implications about the divine ordination
of politics: the general doctrine of passive obedience to political rulers and
the particular scriptural support for absolute monarchy.11 In Scripture old
and new, Filmer draws divine sanction for the same absolutist teaching.
The argument from Adam’s creation exposes two distinct but related di-
mensions of Filmer’s thought. On the one hand, it possesses a genetic dy-
namic whereby Filmer suggests that authority is a type of being intelligible
in linear terms inasmuch as the individual can trace his or her subjection
back to Adam and ultimately to God. In this light, any rejection of the in-
herent political subjection such as that posited by Catholic natural law is
tantamount to atheism, a denial of God as the supreme source.12 However,
Filmer’s divine right also manifests what might be called an “existential dy-
namic” concerning an exposition of the origin of political power per se. In
this sense, Filmer’s interpretation of creation in Genesis rests on the premise
that the existence of rule and subjection in the world is intelligible only in
terms of the revealed truth of Scripture. The existential aspect of Filmer’s
logic does not rely so much on the individual’s relation to a particular pa-
terfamilias as on a recognition of the utterly extrinsic character of political
power vis-à-vis humanity. It is not merely the legal codification of patriarchal
principles that is the operating factor in Filmer’s theory; rather, he identifies
the patriarchal perspective as the only one from which to distinguish the
origin of all law and political authority. This aspect of Filmer’s argument
radically minimizes human participation in the generation of rule and thus
serves his central theoretical concern to combine the genetic and existen-
tial aspects of patriarchalism in a single account of the fundamental human
stance toward political authority as well as the whole of creation.
10 Ibid., p. 282.
11 Ibid., pp. 236, 238. The use of the singular form in St. Paul’s query “Wilt thou not be afraid
of the power?” is the foundation of Filmer’s argument for the New Testament support for
monarchy.
12 As his critics were quick to point out, however, the consequence of Filmer’s doctrine of natural
subjection is to radically reinterpret the traditional Augustinian position that political life,
and hence subjection, is a product of the Fall and sin. See St. Augustine, The City of God
(New York: Penguin, 1984): bk. XIX, ch. 15 and Ernest Fortin, “St. Augustine,” in The
History of Political Philosophy, Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987): p. 183.
The unifying thread in Filmer’s account of creation, the guiding principle

that combines the genetic and existential dynamics in his argument, is the
formulation of an ontology of obedience. This position rested on the premise
that all human beings are defined and constrained by the source of their being,
whether by God and Adam as the source of all or by the particular fathers of
families as the source of each. The chief political implication Filmer draws
from this premise is that the natural obligation each individual has to obey
his or her father means that individuals are never sufficiently free to be the
authors of their own political obligation.13 The difference between paternal
and regal power is simply one of degree, not a difference in kind. Filmer
claims: “If we compare the natural duties of a father with those of a king,
we find them to be all one, without any difference at all but only in the
latitude or extent of them.”14 Filmer’s reflections on the account of creation
in Genesis constitute the core of his thoughts on the essence of being and
human being. The full expression of the creatureliness of all creatures – but
especially the humanity of the human – is found in loving obedience to the
source of one’s being and the authority inhering in a superior.
For Filmer, the patriarchal family signifies the human participation in
God’s perpetual creation, but it does so in a way that both minimizes human
initiative in the project and culminates in the production of naturally subject
beings. Just as obedience is the law of creation, so is rebellion the root of
all sin. In the broad frame of Filmer’s ontology of obedience, human beings
stand as created beings. They are thus under obligation to a superior, and
are most fully engaged in their essential nature when they are submitting to
some authority. Filmer reminds his readers that “the desire for liberty was
the cause of the fall of Adam.”15
The creation of Adam recounted in Scripture and the ubiquity of the patri-
archal family through history and across cultures stand as the twin pillars of
Filmer’s political teaching on obedience. Adam’s creation supplied the basis
for Filmer’s contention for the divine ordination of political rule. From the
absolute rule of Adam held by creation, Filmer argues, it “follows that civil
power not only in general is by divine institution, but even the assignment of
it specifically to the eldest parent.”16 This combination of a theological and
a more naturalistic form of argumentation marks Filmer’s approach to the
question of the relation of regal and paternal authority. The argument that
the father who begets and engenders rightfully rules and commands his chil-
dren meshes with Filmer’s chronology from Genesis of the transferal of the
lordship of Adam. According to Filmer, this sovereignty passed to Noah after
13 Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 7, 185 and Gordon Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975): p. 13.
14 Filmer, Patriacha, p. 12.
15 Ibid., p. 2.
16 Ibid., p. 7.
the Flood and to “the distinct families, which had fathers ruling over them”
following the confusion at Babel and finally “by right descending from him
[Adam] the patriarchs did enjoy.”17 A particularly striking feature of this
account is Filmer’s effort to harmonize the complex politics and cataclysmic
events of Genesis with his profession of God’s approval for the patriarchal
family structure. Despite the Fall from grace, an earth-ravaging flood, and
the dispersion of the peoples at Babel, God, Filmer argues, was careful to
preserve paternal, and hence monarchical, rule.
Filmer’s Theology
Having identified the theological basis of Filmer’s political teaching in the
account of the creation of Adam in Genesis, we are still left with a question
regarding the source of Filmer’s political theology. What were the intellectual
and authoritative theological influences on Filmer’s ideas? Despite Filmer’s
robust claims of originality, we can uncover two underlying influences on
his brand of divine right thinking. One source is the general approach to
religious and political issues introduced by Martin Luther, and the other is
the distinctive development of English royalist thought among the higher
clergy in England during Filmer’s formative years.
The reformation orientation toward political questions articulated by
Luther provides the general historical and theological context necessary for
any full understanding of Filmer’s political thought. As Quentin Skinner
has demonstrated, “the main influence of Lutheran political theory in early
modern Europe lay in the direction of encouraging and legitimating the emer-
gence of unified and absolutist monarchies.”18 In many ways the Kentshire
squire was a product of Luther’s political, social, and religious worldview.
First, as we have seen, Filmer was deeply influenced by the sola scriptura the-
ological orientation instituted by the Lutheran Reformation. Filmer inher-
ited Luther’s deep conviction that the Bible unalloyed with church tradition
17 Ibid., pp. 7–8. Filmer’s account of the transferal of rule in the Bible parallels what Schochet
has termed “anthropological patriarchalism” (Schochet, Patriarchalism, p. 11). In this view,
Filmer treats Genesis as the earliest historical record of human association and thus employs
it to explain the transformation of primitive familial association into a wider, more complex
society. While I believe that Filmer did look to something akin to anthropological history, I
emphasize the more fundamental theological basis of the Adamite thesis. Figgis, for example,
greatly exaggerates the anthropological dimension in Filmer when he argues that he turned to
Scripture primarily to provide “authentic information as to the nature of primitive society”
(J. N. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings [New York: Harper, 1965]: p. 159). In contrast to
Schochet and Figgis, I maintain that Filmer’s treatment of Adam is more normative than
descriptive and more theological than anthropological.
18 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume II (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978): p. 113. Cf. John Clement Rager, The Political Philos-
ophy of Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
1926): pp. 44–56, 61–2.
or clerical authority is the only proper guide for political, moral, and reli-
gious matters. Luther’s hostility to the humanist and scholastic claims for
the power of human reason to intuit the ways of God through observation
of nature produced a clear echo in Filmer’s rejection of reason and nature as
authoritative guides for political life. Luther’s profound suspicion of “this
beast . . . Reason” and his vitriolic diatribes against the pervasive influence in
the schools of the “damned, conceited, rascally heathen” Aristotle provide
an important element of the context for Filmer’s own assertion of the im-
potence of reason and his general dismissal of the authority of the classical
political tradition.19 By elevating the claims of what Luther called the “holy
and sacred certain doctrine of Scripture” over and against appeals to hu-
man reason, virtue, and capacities, Filmer followed Luther’s decisive break
from the humanist and scholastic tradition advancing the essential harmony
between reason and revelation.20 For Filmer, as for his German predecessor
and intellectual light, all politics and morality was Bible politics.
The second major element of Filmer’s inheritance from Luther had to do
with his view of human nature. Underlying Filmer’s rejection of the claims
of reason regarding intuition and speculation about the ways of God is an
abiding certainty of the utter depravity of human nature. Filmer’s political
teaching rests on the Lutheran principle that “the whole world is evil” and
that human nature, at least since the Fall, is fundamentally perverse and alien-
ated from God.21 The central Reformation doctrine of justification by faith,
resting on the notion that the only righteousness that matters is “passive
righteousness” that is endowed by God’s grace but cannot be earned, pro-
vides the theological foundation for Filmer’s divine right theory.22 Luther’s
assertion of humanity’s total incapacity to advance our salvation through
our own rational efforts, tradition, or clerical intermediaries establishes the
moral grounding for Filmer’s principle of natural subjection. The Filmerian
proposition of natural subjection, with its emphasis on the moral incapacity
of human beings to constitute sovereign political power, is a direct political
corollary of Lutheran theology. While Filmer generally eschewed the ultra-
Augustinian distinction between the temporal realm and the community of
19 See, for example, Luther’s “Commentary on Galatians” in Martin Luther: Selections from His
Writings, John Dillenberger, ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961): pp. 128, 131 and “An
Open Letter to the Christian Nobility” in The Works of Martin Luther, C. M. Jacobs, trans.
(Philadelphia: Muehlenberg Press, 1915–32), Vol. II: pp. 146–7 (hereafter Works).
20 Luther, “An Open Letter to the Christian Nobility,” Works, Vol. II: pp. 150–1. Cf. Skinner,
Foundations, p. 4.
21 See Luther, “On Secular Authority, to What Extent It Should Be Obeyed,” Works, J. J.
Schindel, trans., Vol. III: p. 236; compare this with Filmer’s identification of the cause of
Adam’s fall in “the desire of liberty” (Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 2). Cf. W. D. J. Cargill Thompson,
The Political Thought of Martin Luther (Brighton, MA: Harvester, 1984): pp. 19–21.
22 For Luther’s doctrine of justification by faith, see “A Treatise on Christian Liberty,” Works,
W. A. Lambert, trans., Vol. II: pp. 316–17, 322–3, 329–34.
Christians that is central for Luther, the Englishman did frame his character-
ization of human nature and the status of the human vis-à-vis the divine on
the basis of theological categories and existential principles traceable back
to Luther.
The third feature of Luther’s influence on Filmer had to do with the
deep political conservatism identified with the Lutheran version of reformed
theology. It is not surprising that the author of the virulent anti-populist
tract Against the Robbing and Murdering hordes of Peasants (1525) would find
no more enthusiastic protégé than the dutiful Sir Robert. Filmer followed
Luther in repeatedly asserting the Pauline doctrine of submission to politi-
cal authority. In this key respect regarding the divine institution of secular
authority, Filmerian and Lutheran divine right arguments are practically
indistinguishable: for both Luther and Filmer, political power flows from
God. Luther’s fear that his call for religious change would be associated
with political radicalism, and thus discredited among the German nobility,
led him to formulate a rigorous theological doctrine of political obedience
rooted in Scripture.23 By adopting Luther’s principle of unyielding nonresis-
tance, Filmer located himself in the deeply rooted English Erastian tradition
of Tyndale, Cranmer, and the earliest followers of Luther in England in the
first half of the sixteenth century.24 Filmer’s Scripture-based argument for
human subjection and political obedience derived from the central Lutheran
theological premise that the entire existing social and political order is a
direct reflection of God’s inscrutable will.25 The God who reveals His will
to radically imperfect human faculties through revelation is omnipotent and
governs everything in the world through divine providence.
In a few respects, Filmer’s adoption of the Lutheran Scripture-based prin-
ciple of political obedience extended in even more authoritarian directions
than that of Luther himself. For example, Filmer does not entertain Luther’s
idea that “if all the world were composed of real Christians, that is true
believers, no prince, king, lord, sword or law would be needed. . . . For what
were the use of them, since Christians . . . of themselves they do more than its
laws and doctrines can demand.”26 Despite Luther’s immediate qualification
that Christians are very few and far between, considering that “the world and
the masses are and always will be unchristian, although they are baptized and
nominally Christian,” the incipient utilitarianism in Luther’s view of secular
government does not comport with Filmer’s more rigorous assertion of natu-
ral human subjection to both political and patriarchal authority. For Filmer,
piety does not exempt the individual from the ontological state of obedience
23 For Luther’s affirmation of the Pauline doctrine of political obedience, see “On Secular
Authority,” Works, Vol. III: pp. 231–4, 255–7. Cf. Thompson, Martin Luther, p. 94.
24 Thompson, Martin Luther, pp. 92–4.
25 Skinner, Foundations, p. 18.
26 Luther, “On Secular Authority,” Works, Vol. III: p. 234.
and subjection. Moreover, while Filmer strongly adhered to Luther’s prin-

ciple that no active resistance to political authority is ever justified, he did
not follow his German master in identifying the binding moral duties of
princes such as maintaining civil order and true religious worship.27 From
the strict Lutheran perspective, Filmer’s idea of monarchy runs the risk of
confusing the agent of divine omnipotent power with the actual divine source
of that power. Despite these few noteworthy differences between Filmer and
Luther’s teaching on government, there is a clear sympathy between them on
the more fundamental aspect of obedience and nonresistance. Luther’s con-
tention that political rulers had to be obeyed for conscience’s sake, and his
rejection of forcible resistance to rulers as sinful, both produced, in the words
of one Luther scholar, a decisive break from “late Medieval Catholics” and
made the issue of political obedience “the central and critical question con-
fronting European political thinkers.”28 The profound influence of Luther’s
teaching regarding obedience and the divine ordination of political author-
ity provided the theological foundation for Filmer’s conception of the sacred
character of monarchy.
While one aspect of Filmer’s political theology derived from the European
context of the Lutheran Reformation, the other major theological, and in-
deed ideological, component of Filmer’s theory of monarchy was the political
doctrine of the higher clergy in England in the formative years of his life in
the opening decades of the seventeenth century. Luther provided Filmer with
a model of the absolute authority of Scripture, the idea of the omnipotence
of God and moral incapacity of humanity, and the sacred principle of non-
resistance. The central role of Adam in Filmer’s argument, however, had a
more emphatically English source. It is in the context of seventeenth-century
England’s perennial conflicts over the extent and origin of royal power that
Filmer’s essentially Lutheran theology assumes its distinctive mantle of de-
fending royal supremacy. Luther’s support for monarchy as the best regime
was never as central to his thoughts on government as it was for Filmer
and his brand of English royalism. Moreover, Luther did not actually root
the origin of government in Adam’s creation in Genesis or attach anything
like the significance given to this particular scriptural passage by Filmer. To
identify the source of the prominence of Adam in Filmer’s thought, we have
to look to England.
27 Sheldon Wolin emphasizes Luther’s limits on the power of princes and links this with what
he takes to be the democratic implications of Luther’s plan for church reform (see Politics
and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought [London: Methuen, 1969]:
pp. 153, 155, 163–4). Wolin’s democratic interpretation of Luther belies the more funda-
mental authoritarian tendencies in Lutheranism that had a profound influence on English
royalism.
28 Francis Oakley, “Christian Obedience and Authority, 1520–1550,” in The Cambridge History
of Political Thought, 1450–1700, J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge
The patriarchalist and Adamite arguments popularized by Filmer had

their precursors in the theological and constitutional controversies of early-
seventeenth-century England. The Adamite interpretation of Genesis, which
would assume such importance for Filmer, first appeared in England in au-
thoritative circles in the Convocation of 1606 under the leadership of Bishop
John Overall. This convocation of bishops organized at the height of James’
controversy with the Jesuit scholastics and English Catholics made a partic-
ular reading of Genesis the scriptural basis for a patriarchal account of the
origin of government. The Convocation also proposed a highly politicized
interpretation of the Fifth Commandment as a scriptural support for divine
right monarchy.29 It is hardly surprising that Filmer would be profoundly
influenced by the formulation of patriarchal monarchy proposed as an addi-
tion to the canon of the Church of England by the leading men of the church.
Filmer did not, however, simply duplicate the argument of the Convocation,
but rather made some significant modifications in the basic scriptural theory
propounded by the bishops. For example, whereas Filmer based his own
scriptural account of the origin of government on the account of Adam’s
creation, the Convocation emphasized Noah’s role and example as the epit-
ome of “patriarchal [and] . . . regal government.” Filmer did not follow the
Convocation’s interpretation that “there is more expressed in the Scriptures”
about Noah “than there was before the Flood, of the power and authority
of Adam.”30 While the direct centrality of Adam in Filmer’s political theol-
ogy was paradoxically suggested by his Jesuit opponents, nonetheless it is
obvious that Filmer’s political reasoning was informed by the spirit of scrip-
turalism and the view of a patriarchal-monarchical nexus prevalent among
the higher clergy in the England of his day.
Another important influence on Filmer was the celebrated writings and
sermons of key clerical supporters of the crown in the Jacobean and early
Carolinian periods. It is remarkable how naturally, almost effortlessly, cler-
ical supporters of the crown in early-seventeenth-century England appealed
to the authority of divine right to undergird their conception of royal pre-
rogative in the king’s disputes with Parliament. To cite just a few instances,
in A Sermon Preached Before the King’s Most Excellent Majestie in 1614,
the Anglican divine William Goodwin asserted the divine anointing of the
English king and the prohibition on all resistance to royal authority flow-
ing from this theological premise. Of the divinely instituted office of kings,
Goodwin intoned, “they cannot be deposed by the sentence, they may not
bee deprived by the force of any Mortall Man.”31 Not only did Filmer imbibe
29 For a fuller discussion of the patriarchalist teaching of the Convocation of 1606, see Schochet,
Patriarchalism, pp. 92–5.
30 Convocation of 1606, chapter vi, p. 7 (quoted in Schochet, Patriarchalism, p. 93).
31 William Goodwin, “A Sermon Preached Before the Kings most Excellent Majestie” (1614),
The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth Century English Political Tracts, Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed.
the central notions of divine right and nonresistance from the vocal Anglican
leadership of his day, he also adopted, quite naturally, many of the consti-
tutional and legal positions advanced by the crown’s clerical supporters in
the periodic disputes with Parliament. For example, Roger Maynwaring’s
argument in two sermons entitled Religion and Allegiance (1627) that the
king, being the Lord’s anointed, can raise taxes without the consent of
Parliament would be incorporated into Filmer’s constitutional arguments
in the 1630s.32 And Filmer’s old friend Peter Heylyn offered an argument
for royal supremacy over the legislative body based on an understand-
ing of law as deriving from the king’s personal will that would also be-
come part of Filmer’s argument.33 Filmer’s political theology, then, clearly
did not develop in an intellectual and ideological vacuum. Important ele-
ments of Luther’s reformed theology and the authoritative pronouncement
of high church leaders in England combined to produce the fertile philo-
sophical and theological soil that nourished Filmerian divine right politics.
Both the general historical context of Reformation Europe and the specific
constitutional controversies in England in his day provided the ideological
assumptions informing Filmer’s view of human nature, the characteristics
of God’s rule over the world, and the origin and structure of the English
Constitution.
The Assault on the Scholastics

The Jesuit scholastics Cardinals Bellarmine and Suarez were, as we noted
earlier, Filmer’s most conspicuous adversaries in Patriarcha. The two corner-
stones of the scholastic argument on which Filmer trains his attack are the
proposition of natural liberty and equality and the argument that particular
forms of government are the product of consent. Bellarmine describes the
original human condition as one of a “multitude of equals,” while Suarez
affirms: “from the nature of the subject all men are born free, and therefore
none has political jurisdiction over another, just as no dominion.”34 The
Catholic position, moreover, rested on the premise of the divine ordination
of political power insofar as God is the “prime and principal Author” of
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999): p. 39; cf. pp. 37–40 for Goodwin’s statement on the
general principle of divine ordination.
32 Roger Maynwaring, “Religion and Allegiance” (1627), in Malcolm, Struggle for Sovereignty,
pp. 67, 70.
33 Peter Heylyn, “A Briefe and Moderate Answer” (1637), in Malcolm, Struggle for Sovereignty,
p. 82.
34 Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 25 and Francisco Suarez, De Legibus, Ac Deo Legislatore (1612,
Coimbra), in Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez, S. J., Vol. I photographic repro-
duction of selections from original editions. Volume II, English version of text prepared by
Gwladys L. Williams et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944): Book III, ch. 2, sec. 3: pp. 373
(hereafter De Leg., bk., ch., sec., and page number).
political life.35 While the Catholic natural lawyers and Filmer agreed that
political power in general comes directly from God alone, for the Jesuits
the particular political forms under which human beings live – monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy – depend upon consent.36 It is this distinction
between a general and a particular, or direct and mediated, species of di-
vine ordination of political authority that Filmer sought to refute with the
Adamite account of the source of political power.
Filmer frames a fundamental dichotomy between his position and that
of Bellarmine: either natural subjection is the truth of the human condition
or natural liberty is. In this light, Filmer and Bellarmine’s agreement on
the divine ordination of political power becomes crucial inasmuch as they
agree that Scripture can, and in fact must, decide the matter regarding the
origin of political right. For Filmer, only a theologically premised argument
can be decisive on the question of sovereignty. This is the major source of
Filmer’s break with the naturalistic absolute sovereignty argument of Bodin.
While Filmer maintains that Bodin’s attack on the mixed regime theories
of Machiavelli and Contarini is sufficient to refute a secular argument for
mixed or limited sovereignty, he suggests that secular absolutists like Bodin,
as well as Hobbes, misunderstand the foundations of political rule.37 The
real debate over sovereignty, he suggests, must be about the political teaching
of Scripture and the character of the divine ordination of political authority.
For Filmer, the great danger and appeal in the Catholic natural law position is
its attempt to harmonize the divine ordination of politics with the principle
of consent. The aim of Filmer’s Adamite thesis is, then, to prove that the
doctrine of natural liberty is inconsistent with any plausible interpretation
of Scripture.
The procedure Filmer adopts in this refutation of the scholastic account of
the origin of political society depends on two central premises. First, Filmer
35 Suarez, De Leg.: III. 3.2.378.

36 Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 24. Cf. Rager, Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine, pp. 42–3.
37 Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 134, 184–5. For Bodin’s argument for absolute and indivisible
sovereignty, see Jean Bodin, The Six Books of the Republic (1606), trans. by Richard Knolles
from the original Les six livres de la republique (Paris, 1580), K. D. McRae, ed. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962): pp. 86, 91, 98. It is also important to note that although
Filmer generally approved of Bodin’s theory of absolute sovereignty, there were many points
on which Filmer’s conception of absolutism was far more arbitrary than Bodin’s. See, for
example, the limits Bodin placed on sovereign power relating to the family (p. 13), property
rights (pp. 109–11), and fundamental laws like the Salic Law (p. 95) and Bodin’s general
reliance on the classical regime types rejected by Filmer (pp. 193–5 and 218 for the right
to slay a tyrant). Cf. James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1979): p. 22 for a thoughtful caution not to exaggerate the
connection between Bodin and Filmer. It is ironic that Filmer criticizes the politique Bodin,
scourge of the Huguenots, for not paying enough attention to religion, but it may be fair to
say that Bodin conceived of absolute sovereignty as a political solution to what he takes to
be a theological problem, while Filmer posited a theological solution to a political problem.
aims to demonstrate that the core of the scholastic argument for natural
liberty is classical thought, not Scripture. Second, he attempts to dismantle
systematically the logic of scholastic contract theory in order to demonstrate
the incompatibility of the doctrine of natural liberty not only with Scripture,
but also with any form of organized political existence.
Filmer emphasizes the classical or naturalistic basis of the scholastic ar-
gument for consent. All of the passages that Filmer gleans to represent “the
strength of all that I ever read or heard produced” for natural liberty are taken
from Chapter VI of De Laicis, which provides Bellarmine’s proof of political
magistracy “drawn from the efficient cause.”38 However, this chapter offers
only one of five of Bellarmine’s proofs for natural liberty. Filmer implicitly
draws our attention to the fact that the two most fully developed and most
radical proofs of magistracy Bellarmine offers relate to the Aristotelian logi-
cal categories of efficient and final causality, with only one discussion or proof
drawn directly from Scripture.39 Filmer castigates the scholastics for trying
to harmonize the idea of divine ordination with the classical justification of
the ends of political rule. Filmer is correct to point to the essential role of
classical thought in the scholastic political teaching. For example, Bellarmine
justifies political power in terms of the social requirements needed to fulfill
human beings’ rational nature. In a direct reference to Aristotle, Bellarmine
cites the gift of speech as an indication of the character and proper end of
political society.40 It is the end and not the source that guides Bellarmine’s
understanding of political life.
This classical dimension in the scholastic argument reflects the general
Catholic theological concern in the context of the Counter-Reformation to
rebut the twin heresies of the Lutheran political teaching, namely, sola scrip-
tura and the direct divine ordination of temporal power.41 However, one
effect of Filmer’s emphasis on the role of consent and efficient causality in
Bellarmine’s position makes it appear “more radically constitutionalist” than
the Jesuit scholastic intended it to be. As Bellarmine himself notes: “The lib-
erty in which we were created does not conflict with political authority, but
with despotic, that is, with true and real slavery.”42 Contrary to what we
38 Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 24 and Filmer, Patriarcha, 5.

39 Bellarmine’s other two proofs of the purpose of political society relate to the authority of the
saints and of antiquity; of course, neither of these sources have much authority for Filmer
(Bellarmine, De Laicis, chs. 3–7). Cf. Rager, Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine, pp. 53–4.
40 Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 20 and Suarez, De Leg., III.1.3, 11, pp. 364–5, 370 (cf. Aristotle
Politics, I:2).
41 For a good discussion of the larger polemical aim of the Jesuit scholastics to refute primarily
the Lutheran teaching, but also Erasmian humanism and Machiavelllianism, see Skinner,
Foundations, pp. 137–46.
42 Bellarmine, De Laicis, pp. 26, 33. Though there is some ground for Somerville’s claim that
the late scholastics were “far more radically constitutionalist than is usually supposed,”
this suggestion runs the risk of exaggerating the extent of their populism (J. P. Somerville,
“From Suarez to Filmer: A Reappraisal,” The Historical Journal 25, 3 [1982]: p. 525 and
would expect given Filmer’s emphasis on Bellarmine’s argument for the con-
sensual origins of government, the Jesuit does not understand despotism as
a violation of consent so much as a violation of the classical and Thomistic
injunction in support of rule directed to the right end, namely, the common
good.43 Thus, for the Jesuit scholastics, popular sovereignty cannot be un-
derstood as a reflection of individual natural rights, but rather as a principle
of legitimacy flowing from the organic nature of political community.
With respect to Filmer’s aim to undermine scriptural support for the
scholastic idea of natural liberty, his tactic is to exploit the patriarchal im-
plications of Suarez and Bellarmine’s interpretations of Genesis in order to
demonstrate the irremediable conflict between Scripture and the Catholic
natural law, which claimed to contain the biblical teaching. He does this by
attempting to show the discrepancy between Bellarmine’s assertion of natu-
ral freedom and equality and his reflections on the significance of creation.
For instance, Bellarmine argued: “from creation itself; . . . God made woman
from man, and did not create many men at the same time, but only one,
from whom all others were to be born; so that He might show the order and
supremacy which He wished to exist among men.”44 From this observa-
tion, Bellarmine proceeds to make the quintessentially Filmerian arguments
that sexual generation immediately produced the subjection of the young
to their elders and the subjection of Adam’s sons and grandsons to him in
particular.45 Bellarmine’s apparent concurrence with St. John of Antioch as
to the implications of Adam’s creation allows Filmer to pit Bellarmine against
Suarez, who had offered his own refutation of St. John’s crypto-Filmerism.
In response to the Church Father’s argument in his 34 Homily on I Corinthi-
ans “that from one Adam were formed and procreated all men in order that
the subordination to one prince might be signified,” Suarez maintains that
Adam’s creation denoted only economic power over his offspring, not po-
litical authority. This economic power, Suarez suggests, related exclusively
to the rule proper to a family, and hence extended over children only until
Rager, Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine, pp. 43, 107], who draws a far too direct connection be-
tween scholastic political theology and American political theory). I argue that the “radical”
reading of Jesuit constitutionalism actually shows the coloring traces of Filmer’s critique, es-
pecially his emphasis on their account of the efficient cause of political power at the expense
of their more fundamental argument from final causality. For other useful cautions about
Jesuit radicalism, see Skinner, Foundations, pp. 182–4 and Annabel Brett, “Individual and
Community in the ‘Second Scholastic’: Subjective Rights in Domingo de Soto and Francisco
Suarez,” Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle,
Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999): pp. 167–8.
43 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summae Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican
Province, 3 vols. (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947): ST I–II q. 90, a. 4. Cf. Suarez (1944),
De Leg.: I.7.1–16. pp. 90–101 and Rager, Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine, pp. 47–51.
44 Bellarmine, De Laicis, pp. 31–2 (cf. Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 14 and Suarez, De Leg. II.8.8–9.
222–3). See also Skinner, Foundations, pp. 150–1.
45 Bellarmine, De Laicis, pp. 32, 35.
their maturity, and never at any time included the power of life and death
over a wife and children. Political power, in Suarez’s view, “did not begin
until several families began to be gathered into one perfected community.”46
Politics was not a result of Adam’s creation, but rather of the consent of
the assembled family heads to the creation of a more complex association
befitting the needs and rational potential of human nature.
Filmer rebuts Suarez’s argument with the assertion that the distinction
between economic and political power is nonsensical given the perfect agree-
ment of regal and paternal power. He complains: “I see no reason but that
we may call Adam’s family a commonwealth, except we will wrangle about
words.”47 Filmer reduces Suarez’s treatment of the differentiated forms of
rule based on the composition and proper end of the particular species of
association to mere semantics. But it is Bellarmine that Filmer turns to in
the hope of delivering the hammer blow to the edifice of Suarez’s argument.
From Bellarmine’s attribution of political subjection to Adam’s offspring –
“the first parents ought to have been princes of their posterity” – Filmer
draws the memorable conclusion: “Until Suarez bring some reason for what
he saith, I shall trust more to Bellarmine’s proofs than to his bare denials.”48
Filmer hopes to prove that this division in the Catholic natural law camp,
particularly over the significance of Adam’s creation and the extent of pater-
nal power, fatally undermines the cause of scriptural support for the doctrine
of natural liberty.
Both Bellarmine and Suarez affirms the naturalness of paternal power
but typically deny, in contrast to Filmer, that it extends to the power over
life and death. In contrast to later radical Whig arguments such as that of
Locke, the scholastics denied the rightful power of punishment with death
to any individual, arguing instead that only the political community as such
possesses this right.49 In attacking the Jesuits, Filmer is not only defend-
ing paternal right but also extending it into the realm of political power
by making that right absolute. Moreover, pitting Bellarmine against Suarez
served the useful rhetorical purpose of displaying (or exaggerating) contra-
dictory opinions within the schools, as well as suggesting Suarez’s hetero-
doxy in his opposition to such a prominent Church Father as St. John of
Antioch.
It is not surprising that of the two Jesuits, Suarez is Filmer’s deadlier op-
ponent, for it is Suarez who anticipates an argument not unlike Filmer’s.
Suarez criticizes “the opinion of some of the canonists . . . who say that this
power from the nature of the subject is in some supreme prince, on whom
46 Suarez (1944), De Leg. III.2.3. 374. Cf. Tierney, Natural Rights, pp. 308, 310.
48 Ibid., p. 19.
49 For example, see Suarez, De Leg. III.3.3,6. 378–80; cf. Tierney, Natural Rights, pp. 308, 310,
314.
by God it has been conferred, and by succession it ought to remain always in

someone.”50 It is in reference to this opinion that Suarez raises his objections
to St. John of Antioch’s homily on I Corinthians. In a stunning inversion of
Filmerian logic, Suarez points to Adam’s creation as the source of a very
egalitarian interpretation of the distribution and origin of political power.
On the political import of creation, Suarez argues: “It should be said that
this power from the nature alone of the matter exists in no single person, but
in the collectivity of men.”51 Rather than Filmer’s absolutist model of the
Adamite thesis, Suarez draws out the more democratic implications of his
own interpretation of Genesis. The effort to divide and conquer the twin pil-
lars of seventeenth-century Jesuit scholasticism depended on Filmer’s expos-
ing possible contradictions in their accounts of creation in order to discredit
the scriptural foundation of the Catholic natural law alternative to divine
right monarchy. Filmer’s fundamentally Lutheran sola scriptura orientation
pervades his treatment of these Catholic divines. His intention is to expose
these Christian Aristotelians as all Aristotle and no Christian or all nature
and no Scripture.52 All the while, of course, he operates on the presumption
that nature, understood apart from generation, is a poor or defective guide
to the truth.
The problem of nature in Filmer’s thought comes to light most clearly
when one compares his stance on the question of reason and revelation to that
of his Catholic opponents and to their philosophical inspiration Aristotle.
He prefaces his consideration of Aristotle with a clarion call for the absolute
necessity of analyzing political phenomena through the prism of Scripture.
He condemns the attempt to find the ground of natural liberty in ancient
philosophers and poets as “the great scandal of Christianity” and then pro-
ceeds to restate the Adamite thesis of Patriarcha.53 Though Filmer expresses
his disdain for those who appeal to ancient pagan philosophers as champi-
ons of natural liberty, he does not preclude the possibility of deriving some
utility in examining ancient authors. In fact, Filmer identifies Aristotle as
“the profoundest scholar . . . in natural philosophy.”54 Filmer’s point in ex-
amining Aristotle is to reveal both the possibilities and limits of natural rea-
son. Ignorance of the manner of the creation of the world, Filmer cautions,
“occasioned several errors amongst heathen philosophers.”55 Nonetheless,
many pagan thinkers could see the truth of the patriarchal origins of politi-
cal power, even if their ignorance of Scripture ensured they could only grasp
50 Suarez, De Leg. III.2.2. 373.

51 Ibid., III.2.3. 373.
52 It is interesting to note how Filmer’s treatment of Suarez and Bellarmine recalls the parallel
between Filmer’s condemnation of Polybius (Patriarcha, p. 14) and Bellarmine’s criticism
of Cicero (p. 22). In both cases, Filmer and Bellarmine emphasize the limits of unassisted
reason.
54 Ibid., p. 4.
55 Ibid., pp. 14, 236.
this truth incompletely. Filmer suggests that Aristotle’s argument that “at the
beginning cities were under the government of kings, for the eldest in every
house is king,” indicates that the power of government, in Filmer’s words,
“did originally arise from the right of fatherhood, which cannot possibly
consist with that natural equality which men dream of.”56 Moreover, Filmer
draws on Aristotle’s identification of monarchy as the “first and divinest
sort of government” to prove the ancient philosopher’s support of absolute
monarchy.57
Filmer’s understanding of the limits of natural reason emerges in his sharp
criticism of Aristotelian classical republicanism. The scholastic argument
that the people may consent to form a variety of regimes (e.g., monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy) reflected their agreement with the fundamental
premises of Aristotelian regime analysis.58 Filmer’s assertion that absolute
monarchy is the natural and divinely inscribed form of rule departs radically
from the classical tradition of political science. To the extent that Suarez
and Bellarmine affirm the possibility of a multiplicity of regimes types that
may be directed toward the common good, the Catholic natural law teach-
ing on politics may be said to be a form of classical republicanism, albeit a
form with serious theological dimensions. Thus, Filmer’s attack on classical
republicanism is an effort to knock the classical legs out from under the
Christian edifice of the scholastic political teaching. One way to do this is
to deny that Aristotle, the classical founder of mixed and balanced constitu-
tionalism, was a proponent of mixed government at all.59 Filmer even goes
so far as to present Aristotle as a champion of patriarchal monarchy. His
treatment of this great classical authority on regimes deserves our attention.
One of the most striking aspects of Filmer’s analysis of Aristotle is his em-
phasis on the latter’s preoccupation with the issue of force. Filmer condenses
Aristotle’s entire complex constitutional teaching into the simple formula
that
[t]he Grecians, when they left to be governed by Kings, fell to be governed by an

army. Their monarchy was changed into a stratocracy, and not into an aristocracy
or democracy. For if unity in government, which is only found in monarchy, be once
broken, there is no stay or bounds, until it come to a constant standing army.60
56 Aristotle, The Politics, Carnes Lord, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984):
1252b15–21 and Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 14. Filmer also approvingly cites Plato’s view of the
city as a “large family.”
57 Aristotle, Politics, 1289a39–41. Filmer also turns to ancient legal practice, particularly Roman
patriarchalism, to support his contention that it is futile to look to the ancients for a defense
of natural liberty (Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 18, 26; cf. Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 19).
58 Aristotle, Politics, 1278b6–1284b20. Rager does a good job of illuminating the essen-
tially Aristotelian character of late scholastic regime analysis (Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine,
pp. 35–9).
59 Aristotle, Politics, 1295a25–1296b12.
60 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 247. Filmer reaches this conclusion from Aristotle’s argument “that the
first commonweals among Grecians after kingdoms, [were] made of those that waged war”
Filmer’s skewed approach to interpreting Aristotle reflects his own deep dis-
satisfaction with the ancient understanding of political life. At one point
Filmer confesses that the “one benefit I have found by reading Aristotle” is
to show the consequences of allowing “any man or multitude of men either by
cunning or force to set up what government they please.”61 The larger effect
of Filmer’s distorting presentation of Aristotle’s political thought is to make a
very specific point. Filmer’s emphasis on ancient militarism – of the ancients,
he concludes that it was “in their power who manage arms to continue or
not the form of government” – leads to the conclusion that, in Filmer’s view,
the problem that Aristotle is attempting to solve is the legitimization and
classification of armed power and acts of force.62 According to Filmer, the
Aristotelian regime typology reflects little more than a rationalization of civil
discord, an attempt to reify the slings and arrows of political fortune in a
discrete constitutional category. The divine right argument simply could not
accept either the internal integrity of Aristotle’s regime forms or the com-
posite elements of the one, the few, and the many that comprised Aristotle’s
mixed regime theory. For Filmer, the clarity of Aristotle’s discovery of the
patriarchal and monarchical origins of government ultimately succumbed to
the bloody spectacle of war and chaos.
Filmer suggests that without the sustaining logic of patriarchalism and a
full-blown scriptural account of the workings of the world, natural reason
can never penetrate the cacophony and clamor of political life to reach a core
of intelligibility. The problem of natural reason, then, is that it is trapped
at the level of phenomena and lacks the access to being provided by rev-
elation. Of Aristotle’s classification of the five sorts of monarchies, Filmer
argues that they “are at most but different and accidental means of the first
obtaining or holding of monarchies, and not real or essential differences of
the manner of government.”63 The problem of the ancient phenomenology
of politics was its inability to distinguish accident from essence. In absence
of Scripture, Filmer holds, there is no firm foundation for a comprehensive
understanding of politics. For Filmer, “nature” is constantly acted upon by
an energetic God, not by human beings. By positing revelation as offering the
comprehensive truth about politic life, Filmer allows little room for politics
as traditionally understood. Gone are Aristotle’s reflections on distributive
justice. If all that is required for a full understanding of the human role in
creation can be known by revelation, then in Filmer’s view, there is no place
(Aristotle, Politics, 1297b16–17). Of course, Aristotle never suggests that these early political
forms preclude the possibility of aristocracy, democracy, or mixed regimes in the more fully
developed city. This use (and abuse) of Aristotle may reflect Filmer’s own concern about
the possibility, and eventual realization, of military rule in England following soon after the
abolition of the monarchy in 1649.
62 Ibid. (cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1329a11–12).
for the deliberation and rational discourse of civic life: there is only room
for obedience.
Contract and Consent

The second main thrust of Filmer’s attack on the scholastics was directed
against their contract theory. One of the chief bones of contention for Filmer
against the Catholic natural law is the scholastic justification for rebellion.
For Filmer, the popular sovereignty notion that grounded the Jesuits’ theory
of the consensual origins of government had two serious implications. First,
Suarez and Bellarmine’s argument that the relationship between the subjects
and the secular ruler is the result of human arrangements bore the clear im-
plication that the civil ruler owns no divine right to his power.64 The second
consequence of the scholastic consent theory is that “with lawful cause” the
people may change the form of regime from a monarchy to an aristocracy
or a democracy.65 Suarez argues that there are two grounds upon which
revolution could be justified: either when a tyrant has seized civil power
without the just title acquired through popular consent (tyrannus in titulo)
or when a ruler who gained power through a just title misuses that power
by injuring the common good (tyrannus in regimine).66 The contract that cre-
ates government is binding on both the people and the rulers, but Suarez
holds that the subjects may sever their allegiance to the ruler “according to
the conditions which have either been expressly stated in the first contract
between the king and the kingdom or which are intimately included in it
by natural law.”67 In answer to the question of who decides when rulers
have broken the social contract, both Suarez and Bellarmine clearly indicate
that the people will decide. Predictably, Filmer finds this a “pestilent and
dangerous conclusion.”68
In the context of the complex world of Counter-Reformation theological
and political controversy, Filmer views the Catholic apologists’ patroniza-
tion of contractual theories of the origin of political power and the grounds
of legitimate popular resistance to civil authority as a means to lower the
status of civil government in relation to the direct divine ordination of papal
power. To some extent this is true, insofar as Suarez attempts to demonstrate
the largely human origin of political power by contrasting it with the direct
64 Reijo Wilenius, The Social and Political Theory of Francisco Suarez (Helsinki: Suomalaisen
Kirjallisuuden Kirjapaino, 1963): p. 81.
65 Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 27 (Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 6). Cf. Rager, Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine,
pp. 112–18.
66 Wilenius, Social and Political Theory of Suarez, p. 83 and Suarez, “Defensio Fidei Catholicae”
in Selections, VI. 4. 1–3. 705–8.
67 Wilenius, Social and Political Theory of Suarez, p. 81 and Suarez, “Defensio,”: VI. 4. 11.714.
divine conferral of papal authority.69 What is not so apparent, though, are

some of the profound similarities between Filmer and his Catholic oppo-
nents. One of the many direct and explicit adversaries targeted by the Jesuits
were the various antinomian Protestant sects, which argued that any and
all civil government is incompatible with Christianity.70 Far from being the
pseudoanarchists Filmer charged them to be, Suarez and Bellarmine operate
from the presumption of the naturalness and intrinsic goodness of political
authority, even if they reject the more stringently Aristotelian understand-
ing of the natural city. Bellarmine says of the relation between the civil and
divine law: “civil law is just, that it is always either the conclusion or the
moral determination of the Divine law; therefore they have the same end.”71
As to the democratic character of the origins of civil power, Suarez qualifies
the implications of these origins with the observation that the natural law
does not prescribe that the institutions of government reflect this natural
democracy. He explains: “Therefore this power, as far as it is given directly
by God to the community . . . does not absolutely order that it ever remain
in it, nor through it this power be directly exercised.”72 Therefore, consent,
for Suarez, does not denote or necessarily even support democracy. Both
the presumption of the naturalness of politics and the possibility of, if not
preference for, monarchy are common strains in Filmer and his Catholic
antagonists.
One implication of Bellarmine and Suarez’s version of the original democ-
racy is their rejection of the argument that the origin of political power lies
in individuals or in the multitude understood in universal terms. Suarez in
particular calls attention to the circumstance that the divine conferral of civil
power presupposes a “perfect community” that is not a mere aggregation
of individuals “without a physical or moral union” but rather a community
formed by “common consent.”73 This act of popular consent transforms
69 See Suarez, De Leg. III.iii.8. 381–2 and Tierney, Natural Rights, p. 311.
70 Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 6. Cf. Rager, Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine, pp. 103–6.
71 Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 47. Brett (“Individual and Community,” pp. 167–8; cf. pp. 164–5)
observes that Suarez was less Aristotelian than de Soto with regard to Suarez’s emphasis
on the distinction between the categories of the moral and the natural, and between the
social community and the contrivance of political government. For a fuller treatment of
the development of the Spanish Thomist thought of the “Salamanca School” that preceded
Suarez, see Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Cf. Skinner, Foundations, pp. 156–63.
72 Francisco Suarez, Extracts on Politics and Government, George Moore, trans. (Chevy Chase,
MD: Country Dollar Press, 1950); Defenio Fidei Cathlicae: III.ii.9.14. (cf. Suarez, De Leg.
III.3.7–8.380–82). Cf. Wilenius (Social and Political Theory of Suarez, p. 79) and Tierney
(Natural Rights, p. 312), who demonstrates that Suarez did not endorse the radical Whig idea
of popular sovereignty as a delegated power. However, see Bellarmine’s description of the
relationship between natural freedom and equality and the formation of government in these
terms: “by the same natural law, this power is delegated by the multitude to one or several,
for the State cannot of itself exercise this power” (De Laicis, p. 26).
73 Suarez, De Leg.: III.2.4.375.
a particular collectivity of people into a “mystical body” infused with the

divine gift of civil authority. Suarez agrees with Filmer as to the inability of
individuals qua individuals to constitute sovereign political authority when
he asserts that “the force of natural law alone is . . . not in individuals.” Fur-
thermore, they agree that “this power is not . . . in the species as a whole,
or in the total collection of men living in the whole world.” Filmer, in
fact, makes much of Suarez’s admission that it “was hardly possible, and
much less expedient” that all humanity be congregated into one political
community.74
Filmer’s intention in pointing to this statement is to show the incompat-
ibility of the argument for natural liberty with any account of the origins
of particular political communities. The natural liberty of the multitude
would, Filmer argues, require the consent of the entire multitude (all of
humanity) in order to break it into distinct communities. The natural lib-
erty of the people and the contractual origins of government are, in this
view, incompatible; thus, the Catholic natural law argument fails on its own
terms. Filmer illustrates this alleged internal inconsistency of Bellarmine and
Suarez’s argument:
Can they show or prove ever the whole multitude met and divided this power, which
God gave them in gross, by breaking it into parcels and by apportioning a distinct
power to each several commonwealth? Without such a compact, I cannot see, ac-
cording to their own principles, how there can be any election of a magistrate by a
commonwealth, but by a mere usurpation upon the privilege of the whole world.75
It is typical of Filmer’s dichotomous approach to theologico–political

disputation – natural liberty versus natural subjection, with little room for
play in the middle – that the suggestion of a supposed contradiction in
the argument for natural liberty, in effect, proves the argument for natural
subjection.
Filmer’s assertion of the incompatibility of natural liberty with the forma-
tion of particular political communities derives from the logical and moral
premises of an argument that denies the unique human capacity to form or
participate in government. Though Filmer offers his own almost perfunc-
tory assurance “not to question or quarrel at the rights of this or any other
nation,” it is clear from his Adamite thesis of the origins of political power
that he deprives the law of nations of the moral status and rational content
presupposed by Bellarmine and Suarez.76 For Filmer, the laws of distinct
communities are not the products of consent and rational deduction from
certain natural laws; rather, they are rooted in natural subjection and the
74 Ibid., 375.
76 Ibid., p. 4. For the Thomist account of the relation of the law of nature and the law of
nations, see Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 27 and Aquinas, Summa, I–II, q. 95, a. 4.1. See Skinner,
Foundations, pp. 152–3 for the late scholastic modification of Thomistic understanding of
the relation of the law of nature and the law of nations.
incapacity of human beings to freely form governments. Thus, these laws

simply reflect the will of a particular ruler. With Filmer’s argument that the
general law of creation is strict obedience to authority and that the determi-
nation of rule is existentially beyond the purview of the subject, we can see
how the Christian Aristotelian notion of nature almost disappears altogether
in the theologico–political calculus of Filmer’s divine right.
The divine right phenomenology of politics articulated by Filmer was
grounded on a complex understanding of divine providence. Such serious
political and constitutional issues as usurpation, succession disputes, and
popular elections provided obvious logical problems for Filmer’s argument
regarding the uninterrupted transfer of political authority from Adam to his
successor monarchs in the modern age. Clearly in the distant past, as well
as in England’s turbulent present, rulers had emerged through such irregu-
lar means as usurpation and election. How could Filmer make the manifest
contingency of politics in the world consistent with his doctrine of natu-
ral subjection? His answer was to suppress the role of autonomous human
agency in political life by explaining such events as usurpation, election,
and succession disputes in terms of divine providence. Filmer’s providential-
ist argument is twofold. First, he claims that the usurpation of power is a
reflection of God’s will, not of any natural right for the people to replace
their rulers. Although God may “use and turn men’s unrighteous acts to the
performance of His righteous decrees,” Filmer makes no attempt to justify
God’s actions in terms amenable to natural reason.77 Even the example of
a group of electors selecting a monarch upon an escheat of power through
want of an heir does not signify a natural constitutive power inhering in all
or even some of the people. In this event, Filmer claims, the electors simply
assume the natural paternal power of Adam on a temporary and limited ba-
sis. Second, Filmer denies that the manifest interruptions to rule signify any
qualification on the obedience of the subject. In this view, God can replace
or select rulers, and it is simply the people’s duty to await the result of this
mysterious process of providential politics. Filmer claims that the obedience
due to existing rulers does not depend on “the difference of obtaining the
supreme power – whether by conquest, election, succession or by any other
way.”78 Subjects must wait as spectators to see who will be their new master.
Thus, Filmer’s conception of divine providence includes a notion of God’s
77 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 11. Cf. Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 86; Schochet, Patriarchalism, pp. 150–
1; and Nathan Tarcov, Locke’s Education for Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984): p. 14.
78 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 132. Of course, as events in English history following the civil war would
demonstrate to Filmer, obedience to usurpers becomes a more difficult position to explain
when the “rightful heir” is still alive. To understand Filmer’s difficulty in the Engagement
Controversy in dealing with the issues of loyalty and the extent of obedience due from
the subject in “dangerous and doubtful times,” see Filmer’s “Directions for Obedience” in
Patriarcha, pp. 281–6.
willingness both to remove and supply rulers for His naturally subject crea-
tures. That we must have rulers is an ontological necessity, but who they will
be and how they will come to power is a matter for the wide and ultimately
mysterious scope of divine providence.
The deeper thrust of Filmer’s providentialist argument is meant to un-
dermine the Catholic natural law principles of contract and consent. This
attempt to refute several of the key premises of the contractual theory of
government places Filmer in the uncharacteristic position of assuming the
doctrine of the natural liberty of the people, at least for the sake of demon-
strating its inability to generate a plausible account of the creation of political
authority. The doctrine of natural liberty, Filmer argues, is an inherently an-
archical principle. His aim in examining the problems of election, majority
rule, and tacit consent is to demonstrate, as Gordon Schochet observes, “the
moral and logical impossibility of deriving government, private property,
and the hierarchical arrangements that exist in society from the conditions of
original natural freedom and equality predicated by contractual thinkers.”79
For Filmer, the insuperable practical and theoretical chasm between natu-
ral freedom and the hierarchical order required for political society may be
demonstrated on several grounds.
First, he argues that the formation of particular communities would re-
quire the universal consent of all humankind, or else the election of a ruler
by one group would constitute a usurpation of the rights of humanity gener-
ally. Even conceding the theoretical possibility of such a consensual division
of the universal multitude into distinct communities, Filmer makes a sec-
ond, more practical, argument that there are no actual historical examples
of an entire people electing a ruler. He charges: “Was a general meeting of
a whole kingdom ever known for the election of a prince? Was there any
example of it found in the whole world?”80 Some kings in Poland, Sweden,
and Denmark, Filmer admits, have been chosen “by some small part of a
people. . . . But by the whole or major part in a kingdom not any at all.”81
It is important to recognize that Filmer does not intend here to dispute the
custom of electing monarchs seen in some kingdoms. Rather, his aim is to
demonstrate that such elections are all practical violations of natural free-
dom and equality inasmuch as they all involve only a minority of electors,
not the vast multitude of subjects. More importantly, however, Filmer’s in-
tention is to demonstrate that contemporary elective monarchies in Europe
reflect only the existing, and in Filmer’s view highly flawed, arrangements
set by the ruling power in those countries and do not indicate the inherent
right of a people to select their rulers. These elective monarchies disprove
rather than affirm the liberty of the people.
79 Schochet, Patriarchalism, p. 122.

81 Ibid., p. 143.
In addition to stating the practical and moral impossibility of popular

elections, Filmer argues that the principle of majority rule is itself antitheti-
cal to natural freedom and equality. Even if an entire people were to gather
for the election of their rulers, Filmer denies that dissenters would be morally
bound to accept the will of the majority. He claims that “the acts of multi-
tudes not entire are not binding to all but only to such as consent to them.”82
A particularly interesting feature of Filmer’s criticism of contract theory is
how seriously he takes the individualist implications of natural freedom and
equality. As he argues, if the assent of one man can be excluded in any
election or in any assembly vote, “the same reason that excludes that one
man may exclude many hundreds, and many thousands, yea, and the major
part itself.”83 The principle of unanimity, Filmer argues, is embedded in the
logic of natural freedom, and the doctrine of natural freedom is the theo-
retical foundation of every attempt to defend the people’s right or power
to constitute political authority. At the heart of Filmer’s contention for the
inalienability of natural freedom is the supposition that if natural freedom
were the fundamental human condition – which Filmer denies – then he as-
sumes it must be inalienable because “the law of nature is unchangeable, and
howsoever one man may hinder another in the use or exercise of his natural
right, yet thereby no man loseth the right itself.”84 With this supposition
in the background, Filmer defies his opponents to prove how any theory of
natural liberty can eventuate in anything but anarchy.
The problem of natural liberty is also a theme in Filmer’s treatment of
the notion of tacit consent. The proposition that merely obeying or enjoying
the protection of an existing government (in a sense, simply not rebelling
against it) signifies the election of the ruler through “silent acceptation”
leads, in Filmer’s opinion, to the logical conclusion that
[e]very prince that comes to a crown, either by succession, conquest or usurpation,
may be said to be elected by the people. Which inference is too ridiculous, for in such
cases the people are so far from the liberty of specification that they want even that
of contradiction.85
Apart from the charge that the principle of tacit consent reduces the ac-
tive principle of consent to a veritable nullity, Filmer levels two additional
criticisms against it. He implicitly denies that any consistent natural rights
theory could countenance the power of one generation to bind the political
allegiance of their descendants. Filmer charges that if each generation or even
every individual does not have the right to alter the inherited political order,
then natural freedom is irrelevant to political discourse.86 If natural rights
82 Ibid., p. 21.
83 Ibid., p. 261.
84 Ibid., p. 21.
85 Ibid., p. 21.
are taken seriously, in Filmer’s view, the natural ebb and flow of humanity, as
some individuals die and others are born, ensures that any existing govern-
ment will degenerate into chaos before the perpetual stream of new life. A
second implication of Filmer’s rejection of tacit consent is that the unanimity
required to establish political society must be precisely that: unanimity. The
removal of the possibility of tacit consent removes the possibility of virtual
unanimity or government being derived from the actions of some and the
acceptance of others. To Filmer, the impossibility of the ever-changing mul-
titude’s agreeing even on the process of majority rule itself marks the futility
and incoherence of populist theories of government.
Filmer’s notion of consent is both active and retractable. Though individ-
uals may agree to establish government or rules of private property, Filmer
denies that this consent, in principle at least, need be perpetual.87 Filmer’s
attack on the populist dimensions of contract theory aims to reinforce a cru-
cial Filmerian premise, namely, that contract theory assumes the very social
machinery necessary for the operation of government and society that is pre-
cluded by the doctrine of natural liberty. Political communities can never be
formed without universal consent, and majorities cannot act for the whole
without direct reference to a primary and unanimous social contract estab-
lishing the process of majority rule. It is a contract, however, that Filmer
argues can never be made.
Filmer’s attack on scholastic natural law populism signifies his bold at-
tempt to dismantle contract theories from within by carrying their core as-
sumptions and deepest commitments to natural liberty and equality to their
logical extremes. In every instance, Filmer contends that the doctrine of nat-
ural liberty results in chaos and anarchy. One commentator even suggests
that Filmer’s attack on the fundamental notions and presuppositions of pop-
ular sovereignty was “a concise statement of the traditional political beliefs
that had to be overcome before constitutional liberalism could become a
dominant ideology.”88 Filmer’s challenge to the Catholic natural lawyers, as
well as to any proponent of consent and contract theory, was for them to
prove that natural liberty need not eventuate in anarchy.
87 Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, pp. 90–1.

2
Calvinism and Parliamentary Resistance Theory
In the early 1640s England exploded into civil war. The decades’-long con-
flict between the supporters of Parliament and the supporters of the crown
came to a dramatic test of arms. In the pamphlet war that preceded and
accompanied the military contest, the disputants dealt with fundamental
questions about the nature and origin of political power and the status of
the monarchy in the English system of government. Filmer joined this con-
troversy about first political principles with characteristic aplomb. In The
Anarchy of a Limited Monarchy he offered a comprehensive critique of the
theoretical foundations of the parliamentary position propounded in the in-
fluential works of Philip Hunton and Henry Parker. It is in this attack on the
parliamentary contractarianism of the civil war era that Filmer presented his
fullest articulation of the divine right theory of absolute sovereignty.
Filmer joined the fray not only to defend the rights and privileges of his
sovereign, Charles I, but also to counter what he took to be the noxious
doctrine of mixed monarchy that underpinned the parliamentary cause in
the war. He identified the intellectual foundations of the parliamentary posi-
tion in the potent combination of Calvinist resistance theory and the English
notion of ancient constitutionalism. In the mixture of theological and secu-
lar arguments that animated the apologists of Parliament, Filmer perceived
dangerous doctrines that justified resistance to the crown and denied the
legal and constitutional supremacy of the monarch. The two preeminent
statements of parliamentary resistance theory were Philip Hunton’s A Trea-
tise of Monarchie (1643) and Henry Parker’s Observations upon some of his
Majesties late Answers and Expresses (1642). Hunton and Parker argued that
political society is a form of contract produced by the consent of the people.
In this variant of the natural liberty tradition, popular resistance to monar-
chical authority was justified by the people’s natural constitutive power to
order political society and to establish legal limitations on the crown. Philip
Hunton, Filmer’s chief opponent in the Anarchy, argued that the English gov-
ernment was a mixed monarchy in which sovereignty is distributed more or
48
Calvinism and Parliamentary Resistance Theory 49
less equally among the three coordinate powers in the king, the Lords, and
the Commons. The Puritan divine Hunton affirmed that political authority is
ordained by God, but he emphatically argued that the character of the polit-
ical contract was the product of the popular will. He maintained that in the
event of a serious constitutional conflict between the various elements of the
government, such as the situation in England in 1642, the matter could only
be decided by recourse to the judgment of the entire community. Whereas
Hunton represented a relatively moderate version of the parliamentary posi-
tion that afforded a large share of sovereign power to the monarchy, Parker
articulated a more radical stance. He argued not only that all political power
derived from the people, but also that the ultimate legal and constitutional
authority in England lay in the two houses of Parliament. In Parker’s populist
notion of the political contract, the representative institutions of the English
government, especially the Commons, expressed popular sovereignty, and
the crown simply did not.
Filmer’s response to the parliamentary contractarians constitutes his most
comprehensive reflections on the issue of sovereignty. He systematically cri-
tiqued the ancient constitutionalist principle of mixed monarchy and the
Calvinist argument for justified resistance to the crown. In doing so, Filmer
put divine right theory firmly and predictably in the service of political abso-
lutism. He argued that God’s ordination of political power extends “not only
[to] the constitution of power in general, but the limitation of it to one kind
(that is, monarchy, or the government of one alone) and the determination
of it to the individual person and line of Adam.”1 In the Filmerian version of
divine right, the power of a monarch is not only divinely ordained, it is also
inherently unlimited and illimitable. Before we examine Filmer’s attack on
the parliamentary position advanced by Hunton and Parker, it will be useful
to consider the theological and constitutional context produced by the ideas
underlying their arguments.
The Problem of Calvinist Politics

Filmer recognized a number of conduits for the transmission of the doctrine
of natural liberty in England. One, as we have seen, was the amorphous
but still palpable threat to political stability posed by the late scholastic
natural law theory. But Filmer also identified a more emphatically English
support for the notion of natural liberty “first hatched in the schools.” These
1 W. J. Allen points to Filmer’s sovereignty thesis as one of his most innovative arguments (A
History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century [London: Methuen, 1977]: p. 434). James
Daly agrees (Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought [Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1979]: pp. 151–3) and even goes so far as to suggest that Filmer’s divine right Adamite
thesis was “relatively unimportant” to Filmer, inasmuch as his “core lay in the doctrine of
sovereignty.” In contrast, I shall argue that Filmer’s sovereignty argument is fundamentally
derivative from his theological foundation.
more dangerous political foes were the “overzealous favorers of the Geneva
discipline.”2 English and to a lesser extent Scottish Calvinism was Filmer’s
most direct ideological opponent in the years preceding the civil war.
The source of this key conflict lay in English political and ecclesiastical his-
tory. One of the most significant developments in early-seventeenth-century
England was the failure of the Elizabethan Church settlement to produce re-
ligious uniformity. Even as the Catholic threat to national independence be-
came more abstract, increasingly in the early 1600s internal divisions within
the ranks of English Protestantism acquired greater political significance. The
late Tudor settlement championed by the great English scholastic Richard
Hooker rested on the idea of the fundamental harmony between church and
state and the establishment of royal supremacy over both. In Hooker’s com-
plex formulation of Christian Aristotelianism, humankind’s two substantive
ends, secular and spiritual, were distinct but connected in a comprehensive
theological and political system.3 Hooker responded to the calls for church
reform by the early Calvinist forerunners of the Puritans, who sought a re-
turn to a “pure” form of Christian church discipline rooted in Scripture, by
contending that Scripture does not provide absolute guidance on all mat-
ters moral, political, and ecclesiastical.4 As a proponent of the Christian-
Aristotelian tradition extending back to Thomas Aquinas, Hooker sought
to defend what he maintained was the proper, and by no means insubstantial,
sphere of human reason against the extreme scripturalism of the Calvinists.
Filmer, then, was correct to identify a major source of the constitutional
struggles of the 1630s and 1640s in the internal quarrel over the structure
and doctrine of the Church of England between Calvinists and the orthodox
religious establishment. Where Filmer would depart from his predecessor
Hooker, however, was that Filmer would not try to temper Calvinist scrip-
turalism with the authority of reason; he would try to out-Scripture the
scripturalists.
Filmer’s condemnation of the “Geneva discipline” drew its animus from a
long history of political and religious division in England. As far back as the
late Tudor period, English Calvinists had challenged not only the political
role of the bishops in the House of Lords, but in the most extreme cases even
the existence of the bishops in the church structure. The English royalists’
conception of the underlying connection between the power of the monarchy
2 Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann Somerville, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1991): p. 3. Frances Oakley’s argument (The Politics and Eternity: Studies in the
History of Medieval and Early-Modern Political Thought [Leiden: Brill, 1999]: p. 178) illustrat-
ing the indebtedness of English and French Calvinists to scholastic resistance theory suggests
that Filmer may not have been so far off the mark!
3 See Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593), George Edelen, W. Speed Hill,
and P. G. Stanwood, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977–81) 3.11.16; 8.2.3
(cf. 8.1.5). Hereafter Laws.
4 Hooker, Laws: 2.8.5.
and the status of the episcopacy was given clear expression in James I’s fa-
mous royal dictum “No bishop, no king” dating from his earliest arrival
in England.5 While the split within English Protestantism was somewhat
muted during James I’s long controversy with the Catholic Church, contin-
ued Calvinist dissent and the enduring problem of an obstinate Presbyterian
majority in Scotland greatly contributed to the major crisis in the reign of
Charles I.6 This crisis simmered ominously throughout the period of church
reforms instituted by Archbishop Laud in the 1630s. Laud’s efforts to ex-
cise the Calvinist theological principles of grace and predestination from the
Church of England through endorsement of Arminian orthodoxy and a new
emphasis on forms, ceremony, and sacramentalism sparked a bitter reaction
from English Calvinists.7 The crown’s support for Laud’s effort to eradicate
“Puritanism” inevitably reignited the politically charged dispute over church
government and doctrine. In the context of Counter-Reformation Europe,
Laud’s intention to restore “papist” practices in the church and the con-
temporaneous bold assertion and extension of royal prerogative by Charles
produced a highly combustible situation. In this context open defiance of the
crown was predictable.
Filmer voiced the opinion of many English royalists when he associated
Calvinism with political instability and opposition to monarchy. He identi-
fied a deep connection between Calvinist resistance to Laudian reform and
parliamentary opposition to the crown. The parliamentary leaders in the
late 1630s and early 1640s most likely to oppose the crown were Calvinists
who bitterly opposed royal support for Laudian reform and who sought to
exclude the bishops from their political role in Parliament in the House of
Lords. By the time of the civil war English Calvinists, especially Presbyterians,
were committed to the twin goals of reforming the national church and
5 For an excellent treatment of the ongoing dispute between English and Scottish Presbyterians,
on the one hand, and the Elizabethan and Stuart commitment to episcopacy, on the other,
see Michael Mendle, Dangerous Positions: Mixed Government, the Estates of the Realm, and the
Answer to the XIX Propositions (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1985): chs. 3–5.
6 Johann Somerville notes that there were many important Calvinist supporters of James in his
quarrel with the Catholics (Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640 [London: Longman,
1986]: pp. 44–5). The alienation of Calvinists from the crown is one of the central features
of Charles’ reign, although Mendle points out that the more extreme elements of English
Calvinism had linked the theological problem of episcopacy with the political question of
whether the bishops were one of the “estates” of the realm at least since the late Tudor period
(Dangerous Positions, pp. 63–5, 77–96). Cf. Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): pp. 85–148.
7 For analysis of the impact of arminianism on English Calvinists, see R. T Kendall, Calvin
and English Calvinism to 1649 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979): esp. ch. 10. For an
account that downplays the significance of Laud’s reforms as a catalyst for civil war, see
William Lamont, “Arminianism: The Controversy That Never Was,” in Political Discourse in
Early Modern Britain, Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993): pp. 45–66.
permanently limiting the powers of the king.8 However, Filmer perceived a

more fundamental fault line in the doctrines of reformed theology that pro-
duced the intrinsic causal relation between Calvinist principles and opposi-
tion to monarchy. Filmer audaciously reversed the Puritan charge associating
Stuart absolutism and Laudian crypto-papism by uncovering what he took to
be the common philosophical heritage of Calvinist and Catholic resistance
theory in the natural liberty tradition. It was the Puritan and parliamen-
tary resisters who were the crypto-papists, not the king and his archbishop.
For Filmer, the ideological and theological context of England’s religious
and political troubles was indelibly linked to a seminal cleavage within re-
formed theology represented by the distinctive political teachings of Luther
and Calvin, or more properly between their followers and successors.
For Filmer, the problem of the English adherents of the Geneva discipline
had to do with their mistaken understanding of God’s design for human
government. While Calvin followed Luther in advocating the divine ordina-
tion of political authority, a general Christian duty of obedience to temporal
power, and a commitment to scripturalism, Filmer pointed to a number of
fateful differences between Luther’s and Calvin’s political teachings.9 First,
whereas Luther’s approving presentation of government as the “great en-
gine of repression” warmed the cockles of Filmer’s royalist heart and sup-
plied theological support for his authoritarian interpretation of Scripture,
8 Mendle, Dangerous Positions, pp. 8, 136–7, 155–62; Somerville, Politics and Ideology, p. 219
and David Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution,” in The Cambridge
History of Political Thought, 1450–1700, J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991): p. 417. For a good discussion of the appeal of Calvinism
to the English gentry in the early seventeenth century and its role in the development of
antimonarchical sentiment in England, see Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The Origins
and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600–1835 (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1988): pp. 175–6.
9 See Jean Calvin, Institutio of the Christianae religionis, Ford Lewis Battles, trans, trans. from
the 1559 Latin edition (Library of Christian Classics, Vols. 20, 1, John T. McNeill, ed.
[Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967], hereafter Institutes) for divine ordination of tem-
poral authority (4.20.4), for the duty of obedience (4.20.29), and for the supremacy of Scrip-
ture over philosophy (4.20.8). Cf. Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): p. 49. The debate over the character of Calvin’s
political teaching covers the full range of possibilities. For a conservative reading of Calvin that
places him closer to Luther than I do, see Perez Zagorin, A History of Political Thought in the En-
glish Revolution (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954): pp. 72–4 and John Clement Rager,
The Political Philosophy of Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine (Washington, DC: Catholic University
of America Press, 1926): pp. 111–12. For the opposite view of Calvin’s thought as laying
the ideological groundwork for modern radical politics, see Michael Walzer, The Revolution
of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1965). For more balanced readings of Calvin that identify the radical dimensions of his
thought but also recognize its distance from modern secular arguments about government,
see Ralph Hancock, Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989), and Harro Hopfl, The Christian Polity of John Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982).
Calvin’s view of government was less reassuring. While Calvin was as much
of a scripturalist as Luther, the humanist-trained legal scholar presented a
conception of the moral possibilities for political life that were potentially a
good deal more elevated than those permitted by Luther. In the exhortation
for magistrates to ensure that piety and “due honor [have] been prepared
for virtue” among the citizens, Calvin assumed a role in moral education in
virtue for government that was largely absent in Luther.10 Filmer certainly
denied the complex classical conception of citizenship in favor of the single
comprehensive virtue of humble obedience.
Moreover, Calvin’s studious attention to the reform of the structure of
the church government reflected an interest in institutional design that, in
Filmer’s view, indicated a dangerous propensity toward the classical under-
standing of politics. For example, in the 1543 edition of the Institutes, Calvin
argued that as a pure matter of speculation “aristocracy, or a system com-
pounded of aristocracy and democracy far excels all others.”11 In the later
edition of 1559, Calvin added to this section a more precise endorsement of
polity or mixed government, contending that “men’s faults or failings causes
it to be safer and more bearable for a number to exercise government, so
that they may help one another, teach and admonish one another; and, if one
asserts himself unfairly, there should be a number of censors and teachers
to restrain his willfulness.”12 This could hardly be construed as any kind
of approval for absolute monarchy. To make matters worse from Filmer’s
perspective, Calvin had the temerity to base his argument for mixed govern-
ment on the scriptural authority of the Israelite model of government prior to
the kings. While the political teachings of both Luther and Calvin operated
from the reformed theological premise of human corruption, Calvin drew
less authoritarian implications from this premise than does Luther.13 Calvin
reached a distinctly classical republican conclusion that human frailty justi-
fies and necessitates institutional checks and balances to remedy the magis-
trate’s presumed lack of control. From Calvin’s statements about the moral
economy of human nature and the importance of institutional safeguards
10 Calvin Institutes: 4.20.9. Cf. Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism
and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992): p. 354
and Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought
(London: Methuen, 1969): pp. 170, 182–4.
11 Calvin, Institutes: 4.20.8.
12 Calvin, Institutes: 4.20.8. Cf. Hopfl, Christian Polity, pp. 124–6, for a good discussion of this
passage.
13 Of course, it was this aspect of Calvinist theology – the combination of a theological doctrine
of fundamental human depravity and a political commitment to austere republicanism – that
caught the attention of later commentators such as Mill, Tocqueville, and Weber (see John
Stuart Mill, On Liberty [New York: Penguin, 1985]: pp. 126–30; Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America, George Lawrence, trans. [NewYork: Harper, 1966]: pp. 31–49; Max
Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Talcott Parsons, trans. [New York:
Vintage, 1958]).
on magisterial power, his English followers could and did derive theological
and scriptural support for a regime type unmistakably resembling the par-
liamentary formulation of the English Constitution in the years leading up
to and during the civil war.
The second aspect of Calvinist thought that gravely concerned Filmer had
to do with the idea of legitimate resistance to magisterial power. In castigat-
ing Bellarmine’s argument for the right to depose rulers, Filmer indicated that
Calvin also looked “asquint this way.”14 Calvin’s teaching paralleled that of
Luther insofar as both maintained that private individuals are never justified
in actively resisting their ruler. However, Calvin included a portentous mod-
ification to the Protestant teaching on resistance when he added that certain
subordinate “magistrates of the people, appointed to restrain the willfulness
of kings,” have not so much a right as a positive duty to resist a tyrannical
sovereign.15 Calvin adduced the ephors of Sparta, the tribunate in Rome, and
the Estates General in France as examples of inferior magistrates who are
justified in resisting wayward monarchs. Calvin was not endorsing popular
sovereignty – all power still derived from God – but rather stating that in
any constitutional order including institutional checks on royal power, the
members of these institutions are exempt from the general duty of obedi-
ence incumbent on all private individuals. For English royalists like Filmer
this was tantamount to asserting a divinely ordained resistance right against
monarchy, and thus was totally antithetical to the proper Protestant position
regarding the subject’s absolute obedience to temporal rulers. In the particu-
lar context of England, the potential for justifying parliamentary resistance
on the grounds of Calvin’s theory of subordinate magistrates was not lost
on Filmer. In looking “asquint” at the dangerous Catholic teaching, Calvin
was, in Filmer’s view, not being true to the politics of reformation. Thus,
the unique historical and political circumstances in England of the 1640s
produced a violent clash between Luther’s and Calvin’s visions of reforma-
tion politics, between a theory of Protestant absolutism and obedience and
a Protestant ideal of mixed government and legitimate resistance that would
bloody England’s green fields in a form of intra-Protestant warfare for the
most part unseen on the Continent.
Filmer was correct to observe that when English Calvinists developed the
parliamentary resistance theory in the 1640s, they were building on an estab-
lished legacy of resistance ideas rooted in Calvin’s teaching and modified and
radicalized by his successors and followers.16 The idea of divinely ordained
15 Calvin, Institutes: 4.20.31.
16 As several scholars have illuminated, Lutheran resistance theory predated and significantly
influenced Calvinist ideas about resistance (e.g., W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, The Political
Thought of Martin Luther (Brighton, MA: Harvester Press, 1984): pp. 92–4; Quentin Skinner:
The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978): pp. 192–224 and Robert Kingdon, “Calvinism and Resistance Theory, 1550–1580”
institutional checks on monarchy that legitimize resistance resonated in both

the Huguenot and Scottish traditions of Calvinist thought. The Huguenots
represent an important modification and radicalization of Calvin’s position
on justified active resistance to rulers. However, it is important to observe
that even the most radical expressions of Huguenot contract and resistance
theory were a far cry from the natural rights–based arguments of the Whigs
a century later. For the Huguenots the constituent elements of the social
contract were groups, estates, and congregations, not individuals possessing
pre-civil rights.17 The Huguenots held a special place in the political con-
sciousness of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. The image of a
persecuted Protestant minority, victims of the traditional Catholic nemesis
and its brutal centralized monarchy, as waves of pitiful refugees yearning
for the safety of England’s shores struck deep chords of sympathy among
many Englishmen.18 The theoretical innovations that Huguenot polemicists
developed in the principle of resistance, however, alarmed English royalists
like Filmer. In the religious wars in France prior to the massacres of 1572,
Huguenots efforts to secure official toleration for Protestant worship had
been framed in terms of professed loyalty to the crown and opposition to
the ultra-Catholic advisors surrounding the king.19 Following the catastro-
phe of 1572 in which the Huguenot leadership was decimated by the forces of
the crown, the Huguenot champions François Hotman, Theodore Beza, and
the anonymous author of Vindicae Contra Tyrranos took Calvinist resistance
theory in new and radical directions.
Hotman’s Francogallia was a landmark work in the development of Calvin-
ist resistance theory.20 In this sweeping constitutional history of France,
in Cambridge History of Political Thought, pp. 203–5). Luther grudgingly advocated a theory
of resistance to support the Protestant princes of the Schmalkaldic League against imperial
attempts to crush the reformation in Germany in the 1530s and 1540s. Filmer and other
English royalists, however, identified Calvin as the source of the Protestant analogue to
Catholic resistance theory, suggesting that the classical elements in Calvin’s thought, and his
more clearly formulated principles of institutional resistance to monarchy, signified a much
more serious departure from the true path of Scripture-based reformed politics than that of
Luther’s justification of resistance ex tempore.
17 For an insightful analysis of the Calvinist theological and emphatically anti-individualist
basis of Huguenot contract theory, see Harro Hopfl and Martyn Thompson, “The History
of Contract as a Motif in Political Thought,” American Historical Review, vol. 84, no. 4
(October 1979): pp. 929–34.
18 For a demonstration of the degree to which the idea of the Huguenots still evoked the
sympathy of English radicals even in the seventeenth century, see Locke’s somewhat macabre
fascination with the declining French Protestant population (Maurice Cranston, John Locke:
A Biography [New York: Macmillan, 1957]: 163).
19 Skinner, Foundations, p. 254. For a comprehensive treatment of the Huguenots’ position
prior to 1572, see Robert Kingdon, Geneva and the Consolidation of the French Protestant
Movement, 1564–1572 (Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1967).
20 For excellent treatments of Hotman, see Kingdon, “Calvinism and Resistance Theory,”
pp. 208–10 and Skinner, Foundations, pp. 306–7. W. J. Allen denies that Francogallia had
Hotman advanced several radical claims. He argued that the early Frankish
monarchy was elective and maintained the claim that some form of public
council had always played an integral role representing the whole French
population. For Hotman, the national Estates General rather than the lo-
cal parlements was the modern version of this ancient popular assembly.
Most significantly, Hotman avowed that this public council held the ultimate
power in the state as the custodian of the immutable fundamental laws lim-
iting the power of the French king.21 He presented the Estates as the French
equivalent of Calvin’s “ephoral” power, a divinely instituted constitutional
check on the monarchy, and consequently defended the legitimate right of
resistance to the crown by the leaders of this representative assembly. In this
way Hotman established the pattern for other Huguenot theorists to adapt
Calvin’s teaching on inferior magistrates to a populist reading of French con-
stitutional history. Calvin’s successor in Geneva, Theodore Beza, expanded
Hotman’s idea of resistance even further in his Of the Right of Magistrates.
Beza accounted for the resistance right of two types of subordinate magis-
trates, officials of local government and constitutionally established leaders
of the national government. Among the examples of national institutions
that derive their authority from a reciprocal contract with the king Beza
included not only the Estates General but also, significantly, the English Par-
liament.22 In the later Vindicae Contra Tyrranos, Huguenot resistance theory
reached a zenith of populism. Whereas Hotman and Beza had, in keeping
with Calvin, never extended the right of resistance to individuals, but rather
reserved this power to legally established inferior magistrates, the author of
Vindicae argued that a tyrant holding office by usurpation may be resisted
by every individual and even sanctioned assassination.23 While Huguenot
thinkers were careful not to equate a right of resistance with a claim of pop-
ular sovereignty – as Calvinists they adhered to the principle of divine ordi-
nation of all political power – the clear trajectory of the Huguenot argument
for resistance was radical and potentially populist. This incipient populism
would manifest itself in the later arguments of the Calvinist apologists for
Parliament in England such as Hunton and Parker.
a lasting influence outside of Huguenot circles (History of Political Thought, pp. 310–11).
However, Tyrrell and Sidney make reference to it in their own critique of Filmer in Exclusion
era England.
21 For François Hotman’s Francogallia (1573) as well as Beza and the anonymous author of
Vindicae contra tyrrannos, see Julian Franklin’s translations of the original editions in Consti-
tutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza and Mornay
(New York: Pegasus, 1969): pp. 57–8, 90 (hereafter Three Treatises).
22 For Theodore Beza, Of the Right of Magistrates (1573), see Franklin, Three Treatises, pp. 97–
135, esp. pp. 110–15, 118–19. Cf. Kingdon, “Calvinism and Resistance Theory,” pp. 210–11.
23 For Vindicae contra Tyrranos (1579), see Franklin, Three Treatises, pp. 142–99, esp. 187–97.
Cf. excellent treatments of this seminal Huguenot tract in Hopfl and Thompson, “History
as Contract,” pp. 929–33 and Kingdon, “Calvinism and Resistance Theory,” pp. 212–14.
For their part, Scottish Calvinists provided not only a consistent irritant to
Charles I in the religious struggle of the 1630s over the status of the bishops
in their relation to the kirk, they also supplied their English coreligionists
with a rich heritage of political resistance theories. The most important of the
Scottish monarchomachs, and the one Filmer singled out for abuse, was the
humanist scholar George Buchanan.24 Buchanan’s De jure regni apud Scotos
was written as a defense of the Protestant nobles who ousted Queen Mary
Stuart. It was in the context of justifying Mary’s expulsion that Buchanan,
drawing heavily on classical sources, established the crucial classical distinc-
tion between kingship and tyranny. Kings, he argued, derive their power from
popular consent, and rule by and are subject to law. In addition, Buchanan
argued that laws may be changed by the estates of the realm and the public
council that a king must assemble to help him govern. Tyrants, on the other
hand, seize power illegitimately and aspire to rule unbound by law. Political
obedience, in Buchanan’s view, applied only to kings, whereas tyrants may
be deposed by legal action, military force, or assassination.25 In this respect
Buchanan drew Filmer’s ire as another populist incendiary produced by the
Geneva discipline.
The Calvinist supporters of Parliament inherited a rich legacy of re-
sistance theories drawn from the Huguenot, the Scots, and the writings
of Calvin himself. The logic of the argument for parliamentary resistance
is fully intelligible only in the context of the development and modifica-
tion of Calvin’s theory of inferior magistrates. The danger for English roy-
alism that Filmer identified lay in the volatile combination or fusion of
Calvinist resistance theory and the arguments for mixed government and an-
cient constitutionalism that he complained were gaining increasing currency
in England prior to the civil war. In order to complete our discussion of the
unique historical and political context in which Filmer and his parliamen-
tary opponents found themselves, we must briefly consider the emergence
and development of ancient constitutionalism in England.
Divine Right and the Ancient Constitution

In The Anarchy of Limited Monarchy Filmer set out to dismantle the theory of
mixed and limited monarchy propounded by the parliamentary apologists
Hunton and Parker. However, Filmer also indicated that any successful de-
fense of absolute monarchy would require overcoming a deeply ingrained
feature of English political culture. He suggested that by the time of the civil
war, the theory of mixed and limited monarchy had become the standard
24 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 3. For good discussions of Buchanan, see Kingdon, “Calvinism

and Resistance Theory,” pp. 216–18 and J. H. Burns, “George Buchanan and the Anti-
Monarchomachs,” in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, pp. 3–22.
25 Kingdon, “Calvinism and Reistance Theory,” p. 218.
coin of the realm in English political discourse. He complained: “There is

scarce the meanest man of the multitude but can now in these days tell us that
the government of the kingdom of England is a limited and mixed monar-
chy.”26 In order to understand the complex theoretical and constitutional
backdrop to Filmer’s argument, it is useful to present a brief account of the
historical and intellectual climate that brought limited and mixed monarchy
theories to such prominence in mid-seventeenth-century England.
The historical origins and political context that produced such widespread
acceptance of mixed and limited monarchy theories may be understood as
a response to the divine right pretensions of James I at the beginning of
the seventeenth century.27 James conceived of the kingship as “the office
given him by God” over England. His divine right theory had certain su-
perficial similarities to that of Filmer, such as the analogy of the king to
the father’s rule of a family and the exhortation to unquestioned obedience
on the part of the subjects.28 James’s theory, however, rested on a kind of
modified Aristotelianism that melded divine right with a conception of the
organic character of political society and the natural principle of rule inher-
ing in composite bodies. As we have seen, Filmer’s argument extends beyond
James’s use of the general notion that all associations require a ruling ele-
ment to the proposition that the truth about political rule can be derived
from the details of Scripture. Even without the strong scriptural foundation
of Filmerism, however, James’s argument had serious constitutional impli-
cations. In one celebrated passage, James compared monarchy to the head’s
rule of the body and declared that just as it is best to remove a diseased mem-
ber before it affects the whole body, “even so is it betwixt the prince and
the people,” and as such the prince may remove a diseased member of the
polity in order to preserve the common good.29 Presumably, under certain
circumstances, one or both of the houses of Parliament could be conceived
as such a diseased member of the polity.
The main response to James’s pretensions from his parliamentary and
judicial opponents was another sort of Aristotelianism. The ancient consti-
tution theory of James’s opponents shared the Aristotelian assumption that

27 The following discussion owes a great deal to Michael Zuckert’s excellent account of the
origins of ancient and balanced constitution theories in English political thought (Natural
Rights, pp. 49–66), as well as to Mendle, Dangerous Positions and to Corinne Weston, “Theory
of Mixed Monarchy under Charles I and after,” English Historical Review, vol. 75 (July 1960):
pp. 426–43.
28 James I, “Trew Law of a Free Monarchie,” in Divine Right and Democracy, David Wootton,
ed. (Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Classics, 1986): pp. 103, 99, 105. Oakley (Politics
of Eternity, p. 325) sees James following Lutheran theology with respect to the distinction
between God’s absolute and ordained power. However, with respect to monarchy I argue
that James is much more Aristotelian than Filmer.
29 James I, “Trew Law,” p. 99.
the English Constitution was natural and, though an organic composition,

was a whole irreducible to its parts. It also contained, however, theoretical
elements inimical to divine right ambitions. For example, the ancient consti-
tutionalist position that the preconstitutional origins of the English regime
have no bearing on its actual operation attenuated the divine rightists’ claims
to royal supremacy on the grounds that the rights and privileges of the estates
originally derived from and are ultimately subject to retraction by the king.
The ancient constitutionalism propounded by many parliamentarians and
jurists in the first half of the 1600s defended the English regime on the basis
of both its antiquity and its utility. The English Constitution, they argued,
with its emphasis on the structural relation of the parts – the Commons,
the Lords spiritual and temporal, the bench, and the king – to the whole
worked well and had worked well for a very long time. Ancient constitu-
tionalism made no appeal to pre-civil individual rights, but rather held the
English model of divided sovereignty as the embodiment of the structural
arrangement most consistent with the natural purpose of political society.
Filmer’s confrontation with the parliamentary contractarians marks the
dramatic shift that occurred in English political discourse in the decade or
so preceding the civil war. Just as Filmer’s divine right theory signifies a
radicalization of James’s similitudes of the father to the king and the head
to the body, so does the civil war era theory of mixed and limited monar-
chy indicate a significant departure from ancient constitutionalism. While
the immediate issues that produced intense friction between the king and
Parliament related to matters of taxation and the ecclesiastical dispute over
episcopacy and Presbyterianism, the heart of the conflict that precipitated
the shift from ancient constitutional to mixed regime arguments sprang from
the constitutional dilemma raised by competing claims for royal prerogative
and the extension of parliamentary power. The court’s judgment in favor
of Charles I in the Ship Money case of 1638, which recognized the king as
the supreme arbiter in determining national emergencies, as well as his long
period of rule without a sitting Parliament from 1629 to 1640, were seen
by his opponents as brazen attempts to extend the royal prerogative beyond
traditional limits.30 The parliamentary response to these actions included
the Triennial Act legislating regular parliaments every three years with or
without royal assent; the Grand Remonstrance, which would have required
the king to employ only ministers acceptable to Parliament; the act exclud-
ing bishops from the House of Lords; and the Nineteen Propositions, which
would have legislated parliamentary control over the militia, church reform,
30 J. P. Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution: 1603–1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1966): pp. 109–11. Notice also the Filmerian arguments made by Sir John Finch, lord chief
justice of common pleas, who maintained that the king’s power historically precedes that of
Parliament and that Parliament cannot bar a succession. Compare Kenyon, pp. 114–16 with
Filmer, Patriarcha, III: 5, 6, 9.
and the education of the royal children.31 These measures were intended to
transform radically the English conception of the Constitution and the re-
lation of church and state. Clearly, by the early 1640s, many in Parliament
were no longer willing to accept the traditional premise that the king was
the head of the three estates composing Parliament – the Commons and
Lords spiritual and temporal. Amid the tumultuous climate and spiraling
events of this period, ancient constitutionalist arguments were drowned out
by the mutual recriminations and charges of executive tyranny and legisla-
tive usurpation. Clearly, in the minds of the English political class, even if the
English regime had operated smoothly in the past, it was not doing so now
and would not do so in the foreseeable future until the constitutional crisis
had been resolved. The mixed constitutional theory emerged as an argument
with appeal on both sides of the constitutional divide.
Mixed government theory, then, was essentially an innovation in English
constitutional thought flowing from both the political quarrel between crown
and Parliament and the religious battle over episcopacy and the presbytery.
It was more theoretical than ancient constitutionalism in that it emphasized
the need to balance and calibrate the distinct elements in the English polity,
rather than appealing primarily to its antiquity.32 Ironically, the classic ex-
pression of the mixed constitution was contained in Charles I’s Answer to
the Nineteen Propositions. It is here that Charles and his advisors, who had
bitterly opposed the idea only a year before, now made the case that England
was a mixed regime:
There being three kinds of government among men (absolute monarchy, aristocracy,
and democracy), and all these having their particular conveniences and inconve-
niences, the experience and wisdom of your ancestors has so moulded this out of a
mixture of these as to give this kingdom (as far as human prudence can provide) the
conveniences of all three, . . . as long as the balance hangs even between these three
states, and they run jointly on in their proper channel.33
Mixed regime theory is at once palpably Aristotelian and yet uniquely at-
tuned to the particular circumstances in England circa 1642.34 The idea of
31 For the Triennial Act, see Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, pp. 219–22; for the Grand Remon-
strance, see pp. 228–40 (esp. p. 230), and for the Nineteen Propositions see pp. 244–7.
A curious feature of those turbulent and confused times is the similarity between Filmer’s
crusade against Catholic scholasticism and the particular animus of his parliamentary oppo-
nents toward “the Jesuits and other engineers and factors for Rome” (Grand Remonstrance,
in Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, pp. 229, 231) – proof, I suppose, that you can’t always choose
your friends. Cf. Weston, “Theory,” p. 428.
32 Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 60.
33 Charles I, “His Majesties Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament”
(1642) in Wootton, Divine Right and Democracy, p. 171.
34 Aristotle, Politics, IV: 11. For two diverging approaches to the development of classical regime
typology in England and its bearing on the King’s Answer, see Weston, “Theory,” pp. 426,
436–7 and Mendle, Dangerous Positions, pp. 2–3, 38–40 and 111–13. Cf. Woolrych, Britain
in Revolution, pp. 223–4.
mixed government was sufficiently protean to allow for its appropriation by

both sides in the constitutional struggle. The king employed it to stigmatize
Parliament’s actions of the previous year as unjustifiable invasions of legiti-
mate royal prerogative. Parliamentary radicals saw Charles’s acceptance of
mixed regime theory as a victory on two counts. It reversed, or at least at-
tenuated, the traditional claim of royal supremacy maintained since the time
of Elizabeth and James by including the monarchy as one of the estates of
the realm. Moreover, with the exclusion of the bishops from the schema of
estates, the Answer also satisfied the desire of many English Calvinists to
reduce the political power of the bishops, if not destroy the episcopacy en-
tirely.35 Despite the particular partisan claims of victory resulting from the
king’s Answer, the emphasis on balance and respect for the position of the
part in the order of the whole held both intellectual and rhetorical attractions
to royalists and parliamentary radicals alike.
Mixed regime theory did not, however, appeal to Filmer. His sarcastic
reference to the ubiquity of mixed constitution theory in English political
circles was as critical of many of his fellow royalists as it was of the king’s
opponents. Filmer rejected the inclusion of the king as one of the three
estates and detested the malleability of mixed regime theory and the wide
range of interpretations it allowed.36 Filmer’s attempt to ground a theory
of absolute monarchy in Scripture is as much a correction of civil war era
English royalism as a refutation of English parliamentarianism and popular
sovereignty theories. One such errant royalist is Henry Ferne. This moderate
royalist was castigated by Filmer for accepting the central tenets of mixed
regime theory, even though Ferne argued that the king retained supreme
power within the mix and that Parliament’s rights derived from the king.37 In
admitting the practical superiority of England’s mixed regime, Ferne insisted
that rejecting resistance to royal authority did not constitute a defense of
absolutism.38 In his dispute with the parliamentary contractarians Filmer
had few, if any, true soul mates even on the royalist end of the political
spectrum.
35 Cf. Mendle, Dangerous Positions, pp. 171–85.

36 Filmer (Patriarcha, pp. 88–9) saw the three estates in more traditional terms as the Commons,
the Lords Spiritual, and the Lords Temporal. In adopting this formulation of the Constitution,
Filmer perhaps followed the lead of some of Charles’ many royalist critics such as Sir Matthew
Hale and Thomas Hobbes, who believed the Crown conceded far too much to Parliament
in the king’s Answers (cf. Corinne Weston, “England: Ancient Constitution and Common
Law,” in Cambridge History of Political Thought, pp. 396–7).
37 Henry Ferne, “The Resolving of Conscience” (Cambridge: 1642). See also Zuckert, Natural
Rights, p. 66. Compare with Filmer’s criticism of “Dr. Ferne” in Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 134.
38 See Ferne cited in J. W. Allen, English Political Thought 1603–1644 (London: Archon, 1967):
p. 495. Ferne’s position regarding the legislative power was also very different from that
of Filmer. Whereas Filmer considered the legislative power to be, following Bodin, the first
mark of sovereignty and thus entirely belonging to the monarch, Ferne allowed only that
there could be no law without royal assent, i.e., the concurrence of all three branches of
government.
Hunton and the Mixed Regime

Two of the most articulate and effective defenders of Parliament in its
open struggle with the crown during the civil war were the Puritan divine
Phillip Hunton and the parliamentary lawyer Henry Parker. The core idea
of Hunton’s A Treatise of Monarchie is that the king is one of the three estates
of the English constitutional order. England is, in Hunton’s view, a “mixed
monarchy” because within the balance of the three coordinated branches,
sovereignty is shared but the “primity (sic) of share in the supreme power”
is in the king.39 Despite the king’s “primity of share” in the supreme power,
the king does not have supreme power in toto; rather, in the event of conflict
between the monarch and one or both of the houses of Parliament, there
is no internal judge to such disputes. The underlying premise of Hunton’s
mixed monarchy theory is the idea of contract. For Hunton, all government
is derived from consent and must be understood as a contract between the
rulers and the people.40 Hunton’s emphasis on the contractual arrangement
that forms the fundamental laws of a particular regime indicates two impor-
tant features of his thought. First, it signifies his departure from the ancient
constitution model inasmuch as he looks for the legitimacy of the English
regime in its preconstitutional origins. Furthermore, Hunton emphasizes that
political subjection is primarily a moral act “because man, being a volun-
tary agent, and subjection being a moral act, it does essentially depend on
consent.”41
Where the Calvinist Hunton, the Lutheran Filmer, and the Jesuits Suarez
and Bellarmine all agree is about the divine ordination of political authority.
The moral character of political obligation is ultimately derived from this
central theological fact. Hunton’s schema of the four levels of political au-
thority illustrates important parallels between English Calvinist thought and
that of the Jesuits. On the most fundamental level, the power of government
derives from God, but this divine grant specifies that no particular form of
government is required.42 The next level relates to the presovereign power
of the people from which derives the consent to form a government. The
third level involves the establishment of a particular constitution by the peo-
ple. The fourth and most immediate level of political authority comprises
those who actually exercise power in a given constitution. It is Hunton’s
contention, in contrast to Filmer, that the divine ordination of politics al-
lows wide possibilities for the variety of regimes human beings can produce.
In England in particular, the four levels of authority signify “the rule of
God, the people of England, and, for the final two, the mix of King and
39 Philip Hunton, “A Treatise of Monarchy” (1642), in Wootton, Divine Right and Democracy,
p. 192.
40 Hunton, “Treatise,” pp. 177, 183, 191.
41 Ibid., p. 189.
42 For the four levels in general, see Hunton, “Treatise,” pp. 175–7. Cf. Calvin, Institutes 4.20.8.
Parliament.”43 Hunton’s precise account of the theological premises under-

lying the legitimacy of England’s contractual mixed monarchy demonstrates
the significant departure of English Calvinist supporters of Parliament from
the earlier understanding of ancient constitutionalism.
Hunton’s theory of mixed monarchy was a compelling target for Filmer’s
attacks due both to its appeal to divine sanction and to the use of contract.
Though Hunton’s powerful injection of consent into the Aristotelian frame
of mixed constitutionalism bears strong links to the arguments of Filmer’s
Catholic enemies, there is at least one significant difference. While Suarez
and Bellarmine propounded the consensual origins of government, the moral
power exercised through consent was mainly a device to explain the legit-
imate acceptance of existing authority. Hunton, on the other hand, more
strongly emphasized the creative role of the moral power expressed through
consent and the right of resistance that flowed from this understanding of
consent.44 This difference in emphasis was no doubt partly influenced by
the context of the civil war conditions under which Hunton wrote, when the
claims of competing existing authorities were so manifestly at issue.
However, another explanation for Hunton’s emphasis on the active moral
agency of consent is his reliance on the idea of “subordinate magistrates”
so central to Calvinist resistance theory. Hunton’s theory of coordinate
sovereignty represents an English argument similar to the radicalization of
the principle of resistance by institutions and political leaders participat-
ing in, although not exercising exclusively or even primarily, the right of
sovereignty. In the context of mid-seventeenth-century England, in which
the notion of mixed sovereignty had already taken root somewhat with the
spread of ancient constitutionalism, it was not a major theoretical or theolog-
ical leap to transfer the idea of a justifiable resistance right in “subordinate
magistrates” to a right of resistance against the crown by the two houses of
Parliament as almost coequal sovereigns.45 Hunton, however, takes Calvinist
resistance theory even further in the radical direction than the Huguenot
position in Vindicae Contra Tyrrannos by arguing that in the event of a con-
stitutional conflict between the various branches of government, judgment
regarding the validity of these institutional claims devolves to “the sentence
in every man’s conscience.”46 While Hunton recognized the act of resistance
as a moral power inhering in individuals, he also firmly contends that it
does not denote a “civil” right of resistance. Hunton clearly limits the in-
dividualist implications of his notion of devolution. Consent, he argued, is
43 Hunton, “Treatise,” pp. 195–211. The quote is from Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 68.
45 It is typical of Hunton’s contractualist argument that he distinguishes the general theological
and moral justification of resistance (“Treatise,” pp. 185–8) from his discussion of the par-
ticular scope of resistance in England (“Treatise,” pp. 202–9). Cf. Calvin, Institutes 4.20.31.
46 Hunton, “Treatise,” pp. 187–8.
required to form government and to choose a constitutional structure, but

coercive power properly derives from God. Following the Calvinist politi-
cal teaching, Hunton argues that only governments or institutions ordained
by divine sanction can exercise coercive authority, not individuals.47 Thus,
while Hunton granted that individuals may possess a moral power to resist
civil authority, such resistance must be understood by reference to the com-
munity. The individual may pass judgment on his own safety and the safety
of the entire community of which he is a member, but Hunton grounded this
right of resistance in the good of the whole community rather than in the
pre-political rights of the individual. For Hunton, the ultimate end of the
individual’s power to resist is the verdict of the whole community decided
in war.48 In this way Hunton stops far short of the radical theory of the
dissolution of government.
Filmer and Hunton agree that government involves a moral subjection.
Hunton, however, argues that this subjection is not natural, but rather orig-
inates in contract. Filmer’s own account, of course, denied human beings
the capacity to form obligations on their own terms. In attacking another
theory rooted in a divine grant of political power, Filmer is actually con-
demning Hunton’s attempt to mix divine right with the coactive power of
human beings.49 For Filmer, God’s general and specific ordinances arising
from Adam’s creation allow no moral space for human participation in the
formation of rule; there is only subjection. There is, however, an important
ambiguity in Filmer’s rejection of Hunton’s argument for the mixed charac-
ter of sovereignty in England. On the one hand, like Ferne, he accepts the
practical existence of the estates in England – though not including the king
as one of them – and he argues that the king alone has supreme power.50
On the other hand, Filmer, unlike Ferne, rejects the mixed regime motif as
not being even practically beneficial to the good order of the realm. Filmer’s
emphatic insistence on the supremacy of the monarch alone is born from his
broader doctrine of obedience. Though the Lords and Commons may assist
the king in ruling – and Filmer admits that they do – the implicit suggestion
47 Julian Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1978): p. 39. In this respect, Hunton’s Calvinist argument shares the Christian-
Aristotelian premises of the Catholic natural lawyers. Cf. Calvin, Institutes 4.20.4 and
Francisco Suarez, Ac Deo Legislatore (1612, Coimbra), in Selections from Three Works of
Francisco Suarez, S. J. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944): III.3.3.378. Cf. Oakley, Politics of
Eternity, p. 178.
48 Franklin, John Locke, p. 42.
49 Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 69. However, note the inherently conservative character of
Hunton’s idea of contract (e.g. “Treatise,” pp. 177, 182, 186) by which he allows that a
people may legitimately subject themselves and their posterity to absolute government. In
this respect, Hunton not only recoils from the idea of a general right of rebellion, he also
falls short of the scholastic argument that delegitimated tyranny prima facie on the basis of
the natural law.
50 Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 99, 145.
of Filmer’s teaching is that even the appearance of mixture in the sovereign

power confuses the operation of the obedience principle and tends to divide
the subject’s loyalty.51 Filmer’s repeated emphasis is on the unity necessary
for sovereign power, a unity in its deepest sense antithetical to Hunton’s
or Aristotle’s notion of mixture. As Filmer argues: “Neither his primity of
share in the supreme power, nor his authority being last, no, nor having the
greatest authority, doth make him a monarch unless he have that authority
alone.”52 Mixture, moreover, opens the possibility of internal disputes within
the sovereign power – the very situation prompting Hunton’s writing – and
Filmer sees no way to resolve these disputes if no organ of rule possessed
supreme power in its entirety. To Filmer, this incapacity to settle disputes and
provide for a final arbiter or judge makes mixed regime theories the very em-
bodiment of the principle of anarchy itself. As Filmer cautions, “farewell all
government if there be no judge.”
The other important element in Hunton’s theory is the notion of legal
limits. In addition to being a mixed regime, England is also, in Hunton’s
view, a limited monarchy in which the supreme sovereign power – the king –
is regulated by certain fundamental laws and principles. Hunton lists the
five “principal and most apparent limitations of this monarchy” as involv-
ing a wide range of issues relevant to the operation of government.53 These
limits reflect both the mixed character of the English Constitution and the
contractual origins of government in general. The first limit has to do with
the “nomothetical power” and forbids the kings to make laws “solely and
by themselves, but together with the concurrent authority of the two other
estates in parliament.” The second limit prohibits the monarch from con-
travening the “fundamental common laws,” which appear to include the
common law precedents and such fundamental constitutional laws as the
Magna Carta. Third, though the king reserves the right of judicial appoint-
ment, Hunton argues that he is prohibited from exercising the “power of
constituting officers and means of governing” such as courts of judicature.
The fourth limit relates to the crucial matter of succession, as a “succes-
sive monarch is so far limited in his power that he cannot leave it to whom
he pleases, but to whom the fundamental law concerning that succession
has designed it.” The fifth and final “principal limitation” on the English
51 For Filmer’s admission that kings first created written laws and called parliaments to assist
them in ruling large and diverse realms, see Filmer, Patriarcha, III: pp. 5, 12.
52 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 156 (emphasis in the original).
53 For the five limits, see Hunton, “Treatise,” pp. 199–201. Goldsworthy argues that Filmer
displays a crucial misunderstanding of Hunton’s point about fundamental laws in seeing
them only as limits on the king alone and failing to see the absolute authority of king-
in-Parliament (Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999]: p. 134). This argument does not, however, take full account
of Hunton’s concern to place certain limits on sovereignty per se through the medium of
quasi-Aristotelian statements about the inherent character of political life.
monarchy is the prohibition on taxing the subjects without the assent of

Parliament or “to make an alienation of any lands or other revenues an-
nexed by law to the crown.” Though Hunton’s account of the chief limits on
monarchical power is not radical or innovative in itself – Hunton’s limits are
nowhere near as intrusive as those proposed by Parliament in the measures
of 1641 – it inflamed Filmer’s deepest fears of the dark populist implications
of the mixed monarchy theory.
Apart from the limitations placed on regal power by the fundamental
constitution, the original contract, Hunton identifies a second source of le-
gal limitation that he terms “after condescent.” Hunton maintains that after
condescent occurs “when a lord who, by conquest or other right, has an ar-
bitrary power but, not liking to hold by such a right, does either formally or
virtually desert it and take a legal right.”54 Filmer condemns this argument
as a veil for populism. Who decides whether a ruler has “virtually” deserted
one of his prerogatives? Predictably, he charges, most likely the people! The
limits instituted by such a development, Hunton argues, amount to a “sec-
ondary original constitution.” Filmer attacks this notion of the self-limiting
character of regal power both on its own terms and in relation to Hunton’s
professed originalism. On its own terms, Filmer argues that a self-limitation
of regal power depends entirely on the will of the monarch and hence is
no limit on sovereign will at all. For Filmer, a will can only be limited by a
greater will. He proposes that after condescent is merely an “act of grace”
that is fully retractable with no diminution of sovereign power.55 Filmer’s
second criticism of after condescent is that it signifies a noncontractual form
of limitation that does not require the consent of the people. In this way,
Filmer maintains that after condescent represents an erosion of the primacy
of the fundamental or original constitution. Filmer even suggests that after
condescent reflects Hunton’s more sober second thoughts on the matter of
consent. He explains:
Howsoever our author speak big of the radical, fundamental and original power of
the people as the root of all sovereignty, yet in a better mood he will take up and be
contented with a monarchy limited by an after condescent and act of grace from the
monarch himself.56
Filmer does not deny that monarchs may choose not to exercise fully their
power or may change the laws as they please, but he does deny that such
actions assume a legal character that binds sovereign power. For Filmer,
even if every English king since William the Conqueror has ruled by certain
standing laws, these developments, such as the calling of parliaments and the
incorporation of the Magna Carta, do not form constitutional limitations
54 Hunton, “Treatise,” pp. 183–4.

55 Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 149–50. Cf. Hunton, “Treatise,” p. 184.
extrinsic to the particular will of the current monarch. Filmer’s theory of

sovereignty denies the very possibility of any meaningful treatment of con-
stitutional development.
Filmer’s response to Hunton’s notion of legal limits on the crown is that a
king, being the source of all law, cannot govern by fixed constitutional laws.
The very arbitrariness of law, in Filmer’s view, militates against a sovereign
setting his own rules and promising to keep them. The supreme power cannot
be restrained by law because if it is “restrained by some law, is not the power
of that law, and of them that made that law, above his supreme power?”57
The power to make laws is arbitrary, and thus laws cannot be made in a legal
way. Filmer also criticizes Hunton’s caution that subjects should obey the
monarch, even if he passes certain limits, unless the king’s actions endanger
the survival of the realm. As Filmer observes, any breaking of the law by
the king destroys the limited monarchy: “if there be illegality in the act, it
strikes at the very being of limited monarchy, which is to be legal.”58 It is
the particular character of Filmerian divine right that law and arbitrary will,
usually seen as opposites, are integrated in a theory of absolute sovereignty.
Parker and Parliamentary Supremacy

Henry Parker’s Observations was one of several parliamentary responses
to Charles’s thesis concerning English mixed monarchy. Charles, we recall,
sought to affirm the integral position of the crown in the Constitution as one
of the three major elements of the government and to defend his exclusive
rights and prerogatives. Parker, already a celebrated opponent of the crown
for his brilliant tract against the decision in the Ship Money case and his crit-
icism of the Laudian church reforms, advanced the most sweeping claims for
parliamentary authority in the civil war period. His argument for legislative
supremacy also signified the most radical extension of parliamentary resis-
tance theory. For example, whereas William Prynne argued in the Soveraigne
Power of Parliament (1643) that the two houses together held greater author-
ity than the crown alone, and whereas Hunton, as we have seen, maintained
a primity of share for the crown in supreme power, Parker argued that
Parliament was the supreme constitutional power because it alone repre-
sented the nation as a whole.59 Parker did not deny the role of the monarch
57 Ibid., pp. 148, 136. Cf. Zagorin, English Revolution, p. 197.

58 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 152 and Hunton, “Treatise,” p. 188.
59 Caton even goes so far as to identify Parker with a “version of republicanism” (Caton, Politics
of Progress, p. 135). Richard Tuck, on the other hand, argues (Philosophy and Government,
1572–1651 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993]: p. 229) that Parker’s defense
of parliamentary authority is largely pragmatic (cf. Goldsworthy, Sovereignty of Parliament,
pp. 86, 88, 97–9, 103). For arguments that, I believe correctly, observe the naturalistic basis
of Parker’s argument, see Alan Craig Houston, “Republicanism, the Politics of Necessity and
the Rule of Law,” in A Nation Transformed: England after the Restoration, Alan Houston and
in the English government, but he did confine it to a clearly subordinate

status vis-à-vis the absolute legislative power of Parliament. While Filmer
paid less attention to Parker than to Hunton, his response to the parliamen-
tary apologist he called the “Observator” was indicative of his divine right
opposition to civil war era resistance theories.
Parker maintained that the laws of society are dictates of reason “ratified
by common consent.” To this extent he, like Hunton, operated from the
Aristotelian premise of natural human sociality. However, Parker also
grounded his populist account of the origins of government in an interpre-
tation of constitutional history characteristic of the radical Huguenot resis-
tance theorists. According to Parker, the human need for law meant that in
the early stages of human civilization people conferred supreme power on
monarchs. In time, however, they saw the dangers of “unbounded prerog-
ative” and realized the need to establish “laws for the limiting of supreme
governors.”60 While Parker affirmed that by the law of nature “the body
of the people” may rise against abusive magistrates and “redress all public
grievances,” he also maintained that in the course of their constitutional
development nations instituted “public assemblies, whereby the people may
assume its own power to do itself right.” Parker’s central contention is that
in England the people established the houses of Parliament so that “by virtue
of election and representation a few shall act for the many.”61 For Parker,
the representative institutions of Parliament play a similar role in England
that the Estates General did in the Hugenot interpretation of French con-
stitutional history. These institutions express popular sovereignty, and as
such the crown, properly speaking, has no share in the sovereign power.
Thus, Parker defended parliamentary resistance to the crown in the civil war
on the grounds that it was in Parliament that the “whole community in its
underived majesty shall convene to do justice.” As such, he granted Parlia-
ment sweeping powers “to create new forms and precedents” and to have
“jurisdiction over itself.”62 With this assertion of absolute legislative power,
Parker ascribed to Parliament the right to assume the executive function in
the event of a national crisis.
In the heated atmosphere of civil war era England, Parker’s argument was
attractive to the more radical defenders of the parliamentary cause, even as
Hunton’s position was more suited for the many moderates still committed to
some royal share in sovereignty. Huntonian moderates in the parliamentary
Steve Pincus, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): pp. 248–9 and Michael
Mendle’s “Parliamentary Sovereignty: A very English absolutism” Political Discourse in Early
Modern Britain, in Phillipson and Skinner, eds., pp. 116–17 and his Henry Parker and the
English Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
60 Parker, Observations, p. 13 (quoted in Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 163).
61 Ibid., pp. 13–14 (in Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 164–5).
62 Ibid., pp. 14–15 (in Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 165). Cf. Houston, “Republicanism,” pp. 250–1
and Mendle, Henry Parker, p. 183.
camp could only be deeply concerned by the populist implications of Parker’s

tendency to elide the power of the people and the sovereignty of Parliament.
For Hunton and the moderates, the ultimate appeal to the judgment of the
“community” in time of constitutional crisis was meant to ensure, not dero-
gate from, the crown’s pivotal role as the primary organ of sovereign power.
Only the community could seriously restrict the crown, not Parliament. For
Parker, on the other hand, Parliament’s conflict with the crown did not need
to be explained and justified by recourse to the uncertain judgment of the
community because, in a fundamental sense, Parliament was the community.
Filmer’s brief critique of Parker rested on two major objections. First,
he countered Parker’s claim that Parliament had jurisdiction over itself by
observing that Parker had no way to explain this jurisdiction in cases of
“divisions” arising between the Commons and the Lords.63 Filmer reiter-
ated his opposition to the logic of divided sovereignty and applied this ob-
jection to Parker’s claims regarding sovereignty in any composite body. Who
would or could resolve a dispute between the Lords and Commons? Filmer
responded that clearly Parker’s argument for parliamentary sovereignty is
simply another recipe for anarchy. Only the unified and unlimited system
of command embodied by an absolute monarch could avoid the anarchic
possibilities inhering in any theory of mixed government.
Filmer’s other major objection to Parker’s theory of mixed government
was his claim that Parker could not point to a single historical example of
a nation governed by a system of limited monarchy. Filmer claimed that
insofar as the legislative power inheres solely in a monarch, it is absurd to
propose that any king could be restrained by a legal superior. Moreover, he
charged that Parker could not identify any regime operating on the principles
of limited monarchy. According to Filmer, limited monarchy did not occur
to the ancient Greeks or to any of the modern states such as Sweden, Poland,
or Denmark that were often cited as exemplars of it. Filmer charged:
Now let the Observator bethink himself, whether all or any of these three countries
have found out any art whereby the people or community may assume its own power.
If neither these countries have, most countries have not, nay none have. The people
or community in these realms are as absolute as any in the world.64
With an argument echoing his assault on the populist implications of the

scholastic contract theory, Filmer challenged Parker to provide any example
of a nation “where the community in its underived majesty did ever come to
do justice.”65 In Filmer’s view, insofar as neither England nor any country
could point to such a radically populist origin of government, no argument

64 Ibid., p. 170.
65 Ibid., p. 167.
for mixed or limited sovereignty or for popular resistance to monarchical

authority could be justified.
The divine right attack on the parliamentary contractarians pointed beyond

the immediate issues of the English constitutional controversy in the civil
war era. Filmer saw in the parliamentary resistance theories of Hunton and
Parker another variant of the dangerous doctrine of natural liberty. Filmer
perceptively traced the origin of these arguments to two confluent sources:
the tradition of Calvinist resistance theory and the English idea of mixed
monarchy that had developed from ancient constitutionalism. With his ar-
ticulation of a divine right theory of unlimited sovereignty, Filmer buttressed
the cause of English royalism with the theological support of Lutheran abso-
lutism. In so doing, he framed the constitutional dispute in England in terms
of the general context of a fundamental quarrel within Protestantism over
the nature of political obligation and the proper form of government. For
England in particular, the exchange between Filmer and his parliamentary
opponents foreshadowed the constitutional upheavals that would take place
during the 1640s and 1650s. Hunton’s appeal to the “conscience of every
man” would indeed result in a long and bitter contest of arms. In Parker’s
radical argument for legislative supremacy we see the seeds of the Common-
wealth and the full absorption of all constitutional powers into a single leg-
islative body.66 Even further down the road, however, loomed Cromwell, the
collapse of the Commonwealth, the restoration of the Stuart monarchy, and
the dark prospect of further constitutional travails in the future. Filmer, then,
was correct in one crucial respect. The mixed regime proposed by Hunton
and the principle of legislative supremacy advocated by Parker signally failed
to achieve their direct aim: to establish the theoretical grounds for a perma-
nent settlement of the jurisdiction of the various elements of the English
Constitution. The challenge of establishing such a comprehensive settlement
would confront Filmer’s new Whig antagonists nearly forty years later.
66 For a good treatment of Interregnum republican thought, see Blair Worden, “Marchmount
Nedham and the Beginnings of English Republicanism, 1649–1656,” in Republicanism,
Liberty, and Commercial Society 1649–1776, David Wootton, ed. (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1994): pp. 45–81. Cf. Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, pp. 432–56.
3
The Problem of Grotius and Hobbes
The two civil wars from 1642 to 1648 proved to be calamitous for the
cause of divine right monarchy in England. Filmer’s greatest fears about
the parliamentary radicalism in the mixed regime theories of Hunton and
Parker, the latter eventually becoming a secretary of state under Cromwell,
were realized in the regicide and the establishment of the Commonwealth in
1649. Filmer lived to see not only the triumph of Calvinist and Independent
resisters over crown and church, but also the utter implosion of Charles and
the moderate royalists’ argument for mixed monarchy when a radicalized
Parliament assumed the full right of sovereignty as the sole representative of
the nation. The postwar period also, however, saw the publication in 1652
of the nothing if not resilient Filmer’s Observations concerning the Originall of
Government, the greatest portion of which composed an extended critique of
Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis and Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. With this
substantial offering in the closing years of his life, Filmer’s work took on a
somewhat new direction. Whereas his prior efforts had focused primarily on
the Catholic natural law and the Calvinist-influenced parliamentary resisters,
now near the end of his career Filmer trained his sights on the two most
prominent natural law and natural rights theorists of the period.
Unlike his Catholic and Calvinist theological opponents of years past,
Filmer’s new antagonists in the natural liberty school did not fuse their argu-
ments for consent with the principle of divine ordination of political power.
Grotian and Hobbesian natural jurisprudence represented, although to de-
cidedly varying degrees, the process of secularization in the natural liberty
tradition in the seventeenth century. While Hobbes was more emphatically
modern than Grotius, a greater secularist and a more rigorous and logically
consistent proponent of individual natural rights, Filmer recognized in both
a new dimension in the natural liberty tradition “first hatch’d in the schools.”
This, he believed, marked, again to varying degrees, a significant modifica-
tion, and indeed a departure from, the classical and Christian premises of
the schoolmen and the favorers of the Geneva discipline.
71
Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes cast a long and complex shadow over
the philosophical foundations of the Whig politics of liberty. As we shall see
in Part Two, the Whig argument for natural liberty and limited government
also rested on the philosophical foundation of modern natural jurisprudence.
In this respect, Grotius and Hobbes were the thinkers most similar to the
Whigs out of all of Filmer’s opponents in the natural liberty school. Yet
Hobbes and Grotius advanced theories of right affording no necessary or
even easy connection between natural rights and limited government. The
politics of Filmer’s Whig critics was of an emphatically anti-absolutist char-
acter, and as such, their adoption of natural rights theory had to involve
significant modifications of the inherited notions in order to avoid the au-
thoritarian or absolutist implications of Grotian and Hobbesian natural law
and natural rights theory.1 Prior to the Whig theorists of the 1680s, natural
law and natural rights held only a limited and deeply suspect utility in pro-
moting limited constitutionalism. In order to understand the modification of
modern natural jurisprudence that occurred in England in the early 1680s, we
will have to examine Filmer’s critique of Grotian and Hobbesian theory and
assess the possibilities and limitations for harmonizing these theories with
a defense of limited government. Insofar as Grotius and Hobbes provided
the Whigs with the basic theoretical and conceptual materials necessary to
produce theories of right and government more liberal and republican than
Hobbes or Grotius intended or envisioned, an examination of Filmer’s cri-
tique of these two thinkers will help us understand how the Whigs managed
to square the natural rights circle.
Filmer and Grotius

Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis was first published in 1625 and was
soon recognized as a seminal work in modern natural jurisprudence. As
the title suggests, Grotius’ explicit aim and most of the argument in the
work was directed to finding a natural law basis for legitimate relations be-
tween nations, rather than among individuals, both in war and in peace.2
1 While I recognize the authoritarian or even absolutist possibilities in Grotius, I do not go as

far as Tully, who argues that Grotius (and Pufendorf) set out to establish an absolutist theory
of sovereignty (James Tully, A Discourse on Property: Locke and His Adversaries [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980]: pp. 157, 172). Rather, the glaring difference between
Grotius and Filmer’s Whig critics was the latter’s rejection of even the possibility of legitimate
absolute rule.
2 For Grotius’ role in the development of the international relations theory, see Peter Ahrensdorf
and Thomas Pangle, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of War and Peace (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1999): pp. 162–77, in which they identify Grotius as the “last great
representative of the Medieval Christian just war tradition” (p. 162). For a similar assessment
of Grotius’ thought as rooted in the late medieval tradition, see Charles Edwards, Hugo
Grotius, the Miracle of Holland: A Study in Political and Legal Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hall,
1981): esp. chs. 4 and 5.
The Problem of Grotius and Hobbes 73
However, it was primarily through his reflections on the contractual basis

of government and property and his naturalistic theory of sovereignty that
Grotius acquired his prominence in the natural liberty tradition. In England,
the impact of Grotius’ work was considerable, being widely respected by
Englishmen of all political stripes. Supporters and opponents of royal power
in the mid-seventeenth century drew theoretical support for their arguments
from Grotius. Thus, as James Daly observes, Filmer was unusually anti-
Grotian for an English royalist.3 Grotius’ aim in formulating his law of
nature theory was to identify universally valid minimalist moral and ethical
principles that could counter the relativism of late-sixteenth-century skeptics
such as Montaigne and Charron, on the one hand, and provide a more rigor-
ous empirical and scientific approach to moral and political questions than
that of orthodox sixteenth-century Christian Aristotelianism, on the other.4
In response to skepticism, Grotius provided an argument for a set of albeit
minimalist moral principles underlying and operative in every human soci-
ety. As a corrective to what he took to be the rigid categories and excessively
dogmatic tenets of orthodox Aristotelianism, Grotius offered an empirical
analysis producing a nonsectarian law of nature rooted in a rationalist con-
ception of human nature and the proper ends of human society.
In contrast to both the Catholic and Calvinist variants of Christian
Aristotelianism, Grotius rejected the idea of the divine ordination of politi-
cal authority. He even went so far in the direction of secularism as to argue
that his natural law theory would be intelligible “even if we should concede,
that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there
is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to him.”5 With this
celebrated etiamsi daremus statement Grotius did not, of course, mean that a
3 James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press): p. 142; cf. p. 24 for Grotius’ royalist sympathies. Michal Zuckert (Natural Rights and
the New Republicanism [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994]: ch. 4) and Richard Tuck
(Natural Rights Theories [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979]: ch. 3) have shown
the wide range of interpretations of Grotius at the time, with Tuck observing: “Grotius was
both the first conservative rights theorist in Protestant Europe, and also, in a sense, the first
radical rights theorist” (p. 71).
4 Richard Tuck, “Grotius and Selden,” in Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700,
J. H. Burn and Mark Goldie, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): pp. 516,
518 and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philoso-
phy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): pp. 66–7. Zagorin argues that Grotius
showed little concern with refuting skepticism, and rather was following the lead of Bacon’s
empiricism (Perez Zagorin, “Hobbes without Grotius,” History of Political Thought, vol. 21,
no. 1 [Spring 2000]: pp. 24–5). Although Grotius does not identify or deal with the modern
skeptics at length, I think the thrust of his argument suggests that the ancient conventionalist
Carneades is a proxy for the modern skeptics.
5 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libre Tres, Vol. I, photographic reproduction of the 1646
Amsterdam edition, and Vol. II, translation of the text by Francis Kelsey (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1925): prolegomena, sec. 11 (hereafter DJB book, chapter, section, page number or
prol. sec.).
comprehensive system of morality could be established on a purely secular

foundation. What he meant to suggest was that there was an empirically dis-
coverable law of nature with identifiable minimalist moral principles that ex-
isted independently of the divine positive law in Scripture.6 Grotius’ concern
to establish a nonsectarian natural law was rooted in the context of his own
formative political and intellectual experience as a participant in the bitter
intra-Protestant theological controversies in the United Provinces in the early
seventeenth century.7 As a supporter of the ill-fated Oldenbarnevelt regime’s
policy of religious toleration and by virtue of his criticism of the orthodox
Calvinist doctrines in theology and politics during the Arminian controversy,
Grotius suffered imprisonment and a twenty-three-year exile spent largely
in Paris as a pensioner of the French and Swedish courts. Grotius’ effort to
establish a naturalistic basis for a universal system of morality did not, how-
ever, produce the distinctly modern natural rights theory of Hobbes with
its rigorous secularism and a fully developed principle of individual natural
rights. Grotius blended classical and Christian ideas of natural sociability
and intrinsic moral knowledge with the modern ideas of consent and con-
tract to produce a version of natural law theory that modified significantly,
but ultimately did not sever its connection to, the Aristotelian tradition.
The law of nature, for Grotius, is a “dictate of right reason, which points
out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature,
has in it a quality of moral baseness or a moral necessity.”8 The natural law
relates to the general principles supporting the requirements for human soci-
ety. It reflects both human physical needs and the social conditions required
to develop human rational and moral potential. In his response to the ancient
conventionalist Carneades, Grotius maintains that justice and society can-
not be simply reduced to a standard of utility. Rather, the distinctly human
capacity for law and society is rooted in a “desire for society . . . according to
the measure of his intelligence.”9 It is the possession of this “impelling desire
for society, for the gratification of which he alone among animals, possesses
a special instrument, speech” that makes it reasonable to assume that human
beings have “a faculty of knowing and of acting in accordance with general
6 In fact, far from being a great secularist, Grotius ascribed a great deal of importance to God.
See, for example, DJB prolegomena, sec. 12 for Grotius’ assurance that the rational faculties
were planted in humans by God; see also DJB prol., sec. 20 for his invocation of divine
support for justice. For Grotius’ reliance on religion, see Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy,
pp. 68–70, 73–5; Edwards, Miracle of Holland, pp. 47–66 and Zagorin, “Hobbes,” pp. 29–30.
7 For Grotius’ biographical and historical context, see Tuck, “Grotius,” pp. 509–14, 521–2 and
Edwards, Miracle of Holland, pp. 1–8.
8 DJB, 1.1.10.1. Barbeyrac adds rational “and social” nature of man. For a good discussion
of the important classical elements in Grotius’ natural law theory such as the argument for
natural human sociality and the naturalness of a ruling element in any composite body, see
Richard Cox, “Hugo Grotius,” History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., Leo Strauss and Joseph
Cropsey, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987): pp. 390–2.
9 DJB, prol., sec. 6.
principles.”10 In the context of the law of nature, the natural freedom of

individuals includes the freedom to choose the form of government under
which one lives. Grotius explains: “But as there are many ways of living, one
better than another, and each man is free to choose which of them he pleases;
so each nation may choose what form of government it will.” Government
is a product “not of Divine Precept” but of human will, reflecting human
necessity and the natural impulse toward society.11 In addition to the forma-
tive power of contract, Grotius maintains that all legitimate political power
is exercised through the terms of the original contract. The central tension
in Grotian thought rests on the double source of society both in physical ne-
cessity and in human rational nature. The “first principles of nature,” such
as self-preservation, Grotius admits, “commends us to Right Reason; but
Right Reason ought to be more dear to us than those things through whose
instrumentality we have been brought to it.” Although the status of political
society is determined mainly by reference to the social character of human
rationality, Grotius does not deny that it originates in necessity. He claims:
“Society has in view this object, that through community of resources and
effort each individual be safeguarded in the possession of what belongs to
him.”12
Connected to this argument is Grotius’ understanding of the natural right
of individuals to punish transgressors of the law of nature. Grotius justifies
this particular example of force on the grounds that “it is not then contrary
to the nature of society to look out for oneself, . . . and consequently the use of
force which does not violate the rights of others, is not unjust.” Though this
natural right to repel injury by forceful means does not disappear in society,
Grotius asserts “that the license which was prevalent before the establish-
ment of courts has been greatly restricted.”13 It is precisely the transferal of
this punishment power to the public authority that constitutes civil govern-
ment. In contrast to Suarez and Bellarmine, who deny this natural punishing
power in individuals, Grotius makes this right of punishment one of the
core features of the moral power of individuals to create government.14 At
its source, then, Grotius sees government emerging as much from the con-
flict of rights bearers and the improper exercise of those rights as from the
requirements of human moral and intellectual development.
How are we to understand Grotius’ apparent insistence both on sub-
jective individual rights and on the classical notion of natural sociability?
Grotius scholars are divided between those who emphasize his role as an
individual rights thinker and forerunner to Hobbes and those who contend
10 Ibid., sec. 7.
11 Ibid., 1.3.8.2; 1.4.7.3.
12 Ibid., 1.2.1.5. Cf. 1.4.2.1.
13 Ibid., 1.2.1.6; 1.3.2.1; see also 1.4.2.1.
that Grotian rights are entirely derivative from directives of the substantive
moral principles inhering in the law of nature.15 There are two aspects of
Grotius’ teaching that cast serious doubt on the subjective individual rights
interpretation. First, Grotius does not articulate a pre-political state of nature
on which we can ground the moral claims of the individual independently
of society.16 While he does ascribe considerable importance to preservation-
ist considerations of necessity impelling individuals into society, Grotius is
careful to remind us that “Right reason ought to be more dear to us than
those things [like the “first principles of nature” involving self-preservation]
through whose instrumentality we have been brought to it.”17 By identify-
ing the law of nature as intrinsic moral rules drawn from human rational-
ity, Grotius subordinates the universalistic and appetitive principle of self-
preservation to a more elevated standard of right reason, which contains but
is not limited to subjective preservationist morality. The second and related
aspect of Grotius’ law of nature teaching that belies the subjective rights
interpretation is his formulation of political society as the “complete” or
“perfect association” in some sense ontologically prior to the individual.18
By positing the formal political order complete with laws as the “perfect
association,” rather than simply validating the social entity of community,
Grotius adopts a more rigorous Aristotelian teleology than even the Calvinist
Hunton. Grotius, nonetheless, does not Christianize civil society in the man-
ner of Suarez’s “mysical union.” In the modified Aristotelianism of Grotian
natural law theory, political society is both natural to human beings and yet
emphatically a human construction.
Thus the role of rights in Grotian natural law theory is fully intelligible
only in the context of the moral rules derived from the law of nature that
15 The most famous statement of the subjective rights school is Tuck, Natural Rights Theories
(for Grotius’ formative impact on Hobbes see also Tuck, “Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes,”
Grotiana, vol. 4 [1983]: pp. 59, 61). Other proponents of the subjective rights school include
Knud Haakonssen, “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought,” Political Theory,
vol. 13, no. 2 (May 1985): pp. 239–65 and Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy. For the
clearest rejections of this view, see Edwards, Miracle of Holland, ch. 3; Zagorin, “Hobbes
without Grotius”; and Zuckert, Natural Rights, ch. 5.
16 Contra Tuck, “Grotius and Selden,” p. 515. Cf. Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 137 and DJB 1.2.1
and 2.5.9, 15 for Grotius’ only uses of the term “state of nature,” neither of which bear any
relation to a pre-civil condition. Cf. Edwards, Miracle of Holland, pp. 51–4 for Grotius’
rejection of the possibility of there ever being a presocial existence for human beings.
17 DJB 1.2.1.2. Cf. prol., secs. 8, 9.
18 Ibid., 1.3.7.1. Cf. Suarez, Extracts on Politics and Government, George Moore, trans. (Chevy
Chase, MD: Country Dollar Press, 1950): p. 101. Edwards, for example, goes too far to
connect Grotius and Suarez because they both may have a similar argument about God’s
role as proximate efficient cause for the natural law. Grotius is much more insistent than
Suarez that political society must be understood as an emphatically human creation, i.e., the
source of obligation is our natural revulsion to injuring the cause of “right reason,” not a
suprarational “mystical union” (Edwards, Miracle of Holland, pp. 55–6).
facilitate social life. Individual rights and duties such as those relating to
property are meant by Grotius to be seen as means to maintain the civil
peace and order necessary for human flourishing. While Grotius roundly
criticized Aristotle’s prudential understanding of justice and virtue, he did
so not to affirm pre-political individual rights, but rather to enhance the
normative status of these ideas by connecting them to an enforceable and
rigorous conception of law.19 It is this aspect of Grotius’ teaching that caused
particular concern for the Whigs toward the end of the seventeenth-century.
For Grotius, the moral status of subjective natural rights is so contingent
on law that not only individuals, but also entire peoples, are capable of
completely alienating their liberty through contractual slavery. The implica-
tions of this theoretical possibility of complete alienability with respect to
the right of resistance and the settlement of property were obviously discon-
certing to Filmer’s Whig opponents in the 1680s.20 In a fundamental sense,
it is contract rather than consent that dominates Grotian natural law the-
ory because it is the binding character of contract that Grotius cites as the
decisive factor preventing natural liberty from endangering society. As such,
he emphasizes the laws of nations – actual historical constitutions – as the
primary determinant of political obligation, not pre-political rights. Thus
the subjective rights dimension of Grotian natural law theory is ultimately
best understood as a significant and even radical modification of essentially
Christian-Aristotelian categories and assumptions.
Filmer’s objections to Grotian contractualism rest on his dispute with
two key ideas: the law of nations and the arguments for legitimate resistance
to sovereign authority that derive from Grotius’ notion of contract. The
importance of the law of nations in Grotius’ thought is due both to his
reliance on the classical Roman legal distinctions between natural, national,
and civil law and to his own method of procedure. In the Roman law typology
of the distinct species of law, the law of nations had an even more elevated
status than the law of nature, as witnessed in the natural law proposition
of natural equality giving way to the conventional national laws codifying
slavery.21 Grotius justifies his use of the law of nature classification on the
grounds that there are two ways to prove the existence of the law of nature.
19 Zagorin, “Hobbes without Grotius,” pp. 31–4 and Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 145. Cf. DJB
prol. secs. 42–5 for Grotius’ criticism of Aristotle’s position on virtue and justice.
20 DJB 1.3.8.1; 1.3.8.14; 1.3.12.1. Tuck attenuates the absolutist tendencies in Grotius’ idea
of contract by pointing to Grotius’ expectation of what Tuck calls “interpretive charity”;
that is, people are logically free to enslave themselves, though we may assume almost no
one would be so foolish to do so (Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, p. 155–6). Haakonssen
(“History of Political Thought,” p. 245) takes this argument I believe too far in the direction
of Hobbes claiming that Grotius may see that an absolutist regime may be the best guarantor
of individual rights in some cases. The protection of rights is not Grotius’ primary goal,
although it may be an important ancillary one.
The first is by the a priori method, which deduces the natural law from
“the necessary agreement or disagreement of anything with a rational and
social nature.” The empirical a posteriori method, on the other hand, which
constitutes the lion’s share of the book, involves “every probability that that
is according to the law of nature which is believed to be such among all
nations, or among all those that are more advanced in civilization.”22 The
laws of nations, then, are a means to apprehend the law of nature.
Filmer’s argument is that Grotius’ law of nations obscures the divine will
that grounds political life. He condemns the Roman law distinction between
the law of nature and the law of nations as spurious, reflecting the pagan
ignorance of revelation. Filmer returns to the theological premises of his own
argument:
If we will allow Adam to have been lord of the world, there will need no such
distinctions of the law of nature and of nations. For the truth will be that whatsoever
the heathens comprehended under these two laws, is comprised in the moral law.23
In Filmer’s view, Grotius’ reliance on Roman law produced “an error which
the heathen taught that ‘all things at first were common’ and that ‘all men are
equal.’” Predictably, he charges that falling into these pagan errors is a “fault
scarce pardonable for any Christian.”24 While accepting Grotius’ position
that each nation must have the power within itself to bind its subjects to
its particular laws, Filmer denies that the ubiquity of certain legal practices
proves the natural law in the Grotian sense. Filmer holds that Grotius’ law of
nations is really aimed at promoting the “mutual society of nations among
themselves” and cannot be seen to point to a higher, more natural, standard
of law beyond the legislative will of particular sovereigns.25 For Filmer, all
law requires a supreme power, and the active agency of divine will is the
only common power that can bind all nations. Any conception of a law of
nature that does not directly depend on divine sanction or sees God only as
an “obliger of last resort” distorts the profound role of divine providence in
human affairs.26 Filmer’s point here is not to deny the naturalness of such
practices as patriarchalism, for example, which may indeed be ubiquitous;
rather, he aims to reveal the obscuring effect Grotius’ law of nations idea has
on our broader understanding of the “moral law” that reflects God’s active
agency in politics.
22 DJB 1.1.12.1.
23 Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann Somerville, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
24 Ibid., p. 210.
25 Ibid., pp. 215–16. See also DJB 1.1.14.1 and 2.8.1.2.
26 DJB 1.4.7.3; 1.1.10.2 and prol. 6. The quote is from Haakonssen, “History of Political
Thought,” p. 252. Even though Grotius identifies the two sources of jus as nature and the
“free will of God,” he attributes this view as much to Jupiter as to the biblical God, thus
showing it to be an a posteriori position (DJB prol. 12).
Filmer’s most serious objections to Grotian contractualism, however, have

to do with the question of resistance. For his part, Grotius went far to deny
the purportedly seditious implications of his theory. Though human beings
are endowed with certain rights and form civil societies, at least in part,
to secure those rights, this does not extend to a general natural right of
rebellion. As Grotius argues:
By nature all men have the right of resisting in order to ward off injury. But as civil
society was instituted to maintain public tranquillity, the State forthwith acquires
over us and our possessions a greater right, to the extent necessary to accomplish
this end. The State therefore in the interest of public peace and order can limit that
common right of resistance. That such was the purpose of the state we cannot doubt,
since it could not in any other way achieve its end.27
The justification of resistance is deduced from the terms of the original

contract that formed society and not from any claim of pre-political right.
Grotius explicitly rejects the position that “everywhere and without excep-
tion sovereignty resides in the people so that it is permissible for the people to
restrain and punish kings whenever they make a bad use of their power.”28
This opinion, Grotius continues, has given rise to “many evils.” Moreover,
Grotius rejects the Calvinist “subordinate magistrate” argument, and he very
narrowly construes the possibility of legitimate resistance being offered by
private individuals or only a minority of the people.29 Filmer holds these
restrictions on the right of resistance to be neither sufficient nor entirely sin-
cere. With respect to the authority of “the will of those men who at first
joined themselves in a civil society,” Filmer argues that the submissive char-
acter of this appeal to original intent is utterly undermined by Grotius’ later
admission that if the will of the founders of the contract is unknown, then it
may be interpreted and expounded by the present generation.30 In addition
to this obvious loophole in the construction of Grotius’ strict originalism,
Filmer deduces a further right of resistance from within the logic of Grotius’
own theory. Even if there is a contractual obligation of nonresistance, Filmer
argues, it is a human law of not resisting superiors and can thus be super-
seded by the implied conditions of the contract itself. The chief implied
condition Filmer cites is that even if a people “made an absolute grant of
their liberty . . . it must necessarily be implied that it was upon condition to
be well governed.”31 In contrast to his own theologically premised doctrine
of obedience, a purely human law, Filmer argues, lacks the normative power
to compel absolute non-resistance.
27 DJB 1.4.21.
28 Ibid., 1.3.8.1 and 1.4.3–5.
29 Ibid., 1.4.7.4 and 1.4.6.1.
30 Ibid.; cf. 1.4.7.2 and 2.7.27.2.
This problem is evident in Grotius’ own admission of the possibility of

explicitly reserved powers on the part of the people. He claims: “It may hap-
pen that a people when choosing a king, may reserve to itself certain powers,
but may confer the others to the king, absolutely.” From this reservation of
power in the people, Filmer concludes that Grotius’ lawful kings do not have
“property in their kingdoms, but an usufructuary right only as if the people
were the lords and the kings but their tenants.”32 All of Filmer’s particular
objections to the seditious implications of Grotian contractualism center on
what he takes to be Grotius’ fundamental premise that “the empire which
is exercised by kings doth not cease to be the empire of the people.” From
this Filmer draws the contention that “the very effect of the constitution of
kings by the people depends upon the will of them that constitute, and upon
no other necessity.”33 The inability to ground a consistent theory of nonre-
sistance on Grotian contractualism is due to the proposition that in some
sense government is a creature of those who created it. The very power of
government to command obedience points to a deeper power in the constitu-
tive right of the people. Filmer’s stance on Grotius’ restrictions on resistance
recalls his treatment of the English royalist Ferne’s account of mixed monar-
chy. In rejecting a general right of rebellion, yet drawing a lengthy list of cases
in which resistance to the king was justifiable, Grotius, like Ferne, provides
an example of Filmer’s suspicion that a halfhearted defense of royal power
is as bad as or worse than its complete rejection.
The critique of Grotius’ account of the origin of private property reveals
Filmer’s most fully developed thoughts on the relationship between prop-
erty and government. For Grotius, both private property and government
derive from human compact. The core of Grotius’ account of the origin of
private property is his adoption of the Roman law proposition of natural
community. Grotius argues that at the Creation and after the Flood, all things
were common and “each man could at once take whatever he wished for his
own needs, and could consume whatever was capable of being consumed.”34
This condition continued while human beings lived in a “primitive state,”
but became untenable with the invention of the arts and the inequality of
possessions that developed. The original grant that all individuals may use
whatever they seized then became the ground for widespread violence and
bloodshed. It was for this reason that human beings compacted to establish
propriety in goods in order to distinguish the claims of individuals. Filmer
observed the apparent contradiction between Grotius’ inclusion of “the rule
of abstaining from that which belongs to other persons” in the natural law
requirements of society and his notion of the disappearance of the original
common through the widespread violation of rights in that condition.35 The
32 DJB 1.3.17.1 and Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 222.

33 DJB 2.16.16.1 and Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 221, 224
34 DJB 2.2.2.1.
35 Ibid., prol. 8 and Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 212–13.
key mistake in Filmer’s understanding of Grotius’ natural community is to

see it as a positive common rather than a negative one.36 The original com-
mon was not owned by everyone but by no one in particular. It was pre-
cisely the vacant character of the original common that justified the original
seizure right of individuals: “thus the use of things in common was in ac-
cordance with the law of nature so long as ownership by individuals was
not introduced; and the right to use force in obtaining one’s own existed
before laws were promulgated.”37 Filmer is struck both by the assertion that
human will can negate God’s original law of community and by Grotius’
further contention that God is powerless to alter these enactments. Of the
Dutchman, Filmer says, “He gives a double ability to man: first, to make
that no law of nature, which God made to be the law of nature; and next,
to make that a law of nature which God made not.”38 Grotius’ idea, Filmer
charges, goes beyond human participation in the divine will and extends to
a power of absolute negation. It is in reference to this aspect of Grotius’ ar-
gument that Filmer injects the celebrated English legal scholar John Selden
into the discussion.
Grotius and Selden shared similar positions with respect to the mutabil-
ity of the original common, but the Englishman dated this alteration to the
period following the Flood in Scripture. Filmer explicitly employs Selden,
however, to draw Scripture into the conflict against Grotius, for it is Selden’s
argument that Adam “by donation from God was made the general lord of
all things” that Filmer employs to prove how repugnant Grotius’ doctrine
is to “the truth of Holy Scripture.”39 Selden accepts the original donation
of the world to Adam, hence denying the natural common, but he asserts
that the primitive community of which Grotius speaks did emerge a few gen-
erations after the Flood. What makes Selden such an interesting ingredient
in the argument is his intermediary role between Filmer and Grotius. On
the one hand, he agrees with Grotius that the institution of private prop-
erty followed an earlier period of community, but he prefaces this argument
36 Tully, Discourse on Property, p. 97 and Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 250.

37 DJB 1.1.10.4, 7. Grotius uses Cicero’s celebrated example of a seat in a theater to illustrate
the character of the ownerless original common (DJB 2.2.2.1).
38 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 215. Filmer also adopts his familiar anti-populist arguments about the
universality and retractibility of consent (pp. 219, 234).
39 Ibid., pp. 216–17. Tuck (Natural Rights Theories, pp. 82–100) identifies Selden as a precursor
to Hobbes because, for Tuck, Selden’s argument that God promulgated the natural law at a
specific point in history following the Flood, before which there was no morally obligatory
natural law, foreshadows the Hobbesian concept of a state of nature. For a persuasive account
that challenges Tuck’s claim for the “historicity” of the natural law in Selden, and tends to
locate Selden more clearly in the Christian-Aristotelian camp along with Suarez and Hooker,
see J. P. Somerville, “John Selden, the Law of Nature, and the Origins of Government,”
Historical Journal, vol. 27, no. 2 (June 1984): pp. 439–41, 443–5. For his part, Filmer is more
in keeping with Somerville’s reading of Selden inasmuch as Filmer appropriates Selden to the
cause of divine right precisely because of the theological basis of his argument for the law of
nature rather than Tuck’s historical interpretation.
with the admission of the divine donation to Adam, a position central to

Filmer’s thesis. In response to Selden, Filmer argues that the donation to
Adam in Genesis 1:28 was the unalterable source of propriety and that
the supposition of community between Noah and his sons in Genesis 9:2
is not warranted by the text.40 Noah inherited Adam’s right alone and entire.
In response to both Grotius and Selden, Filmer claims that the very notion
of the mutability of the original condition by human compact diminishes
the power of divine providence. He queries: “Doth it not derogate from
the providence of God Almighty to ordain a community which could not
continue?” Moreover, Filmer argues that the affirmation of the institution
of propriety by human will suggests that the duties contained in the second
table of the Decalogue, concerning the right of property, are themselves of
human creation. “But if property be brought in by a human law,” Filmer
observes, “then the moral law dependeth upon the will of man.”41 Filmer
concludes with the familiar assertion that the theoretical and theological
problems of Grotius’ treatment of property – error and atheism – are solved
in the impenetrable core of his Adamite thesis. In the beginning the whole
world was given to Adam, and all claims to rule and title to property derive
from that one irrefutable source.
Another major source of dispute between Grotius and Filmer has to do
with the question of the means of acquiring supreme power. Filmer does
not explicitly take issue with Grotius’ understanding of sovereignty as such,
inasmuch as the Dutchman maintained that the sovereign power is by def-
inition subject to no higher human power and is itself indivisible.42 The
object of Filmer’s attacks rather is Grotius’ view of the means of acquiring
supreme power and the terms upon which it is exercised. Filmer articulates
three ways “Grotius propoundeth, whereby supreme power may be had:
First, by full right of propriety. Secondly, by an usufructuary right. Thirdly,
by a temporary right.”43 In contrast to Filmer’s tendency to conceptualize
political rule in terms of proprietary right, Grotius’ schema of the different
kinds of supreme power separates the character of supreme power from the
full possession of it. The particular character of Grotian contractualism pre-
supposes both the possibility of forming a variety of regime types and the
capacity to constitute and regulate the supreme power in any given regime
by an assortment of contractual arrangements.
Filmer disputes the features of the three means of acquiring supreme
power, but more importantly, he denies the contractual premises of Grotius’

41 Ibid., p. 218.
42 Filmer notes this at p. 233. For Grotius’ statement on the indivisibility of sovereignty, see DJB
1.3.7.1 but note the historical examples of mixed sovereignty in antiquity – Rome, Athens,
and Macedon – that Grotius cites at DJB 1.3.20.4–7.
argument. For Filmer, supreme power is absolute, illimitable, and not of

human origin. He dismisses out of hand Grotius’ category of the temporary
right of supreme power, the chief example of which is the Roman dictators.44
Any grant of power with an expiration date is, to Filmer, just democracy by
another name. Grotius argues that usufructuary right holds when a ruler
holds title as a kind of “tenant for life,” and he adds that “most kings, both
elected and hereditary, (rule) by usufructuary right.”45 The clear implication
for Filmer is that Grotius allows the possibility that supreme power remains
inviolate in the people. The king – the majority of kings, in fact – become like
hired managers and ultimately the servants of the people. As Filmer com-
plains, the usufructuary right “is to make a kingdom all one with a farm, as
if it had no other use but to be let out to him that can make most of it.”46
If Filmer’s criticism of Grotius’ usufructuary right argument can be seen
as a fairly cut-and-dried example of his anti-populism, the same cannot be
said of his critique of Grotius’ understanding of full right. Grotius’ jure pleno
results from an absolute cession of liberty by the subjects to the ruler. A king
by full right exercises rule with no restrictions and is bound by no contractual
obligations. This king by full right seems to be the classic Filmerian monarch,
yet Filmer takes issue with the origins of such rule. Grotius argues that full
right is acquired either through conquest in a just war or by the original
consent, or donation, of the subjects. Filmer immediately raises the problem
of an exiled ruler returning to conquer his former kingdom. In this case,
Filmer argues, the conquest, be it ever so just, does not produce a full right but
simply restores the conqueror/former exile to his original title. He explains:
For if originally he and his ancestors had but an usufructuary right . . . yet shall not
the conqueror in this case gain any full right of property, but must be remitted to his
usufructuary right only.47
Even in the case of war between kingdoms, Filmer argues, Grotius’ full right
by just war unravels on the grounds of natural freedom and the original
title of the conquered people. He charges: “if they have no governor, then
they are a free people, and so the war will be unjust to conquer those that
are free. . . . But if the people have a governor, that governor hath either a
title or not. If he have a title, it is an unjust war that takes the kingdom
44 Filmer ignored this argument in Bodin also. See Jean Bodin, The Six Books of the Republic
(1606), trans. by Richard Knolles from the original Les six livres de la republique (Paris, 1580),
K. D. McRae, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962): pp. 85–6.
45 DJB 1.3.11.1.
46 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 232. One aspect of this usufructuary right Filmer does not address
is Grotius’ argument that such a king does not possess the power to alienate or sell any
territory of the kingdom. At times Filmer’s exhortations about the duty of kings “to feed,
clothe, instruct and defend the whole commonwealth” suggest his agreement with at least this
one limit on supreme power (cf. Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 12 [emphasis mine] and DJB 1.3.13.1).
from him.”48 Filmer here ignores the possibility that an aggressor power
or the leaders in an aggressive war lose the protection and legitimacy of
their natural freedom and original title.49 Filmer is less interested in the
subtleties of just war theory than in revealing the purely formal character
of Grotius’ full right by conquest argument. To Filmer the formalism of this
argument is exposed by the core Grotian teaching that “public subjection is
that condition in which a people is that surrenders itself to some man, or to
several men, or even to another people.”50 Filmer advances the impossibility
of harmonizing the just war as title to rule with the theoretical origins of
political authority as such: “If subjection be the gift of the people, how can
supreme power pleno jure, in full right, be got by a just war?” Despite Grotius’
official pronouncements, Filmer concludes: “I cannot find in Grotius’ book
De Jure how that any case can be put wherein by a just war a man may
become a king pleno jure proprietis.”51
It is with regard to Grotius’ argument for the consensual origins of full
right that Filmer delivers his coup de main. Grotius explains full right by
donation of the people as emerging “through the submission of a people,
to avoid greater disaster, subjected itself without any reservation.”52 The
“greater dangers” Grotius suggests are extreme poverty and the threat of
destruction in war. But in these cases, Filmer observes, it is war and poverty
that cause the cession of power, not a free gift of the people. Filmer denies
that it even makes sense to speak of a freedom for contract in the face of the
kind of crushing necessity that would cause a people to alienate their freedom
totally.53 What is remarkable in Grotius’ presentation of full right by dona-
tion is the extreme lengths to which he goes to justify even total subjection
in terms of contract. Grotius, in Filmer’s view, sacrifices the claims of full
proprietary right of rule on the altar of contractualism and natural freedom.
He accuses Grotius of surreptitiously undermining the very possibility of the
full right of property in rule: “Howsoever Grotius in words acknowledge
that kings may have full right of property, yet by consequence he denies it by
such circular suppositions as by coincidence destroy each other.”54 Filmer’s
use of a hermeneutic of suspicion tends, it is true, to uncover a “plebist”
under every rock, but in this case he does reveal some of the crucial tensions
and ambiguities in Grotius’ account of supreme power. The English royal-
ist’s critique of the Dutchman served an important theoretical function by
48 Ibid., p. 230.
49 As for example in Locke, Two Treatises, Chapter Sixteen, especially sections 176–80.
50 DJB 2.5.31.
52 DJB 1.3.11.1.
53 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 231. Tyrrell cites the example of the Dutch submitting to the French and
Joseph to the Egyptians (James Tyrrell, Patriarcha, Non Monarcha [London, 1681) pp. 120–1∗
(second pagination).
indicating the difficulty, if not impossibility, of articulating a contractual ba-

sis of sovereignty that could satisfy the obedience requirements of Filmerian
divine right. Filmer set the bar for contractual absolutism very high. Enter
Mr. Hobbes.
Filmer and Hobbes

At first glance, the difference between Filmer’s treatment of Hobbes and
his use of Grotius could not be more starkly drawn. While both Hobbes
and Grotius posit natural rights arguments that supplied mid-seventeenth-
century Europeans with a theoretical alternative to divine right, Filmer shows
a gentleness with Hobbes that is distinctly lacking in his use of Grotius.
Hobbes’ pronounced royalism and his castigation of Calvinist and Catholic
resistance theories in the years preceding and following the civil war in
England signified an important affinity between Filmer and Hobbes.55 Filmer
by and large approves of Hobbes’ theory regarding the extent and character
of sovereignty, and he never really questions his fellow countryman’s dedi-
cation to the royalist cause, as he does with the Dutchman. Indeed Filmer
chimes: “With no small content I read Mr. Hobbes’ book De Cive, and his
Leviathan, about the rights of sovereignty, which no man, that I know, hath
so amply and judiciously handled.”56 Despite his opening expression of a few
kind words for his subject, however (a rarity for Filmer), Sir Robert’s brief
treatment of Hobbes comprises a series of specific criticisms that amount to
a variation on two themes: the rejection of Hobbesian natural right and of
Hobbes’ account of the contractual origin of government. Filmer grumbles:
“His jus naturae (right of nature) and his regnum institutiuum (kingdom by
institution) will not down with me, they appear full of contradiction and im-
possibilities.”57 He then proceeds to show how Hobbes’ theory of absolute
and indivisible sovereignty would be better and more solidly grounded on
paternal right.
Filmer’s rejection of Hobbesian natural right is drawn out of his statement
that “I wonder how the right of nature can be imagined by Mr. Hobbes,
which, he saith is a liberty for ‘each man to use his own power as he
will himself for preservation of his own life’; ‘a condition of war everyone
against everyone’; ‘a right of every man to every thing, even to one another’s
55 But as Goldie observes, royalists and Tories were often Hobbes’ most severe critics, primarily
because they, like Filmer, detected the radical potential in Hobbes’ natural rights theory and
his heterodox position on church–state relations (Mark Goldie “The Reception of Hobbes,”
in Cambridge History of Political Thought, pp. 595, 610–15; see also pp. 596, 598, and 604
for Filmer’s criticism of Hobbes). Cf. Quentin Skinner, “The Ideological Context of Hobbes’
Political Thought,” Historical Journal, vol. 9 (1966): pp. 286–317.
57 Ibid., p. 185.
body’.”58 Filmer’s own conception of the origin of political power runs con-
trary to each of the three central tenets he identifies in Hobbes, namely, the
primacy of self-preservation, the natural state of war, and the absolute liberty
marking the natural human condition. It is in response to this presentation
of Hobbesian natural right that Filmer offers his most complete and succinct
statement of the Adamite thesis in his entire corpus:
If God created only Adam and of a piece of him made the woman, and if by gener-
ation from them all mankind be propagated; if also God gave to Adam not only the
dominion over the woman and the children that should issue from them, but also
over the whole earth to subdue it, and over all the creatures on it, so that as long as
Adam lived no man could claim or enjoy anything but by donation, assignation or
permission from him.59
The two seminal aspects of Filmer’s theory, Adam’s right of dominion by cre-
ation and his full right of property by donation, are the bedrock of his refu-
tation of Hobbesian natural right. With the scriptural support of Genesis for
the natural subjection of humankind in the background, Filmer proceeds to
attack the Hobbesian formulation of the state of nature on the grounds of the
naturalness of the family and the pervasive operation of divine providence.
Filmer’s strategy to refute the state of nature theory by reference to the
ubiquity and naturalness of the family takes two tacks. First, he draws as
many concessions as he can out of Hobbes regarding the naturalness of the
family and of paternal power in particular. His second method is to cast the
general thrust of Hobbes’ theory in the unfavorable light cast by Scripture.
A good example of Filmer’s first method is his illustration of the implication
of Hobbes’ admission that while the state of nature “was never generally
so . . . there are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in
many places of America (except the government of small families, the con-
cord whereof dependeth on natural lust) have no government at all.”60 Filmer
concludes from this single example of familial rule in America that “one
exception bars all.” The existence of families, even in the most uncivilized
conditions, precludes the possibility of the state of nature.61 Moreover, the
specific character of “the government of small families” conforms perfectly
with Filmer’s patriarchalism inasmuch as Hobbes asserts that “originally
the father of every man was also his sovereign lord with power over him
of life and death.”62 Hobbes’ apparent admission of the naturalness of the
58 Ibid., p. 187 and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edwin Curley, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1994): pp. 79–80.
60 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 77.
61 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 187 and Gordon Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1975): pp. 225–6. In this respect, Schochet argues, Filmer was
typical of Hobbes’ seventeenth-century critics.
patriarchal family is grist for Filmer’s mill, for in Sir Robert’s view it admits
of only two interpretations. Either the state of nature is a moral and histor-
ical nullity or the condition of perfect freedom Hobbes describes is enjoyed
solely by the male heads of independent families. The latter alternative of-
fers an account of the origins of government not far removed from that of
Filmer himself. Hobbes’ reference to the “Fathers of families” who “when
by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute power” over
the life and death of their children/subjects, echoes Filmer’s statement that
“By the uniting of great families or petty Princedoms, we find the greater
monarchies were at first erected.”63 In exposing what he takes to be the in-
compatibility of Hobbes’ historical account of the origins of political society
in absolute paternal power and the theoretical propositions of contract and
consent, Filmer implicitly calls attention to his own postulation of the perfect
consistency of his Adamite patriarchal thesis.
Despite Hobbes’ allusion to something approximating a patriarchalist ac-
count of early societies, he suggests that the comprehension of his natural
rights theory requires a theoretical abstraction from the family per se; human
beings must be conceived as “mushrooms (fungorum more) they all on a sud-
den were sprung out of the earth without any obligation one to another.”64
A more clear antithesis to Filmer’s source-based argument is scarcely imagin-
able, and he responds predictably that “the Scripture teacheth us otherwise,
that all men came by succession and generation from one man.” The de-
nial of natural dependency and subjection contained in Hobbes’ mushroom
metaphor constitutes, in Filmerian terms, either a rejection of the moral
implications of human generation and the family that it produces or a con-
jecture of the multiple creation of men by God in the beginning. In the full
range of Filmer’s Adamite thesis both arguments amount to atheism, inas-
much as, according to Filmer, Scripture clearly relates the original creation of
one man alone and authorizes the subjection of his progeny to him. Beneath
Filmer’s charge against the ahistorical character of the state of nature lies a
deeper condemnation of its atheism. He warns: “We must not deny the truth
of the history of creation.”65
Filmer’s charge against the inherent atheism of Hobbes’ state of nature
raises the problem of scriptural interpretation as a whole. Much as Hobbes’
conjectural multiple creation offends Filmer’s religious sense, he also ponders
the implications of Hobbes’ mushroom theory of moral individualism for
the Fifth Commandment. In De Cive Hobbes responded to an anonymous
questioner that the obedience of children to their parents demanded by divine
law is not affected by his argument for natural liberty inasmuch as “no son
63 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 11 and Schochet, Patriarchalism, p. 239.

64 Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, Bernard Gert, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991): p. 205
and Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 187.
65 Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 187, 188.
can be understood to be in the state of nature.” This admission that no son

is naturally free because he has parents requiring obedience, Filmer explains,
“is all one with denying his (Hobbes’) own principle.”66 Hobbes defended
this position on the grounds that children must recognize the power that
protects them, whether that power be in a father, a mother, or any surrogate
who nourished them.
Hobbes’ reinterpretation of the Fifth Commandment in terms of power –
a parent is simply a recognized power – retains the logic of consent even in
this primal relation of parent or provider to child. The obligation of children
to parents is not a part of the recognition of the obedience due to the original
source of one’s being, but is rather a feature of the obedience promised to
one’s protector in the here and now. Filmer utterly denies Hobbes’ inference
that when this parental protection ceases or ceases to be necessary, so too
does the ground of this obligation. Natural freedom, if it is to have any
plausibility at all, must be an irreducible aspect of human nature, not subject
to the exigencies of rational development or the increase of physical strength.
The subjection of children to parents is the natural condition of humankind,
not Hobbes’ theoretical postulation of the state of nature. Filmer challenges
Hobbes: “For if men be not free-born, it is not possible for him to assign and
prove any other time for them to claim a right of nature to liberty, if not at
their birth.”67 Filmerian source anticipates and subsumes Hobbesian force.
Hobbes’ state of nature theory rejects Filmer’s notion of providence at
its core. It is a condition without governors, order, or even the most basic
advantages of communal life. In such a condition:
There is not place for industry, . . . no culture of the earth, no navigation, . . . no knowl-
edge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and
which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.68
Neither the hand of God nor human beings can secure justice and prosperity
in this state. Filmer argues that even if we were to assume a condition wherein
no “common power” prevailed, this would not result in an anarchic state
of war. It is scarcity that would cause primeval war, not the absence of
recognized rule. Filmer charges:
But God was no such niggard in the creation, and there being plenty of sustenance
and room for all men, there is no cause or use of war till men be hindered in the
preservation of life, so that there is no absolute necessity of war in the state of pure
nature.69
66 Hobbes, Citizen, p. 117 and Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 188.

This statement goes beyond a mere rejection of the historical possibility of

the state of nature. Filmer’s argument, rather, is that the institution of natu-
ral bounty by creation combined with God’s perpetual providence remedies
the only conceivable situation that would produce universal warfare. Filmer
attempts to superimpose divine providence on Hobbes’ preservationist argu-
ment in order to confound the state of nature on its own terms. The “artificial
providence” supplied by the Hobbesian state is a cipher because of the con-
tinual stream of divine providence.70 Though Hobbes and the Whig thinkers
of a later generation agree with respect to human power being the animat-
ing principle of politics rather than divine power, there is a striking parallel
between Filmer and the liberals with regard to the identification of scarcity
as the fundamental cause of war. In this sense, at least, Filmer’s critique
of Hobbes anticipates the liberalization of natural rights theory.71 Filmer’s
postulations of natural bounty and divine providence constitutes a denial
of Hobbes’ treatment of the psychological causes of war, including those
lodged deep in human psychology, such as diffidence and a love of glory.
Both the insecurity caused by relative equality and the presence of some that
take “pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest”
are psychological factors operating in the Hobbesian state of war.72 The
Leviathan is primarily “King of the Proud,” not of the hungry.
Filmer contends that Hobbes’ law of nature, which is “a rule found out by
reason” forbidding a man “to do that which is destructive to his life, and to
omit that by which he thinks it may be preserved,” cannot secure the peace it
intends.73 For the law of nature to be effective, “in the first place nature must
teach him that life is to be preserved,” but in this event, Filmer concludes,
“the right of nature and the law of nature will be all one.”74 If nature teaches
human beings the importance of self-preservation, then this natural guidance
acts more like a command or duty to preserve life than Hobbes’ formulation
of a prohibition against doing things that are self-destructive. The major issue
between Filmer and Hobbes here has to do with the distinction between
right and law. Hobbes explicitly directes his argument against those who
“confound jus and lex (right and law).”75 The Hobbesian argument for the
primacy of rights over law reduces these dictates of reason to an instrument to
serve the most fundamental passion for self-preservation. Filmer, in contrast,
70 Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Rebecca Balinski, trans. (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1994): pp. 30–1.
71 See Locke, Two Treatises, ch. 5, Tyrrell, Patriarcha, Non Monarcha, pp. 118–21, and Algernon
Sidney, The Discourses Concerning Government, Thomas West, ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund Classics, 1996): ch. 1., sec. 10. Cf. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953): p. 235.
73 Ibid., p. 79.
75 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 79 and Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 307.
presumes the primacy of law with its obligatory character over the supposed
natural freedom contained in Hobbes’ notion of rights. Filmer is heavy on
law but very sparing with rights. For Filmer, the law of nature cannot simply
be a deduction from reason; rather, to be a law, it must have an obligatory
and commanding quality in itself. As Hobbes suggests, it was typical of
political thinkers to confound or conflate natural law and natural right.
Even Grotius, while distinguishing right and law, still defines jus naturale in
a way that makes it a command.76 Filmer goes beyond Grotius, though, in
the sense that his notion of law completely subsumes right. Right for Filmer
is always the right of rulers. While both Hobbes and Filmer hold law and
right as contradictory, the scriptural premises of the latter’s Adamite thesis
make Hobbesian natural right a moral and ontological impossibility.
We recall that Filmer agreed with Hobbes’ account of the exercise of
sovereign power but not with his means of acquiring it. Filmer’s critique
of Hobbes’ contract theory rested on his argument for paternal right, the
problem of regimes, and the even bigger problem of resistance. First, re-
garding paternal right. The contractualism of Hobbes’ regnum institutium
drew Filmer’s appeal for the regnum patrimoniale. Filmer’s method in re-
futing contract theory is to point out what he takes to be Hobbes’ own
admissions that paternal rule of the family is the primal core and model of
political authority. He gleefully cites Hobbes’ statements that “the ‘father
being before the institution of a commonwealth’ was originally an ‘absolute
sovereign’ ‘with power of life and death’, and that ‘a great family, as to the
rights of sovereignty is a little monarchy.’”77 This does not signify a criti-
cism of Hobbes’ view of sovereignty, however, as both he and Filmer agree
that sovereign civil power can and usually does place limits on the power
of fathers in families.78 Filmer’s aim is to attack Hobbesian contractualism
at its source. If paternal rule is such an undeniable feature of human life,
Filmer argues, then there is little freedom left in individuals to consent to the
institution of government. Hobbes, however, explicitly argues that paternal
dominion, despite its appearance and ubiquity, is not the result of generation
but actually is a product of contract. He cautions that paternal dominion
“is not so derived from the generation as if therefore the parent had do-
minion over his child because he begat him, but from the child’s consent,
either express or by other sufficient arguments declared.”79 Filmer responds
incredulously: “How a child can express consent, or by other sufficient ar-
guments declare it before it comes to the age of discretion I understand
76 DJB 1.1.10.12 and see Curley’s note in Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 79. Zagorin (“Hobbes without
Grotius,” pp. 37–8) makes a persuasive case that with this argument Hobbes may be targeting
Grotius in particular as a thinker who fails to distinguish right (jus) and law (lex).
77 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 185 and Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 153, 132, 107.
78 Compare Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 12 and Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 153.
not.”80 The issue between Filmer and Hobbes is not, however, the character
of reason but the primacy of the source.
There is a profound antipatriarchalism in Hobbes’ theory. As Tarcov re-
lates of Hobbes, the only “generation that is truly the work of man by way
of art is the generation of artificial man, the body politic.”81 In contrast
to Filmer’s scriptural argument that by creation God made man the “no-
bler and principal agent in generation,” Hobbes claims in De Cive that the
“mother originally hath the government of her children, and from her the
father derives his right, because she brings forth and first nourishes them.”82
Hobbes explains the prevalence of patriarchy by a woman’s need to submit
to a man in order to secure her children in the state of nature and by the fact
that “for the most part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers,
not by the mothers of families.”83 These arguments are clearly anathema to
Filmerian scripturalism. The decidedly tortured logic of Hobbes’ treatment
of the origins of the subjection of women and children amounts ultimately
to an attempt to ground all legitimate authority in contract.84 For Filmer,
these species of subjection reflect the natural subjection of all human beings.
The individual, however understood, lacks the moral power to create moral
obligation.
Another aspect of Filmer’s critique of Hobbesian contractualism relates to
the issue of regimes and representation. In this respect alone, Hobbes’ monar-
chist credentials come under Filmer’s microscope much as had Grotius’. Like
the Dutchman, though to a lesser degree, Hobbes’ blue blood is found want-
ing. Hobbes and Grotius both maintain the possibility of instituting three
distinct regime types: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.85 But whereas
Filmer finds that the Grotian typology formally includes the possibility of
absolute monarchy yet undermines it by implication, he finds that Hobbes’
typology admits of aristocracy and democracy but always reduces, by the
logic of his argument, to absolute monarchy. Of Hobbesian aristocracy and
democracy, Filmer remarks, “he affirm in words, yet by consequence he

81 For example, Richard Allen Chapman, “Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the
Family,” American Political Science Review, vol. 69, no. 1 (March 1975): p. 89; Ingrid Makus,
Women, Politics, and Reproduction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996): ch. 1; Nathan
Tarcov, Locke’s Education for Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984): p. 37
and John Zvesper, “Hobbes’ Individualistic Analysis of the Family,” Politics, vol. 5 (October
1985): p. 3. For a contrary view that identifies Hobbes as a patriarchalist, see Carole Pateman,
“‘God hath ordained Man a Helper’: Hobbes, Patriarchy, and Conjugal Right,” in Feminist
Interpretations of Political Theory, Carole Pateman and Mary Shanley, eds. (University Park:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991): pp. 64–5.
82 Hobbes, Citizen, p. 215 and Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 192.
84 Schochet, Patriarchalism, pp. 232–3.
85 Hobbes, Citizen, ch. 7 and Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 18.
denies.”86 Democracy by institution fails because “if every man covenant

with every man, who shall be left to be the representative? If all must be
representatives, who will remain to covenant?”87 Democracy by institution
falls on the ground that the sovereign, in Hobbes’ theory, cannot be a party
to a covenant. If all individuals covenant, there is no sovereign; if all individ-
uals are sovereign, it is the state of nature. The democratic character of the
state of nature militates against democratic government. Aristocracy faces
similar problems. If a commonwealth were ruled by an aristocratic assem-
bly, any member of that body could kill any subject freely, not being himself
party to a covenant with them, and every member would be in an identical
state of nature with every other.88 Filmer maintains that within the strict
context of Hobbesian natural rights theory any representative body would
be plagued with violence toward the subjects and strife within the body it-
self. With respect to the possibility of contract between conquerors and the
conquered, Filmer muses: “I would know how the liberty of the vanquished
can be allowed if the victor have the use of it at pleasure.”89 His attack on
the more practical aspects of Hobbesian contractualism results in his affir-
mation that Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty is only consistent with absolute
monarchy, which, Filmer adds, does not have a contractual but a paternal
origin. The striking feature of Filmer’s treatment of Hobbesian regime types
is his unique criticism of Hobbes as a closet Aristotelian.90 Though he sug-
gests that in most respects Hobbes made a much more decisive break from
Aristotle than Grotius, Filmer charges that they both cling to the Aristotelian
regime typology. In his rejection of the three distinct regime types, Filmer’s
anticlassicism outstrips them both.
Filmer’s most involved attack on Hobbesian contractualism has to do
with the question of resistance. To Hobbes’ principle that “if other men
will not lay down their right as well as he, then there is no reason for any
one to divest himself of his,” Filmer offers his characteristic retort: “if all the
men in the world will not agree, no commonwealth can be established.” This
standard of universal consent could never be attained “though all men should

87 Ibid., p. 185. Filmer uses the same logic to refute democracy by acquisition. If all are con-
querors, who covenants? If all are not conquerors, how can it be a democracy by conquest?
88 Ibid., p. 187.
89 Ibid., p. 186.
90 Paul Rahe also identifies a “partially concealed teleology” in Hobbes’ thought (Republics
Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution [Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1992]: p. 397). While Rahe is correct to point out that
Hobbes’ “concealed” teleology shares a rationalistic core with that of the classics – i.e., for
Hobbes irrational behavior that endangers self-preservation is immoral – it is still important
to observe that Hobbes’ quasi-teleology lacks the normative component of moral education
so crucial to the classic thinkers such as Aristotle and was still a prominent feature in Grotius’
thought.
spend their whole lives in nothing but running up and down to covenant.”91
Filmer’s peculiarly active and catholic understanding of consent permeates
his view of assemblies as well. In contrast to Hobbes, who admits that “the
only way to erect a common power” is to cause individuals to “reduce all
their wills by plurality of voices to one will, which is to appoint one man
or assembly to bear their person,” Filmer cautions, “it is not a plurality
but a totality of voices which makes an assembly be of one will.”92 Filmer
implies that Hobbes sets a standard for the unity of political action that
is impossible except in absolute monarchy: “It seems Mr. Hobbes is of the
mind that there is but one kind of government, and that is monarchy. For he
defines a commonwealth to be one person.”93
However, the deeper strand of Filmer’s argument relates to the significance
of the covenant itself. Filmer attacks Hobbes’ statement that “the consent of
a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words, ‘I authorize and do
take upon me all of his actions’, in which there is no restriction at all of his
own former liberty.”94 The argument that sovereign authorization does not
alienate natural liberty holds individualist implications that Filmer rejects.
For example, according to Hobbes, the authorization I give a sovereign to
punish criminals, potentially including myself, does not negate my or anyone
else’s natural right of self-defense. An individual’s chances in any contest with
the sovereign may be pitifully slight, but no one can deny the legitimacy of
whatever resistance or flight is offered.95 The seditious consequences of this
theory are undeniable to Filmer. Hobbes’ postulation of inalienable rights
subverts the very idea of absolute sovereignty he is trying to defend inasmuch
as the proposition that “a covenant not to defend myself from force by force
is always void” encourages rebellion and disobedience.96 To Hobbes’ qual-
ification that the individual can disobey any “dangerous or dishonorable”
command unless “our refusal frustrates the end for which sovereignty was
ordained” Filmer queries: who decides this important question? Ultimately,
he suspects it can only be the individual (and hence the people), and thus he
reaches the conclusion that Hobbes’ natural right undermines the sovereign’s
capacity to execute war or maintain national defense.97 For Filmer, the logic
of resistance is embedded in the very fabric of Hobbes’ theory.
The heart of Filmer’s critique of Hobbes’ contractualism is his argument
that the mere laying down of individual rights is not enough to secure the
ends of the commonwealth. For Filmer, the essence of sovereignty should be
91 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 80 and Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 189.

95 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 142, 141–2, 87.
96 Ibid., p. 87.
97 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 194. See also Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 197–8 and Schochet,
Patriarchalism, p. 129.
nonresistance, but instead Hobbes places significant limitations on political

obligation.98 Moreover, Filmer contends that Hobbes signally fails to create
in the subject a positive obligation directly to obey the sovereign. If the sub-
ject is to be bound actively to obey the sovereign’s commands, the contract
must be to obey, not simply to refrain from doing as one wishes.99 Hobbes
was clearly aware of this problem. He rejected the idea that active obedience
could arise from a contract between the sovereign and the subject because
this would impose obligations and limitations on the sovereign incompatible
with absoluteness. Hobbes proposes two possible solutions: the principle of
authorization and the natural freedom of the sovereign. As we have seen,
the first involved the idea that the individual creates his or her obligation
to obey by authorizing all the sovereign’s actions.100 The other explanation
Hobbes offers for the obligation to obey the sovereign is the natural free-
dom of the sovereign as the one uncontracted agent in the commonwealth.
In this account, the sovereign’s undiminished freedom includes the natural
right to the use of anything, including his subjects’ bodies, to exercise rule.
The problem, from Filmer’s point of view, is that simply promising not to
interfere with the sovereign’s exercise of rule is not morally compelling, es-
pecially given the subject’s inalienable natural right to employ any means to
secure self-preservation. If subjects are not bound to absolute obedience and
nonresistance, Filmer contends, then Hobbes’ sovereignty rests on a bed of
sand.
Filmer’s most powerful criticism of Hobbes is that the preservationist jus-
tification of his absolute sovereignty argument undermines this very idea
of sovereignty. The inalienability of the preservation right makes govern-
ment, which is instituted to secure that right, a cipher. Auto-interpretation
of obligation, Filmer cautions, is the very problem of the state of nature.101
Filmer extends this problem to the issue of property. He argues that if it
could be inferred from Hobbes’ argument that the means of preservation
can never be fully renounced, then no contract is possible given the circum-
stance that any contract could be broken to restore one’s goods, or to take
anyone else’s goods, if one feels the need.102 In this respect, Filmer antici-
pates one of the major theoretical difficulties in natural rights theory that
his Whig critics would later have to work through. Filmer’s often friendly
advice to Hobbes, from one good monarchist to another, is to recognize pa-
triarchy and the scriptural account of creation as the only starting point from
98 Filmer (190) argues that rights must be completely alienable or else it will frustrate the ends
of sovereignty. Cf. Schochet, Patriarchalism, pp. 128–9.
99 Clifford Orwin, “On the Sovereign Authorization,” Political Theory, vol. 3, no. 1 (February
1975): p. 29.
100 As Orwin illustrates, there is good reason to suspect that Hobbes’ use of the authorization
principle was largely rhetorical. See Orwin, “Sovereign Authorization,” esp. p. 32.
101 Schochet, Patriachalism, p. 129.
which to proceed in order to reach Hobbes’ goal of an absolute, indivisible

sovereignty.
The Problem of Grotius and Hobbes

The legacy of Hobbessian and Grotian natural jurisprudence presented a
serious problem for later English constitutionalists. On the one hand, the
Whigs were attracted to their ideas about contract and the secularizing di-
rection in their notions of natural rights. But on the other hand, both Hobbes
and Grotius proposed theories of contract and sovereignty that inclined to-
ward absolutism.103 With respect to Grotius, the Whig constitutionalists of
the 1680s would by and large reject him as a model for their political the-
ory. They did so primarily for two reasons. First, Grotius’ idea of natural
rights was, in their view, far too liable to the dangers of contractual abso-
lutism. Radical and moderate Whigs alike sought to avoid any notion of
rights that allowed the theoretical possibility of complete alienation. Ad-
mitting this possibility would have left the battle between the Whigs and
Tories as simply an interpretive one fought over the nature and history of
the English Constitution. While Whig authorities such as James Tyrrell and
William Petyt were quite prepared to fight Tory historians like Robert Brady
in the primeval forests of Saxon history, the Whigs did not want to put all
their polemical or logical eggs in the antiquarian basket. Second, Grotius
retained important Aristotelian and even late medieval elements in his argu-
ment that comported poorly with the scientific bent of the Whig mind. For
Grotius, the principle of consent still retained strong traces of the scholas-
tic and Calvinist arguments that understood it as the human acceptance of
nature or God’s rational purposes. In the context of an England ravaged by
past religious wars and dreading the prospect of renewed war, the Whigs
desperately sought to excise any substantive theological elements from their
constitutional theory. Moreover, they no longer accepted the classical tele-
ology animating Grotian natural jurisprudence, seeing in this teleology little
more than another fertile ground for philosophical and theological contro-
versy over the “proper” end for humanity. A minimalist political morality
of rights protection was precisely what the Whigs felt England’s situation
warranted.
Hobbes, of course, offered such a minimalist preservationist political
morality. However, the uncompromising movement of Hobbes’ individ-
ualistic preservationist thesis actually grounds his theory of absolute
sovereignty.104 In many ways, Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty is the antithe-
sis of Whig constitutionalism. For Hobbes, sovereign power is by its very
nature absolute. In Leviathan he states: “So that it appeareth plainly, to my
103 Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, p. 53 and Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 244.
104 Manent, Intellectual History, p. 28.
understanding, both from reason and Scripture, that the sovereign power . . .
is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.”105 In response to
those who fear such a concentration of power, Hobbes replies that “there
happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what pro-
ceeds from the subject’s disobedience and breach of those covenants from
which the commonwealth hath its being.”106 In keeping with Hobbes’ fear
of the natural state of war, it is the breaking of promises that threatens self-
preservation, not the unlimited power of the one who enforces covenants.
Furthermore, Hobbes’ sovereign power is indivisible. He maintains that the
powers required for sovereignty, such as control of the militia and the power
to make war and peace, are “incommunicable and inseparable.”107 To divide
sovereign power is to create rival sovereigns and, thus, inevitably to initi-
ate the kind of strife that civil society is supposed to remedy and prevent.
Hobbes’ argument for the indivisibility of sovereignty extends to an utter
rejection of any notion of a mixed regime. To Hobbes “such government is
not government, but division of the commonwealth into three factions.”108
Filmer and Hobbes were almost unique among mid-seventeenth-century
Englishmen in their steadfast opposition to mixed regime theory. Like Filmer,
Hobbes blames Charles I’s councilors for legitimating the principle of mixed
government in the pre–civil war period.109 Moreover, neither criticizes the
mixed regime as simply a bad or defective form of government; rather, in the
Hobbesian and Filmerian theory of sovereignty, a mixed government is no
government at all.
Hobbes’ natural rights theory also contains an explicit denial of the logic
of resistance. In contrast to the varying degrees of this right asserted by
the Whig constitutionalists, Hobbes’ preservationist thesis militates against
the logic of resistance.110 The ancillary effect of Hobbes’ hostility to resis-
tance theories is his rejection of tyranny as an intelligible species of political
rule. Hobbes calls tyranny monarchy “misliked” and accounts for its per-
sistence as a recognized regime type on the grounds that “they that are dis-
contented under monarchy call it tyranny.”111 The essence of sovereignty,
for Hobbes, is power simply. Whereas the possibility of tyranny is cen-
tral to Filmer’s Whig critics’ understanding of legitimacy – they refer le-
gitimate rule at least partly to its antithesis in illegitimate rule – Hobbes
105 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 135 and Hobbes, Citizen, pp. 180–3. Filmer praised Hobbes’ claim
regarding “the rights of sovereignty, . . . no man that I know hath so amply and judiciously
handled” (Patriarcha, p. 184).
107 Ibid., p. 115.
108 Ibid., p. 216 and Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 192.
109 Corinne Weston, “Theory of Mixed Monarchy under Charles I and after,” English Historical
Review, vol. 75 (July 1960): p. 437.
110 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 112–13.
111 Ibid., pp. 118–19.
refers government simply to its antithesis, namely, anarchy. In response to

the influential Aristotelian argument that monarchy is one-man rule directed
to the common good, while tyranny is directed to the private advantage of
the ruler, Hobbes concludes that it is in the absolute prince’s good to see the
kingdom thrive. To those who object that the condition of a subject of an ab-
solute ruler is miserable, Hobbes replies: “the greatest pressure of sovereign
governors proceedeth not from any delight or profit they can expect in the
damage or weakening of their subjects (in whose vigour consisteth their own
strength and glory).”112 It is somewhat surprising to see such an innovative
thinker as Hobbes employ this very pedestrian royalist argument, virtually
replicated in Filmer and James I.113 Yet Hobbes, Filmer, and James I, de-
spite their other differences, agreed on the need to erase, or at least blur, the
classical distinction between monarchy and tyranny. For their part, Filmer’s
Whig critics maintained that absolute power and moderation simply do not
cohere. It is central to their understanding of human nature and the fragility
of liberty and rights that no individual can be trusted with absolute power.
For his part, Hobbes denies the very possibility of fundamental or con-
stitutional laws. Law cannot restrain sovereign power because the former
is purely an expression of the latter. In De Cive Hobbes defined civil laws
as “nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chief authority in
the city, for direction of the future action of the citizens.”114 For Hobbes,
even custom becomes law only by the authority of the sovereign’s will.115
Together Hobbes and Filmer stripped of any meaning the moral claims of
ancient constitutionalism and popular consent by common practice. As such,
they denied the antiquity of Parliament in the English constitutional order
and any moral authority for representative institutions that these arguments
suggest.116 What Filmer liked about Hobbes’ theory of law was its hostility to
the logic of constitutionalism. Hobbes articulates a conception of sovereign
power that resists constitutional limits.117 Quite simply, for Hobbes, as for
Filmer, laws are not made in a legal way. Inasmuch as law originates in the
sovereign’s will, Hobbes argues: “Neither is he bound to the civil laws, for
112 Ibid., pp. 117–18 and Aristotle, Politics, 1279a32–b10.

113 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 31 and James I, “Trew Law of a Free Monarchy,” in Divine Right and
Democracy, David Wootton, ed. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1986): p. 101.
114 Hobbes, Citizen, p. 178. In Leviathan, Hobbes’ radically voluntaristic conception of law
included a rejection of prior law restraining the sovereign with respect to the issue of
succession: “It is manifest that by the institution of monarchy the disposing of the successor
is always left to the judgment and will of the present possessor” (p. 138; cf. 173, 125).
Clearly Hobbes was a particularly inapposite authority for Whigs in the Exclusion Crisis!
115 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 174 and Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 279–80, 45.
116 J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1987): pp. 151–6.
117 Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 193–4. For Filmer’s own hostility to constitutional
limits on sovereign power, see Filmer, Patriarcha, ch. III: 1, 6, 7–9.
this is to be bound to himself.”118 Hobbes holds law to be, at its core, a

restraint on popular freedom, thus being a reflection of that freedom only
in a highly problematic way. The problem of freedom produces the need for
absolute sovereignty.
When the Whigs attempted to formulate their political and constitutional

theory in the context of late-seventeenth-century England, they were forced
to grapple with the difficulty presented by Grotius and Hobbes. The prob-
lematic relation of Hobbes and Grotius to their predecessors in the natural
liberty tradition encapsulated the dilemma facing English Whigs in the 1680s.
These leading lights of early modern natural jurisprudence offered secular-
izing and, in Hobbes’ case, emphatically individualistic models of political
theory, but these models also contained dangerous absolutist tendencies.
The anti-absolutist traditions of Calvinist and Catholic political and consti-
tutional thought, however, carried heavy theological and classical baggage
that the Whigs sought to shed. Each of the important strains of Whig thought
we will now consider represented a distinctive effort to synthesize the secu-
larist and anti-absolutist dimensions of the natural liberty tradition in a new
politics of liberty.
118 Hobbes, Citizen, pp. 183–4 and Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 174.

part two
THE WHIG POLITICS OF LIBERTY IN ENGLAND
In 1660 the eighteen-year nightmare for English royalists of rebellion, regi-

cide, and republicanism finally and dramatically came to a close. Soon af-
ter the arrival of General George Monck’s army in London, events moved
rapidly toward the disintegration of the Commonwealth. While the diehard
republican John Milton would offer posterity a plaintive cry against “this
noxious humour of returning to bondage,” most Englishmen welcomed the
Convention’s invitation to Charles II to return to rule his dead father’s king-
dom.1 The general public and political elites alike expressed great support
for and confidence in the restored Stuart monarchy. The Cavalier Parlia-
ment elected in 1661 in the immediate euphoria following the restoration
imprinted a decidedly pro-royalist stamp on the Restoration Settlement.
Despite renewing the Triennial Act in 1664 declaring that the king should
summon Parliament at least every three years, in other respects Parliament
strengthened the power of the crown through a series of measures securing
royal authority over the military, affirming the principle of nonresistance,
and establishing strict treason laws. In some respects, the Cavalier Parlia-
ment acted more strenuously to efface the memory of the Commonwealth
than even the new king himself. In spite of court support for limited tol-
eration, Parliament passed a series of harsh laws, known as the Clarendon
Code, to enforce religious uniformity and penalize the dissenters held by
1 John Milton, “Readie and Easie Way,” in Areopagitica and Other Political Writings of John
Milton, John Alvis, ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 1999): p. 415. The varied interpre-
tations of Milton’s thought cover a wide range of possibilities. For the argument that Milton
represents a radicalization of Christian humanism, see Joan Bennett, Reviving Liberty: Radi-
cal Christian Humanism in Milton’s Great Poems (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1989) and Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994): ch. 3. For interpretations that emphasize the classical republican
elements of Milton’s thought, see Paul Dowling, Polite Wisdom: Heathen Rhetoric in Milton’s
Areopagitica (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996) and Zagorin, A History of Thought
in the English Revolution (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954): pp. 113–20.
99
100 The Whig Politics of Liberty in England
many English royalists to have been the chief instigators of the “late unhappy
rebellion.”
However, within twenty years of Charles’ return, events would expose
the underlying fragility of the Restoration Settlement. The long-simmering
constitutional dispute in this period between crown and Parliament revealed
that many of the issues raised by the civil war had been temporarily deferred
but by no means entirely resolved. It is in the context of these unresolved
fundamental questions regarding the nature, character, and limits on royal
and parliamentary authority that the Exclusion crisis acquired major signif-
icance. The immediate issue in question during the crisis was whether Par-
liament could alter the line of succession with the aim of barring the heirless
Charles’ Catholic brother James, the Duke of York, from the throne. What
was at stake in the controversy, however, went beyond the immediate politi-
cal or constitutional issues raised by James’ possible succession. At the core
of the debate lay fundamental questions regarding the principle of indefeasi-
ble hereditary right, the distribution of powers in the English constitutional
order, and the nature of representative government. In three successive Par-
liaments in 1679, 1680, and 1681, a group of exclusionist parliamentarians
advanced a bill to exclude James, only to see Parliament prorogued and fi-
nally dissolved in 1681 by Charles, who, in violation of the Triennial Act,
refused to call another for the remaining four years of his reign. In this bitter
contest between the claims of parliamentary authority and the exercise of
royal prerogative, the king and his supporters won the day.
The Whig thinkers and tracts we will examine forthwith wrote in sup-
port of the abortive effort to exclude James from the succession. This pro-
Exclusion group known as Whigs was led by the Earl of Shaftesbury, and
its position in support of Exclusion rested on two main grounds. First, the
Whigs were deeply concerned that the accession of the militantly Catholic
James Stuart would endanger the Protestant religious establishment deemed
by many as a vital element in the English ideal of national independence
and free government. Could a zealous Catholic be trusted as head of church
and state? This was a dilemma English Protestants had not had to face di-
rectly since Mary’s brief reign from 1553 to 1558. Besides the constitutional
problem posed by a Catholic sovereign, many Whigs feared that James’
sympathies for Catholic France would further compromise English national
security. The second main ground for the Whig position was fear of the ex-
tension of royal power. At least since the time of the unpopular policies of the
Cabal period in 1670–3, many in Parliament and in the country suspected
Stuart ambitions for absolutism. In the Whigs’ view, the open distaste for
parliamentary “interference” expressed by the Stuarts could plausibly sig-
nify their long-term goal of eroding parliamentary authority and privilege
and installing an absolute monarchy. For their part, the Tory supporters of
the crown rested their position on an assertion of monarchical authority, the
sanctity of hereditary succession, and the doctrine of nonresistance to the
The Whig Politics of Liberty in England 101
sovereign. It was in support of these principles that the Tories republished

the largely forgotten works of Robert Filmer. Despite his vociferous support
for absolutism, Filmer’s arguments resonated deeply among supporters of
the court in the higher clergy, in Parliament, and in much of the country at
large.
While it is outside the purpose of this study to provide a detailed anal-
ysis of the complex issues and events surrounding the Exclusion crisis, an
awareness of the general political and ideological context of the period is im-
portant for understanding the motives, arguments, and rhetorical strategy of
the major Whig pamphleteers.2 Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke were sophisticated
theoreticians operating in an ideologically charged context that required that
attention be paid to important practical considerations. The Whig tracts we
will analyze are each to some extent pieces d’occasion set in the clear context
of specific political and constitutional issues. Moreover, given the overriding
practical aim of the Whig apologists, namely, to garner and solidify popular
and institutional support for the policy of Exclusion, deeply rooted conven-
tional assumptions and political and cultural commitments could not fail to
shape the rhetorical strategy of the Whig writers. Three features of the his-
torical and ideological context of the Exclusion crisis are worthy of special
notice.
The first relates to the English tradition of anti-Catholicism. This was
by far the most lethal weapon in the Whig propaganda arsenal against the
Stuarts. As we have seen, the Whigs held James’ vociferous Catholicism to
be a sufficient justification for his exclusion from the line of succession.
The long-standing association of Catholicism with foreign threats to na-
tional independence had been a touchstone in English political culture since
the Elizabethan and Jacobean ages. The popular suspicion of Catholics had
only intensified since the days of the failed Gunpowder Plot, which was still
ritually and boisterously celebrated annually on November 5. In addition
to the strong cultural suspicion of Catholics, the Whigs capitalized on the
English perception of Louis XIV’s France. By the late seventeenth century,
Catholic France had replaced Spain as the dominant European power, and
Louis’ centralized monarchy was seen by most Englishmen as an axiomatic
demonstration of the irremediable connection between Catholicism and arbi-
trary government. Besides exemplifying the incompatibility of Catholicism
and constitutional government, Louis XIV’s aggressive foreign policy and
persecution of the Huguenots suggested to many Englishmen a threat to the
2 For good general treatments of the events of the Exclusion crisis, see J. R. Jones, The First
Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678–1683 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961);
Mark Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed (London: Oxford University Press, 1996); Howard
Nenner, The Right to Be King: The Succession to the Crown of England, 1603–1714 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995): pp. 100–46; and J. R. Western, Monarchy
and Revolution: The English State in the 1680’s (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1972):
pp. 35–45.
very survival of Protestantism, not only on the Continent but also in England
itself.
Perhaps the most cynical, but politically advantageous, example of the
Whig manipulation of anti-Catholic feeling in England was the disclosure
of the Popish Plot in 1678, which helped bring down the king’s detested
chief minister, the earl of Danby, and pressured Charles into calling the
first Exclusion Parliament. The public outcry caused by Titus Oates’ utterly
baseless claim about a Jesuit plot to assassinate the king and install James on
the throne with the aid of an invading French army allowed the Whigs under
the earl of Shaftesbury to ride a wave of popular support into a parliamentary
majority.3 The anti-Catholic furor produced by the Popish Plot was, however,
a mixed blessing for the Whigs. On the one hand, it made James a very
unpopular figure at the time and ensured solid Whig support in Parliament.
But on the other hand, it left Whig polemicists such as Tyrrell, Sidney, and
Locke in the tricky position of having to attack the arguments of Filmer –
himself the mortal enemy of all things Jesuitical – while preventing the Tories
from associating Whig natural liberty arguments with those of the Catholic
natural lawyers. At least one obvious interpretation of the Whig assault on
Filmerian divine right was that the Catholic natural law argument of the
later scholastics was part of the natural liberty tradition the Whigs were
defending against the Tory champion Filmer. At least one Tory opponent
of Exclusion made this point declaring in Parliament that with the Whigs
“Jesuitical principles [have been] brought upon the stage again.”4 The Whigs
strenuously attempted to refute this interpretation of their position. As we
shall see, Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke each tried to maintain a prudent distance
from their Catholic predecessors in the natural liberty tradition. Thus, at
least one aspect of the rhetorical strategy of the Whig theorists was to avoid
a boomerang effect from the anti-Catholic furor the Whig political leaders
and organizers had done so much to encourage.
The second important feature of the historical context of the Exclusion
period was the widespread revulsion toward the idea of republicanism in
England. If the Whigs capitalized on the aura of the anti-Catholic celebra-
tions every November 5, it was the Tories who took enormous political
advantage from January 30, the anniversary of the execution of Charles I by
Parliament. Only the regicides of 1649 rivaled the fabled Jesuit Plotters in
the rogues gallery of the English political imagination. In the potent political
symbolism of Restoration England, the executed king assumed the status of
a patriotic martyr sacrificed on the wicked altar of radical republicanism.
Every January 30 clerical voices from nearly every pulpit in the land decried
the evil lessons of rebellion. In the cultural memory of the English people,
3 For a full account of the Popish Plot, see the classic J. P. Kenyon, The Popish Plot (New York:
St. Martin’s, 1972).
4 Quoted in Nenner, Right to Be King, p. 105.
The Whig Politics of Liberty in England 103
the civil war and the Commonwealth evoked the painful experience of mil-
itary rule by a politicized army, threats of social and economic leveling, and
the dismantling of the church establishment. In large measure the failed ex-
periment of the Commonwealth inoculated English political society against
the lure of republicanism for generations.5 In the context of this profound
revulsion toward republicanism, the Tory strategy in the crisis was simply
to paint all Whigs as dangerous crypto-republicans by presenting the leg-
islative effort to control royal succession as the ideological descendant of
mid-century parliamentary radicalism.6 The Whig response to this charge
generally took on a number of characteristics. First, as we shall see most
clearly in Tyrrell, nearly all of the Whigs were careful to disavow republi-
canism in the strongest possible terms.7 Most Whigs presented themselves
as staunch defenders of the traditional form of the English monarchy con-
ceived within established legal limits and in terms consistent with the tra-
dition of the national commitment to Protestantism.8 The Whigs charged
that it was the Catholicism of James and the excessive use of prerogative
by Charles II that constituted the radical and dangerous innovation in the
constitutional order. Tyrell, Sidney, and Locke repeatedly attempted to drive
home the idea that the Tory endorsement of Filmerian divine right theory
demonstrated the radical and absolutist tendencies in English royalism. To
achieve this aim, however, the Whig apologists had to demonstrate that par-
liamentary control over succession was a traditionally acceptable form of
legislative authority.9 Only by proving that altering the line of succession
was not a radical innovation could the Whigs hope to present their position
as a defense of, as opposed to an attack on, the English monarchy as an
institution.
The final major element of the historical context of the exclusion period
is the widespread fear of civil war in later Stuart England. To some extent
this fear was rooted in the memory of the long and bloody period of po-
litical instability unleashed by the constitutional struggle of a generation
earlier. Ultimately it was this fear of renewed civil strife that, more than
any other factor, undermined the Whigs’ position in their quarrel with the
king. Charles’ defense of the principle of indefeasible hereditary right had
5 For an account of the revulsion toward republicanism during the Restoration period, see
Blair Worden “Republicanism and the Restoration, 1660–1683,” in Republicanism, Liberty,
and Commercial Society, 1649–1776, David Wootton, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1994): pp. 139–40.
6 Cf. Nenner, Right to Be King, pp. 124–6.
7 For his part Locke, included an approving discussion of prerogative in the Second Treatise. It
is Sidney’s open admiration for republicanism that most firmly cast him outside mainstream
English Whiggery of the 1680s.
8 O. W. Furley, “The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet Literature in the Exclusion Crisis, 1679–
81,” Cambridge Historical Journal, vol. 13, issue 1 (1957): p. 35.
9 Nenner, Right to Be King, pp. 56–7.
at least the plausible claim of ensuring a stable succession.10 Sensing that

the English people, and even the majority of Whigs, had no appetite for
civil war, Charles gambled successfully that his decision to dissolve the third
Exclusion Parliament would be perceived as an acceptable resolution to the
crisis in the eyes of most of his countrymen. Popular support for the Whigs
eroded as the crisis appeared to be lurching toward war. By dissolving Par-
liament, Charles removed the Whig platform and broke up the Whigs as a
serious opposition group. Once again we will see most clearly in Tyrrell the
abiding concern to demonstrate the principled moderation animating most
Whigs. The typical Whig supporters of exclusion were deeply conservative
men in many respects, from some of the oldest and most respectable families
in the country. They were not predisposed to political radicalism either by
temperament or by ideology. The desire of most Whigs to resist the drift to
absolutism, on the one hand, and social upheaval and populism, on the other,
was rooted in their attachment to the principles of limited monarchy that
they believed supported the stable, hierarchical political order that protected
property, established privileges, and traditional liberties.11 Indeed, the radi-
cal Whigs Sidney and Locke are identifiable as radicals in large part precisely
because of their openness to the idea of popular revolt against monarchical
rule. Given the fact that even most Whigs in 1681 did not wish to see the
dispute between crown and Parliament explode into a contest of arms, it is
perhaps not surprising that of the three major Whig tracts composed during
the Exclusion years, only Tyrrell’s moderate offering saw the light of day
during the crisis.
The first Whigs were political failures but philosophical victors. Their ac-
tions and arguments failed to exclude James from the line of succession, but
the writings of the Exclusion Whigs changed the English political landscape
permanently and made a formative impact on the Anglo-American tradition
of political and constitutional thought. English and American Whigs for at
least the next century would approach issues of political obligation, resis-
tance, and the nature of government in terms first conceived largely in the
turbulent years of the Exclusion crisis. In the following analysis of the major
Whig writings of the period, we must bear in mind the historical context of
this seminal time. The general lines of development in the Whig arguments
of the period can, in part, be traced back to the specific constitutional, legal,
and religious issues brought to the fore by the crisis. Only by paying careful
attention to this complex historical context are we in a position to under-
stand why the Whigs made the arguments they did in the manner they did
and perhaps even why they deemed some things better left unsaid.
10 Ibid., p. 122.
11 For an excellent discussion of the conservative ideology of the majority of Whigs, see H. T.
Dickinson, Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth Century Britain (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977): pp. 57–70.
4
James Tyrrell
The Voice of Moderate Whiggism
The publication of James Tyrrell’s Patriarcha, Non Monarcha in 1681 was the
first major Whig shot fired in the polemical dispute raised by the issue of
Exclusion. It was at once a piece d’occasion devoted to advancing the Whig
position in the Exclusion crisis and a major work of political philosophy deal-
ing with such issues as the nature of political society, the origin of property,
the principle of consent, and the main features of late-seventeenth-century
natural jurisprudence. One commentator has observed that Patriarcha,
Non Monarcha is “perhaps the most interesting work of political theory
published in England between 1660 and 1689.”1 At its core, this work
is the classic moderate Whig defense of limited government against what
Tyrrell calls Filmer’s “Absolute Monarchy Jure Divino.” In contrast, Tyrrell
presents himself as a defender of the rule of law and rejects all of Filmer’s
attempts to deny the validity of the legal limits on monarchical power that
require rulers to abstain from the “Lives, Liberties or Properties of their
Subjects.”2
Tyrrell’s moderate political credentials were impeccable. He was born in
1642 at the outbreak of England’s turbulent civil war period.3 As the son
of a prominent Buckinghamshire gentleman in royal service, Sir Timothy
Tyrrell, and grandson on his maternal side of the celebrated champion of
the divine right of kings, Archbishop Ussher of Armagh, James Tyrrell’s
familial political legacy was decidedly Cavalier. Indeed, his first literary
1 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979): p. 154.
2 James Tyrrell, Patriarcha, Non Monarcha (London, 1681): Preface, p. 1 (hereafter PNM and
page number).
3 For useful biographical accounts of James Tyrrell, see John Gough, “James Tyrrell, Whig
Historian and Friend of John Locke,” The Historical Journal, vol. 19, no. 3 (1976): pp. 581–
610; Julia Rudolph, Revolution by Degrees: James Tyrrell and Whig Political Thought in the Late
Seventeenth Century (New York: Palgrave, 2002): pp. 24–8 and The Dictionary of National
Biography, Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds. (London: Oxford University Press, 1921–2),
Vol. XIX: pp. 1368–9 (hereafter DNB).
105
venture in 1661 was a dedication to Charles II of a republished edition of his

grandfather’s famous sermon The Power Communicated by God to the Prince.4
While Tyrrell perhaps inherited his native abhorrence of political radicalism
from his family background, the formative experience in his intellectual de-
velopment, and the event that would eventually set him on the Whig course,
was his time at Oxford.
Tyrrell entered Queen’s College, Oxford, in 1657 near the end of the In-
terregnum and graduated with an M.A. in 1663. He studied law and was
called to the bar three years later, although he never practiced law, prefer-
ring to retire to one of his family estates at Oakley in Buckinghamshire.
The most important development in Tyrrell’s Oxford years did not, how-
ever, involve directly his studies, but rather his meeting and befriending the
man who would in many respects shape the course of his life: John Locke.
In Locke, who was ten years his senior and at the time a promising young
lecturer, Tyrrell found an intellectual companion with whom he discussed
all the major political, scientific, philosophical, and religious issues of the
day. It was Locke who invited Tyrrell to join the Exeter House circle of intel-
lectuals that met regularly under Shaftesbury’s mentorship in the late 1660s
and early 1670s, thus introducing him to the informal web of relations that
would in time form the nascent Whig opposition. The lifelong, but in later
years often rocky, friendship between Tyrrell and Locke represents one of
the most fascinating and touching personal stories in the Whig high political
drama.
Tyrrell moved in Whig circles and knew most of the important public
figures of the day, but he was not particularly politically active, at least on
the national stage. His experience in public life was limited to local admin-
istration in his home county, where he served as a justice of the peace and
as deputy lieutenant. He never sat in Parliament and by most accounts was
not directly involved in Shaftesbury’s activities during the Exclusion crisis
in 1679–81.5 However, it was in this period that he offered his polemical
skills in the service of the Whig cause, publishing anonymously Patriarcha,
4 It is important to note that the decidedly low church Ussher (1581–1656) was never a Filmerian
divine rightist. Although he strongly affirmed the principle of divine right in 1648 at the time
of Parliament’s debate over how to handle the fate of the imprisoned Charles I, Ussher also
held strongly Calvinist views on church government that frequently set him at odds with high
churchmen and made him one of Cromwell’s favorite antiepiscopal divines. As one biographer
described this complex man: “His Augustinian theology commended him to the puritans, his
veneration for antiquity to the high churchmen; no royalist surpassed him in deference to the
divine right of kings” (DNB, Vol. XX: pp. 96–7). For Ussher’s attempts to mediate between
episcopacy and presbytery, see Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002): pp. 48, 162, 676 and Michael Mendle, Dangerous Positions:
Mixed Government, the Estates of the Realm, and the Answer to the XIX Propositions (University,
AL: University of Alabama Press, 1985): pp. 141–2.
5 Richard Ashcraft suggests otherwise (Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of
Government [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986]: pp. 387–8).
James Tyrrell: Voice of Moderate Whiggism 107
Non Monarcha and perhaps even collaborating with Locke, who was then a
frequent visitor to Tyrrell’s Shotover estate near Oxford, on a pamphlet on
toleration.
He survived unscathed the Tory backlash that followed the collapse of
the Whig parliamentary opposition, despite his Whiggish associations. Un-
like Sidney or his friend Locke, the crown does not appear to have considered
Tyrrell to be a threat, in part because he was not seen as a radical activist
and in part out of deference to his lineage, with one government spy assur-
ing his superiors that James “is the son of a very good [i.e., royalist] man,
Sir Timothy Tyrrell.”6 The crown’s treatment of Tyrrell in this period dis-
plays poignantly the extent to which the civil war loyalties of one’s forebears
still mattered in late Stuart England. During the Whig years in the political
wilderness from 1683 to 1688, Tyrrell was never arrested or forced into exile.
He also does not appear to have had any real contact with the “Council of
Six,” including Sidney, Essex, Russell, Hampden, Howard, and Monmouth,
who briefly and disastrously assumed leadership of the Whig movement af-
ter Shaftesbury’s flight to Holland and subsequent death in early 1683. For
most of the half decade before the Glorious Revolution Tyrrell stayed put
at his estates, performing local administrative duties and keeping Locke,
now in Dutch exile, informed of political events at home. To Locke’s great
annoyance, Tyrrell pressed for a royal pardon for his friend and regularly
pleaded with him in letters to return to England. Tyrrell was initially favor-
ably disposed to James’ Declaration of Indulgence extending toleration, as
were many Whigs, but he soon changed his mind (possibly under the in-
fluence of Locke’s vehement opposition to it) and was eventually stripped
of his offices by James in early 1688 for refusing to support the Declara-
tion.7 Although he played no direct part in the dramatic events of 1688–9
and never held high office, Tyrrell did become celebrated as one of the chief
moderate Whig apologists for the Glorious Revolution settlement, especially
through the influence of his massive Bibliotheca Politica and his emphatically
Whiggish and unfinished History of England.
It is clearly impossible to understand Tyrrell’s role as a Whig theorist
without recognizing the profound effect of his relationship with Locke. The
typical interpretation of their friendship emphasizes the minor dramas of
domestic intercourse involving disputes over money loaned and owed, con-
fidences exposed to strangers, and new acquaintances interrupting old af-
fections. To many historians the Locke–Tyrrell connection presents a rela-
tively uncomplicated picture, with Locke as the towering figure who becomes
progressively more detached from the sycophantic, cloying, insecure, and
6 Gough, “James Tyrrell,” p. 589.

7 In this regard he cannot be mistaken for one of what Goldie calls “James’ Whigs.” See Mark
Goldie, “John Locke’s Circle and James II,” Historical Journal, vol. 35, no. 3 (September 1992):
pp. 568–9. Cf. Rudolph, Revolution by Degrees, p. 27.
obviously less talented Tyrrell.8 While there is some truth to this account, it
misses the mark on the most important aspect of their relation. Locke and
Tyrrell’s friendship was rooted in the liberating experience of intellectual
discourse and the mutual exchange of ideas. Tyrrell admired Locke deeply,
but this admiration should not occlude our understanding of the important
philosophical disagreements between the two. Tyrrell was not one to hide
his light under a bushel, and when they enjoyed close relations, as they did
at the time of the Exclusion crisis, it is likely that Locke and Tyrrell would
have some influence on each other, even if primarily in the form of critiques.9
After the publication of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding in
1690, Tyrrell chided Locke in a letter for not distinguishing his teaching on
the law of nature sufficiently from the vile “Epicureanism of Hobbes.” As
Julia Rudolph perceptively observes, “Locke finally decided to retrieve all
of his possessions from Oakley – setting in motion the final round of accu-
sation and bargaining between them – soon after he defended his position
on the natural law against Tyrrell’s critique.”10 The suggestion is that they
were intellectual rivals harboring serious disagreements on important politi-
cal and philosophical questions. As we shall see, the disagreements between
Locke and Tyrrell on these issues can be traced as far back as Patriarcha, Non
Monarcha.
The moderate Whiggism in this early writing emerged as a distinct form
of thought with the infusion of the philosophical categories and premises
of late-seventeenth-century natural jurisprudence into the English constitu-
tional controversies of the Exclusion era. Tyrrell’s moderate Whig version of
the natural liberty doctrine departed from that of its predecessors by follow-
ing the philosphical authority of Samuel Pufendorf. Many of the key elements
of moderate Whig thought such as the rejection of popular sovereignty, the
seriously qualified right of rebellion, and the denial of the theory of the
dissolution of government derived from a fundamentally Pufendorfian un-
derstanding of the natural law and the contractual origins of government. In
order to defend the principle of legal limits on the monarchy against Filmer
and his Tory supporters, Tyrrell addressed the fundamental questions re-
garding the nature of political society, the origin of property rights, and the
constitutional limits on sovereign authority. In this chapter we will exam-
ine the main features of Tyrrell’s moderate Whig position, paying particular
attention to his essentially Pufendorfian natural law theory, his account of
property, and the character of constitutional sovereignty. For Tyrrell and
the moderate Whigs, resisting absolutism did not require advocating radical
natural rights or a dramatic increase in popular control of the government.
8 This view has been persuasively challenged recently by Rudolph, Revolution by Degrees,
pp. 26–7.
9 Ibid., pp. 161–7.
10 Ibid., p. 26.
Yet even as the moderate Whigs tried to defend the traditions of England’s
complex and balanced Constitution, they introduced new principles of nat-
ural jurisprudence to undergird their conception of limited monarchy. Thus,
Tyrrell’s critique of Filmer produced a defense of the old England that
required an articulation of a new England.
Pufendorf and Whig Philosophy

Before we examine the substance of Tyrrell’s moderate Whig argument for
Exclusion, it is important to understand the intellectual context informing
his and the mainstream Whig position. Samuel Pufendorf was, as we shall
see, the most influential philosophical authority for moderate Whigs in the
1680s. But who was Pufendorf and why was he so influential among his
contempories? It is one of the great ironies in the history of political thought
that this largely neglected figure was once one of the leading philosophic
voices for educated Europeans.11 Born in Saxony in 1632, the same year
as Spinoza and Locke, Pufendorf has had the misfortune for centuries to be
overshadowed by his more illustrious cohorts. Yet to uncover the roots of the
moderate Whig position in the 1680s and beyond, we must briefly consider
the sources, assumptions, and arguments of this complex thinker. From his
early days in Saxony during the tumultuous Thirty Years War, Pufendorf
carried with him a burning desire to explicate, rationalize, and demystify
political and moral phenomena. As a student and later as a lecturer at the
universities of Leipzig and Jena, Pufendorf began a rigorous study of politics
that continued through the several incarnations of a colorful career that
included lengthy tenures as the court historian to the king of Sweden and
later to the elector of Brandenburg in Berlin.
Pufendorf’s voluminous and diverse body of work comprised many cele-
brated works of philosophy, history, theology, and jurisprudence, but it was
his massive compendium of legal and political philosophy De Jure Naturae et
Gentium (1672) that left the deepest imprint on the English political mind.
The most fundamental principles of the Pufendorfian teaching on politics in
De Jure Naturae et Gentium reflect the maturation of ideas conceived during
11 A clear sign of the neglect that Pufendorf has suffered in recent times is the fact that there is,
to my knowledge, only one full-length modern treatment of him in English: Leonard Krieger,
The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1965). But see also Craig Carr and Michael Seidler, “Pufendorf, Sociality and
the Modern State,” History of Political Thought, vol. 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): pp. 352–78;
Alfred Dufour, “Pufendorf,” in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700, J. H.
Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): pp. 561–88;
and Istvan Hont “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the
Theoretical Foundations of the ‘Four-Stages Theory,’” in The Languages of Political Theory in
Early-Modern Europe, Anthony Pagden, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987):
pp. 253–76. These works were very helpful to me in the following discussion.
Pufendorf’s formative political experiences while growing up and studying

in the German lands deeply scarred by sectarian conflict in the Thirty Years
War. The two guiding principles of Pufendorfian political theory were a hor-
ror of theologically charged politics and a visceral concern for the political
and constitutional instability caused by poorly designed governing institu-
tions and, more particularly, what he took to be the fundamentally defective
conception of sovereignty then regnant in the Holy Roman Empire. Thus,
Pufendorf set himself the daunting task of establishing a secular founda-
tion for moral and political science and reconstituting viable political orders
through the articulation of a theoretically rigorous and logically consistent
conception of sovereignty.
Pufendorf’s reputation as one of the great synthesizers in the modern nat-
ural law tradition is certainly apposite. Indeed, his conciliating spirit and his
efforts to harmonize diverse intellectual influences comported well with the
intellectual temperament of most English Whigs, themselves avid blenders
of philosophical principles, historical custom, and legal precedent. However,
it is important to recognize that Pufendorf’s chief political authorities in the
natural liberty tradition were emphatically secular. Pufendorf represents per-
haps the most ambitious voice among the generation of conservative natural
law thinkers who followed in the wake of Hobbes’ groundbreaking cri-
tique of the central principles of Christian Aristotelianism. Repulsed by the
Hobbesian rejection of natural justice, Pufendorf sought to incorporate fun-
damentally Hobbesian insights about the character of natural rights into a
comprehensive natural law theory that would provide a moral grounding for
political life. Thus, he generally rejected the arguments of Catholic scholastic
and reformed divine apologists for the divine ordination of political power,
favoring rather the solid rationalist foundations of Hobbes and Grotius.12
While Pufendorf’s eclectic style drew in an enormous variety of sources both
sacred and profane, the political teaching of De Jure Naturae et Gentium is
best understood primarily as a synthesis of the ideas of Hobbes and Grotius.
From Hobbes, Pufendorf borrowed the idea of political society originating
in a pre-political state of nature. However, he blended the idea of the state
of nature with an identifiably Grotian conception of a relative sociability in-
herent in human nature. By fusing the individualist premises of Hobbes with
the anthropological observations of natural human sociability expounded by
Grotius, Pufendorf established a conception of the natural human condition
that rejected the amoral atomism and mechanical materialism of Hobbes
while also eschewing the teleological Aristotelian assumptions still integral
12 See Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, Vol. I, a photographic repro-
duction of the Amsterdam edition of 1688, and Vol. II, a translation of the text by W. A.
Oldfather and C. H. Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934): bk 7, ch 3, secs. 1–2,
pp. 683–4 (hereafter in notes DJNG bk., ch., sec., and page number where applicable).
Cf. Dufour, “Pufendorf,” pp. 574–5.
for Grotius.13 The Pufendorfian individual who contracted to form political

society possessed not only Hobbesian natural rights, but also natural duties
and obligations flowing from the dictates of the natural law, which directs
rational beings toward peace and a viable social existence.
Pufendorf’s account of the origin of political society also reflected this
effort to moderate and fuse the Grotian and Hobbesian elements in the nat-
ural liberty tradition. In contrast to the Hobbesian pattern of collapsing the
contract of association and the contract of subjection through the act of
recognizing a sovereign power, Pufendorf separated these stages in the for-
mation of political society into two distinct forms of voluntary agreement. In
addition, Pufendorf added a third, decidedly Grotian, stage in the process, a
pact established in the time between the contract of association, which forms
one people, and the contract of subjection, which completes the formation
of the political state. This intervening pact establishes the type of govern-
ment that will lead the state.14 It not only parallels the Grotian notion of the
contractual agreement underlying any particular form of government, but
also provides logical and theoretical support for the consensual and legal
source of particular institutions such as the English Parliament and situates
the creation of these institutions in the very origins of the state. Operating
in tandem with this innovative conceptual space between the pre-civil so-
cial existence of voluntary association and the morally binding character of
political subjection is Pufendorf’s assertion of the moral reality inhering in
the corporate entities he calls “composite moral persons” that are both vol-
untary in origin and can, theoretically, predate the formation of sovereign
power.15 By including the formation of corporate bodies and a system of
property ownership within the range of contractual possibilities available to
pre-civil society through the dictates of the law of nature, Pufendorf pro-
vides a theoretical account of the complex, multilayered, and potentially
hierarchical web of relations forming and underlying political society.
In one vital respect, it may appear odd to argue for Pufendorf’s role as the
philosophical authority for the Whigs. Pufendorf has come down to posterity
as one of the strongest proponents of an absolutist conception of sovereignty,
the kind of argument the Whigs would be expected to reject out of hand.
Whig thinkers did typically reject Bodinian, Hobbesian, and even Grotian
notions of sovereignty precisely because of the absolutist tendencies or po-
tentialities of these positions, but they viewed Pufendorf in a different light
from his predecessors on this issue. The Whigs recognized that Pufendorf’s
13 For Pufendorf’s attempt to synthesis Hobbes and Grotius, see Carr and Seidler, “Sociality and
the Modern State,” pp. 355–6, 363; Dufour, “Pufendorf,” pp. 567–9; and Hont, “Sociability
and Commerce,” pp. 253, 256, 258–9, and 263–5. Cf. DJNG 2.3.15.
14 DJNG 2.6.5–6.120. Cf. Krieger, Politics of Discretion, p. 121 and Dufour, “Pufendorf,” p. 573.
15 DJNG 7.2.13. Cf. Carr and Seidler, “Sociality and the Modern State,” p. 374; Dufour,
“Pufendorf,” p. 567; and Hont, “Sociability and Commerce,” pp. 256–7, 263–5.
teaching on sovereignty was far from being a principled defense of abso-

lute monarchy. Rather, the thrust of Pufendorf’s sovereignty argument was
that whatever form of government a people constituted must be guided by
an indivisible and absolute supreme power that is subject to no limitations
from any other institution or external moral force.16 Pufendorf’s argument
for sovereignty, then, appealed to Whigs for several reasons.
First, Pufendorf’s emphasis on the indivisibility of sovereign power in-
cluded an emphatic rejection of any form of mixed regime theory resting on
the idea of coordinate sovereign powers. This kind of argument, as we have
seen, was very influential among civil war era parliamentary resistance theo-
rists such as Hunton and Parker and bore the strong approbation of Grotius.
More importantly mixed regime theory was identified by most Whigs as one
of the chief causes of political and constitutional instability in the civil war
period. Pufendorf’s dismissal of mixed constitutionalism as productive of
“irregular,” and hence radically defective, forms of government (like the
Holy Roman Empire) conformed admirably to the Whig understanding of
English political history.17 Second, Pufendorf supplemented his condemna-
tion of mixed regime theory with an articulate and theoretically sophisticated
argument in support of limited monarchy. He claimed that a people may
choose at the time of the formation of the state to establish fundamental laws
and representative institutions to limit royal power.18 This argument not only
provided a rationalized and theoretically attractive support for the Whig view
of the historical English Constitution, with its institutional checks on monar-
chical authority, but also located the authority of Parliament within a uni-
fied and absolute sovereign power. Pufendorf made the sovereignty of king-
in-Parliament a plausible and theoretically consistent possibility. Finally,
the Whigs were attracted to the very narrow, but significant, Pufendorfian
formulation of the right of resistance. In keeping with the conservative mind-
set of most Whigs, Pufendorf maintained a general prohibition against resis-
tance, especially of the popular variety.19 Like most Whigs, Pufendorf was
deeply hostile to the idea of social upheaval and threats to civil order and
the security of property. However, Pufendorf did sanction a limited right
of resistance framed in terms of a legitimate self-defense right that would
allow legally established institutions to repel tyrannous actions against the
entire people.20 This limited right of self-defense was not an endorsement of
popular sovereignty or a right of radical constitutional change, but rather
was legitimated by the more conservative goal of restoring the original
16 DJNG 7.4.11.695–6 and 7,6,7.

17 For good discussions of Pufendorf’s teaching on “irregular” regimes, see Dufour,
“Pufendorf,” pp. 581–3 and Krieger, Politics of Discretion, pp. 156–64.
18 Cf. DJNG 7.6.7,9,11.
19 DJNG 7.8.5.
20 DJNG 7.8.6.
constitution. To the Whigs who were seeking justification for their own
resistance to the crown during the Exclusion crisis and the Glorious Revo-
lution, but were also profoundly suspicious and fearful of the populist or
even republican implications of radical resistance theory, Pufendorf’s formu-
lation of a limited, primarily restorative, right of resistance in emergencies
was the ideal theoretical support for Whig claims to being the defenders of
traditional constitutional liberties.
It is not surprising that Pufendorf’s political project to anchor the idea
of sovereignty in firm and logically consistent grounds appealed to a gener-
ation of Englishmen whose formative political experiences of theological–
political controversy and constitutional instability so clearly paralleled his
own. Pufendorf’s account of the origins and ends of government with its
articulate rejection of popular sovereignty, on the one hand, and unbridled
absolute monarchy, on the other, fit perfectly with the moderate and in many
respects deeply conservative temper of most English Whigs. In Pufendorf’s
argument for the threefold contract establishing civil society, he supplied
logical support for Whig historical claims about the antiquity and centrality
of Parliament at a time when royalists appealed to Filmer and Brady to deny
both its historical pedigree and its legal autonomy. His account of the nature
of government and sovereignty seemed to provide a theoretical reflection of
the Whigs’ instinctive view of the complex, hierarchical whole that was the
English Constitution and society. In his repudiation of mixed regime theory,
an idea inauspiciously associated in the Whig mind with the radicalism of the
1640s, and his defense of limited monarchy checked by fundamental laws
and representative institutions, Pufendorf appeared to be the philosophical
champion of the English Constitution as Whigs like Tyrrell conceived of it.
Moderate Whig Natural Law and Natural Rights

Tyrrell’s opening salvo against Filmer aims to defend the principle of nat-
ural liberty. He observes that Filmer’s “first Argument against the natural
Freedom of Mankinde is drawn from Scripture.” In Filmer’s Adamite thesis
Tyrrell finds “the substance and strength of all that the Author had to say
in defense” of the “Divine Right of Absolute Monarchy.”21 The objections
Tyrrell raises to Filmer rest on the interpretation of two key passages in
Genesis that Filmer had appropriated from John Selden and Philip Hunton.
The argument that “Children are tyed to an Absolute Subjection or Servitude
to their Parents,” Tyrrell detects, is rooted in Filmer’s attribution of the
absolute “dominion of Adam over the Earth and all the Creatures therein,
on Gen. 1.28.” This point Filmer draws from “Mr. Selden in his Mare
Clausum.” The second key scriptural passage that Tyrrell singles out by
which Filmer “seems to found this Power of Adam upon” is “Mr. Hunton’s
21 PNM: 9.
concession. . . . That it is God’s ordinance that there should be Civil Gov-

ernment, because Gen. 3.16 God ordained Adam to rule over his wife.”22
Tyrrell’s strategy is to develop a comprehensive design to sever Filmer’s argu-
ment from the authority of Scripture. Tyrrell attempts to prove that Scripture
does not afford Adam an exclusive or despotic dominion over creation.23
Moreover, whatever right Adam may have enjoyed, it was not transferable
to his heirs. Tyrrell admits that even if Scripture did grant this sweeping
power to Adam’s heirs, the holy text provides no promise that Adam’s heirs
can be known contemporaneously. Tyrrell employs Scripture’s obscurity re-
garding the extent of Adam’s power and the possibility of its transferability
to prove that different forms of subjection, for example filial and conjugal,
cannot be traced back to a single patriarchal authority in Adam.
Tyrrell argues that the Bible recognized different forms of subjection both
political and familial. For his part, Filmer had cited the subjection of Eve
at Genesis 3:16 as proof of “God’s Ordinance that there should be Civil
Government.” Tyrrell counters Filmer with the position that “all Exposi-
tors look upon these words thy desire shall be to thy husband as respecting
only a Conjugal and not a Filial Subjection.”24 The key element in Tyrrell’s
interpretation of this passage is his insistence that whatever power Adam
“or any other Husband” acquired by this divine grant, it did not extend to
“an Absolute Authority over the Life of his Wife.” The justification for this
limit on conjugal power is its basis in compact. Tyrrell affirms that Eve, or
any wife, has that “right left to her to defend herself from the unjust vio-
lence or rage of her Husband.”25 This self-defense right also appears, in a
somewhat muted form, in Tyrrell’s treatment of the power of eldest sons. He
interprets the Bible’s promise that Cain “shalt rule over his brother Abel” as
falling far short of political subjection. Tyrrell claims that this promise may
have been given only to Cain personally and thus does not “give a Right
to all Eldest Sons.” Moreover, even if it did, “the words do not signifie an
absolute Despotick Power, but a ruling or governing by persuasion or fair
means.”26 Tyrrell reduces the promise to Cain to a sadly ironic endorsement
of the importance of warm brotherly advice. Jacob and Esau, in Tyrrell’s
22 PNM: 10, 13.

23 James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1979): p. 65 and Alan Craig Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in
England and America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991): p. 104.
24 PNM: 13.
25 PNM: 13. Tyrrell follows Grotius and Pufendorf in emphasizing the contractual basis of
conjugal right. However, Shanley and Rudolph are correct to observe that by stressing the
voluntary origins of women’s secondary position in marriage rather than assumptions about
natural subjection, Tyrrell more closely follows Pufendorf than Grotius (Rudolph, Revolution
by Degrees, pp. 39–45 and Mary Shanley, “Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Sev-
enteenth Century England,” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 1 [March 1979]: p. 86).
Compare PNM: 109 with Grotius, DJB 2.5.1 and Pufendorf, DJNG 6.1.9.
26 PNM: 39 and Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 75.
view, exemplify this relation inasmuch as even the inheriting of his father
Isaac’s blessing did not make Jacob “Lord over Esau,” his brother. With
these biblical examples, Tyrrell drives home his contention that Scripture’s
understanding of the relations of husband and wife, and of elder son to
younger siblings, do not conform to Filmer’s Adamite thesis.
Tyrrell never denies that fatherhood determines a kind of filial subjection.
His aim rather is to show that this authority arises from the general character
and end of the relation and not from any specific right of Adam. Of the rule
the biblical patriarchs exercised over their children, Tyrrell argues that it
“must belong to them either as Fathers, or else as Masters, or Heads of their
particular Families; and not as Heirs to Adam.”27 Where, then, does Tyrrell
find the “true original” of paternal right, if not in Adam? He grounds it
in the “Laws of Nature, or Reason” governing the state of nature, or the
condition “separate from any Commonwealth.” These laws, Tyrrell states,
“are intended for one end or effect, viz. the common good and preservation
of Mankinde.” As such, parental power over children “extends no farther
than it conduces to this end.”28 Tyrrell’s law of nature does not endorse
despotic paternal or parental power because such a right is antithetical to
the stated end of this law: the common good and preservation of humankind.
Tyrrell understands legitimate paternal right as the power deriving from the
education of children. The source of this right, however, is a duty, the “great
Duty of Education.” Tyrrell’s God of the natural law who imposes duties on
parents replaces Filmer’s God, who is the giver of power simply. The rational
law governing human relations in the natural condition determines that “the
highest Right which Parents can have in their Children, is not meerly natural,
from generation; but acquir’d by their performance of that nobler part of
their Duty.”29 One effect of Tyrrell’s reinterpretation of paternal right in
terms of a duty is to alter the claims on filial obedience. Obedience now
becomes a product of gratitude, and obligation is transformed into a much
more self-determined and self-generated phenomenon than Filmer would
allow. Tyrrell argues that the duty of children rests on “that Gratitude and
Sense they ought to have of the great obligation they owe their Parents, for
the trouble and care they put them to in their Education.”30 This “great
obligation” is conditional in two senses. It requires performance of a duty
by parents, and it may repose in a nongenerative caregiver. Tyrrell’s aim here
is not merely to sever paternal right from its allegedly generative source, but
also to stipulate the terms of the natural law that governs human relations
27 PNM: 12. See PNM: 27 for Tyrrell’s radical reinterpretation of the meaning of the binding
of Isaac.
28 PNM: 15, 17. For Tyrrell’s appeals to the claims of mothers as possessors of parental right,
see PNM: 14, as well as Gough, “James Tyrrell,” p. 587.
29 PNM: 16.
30 PNM: 16–17.
apart from civil society and that indeed must be implicit and reflected in any
legitimate civil law.
Tyrrell explains the limits on paternal power as the product of the natu-
ral law directive toward peaceful human coexistence. He argues that a son
may restrain a mad or drunken father out of “that love and charity which
all men in the state of nature ought to shew toward each other.” If the un-
controllable rage of such a violent fellow were to endanger the lives of his
children, then preventive action would be justified by the requirements of the
natural law:
The evils which an Aggressor, or Wrong-doer, suffers from him he injured, though in
respect of God the Supreme Lawgiver they may be natural punishments ordained by
him, to deter men from violating the Laws of Nature, yet they are not so in regard
of the Person who inflicts them.31
Notably Tyrrell posits God as the “Supreme Lawgiver.” While he does not
suggest that both the knowledge and obligatoriness of the natural law are
absolutely dependent on the rational knowledge of the existence and will of
the transcendent God, Tyrrell does indicate that human beings are somehow
dependent on both God and society for their existence and flourishing.32
Tyrrell implies that the natural punishments offered by the lawgiving God
are identical to the primary punishing power of individuals in the state of
nature.
The core of this punishment power is a natural right of self-preservation.
Tyrrell argues that a wife, for example, may resist her husband’s “ungovern-
able rage” in order to save the lives of her children and herself.33 Moreover,
Tyrrell emphatically asserts that this right does not denote any superiority
on the part of the resister. Quite the contrary, it signifies a profound natural
equality. As Tyrrell explains, when a son defends himself or others from the
unjust violence of a father
[h]e doth not act as his superior, but in this case as his Equal, as he is indeed in all the
Rights of Nature, considered only as a Man; such as a Right to live, and to preserve
himself, and to use all lawful means for that end.34
Moreover, Tyrrell extends this right of self-defense even to the point of

justifying the taking of human life: “Since the first law of Nature is Self-
Preservation, it is lawful for a man to use all means conducing to this
31 PNM: 26.
32 Michael P. Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1994): p. 207 and James Tully, A Discourse on Property: Locke and His Adversaries
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980): p. 49. By Zuckert’s suggestion, this would
make Tyrrellian natural law much closer to that of Pufendorf than Locke’s presentation in
the Questions on the Law of Nature.
33 PNM: 10–11, 25–6, 109–13 and Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 66.
34 PNM: 26.
end . . . so that if any Man assault me in the State of Nature, I may defend
myself, and consequently kill the assailant.”35 This is both a statement of
natural equality and a further reminder that all power is restricted by the
ends it serves. Tyrrell both breaks from the scholastic prohibition on the
natural punishment right and extends the principle of resistance to arbitrary
rule far beyond the strictly political or constitutional limits of the earlier
parliamentary contractarianism of Philip Hunton. For his part, Tyrrell takes
seriously Filmer’s assertion that absolutist politics has a familial root. Yet it is
important to note that the moderate Whig Tyrrell attempts to place certain
restrictions on this resistance right. For example, a son resisting a violent
father may “use all lawful means” toward the end of self-preservation and
the safety of others. At one point, Tyrrell restricts this right to a practical
nullity, advising: “Patience is the only lawful means to make the Father see
his Errour.”36 While Tyrrell is prepared to break from the more conservative
scholastic position on the individual punishment right, he is clearly uncom-
fortable with some of the radical implications of his natural rights teaching.
He argues, for example, that this right of resistance does not operate for
frivolous reasons and should not extend to revenge for past actions. The
“lawful means” Tyrrell supports seem to have safety as the aim. Once safety
is achieved the use of force should end, “otherwise quarrels would be per-
petual.”37 Tyrrell’s conception of individual natural rights, then, reflects a
more primary concern with the social ends authorized by the natural law.
Tyrrell extends his account of the natural law to an analysis of the way in
which it regulates other relations in addition to those specifically involving
paternal and conjugal power. The first such relation with which he deals is
that of master and slave. Tyrrell follows Pufendorf and Grotius in assuming
that slavery and servitude more generally falls into two varieties: that by
contract and by conquest. Slavery by conquest arises as a punishment for
aggressors who are defeated by a defensive power waging a just war. As this
relation has no basis in compact, both master and slave are still in a state
of war, and as such, the master’s right imposes no obligation on the slave to
serve. Tyrrell affirms that “there is no sober Planter in Barbadoes (who are
most of them Assignees of Slaves taken in War) but will grant such a Slave
may lawfully run away if he can.”38 The law of nature, which incorporates a
primary natural right of self-preservation, determines that even a slave taken
35 PNM: 115. Compare with Roberto Bellarmine, De Laicis, Kathleen Murphy, trans. (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1928): pp. 25–6 and Francisco Suarez, Extracts on Govern-
ment and Politics, George Moore, trans. (Chevy Chase, MD: Country Dollar Press, 1950):
Defensio 3.2.1–4. pp. 372–5.
36 PNM: 29.
37 PNM: 28. Tyrrell’s emphasis on the proportionality between crime and punishment resembles
that of Grotius, but his prohibition of revenge is more akin to Pufendorf. Compare Grotius
DJB 2.20.28, 2.20.1, 4 and Pufendorf, DJGN 2.5.3.
38 PNM: 105. Cf. Grotius, DJB 3.7, 8.
in a just war cannot be presumed to have surrendered this right. Tyrrell also
limits the legitimate exercise of despotic power in this case. In answer to
“what Mr. Hobbes says, That no injury can be done to a Slave,” he offers
the idea that by the laws of nature no slave is “so absolutely at his Masters
dispose, as that because he hath him in his Power, he hath therefore a Right
to use him as he will.”39 Whereas Hobbes intended by this to argue that
injury can only arise in a condition already normalized by contract, Tyrrell
asserts that the subjection of even the “worst of slaves” means no more than
that such a slave “hath no just reason of complaint though his Master give
him Victuals that does not suit his palate, or prescribe him Work which may
not please his humour.” This almost comical formulation of the natural law
restrictions on despotic power has serious implications for Tyrrell’s broader
argument against Filmer.
In addition to asserting basic natural law limits on despotic power, Tyrrell
makes a characteristically Pufendorfian argument for the co-relativity of
rights and duties. He asserts that no “rational man will affirm, that this
slave [by conquest] hath given up the natural rights of living.”40 As such, the
persistence of this right produces a duty in the master to observe certain limits
in his treatment of the slave. It is this Pufendorfian aspect of Tyrrell’s account
that makes his version of natural rights more robust than that of Grotius, for
example. The “natural Rights of living” inhering in “a rational Creature”
place not a positive duty on the master, but a negative duty to refrain from
abusing the slave or giving commands obviously beyond the slave’s capacity.
By this means, Tyrrell incorporates something like Hobbesian natural rights
into a law of nature directed toward social life and ultimately sanctioned
by God. Tyrrell does not, however, anchor this natural right in a form of
natural proprietorship or in an explicit statement of the indefeasible charac-
ter of the primary human passion for self-preservation.41 As we saw in his
criticism of Hobbes’ view of the rights of masters, the Tyrrellian individual is
a more social animal than Hobbes’ and more clearly subject to the rational
and divinely sanctioned directive of the natural law.
A useful way to approach this problem is to examine Tyrrell’s discussion
of contractual slavery. Tyrrell affirms that this form of slavery arises when
individuals “submit themselves to the will and disposal of another” regard-
ing such things as their diet, clothes, productive labor, and leisure time. In
addition, such an individual accepts that “the Master may beat or correct
him if he do amiss.”42 Self-enslavement, for Tyrrell, seems to be a real moral
possibility in the state of nature and in some civil societies. While affirm-
ing this possibility, Tyrrell also, however, denies that this condition need be
39 PNM: 105–6 and Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, Bernard Gert, ed. (Indianapolis, Hackett,
1991): p. 208.
40 PNM: 106. Cf. Pufendorf, DJNG 3.5.3 and Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, pp. 159–60.
41 Hobbes, of course, roots natural rights in the latter.
42 PNM: 102.
absolute or perpetual. Reciprocal obligation, he argues, accompanies the

very act of contract, such that if a master does not fulfill his obligations to
the slave – whatever the terms of the contract stipulate these obligations to
be – then the contract is void. Beyond the legal strictures of the contract,
Tyrrell finds a deeper argument for the limits placed on despotic power by
contract. He proposes that
[n]o man can be supposed so void of common sense (unless an absolute Fool, and
then he is not capable of making any Bargain) to yield himself so absolutely up to
anothers disposal, as to renounce all hopes of safety or satisfaction in this life, or of
future happiness in that to come.43
Tyrrell, then, follows the Grotian argument that individual freedom is in

principle totally alienable, although it is scarcely imaginable that anyone
would do such a foolish thing. There seems to be nothing inherent in the
notion of natural rights that makes them inalienable.
While conceding the legitimacy of contractual slavery, Tyrrell also at-
tempts to mute its despotic character.44 The logic of Tyrrell’s presentation of
a kinder, gentler understanding of slavery is rooted in the law of nature and
its duties of humanity. Tyrrell asserts that no matter how sweeping the power
granted to a master by contract, the natural law prohibits absolute power.
As he explains: “the Laws of Humanity do not permit, that however a man
hath carried himself towards us, all Remains of that Primitive Equality be-
tween men should be quite extinguished towards him.”45 Tyrrell includes a
direct moral obligation, however minimal, on the wielder of despotic power.
For a master to behave as though the slave retains no trace of that “Primi-
tive Equality” among human beings is to act against the law of nature. In a
bold move, Tyrrell affirms that no “Slave hath given up the natural Rights
of Living.”46 Thus, Tyrrell’s natural rights teaching on contractual abso-
lutism differs from Grotius’ inasmuch as it places greater normative power
in the reciprocity of duties and rights and, in effect, unearths the theoretical
materials out of which to construct a refutation of contractual absolutism.
Tyrrell’s moderate Whig understanding of the law of nature regulating
familial relations indicates that society, in a sense, is natural to human be-
ings.47 The moderate Whig idea of natural law expressed by Tyrrell in some
respects departs considerably from the more radical natural rights theories
of his fellow Exclusionists Locke and Sidney. Tyrrell followed Pufendorf in
articulating a natural law directed toward establishing the grounds for the
43 Ibid., 103.
44 For example, he repeatedly asserts that Scripture offers no support for slavery (PNM: 104).
Likewise, he rejects the notion of an Old Testament defense of slavery by arguing that the
English word “slavery” has no counterpart in Hebrew (PNM: 108–9). Cf. Tyrrell’s treatment
of the prediction of Canaanite servitude (PNM: 48).
45 PNM: 107.
46 PNM: 106.
47 Tully, Discourse on Property, p. 73.
common good of society. In the moderate Whig conception of natural ju-

risprudence, individual natural rights are neither nugatory nor primary. In
keeping with Pufendorf, the moderate Whigs argued that individual rights
are in fact subordinate to the more fundamental duties human beings have to
ensure and encourage the social good of the community. Tyrrell argues that
we do not form societies out of primarily selfish calculations. The right of self-
preservation is subsumed in and in effect given its normative content only as
the particular expression of a general duty and an obligation toward society.
Thus, Filmer’s extreme patriarchalism violates not only Tyrrell’s understand-
ing of the right of self-preservation, but also the extent of power and author-
ity legitimately required to further the natural law requirements of human
sociality. In moderate Whig natural law theory, absolute power is incompat-
ible with the ends or purposes of the various layers of association – parental,
conjugal, and perhaps even quasi-despotic – required for the good of society.
Property and Government: Moderate Whig Consent Theory

In the course of dismantling Filmer’s divine right theory of monarchy, Tyrrell
advances his own moderate Whig account of the origin of government and
property. This involves him in exposing many serious practical and theoret-
ical flaws in Filmer’s attack on the principle of consent. Tyrrell’s attempt to
rehabilitate consent theory in the face of Filmer’s anti-populist attacks in-
cludes both a conservative and a radical dimension. In response to Filmer’s
charges of the anarchic implications of consent theory, Tyrrell presents a
more moderate and conservative reading of the principle of natural liberty
than Filmer would ever allow. This involves refuting Filmer’s position that
individual consent is fundamentally unrepresentable, as well as his charge
that the revocability of individual consent undermines and endangers every
government and property settlement. With respect to the issue of represen-
tation, Tyrrell assures his readers that when he speaks of consent, he must
not be supposed to mean the consent of the whole “promiscuous Rabble
of Women and Children.” They may be understood to be represented by
their male family heads. In Tyrrell’s estimation, the principle of represen-
tation precludes the dark and revolutionary implications of consent theory
that Filmer ruthlessly sought to exploit. In a passage meant to comfort the
moderate Whig and Tory alike, Tyrrell affirms:
Civil Government does not owe its Original to the consent of the People, since the
Fathers of Families, or Freemen at their own dispose, were really and indeed all
the People that needed to have Votes; since Women, as being concluded by their
Husbands, and being commonly unfit for civil business, and Children in their Fathers
Families being under the notion of servants, and without any Property in Goods or
Land, had no reason to have Votes in the Institution of Government.48
48 PNM: 83–4.
Here Tyrrell affirms that the direct operation of individual consent results
from a particular status, as father or propertied man, and not from the
bare possession of a human nature. The same paternal status that confers
direct consent to government also produces a capacity to represent one’s
dependents in the formation of civil power.
Although Tyrrell’s appeal to the principle of representation seems to fend
off many of Filmer’s charges about the revolutionary implications of consent
theory, it leaves us with a number of serious questions. By what means do
married men acquire this right of representing their family members if, as
Tyrrell claims, human beings are marked by a “Primitive Equality”? If this
sole right of male family heads to consent to government does not derive
from a natural superiority, how then can it be justified? Even keeping in
mind Tyrrell’s argument that male rule in the family most clearly conforms
to the utilitarian considerations of the natural law, does this principle of
utility extend even to the very formation of civil society?
Tyrrell’s responses to these questions are at the core of moderate Whig
consent theory. Tyrrell asserts that men are generally superior to women with
respect to “civil business.” The key moral implication of the natural “Primi-
tive Equality” of all human beings is that absolute or despotic power is never
justified on natural grounds. As such, the natural law injunction to preserve
the common good of humankind is, in Tyrrell’s view, in no way injured by
male family heads representing their dependents in matters of civil govern-
ment. The profoundly utilitarian considerations inhering in the natural law
support such a principle of representation even in the very foundation of
society. The conservative ramifications of Tyrrell’s treatment of the practical
aspects of consent theory extend beyond the political status of women and
children into the areas of obligation and property.
One particularly vexing question for Filmer had been the status of individ-
uals or groups who simply withdraw their consent to an original compact,
whether that compact is governmental or relates to property. Tyrrell argues
that people generally are loath to undo the solemn bonds of social union
“and reduce all things to the state of Nature again.” The state of nature
clearly contains its own inconveniences that would make it deeply unattrac-
tive. Even so, Tyrrell concludes, any individuals or groups that withdraw
their consent from an existing society enter a “state of War” and become
“Enemies to the Government.” This obligation to existing authority extends
also to those, such as women, children, and servants, who did not consent
directly to the institution of government but nevertheless owe a high “obli-
gation in Conscience and Gratitude to this Government” that protects and
nourishes them.49 This subordination of individual rights to the demands
of the common good also operates in Tyrrell’s assessment of the issue of
49 PNM: 76–7.
property. In contrast to Filmer, who asserted that the notion of individual

natural rights endangers the right of private property, Tyrrell counters that
“every Possessor of a propriety in Lands or Goods, in any Government”
accepts the maintenance of this right on the same terms as those “that first
instituted the Government.” The enjoyment and use of property implies and
confirms consent to the existing distribution of property. Tyrrell also affirms
that even those “possessing no state in the Lands or Goods of a Kingdom”
enjoy the protection of the government and hence are morally bound to up-
hold the existing system of property.50 Tyrrell’s point is that even while the
propertyless may find it inconvenient to obey a government that upholds a
system of property contrary to their direct private interest, they must obey
it in order to prevent violation of the natural law by introducing conditions
tending toward anarchy and violence.51 Thus, in many crucial respects relat-
ing to the representation of women and children by male family heads and
to the distribution of property, Tyrrell advances a natural law argument that
supports a very conservative reading of consent theory – a reading bound to
appeal to the broad center of the political spectrum in seventeenth-century
England.
The other, more muted, dimension of Tyrrell’s rehabilitation of consent
theory has more radical aspects. Even in the course of his argument for the
deep moral obligation accruing from compact, Tyrrell affirms that people
are not always “directly or expressly bound by the Acts or Consents of their
Ancestors.”52 If, for example, an existing system of government or property
has come to be disastrous to the interests of a large body of the people,
an alteration of the system may be justified. The sanctity of compact need
not signify the complete ossification of the social and political order. The
significance of this conceptual opening to the idea of contractual revision,
however, relates more to the possibility of organic constitutional change
than radical revolution. The one concession Tyrrell makes to a more radical
individualist understanding of natural rights relates to the natural right of
emigration. This is a right Tyrrell identifies with nature and uses to reveal
the limits of civil law. As he reflects: “I cannot think that the positive Laws
of any Government do oblige any man in Conscience . . . never to go out
of the Country where he was born.” Positive laws may legitimately entail
loss of property for emigration but, Tyrrell affirms, they cannot “bind the
Conscience” in this important matter.53 Although Tyrrell strives to reduce
the revolutionary implications of natural rights as they relate to civil order
and property, these individual rights never entirely disappear as factors in
his reflections on political life and the principle of consent.
50 PNM: 86–7.
51 Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 236.
52 PNM: 76.
53 PNM: 87.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Tyrrell’s treatment of the problems

arising in consent theory is his open disagreement with Catholic scholasti-
cism. In the course of critiquing Filmer’s contention that sovereignty could
not possibly arise from the people, Tyrrell makes reference to the position
of Bellarmine and Suarez, particularly their opinion that sovereignty orig-
inally resided in the whole body of the people prior to any compact. In
this instance, Tyrrell at least partially takes Filmer’s side. He states: “I con-
ceive the Jesuit hath gone too far, in asserting an undivided Soveraignty in
the whole Multitude collected together before any Civil Government insti-
tuted.”54 Tyrrell agrees with Filmer that originally there was no undivided
sovereignty in the multitude. Rather, in contrast to the Jesuits, Tyrrell as-
serts that the rule existing prior to any express social or political compact
was the rule of independent family heads.55 By holding the family as the
basic unit of association, Tyrrell counters the charges of radical individual-
ism that Filmer made against natural rights. In the view Tyrrell advances,
“the people” is not meant to express atomistic individualism but rather an
articulated whole composed of parts that are related to each other through
agreement and the natural laws regulating human association.56 In this way,
Tyrrell locates the origins of government in an identifiable and ubiquitous
form of association rather than a theoretical abstraction of the isolated self.
While this effort may go far toward countering English royalist charges of
radical individualism, it does not fully explain Tyrrell’s position vis-à-vis
the Catholic natural law theorists Suarez and Bellarmine. As we have seen,
they are hardly radical individualists either. For them, the consent forming
government was of a profoundly communal character.
It appears that Tyrrell’s primary aim in confronting the Jesuits is to dis-
close the particular features of his own moderate Whig version of contract
theory. In emphasizing the familial, as opposed to the communal, origin of
the political compact, Tyrrell aims to illustrate the multiple compacts that
produce government. Tyrrell’s schema emphasizes the layers of compact op-
erative in the family, in society, and in political rule. The family represents
only a pseudocompact inasmuch as Tyrrell maintains that while it is for the
most part a natural relation, it does operate on the principle of tacit con-
sent. So, even if the family may be more natural and less conventional than
government, it still bears witness to the primal equality that grounds indi-
vidual consent. In the state of nature individuals exist “under the conduct
or Government of distinct Heads of Fathers of Families.” It is on the basis
of this social arrangement that these family heads take the further step to
form governing political institutions.57 Thus, Tyrrell’s position with respect
54 PNM: 81.
55 Tyrrell ignores Suarez’s argument, which is identical to this position. See Suarez, Extracts:
Defensio, p. 103.
56 Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, pp. 298–9 and Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 92.
57 PNM: 82–3.
to Filmer and the Jesuits is complex. On the one hand, he wants to show
English royalists that Whig consent theory is not as atomistic as Filmer’s Tory
apologists would like to present it. The central importance of the family in
Tyrrell’s consent theory goes far in this direction. On the other hand, Tyrrell’s
emphasis on the multiple compacts culminating in political society suggests
that his other, perhaps more theoretical, concern is to show his decisive break
from the central tenets of Christian Aristotelianism. Tyrrell’s assessment of
the need to view political society in terms of the progression of compacts
that form it denies the Aristotelian claim for the naturalness of political soci-
ety. In contrast to Bellarmine, Suarez, or even Grotius, Tyrrell never refers to
political society as a “perfect association” or “mystical union.” By maintain-
ing the multiplicity of compacts, he reinforces the notion of the contractual
character of politics while simultaneously defending the family as the basic
unit of association. In Tyrrell’s moderate Whig version of natural law, hu-
man beings appear to be naturally social – in the sense of being familial –
but citizenship is definitely contrived.
What, then, is political society? And what precisely is the character of the
compact that produces it? Tyrrell indicates that the compact that forms po-
litical society differs from the other layers of association in that it is only the
political compact that can form a duly recognized sovereign power. Tyrrell
argues that the participants in the political compact engage in “the submis-
sion of the Wills that institute it to the Will of him on whom they confer it” in
order to make use of “all their Powers for the common good.”58 Although
the same natural law principle of concern for the common good operates
in the political compact as in the familial and social compacts, the former
differs from the latter two in that only the political compact can generate
legislation in the proper sense.
The political compact differs from the other compacts in that it alone
is capable of creating a sovereign political authority capable of making
and enforcing civil legislation. Neither the father nor the clan leader can
exercise sovereignty in the full sense. In order to confront Filmer’s provi-
dentialist account of the operation of political sovereignty, Tyrrell articu-
lates the profoundly conventional and hence decidedly human character of
sovereignty. His major criticism of Filmer is that his divine right treatment
of sovereign power is at once highly abstract and yet strangely somatic.
Tyrrell states that sovereignty is not included among human beings’ natu-
ral powers or faculties, as it is “not any physical but a moral Quality.” As
such, it can be produced in another human being only through compact.
As a purely conventional thing, it is “absurd to alledge, that Soveraignty is
not derived from men.”59 Tyrrell discloses the absurdity of Filmer’s position
in the following terms: Filmer conceives of sovereignty “as an abstracted
58 PNM: 117.
59 Ibid.
Ems, or Physical Quality, which is immediately produced by God, and con-

ferred upon the Soveraign at his Election or Declaration.”60 In response,
Tyrrell proffers a number of searching queries. Where does this “abstracted
Soveraignty” exist before it finds a “King to settle upon”? Is this abstracted
sovereignty “a Substance or an Accident”? If the latter, can it “subsist without
its Subject”? And when was it created? Perhaps most importantly, he asks, is
there “one single Soul of Soveraignty diffused all over” the world to animate
kings?
Tyrrell’s central aim is to flesh out an understanding of the relationship be-
tween the law of nature and the unique human capacity to generate sovereign
political institutions through compact. The question this relationship in-
evitably reintroduces is that of God’s relation to human beings. Although
Tyrrell maintains unequivocally the proposition that political sovereignty
has a human source, he concedes:
I will not deny that God is properly the original and efficient Cause of Soveraignty as
of all good things, and particularly of that Power whereby every individual Freeman
in the state of Nature, hath a power to dispose of his actions for his own preservation
and the common good of mankind.61
Tyrrell immediately checks the theological tenor of this statement with his
reaffirmation that “the particular powers of many men being put together,
constitute that which we call a Politick or Civil Power.” Nonetheless, Tyrrell
leaves unclear the precise role of God, “the Supreme Lawgiver,” in the for-
mation of political society. While Tyrrell argues that human beings were
given reason by God principally for “the constitution of Civil Government,”
he also maintains that “God hath not imposed upon any People an absolute
Obligation of constituting any Civil Government at all, if they can live with-
out it.”62 In one fell swoop, Tyrrell reaffirms the divine sanction behind the
natural law while simultaneously carving out a field for free human choice in
the institution of government, especially given the possibilities that arise “if
they can live without it.” This is, of course, a portentous “if” that requires
further examination.
Tyrrell’s response to this dilemma is that curious mixture of political the-
ory and amateur anthropology that characterizes the Pufendorfian notion
of the state of nature.63 He suggests the possibility of society without
sovereignty – the notion that individual natural rights need not necessitate
60 See PNM: 118–19 for this and the following passage. It is interesting to note that Tyrrell
lifts this critique of Filmer almost verbatim from Pufendorf’s critique of the German divine
rightist Friedrich Horn, who made an argument very similar to that of Filmer (see DJNG
7.3.4).
61 PNM: 119.
62 PNM: 119–20.
63 For the important historical dimension in Pufendorf’s state of nature account, see Hont,
“Sociability and Commerce,” pp. 256–7, 263–5.
the dichotomy of anarchy or political society – by pointing to the example of

“the West Indians, in several parts of America,” who live socially but not po-
litically. Of these “Carribes,” Tyrrell says, “they have lived many Ages with-
out any common Power to keep them at peace amongst themselves; . . . and
so they could live together without any other Government than that of the
Fathers of Families over their Wives and Children.” Despite lacking any com-
mon power to check the excesses occasioned by glory-seeking individuals or
even the simple fear of one’s fellow human beings, Tyrrell states that these
Caribbes “have much fewer Crimes committed amongst them than us.”64
The key to the possibility of society without sovereignty is property, or rather
the lack of substantial property holdings.
Though Tyrrell’s treatment of the Caribbes serves the purpose of illustrat-
ing his theory of multiple compacts and layers of association that compose
political society, its deeper purpose has to do with an elaboration of the
complex connection between property and government. The Caribbes lack
recognized civil power but they also coexist with “no distinct propriety in
Land.” As such, Tyrrell continues, “one of the main ends of a supreme power
among us, viz. to decide Controversies about Property, and punish Thieves,
are there of no use.”65 Tyrrell’s understanding of the state of nature, then,
reflects a central agreement with Grotius as to the origin of political society.
Like Grotius, Tyrrell considers that the simple needs and tastes of a people
little developed in the arts obviates the need for civil rule.66 What small hold-
ings the Caribbes possess, such as “their little Gardens, and Cabins,” they
enjoy “by a tacite consent.” Lacking the need to generate the formal political
institutions required to secure the mine–thine distinction in more advanced
and prosperous societies marked by increasingly large property holdings, this
tacit consent can accommodate a minimal level of social existence and co-
operation. In contradistinction to Grotius, however, Tyrrell never identifies
political society as a “perfect association” having its origins in the protection
of property but pointing beyond this to a higher end in the development of
human rationality and virtue. Tyrrell quite explicitly contends that God gave
human beings reason in order to decide when and whether to form political
societies. As such, Tyrrell’s moderate Whig articulation of the possibility of
a social state of nature both rejects Hobbes’ sharp distinction between the
state of nature and political society and resists Grotius’ tendency to justify
civil government on grounds more elevated than the protection of property.
64 PNM: 121. Cf. Julia Rudolph, Revolution by Degrees: James Tyrrell and Whig Political Thought
in the Late Seventeenth Century (New York: Palgrave, 2002): pp. 35–8 and Martyn P.
Thompson, Ideas of Contract in English Political Thought in the Age of John Locke (New York:
Garland, 1987): pp. 240–1, 251–2.
65 PNM: 120–1.
66 Tyrrell (PNM: 120) emphasizes the simplicity of Caribbe life – “they never have any super-
fluities” – and in this sense agrees with Grotius that the small holdings of these people reduce
the need for political society.
Tyrrell leaves little doubt as to the profound connection between the security
of property and the purpose of government.
The most conspicuous feature of Tyrrell’s account of the origin of property
is his argument for the original common. In rejecting the Filmerian logic of
Adam’s unique title to property, Tyrrell maintains that Eve and her children
“had as much right to their lives as Adam had himself.”67 Their right to
property was natural and did not rely on the generosity or consent of Adam.
But how, then, did they actually acquire a title to the property that they
had a natural right to use for their preservation? Tyrrell’s answer is twofold.
First, he insists that the original community was one in a negative rather
than a positive sense. It was a condition in which no one owned anything;
rather than everyone had a title in everything. The latter Tyrrell calls “a
sociable community of all things.” In this Tyrrell explicitly corrects Filmer’s
misreading of Grotius’ version of original community.68 Tyrrell even iterates
Grotius’ use of Cicero’s celebrated example of the seat in the public theater
to illustrate the sensible and respected character of the negative community
teaching. Second, Tyrrell’s addition to the traditional teaching is his emphasis
on both labor and occupancy as the means to remove something from the
original common. The key problem he identifies with the positive community
teaching is the principle that acquisition depends on the consent of all the
others who use the vast, ordered natural whole. For Tyrrell, it is sensible to
assume that by nature no one owned anything in particular, but it would be
sheer madness to infer that “no man could have eat anything which another
might not have pulled out of his mouth, pretending he could not eat without
his leave, because he had a share in it.”69 The requirement of the consent
of all commoners for the use right of any individual would have resulted in
mass starvation. Tyrrell’s aim here is to demonstrate that the original claim
to property emphatically did not rely on consent because such a condition
would both frustrate “Gods first command to man [which] was, encrease
and multiply” and constitute a denial of the individual’s natural “right to the
means of his preservation.”70 Hence, positive community would be impious
as well as irrational and unnatural.
In Tyrrell’s understanding of negative community, occupancy and labor
replace consent or express divine donation as the original basis of property.
He argues that a “Propriety of occupancy or the personal possession of things
and applying to the needs of one or more men while they have need of it” is
perfectly consistent with and indeed is “absolutely necessary to the preser-
vation of Mankind.” By labor too, Tyrrell asserts, an individual can have
67 PNM: 102∗ .
68 PNM: 99∗ . For this reason I believe Tully (Discourse on Property, p. 178) has mistakenly
construed Tyrrell to mean community in the positive sense. See PNM: 108–9∗ .
69 PNM: 109∗ .
70 PNM: 100∗ .
“acquired such a proportion of either as would serve the necessities of him-

self, and family, they become so much his own, as that no man could without
manifest injustice rob him of these necessities of life.”71 The principal feature
of Tyrrell’s negative community, and that which makes it consistent with his
larger natural law teaching, is the duty of abstention. Like Grotius before
him, Tyrrell includes a negative duty to abstain from taking the goods of
others as the “first principle of natural Justice.”72 To this extent, Tyrrell
characterizes the sociableness commanded by the natural law essentially by
the negative duty of respecting what belongs to others, not by a positive
duty to give what one has of one’s own.73 Yet despite this appeal to a natural
duty of abstaining, the signal element of Tyrrell’s teaching on property is his
insistence that while labor or occupancy can generate, however tenuously,
the mine–thine distinction that ought to be respected, it is primarily through
compact that the right to property produces a moral effect on all parties.
Tyrrell’s defense of the Grotian account of the origin of property against
Filmer’s attack veils his own modification of Grotian natural law theory.
While Tyrrell openly endorses Grotius’ notion of the original negative com-
munity in opposition to Filmer’s donation thesis, he also introduces an
anthropo-historical approach to the state of nature, which is alien to Grotius’
thought. After having defended the possibility of negative community, Tyrrell
declares that neither community nor propriety is simply natural or unnatural.
He explains:
I will not take upon me to maintain what Grotius asserts, that after property was
once introduced, it was against the law of nature to use community, since neither
community, nor property are by the absolute law of nature.74
Tyrrell’s reasoning here requires some further elucidation. As we recall,

Grotius maintained that after the institution of private property, this ar-
rangement became an unalterable feature of the natural law and anyone
who failed to respect the established proprietary right of another was in
violation of that law. This argument predictably had driven Filmer into a
veritable frenzy.
Tyrrell’s positing of an “absolute law of nature,” in contrast to the law of
nature simply, introduces a deeply pragmatic or circumstantial element into
his natural law teaching. For example, he argues that the natives in America
exist in a state of negative community, whereas the European “planters”
have introduced a proprietary right that must be respected by all. The thrust
of Tyrrell’s natural law teaching on property is the proposition that God has
71 PNM: 99–100∗ .
72 PNM: 110∗ .
73 As Tully (Discourse on Property, p. 86) points out, this is also a feature of Pufendorf, DJGN
2.3.15.
74 PNM: 113∗ .
“left it to the discretions of those several parcels of Mankind who agreed

to live in civil society” whether or not to introduce property rights in land,
depending on “their particular way of living, or common safety and inter-
est.”75 The logic behind Tyrrell’s argument reflects the much more utilitarian
considerations in his view of natural law than in that of Grotius. The basis
for the introduction of property, in Tyrrell’s view, is not the unimpeachable
character of the law of nature, but rather the socioeconomic circumstances
of a people. In a “thinly peopled” country, where all the necessities of life
are provided “by the Labour of the Inhabitants,” there is no need for dis-
tinct propriety, while “where the People are more than the Country can well
maintain from its own Products,” private property rights become necessary
to allow and encourage trade and commerce. Tyrrell confides “this is the true
reason why there is an absolute necessity for a division of lands in Holland,
but not so in Surinam.”76
Tyrrell’s modified Grotianism and the more utilitarian character of his law
of nature reflect the profound theoretical influence of Pufendorf. Tyrrell’s
great debt to Pufendorf is seen in his use of the multiple compact theory.
Tyrrell’s argument that the natural law allows different peoples to use prop-
erty or community – and indeed, the same people may alter their arrange-
ment because of population change or natural disaster – allows greater scope
for human agreement and decision than does the argument of Grotius. Just
as Tyrrell’s reliance on the notion of tacit consent to establish the contrac-
tual character of familial and nonpolitical communal life reveals a more
Pufendorfian than Grotian influence, so too does Tyrrell’s heavy emphasis
on the contractual and hence alterable character of the property right.77
Tyrrell’s understanding of the multiple compacts that form the layers of as-
sociation culminating in political society is closely connected to his teaching
on property. What separates the political compact from the others is its
explicit end, namely, the preservation of property. Although property ex-
ists prior to government by a right of occupancy or labor, Tyrrell insists
that its effective security depends on “Government, one main aim of which
is to maintain the Dominion or Property before agreed upon.”78 As we
saw in Tyrrell’s earlier example of the Caribbes, he envisions government
principally as the institution devised by human beings to settle the disputes
that inevitably arise with the expansion of holdings.
The final aspect of Tyrrell’s modification of Grotius’ teaching on prop-
erty has to do with the issue of labor. Previously, we saw that Tyrrell held
both labor and occupancy as means to separate a thing from the common.
75 PNM: 112–13∗ . Cf. DJGN 4.4.1.
76 PNM: 113–14∗ .
77 Tully, Discourse on Property, pp. 88–9 and Zuckert, Natural Rights, pp. 251–2. Cf. Rudolph,
Revolution by Degrees, pp. 46–50 for Tyrrell’s indebtedness to Pufendorf for his ideas on
property.
78 PNM: 116∗ .
Yet his heavy emphasis on the need for compact to establish property on a
secure moral plane suggests that while Tyrrell views both labor and occu-
pancy as ways to refute the idea of positive community, neither alone can
establish property right in the full sense. Tyrrell never denies the profound
negative duty of individuals to abstain from taking the goods produced or
the land improved by another’s labor, but the precise role labor plays in
the formation of property for Tyrrell is left ambiguous. This ambiguity has
caused considerable debate among scholars.79 While it is correct to observe
the ambiguous character of Tyrrell’s position on labor, this ambiguity is not
one Tyrrell, at least intentionally, leaves unresolved. It appears that Tyrrell’s
connecting labor with occupancy may amount to something like a use right.
It is undeniable that Tyrrell extends labor to the possession of land, but for
him labor only confirms an individual’s property in what he may rightfully
possess: “since the owner hath possessed himself of this land, and bestowed
his Labor and Industry upon it,” no other individual can claim it.80 We must
resist the temptation to exaggerate the Lockean undertones in Tyrrell’s view
of labor. One way to assess the genuine role of labor in Tyrrell’s account of
property is to locate it in the context of his broader natural rights and natural
law teaching. Despite the professed importance of labor in the formation of
property rights, Tyrrell adds the significant qualification that the “natural
Propriety in things much less, that which is introduced by Law, or common
consent, cannot exclude the natural right every man hath to his own preser-
vation, and the means thereof.” Thus, Tyrrell’s natural law commands that
each individual proprietor leave as much and as good for others.
In contrast to Locke, Tyrrell does not overturn this limitation on ap-
propriation with the introduction of money and political society. On the
contrary, Tyrrell affirms explicitly that all human compacts assume this nat-
ural right: “therefore this right of self preservation is still supposed in all
humane compacts, or laws about the division, and distribution of things.”81
In this sense, Tyrrell follows Pufendorf and Grotius in stressing that human
agreement must embody the social imperative animating the natural law that
designates the assignment of things for the common advantage of human so-
ciety.82 Yet Tyrrell also follows Pufendorf’s critique of Grotius on the issue
79 For example, Tuck (Natural Rights Theories, p. 171) argues that Tyrrell’s position here in
what he calls “the Lockean subsection” of the book is practically identical to that of Locke.
Ashcraft, on the other hand, argues that Tyrrell’s reliance on both a Lockean-type labor
argument and a Pufendorfian or Grotian idea of occupancy as the source of property rights
reflects a theoretical incoherence that Tyrrell never fully works out. I agree with Ashcraft
that Tyrrell’s moderate Whig property account uses both a labor and an occupancy argument
(and thus is not thoroughly Lockean), although I do not believe he is incoherent.
80 PNM: 112∗ . See also Laslett’s very helpful footnote at II:32 of his edition of Locke’s Two
Treatises.
81 PNM: 110–11∗ .
82 Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 254. Cf. Pufendorf, DJNG 4.4.4.
of the relation of natural rights to property. Pufendorf’s famous criticism of

Grotius was that the proposition of the first seizure right of things violated
the principle of natural equality.83 Pufendorf and Tyrrell argue that all indi-
viduals have an equal right to necessary goods, but the seizure right offers
no natural principle of distribution consistent with this natural right. Thus,
before the institution of government individuals could conceivably starve,
being excluded from the goods seized by others. This, of course, would vi-
olate the natural law principle enjoining the preservation of humanity. This
presumption seems to animate Tyrrell’s admission of something very nearly
approaching a natural theft right in extreme circumstances. Ultimately, it
is only compact that promises some principle of distribution that does not
prejudice natural equality.
How, then, does Tyrrell harmonize his assertion of a right to take another’s
goods “without the owners consent” with the broader aims of his natural
law teaching directed to social peace?84 The persistence of natural rights
in any human compact holds anarchic possibilities that are not difficult to
imagine. We should keep in mind that Tyrrell has no intention of advancing
“leveling notions” concerning property. In fact, one clear intention of his
work is to show that the divine right idea that all property is subject to the
crown is more dangerous to property rights than constitutionalism.85 The
moderating element in Tyrrell’s justification of a theft right is his stipulation
that it be respected only “in case of extream necessity” and if the taker
intends to restore the goods later.86 In this way, Tyrrell suppresses the radical
potential of this idea by locating it in the broader framework of his natural
law teaching. The law of nature may sanction subsistence for all, but Tyrrell
does not envision it as a threat to property or as a justification for leveling.
For all practical purposes, Tyrrell’s insistence on an extreme necessity
provision in the law of nature reflects something more akin to Pufendorf’s
concept of the duties of humanity than any radical confiscation right.87 These
duties, which we saw Tyrrell employ earlier to moderate despotic power over
slaves, are defined by Pufendorf as reflecting a kind of imperfect as opposed
to a perfect right. In Pufendorf’s understanding, the difference between these
two forms of rights is one of degree rather than of kind. Whereas perfect
rights relate to the “very being” of society seen in such things as the protection
of property, imperfect rights relate to a society’s “well-being.” The latter refer
to what one is due by stipulation of the natural law and not to what is one’s
83 Two good discussions of Pufendorf’s critique of Grotius are Tully, Discourse on Property,
pp. 86–8 and Zuckert, Natural Rights, pp. 250–4. Tyrrell does not, however, offer a detailed
treatment of the three levels of compact. Compare this with Pufendorf, DJNG 4.4.5–8.
84 PNM: 111∗ .
85 PNM: Preface 1 and Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 251.
86 PNM: 111∗ .
87 See DJNG Book II, ch. 6, “On the Right and Privilege of Necessity.” See especially secs. 1,
2, and 4 dealing with the extreme necessity theft right.
own; as such, they indicate but do not require the performance of a duty.88
Although Tyrrell never denies a universal “right to the necessities of life,” he
does not make the satisfaction of this right an absolute duty on the part of
others or even of government; rather, he indicates that this aim would be one
of any well-ordered society. Moreover, Tyrrell never appeals to Scripture or
the tenets of Christianity to justify charity. Scripture is conspicuously absent
in this account of the origin of property. Once again, it appears that utility
rather than piety, and a combination of natural rights and certain natural
law duties and obligations, animate Tyrrell’s discussion of the political and
moral implications of the deep underlying connection between government
and property.
88 Tully, Discourse on Property, p. 90 and Pufendorf, DJNG 2.6.6.

5
The Pufendorfian Moment

Moderate Whig Sovereignty Theory
Although he was a committed Whig and an ardent opponent of Stuart pre-

tensions to arbitrary rule, Tyrrell’s philosophical and constitutional position
displays an abiding moderation. Moderate Whigs like Tyrrell did not advo-
cate dramatic constitutional reform in England. He is careful to emphasize
that a rejection of divine right absolutism does not amount to an endorse-
ment of popular sovereignty or democracy. He openly professes his admira-
tion for monarchy, calling it “that Government which tempered by known
Laws, I take to be the best in the world.”1 Tyrrell distances himself from the
radical parliamentary position in “the late unhappy times” of the English
civil war, and even concedes that Filmer’s arguments may have been defen-
sible in the cause of preserving the “then Majesties lawful and just Rights”
against the “domineering faction” that seized rule and the “divers levelling
notions then too much in fashion.”2 Tyrrell suggests that Filmer’s extreme
arguments were a typical feature of a turbulent time. He presents his own
moderate Whig argument as a mean between the two extremes of lawlessness
reflected in the Scylla and Charibdes represented by divine right absolutism
and unchecked parliamentary democracy. As a defender of “Government
establisht by law,” Tyrrell pits himself against the common desire of both di-
vine rightists and extreme parliamentarians “to alter that Government, and
give up those Privileges which their Ancestors were so careful to preserve
and deliver down to Posterity.”3 Tyrrell suggests that whatever may have
1 James Tyrrell, Patriarcha, Non Monarcha (London, 1681): Preface, p. 1 (hereafter PNM and
page number). The moderate character of Tyrrell’s Whiggism has been noted before. See
James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1979): p. 9; Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen (New York:
Atheneum, 1968): p. 73; and Julia Rudolph, Revolution by Degrees: James Tyrrell and Whig
Political Thought in the Late Seventeenth Century (New York: Palgrave, 2002). To this effect,
the frontispiece of the 1681 edition of PNM bore a flattering likeness of Charles II.
2 PNM: Preface 1.
3 PNM: Preface 3.
133
been the vast theoretical and philosophical differences between the com-
monwealthmen and the divine rightists, they shared one central premise:
the argument that the English Constitution understood as a constitutional
monarchy framed by legal limits must be rejected.4
Tyrrell’s explicit aim, then, in Patriarcha, Non Monarcha was to defend
England’s “Ancient Government,” which he calls “the best in its kind,”
from two opponents; the divine rightists like Filmer, who want to remove
“all Limits between Prerogative and Law,” and the commonwealthmen, who
want “to set up a Democracy amongst us.”5 The root of Tyrrell’s argument in
this defense of limited government is the notion of natural liberty. He is one
of the first English thinkers to appeal to a modern notion of natural rights
and natural law to defend, rather than criticize, the basic structures and insti-
tutions of the English regime. Prior to Tyrrell, the most conspicuous English
proponents of natural rights had been among the English Constitution’s
most conspicuous opponents.6 Tyrrell defends the “Ancient Government”
of England in an emphatically new way, on the novel ground of individual
rights and a secularized law of nature. In this way, Tyrrell aims to provide a
rational foundation for the English regime that can resist the claims of ab-
solute monarchy and extreme democracy more successfully than arguments
drawn from history, classical philosophy, Christian Aristotelianism, or the
parliamentary theories of the civil war era.
The final piece, then, of Tyrrell’s moderate Whig puzzle, after his state-
ment of the character of the natural law and the origins of property and
government, is his idea of sovereignty. Here, as in the rest of his argument,
Tyrrell is deeply influenced by Pufendorf. The moderate Whig understand-
ing of the constitutional sovereignty of the king-in-Parliament rested on the
4 While an in-depth treatment of the philosophical arguments of the Commonwealthmen is

beyond the scope of the present study, it should be noted that many of the more democratic
elements in the civil war era expressed deep dissatisfaction with the English Constitution as
historically understood. At the Putney Debates, Captain John Clarke expressed the need for
England to alter the “principal fundamental constitution that it now has” (see Clarke in The
English Levellers, Andrew Sharp, ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998]: p. 128).
John Wildman went further, remonstrating that “our very laws were made by our conquerors”
(see Wildman, quoted in H. N. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution [Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1961]: p. 282).
5 Tyrrell frames this dichotomy with the memorable statement “I know not which is worst, to
be knawn to death by Rats, or devoured by a Lion” (PNM: Preface 5).
6 As we have seen in chapter 3 Hobbes rejected the mixed or limited Constitution on em-
phatically natural rights grounds. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the Leveller
Richard Overton appealed to something very much like the natural rights of the individual
as the root of all government, but drew from this a radical supremacy in the Commons that
is antithetical to Tyrrell’s understanding of the English Constitution (see “An Arrow against
all Tyrants” in Sharp, English Levellers, pp. 55, 57, 62). See also The Leveller Tracts: 1647–
1653, William Haller and Godfrey Davis, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944):
pp. 35–7 and Theodore Calvin Pease, The Leveller Movement (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith,
1965): pp. 23–7.
The Pufendorfian Moment 135
Pufendorfian argument for the necessity of one legally constituted supreme

power in a regularized constitutional order. The moderate Whig conception
of the English Constitution advanced by Tyrrell would be in essence an adap-
tation of Pufendorfian philosophical principles to the historical conditions
of English constitutional development in the seventeenth century.
Defending Grotius and Hunton

Tyrrell begins his account of sovereignty with the observation that he
hopes to prove the existence of “such a kind of Government as a limited
Kingdom.”7 To support this claim, he draws heavily on the arguments of
Filmer’s main opponents on the issue of sovereignty, Grotius and Hunton.
Tyrrell argues that Grotius’ account of the “three ways whereby Supreme
Power may be had” can be very well defended against Filmer “in most
things . . . , though not in all.”8 Like Filmer himself, Tyrrell largely ignores
Grotius’ argument for a temporary right of supreme power and focuses on
the means of acquiring supreme power with full right and with a usufructu-
ary right. The thrust of Tyrrell’s defense of Grotius on this issue is to refute
Filmer’s contention that Grotius ostensibly holds out the possibility of a full
right of supreme power in the monarch while actually undermining any such
possibility. Tyrrell states that the cause of Filmer’s confusion is his desire to
claim for “all Usurpers whatever to have a right, whether by Conquest or
otherwise, which Grotius will not.”9 Tyrrell thus adduces Grotius as the de-
fender of legitimacy in contrast to Filmer, the patron of usurpers and rebels.
With regard to the full right by just war, Tyrrell follows Grotius’ lead in
asserting that if a just conqueror had only “limited Power” before losing
power, he cannot return to gain absolute power. In this oblique reference to
the restoration of Charles II, whose return in 1661 could be construed as a
very mild form of conquest and who was the ruling monarch at the time,
Tyrrell affirms that such a just conqueror “could be restored to no more than
the Constitution of the Government will allow him.”10
Tyrrell’s defense of Grotius’ notion of the usufructuary right of supreme
power is more spirited than his treatment of full right. As we recall, Filmer
detested this notion of sovereign right because it signaled a people’s right to
establish a constitutional order by which a monarch ruled supreme but was
limited by certain fundamental prescriptions.11 Noting that Filmer held the
7 PNM: 128∗ .
8 PNM: 117∗ .
9 PNM: 118∗ .
10 PNM: 117∗ .
11 Filmer scornfully argued that this arrangement, which made the people the owners and
the king the tenant of the kingdom’s ruling office, was to make “a kingdom all one with
a farm” (Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann Somerville, ed. [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991]: p. 232).
usage usufructuary right “too base to express the Right of Kings,” Tyrrell
counters that “the French are not so scrupulous”; even in the “absolutest
Monarchy in Europe,” they understand their monarch’s title in these terms.
In holding his title by usufructuary right, the French king cannot charge his
territories “with his debts, or alienate, or dispose of them . . . without the
consent of the States of France.” Moreover, this understanding of monar-
chical title extends also to England, for as Tyrrell asserts, King John had
“no Power to make this Kingdom feudatory, and tributary to the Pope.”12
Nor could he “have made over his Kingdom to the Emperor of Morocco.”
Tyrrell’s intention here is to reinforce his argument that no fundamental con-
stitutional changes may be made in a limited monarchy without the assent
of the people’s representatives in the estates and assemblies.
Of particular interest in the context of the Exclusion crisis is Tyrrell’s ex-
tension of the principle of usufructuary right to the issue of succession. The
argument that the people may devise a constitutional arrangement whereby
a monarch exercises supreme power without absolute propriety holds seri-
ous implications for the English succession dispute. Tyrrell argues that the
succession laws agreed to by the people and estates cannot be changed with-
out their consent. As such, a king’s testament does not bear the power to
ensure a claimant’s inheritance. As evidence, Tyrrell cites the testaments of
Henry VIII and Edward VI, which disinherited “the line of Scotland” and
Edward’s sisters, respectively, but were invalid because “the Loyal Subjects
of England believed that neither of those Kings could disinherit the right Heir
to the Crown by their Testaments alone.” The succession of Queen Mary
and King James occurred despite “those pretended wills.”13 It is important to
note two things in Tyrrell’s argument. First, in denying monarchs a unilateral
right of determining succession, Tyrrell does not advance one for the great
popular assemblies either. Second, Tyrrell implies that kings who do rule by
absolute proprietary right would be able to name anyone heir on their own
volition.
In denying the capacity of one element of a multiple-bodied constitutional
order to unilaterally determine succession, Tyrrell is, on the one hand, sim-
ply offering a realistic appraisal of the English situation in terms consistent
with moderate Whiggism. Very few people in the England of 1679 wanted a
return to the days of 1649. But Tyrrell also uses this opportunity to express
his disagreement with Grotius. Tyrrell refers to the succession issue, at least
partly, in order to express the position that “I will not affirm with Grotius
That the Empire which is exercised by Kings, doth not cease to be the Empire of
the People.”14 In contrast to Grotius, Tyrrell argues that once a people have
12 PNM: 122∗ , 124∗ .

13 PNM: 125∗ .
14 PNM: 126∗ . See also Hug0 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1925): 2.16.16.1 (hereafter DJB) and Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 233.
consented to monarchical rule, they agree to obey it and cannot alter the
succession “as long as there is a lawful Heir remaining and succeeding in his
right.” Tyrrell’s Pufendorfian understanding of the natural law obligations
informing human sociality produces a highly conservative notion of consent
that commits the individual to support the continuation of the Constitution
in its existing form. Thus, Tyrrell can affirm with Grotius that a king by full
right holds sovereignty and hence cannot be punished by a higher power
while simultaneously rejecting Grotius’ argument that a usufructuary right
remains the “Empire of the People.” Tyrrell accepts that sovereignty is re-
quired to secure the political compact, but in a constitutional order the pur-
pose of such sovereignty is to secure the constitutional process.15 As such,
not the people but rather the institutions of government may reclaim the
power over succession when the king dies without an heir. Moreover, even
Parliament can exercise this power only to restore the existing constitutional
order. In this respect, Tyrrell’s moderate Whiggism is even more conservative
than that of Grotius.
Tyrrell’s moderate Whiggism also draws important parallels with the par-
liamentary argument of the civil war period. He agrees with these earlier pro-
ponents of the natural liberty doctrine regarding the legal limits that may be
placed on royal power. In such things as an original contract, the act of after
condescent, and even in the coronation oath, Tyrrell identifies legal and insti-
tutional devices consistent with Hunton’s idea of restraints on monarchical
power.16 Both Tyrrell and Hunton, for example, agree that political society
is the product of a compact originally instituted by the people. What sepa-
rates them, however, is Tyrrell’s insistence that limited monarchy is superior
both to absolute rule and to mixed monarchy. Hunton, of course, had en-
dorsed the validity of mixed monarchy particularly in relation to England.17
In contrast to the parliamentary contractarianism of an earlier generation,
Tyrrell’s preference for limited monarchy shows the profound influence of
continental natural law theory. It is primarily Tyrrell’s understanding of the
Pufendorfian distinction between regular and irregular regimes that informs
his defense of a monarchy resting on legal limits. For Pufendorf, the two
major sources of irregularity in a constitution – the two elements most likely
to produce instability and to frustrate the ends of government – are absolute
15 PNM: 126∗ .
16 PNM: 139–41 for after condescent and 159–60 for oaths. Tyrrell’s treatment of the impor-
tance of oaths closely follows Pufendorf’s account in Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et
Gentium Libri Octo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934): bk. 7, ch. 6, sec. 10 (hereafter DJNG
bk., ch., sec., and page number where applicable).
17 Despite Tyrrell’s objections to mixed regime theory in Patriarcha, Non Monarcha, he seems
more open to viewing England as having a mixed Constitution in his later Bibliotheca Politica.
See James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica (London, 1718): dialogue 7 and John Gough, “James
Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend of John Locke.” The Historical Journal, vol. 19, no. 3,
(1976): 602.
power and mixed power.18 Both of these elements of irregularity are foci of
criticism for Tyrrell. He maintains that a mixed body of sovereign power
obscures the legitimate need for supremacy, hence inviting disorder and tur-
moil, while absolute power subjects the government to the vagaries of an in-
dividual’s or group’s passions, with equally destructive consequences. Tyrrell
maintains that both the principle of mixture and the principle of absoluteness
make it impossible to preserve the formal structures of rule and to restrain
the abuse of power.
Tyrrell’s concern with the problem of absolute power is a theme running
through the moderate Whig account of sovereignty. One of Tyrrell’s pur-
poses in Patriarcha, Non Monarcha was to counteract Filmer’s attempt to
take “away all distinction between Kings and Tyrants, and between Slaves
and Subjects.” In fact, the primary intention of Tyrrell’s critique of Filmer’s
observations on Aristotle is to reassert the traditional distinction between
tyranny and monarchy.19 Yet Tyrrell does not do this to endorse the classical
Aristotelian regime typology. Rather, he reveals the innovative element of his
thought by criticizing ancient republican Rome not in terms of the classical
categories but in terms of its “irregularity,” a term employed by Pufendorf
and alien to the Aristotelian schema of regimes.20 The key problem Tyrrell
identifies with absolute power is the vagaries of the human passions. Tyrrell
counts himself a “defender of the Government establisht by Law” because
the subjection of all people to the will of one inevitably leads to the abuse of
power. Absolute monarchy, Tyrrell proclaims, would be an admirable form
of rule “could humane nature long be trusted with it.” On this basis, Tyrrell
reaches a remarkable conclusion:
The fault is not in the Government as absolute, but in humane Nature, which is
not often found sufficient, at least for above one or two Successions, to support and
manage so unlimited a Power in one single person as it ought to be.21
Thus, to some extent, Tyrrell grounds his defense of limited monarchy and
constitutional government on the unreliability of securing rule by virtuous
kings. This suspicion of the human possibility of acquiring virtue and con-
trolling the passions firmly locates Tyrrell’s moderate Whig thought in the
larger school of modern constitutionalism identified with Montesquieu or
the authors of the Federalist Papers. For Tyrrell, the legal structures produced
by compact are the chief safeguards to liberty.
18 For a succinct statement of Pufendorf’s concern with constitutional irregularity, see Samuel
Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, James Tully, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
19 PNM: Preface p. 2, and pp. 129–30.
20 Tyrrell shows his departure from conventional Aristotelian regime analysis by calling ancient
Rome “the most unequal and irregular” commonwealth in history (PNM: 135).
21 PNM: Preface p. 3. See also, Tyrrell’s quotation from Juvenal on Preface p. 4.
The rejection of absolute monarchical power as the ordering principle

of government does not, however, constitute a denial of the validity of
supremacy per se. Tyrrell maintains that supremacy is required in any con-
stitutional order because of the need for one recognized power to secure the
terms of the political compact. The contractual origins of government in the
consent of individuals, even if only of family heads, requires such a ruling
common power to bind the disparate elements of the polity to the terms
of the original agreement.22 In a limited monarchy such supremacy would
obviously rest with the monarch. Tyrrell’s aim is to harmonize the notion of
supremacy with the principle of legal limitation. Filmer and Hobbes had de-
nounced this possibility as antithetical to the very essence of political power.
In his attempt to defend the proposition that a political compact formed
by individuals could indeed establish a monarchy with legal limits, Tyrrell
makes a crucial concession to Filmer and Hobbes. In open disagreement
with Hunton, Tyrrell confesses that a constitution may limit a sovereign’s
power but cannot actually restrain it.23 In this the moderate Whigs followed
the authority of Pufendorf, who famously argued that because “sovereignty
is supreme, that is, not dependent upon an superior man on earth, its acts
cannot, for that reason be made void at the discretion of any other human
being’s will.”24 By this Tyrrell means that in a constitutional monarchy there
can be no body with a coercive power over a king. Any body with such a
coercive power would be in effect the supreme power in the constitutional
order. What, then, does Tyrrell mean by legal limits if they do not signify a
superior coercive power?
Tyrrell offers two suggestions. The first is that not a king, but rather his
ministers, may be punished by the right of another legally constituted body.25
This reliance on the distinction between royal infallibility and ministerial re-
sponsibility is augmented by the further argument that a people may compel
a king to execute a law.26 Noticeably, Tyrrell’s examples of the actual oper-
ation of legal limits on supreme power do not result in his affirmation of a
popular right of deposition. Tyrrell is more inclined to emphasize the mod-
erate character of legal limits rather than their revolutionary potential. In
keeping with the moderate tone of the discussion, Tyrrell moves to assuage
the fears of royalists by denying Filmer’s charge that legal limits on a king re-
duce him to a mere executive agent of a legislative principal. Tyrrell counters
that from the principle of legal limitation, “it does not follow that in all laws
where the Law governs the Monarch, he hath therefore but a Gubernative
Power.”27 He insists that the constitutional monarch’s source of power is
22 PNM: 127–8∗ .
23 PNM: 129∗ .
24 Pufendorf, DJNG 7.6.1.
25 PNM: 129∗ .
26 PNM: 129–30∗ . Cf. Daniel XIII.
27 PNM: 130∗ .
independent of the legislature, and by so doing he rejects the principle of

parliamentary supremacy in England.28 Tyrrell maintains that “the King in
a Limited Monarchy is he who alone gives the Essence and Authority to the
Laws.” This is true, Tyrrell continues, even if the king can make no other
laws “than what are offered him in the Assembly of his Estates.”29 Thus,
in Tyrrell’s view, it is the constitutional provision requiring royal assent that
guarantees monarchical supremacy, not the sole possession of the execu-
tive and legislative functions. Nonetheless, despite the diminished majesty of
Tyrrell’s conception of a limited monarch, it should be noted that he is also
at pains to distance such a ruler from the direct supervision of the legislative
body. The argument for monarchical independence, at least in principle, acts
as a limit on the power of the more popular forces in the constitutional or-
der. This reflects Tyrrell’s moderate Whig concern to limit the destabilizing
and irregularizing tendency of absolute power in both its regal and popular
forms.
Tyrrell’s indebtedness to Pufendorf is most pronounced in his rejection
of the principle of mixed sovereignty. Tyrrell raises his objections to mixed
regime theory by explicitly criticizing Hunton. He reveals: “I shall not defend
Mr. H’s opinion, when he saith that in a mixed Monarchy, the Soveraign
Power must be originally in all the three Estates, or that the three Estates
are all sharers of the Supream Power.” To defend his rejection of the mixed
regime theory of Hunton and Charles I, Tyrrell appeals to the authority
of “what Mr. Pufendorf hath said in that excellent work de Jure nature et
Gentium.” It is on the basis of this authority that Tyrrell expresses his opinion
that
[t]he Supream Power cannot well be divided into several shares, since there is so
great a conjunction between all the parts of Soveraign power, that one part cannot
be separated from the other, but it will spoil the regular form of the Government; and
set up an Irregular Commonwealth, which will scarce be able to hold well together.30
The source of this irregularity is the inability to locate the supreme punishing
power within the constitutional system. This was a theoretical difficulty that
civil war era thinkers were unable to resolve except by recourse to the contest
of arms and the judgment of the community expressed through civil war.
Inasmuch as Tyrrell affirms that a right of punishment can only proceed
from a superior, then, by the logic of his argument, this right cannot reside
in the people or their assembled representatives.
28 Julian Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978): pp. 90–1.
29 PNM: 133∗ .
30 PNM: 130–1∗ . Although Tyrrell also expresses his agreement with “Grotius’ mind” on the
evils of divided sovereignty, the passage he cites and the direction of his argument are taken
from Pufendorf. Compare Pufendorf DJNG 4.7.9–13 and Grotius DJB 1.3.9.17.
The moderate Whig theoretical objection to the principle of mixed

sovereignty reflects and is rooted in the Pufendorfian notion of compact. For
Tyrrell, as for Pufendorf, the claim to sovereign right derives from the moral
act of submission to a government constituted by contract and consent. The
moral effect of political obligation can only arise from compact. As such,
Tyrrell distinguishes the moral right of compulsion inhering in sovereign
power from the physical act of compulsion evinced in war: “All compul-
sion is performed two ways, either morally, or Physically, that is by way of
Soveraign Authority, or by force of Arms, or War.”31 The major theoretical
implication of Tyrrell’s distinction is his concern about the instability pro-
duced by the parliamentary contractarian idea of ascribing sovereign power
to coequal branches of government. Moral compulsion proceeds from a su-
perior confirmed by compact, whereas force of arms denotes equality. While
Tyrrell denies that England is simply a mixed monarchy, he affirms the possi-
bility, however undesirable, of establishing such a form of government. This
must be read in light of Tyrrell’s observation that Hunton’s mixed regime
theory was in fact typical of “the Opinions held during the late Wars.”32
By explicitly connecting Hunton’s mixed regime theory with the turmoil of
the civil war, Tyrrell implicitly points to a serious problem in the prevail-
ing interpretation of the historical English Constitution. The failure of past
generations of theorists to ground England’s constitutional monarchy on a
foundation of natural law, Tyrrell implies, has left it open to interpretations
that introduce and justify elements of irregularity and instability in English
constitutional theory and practice.
Tyrrell’s effort to advance the principle of compact is seen most clearly
in his treatment of the legal limitation produced by the original contract
establishing a particular constitutional order. He attempts to prove that con-
stitutional monarchy is the product of human agreement and not of simple
antiquity or organic development.33 In such a regime the monarch may be
understood to rule as the supreme “fountain of Power in all his Dominions,”
though “obliged either by original contract, or by after promise, or conde-
scent not to make any laws, or to levy any money, or taxes from his Sub-
jects, but what they shall offer him in the Assembly of his Estates.”34 Tyrrell
understands this limitation produced by original contract as more than
31 PNM: 131–2∗ .
32 PNM: 236 and Franklin, John Locke, p. 92.
33 Although, as Pocock and Colbourn have observed, Tyrrell did make an effort, albeit an
ancillary one, to defend the historical validity of limited monarchy against Filmer’s charges
(H. Trevor Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of
the American Revolution [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965]: p. 30 and
Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987]: pp. 206, 213), he left most of the historical heavy lifting to his friend William
Petyt.
34 PNM: 133∗ .
merely procedural. He understands the compact producing a constitutional

monarchy in these terms: “There must be some form, or rule agreed upon,
both of making, and promulgating Laws.” Tyrrell’s statement that such an
arrangement is “absolutely the best both for the Prince and People” im-
plies his deeper natural law teaching that government must be conceived as
more than simply an instrument to secure rights.35 Moreover, this concern
with defending the validity of legal processes and political forms also re-
flects Tyrrell’s effort to refute Filmer’s principle of natural subjection, which
marked a denial of the human capacity to generate political institutions and
conventions. For Tyrrell, a monarch may have an independent position of
authority in a constitutional order, but he or she is not the ultimate source
of that authority.
Tyrrell makes this point directly in his articulation of the importance of
constitutional forms for the well-being of a legally established government.
As he explains:
Though Forms are not essential to the declaring of the will of a private man in the
state of nature, yet they must be in respect of . . . a Prince, since the power of the
former is natural and can only influence those that hear him, but that of a Prince is
artificial, or political as proceeding from compact.36
This passage once again demonstrates Tyrrell’s indebtedness to Pufendorf.

Tyrrell’s understanding of the importance of political forms is derived from
Pufendorf’s theory of the fundamentally legal, as opposed to natural, char-
acter of political authority. It is the artificiality of political life that produces
and validates constitutional processes and forms. The “private man in the
state of nature” does not require a legal form to express his will because,
not being party to a compact, his will can in no sense be legally binding on
anyone else. Tyrrell’s concern with political forms amounts to a defense of
representation. The preservation of the principle of representation in the leg-
islative process requires, in Tyrrell’s view, that the supreme executive power
not also possess the legislative power in toto. In Tyrrell’s view, the very op-
eration of representative government requires an articulation of powers best
settled in the “original and fundamental constitution of the Government.”
Tyrrell’s chief concern in this discussion is to expound the stabilizing and reg-
ularizing effects of constitutional forms on political society. As such, Tyrrell
emphasizes the normative effect of the original contract by asserting that the
principle of constitutionalism ensures that these vital political forms cannot
be altered without the assent of all the duly constituted bodies established
by the consent of the people. For moderate Whigs, history had decisively
35 PNM: 134∗ . See also Richard Ashcraft (Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of
Government [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986]: pp. 206, 213), who draws from
this that Tyrrell sees absolute, unlimited monarchy as antithetical to civil society.
36 PNM: 134∗ .
shown that parliamentary usurpation, no less than royal absolutism, was far
from unimaginable in the English constitutional system.
Resistance and Prerogative

Lying in the background throughout much of the discussion of legal limits is
the vexing question of resistance. The question of who decides when a king
has broken the law and what measure of resistance is justified in this situation
had plagued English constitutional theorists since even before the civil war.
We have seen that the parliamentary radicals of the 1640s had not resolved
the issue at any level of theoretical satisfaction. Tyrrell, the Cavalier Whig,
tried to fashion a theory of resistance consistent with the moderate tenor of
his natural law teaching. His discussion of justifiable resistance begins with
a concession to the royalist argument that “no coactive power” can judge
or punish a ruling sovereign.37 In affirming that there can be no compulsory
power operating over and above a king, Tyrrell rejects the principle of par-
liamentary supremacy in the Parkerian sense. The memory of the English
public’s rejection of that principle in the Restoration of 1660 fueled the cau-
tion of most Whigs on this matter. In large measure, Tyrrell’s treatment of the
delicate issue of resistance reflected a desire to avoid the revolutionary con-
sequences of 1649 that grew out of the logic of parliamentary resistance in
1642.38 Before we can fully grasp the moderate Whig position on resistance,
it may be useful to briefly consider Tyrrell’s view of prerogative.
Although Tyrrell frames the issue of resistance in terms of the distinction
between prerogative and law, his strong support for legal limits does not
result in a simple rejection of royal prerogative. The monarch is not a mere
creature of the legislative assembly. Tyrrell sees the limiting character of law
in its capacity to demarcate the areas in which a sovereign may freely act
from those in which he or she may not. He describes the legal relation be-
tween king and subject as being characterized by “those Laws that are the
boundaries between his Prerogatives, and the Peoples just Rights.”39 Tyrrell
affirms that it may be good for a king “to dispense with” some laws, “yet
only for the publick good, in cases of extreme necessity.”40 Although all
prerogative is properly the king’s alone, Tyrrell affirms that he is bound to
exercise this power in accord with certain fundamental laws.41 The question
37 PNM: 153∗ .
39 PNM: Preface p. 1.
40 Tyrrell’s examples of manifestly unjust acts of prerogative would be a royal pardon for all
murderers, the maintenance of a standing army, the confiscation of property, and a refusal
to take the coronation oath (PNM: 138∗ , 155–6∗ ).
41 Franklin, John Locke, p. 92. Alan Craig Houston (Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage
in England and America [Princeton University Press, 1991]: p. 194) points out that Tyrrell’s
acceptance of rather wide latitude for prerogative signals a serious disagreement with Sidney.
of who judges a king’s actions and, perhaps more importantly, who is in the
legal position to punish unjust acts of prerogative is central to the moderate
Whig treatment of resistance. Tyrrell’s theory of resistance hinges on two
concepts: his understanding of fundamental laws and his notion of natural
rights. He considered fundamental laws as those with portentous bearing on
the operation of free government. Unlike normal statute laws, Tyrrell asserts
that fundamental laws are emphatically outside the scope of legitimate pre-
rogative. Tyrrell repeats that these laws “can never be altered without the
Consent of the King and the Estates.”42 Tyrrell’s examples of the fundamental
laws, whose transgression would threaten the integrity of the constitutional
order, are succession laws, property rights, and the right of representative
assemblies. In response to Filmer’s challenge to Hunton to produce one ex-
ample of a fundamental law, Tyrrell states that “the Crown upon the death of
the King should descend to the next Heir, and so we have one Fundamental
Law.” Throughout the course of the discussion Tyrrell also points to the
right in “Propriety in Goods and Lands and Estates of Inheritance” and the
constitutional provision “ordering all publick affairs in General Councils or
Assemblies of the Men of Note” as additional illustrations of the kinds of
fundamental laws a people may devise and agree to.43 It is noticeable that
at least the latter two of these fundamental laws are explicitly related to the
security of the subject’s rights.
When Tyrrell turns to an examination of the fundamental laws particular
to the historical English Constitution, there is a subtle shift in his catalog of
conceivable fundamental laws. He identifies the “three great Liberties of the
Subjects” of England as
[t]rial by a Mans equals, and absolute Propriety in Lands and Goods which the Kings
could not justly take from them; and a Right to joyne in the making of all Laws, and
raising Public Taxes, or Contributions for War.44
While the two more directly rights-securing laws regarding property and
representative assemblies are present in both the hypothetical and the his-
torically English list of fundamental laws, it is important to note Tyrrell’s
substitution of the English right of jury trial for the hypothetical succession
law.45 In so doing, Tyrrell emphasizes the individual rights-securing orien-
tation of the English Constitution, as witnessed in his concern to highlight
the importance of the jury trial. Moreover, Tyrrell suggests that one signifi-
cant feature, and possible defect, of the historical English Constitution was
its failure to clearly stipulate the acceptable means for the transmission of
royal power through succession. At the very least, Tyrrell implies that the
42 PNM: 230, 134–6∗ .

43 PNM: 219, 221.
44 PNM: 227.
traditional understanding of the “great Liberties of the Subject” in England

do not exhaust the possibilities for the establishment of fundamental laws.
Tyrrell’s clearest statement of the connection between fundamental laws
and justifiable resistance emerges in his defense of Hunton’s position that if
petitions fail to move a transgressing monarch,
[t]hen the Fundamental Laws of that Monarchy must judge and pronounce sentence
in every mans Conscience, and every man . . . must follow the Evidence of Truth and
his own Sense, to oppose or not oppose according as he can in Conscience acquit or
Condemn the Act of the Governour or Monarch.46
This appeal to individual conscience as the final arbiter pertaining to resis-

tance reflects what Tyrrell calls a “moral power” inhering in individuals,
which in turn grounds the right to refuse royal commands. As Tyrrell re-
lates, “it would be our Crime, and we alone were punishable” for obeying
a vicious or absurd royal command.47 But how are we to understand this
individual “moral power” and its relation to natural rights?
On the one hand, Tyrrell wants to demonstrate that the moral power that
grounds his theory of resistance is a power and capacity natural to human
beings. In contrast to the origin of sovereignty, this particular moral power
is not the product of compact or the exclusive purview of a civil sovereign.
In effect, Tyrrell attempts to inject a specific moral content into Hobbesian
natural right by making it derivative from a natural law stipulating the re-
quirements for peaceful association. For Tyrrell, unlike Hobbes, a right can
be a right in the proper sense only if it is accompanied by a correlative
moral duty. Herein lies Tyrrell’s attempt to follow Pufendorf by synthesiz-
ing Hobbesian natural rights and Grotian natural law. Tyrrell aims to make
the subjective right to self-preservation compatible with an objective law of
nature governing human relations. Moreover, the moral content of this law
is not derived from this right; rather, the right must be understood in terms
of the duty the individual has to uphold the good of society.48 By this means
Tyrrell tries to assure moderate Whigs that an individual natural right to
judge moral actions is not antithetical to the morally binding character of
compact. He wants to preserve the importance of contract but still retain a
fundamental layer of pre-civil individual natural rights. The means Tyrrell
uses to avoid the absolutist implications of Hobbesian rights theory is to in-
corporate something very similar to Hobbesian natural rights into a law of
nature denoting even a minimal moral order governing the state of nature.
46 PNM: 217.
47 PNM: 214–15. In this regard, I believe Rudolph is mistaken to suggest that Tyrrell does
not have a teaching on resistance in PNM (Revolution by Degrees, p. 166). Rather, even in
PNM he offers veiled threats to the king that the nation (i.e., the Parliament) can counter
prerogative with a more fundamental power.
48 Cf. Pufendorf, DJNG 3.5.3 and Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979): pp. 156–60.
The Rejection of Popular Sovereignty

The moderate Whig compact theory of sovereignty follows Pufendorf in
rejecting the doctrine of popular sovereignty, that is, the argument that
sovereignty rests naturally in the people. The sovereign for Tyrrell is made
by the people, who unanimously recognize one ruler or body as the supreme
political power. They all agree to obey, or at least not obstruct, the sovereign
in the execution of his, her, or its office. This is the Hobbesian core of Tyrrell’s
Pufendorfian moment. For Tyrrell, the sovereign power in the English Con-
stitution is the king-in-Parliament. Tyrrell’s concern to derive natural rights
in some significant sense from a natural law governing human social exis-
tence has the consequence of making his theory much less radical than it
might have been; in a sense, it has less radical implications even than that of
Hobbes. For example, while Hobbes never holds individual resistance to civil
authority morally blameworthy (at least on the ground of self-preservation),
Tyrrell quite emphatically argues, à la Grotius, that the moral good reflected
in civil peace should not be endangered by the unjust actions affecting in-
dividuals per se. Individuals are still, despite their claims to certain natural
rights, in some sense fundamentally restricted in the exercise of those rights
by the requirements of society as a whole.
Although Tyrrell defends an individual natural right to resist civil au-
thority, he never directly affirms a general right of rebellion. He says: “The
People though they do not argue so subtilly as our Author [Filmer] does, yet
in their Sense of Feeling, when wrong’d or hurt, are seldome mistaken.”49
Although the general feeling of being wronged or treated unjustly by civil
authority may serve to validate widespread popular resistance, Tyrrell rejects
the idea that this act of rebellion leads to a dissolution of government. The
prevailing tenor of Tyrrell’s natural law theory and his concern to preserve
the importance of compact signify the moderate Whigs’ deep distrust of the
radical notion of the dissolution of government.
Tyrrell’s Pufendorfian moment culminates in his offering up to his readers
an extended passage translated verbatim from Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae
et Gentium as a kind of conclusion to his own work. Tyrrell prefaces this
passage with a rehearsal of the main elements of Pufendorf’s theoreti-
cal distinction between irregular and regular regimes. He appeals to the
authority of “that eminent Civil Lawyer Mr. Pufendorf” to expose the
kinds of “Disease” that affect “irregular Forms” of regime.50 The theme of
49 PNM: 219 (parentheses mine).

50 PNM: 236–37. While Pufendorf has been identified by some as an absolutist (e.g., James
Tully, A Discourse on Property: Locke and His Adversaries [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1980]: pp. 55, 157, 171), the key to my argument is not the plain meaning of Pufendorf,
but rather Tyrrell’s use of him. The extended passage from Pufendorf that Tyrrell employs to
enlighten those English readers who “cannot easily procure the Latine Original” highlights
Pufendorf’s insistence on the salutary consequences of placing legal limits on sovereign power.
constitutional regularization in the historically identifiable principle of

king-in-Parliament peaks in Tyrrell’s account of Pufendorf’s treatment of
sovereignty.
Pufendorf’s fundamental argument in the passage Tyrrell quotes is that
supremacy in a political order does not necessarily denote absolute power.
Pufendorf aims to demonstrate that supremacy or sovereignty is not incom-
patible with constitutionalism. He maintains that sovereignty may be “abso-
lute or restricted to a certain manner of procedure.”51 The reason Pufendorf
cites for the need for supreme power in any proper or regular constitutional
order is the character of natural liberty. The state of absolute liberty that
characterizes the state of nature requires a supreme civil power to secure the
obedience needed to achieve “the end of established states.”52 The end of
civil society is, of course, the securing of civil peace mandated by the natural
law. Although, in contrast to Hobbes, Pufendorf argues that this supreme
power can be absolute or limited, he does not deny that it can be legitimately
absolute.
Pufendorf defended the need for supreme sovereign power on the natural
law grounds of the requirement to harmonize natural liberty with social
order. Yet he immediately indicates two problems or qualifications to the
supreme sovereignty argument: the problem of democracy and the problem
of absolute monarchy. In this manner, Pufendorf identifies the two dangerous
tendencies Tyrrell ascribed to the historical English Constitution: those that
he hoped to alleviate with his formula of naturalization and regularization.
First, we should consider Pufendorf’s (and implicitly Tyrrell’s) understanding
of the problem of democracy.
Pufendorf’s presentation of the necessity for a recognized supreme power
in a constitutional order is a stinging indictment of both democracy and
mixed regime theory. By democracy Pufendorf means a regime governed
solely by the people’s will expressed through a broadly popular legislative
assembly. The major problem Pufendorf identifies is the impossibility to pre-
serve written laws when there is no distinction between the circumscribed
and absolute sovereignty of the people. As Pufendorf’s examples of Caesar
in Rome and Solon’s successors in Athens illustrate, in a democracy the
Even if Pufendorf is not a bona fide champion of limited government, which is debatable,
the Pufendorf Tyrrell delivers up for English consumption most certainly is sympathetic
to it. Perhaps the one major flaw in Rudolph’s otherwise very worthy study of Tyrrell is
her failure to recognize the role of Pufendorf’s theory of sovereignty in the development of
Tyrrell’s arguments about the legally constituted nation embodying “the people” (Revolution
by Degrees, pp. 55–7; but see also pp. 126–7).
51 For purposes of clarity, I shall note the passage both as to its page number in Tyrrell’s PNM
and to its book, chapter, and section numbers in Pufendorf’s DJNG. The direct quotations
will be from Oldfather’s authoritative translation. I shall note where Tyrrell’s translation
differs substantially from this edition. See PNM, 239 and DJNG 7.6.7.
52 PNM: 238 and DJNG 7.6.7.
people can abrogate any law or custom they wish.53 Legal limits on sovereign
power cannot be enforced when the sole legislative power rests with the peo-
ple. Thus, Pufendorf points to the necessity for a supreme power to secure
the legal limits created by the original compact forming political society.
Democracy, for Pufendorf, is antithetical to legal and political forms. A con-
stitutional provision institutionalizing bicameralism and/or granting the ex-
ecutive power a role in the formation of law provide checks on unbridled
popular sovereignty. For Pufendorf these structural checks on popular will
protect both individual rights and the common good. Tyrrell’s use of this
passage reflects his own moderate Whig fear of the radical consequences of
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy for England. Tyrrell expresses this
concern in his antipathy to the radical Rump Parliament and his sympathy
for Charles I. Pufendorf assists Tyrrell in confirming the latter’s status as a
Whig with Cavalier sympathies.
Regarding the problem of absolute monarchy, Pufendorf identifies this
as a highly unstable ordering principle for any regime and advises that it
is wise to prescribe certain legal forms to limit such a power. Pufendorf
declares that “it has appeared advisable to many people not to commit in
so absolute a fashion such power as this to a single man, . . . but to prescribe
for him a definite manner of holding office.”54 In addition to the practical or
utilitarian advantages of circumscribing sovereign power, Pufendorf points
to another problem particular to absolute monarchs, namely, the tendency
of such rulers to rely on divine right as a source of legitimacy to replace
the lack of a popular foundation. Pufendorf emphatically rejects the “trite
and banal” arguments of those defenders of divine right who claim that
“Kings are constituted by God, and He has enjoined upon them the proper
conduct of their office, which is impossible without the exercise of supreme
authority” illimitable by any law.55 Pufendorf, like Tyrrell, argues that all
human government is a product of consent. In order to deflate the divine right
argument, Pufendorf offers his remarkable reinterpretation of the crucial
scriptural passage I Samuel 8.
Filmer, of course, had used Samuel’s illustration to the Israelites of the
sweeping powers of kings in order to support his argument that Scripture
endorsed absolute monarchy.56 Pufendorf rejects both the divine right inter-
pretation of this passage and Grotius’ interpretation, which held it to be a
scriptural support for the principle of nonresistance to established authority.
As Pufendorf presents it, Grotius was mistaken to refer to the authority of I
Samuel 8 to give scriptural credence to contractual absolutism. For his part,
53 DJNG 7.6.8 and PNM: 241. Tyrrell leaves the dramatic examples of Caesar and Solon out
of his version.
54 DJNG 7.6.9 and PNM: 242.
55 DJNG 7.6.9 and PNM: 243.
56 Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 35–8.
Pufendorf interprets Samuel’s dire predictions of monarchical power as evi-

dence of the particular consequences of the establishment of the warrior king
desired by the citizens of the Hebrew democracy. As such, it is not meant
as a “protection to wicked princes, nor dictates any set measure, as it were,
of kingly sovereignty, as by a law of God”; rather, it is a cautionary tale of
the care a people should take in determining the legal limits they impose on
sovereign power.57 Noticeably, Pufendorf both defends the people’s right to
make terrible errors and affirms the necessity of maintaining the constitu-
tional order originally produced by compact. However, Pufendorf also offers
Scripture as testimony to the natural liberty of human beings to devise po-
litical orders as they see fit. Moreover, he does so even as he articulates the
dangers of democracy and absolute monarchy.
While Pufendorf advocates the necessity of one supreme power in any con-
stitutional order, he also suggests certain limits that can be set on sovereignty.
One structural way to ensure limited sovereignty is for a people to “establish
a council without whose consent those acts which had been excepted cannot
be exercised.”58 While the creation of such a body does, in Pufendorf’s view,
act as a check on monarchical power, he also suggests that the existence of
two or more autonomous branches of government operating without clearly
circumscribed powers can lead to the problem of mixture. Pufendorf does
not envision limited constitutionalism as a pitched battle between the claims
of royal and popular sovereignty. It is Pufendorf’s deep theoretical objection
to the mixed regime model that leads him to modify the concept of council
limitations by offering the principle of councils with the additional limitation
of certain basic constitutional laws. These “basic laws” place limits on both
royal and popular sovereignty by registering the supremacy of the principle
of legal and formal process over the expressions of raw power from above
or below.
Pufendorf’s argument for the supremacy of fundamental laws does not,
however, negate the importance of popular representation. Rather, he affirms
that the existence of “an assembly of the people or council of nobles” that
is enshrined in law makes these bodies “an absolute necessary condition”
for the exercise of sovereign power. The way in which Pufendorf envisions
this limited sovereignty operating in practice is revealed in his treatment
of the two kinds of matters he argues are issues for “the nature of limited
monarchies.” These are “those decided in advance” and those in which a
judgment can be “reached only at the time they arise.”59 An example of
the former sort of pressing political issue would be the religious settlement
of a nation. Pufendorf maintains that “a People satisfied of the truth of
its religion . . . could lay down a law for the king, when they crowned him,
57 DJGN 7.6.9 and PNM: 244–6.

58 DJNG 7.6.10 and PNM: 248. Tyrrell calls this assembly a “Great Council.”
59 DJNG 7.6.11 and PNM: 251.
that he would not on his own authority make any change in the matters
of the religion of the land.”60 Pufendorf offers this both as an example of
a political device that could reduce theological controversy in a kingdom –
a concern shared by many English Whigs – and as the kind of fundamen-
tal provision that can regularize sovereign power with preestablished legal
limits.
As to the kinds of issues that must be decided contemporaneously with
events, Pufendorf adduces the questions of war and peace. Since these largely
prudential matters are impossible to address fully in the original contract
or even properly by after condescent, Pufendorf suggests that it is best to
require the monarch to consult with the established noble council and/or
popular assembly. This provision is particularly well advised, in Pufendorf’s
view, given the tendency of monarchs to use war as a means of satisfying
their “ambition and luxury.”61 Once again, Pufendorf’s central thesis in this
passage is that structural and legal provisions in the constitution can pro-
duce stability and regularity in the vital operations of sovereign power. For
moderate Whigs such as Tyrrell, Pufendorf’s insights regarding sovereign
power were comforting. Pufendorf’s argument that supreme, and indeed ir-
resistible, constitutional power could be moderated by internal structural
designs such as that characterizing the king’s relation to Parliament con-
formed perfectly with the moderate Whigs’ deep commitment to the natural
law principles of social order, as well as their attachment to the historical
tradition of England’s political institutions. That there could be a supreme le-
gal power above any claims for popular sovereignty soothed moderate Whig
fears about radical democracy. That this supreme power could be limited by
the interaction of the representative institutions of England’s complex and
balanced Constitution allayed moderate Whig concerns about the dangers
of absolute monarchy.
Tyrrell’s Pufendorfian moment culminates in a theoretical outline of an

England governed by parliamentary sovereignty including the three historic
parts of the balanced Constitution. Pufendorfian natural jurisprudence and
constitutional theory provided moderate Whigs with the intellectual and con-
ceptual materials necessary to articulate a vision of the English government
that avoided and resisted what they perceived to be the twin pitfalls of royal
absolutism and radical popular sovereignty. By denying the principles of
dissolution and general right of rebellion, moderate Whigs asserted the con-
tractual, and hence legal, character of sovereign political power. Sovereignty
in England rested in the king-in-Parliament, not in the people understood
independently of the institutions of government. And yet the capacity of the
people in their original constitutive role to create representative institutions
60 DJNG 7.6.11 and PNM: 251–2. Tyrrell adds the example of Sweden to Pufendorf’s treatment.
61 DJNG 7.6.11 and PNM: 253.
also provided moderate Whigs with the means to defend the identifiable
legal and constitutional limits on the power of the crown established by the
houses of Parliament. For moderate Whigs such as James Tyrrell, somewhere
between the radical democracy of the “promiscuous rabble” and the tyranny
of “Absolute Monarchy Jure Divino” lay the promised land of government
by the rule of law.
6
Algernon Sidney and the Old Republicanisms
Algernon Sidney and his Discourses Concerning Government cut a striking fig-
ure even among the colorful cast of characters in English Whiggery. Whereas
the Cavalier country squire Tyrrell was self-consciously moderate and mea-
sured in tone, Sidney’s argument is bellicose, incendiary, and defiantly repub-
lican. He was born in 1622, the scion of two illustrious aristocratic families,
the Sidneys and the Percys.1 His father was the second earl of Leicester and
his mother was the daughter of the ninth earl of Northumberland. His an-
cestors included the famed Elizabethan courtier, warrior, and poet Sir Philip
Sidney and the proud, warlike, aristocratic rebel Hotspur, immortalized in
Shakespeare’s history plays. His youth was spent divided between the family
estate in Kentshire at Penshurst and living with his diplomat father on as-
signments in Denmark and France in the 1630s, where the second earl met
and came to know Grotius and other leading continental thinkers.
As was true of most Englishmen of his generation, the formative experi-
ence of Sidney’s life was the civil war. Ironically, the man who would become
so clearly identified with the “old cause” of the Commonwealth actually be-
gan the war in royal service in Ireland but took up the parliamentary cause
upon his return to England in 1643. By all accounts, he served gallantly as
an officer in the earl of Manchester’s Horse Regiment and was seriously
wounded in a charge at Marston Moor in 1644. It was in the period of
1 For biographical accounts of Sidney’s life and times, see Dictionary of National Biography,
24 vols., Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds. (London: Oxford University Press, 1921–2):
Vol. XVIII, pp. 202–9 (hereafter DNB); J. G. A. Pocock, “England’s Cato: The Virtues and
Fortunes of Algernon Sidney,” Historical Journal, vol. 37, no. 4 (December 1994): pp. 915–35;
Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988) and Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991); Thomas West, “Introduction” to The Discourses Con-
cerning Government (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 1996); and Blair Worden, Roundhead
Reputations: The English Civil Wars and the Passions of Posterity (London: Penguin Press, 2001):
esp. chs. 5, 6.
152
Algernon Sidney and the Old Republicanisms 153
recuperation from his wounds that the twenty-four-year-old Sidney entered

parliamentary politics, being returned to the Long Parliament in 1646 from
Cardiff. The young aristocrat served in a variety of functions in the Long
Parliament and acquired an intimate knowledge of the workings of the insti-
tution after the war. He was self-admittedly a difficult person to work with
and probably would not have quarreled with Burnet’s account of him as a
learned and courageous man, but of a “rough and boisterous temper” that
“could not bear contradiction.”2 Appointed as a commissioner for the court
created to try Charles I, Sidney angered Cromwell by publicly questioning
the legality of the proceedings on the grounds that “first, the king could be
tried by no court; secondly, that no man could be tried by that court.” Sidney
resolutely refused to take part in the proceedings of the court. He also ran
afoul of Cromwell by opposing the Act of Engagement, although more on
prudential than doctrinal grounds.
However, for the most part, his time in the Rump Parliament was the high
point of Sidney’s life. In his glory days in the final year before its demise in
1653, Sidney was elected to the Council of State and served on the foreign
affairs committee then busily engaged in conducting the First Anglo-Dutch
War. Sidney drew from his experience of this period a deep commitment to
republicanism and a conviction that the Rump, a unicameral legislature with
executive committees, was the best government England ever had.3 When
Cromwell and the army dissolved the Rump in 1653, legend has it that Sidney,
sitting to the right of the speaker, was the last member of Parliament to leave,
and only after being threatened with forcible removal by army troopers.
Predictably, Sidney chafed under the Protectorate and loathed the mili-
tary dictator Cromwell. Again legend has it that Sidney signaled his feelings
toward the Protector by putting on a performance of Shakespeare’s Julius
Caesar at Penshurst, pointedly casting himself in the role of Brutus.4 When the
army restored the Long Parliament in 1659 after Cromwell’s death, Sidney
returned to the House of Commons and was again elected to the Council of
State, dealing primarily with foreign relations. It was while on a diplomatic
mission in Denmark to mediate a dispute between the kings of Sweden and
Denmark that he first learned about the plans for the Restoration and was in
Scandinavia when the dramatic events of 1660 unfolded. In contrast to his
colleague John Milton, and even in contrast to his reaction to the dissolution
of the Rump seven years earlier, Sidney’s initial response to the Restoration
was not immediate hostility. As a matter of principle, he was willing to defer
to the authority of the Parliament that installed Charles II. Moreover, he
personally was not on Charles’ list of proscribed regicides. Sidney did not,
however, return to England.
2 Worden, Roundhead Reputations, p. 124.

3 Pocock, “England’s Cato,” p. 919.
4 DNB, Vol. XVIII, p. 205.
His reasoning appears to have been twofold. First, as a matter of personal

honor, he was not willing to renounce his actions in the Commonwealth gov-
ernment and was unwilling to live in England under a cloud of suspicion. In
a letter to his father, who had pleaded with the new king to allow his son’s
return, Sidney proudly declared: “When I call to remembrance all my actions
relating to our civil distempers, I cannot find one that I can look upon as
a breach of the rules of justice or honor.”5 Second, Sidney’s political prin-
ciples were still unrepentantly republican. He created a stir among English
royalists when he famously autographed the visitor’s album at the Univer-
sity of Copenhagen with the monarchomach motto “Manus haec inimical
tyrannis” – “This hand inimical to tyrants.”
For Sidney, the Restoration meant a seventeen-year-long career in exile on
the Continent. In this time he traveled widely throughout Europe, studied,
wrote, survived assassination attempts by Charles’ men, and periodically
plotted an English republican exile invasion of their homeland. During the
Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1665–6 he lived in Holland, fruitlessly peti-
tioning the Dutch republican leaders, and later even France’s Louis XIV, to
support the English republican cause. Dispirited by his failure to mobilize
support for a republican return at home or abroad, Sidney bemoaned his fate
as a “broken limb of a shipwrecked faction,” eventually settling in the south
of France in dignified retirement as “le comte de Sidney.”6 However, Sidney’s
European exile was not totally consumed by personal frustration and in-
evitable political fatalism. It was during his long exile that Sidney contem-
plated the primary theoretical principles that would become the foundation
for his political teaching in the Discourses. He reflected deeply on the painful
lessons of the English Commonwealth’s failure to establish secure republi-
can government as well as on the resilience of the English monarchy. Sidney
spent his forced retirement from politics thinking through the philosophical
foundations of modern republicanism by assimilating the English experi-
ence of 1649–53 into the lessons provided by the example of Dutch repub-
lican government and, more importantly, of Dutch republican philosophy.7
The Discourses would be the product of these reflections on English po-
litical history in light of the broader context of European Enlightenment
philosophy.
Sidney’s long-awaited return to England in 1677 occurred not at the head
of a republican invasion, but rather as the result of royal permission to return
to settle mundane private family matters. He expected to stay only briefly,
but the death of his father and an unseemly quarrel with his parsimonious
5 Ibid., p. 205.
6 West, “Introduction,” xxxi and Pocock, “England’s Cato,” p. 921.
7 This reading runs counter to that of Pocock (“England’s Cato,” pp. 917–18 and 929–31),
who sees Sidney’s republicanism as decidedly unphilosophical, more a matter of aristocratic
temperament than egalitarian principles.
elder brother over Sidney’s patrimony compelled him to extend his stay.
Sidney was drawn irresistibly back into political activity by the fall of Danby
and the ensuing Exclusion controversy. He was frustrated by several unsuc-
cessful attempts to win a seat in Parliament, but despite these electoral fail-
ures he established himself in Whig circles. Sidney did not, however, have
any real contact with the Shaftesbury circle Locke and Tyrrell moved in,
partly because Sidney and Shaftesbury loathed each other personally and
partly because Sidney’s political aims were more emphatically anti-royalist
than the Exclusion program designed by Shaftesbury. Sidney feared and dis-
trusted the Orange interest as much as the Stuarts, and saw the crisis more
as a way to severely circumscribe the power of the crown (or, ideally, estab-
lish a republic) than as a way merely to ensure a pliant Protestant succes-
sor to Charles.8 With the collapse of the Whig parliamentary opposition in
1681, Sidney began writing the Discourses and plotting more extreme mea-
sures. After Shaftesbury’s flight to Holland and subsequent death, Sidney
and the rest of the “Council of Six,” including Monmouth, Essex, Russell,
Hampden, and Howard, assumed leadership of the Whig movement and tire-
lessly sought French support for a broad-based Whig insurrection in England
and Scotland. He was arrested and sent to the Tower along with other top
Whig leaders in June 1683 after the discovery of the Rye House Plot to kidnap
the king and the duke of York.
Sidney’s political career did not, however, end with his arrest. In a sense, it
really began to assume legendary proportions only with his trial for treason
in the autumn of 1683. The hagiography of Sidney the martyr for the cause
of freedom drew its inspiration from the manifest irregularities and outright
illegalities orchestrated by Sidney’s prosecutor, Chief Justice Jeffreys. It was
established in English law that two witnesses were required to prove treason.
Jeffreys, having only the well-known scoundrel Howard as a witness against
Sidney, used portions of the unpublished manuscript of the Discourses found
in Sidney’s rooms to demonstrate the defendant’s treasonous state of mind.
With a packed Tory jury and given the public mood at the time, Sidney’s fate
was sealed, and he was executed after being refused the chance to resume ex-
ile in December 1683, by all accounts going to the scaffold with courage and
dignity. Among Whigs the obvious travesty of the trial, and especially the vi-
olation of an individual’s private chambers and even more private thoughts,
assumed great significance as a symbol of Stuart tyranny.
Immediately upon his death Sidney entered the pantheon of Whig mar-
tyrs, but the manuscript that had assumed such significance at this trial would
not be published until 1698, fifteen years after his death and nearly a decade
after the Glorious Revolution. The Discourses as they have come down to
history under the editorial guidance of the Whig publicist John Toland are a
8 Scott, Restoration Crisis, pp. 24–5, 106–7. Cf. Worden, Roundhead Reputations, pp. 135–6.
remarkable piece of work.9 They are by far the longest of the Exclusion era
Whig responses to Filmer. Their three enormous chapters and their presenta-
tion as a point-by-point refutation of Filmer make them a notoriously dense
and voluminous offering. Despite the general recognition of the Discourses
in the eighteenth century as one of the seminal texts in republican consti-
tutionalism, this density and opacity have produced widespread neglect of
Sidney’s work over the past 200 years.10 However, the Discourses are the
foundational writing in the radical Whig republican tradition. The defining
features of Sidney’s radical Whiggism were his endorsement of the principle
of popular sovereignty, the general right of revolution, and his emphatic de-
fense of republicanism. In one sense, Sidney was in fundamental agreement
with Tyrrell and the other moderate Exclusion Whigs. They concurred that
Parliament is sovereign in England, but they disagreed about the meaning
and character of Parliament. In contrast to the moderate Whigs, Sidney’s
brand of modern republicanism did not conceive of sovereignty residing in
the balanced Constitution embodied in the notion of king-in-Parliament.
Where Sidney most clearly departed from his moderate Whig colleagues was
in his harsh criticism of mixed regime theory and his insistence that political
sovereignty must reside in popular institutions marked by numerous repre-
sentation, rotating delegates, and frequent elections, which can reflect the
general will of the people and the collected power of the multitude of indi-
viduals in society. As such, Sidney founded a strain of Whiggism that was
deeply opposed to the principle of prerogative and an independent execu-
tive. In the course of defending the doctrine of natural liberty against Filmer’s
divine right attacks, Sidney advocated a distinctly modern form of republi-
canism infused with the principles of radical natural rights theory associated
with Benedict Spinoza. The republican strain of Whig thought originating in
Sidney incorporated important elements of classical and Machiavellian re-
publicanism into the rubric of Spinoza’s radical natural rights teaching, pro-
ducing an egalitarian and democratic version of modern republicanism that
9 For an account of Toland’s relatively minor editorial license with the Discourses, see Worden,
Roundhead Reputations, pp. 131–3.
10 Sidney’s work was well known to eighteenth-century European, English, and American
thinkers. For Sidney’s influence on Montesquieu, see The Spirit of the Laws, Anne Cohler,
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): bk. 11, ch. 6, pp. 159–60. For good
discussions of Sidney’s influence on the early American Republic, see Peter Karsten, Pa-
triot Heroes in England and America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) and
Alan Carig Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991): esp. ch. 6. Also note John Adams’ letter to
Thomas Jefferson of September 17, 1823, in Lester J. Capon, ed., The Adams–Jefferson Let-
ters (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1959): p. 598 and Jefferson’s
praise of Sidney as one of the leading sources for the American understanding of the princi-
ples of political liberty in “From the Minutes of the Board of Visitors, University of Virginia,”
March 4, 1825, in Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson Writings (New York: Viking Press,
1984): p. 479.
would provide the theoretical inspiration for generations of radical Whigs

in England and America.
In this chapter, we will examine Sidney’s defense of the earlier natural
liberty arguments associated with the Catholic natural lawyers, and the clas-
sical and Machiavellian forms of republicanism against divine right royalism.
We will also consider the way in which Sidney modified these older forms
of republicanism by synthesizing them with the modern natural rights theo-
ries of Hobbes and Spinoza to produce a distinctly modern vision of radical
Whig republicanism for a dramatically reformed English Constitution. In the
following chapter, we will consider Sidney’s effort to limn the features of a
modern republican political science modeled on Spinoza’s articulation of the
natural order of power relations and the naturalness of democracy. With his
emphatically modern version of republicanism, Sidney paradoxically both
located himself on the extreme fringe of Whig opinion at the time and also
planted the seed for a vibrant strain of Anglo-American republicanism that
would resonate far beyond England’s shores.
Sidney and the Old Republicanisms

Sidney’s defense of the doctrine of natural liberty began as a critical response
to Filmerian divine right but gradually expanded into a treatise on the na-
ture of republicanism. Sidney’s response to Filmer is multilayered. First, he
denies that any consistent reading of Scripture supports Adam’s “natural
and private dominion” over creation.11 Sidney disputes Filmer’s claim that
Adam’s unique creation directly by God is a sign of Adam’s sovereignty.
Rather, Sidney contends that whether the creation had been of a single man
or a multiplicity, “they had all been equal, unless God had given preference
to one.”12 Fatherhood, Sidney claims, signified no such preference. The bare
fact that “every man should be chief of his family” does not in any degree
“signify an absolute power.” Sidney maintains that far from elevating Adam
above the rest of humankind, Scripture actually suggests a primal equality:
“the same law that gave to my father a power over me, gives me the like over
my children, and if I had a thousand brothers each of them would have the
same over their children.”13 Sidney maintains that Scripture’s Adam differs
greatly from that of Filmer.
Sidney claims that even if Adam had an absolute right, his heirs did not.
For example, Scripture never suggests that the fratricide Cain “had any do-
minion over his brethren, or their posterity.” Scripture, moreover, affords
11 Houston, Algernon Sidney, pp. 104–5.

12 Algernon Sidney, The Discourses Concerning Government, Thomas West, ed. (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund Classics, 1996): ch.1, sec. 7, p. 24 (hereafter in notes as D, ch., sec., and, where
appropriate, page number).
13 D 1.6.22, 2.2.89.
little help in determining the political status of Adam’s heirs. The Bible’s ob-
scurity about what passed between the Creation and the Flood means that it
is “not easy to determine, whether Shem or Japheth were the elder.” Sidney
contends that if Scripture had intended to teach the absolute right of Adam’s
heirs it would have said so plainly rather than “leave us in a dark labyrinth,
full of precipices.”14 The uncertainty in tracing the descent of Adam’s line,
he charges, ensures that even if Scripture did intend to teach the supreme
right of Adam’s heirs to rule, they cannot be known in any reliable way
in the present.15 In this opening salvo against Filmer, Sidney demonstrates
both that Scripture offers no political right to Adam and his heirs and that
paternal power does not contradict natural liberty.
Sidney aims to prove that Scripture explicitly distinguishes between pa-
ternal and regal power. For example, Abraham may have enjoyed a form of
rule over his wife, children, and servants, but he was equal to all other men,
including his nephew Lot.16 His sons likewise had a legitimate power over
their families but were also rulers “void of all worldly splendor.” Moreover,
Moses and the judges who succeeded him were not hereditary monarchs,
but rather were magistrates chosen from different tribes and whose children
did not succeed them. As Sidney wryly remarks, if Moses and the judges
had ruled by Adam’s supreme right, then “Saul, David and Solomon could
never have been kings.”17 More importantly, Sidney suggests that the Bible
is unenthusiastic regarding regal power. Of the first king, Nimrod, “Scrip-
ture testifies to it as a usurpation,” and through the Babel story shows “the
pride, cruelty, injustice and madness of this first kingdom.”18 In addition to
highlighting Samuel’s warning to the Hebrews before the accession of Saul,
Sidney is at pains to display the turbulent history of the Israelite kings, which
he observes is chronicled in grim detail in Scripture.
Sidney also tries to prove that Scripture does not even fully support
Filmer’s conception of the patriarchal family. First, he argues that while
it endorsed patriarchal rule in the family, it did not extend this into a model
legitimating absolute monarchy.19 By the very fact that the Bible chron-
icles the establishment of the Hebrew regime under Moses and the later
monarchy under Saul, Scripture relegated patriarchal government to a very
distant and primitive past. Sidney claims: “We may reasonably affirm, that
mankind is forever obliged to use no other clothes than leather breaches, like
14 D 2.2.89, 1.8.25–6, 1.6.23.

15 D 1.12.33–4.
16 D 1.7.24–5.
17 D 1.13.37.
18 D 1.8.26–7.
19 Unlike Locke and to a lesser degree Tyrrell, Sidney explicitly separates the issue of sexual
equality from his general defense of natural liberty. Sidney approves of patriarchalism and
the exclusion of women from political life but wonders whether it provides a model for
political society (D 2.9.130; 1.18.159–60).
Adam; . . . as to think all nations forever obliged to be governed as they gov-

ern their families.”20 Second, Sidney excoriates Filmer’s attempt to ground
the practice of primogeniture in Scripture. Sidney points to the many obvi-
ous deviations from this rule in Scripture, such as God’s election of Moses
before his elder brother, Aaron, and Jacob’s surpassing of Esau. The evidence
in Scripture generally contradicts Filmer’s model, but even if it were only a
rare instance, Sidney affirms: “If one deviation from it were lawful, another
might be, and so to infinity.”21 If primogeniture were sacrosanct, Moses,
Aaron, David, and Solomon would never have ruled. Sidney strongly sug-
gests that most of the Bible’s great figures came to prominence not by their
status as the eldest heirs, but on some other basis of selection to rule.
According to Sidney, Filmer’s refusal to ground political rule on the prin-
ciple of consent logically leads to the most destructive consequences for
political life. The only two ways to come “to command many” are through
consent or by force. In delegitimating consent, Filmer encourages force. By
the principle of consent Sidney argues, “every man be free, till he enter into
such a society as he chuseth for his own good.” Consent includes the power
to comprehend one’s own good in the “common stock” of the community
and the right both to elevate one to rule over the community and to limit the
power of these rulers.22 For Sidney, consent proves compatible with society.
Force, on the other hand, produces slavery. Sidney reveals that “by the name
of slave we understand a man, who can neither dispose of his person or his
goods, but enjoys all at the will of his master.” He draws from this that “there
is no such thing in nature as a slave.”23 Sidney posits force or usurpation as
the antipode of consent and slavery as the antithesis of rightful political sub-
jection. His general rhetorical strategy in this discussion is not unlike that of
Bellarmine and Suarez. Like them, Sidney wants to demonstrate that natural
liberty is not an anarchic doctrine; rather, it is the violation of the principle
of consent that introduces confusion and misery.24 In contrast to the mod-
erating effect of consent theory, Sidney charges that by Filmer’s doctrine no
European monarch is legitimate, because none can demonstrate direct de-
scent from Adam’s line and none are as absolute as Filmer requires.25 Sidney
20 D 1.6.22–3.
21 D 1.13.37. See also Sidney’s claim that primogeniture is merely a civil law in some nations,
like England, but not a divine or natural law (D 2.4.93).
22 D 1.12.35–6, 1.11.32.
23 D 1.5.17.
24 The Christian Aristotelians whom Sidney seems to support in Chapter One of the Discourses
were concerned to assert the compatibility of natural liberty with society in an attempt
to refute the Antinomian Christian sects of the period. Cf. Roberto Bellarmine, De Laicis,
Kathleen Murphy, trans. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1928): ch. 1, p. 9.
25 D 1.18.52, 1.19.67; see also 1.16.50 for Sidney’s treatment of the tumultuous succession
struggles in the Roman imperial period. The abuses of the Roman emperors are also a
prominent theme in Chapter Two of the Discourses.
proposes that regimes founded on consent, whether monarchical or other-

wise, contain an internal stability rooted in the support of the community.
Divine right, on the other hand, Sidney presents as a recipe for confusion
that “goes directly against the letter and spirit of the Scripture.”
Sidney allies with Bellarmine and Suarez to counter Filmer’s claim that
arbitrary government, and absolute monarchy in particular, represents the
uniform and immutable form of rule ordained by God. Sidney claims that
“the best and wisest of men” having constituted “aristocratical, democrat-
ical, or mixed governments” would thus have produced regimes in opposi-
tion to that monarchy “from which we are not to swerve.”26 Sidney joins the
Catholic natural lawyers in affirming that natural liberty implies a people’s
rational capacity to devise political institutions to satisfy their needs. Thus,
the natural freedom to consent to government makes monarchy only one of
a variety of regimes available to human beings and sanctioned by God.
Sidney attempts to demonstrate natural liberty in two ways.27 First, and
primarily, he uses an a priori method in which he argues that the principle of
consent is one no rational being can deny without doing violence to his own
nature. To demonstrate the self-evidence of natural liberty, Sidney indicates
that even such bitter theological and political foes as the Jesuit scholastics
and the English Calvinist divines agree on this fundamental proposition.28
The second method Sidney employs is a posteriori, by which he argues that
natural liberty is an idea almost universally accepted among the nations.
Sidney claims that people from all ages “in love with liberty, and desirous to
maintain their own privileges,” have created a variety of regimes, not only
monarchy.29 Natural liberty can be proven by demonstrating that nations
have always made their own laws and constitutions.
Sidney’s main effort is dedicated to the proof of natural liberty a priori.
He claims that the “principle of liberty in which God created us . . . is written
in the hearts of every man.” Although liberty consists “in an independency
upon the will of another,” Sidney insists that it is not “a licentiousness of
doing what is pleasing to everyone against the command of God; but an ex-
emption from all human laws, to which they have not given their assent.”30
He thus locates his doctrine of natural liberty in an appeal to the Christian-
Aristotelian understanding of a natural law with a force binding on “the
conscience.”31 He defends natural liberty as a moral or practical truth as
26 D 1.1.5–6.
27 The general structure of Sidney’s argument in Chapter One of the Discourses follows a pattern
employing the a priori and a posteriori methods of demonstration. In this way, Sidney appears
to follow a pattern similar to that of Grotius. Cf. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri
Tres (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925): 1.1.12.1. (hereafter DJB).
28 D 1.2.8–10.
29 D 1.1.7.
30 D 1.2.8, 1.5.17, 1.2.9.
31 D 1.1.7.
demonstrable as the speculative truths of mathematics such as “the whole is

greater than a part, that two halfs make a whole, or that a straight line is the
shortest way from point to point.” These are truths as evident to pagan as
to Christian, Euclid as to Bellarmine, like the “principles of geometry which
no sober man can deny.”32 Sidney’s discussion of natural liberty aims to dis-
play the perversity of Filmer’s position, a position that Sidney claims to be
contrary to the universal human experience. Moreover, while he is careful
not to endorse Bellarmine’s argument for papal pretensions in temporal af-
fairs,33 Sidney nonetheless successfully places his own position in the context
of the respectable Christian-Aristotelian tradition of Catholic and Anglican
scholasticism.
Sidney also displays a careful and muted use of the state of nature concept
in the first chapter of the Discourses. Like the Catholic natural lawyers, he
affirms the condition of natural liberty only to demonstrate its fundamental
compatibility with society. The “equal right to everything” typical of man’s
condition outside of civil society produces inconveniences so great “that
mankind cannot bear them.” The natural condition unimproved by human
art is not a viable state for human beings. However, Sidney uses the state
of nature image primarily to show that no rational person would persist in
it.34 What Sidney achieves by his use of the pre-civil condition is to establish
the origins of government in the “common consent” of people joining into
one body. The theoretical implication of natural liberty is the conventional
variety of regimes, not the natural war of all against all. Sidney emphasizes
that a naturally free people may create a democracy, aristocracy, monarchy,
or “mixed governments composed of the three.”35 In each case, however,
men resign their private right into the community only “in such measure
as they think fit for the constituting of societies for their own good.”36 The
varying degrees of subjection and the variety of regimes do not follow a
uniform pattern inhering in the human condition but rather are the products
of the contractual arrangements of human beings. Thus, Sidney tries to prove
that the fact that human beings typically are in society and not born exempt
from civil law does not mean that they are not naturally free.
32 D 1.2.8. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3 vols. (New York: Benziger Brothers,
1947): q. 79, a. 12 and I–II, q. 94, a. 2 and Francisco Suarez, Extracts on Politics and Gov-
ernment, George Moore, trans. (Chevy Chase, MD: Country Dollar Press, 1950): Defensio,
bk. III, ch. 2, p. 100.
33 Compare D 2.1.77–8 and 1.2.8, where Sidney argues: “Tho’ the Schoolmen were corrupt,
they were neither stupid nor unlearned.” See also D 1.5.18, where Sidney appeals to the
authority of Aristotle and the great Anglican scholastic Richard Hooker.
34 D 1.10.30. Cf. Scott Nelson, The Discourses of Algeron Sidney (Cranbury, NJ: Associated
University Presses, 1993): pp. 36, 58 and Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 20.
35 D 1.10.31. Cf. Aristotle, The Politics, Carnes Lord, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984): 1288b10–1290a30.
36 D 1.12.35–6, 1.10.31, 1.11.32.
A striking feature of the natural liberty doctrine Sidney presents in

Chapter One of the Discourses is his close association of liberty with hu-
man rationality. For Sidney, the human capacity to form and to participate
in political society reflects the endowment of reason. He argues that men
form political societies for two related purposes. The first is to secure the
material advantages of society. Sidney muses: “It cannot be believed that ra-
tional creatures would advance one or a few of their equal above themselves,
unless in consideration of their own good.”37 Society secures the bodily ne-
cessities by establishing general rules of justice. Outside of political society,
“the liberty of one is thwarted by another” and none can reliably enjoy their
property with security.38 Sidney further testifies to humankind’s essentially
social nature by his argument for the central role of the family in the ori-
gins of political society. In essence, Sidney agrees with Suarez’s presentation
of political society as a product of the increasing complexity of social rela-
tions produced by the extended family.39 Political society originates in, but
transcends, the needs of the family.
The second purpose for the creation of political society is the satisfaction
of the human rational nature. Sidney echoes the Aristotelian dictum “homo
est animal rationale.” Politics stands, for Sidney, as the expression of rea-
son. Reason “cannot be in beasts, for they know not what government is.”40
Sidney asserts that “nature, which is reason,” clearly inclines people to so-
ciety, inasmuch as they have “understanding to provide for themselves, and
by the invention of arts and sciences, to be beneficial to each other.” Most
importantly, people “ought to make use of that understanding in forming
governments according to their own convenience.” Sidney offers a privileged
position for the practical wisdom denied by divine right: “Every people is
by God and nature left to the liberty of regulating these matters relating to
themselves according to their own prudence.” The importance of prudence
in constitution making reflects the architectonic character of politics, the
activity that Sidney claims comprehends “all that in this world deserves to
be cared for.”41 Sidney charges that if there is a uniform rule in nature, it
is not hereditary absolute monarchy; rather, Scripture and classical thought
indicate that the uniform rule is the government of the best men. He claims
that “detur digniori is the voice of nature” calling nations to elevate those
“who are most fit to perform the duties belonging to their stations, in order
to the publick good.”42 Insofar as the end of government is to secure and
37 D 1.6.21.
38 D 1.10.30.
39 D 2.1.78. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1252b10–1253a1 and Suarez, Extracts: Defensio, III.2.100.
40 D 1.18.60, 2.8.22. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1253a2; Bellarmine, De Laicis, p. 20; and Suarez,
Extracts: Defensio, III.2.105.
41 D 2.8.121, 1.18.61, 1.1.5. Cf. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, H. H. Rackham, trans.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univesity Press, 1934): 1094a30–1094b12.
42 D 1.16.49. West translates detur digniori as “Let it be given to the worthier.”
promote the common good, virtue as a claim to rule is entirely consistent

with the principle of consent. Sidney presents republican rule of the virtuous
as the antidote to divine right absolutism.
Sidney’s rhetorical strategy in his defense of republicanism is complex.43
In his effort to present a unified front in the natural liberty school against
divine right, he blurs significant distinctions between the Catholic, classi-
cal, and Machiavellian forms of consent theory and republicanism. In the
process, Sidney incorporates classical notions of virtue and government into
his own very modern republican theory. First, he demonstrates the funda-
mental harmony between Catholic natural law and classical republicanism.
In revealing this essential harmony, he reinforces his claim that monarchy
is only one of several regimes available to human beings. Second, Sidney
defends classical republics against Filmer’s charge that they were the home
of demagogues and regimes inimical to moral virtue and patriotism.44 In
response, Sidney proposes the superiority of republics over monarchies. He
argues that only the mixed governments typical of classical republics suc-
cessfully imposed restraints on magistratical power, and promoted a notion
of civic equality and the rule of law consistent with natural liberty. The uni-
fied republican front against divine right, however, ultimately gives way to
Sidney’s endorsement of Machiavellian republicanism rather than classical
republicanism or Christian Aristotelianism. Sidney reinterprets republican
virtue in terms of a lupine foreign policy and the capacity for military ex-
pansion, and thus concludes his defense of republicanism with an account of
human nature more reflective of Machiavelli and Hobbes than of Aristotle
and the other major classical and Christian thinkers.
In the course of his defense of republicanism, Sidney asserts that liberty
is a “truth planted in the hearts of men,” and is thus accessible to Christian
and pagan alike. Both the Christian-Aristotelian theory of government, seen
in Bellarmine and Suarez, and the classical republicanism, which Sidney as-
sociates with Aristotle and Plato, share the core teaching that “magistrates
are chosen by societies, seeking their own good, and that the best men ought
to be chosen for the attaining of it.”45 Sidney claims that these traditions
share two common assumptions about government. First, the purpose of
government is to promote the common good and to educate virtuous rulers
and citizens dedicated to it. The end of government is both to provide for
material security and to develop the rational faculties of the members of the
community. Second, Sidney claims that all previous serious thinkers endorsed
43 For a fuller treatment of Sidney’s complex rhetorical strategy and design in the Discourses,
see Lee Ward, “Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning
Government,” Interpretation, vol. 28, n. 2 (Winter 2000–1): pp. 119–45.
44 For a representative sample of Filmer’s antipathy toward the classical republics, see Robert
Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann Somerville, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1991): pp. 25–6.
45 D 2.1.78, 82.
the mixed regime: “the wisest, best and far the greatest part of mankind, re-
jecting these simple species [monarchy, aristocracy, democracy], did form
governments mixed or composed of the three.”46 Thus, the connection be-
tween virtue and mixed government lay at the heart of Sidney’s conception
of classical republicanism.
Sidney argues that only regimes informed by republican principles re-
ward virtue with rule and encourage civic virtue among the people. Virtue
in this understanding is inseparable from concern for the common good.
Like Aristotle, who defined the deviant forms of the three simple species of
regimes by their service to the private advantage of the ruling group at the
expense of the common good, Sidney is concerned to demonstrate the con-
nection between virtue and the proper end of government. Echoing Plato,
Sidney even proposes that political power properly understood is a burden
to rulers inasmuch as it binds them inextricably to the service of others.47
Unmixed monarchy fails, in Sidney’s view, to promote virtue for several rea-
sons. First, monarchs historically have tended to hate and fear “all those
that excelled in virtue,” and typically saw the slaughter of these best men
as a security for the throne.48 Second, Sidney not only criticizes the abuses
of power coincident with absolute monarchy but also contrasts the merito-
cratic tendencies of republics with any species of monarchy, even a limited
one, based on hereditary right. Sidney presents the unthinking custom of
heredity as the antithesis of selection due to virtue.49 Third, Sidney lauds the
capacity of republics to encourage public spirit. He calls them the “nurse of
virtue,” in which the private interests of individuals were successfully com-
prehended in the common good. The classical republics recognized the need
to institute rewards and honors as inducements to virtuous activity among
the citizenry.50 Their legislators managed to combine public service with the
individual’s natural love of liberty.
Sidney contends that the citizens of ancient republics were more patriotic
than royal subjects because the citizens had a genuine stake in the regime’s
46 While Sidney makes this statement at 1.10.31, he claims that he will prove this assertion
“hereafter,” presumably in Chapter Two.
47 D 2.1.78–80. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1279b5–10 and Ethics, 1160b; and Plato, The Republic,
Allan Bloom, trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 345b–347a. Sidney does, however,
confront the questions raised by Aristotle’s celebrated praise for the supremely virtuous
man by suggesting that Aristotle may have set the bar for monarchy so high – with almost
godlike virtue – in order to prove its impossibility in practice (D 2.1.85 and 3.23.453). For
a contemporary interpretation of Aristotle’s treatment of the problem of kingship that is
similar to that of Sidney, see Mary Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s
Politics (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992): pp. 77–81.
48 D 2.11.136, 2.12.144, 2.25.256.
49 D 2.6.109–12, 2.11.135. Cf. Fink, who demonstrates how important the critique of heredity
was for Sidney’s defense of classical republicanism. See Zera Fink, The Classical Republicans
(Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1962): p. 152.
50 D 2.1.78, 2.19.190, 2.12.146. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics, 1109b30–1110a1.
survival and success. The popular voice in public affairs produced a citizenry
committed to the defense of the commonwealth. By contrast, in absolute
monarchies, individuals lack the power to help their friends or to prevent
injuries, and therefore they neglect “the affairs in which they had no part.”
In absolute regimes, the subjects are too insecure to defend it enthusiasti-
cally and are too apathetic to fear a change in government. Sidney presents
numerous examples, ancient and modern, of small public-spirited republics
defeating the armies of much larger absolute monarchies. He claims: “I think
no example can be alleged of a free people that has ever been conquer’d by
an absolute monarch.”51 If the unique genius of republican government, for
Sidney, was its ability to combine concern for the public good with great
military strength in an armed citizenry, then absolute monarchy emerges as
the personification of the idea of using public force for private advantage.
Sidney’s account of the importance of virtue to the classical republics is
closely connected to his treatment of the structural aspects of the mixed
governments typical of those regimes. The two major features of the mixed
regime, which Sidney contrasts favorably with monarchy, are the popular
element and the limits on magistratical power.52 First, regarding the popular
element, Sidney praises mixed regimes like the Mosaic and Roman republics
for embodying the principle of civic equality, for instituting popular assem-
blies, and for their emphasis on the rule of law. Sidney argues that the popular
voice given institutional expression in mixed regimes encouraged an ethos of
civic equality consistent with natural equality. His concern to demonstrate
the importance of this popular voice is reflected in his opposition to the
notion of tacit consent, whereby a people are thought to express their sanc-
tion for a government by simply obeying its laws and not rebelling. Sidney
charges that the “bare sufferance of a government” does not imply consent;
rather, consent requires “an explicit act of approbation, when men have abil-
ity and courage to resist or deny.”53 Sidney strongly suggests that the explicit
consent to rule is available only through popular assemblies where citizens
can participate as members or at least in the election of those members. The
principle of civic equality embodied in the popular element of government
51 Bourbon France is Sidney’s chief example of a great power unable to exert its natural strength
because of the apathy of its subject people (D 2.21.196, 2.28.277). His major examples of
small republics defeating large monarchies are the English Commonwealth in its struggles
with the European powers and the ancient Greek city-states in their defeat of the mighty
Persian Empire (D 2.11.134–5, 43–4). Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1283a20 for the classical repub-
lican claim to citizenship based on military service.
52 Sidney treats what he calls “the magistracy” as something like the modern executive, i.e.,
any supreme officer who administers the laws, not necessarily a king. Thus, the Israelite
judges or the Roman consuls could play this traditionally monarchical part in the mixed
regime (D 2.8.126). Throughout this chapter dedicated to Sidney, we will retain his use of
“magistratical” rather than the more contemporary “magisterial.”
53 D 2.6.108–9.
found expression in the classical republican emphasis on the rule of law. For
Sidney, law-abidingness is a republican virtue.54 This virtue recognizes that
while government requires a restraint on natural liberty, this restraint must
be general. Only in a regime governed by law can the structures of the state
preserve a measure of civic equality. Moreover, the rule of law allows the
redress of injury without recourse to force. Sidney argues that the rule of law
secures justice among citizens and allows the state to restrain and punish the
ambition of private citizens seeking to usurp power. In absolute monarchy,
which he poses as antithetical to the rule of law, “every man has recourse to
force” in pursuit of justice and the defense of liberty.55
One key aim of the rule of law, in Sidney’s view, is to limit magistratical
power. He appeals in this respect to the philosophical authority of Hugo
Grotius, who maintained that the law gives and measures the power of mag-
istrates. As we have seen, even Grotius maintained that the people have a
right to resist a magistrate bent on the destruction of the community.56 As
a creature of law, Sidney asserts that magistratical power is of an inherently
limited character. The elevation of private interest that marks absolutism
runs directly contrary to the republican practice of applying law to direct
and restrain magistrates. Absolute monarchy repudiates the civic equality
so central to the preservation of republics and, by extension, constitutes a
rejection of natural liberty. Tyrants, Sidney charges, resist all law and “desire
an unrestrained liberty of doing that which is evil.”57 Indeed, Sidney locates
the symptom of the Roman republic’s decline into empire in the elevation of
its magistrates above the law. These were men like Pompey, “the author and
destroyer of his own laws,” rulers who “could no longer content themselves
with that equality which is necessary among citizens.”58 Sidney argues that
if one individual or group is above the law, then no one is safe. This condi-
tion undermines the general restraint on natural liberty implicit in the social
contract.
The final thrust of Sidney’s defense of classical republicanism expands
beyond the particular criticism of divine right absolute monarchy to identify
a problem inherent in monarchy per se. He reduces his opposition to the
principle of monarchy to the formula: “Whatever is done by force or fraud
to set up the interests and lusts of one man in opposition to the laws of
his country, is purely and absolutely monarchical.”59 In this curious play
on the meaning of the words “purely” and “absolutely,” Sidney classifies
monarchy as an idea, a regime pointing to a deeper principle of corruption in
54 See, for example, Aristotle, Ethics, 1129a31–5, 1129b12–5.

55 D 2.13.151, 2.30.297.
56 Compare D 2.7.115., 2.27.265, 2.17.171 and Grotius, DJB, 1.3.14, 16 and 1.4.11.
57 D 2.14.153, 2.20.195.
58 D 2.18.179–80, 2.26.263, 2.19.184.
59 D 2.24.250.
human nature. While Sidney admits that the corrupt use of public power for
private interest is a possibility in any government, he insists that monarchy is
rooted in it. Monarchy is natural only in the sense that “our depraved nature
is most inclined to it.”60 The purest expression of monarchy is a form of
lawlessness. This is the tendency of one-man rule of any kind, and this is why
republics were so careful to restrain magistrates. Even mixed monarchies,
Sidney suggests, find it difficult to resist the slide into absolutism.
Machiavellian Republicanism
At a point roughly two-thirds through the second chapter of the Discourses,
Sidney’s defense of classical republicanism takes a dramatic Machiavellian
turn. He explicitly jettisons some of the central elements of classical repub-
lican thought. Instead of defending traditional republican moderation and
anti-imperialism, Sidney praises wars of territorial expansion; rather than
lauding the classical republican concern for civic unity, he commends the
salutary consequences of popular tumults. In praising the imperialistic and
turbulent Roman Republic at the expense of Sparta, the classical exemplar
of moderation and civic unity, he follows Machiavelli rather than respected
ancient commentators like Plutarch and Polybius.61 Sidney’s broad defense
of the idea of republicanism ultimately narrows into a specific theory of re-
publicanism rooted in a Machiavellian conception of human nature rather
than that of the ancients.
The classical republican argument for citizen armies rested on a concern
to ensure communal self-government. While Sidney praises both Sparta and
Rome as regimes dedicated to war, he presents a distinction between the
ends these republics pursued through war. He relates: “some of those that
60 See D 2.19.189 and 2.24. 234, where Sidney describes the passions in these terms: “Every
man has passions, few can moderate and none can wholly extinguish them.”
61 Plutarch, “Life of Lycurgus” in The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, John Dryden,
trans. (New York: Everyman, 1952): pp. 49–74 and Polybius, The Histories, Evelyn
Shuckburgh, trans. (Lake Bluff, IL: Regnery Gateway, 1987): VI 10–11, 48. Cf. Cicero’s
criticism of the Roman tumults in Cicero, Republic, II: 33 (Cicero, The Republic and The
Laws, Niall Rudd, trans. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988]). For good treatments
of Machiavelli,’s decisive break from the classical republican view of human rationality,
civic concord, and political moderation, see Harvey Mansfield, New Modes and Orders: A
Study of the Discourse on Livy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979); Paul Rahe, “Situating
Machiavelli,” in Renaissance Civic Humanism, James Hankins, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000): pp. 270–308 (esp. pp. 293–308); and Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli’s
Three Romes: Religion, Human Liberty, and Politics Reformed (DeKalb: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1996). For the contrary view, which associates Machiavelli with classical
republicanism broadly understood, see Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975):
pp. 183–218 and Quentin Skinner, “Machiavelli’s Discorsi and the Pre-Humanist Origins
of Republican Ideas,” in Machiavelli and Republicanism, Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and
Maurizio Viroli, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): pp. 121–41.
intended war desir’d to enlarge their territories by conquest; others only to

preserve their own, and to live with freedom and safety upon them. Rome
was of the first sort; . . . On the other side the Spartans.” A few pages later,
Sidney implicitly refers to Machiavelli to decide the contest between Sparta
and Rome: “ the best judges of these matters have always given the preference
to those constitutions that . . . think it better to aim at conquest, rather than
simply to stand upon their own defense.”62
What is perhaps most striking in Sidney’s choice of Rome over Sparta is
that he bases this decision on an understanding of politics alien to the classical
republican tradition that these two regimes represent. Sidney justifies Roman
imperial expansion by reference to a theory of the natural process of growth
and decay. As he states, if a nation does not grow, “it must pine and perish;
for in this world nothing is permanent; that which does not grow better will
grow worse.” Sidney reveals that by “better” he means stronger:
That government is evidently the best, which, not relying upon what it does at first
enjoy, seeks to increase the number, strength, and riches of the people; and by the
best discipline to bring the power so improved into such order as may be of most use
to the publick.63
The inevitable process of expansion and demise is rooted in the natural

state of hostility between peoples. Sidney’s preference for Roman imperialism
over Spartan moderation depends on his reflections on the brutal character
of nature. In their concern for virtue and decent political life, the classical
republican theorists who praised Sparta did not, he suggests, adequately
appreciate that the natural state of international relations is a brutal struggle
and competition for scarce resources.
With this presentation of an essentially Machiavellian view of the natural
state of war, Sidney indicates the dramatic shift from his earlier position. God
and nature are no longer assumed to be hospitable to and providing for hu-
man needs. Classical republican and Catholic natural law theorists assumed
a greater beneficence in nature than there actually is. In praising war as good
in itself, because it reflects the natural necessity of power, Sidney registers
his increasing distance from Aristotle.64 One of the prominent features of
Sidney’s Machiavellian turn is the reduction of reason to an instrument of
the passions. Sidney’s presentation of reason’s inability to secure justice in a
violent world reveals that the moral and intellectual benefits of association
62 D 2.22.203, 205. Cf. Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Harvey Mansfield and Nathan
Tarcov, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996): bk. 1, chs. 2, 6.
63 D 2.23.209.
64 See Aristotle, Politics, 1271b1–2, 1333b4–15. Cf. Vickie B. Sullivan, “Muted and Manifest
English Machiavellianism: The Reconciliation of Machiavellian Republicanism with
Liberalism in Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Government and Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s
Letters,” in Machiavelli’s Republican Legacy, Paul Rahe, ed. (in press), pp. 14–15 of currently
unpublished manuscript.
are not a truth immediately apparent to human beings. Rome surpassed its
classical republican contemporaries not because of the genius of its founders
or the carefully crafted reason behind its institutions, but rather because
the regime unleashed the passions of its citizens in brazen, lupine wars of
expansion.
Whereas classical republicans emphasized civic unity, Sidney argues that
the Roman popular tumults were a salutary device that corrected defects
in the original constitution. Even the best-laid constitutions contain defects
and “Rome in its foundations was subject to these defects,” but the prob-
lems “were by degrees discover’d and remedi’d.”65 Opening the magistracies
to the plebs was one such correction. Sidney follows Machiavelli in argu-
ing that the genius of Rome was its appreciation of the positive benefits of
mutability in constitutional orders. Popular discontent acted as a vehicle for
change. Sidney goes so far as to practically equate the legislative power in
Rome with the popular will expressed through tumults. These disturbances,
he argues, “were composed without blood; and those that seemed to be the
most dangerous produced the best laws.”66 Like Machiavelli, Sidney praises
the Roman tumults and contrasts these largely bloodless disturbances with
the periodic spasms of terrible civil violence seen in monarchies.67 He thus
defends the Roman Republic against its monarchist detractors. Yet in con-
trast to the classical republican tradition of Plato and Aristotle, Sidney does
not posit perfect domestic harmony or even civic concord as the proper goal
of political life. Sidney defends the passionate self-interest expressed in the
class warfare of the Roman tumults as the animating principle in a republic
of liberty.
Sidney’s defense of republicanism includes the characteristically Machi-
avellian argument for the benefits derived from periodically reducing nations
to their “first principles.” Like Machiavelli, Sidney’s understanding of these
first principles relates to a nation’s military capacity. He admits that “the wis-
dom of man is imperfect, and unable to foresee the effects that may proceed
from an infinite variety of accidents.” Thus, regarding the “superstructure”
of government, “changes are therefore unavoidable,” though the “founda-
tions” of good government remain “unchangeable.” Sidney points to Moses
65 D 2.13.150. Cf. Machiavelli, Discourses, I: 4–6.

66 D 2.14.153–54. Wood gives a good account of the manner in which Sidney sees popular tu-
mults as indicative of a regime that recognizes popular freedom as one of its constituent ele-
ments (Neal Wood, “The Value of Asocial Sociability: Contributions of Machiavelli, Sidney,
and Montesquieu,” in Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, Martin Fleisher, ed.
[New York: Atheneum, 1972]: pp. 290, 296). I argue, however, that in Chapter Three of the
Discourses, where Sidney deals more particularly with England, he exposes the fundamental
flaw in Machiavellian republicanism to be its inability to properly ground the expression of
popular freedom in institutions, such as the parliament. This grounding is connected to his
greater emphasis in this chapter on fleshing out the character of his natural rights teaching.
67 D 2.24.235–6.
as the one who laid “the foundation of the laws given to the Israelites.”68
While he does not immediately disappoint the traditional or pious expecta-
tion that the foundation of the Israelite regime was fidelity to God’s revealed
laws, Sidney eventually reveals that Moses provided for “the government
given by God to the Hebrews, which chiefly fitted them for war, and to
make conquests.”69 Sidney offers a thoroughly Machiavellianized reading
of Scripture in order to propose the argument that the capacity to wage and
win wars is inseparable from the very foundations of political society. War is
the natural human condition, and any regime not directed to military success
will not endure in the brutal and unforgiving arena of international affairs.
At one point in the discussion in Chapter Two of the Discourses Sidney
uncharacteristically collapses the distinction between republics and abso-
lute monarchies. War, Sidney contends, does not “less concern monarchies
than commonwealths; nor the absolute less than the mixed: All of them
have been prosperous or miserable, glorious or contemptible, as they were
better or worse arm’d, disciplin’d or conducted.” Despite his general ap-
probation of republics vis-à-vis monarchies, he then proceeds to laud “the
Assyrian valour” under Nebuchadnezzar and “the Persians who under Cyrus
conquer’d Asia.”70 These examples of powerful despots raising obscure
peoples to the heights of conquest cast a troubling shadow over Sidney’s
Machiavellian turn. If military success is the only standard by which to judge
regimes, then on what basis can Sidney condemn the absolute monarchies
of Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, or any modern despot who might emerge with
their virtù? Sidney’s rather tepid response is that absolute monarchy may
allow exceptional leaders wide scope for their talents, but it does not gener-
ally produce them. Poor and unknown nations have been carried to military
glory “by the bravery of their princes,” but there is no reliable guarantee that
their virtues will be transmitted to their successors.71 Sidney claims: “The
impossibility of this is a breach never to be repaired.”
In the harsh light of Sidney’s treatment of war, the biggest problem of
absolute monarchy appears to be not its violation of the principle of con-
sent, but rather the very practical problem of its inability to vouchsafe a
perpetual stream of great military leaders. It appears that utility, rather than
legitimacy, is the central problem of despotism. In the closing sections of the
second chapter of the Discourses, Sidney subtly acknowledges the growing
uneasiness of even his most sympathetic readers. The partisans of natural
liberty can only be chilled by Sidney’s praise of the kingcraft of two ancient
68 See 2.17 (chapter title) and 2.17.173–4.

69 D 2.22.205.
70 D 2.23.210–11. Cyrus, of course, was praised by Machiavelli as one his great “armed
prophets,” along with Moses, Theseus, and Romulus, in Chapter 6 of The Prince. See Niccolo
Machiavelli, The Prince, Harvey C. Mansfield, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1985).
71 D 2.23.211.
despots. The argument for consent returns as a major theme after a short but
painful absence. Sidney’s position toward democracy becomes more concilia-
tory than hitherto, and he reaffirms the contractual origins of government.72
He even registers an implicit criticism of Machiavelli by citing two of the
Florentine’s “armed prophets,” Romulus and Theseus, to prove that no sin-
gle man, regardless of his extraordinary courage and strength, “was ever able
to subdue many.”73 In the final chapter, Sidney will try to purge Machiavel-
lian republicanism of its crypto-monarchical tendencies by planting it on a
firm foundation of natural rights. From Sidney’s reformed and popularized
English Constitution, the idea of a radical Whig modern republic is born.
72 D 2.30.298–302, 2.32. It is interesting to note that at 2.30.293 Sidney refers to François

Hotman’s argument in Chapter 6 of Francogallia, where the Huguenot theorist claims that
tyrannical or abusive magistrates are subject to removal by the people because the power
of the rulers is originally conferred by the people. Sidney’s gesture toward Hotman near the
end of Chapter Two clearly prepares the way for Sidney’s more involved reflections on the
Gothic Polity in Chapter Three. While Sidney employs Gothic constitutionalism to refute
Filmer’s contention that all government is monarchical in origin, he differs from a thinker
like Hotman inasmuch as he ultimately consigns the Gothic Polity to a particular historical
period. Moreover, Sidney reveals that the mixed governments of the Gothic Polities of the
“Northern Kingdoms” were grounded on inherently unstable social relations rather than on
the theoretical postulation of popular sovereignty expressed institutionally. Contrast Sidney’s
use of Hotman near the end of Chapter Two (D 2.30.292–3, 295) with his later account of
the collapse of England’s ancient constitution (D 3.28, 3.37.527).
73 D 2.31.305.
7
A New Republican England
Sidney’s broad defense of republican principles culminated in the articulation

of a distinctly modern form of radical Whig republicanism. In his synthesis
of Machiavellian republicanism and the modern natural rights theories of
Hobbes, and especially of Spinoza, Sidney presents a vision of a new English
republic grounded on radical Enlightenment philosophy. This new radical
Whig English republic would be ruled by broadly based popular represen-
tative institutions that would immediately and directly reflect the sovereign
power of the people. Sidney’s republican idea of sovereignty is in a sense as
absolutist as the moderate Whig idea of parliamentary sovereignty of king-
in-Parliament; however, with the republican Sidney, the sovereign power is
emphatically popular, even democratic. As such, Sidney offers a stinging cri-
tique of executive prerogative, and of the mixed and limited monarchical
models of constitutionalism prevalent in England in the seventeenth century.
In this respect, Sidney’s vision of a democratic English republic broke new
and uncharted ground in the Anglo-American constitutional and political
tradition.
Republican Natural Rights

The core of Sidney’s radical Whig republicanism is the idea of natural rights.
These are the rights and liberties of individuals, which are “innate, inherent,
and enjoy’d time out of mind.”1 The character of these rights “subsists as
arising from the nature and being of man.” They derive from a source inde-
pendent of their particular civil or historical context. The ground for Sidney’s
version of rights is the natural equality existing “in a multitude that is not
entered into any society.” This natural equality, however, is more reminiscent
1 Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government, Thomas West, ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund Classics, 1996) (hereafter as D, ch., sec., and, where appropriate page): D 3.9.366,
3.14.394, 3.29.495.
172
A New Republican England 173
of Hobbes than of Bellarmine or Suarez. Sidney claims: “One man can justly
demand nothing . . . where there is no society, one man is not bound by the
actions of another.”2 Moral obligation arises only when individuals offer “a
publick declaration of their assent” to resign their natural liberty.
Natural rights are the underlying premise of Sidney’s treatment of the ori-
gin and ends of government. He states: “the only ends for which governments
are constituted, and obedience rendered to them, are the obtaining of justice
and protection.” As with Hobbes, the core of Sidney’s natural rights teach-
ing is the universal right of self-preservation. The state of natural liberty, for
Sidney, is one of great insecurity in which “a private man from knowledge
of his own weakness and inability to defend himself, must come under the
protection of a greater power than his own.”3 But what do natural rights
imply for the origin of government? First, Sidney’s natural rights argument
establishes the security of property as one of the main motives for the forma-
tion of political society. Commentators on Sidney typically observe that he
does not treat the issue of property with nearly the same degree of attention
as many of his Whig contemporaries. While this is certainly true, this should
not blind us to its importance for Sidney.4 Sidney evinces the individualistic
character of natural rights in his assertion that “liberty consists only in being
subject to no man’s will.” But, he adds, a necessary component of this idea
of liberty is the means to self-preservation:
Property also is an appendage to liberty; and ’tis as impossible for a man to have a
right to lands or goods, if he has no liberty, and enjoys his life only at the pleasure
of another, as it is to enjoy either when he is deprived of them.5
As such, Sidney charges that one of the duties of political rulers is “to pre-
serve the lands, goods and liberties of their subjects.” By identifying one of
the primary ends of government to be the protection of the individual “in the
peaceful enjoyment and innocent use of what I possess,” Sidney denies
the moral and psychic telos posited in classical philosophy and Christian
thought.
2 D 3.29.495, 3.33.510–11.
3 D 3.33.512, 3.41.548–9.
4 Contrast Sidney’s sporadic treatment of property with John Locke, Two Treatises of Govern-
ment, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), II: ch. 5 and James
Tyrrell, Patriarcha, Non Monarcha (1681): pp. 109–13∗ (second pagination) (hereafter PNM).
One major exception to the general neglect of the property issue among Sidney scholars is
Houston, who does treat Sidney’s notion of property in the context of its relation to the more
celebrated theory of Locke (Houston, Algernon Sidney, pp. 111–14).
5 D 3.16.402–3. Sidney repeats the formula in the following sentence, later at 3.42.557 and
3.43.558. Cf. Neal Wood (“The Value of Asocial Sociablity: Contributions of Machiavelli,
Sidney and Montesquieu, in Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, Martin Fleisher,
ed. [New York: Atheneum, 1972]: p. 292) where he identifies Sidneyan civil society as a
contractual arrangement intended to secure rights like property in land and goods.
In presenting property rights as an appendage of liberty, Sidney follows

a broadly Grotian reading of the origin of private property. He maintains
that the original title to property derived from a kind of seizure right. The
original negative community – no one owning anything in particular – soon
gave way, in Sidney’s view, to the claims of occupancy. Sidney relates:
If every man take upon him to seize what he could, a certain method of making the
distribution was necessarily to be fixed; and it was fit, that every man should have
something in his own hands to justify his title to what he possessed, according to
which controversies should be determined.6
While Sidney does not indicate that the creation of private property required
the approval of the entire community, he does maintain that individual prop-
erty rights are not the result of feudalism but were always derivative of
membership in the larger society.7 Thus, while political society may raise the
normative status of property rights from an insecure natural seizure right
to a mutually recognized civil right, it is the claim of natural rights, rather
than membership in the community, that is the primary source of property
for Sidney.
However, the most fundamental aspect of Sidney’s treatment of the
origins of political society is his attempt to mediate between the posi-
tions of Hobbes and Machiavelli. As we have seen, Sidney suggested that
Machiavelli’s republicanism was prejudiced by his indiscriminate praise of
men like Cyrus, the founder of the Persian autocracy.8 In Chapter Six of
The Prince Machiavelli exalts Cyrus in addition to Moses, Romulus, and
Theseus as “armed prophets” who founded great empires. Machiavelli
presents these men as extraordinary individuals who gained command of
a relatively small armed force capable of dominating an obscure and dis-
tressed people and then transforming them into a conquering nation. Though
Theseus, Romulus, and Moses were, in contrast to Cyrus, founders of re-
publics, this founding was not an expression of popular consent, but rather
showed the effective and calculated use of terrifying force. In Machiavelli’s
view, only the simulation of the anxiety and insecurity of a state of natural
6 D 3.29.496.
7 Conniff observes that Sidney ties property rights to membership in the community but never-
theless roots this right in the natural self-preservation right of the individual rather than in the
consent of the community (see James Conniff, “Reason and History in Early Whig Thought:
The Case of Algernon Sidney,” The Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 23 [July 1982]: p. 409).
8 In this respect, Sidney differs from the pattern of Spinoza and Rousseau. They expressed the
view that Machiavelli’s study of kingcraft in the Prince was actually a satire of princes intended
to educate a republican audience. See Benedict Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise and A
Political Treatise, R. H. M. Elwes, trans. (New York: Dover, 1951): V, 7, p. 315 and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, On Social Contract, in Rousseau’s Political Writings, Alan Ritter and Julia
Conaway Bondanella, eds., (New York: Norton, 1988): III, 6, p. 129. In contrast, Sidney
treats Machiavelli’s monarchical tendencies as a problem inherent in the latter’s conception
of the origins of political society.
liberty can produce the proper conditions for founding any well-ordered po-
litical society, whether republican or monarchical.9 And Machiavelli implies
that the power to do this, at least initially, is generally not popular.
One of the ironies in Sidney’s thought is that he employed an essentially
Hobbesian natural rights teaching to expunge the crypto-monarchical ten-
dencies he saw in Machiavelli. The antipathy of the arch-royalist Hobbes
to the republican school associated with Machiavelli is a prominent fea-
ture in the former’s work.10 In order to understand Sidney’s complex po-
sition regarding these two giants of early modern political thought, it is
necessary to identify an important element in Hobbes’ treatment of the
origin of government. Hobbes understood the origin of political society in
terms of two distinct processes: the “Commonwealth by Institution” and the
“Commonwealth by Acquisition.” While the rights of the sovereign are the
same in both, they differ inasmuch as in the former individuals choose their
sovereign “for fear of one another,” whereas in the latter they “subject them-
selves to him they are afraid of.”11 Hobbes’ Commonwealth by Acquisition
is but another version of the regimes founded by Machiavelli’s “armed
prophets.” Sidney’s method is to defend the popular and freely given consent
of the Commonwealth by Institution against the coercive models offered by
Machiavelli and Hobbes. Although Hobbes was open to the possibility of
violent foundings, he was less taken by its furious charms than the famous
Florentine.
It is the latent populism of Hobbesian natural rights theory to which
Sidney appeals. Even in the midst of his defense of classical republicanism
Sidney offered circumspect praise of Hobbes. He observed that “Hobbes
fearing the advantage” taken by bold and violent men
[h]as no regard at all to him who comes in without title or consent; . . . and allows
all things to be lawful against him, that may be done to a publick enemy or pirate:
which is as much as to say, any man may destroy him who can.12
9 Sullivan, “Muted and Manifest English Machiavellianism: The Reconciliation of Machi-

avellian Republicanism with Liberalism in Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Government and
Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s Letters,” ed. Paul Rahe (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, in press): pp. 6–7. See also Harvey Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1996), ch. 2 and Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, IL:
Free Press, 1958): pp. 25, 70–1. In viewing the difference between Machiavelli and Sidney
regarding first principles as one of populism versus violent foundings, rather than a difference
relating to historical progress, my argument differs from that of Worden (see Blair Worden,
“The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney,” Journal of British Studies, vol. 24, no. 1
[January 1985]: 1–40, esp. 19).
10 For Hobbes’ harsh criticism of republicanism, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edwin
Curley, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994): 21.8–9, pp. 139–41 and De Cive in Man and
Citizen (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991): 10.8–15, pp. 228–33.
11 Hobbes, Leviathan, 20.2–3. pp. 127–8.
12 D 2.24.221.
Sidney wryly notes that whatever Hobbes “may be guilty of in other respects,
he does in this follow the voice of mankind.” While Sidney never goes so far as
to call Romulus, Theseus, et al. public enemies or pirates, he does consciously
diminish their importance as founders in favor of the more popular notion
of consent. For example, Sidney finds the origin of Rome not in the “armed
prophet” Romulus, but rather in the meeting of “a company of Latins,
Sabines and Tuscans” on the banks of the Tiber. These men, Sidney con-
tinues, “carried their liberty in their own breasts. . . . This was their charter;
and Romulus could confer no more upon them.”13 When Machiavelli
speaks of the need periodically to return states to their “first principles,”
it often means to a state of nearly universal fear like that produced by its
founder-conquerors. When Sidney speaks of returning to first principles, it
always means popular freedom. Sidney’s Rome was clearly a commonwealth
by institution.
Despite Sidney’s reliance on an essentially Hobbesian understanding
of natural rights, radical Whig republican politics is more akin to that
of Machiavelli. Sidney tried to purge the monarchical undertones in
Machiavelli’s thought precisely to purify the latter’s conception of repub-
lican government. According to Sidney, Machiavelli recognized the dangers
magistratical power posed for republican self-rule, but he failed to pro-
vide the theoretical foundation necessary to assess and limit this danger
properly. Sidney employs the individualist logic of Hobbes’ consent theory
against Machiavelli’s violent foundations in order to correct a fundamentally
Machiavellian position. Indeed, as we shall see, the great majority of Sidney’s
argument expressed serious disagreement with Hobbes over the character of
sovereignty.
The Problem of Executive Power

Radical Whig republicanism expressed a deep distrust of executive power.
In Sidney’s treatment of England’s mixed Constitution, executive power is
identified as one of the principal dangers to popular liberty. In contrast to
Hobbes, Sidney argued that any free people must establish “the moderate
government of a legal and just magistracy.”14 Sidney emphasizes that the
popular foundation of regimes precedes the magistracy and thus can limit and
direct it through law. The three most important limitations Sidney identifies
that inform a “legal and just magistracy” are the separation of powers,
certain prescribed fundamental laws, and the natural limits of the power
of any single human being. Consent implies the power to limit the power
created by the people.
13 D 3.25.462, 3.33.511.
14 D 3.10.370.
The primary aim of Sidney’s discussion of the separation of powers is to

distinguish magistracy from sovereignty. The first phase of Sidney’s argument
is his assertion that kings or other magistrates are created by the people, not
vice versa. Rather than the monarch or executive officer, Sidney claims that
the legislative body is the primal expression of political power in any civil
society. In the specific case of England, Sidney claims to prove “the essence
of parliaments to be as ancient as our nation.” With this claim, Sidney aims
to make two points. First, he offers a standard Whig response to the royalist
charge that Parliament originated in and continues by virtue of royal grace.
In positing Parliament as antecedent to the institution of monarchy, Sidney
presents royal power as one delegated from the legislature: “All magistratical
power . . . receives its being and measure from the legislative power in every
nation.”15 Thus, by definition, nations are legally constituted bodies. The
second point Sidney makes, in contrast to Machiavelli, is that founding is
an essentially legislative process. Sidney’s presentation of the inherent limits
on magistratical power expresses his concern to demonstrate that the first
and most fundamental active agency in regime formation is the agreement
of many individuals to unite into one legislative body; it is not the awesome
exercise of brute force.
Sidney defines the “two swords” of government as the sword of justice
and the sword of war. These swords represent the powers of government that
Sidney emphasizes must be located in separate bodies if mixed government
is to survive and flourish. Moreover, he claims that historically in good gov-
ernments the magistrates have been given partial but not total power over
both swords. The sword of justice, in Sidney’s view, includes the legislative
and executive power, and the sword of war relates exclusively to military
command.16 While Sidney never offers a detailed treatment of the latter, he
goes to considerable lengths to show that mixed regimes in the past have
given their magistrates only partial control over the legislative and executive
functions. For example, Sidney refers to the Hebrew regime as one in which
the king could make no law and could only judge controversies in conjunc-
tion with the Sanhedrin council of nobles. In Sparta, Sidney claims, the kings
had no role in the legislative or judicial functions but were restricted purely
to military command.17 In both cases, the power of the kings was limited by
a legislative body of some kind.
The second major source of limitation Sidney identifies for magistrati-
cal power is that of prescribed legal limits. These limits both inhere in the
15 D 3.9.366, 3.12.386.
16 D 3.10.374. The sword of justice seems to include the judicial function or, as Sidney terms
it, the power of “judging controversies.” It is important to note that Sidney’s “two swords”
appear to replace the Christian-Aristotelian notion of the swords spiritual and temporal.
Cf. D 2.24.219.
17 D 3.10.374–5.
legislative process and represent basic fundamental laws directing and re-
straining magistratical action. Sidney claims that mixed government estab-
lishes the powers in such a way that the legislative body formulates the public
good that a king, for example, must pursue. However, Sidney also turns to
fundamental laws as means to bind the actions of magistrates. For example,
he argues that in England the Magna Carta commands the kings never to
“sell, delay, nor deny justice to any man, according to the laws of the land.”
Likewise, Sidney claims that in republican Rome “there was a reservation
of the supreme power in the people, notwithstanding the creation of the
magistrates without appeal.”18 Thus, Sidney defends the possibility of creat-
ing laws unalterable by magistratical action. These laws support the formal
separation of powers by providing the people with a means to measure the
rectitude of the executive’s actions.
Sidney’s treatment of the issue of legal limits on magistratical power
closely relates to his opposition to the principle of prerogative. The idea
of prerogative so dear to English royalists held that magistrates are justified
in acting above, beyond, or even against the law if the public good requires
such action. Sidney is unique, even among Whig theorists, inasmuch as he
utterly rejects the idea of prerogative power. He does so on a number of
grounds. First, Sidney maintains that regardless of the public good that may
be served by prerogative power in particular instances, in the general scheme
of political affairs it destroys the liberty it intends to protect. Sidney’s chief
concern is that prerogative power sets a dangerous constitutional precedent,
inasmuch as while good rulers may act for the public good, bad rulers may
appeal to the precedent of their virtuous predecessors in order to do ill.19
Second, Sidney maintains that the traditional royalist argument for prerog-
ative in cases of equity and in the pardon power was unjustified given that
royal exercise of this right did no genuine good for protecting the liberty of
the subjects and only excused royal interference in the legal process. Instead
he advances the position that the rights of the accused are best protected by
the institution of grand and petty juries composed of the accused’s peers.
Sidney both endorses and extends the claims for the popular element in the
judicial process by maintaining that juries may act as triers both of fact and
of law. He claims that “grand and petty juries, are not only judges of matters
of fact, as whether a man be kill’d, but whether he be kill’d criminally.”20
Sidney argues that unlike powerful magistrates, whose interference in judi-
cial cases would be hard to resist if prerogative were widely accepted, the
malfeasance of individual jurors may be deterred or at least punished by the
threat of an indictment for perjury.
18 D 3.14.394–5.
19 D 3.21.442. Despite their differences over the issue of prerogative, Locke also feared this
problem. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988): II:166.
20 D 3.22.447.
Sidney is also ambivalent toward the traditional royalist argument that

prerogative is necessary as an emergency power. He does not completely re-
ject this argument; rather, he defines this power narrowly and then extends
its application far beyond the unique purview of magistrates. Sidney accepts
the emergency power as a central ingredient of magistratical duty. How-
ever, he restricts this power to that of calling the popular assembly at times
“when the law does not exact it.”21 While the magistrate remains in office
when the popular assembly is not in session, his only discretionary power,
according to Sidney, is to assess the threat of an emergency and then do his
duty to reconvene the assembly. To this narrow definition of magistratical
prerogative, Sidney adds the important proviso that this power is not the
exclusive preserve of the magistrate. As he relates of the Romans, “when
Hannibal was at the gates . . . no wise man can think that formalities were to
have been observed. In such cases every man is a magistrate.”22 Thus, Sidney
radicalizes and popularizes this emergency power element of prerogative by
extending it to any member of the assembly or to the public. In Sidney’s view,
popular or legislative bodies contain within themselves a right of convening,
regardless of the exact stipulations of law.
On one level, Sidney’s opposition to prerogative is very practical. The
potential advantages of such a magistratical right are severely outweighed by
the palpable dangers. Moreover, these advantages may be gained more safely
and reliably by extending discretionary power to the other, more popular
elements of the government. Prerogative is, by and large, antithetical to the
public good and individual liberty. Yet, Sidney also poses a more theoretical
objection to prerogative. He explicitly connects the practice of prerogative
with the principle of divine right. He relegates the practice of unlimited
prerogative to a time of greater “simplicity” in the distant past, when men
were unschooled in the abuses of power it introduces.23 He implies that it
begins a dangerous process of encouraging popular acceptance of arbitrary
acts, a process that almost inevitably eventuates in the divinization of politics.
Even the worldly-wise Romans, in Sidney’s view, succumbed to this tendency.
Sidney adduces the case of Augustus, who came to power through the support
of a “mad corrupted soldiery” and ruled the people arbitrarily, but who came
in time to be “the object of their religion.”24 For Sidney, prerogative power
undermines the principle of consent by affirming a right of political action
independent of the popular will expressed through law.
Another, more fundamental limit on magistratical power that Sidney iden-
tified is the natural limit of any individual’s physical power. In his discussion
about the difference between the coactive and directive power of law he
21 D 3.39.538.
22 D 3.38.528.
23 D 3.21.443.
24 D 3.24.455.
equates right and power: one has the right to do, what one has the power to
do, and by nature a magistrate’s power is very limited. Sidney’s reflections
on the relation between the right to command and the power to command
are at the core of his theory of radical Whig republicanism. Sidney denies
that the “coactive” (or coercive) power of law is inherent in the magistratical
office. For example, although Nero formally exercised the coercive power
of the Roman Empire for a time, when the legions overthrew him it became
apparent that Nero, as an individual, had little or no coercive power over a
multitude of people.25 The unifying thread in Sidney’s observations on the
directive and coactive power of law is his concern to show the natural foun-
dations of democracy. It is only in popular regimes that these two aspects
of law, right and power, can be made compatible. The tendency to equate
power and right in Sidney’s treatment of law rests on a deeper metaphysical
reflection on the natural order of power. It is in this respect that the influence
of Spinoza emerges as a key element in Sidney’s thought. While accepting the
Hobbesian premise of the origin of government in consent and the natural
rights of individuals, Sidney follows Spinoza in advancing a harsh criticism
of the absolutist implications Hobbes drew from this premise. Sidney asso-
ciates strength, and thus right, with popular government because it alone
among regimes actively engages the collected power of the multitude of in-
dividuals.26 The right to rule is coextensive with the power to rule. Thus,
Sidney responds to Hobbes that democracy is stronger than autocracy. The
weakness of the individual Nero is indicative of the weakness of the individ-
ual per se. The government that best secures the liberty of the individual is
that which most effectively augments the power of the individual with the
collected power of the multitude of individuals.
Sidney’s defense of popular sovereignty against Hobbes’ absolutism mir-
rors that of Spinoza little more than a decade earlier. In the Theologico-
Political Treatise, Spinoza implicitly responded to Hobbes:
Men have never so far ceded their power as to cease to be an object of fear to the
rulers who received such power and right; . . . If it were really the case that men could
25 D 3.11.382. Winston Churchill succinctly described the phenomenon of military rule in

England, a situation all too familiar to Sidney, as follows: “The story of the Second Civil
War is short and simple. King, Lords, and Commons, landlords and merchants, the City
and the countryside, bishops and presbyters, the Scottish army, the Welsh people, and the
English Fleet, all now turned against the New Model Army. The Army beat the lot” (Winston
Churchill, A History of the English Speaking Peoples: The New World, Volume II [New York:
Dodd, Mead, 1956], p. 274). Cf. Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 402–33, for a more comprehensive, though less dramatic,
treatment of the war.
26 See Benedict Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, R. H. M. Elwes,
trans. (New York: Dover, 1951): TPT 16. 205 and PT 4.1.309, 8.3–4.347 (here and hereafter
TPT and PT, respectively, followed by chapter, page number, and section for PT). Spinoza’s
understanding of the relation between power and right explains his shared concern with
Sidney regarding the dangers of a corrupted military. See Spinoza, PT 7.12.333.
be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any further influence
on affairs . . . it would then be possible to maintain with impunity the most violent
tyranny, which, I suppose, no one would for an instant admit.27
As Sidney argues repeatedly in the last chapter of the Discourses, echoing

Spinoza, democracy is the most natural, and thus the best, regime because
it is physically impossible for an individual or even an unarmed but sub-
stantial minority to govern a multitude without their consent. From this
Spinozist modification of Hobbesian natural rights theory, Sidney offers a
defense of popular republicanism against Hobbesian absolutism. By link-
ing the doctrine of natural liberty to the contention that all legitimate rule
rests on popular sovereignty and is directed to the security of rights, Sidney
establishes the theoretical foundations of radical Whig republicanism.
It is with regard to the issue of revolution that the difference between
Sidney’s popular sovereignty theory and Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty is
most apparent. Sidney refers directly to Hobbes to disprove the latter’s claim
that insofar as the people give all their power to the sovereign, the sovereign
can use this power to absolve himself of the crime of perjury. While Sidney
agrees with Hobbes’ minor premise – the sovereign derives all his power
from the people – he disputes the absolutist implications of this premise.
Echoing Spinoza, Sidney responds that the people have not “conferred upon
him all, but only a part of their power.”28 With this reservation of power
in the people as a collectivity over and against that power granted to the
political ruler, Sidney expands the notion of inalienable rights far beyond
the limits set by Hobbes.29 It amounts to a general right of revolution. What
is particularly striking in Sidney’s treatment of this reservation of power
in the people is the emphasis on the collective right of the people to rebel
against the institutions of their own creation. Within this logic of rebellion,
there is a further subset of assumptions validating the legitimate rights and
power of the legislative assembly over those of the magistrate or monarch.
Sidney assumes that if government is created by naturally free and equal be-
ings in pursuit of their security and advantage, then any formal structure of
government or any particular ruler is subject to replacement by the sovereign
people. Sidney maintains that political obligation only extends to a govern-
ment demonstrably pursuing the public interest.
Sidney’s position on the right of revolution signals his profound differ-
ences from Hobbes. Although he advances a theory of natural rights and
the contractual origins of government that reflects some central Hobbesian
27 Spinoza, TPT 17.214–15. While primarily directed against Hobbes, I believe this statement
would also constitute one of Spinoza and Sidney’s objections against the possibility of con-
tractual absolutism in Grotius.
28 D 3.17.409. Cf. Hobbes, Citizen, 6.14, 7.11, 12.4.
29 Sidney argues that vis-à-vis government “the people continue as free as the internal
thoughts of a man” (D 3.36.521). For Hobbes’ limits on inalienable rights, see Leviathan,
21.8–9.141–5.
premises, Sidney repudiates Hobbes by validating revolution as a reflection

of the popular foundations of any regime. The “extrajudicial” power ex-
pressed in revolution is merely the exertion of the collected power of in-
dividuals, which underlies the actions of government. For Sidney, only the
collected power of individuals can ensure the end of government, the protec-
tion of rights, and the preservation of free and popular institutions. Sidney
marks a sharp distinction between the political obligation of the individual
and the constitutive power of the community as a whole. He argues that
the obedience due to government from “private men is grounded upon and
measured by the general law; . . . the whole body therefore of a nation can-
not be tied to any obedience that is inconsistent with the common good,
according to their own judgment.”30 By this Sidney does not, of course,
deny the individual’s right of resistance; rather, he emphasizes that only an
entire community acting as a collectivity can legitimately alter the system
of government. Indeed, he defines the “general revolt of a nation” as noth-
ing less than such a radical constitutional reordering. His response, then, to
Hobbesian natural rights absolutism includes the argument that autocracy
is too weak to secure even the individual right of self-preservation. Sidney
opines that “the best constitutions are of no value, if there be not a power to
support them.” The animating force of all legitimate constitutional orders,
Sidney continues, is “the power of the whole.”31 Autocratic regimes, he con-
tends, are isolated from popular support and thus are vulnerable to internal
and external threats.
England Old and New

Sidney’s argument for popular sovereignty underlies his entire treatment of
the English Constitution. He defends the popular origins of the English
Constitution against the royalist position rejecting the independence of
Parliament.32 In Sidney’s presentation of his country’s government, the the-
oretical “ought” is popular sovereignty expressed through parliamentary
supremacy. However, the practical and historical reality differs substantially
from this principle of legitimacy. Sidney’s reflections on the historically unre-
solved problem of royal pretensions to supremacy and the uncertain future
of England’s hereditary nobility cast serious doubt on the future success or
even survival of the English Constitution. It is only in his account of English
constitutional development that Sidney discloses the full extent of his de-
parture from traditional English mixed regime theory. Sidney suggests that
30 D 3.36.519.
31 D 3.36.524.
32 See, for example, Filmer’s argument that Parliament originates in and continues by royal
grace and the plenitude of royal power (Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann
Somerville, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): ch. 3, secs. 12–14).
the English experiment in mixed government has failed and can only be
corrected by a radical reordering culminating in an unshakable legislative
supremacy. From Sidney’s defense of the ancient mixed constitution against
the divine right challenge, a new, more democratic and republican England
emerges.
Sidney asserts that the popular origin of the English regime lies with those
“lovers of liberty,” the Saxons. He claims that “the Saxons in their own
country had their councils, where all were present,” and they carried this
practice with them to England.33 These radically democratic councils pre-
existed and actually created the monarchy: “tho our ancestors had their
councils and magistrates . . . they had no kings.” It was by these “general
councils and assemblies” that “kings were made.” Sidney emphasizes that
the legislative power inhering in the people and expressed through their uni-
versal participation in the general assemblies is not only the source of the
monarchy, but also signifies the popular foundation of the English nobil-
ity. The important role of the nobility in the creation of England’s mixed
government is central for Sidney. He claims: “In all the legal kingdoms
of the North, the strength of the government has always been placed in
the nobility; and no better defense has been found against the encroach-
ment of ill kings.”34 However, the Saxon nobility in Sidney’s account is not
the exclusive hereditary aristocracy of the later England; rather, the nobil-
ity itself was originally inseparable from England’s democratic foundation.
Sidney claims “that those called noblemen . . . are often by the historians
said to be . . . an infinite multitude.” Sidney’s democratic interpretation of
the term “nobility” rests on his association of noble titles with military
service. Among a people like the Saxons, “perpetually in arms,” military
service as a claim to title provides for a highly egalitarian understanding of
nobility.35 In principle, the Saxon popular assembly and their council of
nobles could have been virtually identical.
With this claim that England’s mixed constitution originated in a popu-
lar foundation – an elective monarchy and a highly democratic council of
33 D 3.28.479 (emphasis mine), 481. In contrast to Conniff (“Reason and History,” pp. 399,
404, 412) and J. G. A. Pocock (The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987]: pp. 46, 188, 238), I do not believe Sidney appealed to
history as a legitimate or determinative source of political right. Rather I agree with Scott
Nelson (The Discourses of Algernon Sidney [Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses,
1993]: p. 43) that Sidney dealt with historical claims to right largely in order to show their
limitations in this regard. However, I believe Sidney appealed to English constitutional history
primarily to criticize the historical understanding of the English Constitution. In this sense,
the need to respond to Filmer afforded Sidney the opportunity to level his criticisms at one
of England’s most revered legal and political traditions.
34 D 3.28.484.
35 D 3.28.487, 490–2. Conniff (“Reason and History,” p. 406) notes that Sidney was unique
among Whig theorists inasmuch as his notion of popular sovereignty contains no clearly
formulated idea of property qualifications.
nobles – Sidney goes some distance in harmonizing the historical origin of the
regime with his theoretical account of natural rights and popular sovereignty.
For Sidney, Saxon history stands as a plausible conceptual tool to delineate
natural democracy. The strength of the Saxon regime lay literally in the body
of the people. However, Sidney acknowledges that English constitutional
development has obscured this popular foundation. The recurring theme in
English history, he argues, has been the profound difficulty in preserving
the balance of power in the mixed Constitution. In fact, Sidney’s stance to-
ward the Constitution becomes increasingly critical throughout the course
of the final chapter. His earlier praise of the Magna Carta sours when he
accuses it of failing to ensure that the law “for annual parliaments was ob-
served.” Sidney’s distance from the ancient Constitution becomes gradually
more palpable:
In England our ancestors who seem to have had some such thing in their eye as
balancing the powers, by a fatal mistake placed usually so much in the hands of the
king, that . . . his extravagances could not be repressed without great danger.36
These two major departures from the government’s popular foundation – the
failure to secure annual Parliaments and the delegation of sweeping powers
to the crown – combined to deal a serious blow to England’s balanced Con-
stitution. These seeds of royal supremacy came to fruition, Sidney relates, in
the “horrid series of the most destructive mischiefs” known as the War of the
Roses.37 The Constitution’s incapacity to restrain regal power encouraged
ambitious nobles backed by armed factions in their struggle for the crown.
Sidney strongly implies that, despite his earlier protestations to the contrary,
Parliament has not always settled the succession in England.38 The balance
of power has historically failed.
The problem lay in both the structural and the sociopolitical dimension
of the English constitutional balance of power. The English attempt to bal-
ance the powers of government structurally by assigning the monarch a role
in the legislative and judicial functions produced, in Sidney’s view, a strong
public impression that all the proceedings of government and the legal sys-
tem depend on the will and judgment of the king and his ministers. Sidney
systematically examines the historical royal powers of calling and prorogu-
ing Parliament, vetoing legislation, pardoning criminals, and presiding in the
courts of law in order to reveal Parliament’s superior claim in these matters.39
In their effort to produce an effective executive power to check the popular
36 D 3.27.475, 477.
37 D 3.35.517.
38 See D 3.18.430 for Sidney’s earlier insistence that Parliament has always possessed a historic
right to determine the succession.
39 For the power to call Parliament, sec D 3.31, 38; the veto, 3.27.476, 3.34, 3.36: the pardon
power, 3.22, 3.45.555; and the courts, 3.26 and 3.42.
assembly, the English produced a constitutional order that consistently and

gradually eroded the legitimate claims of the popular branch.
The sociopolitical dimension of the problem of constitutional balance re-
lates to the collapse of the feudal nobility. Sidney suggests that the nobility
successfully checked royal power when noble title was rooted in military ser-
vice and large property holdings. With their independent source of arms and
wealth, these feudal lords had the wherewithal to resist monarchical preten-
sions.40 However, this reliance on social bases of institutional power proved
mistaken, for the feudal nobility was unable to prevent or even survive the
vicious succession disputes of the later Middle Ages. Sidney claims that the
War of the Roses “was the first step towards the dissolution of our ancient
government.”41 The great losses sustained by the old nobility destroyed their
standing in relation to the new nobility created by the victorious contenders
for the crown. These new nobles were not independent of the king, but rather
were his creatures. The centralization of power in the monarchy, especially
regarding the distribution of titles and land, made nugatory the nobility’s ca-
pacity to resist the king. Sidney implicitly contrasts the democratic character
of the Saxon nobility with the increasingly narrow and dependent position
of their successors.
The primary consequence of the collapse of the feudal nobility is the
stark division of the nation into two camps. Sidney claims: “all things have
been brought into the hands of the king and the commoners, and there is
nothing left to cement them, and to maintain the union.”42 In the dissolution
of the “ancient” English Constitution, Sidney finds the formation of, or
devolution to, a civil society of increasingly autonomous individual rights
bearers. Unforeseen developments have shattered the illusion of England as
an organic whole composed of different social classes with competing and
mutually limiting claims to rule. History has put to the sword the classical
assumptions of English mixed regime theory. For Sidney, England is returning
to its first principles: the balance cannot hold.
The argument for a radical Whig republic in England rests on Sidney’s
view of the legislative supremacy necessary for any legitimate and stable
constitutional order. He does not endorse a return to the pristine Saxon
democracy of the past or advocate the restoration of the mixed Gothic
40 D 3.28.484. Cf. James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, J. G. A. Pocock, ed.

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): pp. 52, 54–6.
41 D 2.24.248.
42 D 3.37.527. In arguing that Sidney rejects the classical republican notion of mixed govern-
ment, my view differs from that of Zera Fink (The Classical Republicans [Chicago: Northwest-
ern University Press, 1962]: pp. 163–5). I agree more with Conniff (“Reason and History,”
pp. 413–16), who maintains that Sidney seriously attempts to incorporate a progressive
theory of history into his natural rights teaching. Unlike Conniff, however, I see Sidney’s
theory of history as closely linked to his critique of the English Constitution as traditionally
understood.
Constitution. He cautions that it is best to make “new constitutions to repair

the breaches made upon the old.” The solution to England’s constitutional
problem, the problem of mixed government, is the institutionalization of the
popular will through parliamentary supremacy.43 Sidney agrees with abso-
lutists such as Filmer, Hobbes, and Bodin that supreme power must be lo-
cated somewhere in any proper constitutional order.44 Indeed, he agrees with
the moderate Whig Tyrrell that the inability to locate the supreme power has
been the cause of England’s constitutional woes. In Sidney’s reformed repub-
lican England, supremacy rests unmistakably in Parliament. Parliamentary
supremacy, in turn, points to a radical popular sovereignty, which stipulates
that legislative supremacy is incompatible with an independent executive.
He denies the executive practically any role in the legislative process: “The
legislative power that is exercised by the parliament, cannot be conferred by
writ of summons, but must be essentially and radically in the people.” In
Sidney’s new England, Parliaments will be regular, democratic, and irre-
sistible. He asserts that “the Legislative Power is always Arbitrary.”45 By
this Sidney does not mean that it is unrestrained or not responsible, but
rather that by nature it can assume the executive and judicial functions of the
government at its own discretion. These functions are essentially delegated
powers. Indeed, by its capacity to express the collected power of individu-
als, Sidney finds the coercive power of law proceeding from the authority of
Parliament.
The distinction Sidney draws between the sovereign right of Parliament,
essentially the Commons, and the subordinate or delegated powers of the ex-
ecutive and judiciary rests on the radical Whig “reflection theory” of repub-
lican sovereignty. Sidney maintains that popular sovereignty must translate
into the constitutional supremacy of the popular legislative body. Sidney’s
defense of popular sovereignty is a product of a Spinozist natural rights
philosophy of power. In Sidney’s Saxon democracy we have the exemplar
of Spinoza’s teaching that “the right of the commonwealth is determined
by the common power of the multitude.”46 Only the lawmaking body with
broad popular representation can reflect both the power and interests of the
43 D 3.37.526–7. Cf. Alan Houston, “Republicanism, the Politics of Necessity and the Rule of
Law,” A Nation Transformed: England after the Restoration, Alan Craig Houston and Steve
Pincus, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): pp. 258–9.
44 In this respect, Sidney differs greatly from the strand of parliamentary contractarianism of
the English civil war period typified by Philip Hunton’s “A Treatise of Monarchie” (1643),
in Divine Right and Democracy, David Woottan, ed. (Hammondsworth: Middlesex: Penguin
Classics, 1986): Hunton maintained that the English Constitution was composed of three
coequal branches, each with some share of the supreme power. Cf. Bodin, Six Books, (1606)
1:10 and 2:1; Hobbes, Leviathan, 29.16.216–17; and Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 155–6.
45 D 3.44.564, 3.45.569. Cf. Houston (Algernon Sidney, p. 195), who observes that by rejecting
prerogative, Sidney virtually abolishes the monarchy.
46 Spinoza PT 3.9.305.
collected power of all the individuals composing society. Sidney’s defense of

parliamentary supremacy in England, and his antimonarchism more broadly,
follow Spinoza’s reasoning that the individual in society “should be no more
conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and will
of the whole body.”47 In Sidney’s adaptation of Spinoza for the context of
England, only Parliament can be sovereign because only Parliament, more
particularly the Commons, can be understood to reflect “the power and will”
of the whole body of the nation.
The reflection theory of sovereignty rests on Sidney’s identification of
power and right. From his understanding of the spectacular weakness of the
individual as an individual, seen dramatically in the examples of Nero and
of any number of ill-fated tyrants described in the Discourses, Sidney draws
the conclusion that the supreme political power in any commonwealth coin-
cides with the body or institution most closely reflecting or approximating
the greatest power, namely, the people as a whole.48 While Sidney and the
moderate Whigs agreed on the need for supreme sovereign power, in this re-
spect Sidney’s natural rights and constitutional theory departs considerably
from the moderate Whig position associated with Tyrrell and Pufendorf.
The latter two, modifying Hobbes and Grotius, retained a compact theory
of sovereignty whereby the determination of constitutional supremacy was
essentially a matter to be settled by contract and agreement. In this theory,
sovereignty could rest in the monarch or in some combination of the exec-
utive and legislative power. Sidney, following Spinoza, looks not to the ex-
plicit terms of the social compact to determine sovereignty, but rather to the
character of the institution assuming this power. For the modern republican
Sidney, only a popular legislative body can retain sovereign power, because
this is the only kind of institution capable of harmonizing the fullest right
with the greatest power. As Sidney’s reinterpretation of the English Consti-
tution clearly indicates, he holds any compact that locates sovereignty in
anything other than a popular institution, for example the English effort to
divide sovereignty in a mixed regime model, as a distortion of the essence of
sovereignty and the nature of power.
At the core of Sidney’s reflection theory of sovereignty is his insistence that
there must be a homogeneity of interests between the governors and the gov-
erned. Legislative supremacy is defensible both because it reflects something
like the general will of society, at least as long as the legislature is marked
by frequent elections and numerous representation, and because the law-
makers are subject to the laws they make, just like every other citizen. Of
course, Sidney indicates that the people may delegate powers to the exec-
utive or to judicial bodies, but this delegation occurs entirely to perform
functions strictly defined and limited by the people or their representatives
47 Spinoza TPT 16.202–3.

48 Cf. D 3.11.
in the legislature. The homogeneity of interests between the people and the
legislators ensures, in Sidney’s view, that magistrates will not govern and
act in pursuit of their particular interest. Once again, Sidney’s version of
democratic republicanism and the reflection theory of sovereignty on which
it is based echo Spinoza’s warning that “[if ] a few are deciding everything
in conformity with their own passions only, liberty and the general good are
lost.”49 Sidney’s fundamentally Spinozist conception of the reflection theory
of sovereign right shapes his understanding of the character and scope of the
institutions operating in a democratic republic like his envisioned new and
improved England.
Although in some important respects Sidney’s argument for legislative
supremacy resembles the position of radical parliamentary contractarians
of the civil war period like Henry Parker, it is crucial to recognize Sidney’s
deeper differences with his parliamentarian predecessors. Both Sidney and
Parker concur that Parliament best represents the interests of the nation as a
whole. Thus, they agree that Parliament can assume the executive functions
of the crown in the event of an emergency or a serious dispute between
the branches of government.50 In addition, Parker and Sidney share a deep
distrust of the principle of balanced government as an end in itself; rather,
both look to the consideration of the efficient cause of government as the
ground of sovereignty. Inasmuch as government derives from the consent of
the people and aims at the public good, then, Parliament as the representative
of the popular will must be supreme in the English constitutional order.51
The popular character of Parliament more or less ensures that it can have
no private interest separate from the public good.
Where Sidney and the parliamentary radicals of the 1640s most clearly di-
verge is over the character of rights. Parker identifies consent as a communal
phenomenon. In viewing consent in terms of the rights of the community as
opposed to the rights of the individual, Parker offers a more restricted notion
of resistance than does Sidney.52 Parker closely follows Grotius in maintain-
ing that a community may rebel against its rulers only to enforce the terms
of the original contract that established the constitutional order. Sidney, as
we have seen, supports the popular right to alter the terms of political rule
49 Spinoza PT 15.14.376.
50 Corinne Weston, “Theory of Mixed Monarchy Under Charles I and After,” English Historical
Review, vol. 75 (July 1960): pp. 435–6 and Henry Parker, “Observations upon some of his
Majesties late Answers and Expresses”: pp. 16, 21–2, 45.
51 Houston, “Republicanism,” pp. 250–1 and Michael Mendle, Henry Parker and the English
Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): p. 183 (see Parker, “Observa-
tions,” 181, 188, 194, 200, 202, 211–12). Cf. Michael P. Zuckert, Natural Rights and the
New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): pp. 73–5 for Parker’s re-
lation to later Whig natural rights thinkers.
52 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979):
pp. 147, 150–1 and Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 75.
unilaterally, on any ground determined by the people. Whereas both Parker

and Sidney reject the Grotian notion of contractual absolutism, they differ
inasmuch as Parker’s notion of resistance and supremacy is constitutionally
conservative – to restore the original construction of powers – while Sidney’s
advocacy of legislative supremacy is inextricably linked to his argument for
the salutary consequences of periodic political change and constitutional
reordering. Moreover, while Parker opposes absolutism as contrary to the
final causality of government, promoting the public good, Sidney eschews
Aristotelian categories altogether and rejects absolute monarchy as antithet-
ical to the modern scientific understanding of the natural order of power
relations. Thus, Sidney’s anti-absolutism is rooted in a conception of nature
substantially different from that of the Calvinist parliamentary radicals of
the English civil war era.
For Sidney, the arbitrariness of Parliament is qualitatively different from
the arbitrary commands of a monarch. The only irresistible sovereign is the
general will of the people understood as the collected will of the multitude
of individuals. Sidney claims: “No nation that has a sovereign power within
itself, does want this king.”53 Here Sidney both reconceptualizes the under-
standing of popular sovereignty in terms of freedom from foreign domination
and affirms the equal abridgment of natural liberty that grounds political so-
ciety and subjects all to the general rule but subjects none to any particular
will. While Sidney’s version of natural rights republicanism places a heavy
emphasis on free institutions – indeed, popular institutions are more central
to Sidney’s account of government than are individual rights – nonetheless, he
is concerned to demonstrate that the will of the people as a collectivity holds
greater moral and political significance than any particular institutional ar-
rangement. Sidney makes the point that even Parliament is not sacrosanct:
“This being under God, the best anchor we have, it deserves to be preserved
with all care, till one of a more unquestionable strength be framed by the
consent of the nation.”54 In Sidney’s radical Whig republicanism, the people
are the source and purest expression of sovereign power.
Democratic republicanism emerges for Sidney, and his republican forbear
Spinoza, as the most stable and most rational system of government. This is
true primarily because it sufficiently suppresses the dangerous human pas-
sions and thus allows the collected wisdom of the people to be expressed
through the institutions of government. As we have seen from Sidney’s cri-
tique of monarchy, he views the strength of the passions as the salient feature
of human life. He charges that “man is of an aspiring nature” and is marked
by “a strange propensity to run into all manner of excesses when plenty
of means invite, and there is no power to deter.” On another occasion he
confessed: “Every man has passions; few know how to moderate, and no
53 D 3.42.555. Cf. D 3.41.548.

54 D 3.45.572.
one can wholly extinguish them.”55 Political society, then, is chiefly a device
to limit the passions and to bring them under the control of reason. Sidney
affirms that liberty without restraint is inconsistent with any government;
therefore, the good people seek is only found in society, which restrains
liberty. Sidney formulates this:
Everyone sees they cannot well live asunder, nor many together, without some rule to
which all submit. This submission is a restraint of liberty, but would be of no effect
as to the good intended, unless it were general; nor general, unless it were natural.56
It is on this basis that Sidney posits law-abidingness as the quintessential

republican virtue. By this argument he also expresses his disagreement with
Hobbes’ sharp distinction between nature and society. The construction of
society is not for Sidney and Spinoza the radical exit from nature that it is
for Hobbes.
Political society, in Sidney’s view, originates in the need to control the
human passions. The passions are brought under the control of reason in
two ways. The first way is by the encouragement of the rational autonomy
of the republican citizen who dedicates himself to the strict observance of the
society’s general laws. For Sidney, the citizen’s dedication to the public good
expressed through law does not indicate the nullification of the individual’s
concern for his private good. Rather, the application of general laws acts as
a constant check on the excesses of unrestrained self-interest and desire. The
second way the passions are brought under the control of reason is by the
institutions of government. It is on the issue of institutional rationality that
Sidney sees democracy’s greatest advantage over monarchy or aristocracy.
His deep suspicion of the capacity of one man or a small group of governors
to control their self-interest in favor of the public good grounds his defense
of democracy. Democracy is the wisest and most stable of regimes. Even a
well-intentioned monarch or ruling class will not provide the stability and
wisdom of a popular assembly. Sidney states:
Many eyes see more than one: the collected wisdom of a people much surpasses that
of a single person, and tho he should truly seek that which is best, ‘tis not probable
he would so easily find it, as the body of a nation, or the principal men chosen to
represent the whole.57
The irregular appetites endemic to the individual of the species are amelio-
rated in the collected wisdom and interest of the whole.
The superiority of popular governments rests on their capacity to provide
institutional expression for the collected wisdom of the people. Moreover,
popular legislative assemblies comprehend the interest of the legislators into
55 D 2.19.184, 187; 2.24.234.

56 D 2.20.192.
57 D 3.16.403.
the common interest more reliably than any alternative system of govern-
ment. Sidney realistically argues that the question is not whether Parliament
is infallible, but rather whether “a house of commons composed of those
who are best esteemed by their neighbours in all the towns and counties in
England, are more or less subject to error” than a monarch or small group
of rulers.58 As such, he affirms that the most important political matters
“ought to be placed where there is most wisdom and stability.” Of course,
for Sidney this is Parliament:
[w]hich being the representative body of the people, and the collected wisdom of the
nation, is least subject to error, most exempted from passion, and most free from
corruption. . . . They cannot do anything that is ill without damage to themselves and
their posterity; which being all that can be done by human understanding, our lives,
liberties and properties are by our laws directed to depend upon them.59
The logical conclusion of Sidney’s argument for the inherent wisdom and
stability of popular institutions is a sovereign power that is in practical terms
as absolute as the Pufendorfian ideal underlying the moderate Whig view of
parliamentary sovereignty: “the power of altering, mitigating, explaining
or correcting the laws of England, is only in the Parliament, because none
but the Parliament can make them.”60 Sidney grants Parliament sweeping
powers of judicial review of its own legislation and control over the strict
construction of the execution of law, all in addition to and deriving from the
lawmaking power itself. In doing so, his modern republican theory leaves
the separation of powers in tatters. Sidney assumes that the legislative body
maintains the government’s strength and stability by anchoring its actions
and legitimacy in the popular will. Thus, the concentration of power is not
Sidney’s real concern; rather, it is where the awesome power of government
is located. When it is located without question in the popular branch, the
combined power and wisdom of that body, and not the separation of powers,
will produce good government.
Sidney is careful, however, to recommend several vital reforms to ensure
that the popular assembly is truly representative of the general will. First,
he advocates the institutionalization of annual Parliaments to keep the body
informed of the public mood and responsible to the public interest. In this
way, he registers his opposition both to the corruption of the lengthy Cavalier
Parliament of 1661–79 and to the very short Parliaments of the Exclusion
period, which were prorogued and later dissolved by the king after a matter of
weeks. Sidney suggests that regular and annual elections will keep Parliament
close to the public interest and will allow for the circulation of membership
to counteract the corrupting effects of long-term incumbency. Moreover, the
58 D 3.38.532 and Proverbs 11:14.

59 D 3.42.557.
60 D 3.22.451.
institutionalization of annual Parliaments practically removes the possibility

of executive caprice in the area of calling and dissolving the popular assembly.
The arbitrary character of the legislative power need not be incompatible
with responsible government. Sidney argues, “what defects soever may be in
any statute, no great inconvenience could probably ensue, if that for annual
parliaments was observed.”61
Second, Sidney offers a mild endorsement of the practice of instructing
members of Parliament. He affirms : “We always may, and often do give
instructions to our delegates.” Though he asserts the public’s right to in-
struct their members on how to vote on specific issues, Sidney recommends
giving these elected officials the freedom to vote their conscience on issues
of national concern. To oblige members to follow particular orders from
the electors on every vote “would make the decision of the most important
affairs to depend upon the judgment of those who know nothing of the mat-
ters in question, and by that means would cast the nation into the utmost
danger.”62 Moreover, Sidney assures that frequent elections would allow
electors to punish unpopular members of Parliament and would actually in-
crease the capacity of deputies to act in the public interest, given that they
only need fear electoral defeat, not death or disgrace. In his discussion of
the instruction issue, Sidney shows that the arbitrary or discretionary power
in his constitutional system ultimately rests with the people, not Parliament.
As Sidney cautions: “The less we fetter them [the delegates], the more we
manifest our rights.”63 The electors have the right or power to bind their del-
egates’ decisions, though he suggests on prudential grounds that they should
consider not doing so as a matter of course.
The final justification for arbitrary legislative power rests on Sidney’s sup-
port for increasing the size of the popular assembly. We should recall that
when Sidney speaks of “Great Assemblies” and the power of bodies “consist-
ing of many men, and several orders of men,” he never repudiates the Saxon
model of direct democracy in principle. The practice of representation arose
in England only due to the “inconveniences” of calling assemblies of large
numbers scattered over great distances.64 The recognition of the practical dif-
ficulties in assembling large popular bodies does not preclude the possibility
of expanding the membership of the legislature. Given the logic of Sidney’s
argument, an expanded Parliament would presumably be a further check
on corruption and would be more representative of the popular will than
the historical House of Commons. A larger, more representative Parliament
subject to annual elections would help ensure that the popular foundations
of the English republic would not become too narrow over time. With these
61 D 3.27.475. Cf. Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 201.

62 D 3.44.567, 69.
63 D 3.44.567.
64 D 2.5.102–3, 3.16.404. Cf. Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 197.
structural reforms in Parliament, England would go some distance toward

embodying Sidney’s vision of a democratic republic directed to the security
of individual rights and free institutions.
Whig Republican Political Science of Liberty: Amsterdam-on-Thames

The recurring theme of the Discourses is Sidney’s attempt to demonstrate
the defective character of practically all prior modes of political thought. He
systematically treats and then shows the limitations of Christian Aristotelian-
ism, classical republicanism, Machiavellian republicanism, and Hobbesian
natural rights theory, all in addition to his originally stated aim of refut-
ing Filmer’s account of divine right monarchy. In his treatment of the En-
glish Constitution, Sidney registers his criticism of traditional English mixed
regime theory and proposes in its stead a democratic republic founded on
popular sovereignty and directed toward the security of free institutions and
individual rights. In Sidney’s new England, radical legislative supremacy is
the sine qua non of political legitimacy as well as the primary device al-
lowing for constitutional change. This radical Whig English republic is both
the product of and the model for Sidney’s political alternative to the earlier
natural liberty theories of government he considers in the book. He incor-
porated various elements of these other natural liberty theories into his own
notion of “political science.”65 He identified this branch of knowledge as
“that which of all others is the most abstruse and variable according to ac-
cidents and circumstances.” Sidney presents this study of politics both as
scientific and prudential, resting on demonstrable, if abstruse, principles of
causality, while also being subject to the many exigencies and contingencies
attending human life and political society. But on what does Sidney base his
political science?
The key to understanding Sidney’s republican political science of liberty is
determining his relation to Spinoza. Sidney’s understanding of the limits and
possibilities of modern republican government was profoundly influenced
by the theory and practice of the Dutch Republic in the 1660s and early
1670s. Both in his early unpublished and only recently discovered work, the
Court Maxims, and in the Discourses, Sidney expressed a deep admiration for
the Dutch Republic. In his time in exile in Holland in the mid-1660s Sidney
was exposed to the work of the most influential republican theorists in that
most notable of European republics. His work shows the pervading influence
of a number of Dutch thinkers, most particularly Benedict Spinoza.66
65 D 2.8.121.
66 Other Dutch republican thinkers who undoubtedly influenced Sidney were the De La Court
brothers, Jean and Pieter, authors of the Political Discourses and The Political Maxims of the
State of Holland, respectively (both published in 1662). The influence of the De La Courts
is most apparent in Sidney’s Court Maxims, Hans Blorn, Eco Haitsma, and Donald Janse,
Sidney moved in circles in which Spinoza was a celebrated, indeed domi-

nant, figure. Their shared commitment to the principles of modern repub-
licanism established their common association with men like Jan DeWitt,
the Dutch republican leader, and Benjamin Furly, the influential Rotterdam
Quaker leader.67 Sidney’s relation to Spinoza went beyond their mutual ded-
ication to the cause of popular government. Indeed, the stamp of Spinozism
is particularly strong in the final chapter of the Discourses, in which Sidney
presents his reformed English Constitution. They both defend democracy on
a similar assessment of the character of the human passions. Sidney rejects
the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty precisely on the Spinozist ground that
democracy, rather than absolute monarchy, is the form of government best
able to restrain the destructive passions and to bring the government and the
people under the control of reason.68 Spinoza’s theoretical defense of Dutch
republicanism so unmistakably influenced Sidney that the Englishman’s
recent biographer Jonathan Scott claims that what distinguished Sidney from
his English contemporaries was the “location of his political perspective in
the world of the European cities, with an accent on Amsterdam.”69
eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), probably written in 1665, whereas I
suggest that Spinoza’s influence is most significant in the later Discourses, written at around
the time of the Exclusion crisis. Cf. Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The Origins and
Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600–1835 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press,
1988): pp. 230–3 and Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 211 for the important role of the De La
Courts in shaping the commercial republican ideology of the Dutch Republic. For Spinoza’s
impact on Dutch republican thought, see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise,
Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998): pp. 917–21. For a treatment
of Spinoza’s influence in the broader context of European thought, and an interpretation the
general thrust of which supports my claims for the connection between Sidney and Spinoza,
see Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–
1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): Parts III–V, esp. ch. 33 on England, which
relates more to English deism than to republicanism per se.
67 Scott, English Republic, pp. 216–17. The fact that Spinoza’s entire corpus was published by
1677 and Sidney wrote the Discourses in the early 1680s makes it possible for Sidney to have
read Spinoza. Moreover, the fact that Sidney had spent time in exile in Holland in the 1660s
and shared acquaintances with Spinoza, men like the republican leader Jan DeWitt, and the
Rotterdam Quaker leader Benjamin Furly suggests that it is more than likely that Sidney
was familiar with Spinoza’s work. Given the great controversy Spinoza provoked at the time
(see Caton, Politics of Progress, pp. 237–9), it is not surprising that Sidney did not refer to
him directly in the Discourses, even as he made characteristically Spinozist arguments. For
evidence of Sidney’s connection to Spinoza and the Dutch republican theorists of the 1670s,
see Scott, English Republic, ch. 13 and Lewis Samuel Feuer, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1958): pp. 50, 271, 289.
68 For Sidney and Spinoza’s similar treatment of the passions, compare D 2.19, 2.24, 3.41
with Spinoza, TPT 17. 230. Also, to see the way in which both Sidney and Spinoza envision
government as a device for the control of the passions, compare D 3.16.404 and Spinoza,
TPT 17.206.
69 Scott, English Republic, p. 210.
In addition to the deep theoretical influence Spinoza had on Sidney, there

was also a great similarity between Sidney’s political project and that of his
Dutch colleague. For example, Spinoza’s project in defense of Dutch repub-
licanism is analogous to Sidney’s defense of parliamentary constitutionalism
in England. The parallels between Holland in the 1670s and Exclusion era
England are striking. Spinoza wrote his great political works, the Theologico-
Political Treatise and the Political Treatise, in large part in order to defend
Holland’s republican institutions against the personal ambitions of the House
of Orange, much as Sidney aimed to efface the personal rule of the Stuarts
in England.70 Moreover, the problematic relation of religion and politics
played a large part in both Sidney’s and Spinoza’s projects. The conserva-
tive Calvinist ministers who supported the Orangist faction were to Spinoza
what the Anglican establishment of Heylyn and his associates were to Sidney:
the clerical agents of monarchy. In order to defuse the political influence of
orthodox or established religion, these republican thinkers proposed inter-
pretations of Scripture that were compatible with, or even sympathetic to,
republican government.
It may, nevertheless, appear odd to connect Sidney with Spinoza, one
of the great system builders of the Enlightenment project. Certainly, Sidney
showed little relish in his work for elaborate metaphysical speculation. There
is nothing approaching Spinoza’s Ethics in Sidney’s corpus. The more obvi-
ous parallels between Sidney and Spinoza come to light primarily from the
latter’s more emphatically political writings. Yet are there signs of a Spinozist
metaphysic underlying Sidney’s political science? Or to put it differently, does
Sidney’s defense of democracy on modern natural rights grounds presuppose
such a metaphysic?
In order to understand the seminal relation between Sidney’s argument in
the Discourses and Spinoza’s modern republicanism, it is useful to compare
some of the key elements in their arguments. Spinoza’s political natural-
ism follows Machiavelli’s decisive break from the classic writers who, he
argues, “conceive of men, not as they are, but as they themselves would
like them to be.” Just as Sidney assumes that “every man has passions;
few know how to moderate,” Spinoza contends that “men are more led by
blind desire than reason.” The most important passion for both Spinoza
and Sidney grounds the natural right whereby humans “strive to seek their
preservation.”71 The preservationist Hobbesian core of Spinozist–Sidneyan
republicanism is subject to a number of important qualifications, however.
70 For a good treatment of the political context and character of Spinoza’s writings, see Etienne
Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, Peter Snowdon, trans. (New York: Verso, 1998), esp. ch. 1.
Cf. Caton, Politics of Progress, pp. 237–9, 241 and Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 796–
806.
71 Spinoza, PT 287, 292 (cf. TPT 230) and Sidney, D 2.24.234, 2.23.210,14 and 3.41.547.
Cf. Spinoza, TPT 16.200 and Benedict Spinoza, Ethics, Edwin Curley, trans. (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books, 1989): part IV, def. viii, p. 191; and part IV, prop. xviii, p. 202.
First, while Spinoza agrees with Hobbes that the state of nature is a violent
condition in which “men are naturally enemies,” he, like Sidney, does not
concur with the Hobbesian emphasis on the profound artificiality of gov-
ernment. Spinoza claims that since “no one in solitude is strong enough to
defend himself, and procure the necessaries of life; it follows that men natu-
rally aspire to the civil state.” Sidney employs practically identical language
in asserting the quasi-natural status of political society: “a private man from
the knowledge of his own weakness and inability to defend himself, must
come under the protection of a greater power than his own.”72 The second
way in which Spinoza and Sidney depart from Hobbes has to do with their
assessment of the political implications of natural liberty. They both advance
a case for the naturalness and superiority of democracy as a regime. Spinoza
declares that “of all forms of government” democracy is “the most natural,
and most consonant with individual liberty. In it no one transfers his natural
right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs.” Sidney opines
similarly that “of all governments, democracy, in which every man’s liberty
is least restrained” is the best regime “because every man hath an equal part,
would certainly prove to be most just, rational and natural.”73
Sovereignty, then, for Sidney and Spinoza has a much more emphatically
popular foundation than is the case either with Hobbes or the Pufendorfian
moderate Whigs. Sidney advances the opposition of one-man rule to the
principle of natural power relations: “No man comes to command many,
unless by Consent or Force.” Spinoza knocks the metaphysical legs support-
ing monarchy even more forcefully: “they are much mistaken, who suppose
that one man can by himself hold the supreme right of a commonwealth.
For the limit of right . . . is power. But the power of one man is very inad-
equate to support so great a load.” For both Sidney and Spinoza, the only
firm basis of supreme authority is the collected power of “the multitude.”74
The sovereign power in Sidney and Spinoza’s modern republican theory must
express this natural power, preferably through a large, popularly elected gen-
eral assembly. Not only is such a body strong, but it is also more rational than
a monarch or ruling elite. As Spinoza says in praise of popular assemblies:
“so large a council cannot be so much determined by lust as by reason.”
Sidney concurs in almost identical terms: “the collected wisdom of a people
much surpasses that of a single person.”75 However, it is the alliance of pop-
ular strength and wisdom that Spinoza and Sidney identify as the basis of
sovereign right. In one crucial respect the Spinozist–Sidneyan modern repub-
lican idea of sovereignty parallels the Hobbesian absolutist and Pufendorfian
72 Spinoza, PT 296, 316 and Sidney, D 3.41.549. Cf. D 3.33.512.

73 Spinoza, TPT 207 and Sidney, D 2.20.192. Cf. D 3.28.481, 487, and 490.
74 See Spinoza, PT 317 (cf. 346) and Sidney, D 1.11.32 and 3.11, as well as Spinoza, PT 301,
297 and Sidney, D 3.28.487.
75 Spinoza, PT 348 and Sidney, D 3.16.403. Cf. D 3.42.557.
moderate Whig position. In both the modern republican and the Hobbesian
and Pufendorfian arguments political sovereignty is practically absolute, al-
though for the modern republicans sovereignty is also necessarily popular.
Spinoza argues that since a popular assembly “needs no counsellors, its ev-
ery explicit will ought to be law. And hence we conclude that dominion
conferred upon a large enough council is absolute. . . . For if there be any
absolute dominion, it is, in fact that which is held by the entire multitude.”
Sidney captures the essence of this Spinozist teaching in his formulation of
the sovereign power of a radically popularized Parliament in which “the
Legislative power is always Arbitrary,” and, foreshadowing Blackstone,
alone has “the power of altering, mitigating, explaining or correcting the
laws of England, . . . because none but the Parliament can make them.”76
Sidney’s defense of popular institutions and their practically unlimited power
reflects the underlying influence of the Spinozist metaphysic of nature and
power. The central promise of both Spinozist and Sidneyan republicanism
is the possibility of supplying a modern political science that can improve
human political reasoning in light of an understanding of this natural order.
The first pillar of Sidney’s republican political science is his notion of
the predictable character of the human passions. As we have seen, Sidney
identified the self-interested passions as the primary agents and springs of hu-
man action.77 He claims that this universal cause of action produces regular
and measurable effects. For example, Sidney does not attribute the mischiefs
witnessed in monarchies primarily to the personal qualities of this or that
particular ruler. He charges rather that the problems of monarchy “proceed
not from accidents, but from the power of a permanent cause that always
produces the same or like effect.”78 Although Sidney affirms that the pre-
cise measures necessary to ameliorate the problems of monarchy may vary
from case to case, depending on the particular constitutional order of a given
nation – an elective mixed monarchy will need a remedy different from that
of a hereditary one. Nevertheless, he ascribes the cause of these problems to
the universal character of the human passions.
Sidney’s political science is not, however, relegated simply to diagnosing
the problems of monarchy. He employs this scientific understanding of the
principles of natural causality primarily in order to formulate the theoretical
grounding for efforts to strengthen and preserve popular governments, as
well as to reform non-popular regimes. Sidney’s political science is deduced
from and attempts to replicate the rigor of modern natural science. He
offers certain institutional arrangements, such as popular general assem-
blies, which will, within variations open to different political and historical
76 Spinoza, PT 347 and Sidney, D 3.45.569, 3.22.451. For Blackstone’s essentially Pufendorfian
view of sovereignty, see my discussion in Chapter 11.
77 D 2.19, 2.24, 3.41. Cf. Spinoza, PT 3.3.302.
78 D 2.24.240.
circumstances, be able to provide the most reliable foundations for securing

individual rights and communal self-government. Monarchy and aristocracy
distort the natural order of power relations by asserting the right of one or
a few to rule many, despite the fact that these rulers lack the natural power
to coerce a multitude. Democracy, in contrast, operates on principles con-
sistent with the objective and scientific observation of nature. Democracies
locate the supreme right to govern in the one body possessing the actual
power to govern in a supreme or irresistible fashion, namely, the people.
The central tenet of Sidney’s political science is the principle that only pop-
ular institutions reflecting the natural power of the people can guarantee
political liberty. This, too, is an axiom for Sidney, as manifestly proceeding
“from the power of a permanent cause” as any of the demonstrable failings
of monarchy. The core of Sidney’s political science is the idea that democ-
racy is the most natural and thus the most rational system of government. To
understand Sidney’s claim for the superior rationality of democracy vis-à-vis
the other regimes, we must look at two issues: his understanding of virtue
and his suggestions for practical political reform.
Modern Republican Virtues

The conception of virtue embedded in Sidney’s version of modern republi-
canism is a nuanced and complex formulation that belies the stark distinction
between the language of virtue and the logic of rights often espoused by the
contemporary proponents of the liberal and republican theses. Sidney in-
corporates classical republican virtues, such as self-sacrifice, patriotism, and
dedication to the common good, into a modern republican teaching con-
sistent with the principles of individual rights, enlightened self-interest, and
the importance of observing contracts. Sidney’s understanding of virtue, as
with so much of his thought, parallels the thought of Spinoza. For both, law-
abidingness emerges as the cardinal virtue in their reflections on ethics. They
rejected the aristocratic presuppositions of classical republicanism in favor
of a notion of virtue based on republican liberty and the rule of law. The
virtues Sidney associates with natural rights republicanism draw their moral
and theoretical source from his natural rights philosophy: “The equality in
which men are born is so perfect, that . . . I cannot reasonably expect to be
defended from wrong, unless I oblige my self to do none; or to suffer the
punishment prescribed by the Law, if I perform not my engagement.”79 The
virtue of law-abidingness, then, is rooted in the natural equality of the in-
dividuals composing society. The core conceptual device for understanding
this virtue, as for understanding Sidney’s view of virtue more generally, is the
rule of reason over the passions. Sidney’s assessment of the role of reason in
79 D 3.41.548. Cf. Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 133.

the virtues forms the fulcrum in his thought regarding the characteristically
republican concepts of virtue and corruption.
Reason is the guiding principle for Sidney’s view of political life. He fol-
lowed Spinoza in defending democracy and attacking absolute monarchy
precisely because popular regimes were able to bring rulers and ruled under
the control of reason.80 Given the universal character of the human passions,
no individual could be trusted with absolute power. For Sidney and Spinoza,
a nation governed by a system of laws passed by a freely consenting public
was one with an enhanced capacity to act rationally.81 By positing obedience
to laws at least indirectly of one’s own making as the key republican virtue,
Sidney redirects the issue of morality away from the antithesis of rights and
duties, and instead posits the chief opposition as that between reason and
passion. Sidney clearly indicates that the virtue he associates with republi-
can liberty is not licentiousness or a freedom to do whatever one wishes.82
Such licentiousness would be a function of the rule of the passions rather
than of reason. In Sidney’s view, reason informs the individual that peace
and security – the goals of political life – are best maintained when a people
remain united in one body under law. For Sidney and Spinoza, liberty and
virtue are linked because virtue must be understood as action in accordance
with the law of human nature. The foundation of virtue is the natural right
of self-preservation.83 Self-interest, in this sense, cannot be conceived as con-
ceptually distinct from virtue because the ethos of law-abidingness that links
individual interest to the public interest is a function of this natural right.
Sidney recognizes this self-regarding core of republican virtue in these
terms: “Virtuous actions that are profitable to the commonwealth ought to
be made, as far as it is possible, safe, easy, and advantageous.”84 Virtuous
action must be made as compatible with self-interest as possible. One way
to achieve this aim is to define virtue in terms of obedience to law pro-
duced under conditions allowing a public voice in legislation. In this light,
Sidney reevaluates virtue not in terms of the renunciation of private interest,
the view typically associated with classical republicanism, but rather in the
recognition that the private interests both bound by and expressed through
law made in popular institutions are the composite elements of the public
interest.85 Whereas the passions unchecked by reason encourage the advance
80 See D 3.13.387, 389; 3.15.401; 3.43.558 and Spinoza, PT 3.7.303–4.

81 Compare D 3.1.323, 3.14.396, 3.40.543–4 and Spinoza, PT 5.2.313, 6.3.317, 7.27.341,
7.29.342. Cf. Houston’s good discussion (Algernon Sidney, p. 135) of Sidney’s view of the
connection between rationality and legislation.
82 D 1.2.8–9.
83 Spinoza sums up this connection between virtue and self-interest in these terms: “The en-
deavor after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue” (Ethics, part IV,
prop. 22, cor., p. 202).
84 D 3.43.559.
85 Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 166.
of private interests at the expense of the public good, Sidney argues that an
informed and rational assessment of the character of political association
and its benefits for the individual will preserve the importance of law. More-
over, Sidney maintains that the corruption derived from the human passions
is actually a condition of slavery directly contrary to republican liberty. He
sees the slavish effects of the unchecked passions both as a kind of moral
weakness, or in Spinozist terms an “impotence” of mind, and as a feature
of the kind of life experienced under arbitrary government, whereby the in-
dividual cannot truly be master over his or her own actions and thoughts.86
The inherent lawlessness of absolute monarchy mirrors the passionate and ir-
rational behavior of the individual lawbreaker who seeks to injure the public
good for purely private advantage. Thus, virtue, in Sidney’s view, is instru-
mental in its service to the self-interest of individuals and is simply good in
the sense of representing the most rational human response to the challenges
facing political association and its central goals: peace and security.
If Sidney’s reflections on virtue are intended to indicate how an individ-
ual may be brought from the slavery of the passions to the liberty experi-
enced under the rule of law, then his observations on regimes may be said
to demonstrate how unfree regimes may be more free and popular. In the
Discourses Sidney demonstrates that regimes are improved by the degree to
which their popular element is strengthened.87 Indeed, Sidney’s political sci-
ence is directed to the preservation of popular governments and the reform
of non-popular regimes. Part of this teaching is that strong institutions are
strong because they are anchored in popular legitimacy. The political science
of liberty encourages both monarchies and aristocracies to expand the pop-
ular voice in public affairs through the institution of general councils and
assemblies that would participate in the legislative process. This element of
Sidney’s teaching is most pronounced in his frequent appeal to the lead-
ers of the successor states to the gothic polities. He strongly advocates the
revitalization of the assemblies, cortes, diets, and parlements of the great
European monarchies.88 These measures are especially urgent given the
86 Spinoza, PT 2.20.298, 2.7–11.294–5; TPT 16.206 and Ethics, pt. IV, prop. 18, p. 202; and
pt. IV, prop. 37, p. 215. I disagree with Houston (Algernon Sidney, p. 147) regarding the
importance of the biblical Fall in Sidney’s understanding of corruption and the passions.
While Sidney does speak of humanity’s fallen nature early in the Discourses, this biblical
language falls away entirely by the later chapters. Rather than focusing on Sidney’s early
and almost perfunctory references to the Fall, it might be more useful to compare Sidney
and Spinoza’s use of Tacitus’ observations on the servility, i.e. slavery, produced by absolute
monarchy. For example, compare D 2.15.160 and Spinoza, PT 5.4.314.
87 This is also the pattern and methodology of Spinoza’s treatment of monarchy and aristocracy
in A Political Treatise. In this work Spinoza invariably advocates the establishment of large
popular assemblies and general councils in order to improve (i.e., strengthen) nondemocratic
regimes. Cf. Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, pp. 71–5.
88 This can be seen, for example, at D 3.27.477, 3.28.488, 3.31.504–5.
collapse of the feudal nobility “in all the legal kingdoms of the North.”
The concomitant to Sidney’s frequent appeal to the legitimate right of rev-
olution of a people against aspiring autocrats is an implicit warning to
European monarchs. He encourages them to assess their situation realis-
tically, or rather scientifically, and to reform the institutions of government
in the direction of greater popular control in order to forestall or preclude
such explosive and revolutionary possibilities.
While Sidney’s lesson for the political leaders in mixed or limited monar-
chies was to begin or continue the democratization process of reform, he also
had a warning for the supporters of republicanism. As we saw in Sidney’s
treatment of early Saxon England, he presented democracy less as a formal
system of government than as an actuality of power relations.89 With the
narrowing of the popular foundations of the English Constitution, the le-
gal and institutional devices intended to preserve some measure of popular
sovereignty became obsolete. In stressing the mutability of formal structures,
Sidney identifies the power of the multitude as the core of any healthy regime.
To preserve popular regimes, he cautions, this power must be expressed in-
stitutionally, even if it means reforming or replacing existing institutions.
Sidney reminds popular leaders not to cling to outdated institutions and
political structures.
This reasoning lay behind Sidney’s call for several measures to ensure
that Parliament would be responsible to the people. In this sense, Sidney’s
political science aims as much to enlighten England’s parliamentarians as to
challenge the monarchists. He reminds popular leaders that their right to
rule diminishes as the strength of their opposition grows.90 The collapse of
the Dutch Republic in 1672 and the grisly fate of its leader, Sidney’s friend
DeWitt, at the hands of an Orangist mob forms an important backdrop for
Sidney’s discussion of the uncertain future of parliamentary rule in Exclusion
era England. Sidney’s dramatic appeal for the saliency of military strength is
a warning to England’s parliamentary leaders not to trust in empty legalities.
Despite democracy’s natural claim to legitimacy, as opposed to monarchy’s
divine claim, the specter of monarcho-military rule looms over England as
much as it threatens the Continent. In this light, the revolutionary dimen-
sion of Sidney’s teaching forms part of a political science directed toward
the mobilization of mass movements in defense of free institutions. Popular
89 D 3.27. My understanding of the dangers Sidney and Spinoza saw for republican leaders who
might cling to formalities and empty legalities while ignoring the balance of forces vis-à-vis
the opponents of republicanism in their nations is indebted to Balibar (Spinoza and Politics,
pp. xvii, 31–5). However, note Spinoza’s caution about the “terrible example” furnished by
English civil war radicals who tried and failed to install a republic without broad popular
support (TPT 18.243).
90 In this respect, Sidney’s fears about popular government in England recall Spinoza’s assess-
ment of the demise of the Dutch Republic on account of its narrow popular foundation or
simply “the fewness of its rulers” (PT 15.14.376).
regimes and their leaders must understand the source of their strength if they
are to preserve it.
The central paradox of Sidney’s political science is what might be called
the “problem of democracy.” Democracy, for Sidney, is at once the best
regime and a reflection of the immanent causality of all regimes. Certainly
all governments are not popular but, he insists, they all originate in the power
of the people. As we have seen, the major element of political reform Sidney
suggests for existing political societies is to expand the popular voice in gov-
ernment through popular institutions such as general legislative assemblies.
Sidney is aware that affirming the consensual origins of political society does
not preclude the ubiquity of autocracies, oligarchies, and military dictator-
ships. Rather, he posits these regimes as a product of the corruption of the
popular foundation of government. Indeed, Sidney offers his own regime
analysis of the English Constitution as a model for democratic reform. The
political science of liberty aims to strengthen the tendency toward democracy
inherent in any social order. In order to produce Amsterdam-on-Thames or
sur-Seine, Sidney appeals to the popular elements already existing in Europe’s
monarchical regimes.
In his claim that the multitude will not bear violent or irrational rule if
they are capable of opposing it, Sidney suggests that the universal passion
for self-preservation is served well by an openness to science and philosophy.
Indeed, the premise of Sidney’s political science of liberty is that philosophy –
the scientific understanding of nature and its application to politics – is the
surest guarantor of self-preservation for the multitude of individuals.91 Thus,
a people acting rationally will see the benefits of Sidney’s political science and
presumably will be open to the free investigation of nature. Sidney claims
that it is not democracy, but rather nondemocratic regimes, that are hostile
to political philosophy. This is his repeated charge against Filmer’s theologi-
cally based divine right theory. Defenders of democracy, the natural regime,
will have little to fear and much to gain from the objective study of nature.
Sidney implies that scientists and philosophers will see the salutary conse-
quences of their support for popular government. He assumes that they will
be drawn to the study of politics in order to strengthen and preserve sys-
tems of government friendly to their investigations. Sidney claims that “The
wisest and best have ever employed their studies in forming kingdoms and
commonwealths, or in adding to the perfections of such as were already con-
stituted.”92 For Sidney, of course, the “perfection” of the kingdoms founded
by the “wisest and best” requires movement in the direction of democracy.
91 In this fundamental respect, I believe Sidney’s political science and Spinoza’s conception of the
relation between politics and philosophy are practically the same. For a good discussion of
Spinoza’s understanding of the relation between philosophy and politics, see Stanley Rosen,
“Benedict Spinoza,” in The History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., Leo Strauss and Joseph
Cropsey, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987): pp. 456–74, esp. p. 459.
92 D 2.6.112.
The key to Sidney’s republican political science is the promise of gen-

eral enlightenment. While all political society originates in consent, Sidney
suggests that the peoples of earlier, prescientific times failed to understand
properly the implications of this democratic origin of their regimes. As we
recall, Sidney mildly rebuked England’s Saxon ancestors for failing to see the
potential dangers of mixed constitutionalism. He repeatedly contrasts past
ignorance with present enlightenment and, as such, he casts his own political
science in a distinctly modern light. He affirms emphatically that the present
generation is not bound to continue the errors of the past. Sidney claims:
Men were sent into the world rude and ignorant and if they might not have used
their natural faculties to find out that which is good for themselves, all must have
been condemn’d to continue in the ignorance of our first fathers, and to make no use
of their understanding to the ends for which it was given.93
Filmer’s theory of divine right monarchy is, for Sidney, representative of this
political primitivism. Sidney identifies the two hallmarks of Filmer’s system of
monarchy, unlimited prerogative and the principle of heredity, as indicative
of and suitable only for very primitive and ignorant peoples. Sidney concedes
that even if “all nations were at first governed by kings, and that no law were
imposed upon those kings,” nonetheless, succeeding generations “could no
more be obliged to continue in so pernicious a folly, than we are to live in that
wretched barbarity in which the Romans found our ancestors, when they first
entered this island.”94 It is important to notice that Sidney’s statement here
is conditional; he does not affirm monarchy as the primal regime, but rather
denies that there would be a morally binding character to monarchies simply
because they were of ancient pedigree. Rather, Sidney sees the simplicity and
ignorance reflected in prerogative and heredity as antithetical to political
right because these practices suggest sources of legitimacy independent of
human law and consent. Neither prerogative nor heredity, Sidney argues, is
consistent with a scientific understanding of nature.
In asserting the progressive character of human knowledge throughout
history, Sidney implicitly connects his political science with the methodol-
ogy and animating spirit of modern natural science. By associating monar-
chy with a primitive state of social and intellectual development, Sidney
places his own political science of liberty in stark opposition to any theory
of government that mystifies political institutions and thus obscures their
human origins. This mystification of political life manipulates the fears and
superstition of prescientific peoples. The chief culprits in this manipulation,
Sidney charges, are the clergy; men like those in the Anglican Church hi-
erarchy who support Filmer’s vision of an unlimited and divinely vouch-
safed monarchy in England. Sidney charges that Filmer and his clerical sup-
porters maintain that God set “a Law . . . to all mankind which none might
93 D 3.7.357. Cf. 1.6.22 and 2.8.121–2.

94 D 3.13.388. Cf. 3.21.
transgress, and which put the examination of all those matters out of their
power.”95 Sidney identifies this process of political mystification, however,
not only with the claims of the divine rightists, but also with England’s com-
mon law tradition.
Sidney argues that the common law is at once too dense and complex for
common understanding, and yet displays a much greater reliance on custom
and historical practice than it does on reason. He charges that in England “the
laws are so many, that the number of them has introduced an uncertainty and
confusion which is both dangerous and troublesome.”96 Significantly, Sidney
eschews confronting the divine rightists with the common law tradition, a
major source of opposition to the absolutist pretensions in England in the
seventeenth century during the ascendancy of the great jurists Coke and
Halles; rather, he pits the tenets of his political science against common law
as well as divine right. Sidney associates England’s common law heritage
with a persistent antiquarianism and advocates in its stead rationally and
scientifically grounded principles of jurisprudence. He contends:
Axioms are not rightly grounded upon judged cases, but cases are to be judged
according to axioms: the certain is not proved by the uncertain, but the uncertain by
the certain; and everything is to be esteemed uncertain till it be proved to be certain.
Axioms in law are, as in mathematics, evident to common sense; and nothing is to
be taken for an axiom, that is not so.
Slyly Sidney implies his agreement with the attempt of the Nominated
Parliament to codify the common law during the Interregnum period.97
While he does not explicitly go this far in his reevaluation of England’s
common law tradition, Sidney strongly suggests that serious legal reform in
England would be an additional step toward a rationalized society.
In addition to Sidney’s skepticism toward the English legal heritage and
historical custom, another important target for his modern republican po-
litical science is the religious orthodoxy that he finds generally supportive
of monarchy. In this respect, Sidney’s project reflects concerns about the
theologico–political problem similar to those advanced by his Dutch repub-
lican comrades. For instance, Sidney’s opposition to the Anglican Church
hierarchy mirrors Spinoza’s effort to refute the charges of the Dutch Calvinist
ministers who maintained that Scripture was antithetical to republicanism.98
95 D 1.1.7.
96 D 3.26.465.
97 D 3.26.466. By legal principles adhering to “common sense,” Sidney does not mean ideas that
are simplistic but rather those apprehensible to reason or rationally deduced from general
principles. For a discussion of the actions of the Nominated Parliament, see J. P. Kenyon,
The Stuart Constitution, 1603–1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966): p. 333.
98 For Spinoza’s opposition to the Calvinist ministers in Holland, see Spinoza, TPT, “The
Preface,” pp. 3–11. Cf. Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, pp. 3–5 and Caton, Politics of Progress,
pp. 237–9.
In order to refute the political claims of religious orthodoxy, Sidney em-

ployed a hermeneutical principle of scriptural exegesis pioneered by Spinoza.
Sidney’s primary aim in his treatment of Scripture was to deny the ortho-
dox interpretation of biblical texts, which emphasized the privileged status
of the human things in the order of nature. He saw this presentation of a
uniquely human moral order, vouchsafed by revelation, as the cause of the
general hostility to science among the people and as the source of clerical
strength. Sidney offers his modern natural rights – based republicanism as an
antidote to the superstition and primitivism encouraged by the traditional
understanding of the relation between politics and religion.99 For example,
he identifies the source of success for the Hebrew republic not in the mystery
of divine election, but rather in natural causes. In asserting the foundation of
the Mosaic law to be the nation’s capacity for war, Sidney follows Machiavelli
and Spinoza in tying the notion of Jewish election to the regime’s political
and military success, resulting from its internal structures, rather than to the
divine providence of a God active in human affairs.100 More importantly,
however, Sidney divests revealed religion of its claim as a support for certain
forms of political rule. By calibrating the goals of political life to the universal
passion for self-preservation, Sidney denies the tangible political relevance of
the spiritual end for human life posited by religious authorities. In this way,
he sets his political science against the distortion of natural power relations
advanced in divine right theory. The perspective claimed by the orthodox
interpreters of Scripture gratifies human vanity but distorts our proper place
in the whole of nature.
Sidney’s radically secularized political science of liberty aims to encourage
progress in the advance of scientific and political knowledge. An important
element in this project is the separation of religion and politics. What one
commentator observed of Spinoza could be said of Sidney: he presents his
critique of orthodoxy as “a critique of the ‘prejudice’ that reason must sub-
ject itself to the supra-rational revelation laid down in Scripture. Its task is
to liberate men’s minds, held fast in that prejudice, so that they may philoso-
phize freely.”101 While Sidney does not make toleration a sustained theme in
the Discourses, the assumption favoring freedom of conscience and religious
99 Significantly, unlike Spinoza, Sidney does not make the critique of miracles a feature of
his attack on religious orthodoxy. However, Sidney’s generally agnostic tone and his quite
obvious contempt for divinized politics suggest an acute sympathy with Spinoza’s rigorous
rationalist project. Cf. Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (New York: Schocken
Books, 1965): pp. 123–36.
100 D 2.17.174 and 2.22.205. This may be due to Sidney’s skepticism about the talk of English
“election” among Puritans in the civil war period. Cf. Spinoza, TPT 3. 48, and Steven Smith,
Spinoza, Liberalism and the Question of Jewish Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1997), p. 99.
101 Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, p. 144.
freedom underlies Sidney’s larger argument for popular sovereignty.102 In-

deed, the issues surrounding freedom of conscience do emerge in the book.
For example, he attributes “the persecution for religion” in the time of
England’s Henry V to “the ignorance of that age, [rather] than to any evil
in his own nature.”103 The whole tenor of Sidney’s discussion of a mod-
ern democratic England in the final chapter of the Discourses suggests that
prescribed religious belief and practice is not a precondition of citizenship.
The arbitrary power of Parliament does not extend to religious uniformity
because Sidney denies that it is possible by force or fear to make any man
believe any doctrine. In some sense, no political order can control completely
“the internal thoughts of a man.”104 Sidney’s defense of religious toleration
is connected at least in part to his concern for freedom of speech. It is perhaps
no surprise that Sidney, the great Whig martyr to the cause of free speech,
should contrast his own openness to debate with that of the rigid censorship
indicative of absolutist regimes. At one point in the Discourses, he reminds
his divine right opponent Robert Filmer that regarding the freedom to inves-
tigate political and religious questions, Filmer “ought to have considered,
that in asserting that right to himself, he allows it to all mankind.”105 While
freedom of conscience and freedom of speech never develop into sustained
themes in the work, Sidney does suggest that these freedoms are a sign of
the moral and intellectual improvement of enlightened societies over that of
their prescientific forbears.
One final feature of Sidney’s radical Whig republicanism worth noting is
his openness to the ideal of commercial republicanism epitomized in the sev-
enteenth century by Holland. Sidney presents the Dutch commercial republic
as a model for enlightened, tolerant modern republicanism. In this respect,
Sidney’s argument broke decisively from the agrarian classical model and
the militaristic imperialist Machiavellian form of republicanism.106 While it
is true that Sidney praised Plato early in Chapter Two for not intending “to
teach us how to erect manufactures, and to increase trade or riches,” we
have noted that later in the Discourses Sidney largely disposes of the classi-
cal tradition he associates with Plato and Aristotle. From the perspective of
Sidney’s later criticism of classical thought, Plato’s scorn of commerce seems
typical of what Sidney identifies as the excessive faith in the beneficence
102 Houston (Algernon Sidney, p. 124) suggests that “the key for understanding Sidney’s defense
of toleration is the Court Maxims, not the Discourses.” My reading of Sidney’s thought on
toleration follows Houston’s excellent discussion (Algernon Sidney, pp. 122–30).
103 D 3.46.575.
104 D 3.36.521.
105 D 1.5.18.
106 I agree with Houston that the “heroic character” of Sidney’s imperial vision is undermined
by his more preservationist position in the later portions of the book. However, I go beyond
Houston’s speculation that “the depth of Sidney’s commitment to ‘Constitutions that Prin-
cipally intend War’ is unclear” (Algernon Sidney, pp. 160–1). Rather, I believe that Sidney
modifies this position considerably and methodically by the end of the work.
of nature witnessed in classical philosophy.107 On the other hand, Sidney’s

praise of Machiavellian militarism near the end of Chapter Two is seriously
muted in Chapter Three, where Sidney limns the features of a modern com-
mercial republic in England. Sidney’s earlier praise of unlimited militarism
was intended more to indicate his break from classical republicanism than
to reflect his final position on the character of modern republicanism. Even
at his warmongering best in Chapter Two, Sidney still offers remarkable
praise for the military capacity of the commercial republics of Holland and
Venice. While Sidney cautions against regimes directed solely to commercial
activity, he does not view such activity as antithetical to military strength. In
fact, Sidney lauds the military achievement of the English republic, in which
he affirms “neither the Romans nor the Grecians in their time of liberty ever
performed any actions more glorious,” principally for the English success
against the “formidable power of the Hollanders,” their chief commercial
rivals.108
For his part, the Dutch theorist Spinoza appeared to find little conflict
between commercial activity and the military requirements of republican
self-government and military dominance. Spinoza and his Dutch colleagues
shared Sidney’s concern to establish the importance of citizen armies and his
deep hostility to and distrust of mercenary troops and professional armies.109
Neither Sidney nor Spinoza held commerce to be simply incompatible with
military strength. Their primary concern vis-à-vis the army was to elucidate
the dangers of the kind of monarcho-military rule evinced by the House of
Orange in Holland and Cromwell or potentially the Stuarts in England. Pos-
sibly a vibrant commercial society would undermine the military ambitions
of such political leaders. Sidney implies that if the technological advance
promised by free scientific inquiry allowed military strength and commercial
prosperity to conjoin reliably, he would support commercial republican-
ism.110 From his praise of the English Commonwealth and the Dutch and
Venetian commercial regimes, as well as his general openness to intellectual,
scientific, and economic progress, it appears that Sidney already foresaw
such a possibility in the more advanced nations and commercial cities of
late-seventeenth-century Europe.
The Discourses heralded a new era in the long history of republicanism.

Sidney’s decisive break not only from the prevailing paradigms in English
constitutional thought, but also from both the classical and Machiavellian
107 D 2.1.83.
108 D 2.28.276. For Sidney’s praise of the commercial Dutch and the Venetians, see 2.22.206–
8, 2.23.216, 2.28.275. Sidney does criticize the Venetians at 2.22.203, but he retracts this
criticism at 2.28.275.
109 See, for example, Spinoza, TPT 17. 220–7; PT 6.10.319, 7.12.333, 7.17.335, and 7.22.338.
110 Conniff’s argument suggests such a possibility of linking Sidney’s progressive approach to
history with a potential openness to commercial society (“Reason and History,” pp. 413–
16).
strains of republicanism, introduced a radically populist strain of modern

natural rights – based republicanism into Whig constitutional and political
thought. With the infusion of Spinozist philosophy into the conceptual frame
of the constitutional debate in Exclusion era England, Sidney presented a
more emphatic and theoretically sophisticated argument for its popular gov-
ernment than had hitherto been witnessed in England. The Sidneyan form of
Whig republicanism with its call for radical legislative supremacy, its popular
control of government, and its distrust of executive power and the balanced
constitutional model embedded in English history presented a blueprint for
later variations of Anglo-American republicanism. Sidney’s heroic vision of
a modern republic grounded on natural rights and open to the liberating
power of science, commerce, and general enlightenment would become a
touchstone for many radicals in England and America in the century to
come.
8
Natural Rights in Locke’s Two Treatises
John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government is by far the most celebrated work
among those of Filmer’s three major Whig critics and is generally recognized
as a classic of early modern thought. Although it was written more or less
contemporaneously with Tyrrell’s Patriarcha, Non Monarcha and Sidney’s Dis-
courses Concerning Government, the fame and influence of the Two Treatises
as one of the seminal texts of liberal thought has far outlasted those of these
other Whig works. But before he was a philosophical legend, Locke was a
relatively unknown partisan Whig. John Locke was born in 1632 into a West
Country gentry family with small but prosperous estates in Somerset near
Bristol.1 In contrast to his friend James Tyrrell, Locke’s family loyalties were
decidedly parliamentarian in the civil war, with his father, a successful attor-
ney, serving as a captain in a parliamentary regiment of horse commanded
by a local notable, Alexander Popham. Popham was elected to the Long
Parliament in 1646, the same year as Algernon Sidney, and it was through
Popham’s patronage that Locke was admitted to the prestigious Westminster
School that same year. In 1652 he entered Christ Church, Oxford, graduating
with an M.A. in 1658, the same year Tyrrell began his matriculation.
Locke thus began a long but often troubled relation with Oxford Univer-
sity that would span over three decades. In his student days Locke acquired
a keen interest in science and philosophy and shed much of the dogmatism
of his Puritan background. After graduation he took on a variety of limited-
term appointment lectureships in Greek, rhetoric, and moral philosophy. His
academic career was stymied considerably by the fact that most of the senior
studentships then offered were available only to candidates planning to enter
1 For biographical accounts of Locke, see Dictionary of National Biography, 24 vols., Leslie
Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds. (London: Oxford University Press, 1921–22): Vol. XII: 27–36
(hereafter DNB); Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 1957); and
Peter Laslett’s introduction to Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988): esp. pp. 16–79.
209
the ministry. However, the free-thinking and scientifically inclined Locke de-
termined to remain a layman and eventually settled on the study of medicine,
which he later practiced, although he never graduated with a medical degree.
Like nearly all of his colleagues at Oxford, Locke welcomed the Restoration
in 1660, seeing in it the possible end of many years of religious discord in
the country. In some early political tracts written at around this time, Locke
vehemently supported religious uniformity and strong monarchical rule as
an antidote to England’s chronic instability. It was only several years later,
when he was acting as secretary to Sir Walter Vane on a diplomatic mission
to Cleves, that Locke began to reconsider the question of toleration after
seeing in the small German duchy Catholics and Protestants living in peace
and equality.2
The major turning point in Locke’s life occurred at Oxford in 1666,
when he first met and successfully treated a medical ailment plaguing Ashley
Cooper, the future earl of Shaftesbury. The Oxford academic and the rising
political star hit it off almost immediately, and within a year Locke moved
into rooms in Shaftesbury’s Exeter House on the Strand in London. Locke
acted as the family physician and as private secretary to Shaftesbury. For
the next several years Locke would preside over gatherings of intellectuals
and personages including Tyrrell, Sydenham, and Shaftesbury himself, who
would meet regularly at Exeter House to discuss matters philosophical, sci-
entific, political, and religious. In this role Locke played an important part
in helping to form the nucleus of the future Whig movement. Shaftesbury
came to admire not only Locke’s healing powers but also his political acu-
men, and he was soon employed in a variety of public functions relating
to Shaftesbury’s duties as lord chancellor, including a stint as secretary of
presentations, dealing with religious matters, and as secretary of trade and
plantations, responsible for colonial affairs. It was in this capacity that
Locke penned the proposed constitution for the Carolinas colony, in which
Shaftesbury was a major shareholder. However, Locke’s career in public ser-
vice was inextricably connected to Shaftesbury’s political fortunes, and when
he lost the chancellorship in 1673, Locke’s political activities appeared for
all intents and purposes to be over. Between 1673 and 1679 Locke took a
leave from Oxford and passed most of his time traveling through France,
where he enjoyed the company of many of the leading scientific minds on
the Continent.
In the late 1670s Locke’s political career, like that of Sidney, appeared to
be a thing of the past. Locke’s patron, Shaftesbury, had fallen from grace and
was cooling his heels in the Tower. The philosopher seemed more interested
in travel and science than in his nation’s political life. However, it was the
fall of Danby and the ensuing Exclusion crisis that drew Locke, as it did
Sidney, back into England’s political troubles. Locke’s return to England in
2 Cranston, Biography, pp. 57–67, 82.

Natural Rights in Locke’s Two Treatises 211
1679 coincided, not by accident, with Shaftesbury’s return to prominence

in the Exclusion Parliaments. Locke’s activities during 1679–83 are a sub-
ject of considerable historical debate.3 It is probably fair to say that Locke
was neither a hard-core agitator and revolutionary nor a purely disengaged
philosopher. He certainly worked closely with Shaftesbury in this period,
perhaps collaborating with him on some Exclusion pamphlets generally at-
tributed to the earl. He split his time in these years between Shaftesbury’s new
residence in Thanet House and Oxford, where he regularly visited Tyrrell’s
nearby estate at Shotover. It was during this period of intimate contact with
Shaftesbury and Tyrrell that Locke began writing the Two Treatises.
After the collapse of the Whig parliamentary opposition to the crown,
Locke began a very uneasy existence in England. He perhaps knew as well
as anyone that Shaftesbury’s promised Whig insurrection in 1682 manned by
“ten thousand brisk boys from Wapping” would never materialize, and as a
well-known confidante of the earl, Locke was under constant surveillance by
government spies at Oxford. But the notoriously cautious Locke was never
one to show his hand unadvisedly. As one Oxford informer reported at this
time: “John Locke lives a very cunning unintelligible life. . . . Certainly there
is some Whig intrigue amanaging [sic], but here not a word of politics comes
from him, nothing new or anything else concerning our present affairs, as
if he were not at all concerned with them.”4 Of course, Locke was closely
following events, and after Shaftesbury’s death in Holland and particularly
following the arrest of Sidney and the other Whig leaders in 1683, Locke
grew alarmed and made for refuge on the Continent, settling in Holland
for the next five years.5 In his Dutch exile Locke did go underground for a
while, assuming the pseudonym “Dr. Van der Linden” to avoid extradition
back to England. He also lost his position at Oxford and resolutely rejected
the efforts of his friends, including Tyrrell, to secure him a royal pardon.
Locke spent most of his time in Holland writing and making contacts with
other Whig exiles in the Dutch provinces. He probably played no role in the
failed Monmouth rising in 1685, but did become thereafter a trusted friend
and adviser to William and Mary. He also lived for a time with Sidney’s
dear old friend Benjamin Furly in Rotterdam, and it was from there that
Locke watched the dramatic events unfolding in England in late 1688, finally
3 Richard Ashcraft tends to see Locke as a highly active revolutionary (Revolutionary Politics
and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986]: esp.
chs. 10–11), whereas Cranston’s Locke is considerably more disengaged from conspiratorial
politics (Biography).
4 Cranston, Biography, p. 221. For a discussion of Locke’s notorious caution, see Richard Cox,
Locke on War and Peace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960): pp. 1–44.
5 Cranston argues that Locke probably had no direct contact with Sidney’s group (Biography,
p. 228), but Jonathan Scott suggests that they may have had common connections such as
Essex (Algernm Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677 [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988]: p. 219).
returning to England with Queen Mary in February 1689, just in time to

witness Parliament’s offer of the crown to the Oranges.
After the Glorious Revolution, Locke published the many works that
had been germinating during and prior to his exile, including anonymously
the Two Treatises (1690), as well as his publicly attributed works the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (1690), the Letters on Toleration (1690 and
1692), and the Treatise on Education (1693). With the publication of the Essay
in particular, Locke became practically overnight one of the most celebrated
philosophers in Europe. For the last decade or so of his life Locke held some
public offices, most notably as a member of the Board of Trade, in which
capacity he consulted with Isaac Newton, among others, on the issue of
currency reform.6 Retiring from public life in 1700, Locke spent his last
years at Oates in Essex, frequently visited by a host of friends and admirers
from all over Europe, finally dying in 1704 one of the most widely recognized
leading minds of his age.
Locke’s major contribution to the formation and development of Whig po-
litical philosophy was undoubtedly the Two Treatises of Government. Locke’s
version of Whig political thought was, as we have seen, only one strain in
the complex, heterogeneous body of ideas included in the Whig politics of
liberty. Locke was a radical Whig and a defender of the doctrine of nat-
ural liberty. He rejected Tyrrell’s moderate Whig notions of political and
contractual sovereignty, as well as the fundamentally Pufendorfian idea of
the natural law underlying the moderate Whig view of nature and govern-
ment. Instead, Locke championed the principles of individual natural rights,
popular sovereignty, and the dissolution of government.
However, Locke’s liberal strain of radical Whiggism also departed in im-
portant respects from the republicanism advocated by the radical Whig,
Sidney. Locke was a radical Whig, but his principles of individual natural
rights and popular sovereignty did not eventuate in a defense of republican-
ism and popular government. Lockean Whiggism placed greater emphasis
on the role of property in the purpose of the government and in the indi-
vidualist logic of natural rights than did Sidney. The individualistic and ac-
quisitive premises of Lockean natural rights theory rested on fundamentally
different reflections on the character of nature than we saw in Sidney’s Whig
republican thought. Moreover, the republican emphasis on the institutional-
ization of popular sovereignty through the constitutional supremacy of pop-
ular legislative assemblies runs counter to Locke’s support for the separation
of powers and his assertion that sovereignty is a product of the delegated
natural power of individuals. In Locke’s delegation theory of sovereignty,
the various powers of government, being originally derived from individu-
als in society, may be constituted and structured in a variety of ways, in-
cluding forms of government more akin to mixed constitutionalism than to
6 Cranston, Biography, pp. 345–7.

republicanism. Lockean liberal Whigs, for example, were much more open
to the idea of an independent executive and the principle of prerogative than
the republican Whigs. Lockean liberalism and republican freedom, while de-
riving from a common origin in the defense of the natural liberty doctrine
against the absolutist claims of Filmerian divine right theory, would traverse
separate but interconnecting paths in Anglo-American and early modern
thought.
In this chapter, we will examine the major elements of Locke’s argument
for radical Whig liberalism. First, we will analyze the radical premises under-
lying Locke’s long-neglected First Treatise and consider the important ways
in which he departed from his scholastic, parliamentary contractarian, and
Grotian and Hobbesian predecessors in the natural liberty tradition. We will
also examine Locke’s theory of natural rights and his account of property
in order to illustrate his rejection of the principles of moderate Whiggism
articulated by Tyrrell. In the following chapter, we will consider the main
elements of Lockean liberal constitutionalism in order to illuminate Locke’s
liberal and individualistic alternative to the moderate Whig and radical re-
publican constitutional thought of Tyrrell and Sidney.
Reconsidering the First Treatise

It is common to observe that Locke’s First Treatise has historically received
much less attention than its more illustrious sequel. This neglect is under-
standable but not warranted. Whereas in the Second Treatise Locke defines
and outlines such characteristic concepts as the state of nature, the law of
nature, and his theory of property, the First Treatise is generally regarded as
a tedious and uninspiring refutation of Filmer. In viewing the one mainly
as a defense of the doctrine of natural liberty against Filmer’s claims and
the other as the work in which Locke presents his own innovative use and
understanding of natural jurisprudence, Locke scholars have traditionally
maintained the conservatism of the First Treatise and the radicalism of the
Second Treatise.7
While Locke presents the First Treatise in a conservative light, I believe
this posture obscures the radical character of his argument in this work.
Locke’s moderate tone conforms to his claim to be a defender of the notion
7 For examples of the tendency to underestimate the radicalism of the First Treatise, see John
Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969): esp.
chs. 5 and 6 and Martin Seliger, The Liberal Politics of John Locke (New York: Praeger, 1969):
esp. pp. 188–90 and 203–5. The most important exceptions to this trend include Richard
Ashcraft, Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987): pp. 60–96;
Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988): pp. 133–51; Paul Rahe, “John Locke’s Philosophical Partisanship,” Political Science
Reviewer, vol. 20 (1991): pp. 29–30; and Michael Zuckert, “An Introduction to Locke’s First
Treatise,” Interpretation, vol. 8 (1979): pp. 58–74.
of natural liberty against the radicalism of divine right theory. By defending

the principle of consent, Locke counters Filmer’s claim that human beings are
not morally capable of creating, and thus limiting the power of, political and
social institutions. Locke ostensibly sides in this quarrel with other natural
liberty theorists like Bellarmine and Grotius. Locke’s apparent conservatism
in this treatise operates on two levels. First, he offers an indirect defense of
the legitimacy of the English Constitution against the claims of the divine
rightists. Locke claims that peoples, including the English, have always made
constitutions and that these fundamental laws determine legitimate rule.
Second, Locke offers a combination of natural and scriptural arguments in
order to demonstrate their fundamental compatibility and their common
hostility to the doctrine of divine right. God has left human beings free to
choose the form of government they think best for themselves. As Locke
presents it in the First Treatise, revelation and reason speak with one voice in
their opposition to Filmer.
The conservative posture Locke assumes in this treatise, however, is only
part of the story. In the title of the work, Locke calls the reader’s attention
to the fact that the First Treatise is a refutation of “the False Principles and
Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer,” but it is only in the Second Treatise that
Locke offers an account of the “True Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government.”8 Thus, by Locke’s admission, the “True Original, Extent and
End” of political society is not the proper subject of the First Treatise. He
proposes that a mere refutation of Filmer, and more importantly even the
defense of traditional notions of natural liberty, do not constitute in them-
selves an adequate account of the nature and character of political society.
But, as we shall see, the First Treatise operates from more radical premises
than Locke initially led the reader to assume. Indeed, when we reexamine
Locke’s treatment of property, paternal power, and the political importance
of Scripture, it becomes clear that Locke’s most important aim in the First
Treatise is not to refute Filmer, but rather to deliver a powerful, if often im-
plicit, criticism of extant variations of the doctrine of natural liberty. The
radicalism of the First Treatise presupposes Locke’s assessment of the inade-
quacy of his predecessors in the natural liberty tradition.
In the Preface to the Two Treatises, Locke offers the work as a defense of the
“People of England” in “their Just and Natural Rights” against the teaching
of Robert Filmer. He continues to assert that “the King, and Body of the
Nation,” following the Glorious Revolution and the accession of William III,
have so clearly shown their support for constitutional monarchy and the
principle of natural liberty that any refutation of Filmer would have been
unnecessary “had not the Pulpit, of late years, publickly owned his Doctrine,
8 This is the full title of the 1698 version used on p. 135 of Laslett’s edition. All references to
Locke’s Two Treatises in notes and in the text are from the Laslett edition and signify Treatise
I or II and the section number.
and made it the Currant [sic] Divinity of the Times.”9 Of Filmer’s doctrine,
Locke judges: “His System lies in a little compass, ’tis no more but this, That
all Government is absolute Monarchy. And the Ground he builds on, is this,
That no Man is Born free” (I:2). As Locke presents it, so great is the support of
the English people and their leaders for the legitimacy of their constitutional
order and the principle of natural liberty on which it is grounded that only
a fanatical group of Tory clergymen remain obstinate in their defense of the
divine right claims of the Stuarts. To combat these religious leaders and the
many people influenced by them, Locke offers his treatises.
Locke’s strategy in the initial phase of the treatise is twofold. First, he
claims that he will refute the “Scripture proofs” Filmer “pretends wholly
to build on” in his argument for Adamic supreme paternal right. Second,
Locke adopts an “enemy of my enemy is my friend” approach whereby
he defends several of the targets of Filmer’s attacks. In this way, Locke indi-
rectly aligns himself with such notable natural liberty theorists as Bellarmine,
Grotius, Hobbes, and Philip Hunton. Indeed, it is in a passage from Filmer’s
Observations on Mr. Hob’s Leviathan that Locke draws “the Sum of all his
Arguments, for Adam’s Sovereignty, and against Natural Freedom.” The pas-
sage is as follows:
If God Created only Adam, and of a piece of him made the Woman, and if by
Generation from them two, as parts of them all Mankind be propagated: If also God
gave to Adam not only Dominion over the Woman and the Children that should arise
from them, but also over the whole Earth to subdue it, and over all the Creatures
on it, so that as long as Adam lived, no Man could claim or enjoy any thing but by
Donation, Assignation, or Permission from him. (I:14)
Using this statement as a framework, Locke proceeds to examine Filmer’s

claims for Adam’s title to sovereignty by creation, as well as by donation,
Eve’s subjection, and by title of fatherhood. Locke’s strategy develops as fol-
lows. In Chapters Three through Six, Locke confronts Filmer with a series
of descending hypothetical counterarguments and alternative interpretations
of Scripture intended to obstruct Filmer’s thesis at every turn. Locke first ex-
amines Filmer’s claim for Adam’s title to sovereignty by creation. Initially
Locke argues that it could not be the bare act of Adam’s creation or his
coming to be “without the Intervention of parents or the pre-existence of
any of the same species to beget him” that established his title to rule, be-
cause by this reasoning the lion would “have as good a Title to it as he, and
certainly the Ancienter” (I:15). Locke observes that Filmer relies ultimately
on some form of unique divine appointment in order to assign any special
sovereignty claim in Adam, rather than in the lion or any other created being.
By this inevitable recourse to divine appointment, Locke claims, Filmer ob-
viates the need for asserting the extraordinary moral standing of the process
9 Locke, Two Treatises, “Preface,” pp. 137–8.

of Adam’s creation. Moreover, even if Adam derived a unique title to polit-

ical sovereignty on the basis of divine appointment, Filmer would have to
identify when this appointment occurred in Scripture. Logically, it could not
have occurred simultaneously with Adam’s creation, Locke claims, because
then Adam would have been a king with no subjects, a mockery of Filmer’s
Adamic “Governor in Habit, and not in Act” (I:18). Locke concludes that
having a title to rule in potential, or independently of the possibility of ex-
ercising that right, is “no Title at all.”
In his brief examination of Adam’s right by creation in Chapter Three,
Locke makes two major points. First, he denies that any title to rule, can
exist independently of the consent of the governed. For Adam to be a ruler
he must have subjects to rule, and these subjects must recognize the exer-
cise of this rule. Second, through his treatment of the importance of divine
appointment for Filmer’s claims for Adam, Locke establishes that it is not
Adam’s rule of humankind that Scripture expresses in the creation story, but
rather God’s rule of all humankind, including Adam. Presumably, God could
have appointed whomever He wished to rule.
In Chapter Four, Locke examines Filmer’s claim for Adam’s title to rule by
God’s donation of power over all the creatures of the Earth. In this discussion
Locke deals with Genesis 1:28, in which God commands human beings to
“be Fruitful and Multiply and Replenish the Earth and subdue it, and have
Dominion over the Fish of the Sea” (1:23). It is important to recall, however,
that Filmer did not present the donation thesis – that Genesis 1:28 gave Adam
sovereignty over all human beings – as his own, but rather acknowledged
that it was part of Selden’s critique of the Grotian account of the origin of
private property. Thus, in attacking Filmer’s purported use of this argument,
Locke implicitly defends Grotius’ idea of the original negative community. To
support this original community, Locke combines scriptural and naturalistic
argumentation. For example, he argues that the plain meaning of the biblical
text, the presentation of God’s gift of the world to “them,” signifies God’s
authorization of the use of the world at least to both Adam and Eve, but
most likely to all humankind to satisfy their wants and needs (1:24, 29,
30). Locke charges that even if Scripture did intend by this some special
rights for Adam, these could not extend to a property right in human beings;
otherwise, “Princes might eat their Subjects too, since God gave as full power
to Noah and his heirs, Chap. 9.2, to eat every living thing that moveth” (1:27).
Locke contends that even if Adam did derive unique rights, these rights
were severely limited. Locke claims that far from being the proud lord of all
creation, Adam, by the terms of his grant, “could not make bold with a Lark
or a Rabbet [sic] to satisfy his hunger, and had the herbs but in common
with the Beasts” (1:39). Locke calls our attention to the fact that the divine
prohibition on meat eating was not rescinded until after the Flood, long after
Adam’s time. Most importantly, however, Locke argues that irrespective of
any alleged property right in Adam or any one else, this divine donation did
not extend to political sovereignty (1: 40–41, 43). As Locke presents it, God,
the maker and owner of the world, could give or withhold the goods of the
Earth freely, but He left determinations of political rule up to the people to
decide for themselves.
In Chapter Five, Locke examines Adam’s presumed title to sovereignty by
right of the subjection of Eve in Genesis 3:16. As we have seen, Filmer used
this passage to rebut Hunton’s case for natural liberty. Locke charges that the
subjection of Eve does not contradict the doctrine of natural liberty because
by this act God gave no special privilege to Adam. Indeed, Locke states that
Adam “too had a share in the fall, as well as sin.” Adam was also punished
by “his offended Maker,” who commanded him to toil and labor and “seems
rather to give him a Spade into his hand, to subdue the Earth, than a Scepter to
Rule over its inhabitants” (1:44, 45). For Locke, Scripture is more concerned
with identifying the scope of God’s rule over creation than any particular
human being’s title to sovereign authority. Locke concedes, however, that
even if any grant of rule can be derived from Genesis 3:16, it suggests only the
male rule over women in conjugal society, what Locke calls “that Subjection
they (the Female Sex) should ordinarily be in to their Husbands” (1:47). He
clarifies that this authority extends only to “things of private concernment”
in the family and never sanctions “a Political Power of Life and Death over
her, much less over any body else” (1:48). Locke concludes that, by any
reasonable interpretation of Genesis 3:16, it is apparent that Scripture does
not contradict Hunton’s principle of natural liberty.
The final element in Locke’s series of counterarguments against Filmer
relates to Adam’s purported title to sovereignty by right of fatherhood. This
both involves Locke in an indirect defense of Grotius and Bellarmine and
allows him to examine the moral and political implications of the Fifth Com-
mandment. From the admission of these two heavyweights in the natural
liberty school that paternal right is a natural power, Filmer concluded that
the subjection of children to their parents nullified the doctrine of natural
freedom and all the political implications, like consent, that flow from it.10
Locke defends Grotius and Bellarmine on several grounds. First, he radical-
izes the underlying premise of his position in the earlier chapters by arguing
that Scripture is concerned to show God’s rule over human beings. But now
he reveals that Filmer’s patriarchalist argument actually diminishes God’s
role as the actual and direct source of life for every human being. Locke
10 Locke also raises the issue of Bellarmine’s admission of paternal right at I:12. Robert Filmer
quotes Bellarmine to this effect at 1:3 of Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann Somerville, ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Locke deals with Filmer’s use of Grotius’
statement of paternal generative rights at I:50. The phrase under discussion is Grotius’ state-
ment that “by generation a right over children is acquired by parents” (Hugo Grotius, De
Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres [Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1925]): 2.5.1 (hereafter DJB). Filmer
used this statement with great aplomb in his observations on Grotius. See Filmer, Patriarcha,
p. 226.
claims that all humans are the “Workmanship” of God, the “All-wise Con-
triver” who is the “Author and Giver of Life” (1:52–54). Human fathers,
Locke claims, cannot even begin to understand the complexity involved in
creating a single human being, and as such, the primary obligation is to
the divine maker, not the human parent. Locke simply pushes the logic of
Filmer’s patriachalism to the final degree: all human beings are born subject,
but only to God and not to any other human being. With similar antipa-
triarchal reasoning, Locke claims that the obedience and honor enjoined by
the Fifth Commandment explicitly include that due to the mother as well as
the father.11 Filmer, of course, had repeatedly dropped the mother from the
rubric of the commandment. Locke concludes his reflections on this scrip-
tural teaching by charging that the commandment does not indicate political
obedience of any kind (1:65, 68). For Locke, the honor due parents in no
way affects the origins and claims of political sovereignty.
The final movement of Locke’s argument in Chapter Six involves his claim
that Scripture clearly distinguishes political from paternal rule; otherwise, no
father could be subordinate to political authority and any claimant to rule
could base his claim on paternal right. Filmerian logic leads, in Locke’s view,
to what might be called the “sometimes problem.” Locke tries to demon-
strate the complete incoherence of Filmer’s theory, and the anarchic con-
sequences if such a teaching were to be taken seriously, by cataloging a
detailed list of the circumstances in which Filmer identified the supreme pa-
ternal right. Here is just a sample of what Locke offers: “Sometimes Parents
have it, . . . Sometimes Children during their Fathers lifetime . . . , Sometimes
the posterity of Adam . . . , Sometimes all Kings . . . , Sometimes he that can
catch it, an Usurper” (1:72). The clear thrust of Locke’s argument is that in
rooting political right in fatherhood, a biological possibility for practically
half of the human race, Filmer has delivered an invitation for sedition and
usurpation to every (male) rascal with a notion to rule. Locke leaves the
obvious implication that Filmer’s opponents, Grotius and Bellarmine, made
no such error.
The second half of the First Treatise is a detailed analysis of the problems
attending Filmer’s account of the transmission of Adam’s supreme paternal
right through biblical times up to the present day. Much of this discussion is
simply an amplification of the implications of the sometimes problem. Locke
argues that the dark, anarchic core of Filmer’s teaching rests on his inability
to identify who, given Adam’s original right, should rule in the present in
the many nations of the world. He concludes that by the logic of Filmer’s
argument there are two possibilities: either there is one sole descendant or
heir of Adam to whom we all owe obedience or every man has as much claim
11 I:60–2. See also Locke’s claim that with respect to generation, a mother would derive even
more honor than a father inasmuch as she nourished “the Child a long time in her body out
of her Substance” (I:55).
to this title as anyone else. Both possibilities, Locke cautions, undermine the
legitimacy of every sovereign in the world.12 Locke argues that Filmer offers
no middle course between these extremes. The First Treatise concludes with
the skillfully crafted portrait of Filmer as the half-ridiculous, half-villainous
(or half-comic, half-tragic) perpetrator of many wild philosophical and the-
ological innovations, all tending to the unsettling of peace, order, and good
government.
The Radicalism of the First Treatise

Beneath the conservative rhetoric of the First Treatise lies a much more radi-
cal core than Locke originally suggests. This radical character comes to light
when we examine the complex relation between the two treatises. This rela-
tion bears several important features. First, Locke presents the First Treatise
as a refutation of Filmer’s argument, but he indicates in the full title of the
work that it is the Second Treatise that contains his account of the “True
Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government.” Thus, the act of refuting
Filmer on natural and scriptural grounds, as well as deflecting his attacks on
other natural liberty thinkers, does not constitute, for Locke, an account of
the true nature of government. The apparent conservatism of the First Trea-
tise is emphatically in the service of Locke’s own argument in the Second and
is in contradistinction to other natural liberty theorists.13 Second, Locke’s
characterization of Filmer’s influence presents a startling ambiguity. While
Locke confirms that divine right theory has been almost universally rejected
by the English people and their leaders, he affirms that Filmer’s argument
holds great currency among the “Drum Ecclesiastick.” These supporters of
Filmer, then, are the Anglican clergy, a group one might reasonably assume
to be one of the more conservative and traditional elements in English soci-
ety. Locke’s sleight of hand on this issue is remarkable. He presents himself
as a defender of the respectable and traditional notions of natural liberty and
limited monarchy, as opposed to the “radical” clergymen of the established
church. One suspects that traditional English Christianity has come under
much more skeptical and critical scrutiny in the First Treatise than one might
originally suppose.
Third, while Locke presents himself as the defender of the natural lib-
erty tradition, he implicitly reminds the reader of the distinct variations
12 I:104–5. Locke refers obliquely to Tyrrell as “the Ingenious and Learned Author of
Patriarcha Non Monarcha,” who has demonstrated the incoherence of Filmer’s account of
the transmission of Adamic paternal right by carefully detailing the enormous variety and
complexity among the succession laws and practices of the European monarchies (I:124;
cf. James Tyrrell, Patriarcha, Non Monarcha (London, 1681): pp. 57–61 (hereafter PNM and
page number).
13 Locke twice cross-references the First and Second Treatises more or less directly at I:90 and
I:100. The former relates to the issue of property and the latter to paternal power.
within this school of thought. Locke nudges us to consider whether Grotius,

Bellarmine, and Hunton, while in common opposition to Filmer, make ar-
guments compatible with each other. This question assumes even greater
poignancy when we recall that Hobbes appears as a shadowy but crucial
figure in this treatise. Indeed, it was Filmer’s response to Hobbes that pro-
vided Locke with the “sum of all” Filmer’s arguments for Adam’s supreme
right. Locke implicitly suggests that the vindication of Hobbesian natural
rights theory against Filmer is his primary concern in the work.14 It would
be difficult to find stranger bedfellows than the radical individualist Hobbes
and the Christian-Aristotelian Bellarmine, but this is the intellectual context
Locke frames for his audience. Locke subtly and cautiously directs the reader
to reexamine his professed endorsement of the univocity in the natural liberty
tradition.
When we return to Locke’s discussion in the First Treatise with more sus-
picious eyes, we begin to see ambiguities and movements in his argument
that were not apparent previously. For example, the first thing that strikes the
careful reader about Locke’s treatment of property in this treatise is the extent
to which he exaggerates its importance for Filmer. As we have noted, Filmer
did not present the donation argument from Genesis 1:28 in Patriarcha.
Rather, he employed it as a minor element in his critique of Grotius. Locke
slyly points to his own role in giving prominence to the property issue when
he omits it from his list of the important arguments upon which Filmer
built his theory (1:14). It is Locke, more than Filmer, who is concerned to
compare Grotius’ account of the origin of property with the Genesis ac-
count. The Bible, Locke argues, presents the world as the gift of God to
all humankind for the satisfaction of their wants and needs. In the Grotian
account of the origin of property, the Dutchman presented an original neg-
ative community in which no one owned anything in particular but indi-
viduals had the right to seize what they needed. For Grotius, this right of
seizure produced a reciprocal duty on others to abstain from taking the
goods another has claimed. Upon closer examination, it is clear that Locke,
despite his rhetoric of harmony, actually sees a deep tension between these
two conceptions of the origin of property.
This comes to light near the end of Chapter Four when Locke argues that
irrespective of any seizure claim or individual property right, “God the Lord
and Father of all, has given no one of his Children such a Property, in his
peculiar Portion of the things of this World, but that he has given his needy
Brother a Right to the Surplasage of his Goods; so that it cannot be justly
denyed him, when his pressing Wants call for it” (1:42). This argument op-
poses Filmer’s claim for the peculiar property rights of Adam, but it also
operates as a critique of the Grotian seizure right. Locke follows Pufendorf
in advancing a necessity right to another’s surplus goods as a means to
14 See I:14; cf. Michael P. Zuckert, “Introduction to Locke’s First Treatise,” p. 69.
correct the Grotian model, by which individuals could conceivably starve if

all the available goods and land have been seized already by others.15 Most
importantly, Locke appeals to God and Genesis to support his claim that
the goods of the world were intended for all humankind, irrespective of any
prior individual claim. Locke suggests that in this crucial respect regarding
the origin of property, the author of Genesis was not a Grotian.
The tension between the Bible and the Grotian theory of property becomes
even more pronounced when Locke deals with the meat-eating prohibition.
The Grotian seizure right gives no account of such a divine prohibition. The
logic of Grotius’ argument, rooted in a primal right of self-preservation,
would actually make any such prohibition a cruel and inhumane restriction
on the human capacity to satisfy physical needs. The difference between
Grotius and the Bible that Locke illuminates has to do with their views
of the proper human stance toward the world. Locke echoes Genesis by
stating that human beings are created in “the Image of God,” who is our
“Maker” (1:30, 40). In viewing human beings as what Locke later calls
the “Workmanship” of God (1:53), he suggests that the Bible and Grotius
profoundly disagree about the character of human freedom. Whereas Grotius
defended the possibility of contractual absolutism as an unfortunate product
of natural freedom, Locke suggests that the Bible’s teaching precludes such a
possibility because it bases human political freedom on the deeper theological
premise of our natural subjection to God.
Locke’s radical purpose in this discussion relates to two major issues.
First, he continues his theme of distinguishing the right of property and the
right of political rule, but he does so now with Grotius, not Filmer, as his
primary target. As we have seen, Grotius’ theory left open the possibility,
however unattractive, of absolute rule resting on contract and consent.16
Locke reminds his readers that not only Filmer and the divine rightists but
also natural rights theorists like Grotius failed to distinguish the proper ends
of government and property. When Locke argues that title to rule cannot be
transferred or inherited in the way property can, his opponent is as much
Grotius as Filmer. The second major issue raised in Locke’s treatment of prop-
erty relates to the biblical conception of the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the
physical world. While God’s claim over human beings as his “Workman-
ship” may logically resist the absolute claims of human sovereignty, Locke
15 This is the thrust of Tyrrell at PNM, 109–13∗ (second pagination) and of Samuel Pufendorf,
De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934): bk. 4, ch. 4, pp. 5–8
(hereafter DJNG bk., ch., sec., and page number where applicable). However, for the tension
between the Lockean and the Pufendorfian–Tyrrellian view of property, see Ruth Grant, John
Locke’s Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987): p. 59 and John Marshall,
John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994): p. 235; Seliger, Liberal Politics, p. 175; and James Tully, A Discourse on Property: Locke
and His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980): pp. 131–2, 137–8.
16 For the “Full Property Right in Government,” see Grotius, DJB 1.3.11.1.
implies that the Bible’s emphasis on human stewardship and the promise
of divine provision does not cohere with the true human experience of the
world. Hungry individuals should be free to eat anything edible, regardless
of specific divine prohibitions. In the celebrated fifth chapter of the Second
Treatise, the question of the proper human stance toward the physical world
will become an explicit and seminal theme in Locke’s natural rights theory,
but the first glimmerings of Locke’s theory of property appear here in the
First.
The underlying radicalism of the First Treatise can also be seen in Locke’s
discussion of the family. Locke’s stated concern in Chapters Five and Six was
to refute Filmer’s claims for Adam’s title by the subjection of Eve and by the
right of fatherhood. With respect to Hunton’s argument regarding the moral
status of the subjection of Eve, Locke offers a number of observations meant
to demonstrate that the Bible’s endorsement of the subjection of wives to their
husbands conferred at most a conjugal rather than a political power.17 We
recall that the Puritan divine and parliamentary radical Hunton had argued
from the premise of the divine ordination of political power.18 While Hunton
defended the principle of natural liberty, he denied that individuals as indi-
viduals have the moral capacity to constitute sovereign political institutions.
Rather, for the Calvinist Hunton, communal consent to a form of rule merely
placed sovereignty in particular institutions or individuals; consent did not
produce sovereign right. Insofar as Hunton’s argument rested ultimately on
the divine ordination of political power, then, Locke’s treatment of Scrip-
ture, and Genesis 3:16 in particular, is significant for determining his stance
toward this predecessor in the natural liberty tradition. Locke argues that
not only does the subjection of Eve not denote Adam’s sovereign right, in
17 For a fuller treatment of the way in which Locke went much further than any of his Whig
colleagues in extending his individualist principles to women and children in the family, see
Melissa Butler, “Early Liberal Roots of Feminism: John Locke and the Attack on Patriarchy,”
American Political Science Review, vol. 72, no. 1 (March 1978): pp. 135–50; David Foster,
“Taming the Father: John Locke’s Critique of Patriarchal Fatherhood,” Review of Politics,
vol. 56, no. 4 (Fall 1994): pp. 641–70; Mary Walsh, “Locke and Feminism on Private and
Public Realms of Activity,” Review of Politics, vol. 57, no. 2 (Spring 1995): pp. 251–77;
and Lee Ward, “The Natural Rights Family: Locke on Women, Nature, and the Problem
of Patriarchy,” in Nature, Woman, and the Art of Politics, Eduardo Velasquez, ed. (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): pp. 149–79. For the classic study portraying Locke as a
patriachalist, albeit of a liberal persuasion, see Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract: Aspects
of Patriarchal Liberalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988): pp. 3, 22, 92–3. For
a recent study that not only demonstrates the diversity of opinion among the Whigs with
respect to the family but also disputes the importance of patriachalism in Filmer’s argument
for divine right monarchy, see Rachel Weil, “The Family in the Exclusion Crisis: Locke versus
Filmer Revisited,” in A Nation Transformed: England after the Restoration, Alan Houston and
Steve Pincus, eds. (Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 2001): pp. 101, 103,107, 109,
111, 121, 124.
18 Philip Hunton, “A Treatise of Monarchy,” in Divine Right and Democracy, David Wootton,
ed. (Hammondsworth: Middlesex: Penguin Classics, 1986): pp. 176–7.
contrast to Filmer, he also suggests that, in contrast to Hunton, Scripture’s

injunction to Eve may possess no obligatory moral status whatsoever. Locke
charges that in the Bible’s command
[t]here is here no more Law to oblige a Woman to such a Subjection, if the Circum-
stances either of her Condition or Contract with her Husband should exempt her
from it, then there is, that she should bring forth her Children in Sorrow and Pain,
if there could be found a Remedy for it. (1:47)
In his putative defense of Hunton, Locke offers two startlingly secular argu-
ments that Hunton would surely have contested: the contractual character
of conjugal society and the capacity of human initiative to overcome divine
injunction.
If Locke’s professed conservatism in defense of the natural liberty tra-
dition is not all that it appears to be, then we are entitled to ask whether
Locke’s stance toward Scripture is equally deceiving. In the early sections
of the First Treatise Locke presented himself as the defender of the plain
meaning of Scripture against “so much glib Nonsense” and transparent ma-
nipulations of the biblical text proffered by Filmer. This is a particularly
pressing issue, Locke indicates, because Filmer “pretends wholly to build on
Scripture-proofs.”19 By demonstrating that Filmer’s argument is incompat-
ible with the scriptural passages upon which he attempts to build, Locke
promises to undermine the entire edifice of Filmerian divine right theory.
Yet, Locke frequently employs both scriptural and natural forms of argu-
mentation. Locke’s refutation of Filmer is not even putatively based wholly
on “Scripture-proofs.” Does Locke’s effort to demonstrate that Filmer fails
to build his system of government on Scripture also imply Locke’s own skep-
ticism that a decent system of government could be built upon the principles
in Scripture?20
Here it may be useful to examine briefly Locke’s own observations on the
art of political and philosophical writing. As the dispute between Filmer and
Locke reveals, the charge of theological innovation, or even more so athe-
ism, was a powerful weapon in seventeenth-century English polemics. Locke
both directly and indirectly accuses Filmer of these heresies, as had Filmer
against his opponents a generation or so earlier. It is precisely because of the
sensitive nature of theologico–political disputes that Locke accuses Filmer
of attempting to conceal the radical character of his divine right theory by
means of skillful rhetoric and esoteric writing. Locke charges that Filmer,
fearing that a clear statement of his teaching would shock the religious sen-
sibilities of his audience, resorted to crafty writing in order to conceal the
19 Locke, Two Treatises, “Preface” and I:1–2.

20 Cf. Nathan Tarcov, Locke’s Education for Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984): pp. 64–5.
radical character of his teaching from all but the most discerning reader.
Locke claims:
Like a wary Physician, when he would have his Patient swallow some harsh or
Corrosive Liquor, he mingles it with a large quantity of that, which may dilute it;
that the scatter’d Parts may go down with less feeling, and cause less Aversion. (1:7)
We can assume that Locke’s caution to the reader applies as much, and prob-
ably more, to himself than to the irrepressible and brutally candid Robert
Filmer.21 In fact, I shall argue that Locke, a former medical student himself,
was the very picture of a “wary Physician.”
Although the status of Scripture as a guide for political life is a consistent
theme of the First Treatise, Locke rarely in this work offers his own view of
the proper approach one should take in reading biblical texts. In Chapter
Five he states: “God, I believe, speaks differently from Men, because he
speaks with more Truth, more Certainty: but when he vouchsafes to speak
to Men, I do not think, he speaks differently from them, in crossing the Rules
of language in use amongst them” (1:46). Thus, Locke boldly claims that
God, and perforce Scripture, speak in clear and understandable language
to human beings, and only charlatans and partisans would seek to exploit
fabricated ambiguities or inconsistencies in the holy text for their own ends.
However, just a few sections later, Locke muddies this picture of the pristine
and perfectly clear language of Scripture when he argues that God’s words
in Genesis 3:16, “Thy desire shall be to thy Husband” – the core passage for
the subjection of Eve – “is too doubtful an expression, of whose signification
Interpreters are not agreed, to build so confidently on, and in a Matter
of such Moment” (1:49). Later Locke disputes Filmer’s claim for Cain’s
rule over his younger brother, Abel, by offering the remarkable judgment
that the phrase in Genesis “his desire shall be subject to thee, and thou
shalt Rule” is “so doubtful and obscure a place in Scripture, which may be
well, nay better, understood in a quite different Sense” (1:112). Further on,
Locke suggests that regarding the status of Cain’s right as the elder, nothing
“can convincingly be conferr’d from so doubtful a Text” (1:118). Scripture,
originially presented as so clear and unambiguous, soon appears for Locke
to be impenetrably doubtful and obscure on matters of great importance for
political life.
21 For good discussions of Locke’s famous caution, see Butler, “Early Liberalism Roots of
Feminism,” p. 147; Cox, Locke on War and Peace, pp. 1–44; Jean B. Elshtain, Public Man,
Private Woman (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1981): pp. 121–2; Pangle, Spirit, pp. 132–8; Leo
Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953): pp. 200,
206–9, 246 and Michael Zuckert, “Fools and Knaves: Reflections on Locke’s Theory of
Philosophical Discourse,” Review of Politics, vol. 36, no. 2 (1974): pp. 544–64 and his “Of
Wary Physicians and Weary Readers: The Debate on Locke’s Way of Writing,” Independent
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2 (1977): pp. 55–66.
The trajectory of Locke’s critical approach to biblical hermeneutics leads

ultimately to an implicit denial that Scripture provides authoritative guid-
ance for politics and the character of natural rights. Locke claims late in the
First Treatise that with respect to the condition of the people following the
dispersion at Babel, “Scripture says not a word of their Rulers or Forms of
Government” (1:145).22 While this pattern of rejecting Scripture’s role as
a positive guide for political life becomes more pronounced in the closing
sections of the treatise, evidence of Locke’s skepticism toward the political
authority of the Bible appears throughout the First Treatise. For example,
Locke’s first direct quotation from Scripture was buried in the midst of his
claim that if Filmer’s system of monarchy was overturned, then “Govern-
ments must be left again to the old way of being made by contrivance, and
the consent of Men (anthropine ktisis)” (1:6). The scriptural passage Locke
refers to in the original Greek is 1 Peter 2:13, in which the apostle artic-
ulated a principle of government rather different from the one Locke sug-
gests. Indeed, when we look at the scriptural passage as rendered in the King
James version of the Bible, we can see that Locke takes considerable liberties
with the original Greek. The full passage in the King James version runs as
follows: “Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man [anthropine ktisis] for
the Lord’s sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme, Or unto governors.”
At the very least, Locke subtly suggests his own departure from the common
authoritarian interpretation of this passage in traditional English Christian-
ity. By rendering this celebrated and politically potent passage in Peter in
a more populist vein than is generally accepted, Locke forces his reader to
reexamine the authentic biblical position toward politics.23 Locke interprets
this famous scriptural passage to suggest that the biblical teaching on the
origin and character of political society may not conform to the principles
of right deduced from reason. Articulating, defining, and defending these
principles of political sovereignty and natural rights, however, was Locke’s
focus of the Second Treatise.
The Law of Nature

The Second Treatise begins very much where the First left off. It begins os-
tensibly as an elaboration of the Christian-Aristotelian strain of the natural
22 Cf. Tarcov, Locke’s Education, p. 62.

23 While I agree with Thomas Pangle that Locke uses his gloss on this passage to show his
disagreement with Scripture, I would not go so far as to argue that “it would be difficult to
imagine a clearer endorsement, prima facie, of the divine right of kings” than the King James
version of 1 Peter 2:13 (Pangle, Spirit, p. 138). However, it is fair to say that the apostle’s
words are hardly a ringing endorsement of the principle of consent and limited government
either. I believe that in its proper context 1 Peter 2:13 is more about the political moderation
required of a minority religious community in the Roman Empire than a celebration of the
divine origins of monarchy.
liberty tradition. However, throughout the course of the first five chapters of
this work, Locke’s argument heads off in new and uncharted directions. In
his treatment of the state of nature and the origin of property rights, Locke
cautiously but firmly leads us to a more radical account of natural liberty
emphasizing the primacy of individual natural rights over moral duties and
the dictates of natural law.
After recounting the main features of his refutation of Robert Filmer in
the First Treatise as a kind of introduction to the Second, Locke proceeds
in Chapter Two to offer his own assessment of the “True Original, Extent,
and End of Civil Government.” Locke claims that “to understand Political
Power aright, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all
Men are naturally in” (II:4). Locke’s state of nature has two central features.
First, for individuals it is “a State of Perfect Freedom to order their Actions,
and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, . . . without
asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man” (II:4). Moreover,
the state of nature is “a State also of Equality, wherein all the Power and
Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than any other” (II:4). In this
opening presentation of the state of nature, Locke firmly locates his position
in the natural liberty tradition, inasmuch as
[t]here being nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and
rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the
same faculties, should also be equals one amongst another without Subordination or
Subjection. (II:4)
Locke initially associates his state of nature with the Christian-Aristotelian

tradition represented in this case by the great English scholastic Richard
Hooker. He argues that the principle of natural equality was held by “the
Judicious Hooker” to be “so evident in it self, and beyond all question,
that he makes it the Foundation of that Obligation to mutual Love amongst
Men” (II:5; cf. II:15).24 The precise character of this “Obligation to mutual
Love,” Locke suggests, can only be ascertained by reference to the “Law of
Nature.”
While Locke indicates that God and nature have not provided a natu-
ral order of political rule for human beings, he does argue that individuals
have been provided with a natural rule to measure their actions. The state
of liberty is not a “State of Licence” because “the State of Nature has a
Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone” (II:6). Locke indicates
that “Reason, which is that Law,” teaches that all human beings are “the
Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker.” As we recall
24 Simmons astutely observes that Locke does not include the portion of this passage in the
Ecclesiatical Polity, Book I, Chapter viii, in which Hooker acknowledges the right to rule for
those individuals who are most rational. See John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992): p. 30.
from the First Treatise, there Locke employed this modification of an essen-
tially Filmerian concept in order to counter both Filmer and Grotius. Here in
the Second Treatise, Locke develops this argument even further. By virtue of
God’s claim on humanity arising from his status as our source or “Maker,”
Locke affirms, in contrast to Filmer, the primal and fundamental equality
that characterizes human relations. All human beings, no less than Adam,
are the “Workmanship” of God and are bound to follow divine laws as they
are expressed through revelation and the operation of our rational nature.
In contrast to Grotius, Locke argues that the law of nature stipulates that the
individual “has not Liberty to destroy himself” (II:6). Though every human
being is naturally free and equal vis-à-vis other human beings, they are not
therefore logically free to kill themselves or alienate their liberty entirely,
through contractual absolutism, because of their obligation to serve God’s
“business” rather than “one anothers Pleasure.” The natural law suicide
prohibition rooted in humanity’s status as God’s property appears to form
the bedrock of Locke’s opposition to Grotian contractual absolutism.
From the premise of God’s ownership of human beings, Locke derives a
transcendent natural law depending entirely on the human relation to God,
who is the guarantor of that law. The key principles of the natural law are
what may be termed the “no-harm” commands. Locke contends that people
are not only not at liberty to harm themselves, but also “no one ought to
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions” (II:6). Significantly,
Locke frames the moral order derived from the natural law in terms of
duties rather than rights. Even self-preservation is presented as a duty an
individual owes to God the maker. Locke claims that by the law of nature
“Everyone is bound to preserve himself, and . . . when his own Preservation
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of
Mankind” (II:6). At this point, Locke’s natural law appears similar to that of
the Pufendorfian Tyrrell. For both, the right of self-preservation appears to be
derived from a deeper duty to serve the natural law by ensuring the common
good of society. Even Locke’s admission that the right of self-preservation can
only be overridden when one’s preservation “comes not in competition with
others” appears not as an endorsement of the primacy of rights over duties,
but rather as a statement of the status of the right of self-preservation as a
means to perform the duty to preserve others.25 Overzealous defenders of
others may, it seems, contravene the claims of their divine owner by recklessly
exposing themselves to harm and thus, as a corollary, doing little to help
others.
But what dangers do human beings pose for each other if the natural law
is apparent to all individuals “who will but consult it”? Locke responds that
25 James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1993), p. 26 and Michael P. Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republi-
canism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): pp. 218–19.
there will always be some individuals who do not apprehend the natural law.
He does not offer much guidance for determining who would not follow this
law and why; presumably they are governed by passion rather than “Reason,
which is that Law.” But he indicates that the natural law contains a crucial
provision allowing for individuals to protect themselves and others from
these flouters of the natural law. This is every individual’s “right to punish
the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its Violation”
(II:7). Once again, Locke does not present this punishment power as a right
independent of a more fundamental duty; rather, Locke identifies this right
as “a Power to Execute” the natural law. As Locke presents it, human beings
serve God by punishing violators of the natural law. Indeed, he claims that
the natural law would “be in vain” without this human participation in the
natural injunction against the destruction of God’s property. By this reason-
ing, Locke argues that the only exemption to the no-harm principle of the
natural law would be in the service of that very principle.
There are two important features of Locke’s initial presentation of the
executive power of the law of nature. First, he locates this power in the right
of individuals in the state of nature. By doing so, he rejects the Catholic
natural law argument that the right to punish malefactors of the natural law
belongs exclusively to established political authority.26 This right preexists
the establishment of political society and, Locke claims, persists within it
to some extent. Locke goes further, however, to argue that the power of
government, its right to punish offenders against both the natural law and its
own civil laws, derives from this natural power of individuals. Locke defends
the “very strange Doctrine” that every individual can punish offenders of the
natural law by reference to that “Right any Prince or State can put to death,
or punish an Alien, for any Crime he commits in their Country” (II:9). In
answer to the traditionally vexing question “From where does government
derive the right to punish criminals and execute its laws?” Locke offers
the startling suggestion that government can ensure the preservation of its
members, and presumably all of humanity, by virtue of the same power any
individual has independently of membership in political society.
26 In this respect, Figgis exaggerates the connection between the Whigs and the Catholic nat-
ural lawyers when he argues that the Whigs learned their ideas and arguments for natural
rights and resistance from “the Society of Jesus” (Figgis, “On Some Political Theories of the
Early Jesuits,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, new ser., vol. XI [London, 1897]:
pp. 89–112). In locating Locke’s natural law in the medieval voluntarist tradition of Ock-
ham and d’Ailly, Francis Oakley (The Politics of Eternity: Studies in the History of Medieval and
Early-Modern Political Thought [Leiden: Brill, 1999]: pp. 242–5) makes a similar mistake by
not recognizing the radical individualism underlying Locke’s law of nature. Two thoughtful
accounts of Locke’s executive power of the law of nature that rely on a theistic interpretation,
but draw political implications from Locke’s argument that are decidedly radical and indi-
vidualistic, are Kirstie M. McClure, Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996): pp. 127–32, 141–55 and Tully, Locke in Contexts,
pp. 315–23.
The second important feature of Locke’s initial presentation of the exec-

utive power of the law of nature is his consideration of the extent of that
power. Locke makes it clear that the punishment power of individuals ex-
tends to a natural right of capital punishment.27 He reveals that in the course
of executing the law of nature, individuals “may restrain, or where it is nec-
essary, destroy things noxious to them” (II:8). While it is apparent that the
natural executive right allows the ultimate violation of the no-harm principle,
namely, killing, Locke is also careful to soften the implications of this right.
For example, Locke argues that the natural punishment power does not af-
ford an individual an “Absolute or Arbitrary Power, to use a Criminal when
he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless
extravagancy of his own Will” (II:8). By clarifying that the workmanship
of God can never rightfully become the playthings of sadistic individuals,
Locke appears to include a prohibition on torture or slavery in his natural
law. Retribution may require swift and lethal punishment, but it does not
sanction despotism and cruelty. Moreover, Locke is careful to stipulate that
the ends of this punishment right should be reparation and restraint. He em-
phasizes this measured and moderate dimension of the natural punishment
right throughout much of his early discussion in Chapter Two. Proportional-
ity must be the primary consideration for any act of punishment. Thus, while
capital punishment may be required for particularly dangerous individuals
or for purposes of deterrence, Locke leaves the impression that such severe
punishment will be the exception rather than the rule in the state of nature.
Locke’s response to the “mighty Objection, Where are, or ever were, there
any Men in such a State of Nature?” is twofold. First, he replies that “all
Governors of Independent Communities” are in a state of nature with re-
spect to each other (II:14). Second, he points to “a Swiss and an Indian, in the
woods of America” as another example of “Men living together according
to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge
between them” (II:14, 19). From these examples, Locke makes the case that
not all agreements and compacts form political society, “for Truth and keep-
ing of Faith belongs to Men, as Men, and not as Members of Society” (II:14).
With this assertion, Locke begins to develop more fully the artful process
of distinguishing his state of nature from that of Hobbes. Locke’s initial
27 Locke refers to Scripture in order to support this natural right of capital punishment. He
offers the example of Cain to demonstrate Scripture’s agreement with “the great Law of
Nature, Who so sheddeth Mans Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed” (II:11). From Cain’s
plea to God that “Everyone that findeth me, shall slay me” Locke deduces two things:
that this natural right of capital punishment is “writ in the Hearts of Mankind” and that
the injury done by one individual to another affords everyone a “Right to destroy such
a Criminal” (II:11). Thus, Locke’s natural executive power is both lethal and universal,
allowing all individuals to participate in the punishment of an injury not directly related to
themselves. For two different interpretations of Locke’s use of the story of Cain, see Seliger,
Liberal Politics, pp. 56–7 and Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 223, note 84.
presentation of the state of nature differs from that of Hobbes. Whereas for
Hobbes the original moral fact is a natural liberty to do what each consid-
ers necessary for survival – including the “right to everything, even to one
another’s body” – Locke’s natural law orientation emphasizes the natural
moral limits on human action.28 Inasmuch as human beings are the natu-
ral property of God, Locke denies individuals even a right over their own
bodies and lives (II:6). Moreover, while Locke concedes a few exceptions to
the no-harm principle of the natural law, he does so only in furtherance of
individuals’ natural law obligations to “preserve Mankind.” Locke leaves
the reader with the distinct impression that his state of nature is much more
peaceful and orderly than that of Hobbes.
In the following chapter Locke makes the contrast with Hobbes even
more explicit. He announces, with an oblique reference to Hobbes and his
followers, that “the State of Nature, and the State of War, which however
some Men have confounded, are as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good
Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice,
Violence, and Mutual Destruction are from one another” (II:19). By equating
nature and war, Locke suggests, Hobbes made a fundamental error. The
state of war, for Locke, is not the scene of hit-and-run raids and irregular
warfare Hobbes presented in his state of nature; rather, Locke defines the
state of war as “declaring by Word or Action, not a passionate and hasty,
but a sedate settled Design, upon another Mans Life” (II:16). Locke suggests
that not all human beings are naturally warlike, but that a few incorrigible
characters will systematically attempt to invade the rights of others. Against
these villains, all individuals may exercise their punishment power. To this
extent, Locke’s state of nature appears more like Pufendorf’s and Tyrrell’s
than that of Hobbes. Like Tyrrell, Locke suggests that a minimalist social
order, albeit below the sophistication and extent of political society, will be
relatively peaceful and secure. Indeed, in a clever but indirect reference to
Hobbes’ sovereign, Locke turns the table on Hobbes by arguing that anyone
“who attempts to get another Man into his Absolute Power, does thereby put
himself into a State of War with him.”29 The “sedate settled Design” Locke
associates with the state of war appears more characteristic of one who
would aspire to being captain of the Leviathan than the sensible individuals
Locke presents in his state of nature.
Locke’s attempt to distance himself from Hobbes revolves around his
distinction between the state of nature and the state of war. Locke defines the
state of nature as one characterizing human beings “living together according
to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge
between them” (II:19). The state of war, on the other hand, occurs as a result

29 II:17. Here Locke claims that freedom is “the Fence” to the individual’s preservation, and
in so doing, in one fell swoop, he disqualifies any preservationist argument for absolutism,
whether Grotian or Hobbesian.
of the use of force without right (any use of force that is not in execution
of the law of nature), either in the state of nature or “against an aggressor,
though he be in Society and a fellow Subject” (II:19). In this way, Locke both
extends the executive power of the law of nature to civil society and severs
the Hobbesian argument for the exclusive connection between war and the
natural condition.30 Locke suggests that in principle, at least, the state of
nature may be no more violent than political society. Given this fact and
Locke’s picture of the relatively peaceful and orderly character of the state
of nature, we are left to wonder why anyone would want to leave the state
of nature as Locke presents it.31 If the state of perfect freedom and political
society, which requires a considerable restraint of that freedom, provide
a comparable degree of security, there seems to be little reason to do so.
Moreover, given the logic of Locke’s argument that an individual’s freedom
is a “Fence” to his or her preservation, it would presumably follow that the
state of perfect freedom would provide greater security for one’s preservation
than civil government, especially strong and autocratic governments in the
Hobbesian mold.
Lockean Natural Rights

From an initial reading of Chapters Two and Three of the Second Treatise
the reader is led to believe that Locke, for the most part, sees government
as a greater threat to life and liberty than that “State all Men are naturally
in” (II:4). It is thus with considerable surprise that we encounter Locke’s
statement in the last section of Chapter Three, where he reveals: “To avoid
this State of War (wherein there is no appeal but to Heaven, and wherein
every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no Authority to decide
between the Contenders) is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into
Society, and quitting the State of Nature” (II:21). With this, Locke pulls
the rug out from under our feet; he undermines the very premise of his
transcendent natural law, the operation of which we had been assured would
ensure the relative peace and security of the natural condition. To understand
how Locke could have led us unwittingly to this point, we must reexamine
his state of nature and especially his account of the executive power of the
law of nature.
30 Of course, Hobbes also found support for the state of nature in the latent possibilities of
civil society. We recall Hobbes’ response to the skeptical reader in Leviathan, Chapter 13:
“Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks
to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he
locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Laws, and publicke Officers, armed, to
revenge all injuries shall be done him” (p. 77).
31 Hans Aarsleff, “The State of Nature and the Nature of Man in Locke,” in John Locke:
Problems and Perspectives, John Yolton, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969):
pp. 99–136, esp. p. 101.
Let us take stock of what we already know (or think we know) about
Locke’s state of nature. It appears to include, but is not limited to, an original
pre-political condition. As was the case with Tyrrell, the state of nature
describes a form or forms of human society that exist without reference to
the degree of political experience of the individuals in it.32 A Swiss trader
and an Indian brave meeting in “the woods of America” are as truly in the
state of nature as Napoleon Bonaparte and Tsar Alexander meeting on a raft
in the Niemen River. Locke indicates that there are perfect forms of the state
of nature (II:14) – suggesting less perfect or imperfect forms – but does not
in these early stages of the treatise account for the degrees of perfection.33
All Locke has left us for guidance as to the precise character of the state
of nature is his formal definition presented earlier. But it is perhaps a little
puzzling that Locke’s definition of the state of nature, “Men living together
according to Reason, without a common Superior on Earth,” appears not in
Chapter Two, entitled “Of the State of Nature,” but in Chapter Three, “Of
the State of War.” The distinction between Locke’s account of the state of
nature and the state of war may not be as great as we originally assumed.
Locke was careful to demonstrate that the executive power of the law
of nature was not a license for war, but rather a use of force with right
needed to punish offenders against the law of nature. These malefactors
were irrational and violent individuals who endangered the peace in the
state of nature. Locke went so far as to call them “wild Savage Beasts” who
“may be destroyed as a Lyon or a Tyger” (II:11). He admitted that the no-
harm principle of the law of nature could be contravened for the sake of
preserving the general peace and safety of all the individuals in the state
of nature. Indeed, Locke affirmed that an individual executing the law of
nature may legitimately employ great force to the point of causing death.
While Locke was careful to make the deterrent value of such lethal force
harmonize with his concern to preserve proportionality as a measure of
this punishment power in the state of nature (a plausible argument in the
case of murder), he also slipped in the possibility of punishing “the lesser
breaches” of the law of nature with capital punishment.34 Clearly, there is
no necessary or easy connection between Locke’s argument for deterrence
and his emphasis on the principle of proportionality.
Two arguments serve to extend Locke’s defense of lethal force in the state
of nature far beyond the measure of proportionality he originally offered.
Both of these arguments emerge in Locke’s account of the state of war. First,
Locke states that an individual in the state of nature is entitled to view an
32 Tyrrell, PNM 62. Cf. Richard Goldwin, “John Locke,” in The History of Political Philosophy,
3rd ed., Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987),
p. 479 and Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 230.
33 Pangle, Spirit, p. 247.
34 II:12. Cf. Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 235.
aggressor against himself or herself as an enemy to all humankind, “a Wolf

or a Lyon,” and is right to destroy such an enemy.35 Here Locke makes the
remarkable argument that an injury in the state of nature against a single
person makes the aggressor a rightful object of force, even lethal force, for
the entire human race. This at the very least suggests some very large posses
in the state of nature and many individuals not unaccustomed to blood
on their hands. Second, and more importantly, Locke extends the right of
punishment beyond aggressive action to mere hostile intent. Locke argues:
“one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an
enmity to his being” (II:16). He soon reveals that the enmity defense for lethal
force “makes it Lawful for a Man to kill a Thief, who has not in the least hurt
him, nor declared any design upon his Life, any further than by use of Force,
so as to get him in his Power, as to take away his Money” (II:18). Thus, in
the logic of Locke’s enmity doctrine, any interference with an individual’s
liberty, in action or in plan, entitles that individual to kill the interferer or
aggressor.36 Given the manifold possibilities for interference with individual
liberty in the state of nature, where there is no common superior to appeal to
for aid and the inscrutability of determining human intentions, the potential
for endemic violence is very real.
Locke suggests that there are many rational reasons for the use of force
in the state of nature. Retaliating against individuals who interfere with
one’s liberty is the rational response of a sensible being to this condition.
The implications of this rational and defensible action, however, are not
particularly conducive to the peaceful coexistence of “men living together
according to Reason, without a common Superior on Earth.” Human be-
ings, Locke admits, are passionate creatures, often “partial to themselves
and their Friends” (II:13). It is because of their “Self-love” that “it is unrea-
sonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases” (II:13). Yet it was precisely
the Christian-Aristotelian assumption of human rationality that appeared to
make the peaceful state of nature conceivable at all. We realize that the right
to use lethal force against any enemy, real or perceived, lies not only with
rational individuals but with all human beings per se. Locke concedes that
it is the problematic character of the human passions and the weakness of
reason that makes “Civil Government . . . the proper Remedy for the Incon-
veniencies of the State of Nature” (II:13). Locke admits that these “Inconve-
niencies” must “certainly be Great, where Men may be Judges in their own
Case.”
Two important arguments emerge from Locke’s discussion of the prob-
lematic character of the human passions. First, he reveals that the law of
nature may be apprehensible to all “who will but consult it,” but he also
35 II:16. Cf. Goldwin, “Locke,” p. 482.

36 Zuckert, Natural Rights, pp. 235–6 and John Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993): pp. 40–2.
suggests that human partiality ensures that people will not admit that this
law applies to them. Even if we are all the workmanship of God, Locke
suggests, the human passions will resist the moral prohibitions flowing from
this central theological and natural fact.37 Moreover, given the strength of
the human passions, most notably for self-preservation, Locke implies that
even if people apprehend the rational dictates of the natural law, those not
immediately threatened will not reliably enforce a sentence when the guilty
party resists and makes punishment dangerous and frequently destructive.38
Thus, the executive power of the law of nature inhering in individuals, far
from promoting the peace and preservation of all humankind, which is the
end of that law, actually generates potentially chaotic conditions antithetical
to the intention of the law of nature.
Second, while Locke quietly affirms the destructive possibilities intrinsic
to the natural punishment right in the state of nature, he also emphatically
denies the argument that absolute monarchy is the solution to the problem
of the natural condition. Locke argues that it is precisely because of the
chaotic potential of the self-regarding passions that absolutism is the worst
possible regime. Locke rejects Hobbes’ “terrible misstep” with the following
argument:
I desire to know what kind of Government that is, and how much better it is than
the State of Nature, where one Man commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be
Judge in his own Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever he pleases, without
the least liberty to any one to question or controle those who execute his Pleasure?
And whatsoever he doth, whether led by Reason, Mistake or Passion, must be sub-
mitted to.39
In this passage, so reminiscent of Sidney’s and Spinoza’s attack on abso-

lutism, Locke argues that, perhaps paradoxically, the same disorderly and
self-regarding passions that habitually upset the peace in the state of nature
also ensure that the state of nature is a better condition for the preservation
of life and liberty than absolute monarchy.
When we retrace our steps through the twists and turns of Locke’s ar-
gument, we come to the conclusion that the state of nature, for Locke, is
or is always potentially a state of war. This conclusion is puzzling consid-
ering that Locke’s executive power of the law of nature ends up looking
suspiciously like Hobbes’ right of nature, but Locke emphatically rejects
Hobbes’ theory of absolute sovereignty devised to solve the grave problems
37 Ian Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986):
p. 113. For a good discussion of Locke’s assessment of the serious difficulty in determining
the substance of the law of nature, see Peter Josephson, The Great Art of Government: Locke’s
Use of Consent (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002): ch. 3.
38 II:13, 136. Cf. Tully, Locke in Contexts, p. 35.
39 II:13. The phrase Hobbes’ “terrible misstep” is from Pangle, Spirit, p. 245.
produced by this conception of natural rights.40 In Locke’s crucial example

of an individual’s right to kill a thief, he reveals that war is a condition pos-
sible in civil society only when and where “the Law, which was made for
my Preservation . . . cannot interpose to secure my Life from present force”
(II:19). Facing a robber on a lonely highway, miles from any police station,
one is in a state of nature with respect to that criminal because the civil
law can be of no assistance. Where one can appeal to a common superior
to settle any controversies or disputes with others, the threat of war is gen-
erally defused by the overwhelming force available to the civil authorities.
Contrary to our first impression, Locke concludes that the state of war is
possible only in the state of nature or something approximating it in civil
society.41 Approximations of the state of nature may not only include fac-
ing the robber on the highway but may also occur in civil society when an
individual is denied justice or assistance by corrupt magistrates: “where an
appeal to the Law, and constituted Judges lies open, but the remedy is deny’d
by a manifest perverting of Justice, and a barefaced wresting of the Laws”
(II:20). Although there is the possibility of corruption in the civil adminis-
tration of justice, Locke indicates that generally in civil society, in contrast
to the state of nature, war ceases when the actual use of force is over because
“continuance of the State of War is excluded, and the Controversy is decided
by that Power” (II:21). War or the threat of war is a constant feature of the
state of nature.
When Locke considers the issue of slavery in Chapter Four, the picture of
the state of nature worsens even more dramatically. In this crucial chapter,
Locke’s workmanship thesis disintegrates as a meaningful model for human
relations and his transcendent natural law is left in tatters. Four important
developments emerge in this chapter. First, Locke demonstrates that by the
executive power of the law of nature, humans are not only often in conflict
and punish for the sake of deterrence, but they actually can gain a despotic
right over one another. While Locke reaffirms that no one may by “his own
Consent, enslave himself to any one else,” he does insist that an aggressor
in the state of nature may be held as a slave by his victim. Of this aggressor,
Locke claims: “having, by his fault, forfeited his own Life, by some Act that
deserves Death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in
his Power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own Service, and he
40 I agree with Shapiro (Evolution, p. 124) that Locke adopts the Hobbesian “tactic” of sepa-
rating rights from obligations. But I believe that Locke’s aim is more than just tactical. That
Shapiro does not view it this way is probably due to his insistence on Locke’s workmanship
model as the underlying premise of his natural law teaching (pp. 103–7).
41 See Goldwin’s excellent treatment of the distinction between the state of nature, the state of
war, and civil society (“Locke,” p. 481). Cf. also Simmons, Anarchy, pp. 42–4 and Nathan
Tarcov, “Locke’s Second Treatise and ‘The Best Fence Against Rebellion,’” Review of Politics,
vol. 43 (April 1981): pp. 203–4.
does him no injury by it.”42 This contradicts Locke’s earlier prohibition of

cruel and despotic practices in the exercise of the executive power of the law
of nature (II:8). Moreover, it clearly contravenes the central tenet of the
workmanship thesis, which affirmed that God sent human beings “into the
World by his order and about his business, they are his Property . . . made
to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure.”43 Even Locke’s argument that
the aggressor has forfeited his life does not explain and account for how the
actions of individuals could exempt them from the duty they ultimately owe
God, not other human beings, to preserve their lives. Only the potter can
destroy his product, not the other pots.
Second, Locke’s admission of slavery as a legitimate natural law prac-
tice accentuates the chaotic and brutal character of the state of nature. His
argument that slavery is “the State of War continued, between a Lawful
Conqueror, and a Captive” adds a new sense of permanence to the warlike
potential of the state of nature. Conflict in the state of nature no longer
appears as a series of isolated incidents. Now we have a picture of sadistic
slaveholders systematically torturing suspected thieves. With this admission
of a natural law basis for despotic rule, Locke presents the possibility of a
distorting and dangerous model of rule antithetical to legitimate government
by consent.
Third, Locke more or less overturns the suicide prohibition, which seemed
to underlie the entire workmanship thesis. Locke admits that the slave,
“whenever he finds the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value of his
Life, ‘tis in his Power, by resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on him-
self the Death he desires” (II:23). The direct agency Locke identifies in the
“Power” of the slave to cause his own death belies the argument that the
slave is only indirectly responsible for his death and therefore has not bro-
ken the suicide prohibition. Thus, Locke reveals that fundamental preser-
vation rights are not only forfeitable but also in a sense alienable.44 In this
light, Locke’s contention that each individual lacks complete moral power
42 II:23. Contrast this with Tyrrell, PNM 107, 113, where Tyrrell criticizes Hobbes’ argument
in De Cive 2.8 that no injury can be done a slave. In this passage Locke seems to be following
Hobbes rather than Tyrrell, demonstrating his own greater affinity with Hobbes’ natural
rights teaching than with Pufendorfian–Tyrrellian natural law.
43 II:6. Simmons (Anarchy, pp. 52–4) distinguishes between two senses of absolute power: moral
and physical. Simmons argues that Locke means (or should mean) primarily the latter sense
in his discussion of the state of war. However, the confusion between these two ideas of
absolute power is not Locke’s; rather, I believe his point is that in the state of nature these
two species of despotic reasoning tend to collapse by virtue of the self-regarding character
of private judgment.
44 For good accounts of how Locke’s suicide prohibition shows the limits of inalienability,
see Simmons, Anarchy, pp. 102, 118–19 and Zuckert, Natural Rights, pp. 242–5. For the
contrary position, see Gary Glenn, “Inalienable Rights and Locke’s Argument for Limited
Government: Political Implications of a Right of Suicide,” Journal of Politics, vol. 46, no. 1.
February (1984): pp. 80–105.
over his or her life stands less as a divine prohibition on suicide than as
a statement that by the natural faculties and properties of human beings,
they cannot legislate themselves into slavery. In other words, Locke re-
peats that no individual is under a moral obligation to honor an absolute
contract.
The fourth feature of Locke’s account of slavery is his denial of any natural
law limits on the treatment of slaves. In this respect, Locke clearly signals his
distance from the moderate Whig Tyrrell. As we recall, Tyrrell had argued
that while slaves taken in war are under no moral obligation to serve their
masters (they are free to escape if they can), he also affirmed that the holder
of any slave, either by war or by contract, was bound by certain natural law
limits in his treatment of his slaves.45 Tyrrell had maintained that there is
a basic self-preservation right that has to be respected as part of the larger
natural law duty to supply, or at least not hinder, the requirements of peaceful
social existence. Ominously, Locke places no such restrictions on the right
of a master who may put the slave “to his own Service” (II:23). For Locke,
whatever is left of his transcendent natural law teaching, it does not bind the
actions of despotic rulers in this case. Actually, the executive right of Locke’s
law of nature seems to ground this despotic right.
The complexity in Locke’s state of nature also pervades his account of the
executive power of the law of nature. The execution of this natural right or
power gives Locke’s natural law teaching a unique point of departure from
prior natural liberty theories. Throughout the first four chapters of the Second
Treatise Locke’s natural rights teaching presents a central dilemma. On the
one hand, Locke boldly states that the power of government is derived from
and grounded in the natural power of individuals (II:9). Political society is
conventional, a product of contract and consent, but Locke contends that
the animating principle of this convention is a natural power reducible to the
individual. On the other hand, Locke also indicates that the unregulated and
uncontrolled exercise of this individual natural right is, if not antithetical
to, at least in deep tension with the peace and order of society. Filmer’s dire
predictions of the theoretical and practical difficulties produced by natural
liberty theory seem vindicated in the early chapters of this treatise. However,
Filmer is not Locke’s only opponent or target here. Locke uses this early
discussion to signify his own clear break from many of the central tenets of
the natural liberty school. To understand the radical implications of Locke’s
natural rights teaching, we will briefly compare and contrast it with that of
the Christian Aristotelians, particularly Hooker, and the other natural liberty
theorists, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hobbes.
Locke’s conspicuous appeal to Hooker in his account of the state of nature
is more or less indicative of his differences with the Christian-Aristotelian
45 Tyrrell, PNM, 107, 119∗ .

natural liberty tradition as a whole.46 What makes Hooker so important

for our understanding of Locke, however, is the former’s modification of the
Thomist and Suarezian accounts of the origin of government. Hooker, in the
passages Locke cites, affirms a pre-political condition and a kind of natu-
ral right of self-defense inhering in individuals.47 Locke skillfully employs
carefully selected and edited passages from Hooker ostensibly to demon-
strate their fundamental agreement that civil society is produced by con-
sent. However, by placing Hooker’s arguments back in their proper context
and by comparing these contextualized arguments with Locke’s position, we
can appreciate how radically Locke departs from this respectable Anglican
scholastic. For instance, while Hooker claims that individuals can defend
themselves from injury by the provision of the natural law, he also, unlike
Locke, explicitly blames the inadequacy of the natural law alone to pro-
vide for human security given the corruption of human nature caused by the
Fall.48 In the First Treatise, Locke radically reinterprets the meaning of the
Fall, especially with respect to Eve and the status of women, and generally
suppressed its political and moral import. Inasmuch as Hooker considers
the natural self-defense right only to illustrate its deficiency and the intrinsic
need for political society, Hooker expresses his fundamental agreement with
St. Thomas and Suarez that political power inheres in the community and
is not grounded on the natural power of individuals. In this crucial regard
Locke breaks from Hooker.
Locke’s natural rights theory also breaks from the more secular accounts
of Grotius, Pufendorf, Sidney, and Hobbes. In contrast to Locke, Grotius
maintained a form of natural self-preservation right, but he did not make
it the ground of political power. For Grotius, the ground of political power
was the compact forming society. In effect, the source of political authority
is the agreement of subjection supported by the natural law.49 While Grotius
allowed the possibility of a people to rebel against a vicious tyrant, he did
not ascribe this to a natural punishment power, but rather to the violation of
the compact any rational people would have made to empower their rulers.
Pufendorf and his moderate Whig follower Tyrrell come closer to Locke than
46 Clearly, I disagree with Simmons’ (Lockean Theory of Rights, p. 16) and Ashcraft’s (Locke’s
Two Treatises, pp. 35–80) argument that Locke’s natural law theory falls largely within the
Christian-Aristotelian tradition. Cf. Rahe’s (“Locke’s Philosophical Partisanship,” pp. 32–6)
critical response to Ashcraft.
47 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3 vols. (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947):
II-II 64.3, ST I 96.4 and Francisco Suarez, De Legibus, Ac Deo Legislatore (1612, Coimbra),
in Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez, S. J. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944):
ch. 3, sec. 3, pp. 3, 6. See also Zuckert, Natural Rights, pp. 222–33.
48 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593). George Edelen, W. Speed Hill,
and P. G. Stanwood, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977–81): bk 1,
ch. 10, sect. 4.
49 Grotius, DJB 2.20.40.
does Grotius. They allow an unlimited right of self-defense but, in contrast

to Locke, Pufendorf, and Tyrrell, maintain that punishment in the proper
sense can only be exercised by a superior over an inferior; thus punishment,
strictly speaking, has no place in the state of nature.50 Insofar as the right of
punishment does not inhere naturally in individuals, it cannot perforce derive
from individuals. Furthermore, Pufendorf and Tyrrell defuse the potentially
serious political implications of this universal right of self-defense by giving it
a much more conservative bent than does Locke. They argue that the right of
self-defense must be understood as derivative from the more comprehensive
natural law duties establishing the requirements of peaceful social existence.
The contrast between Locke, on the one hand, and Sidney and Hobbes,
on the other, is somewhat more complex. For his part, Sidney based his
political teaching on a natural right of self-preservation but, in contrast to
Locke, he was not concerned to develop a state of nature concept because
the central aim of Sidney’s natural rights theory was to show that the individ-
ual, monarch or otherwise, was not the primary unit of political analysis. In
Sidney’s fundamentally Spinozist system of natural power relations, political
authority derives its right of punishment from the collected power of indi-
viduals, but the great difference in the degree of power between government
and the individual produces a qualitative difference in the exercise of that
power.51 The right of the individual to defend himself against injury rests
on that individual’s power, but the right of government to punish individu-
als rests on its much greater power vis-à-vis any particular individual. For
Sidney, attempting to ground the power of government in the power of the
individual qua individual is like mistaking the forest for the trees.
Locke’s departure from Hobbes has serious implications for radical Whig
liberal constitutional theory. Hobbes derived the power to punish from in-
dividuals, particularly a sovereign free of contract and a people contracted
to assist that sovereign in the execution of the civil law.52 But for Hobbes, in
contrast to Locke, the natural power of the individuals composing political
society cannot be understood as political power in the full sense, because this
natural power, as opposed to the civil power employed by the sovereign, is
not a jurisdictional power to judge any controversy over right or to execute
the judgment and impose sanctions of the natural law. Thus, for Hobbes,
individual natural power may provide the material cause of a political pun-
ishing power but it does not, except in the strict formulations of an ab-
solutist theory of sovereignty, provide any meaningful dimension of formal
causality. In his curious manner of discussing the natural executive power, by
50 Tyrrell, PNM 153,232 and Pufendorf, DJNG 8.3.7, 10.

51 See, for example, Algernon Sidney, The Discourses Concerning Government, Thomas West,
ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Classic, 1996): ch. 3, sec. 11 (hereafter D, ch., sec.).
52 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edward Curley, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994): ch. 28. Cf.
Tully, Locke in Contexts, p. 20.
associating himself with thinkers with whom he seriously disagrees and criti-
cizing thinkers whose arguments closely parallel his own, Locke invites us to
ponder the radical character of his break with the natural liberty tradition.
By the end of Chapter Four of the Second Treatise, Locke’s original pre-
sentation of the transcendent natural law is in shambles. The power of ev-
ery individual to execute that law, in the absence of any natural or divine
provision of government, leads to dangerous and potentially chaotic con-
sequences. Moreover, Locke insists that the power of individuals precludes
the possibility of a Hobbesian solution to this problem. Given the disorderly
structure of the human passions and the ineradicable right of individuals to
punish aggressors, real or perceived, absolute monarchy, in Locke’s view, is
worse than the problem it intends to solve. In Locke’s famous discussion of
property in Chapter Five, he begins the difficult process of putting his natural
law Humpty-Dumpty back together again.
Locke on Property
A veritable ocean of ink has been spilled and an Amazon of trees felled in
recent years in examining Locke’s account of the origin of private property.
It has been by far the most frequently scrutinized aspect of Locke’s political
teaching.53 I do not promise here to add a great deal of new and origi-
nal analysis regarding Locke’s theory of property. Rather, I intend to locate
Locke’s theory of property in the larger context of his argument for political
53 The main source of contention among scholars regarding the issue of property in Locke is the
extent to which he justifies unlimited acquisition. One school maintains that Locke imposes
strict natural law limitations on individual appropriation derived from certain moral duties
the individual has toward society (e.g., Ashcraft, Locke’s Two Treatises, pp. 124–35; Dunn,
Political Thought of John Locke; and Tully, Discourse on Property), while the other school
tends to emphasize Locke’s aim to justify unlimited acquisition as a natural individual right
(e.g., C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism [Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1962]; Pangle, Spirit, esp. chs. 14, 19; Strauss, Natural Right and History,
esp. pp. 236–46; Ross Zucker, “Unequal Property and Its Premise in Liberal Theory,” History
of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1 (January 2000): pp. 29–49; and Zuckert, Natural Rights,
esp. ch. 9). Another aspect of the Lockean property debate pits those who see Locke’s defense
of unlimited acquisition as a feature of a conservative argument for “historical entitlement”
or the “agrarian capitalism” of England’s landed interest (e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Right
to Private Property [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988]: esp. cf. pp. 137–41 and 207–18
and Neal Wood, John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism [Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984]: pp. 49–92) against those who see Locke’s property teaching as politically radical
and subversive of traditional economic elites (e.g., Harvey Mansfield, “On the Political
Character of Property in Locke,” in Powers, Possessions and Freedoms: Essays in Honor of C. B.
MacPherson Alkis Kontos, ed. [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979]: pp. 24, 34–7 and
Rahe, “Locke’s Philosophical Partisanship,” pp. 18–22). Given my reading of the rigorous
individualism in Locke’s natural rights theory, my examination of Locke’s notion of property
rights in the following discussion will owe much to the many insights of the scholars in the
unlimited accumulation and political radicalism schools.
individualism. To do this, I will focus on the way Locke uses his account of
property to provide a new conceptual model for natural rights to replace the
divine workmanship model that has proved so problematic. This new model
is Locke’s theory of self-ownership.
Locke begins his treatment of property in this treatise with the same line
of argument he offered in his response to Filmer’s argument for Adam’s title
by donation in the First Treatise. Indeed, given Locke’s rather detailed dis-
cussion of property in the latter, his ensuing account initially promises to
be superfluous at best. Locke echoes the earlier account by beginning with
the assertion that both “natural Reason” and “Revelation” confirm that the
goods of the Earth were given “to Mankind in common.”54 But if the origi-
nal condition was a negative community of goods, meaning that no one had
an exclusive right to anything, it is unclear how any individual could ap-
propriate the goods and acquire the exclusive right to these goods necessary
for preservation. Locke responds that there are two things that are not in
common: the individual’s body and the actions of that body. Locke claims:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man
has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. (II:27)
The implications of Locke’s self-ownership argument are twofold. First,

it changes the entire fabric of Locke’s proposed law of nature. The cen-
tral moral and political fact is not God’s ownership of human beings, but
rather each individual’s ownership of himself or herself. This development
in Locke’s argument opens a gap in the conceptual space between God’s
governance of the world and the legitimate ground of human action, which
Locke will expand to dramatic effect in his treatment of property. Second,
the self-ownership model of natural rights provides Locke with a way to ex-
plain how a private right of property can emerge from an original common.
He argues that it is the “labour” of the individual that appropriates goods
and puts “a distinction between them and common” (II:28). In answer to
the question of why the labor of an individual produces exclusive title to a
natural good, as opposed to, say, eating or digesting it, Locke replies that
without human labor – even so little as picking up apples from the ground –
the natural plenty would be worthless for human beings.55 Locke indicates
that the forest may be full of game, but this is of little use to human be-
ings until these creatures can be caught and killed. As such, “this Law of
Reason makes the Deer, that Indian’s who hath killed it” (II:30). As Locke
presents it here, labor is the human participation in the production of the
great abundance provided by God and nature for the satisfaction of human
needs.
54 II:25. Note Locke’s use of 1 Timothy 6:7 in II:31. Cf. II:26, II:28.
55 Goldwin, “Locke,” p. 487.
A second implication of the self-ownership model relates to the problems

Locke identified in Grotius’ notion of the original negative community. Im-
portantly, Locke does not take the Tyrrellian–Pufendorfian path of directly
affirming a natural theft or dire necessity right.56 Rather, Locke places a few
natural law limits on the appropriative right of individuals in the state of
nature. Locke presents these limits as an extension of the no-harm principle
he articulated in Chapter Two. By the command of the natural law, people
are not morally free to harm each other indirectly by appropriating more
than their fair share of the external world. The law of nature governs not
only human relations vis-à-vis other human beings but also their relation to
the physical world.
The first of these natural law limits on appropriation is the requirement
to leave “enough, and as good” for others (II:27). Locke suggests that this
natural law limit is essentially a moral restraint acting directly on the ac-
tions (he does not say the conscience) of the individual appropriator. By the
logic of this first limitation, Locke implies that the Indian who kills a deer
for his own needs or those of people close to him must be fully conscious
that killing every deer in the forest for his private use would be wrong and
morally blameworthy. Locke also, however, suggests that the original natu-
ral bounty made this limitation more or less superfluous inasmuch as given
“the plenty of natural Provisions there was a long time in the World, and
the few spenders,” there was little or no possibility that “the industry of one
Man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others.”57 Locke’s
second natural law limit on appropriation is the spoilage limit. Whereas the
“enough, and as good” for others limit had both a natural and a moral
component – there naturally being many provisions and few spenders, as
well as a moral obligation to leave plenty for others – the spoilage limit is
purely a result of the operation of the laws of natural necessity. Locke claims
that nature and God have given human beings “as much as any one can
make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; . . . Whatever is beyond
this, is more than his share, and belongs to others” (II:31). He implies that
nature has a safeguard against the moral failings of human beings; it is not
only morally wrong to appropriate more than one needs or can use, it is
also stupid and perverse given that most edibles eventually spoil. Locke sug-
gests that this is a particularly effective limitation on human appropriation
56 Although Locke comes close to it at I:42, it is significant that he never hints at this possibility
in the Second Treatise, where he lays out his argument for property rights in much greater
detail.
57 II:31. It is interesting to note that in Chapter Five, the state of nature is more closely associated
with primitive society à la Pufendorf and Tyrrell than in the earlier treatment of the state of
nature proper in Chapter Two, where some of the prime examples of rights based relations are
often emphatically political (e.g., II:14). Locke’s reliance on primitive material conditions as
a basis for his natural law limitations on appropriation will shift the emphasis of his natural
rights teaching dramatically in Chapter Five.
because “the greatest part of things really useful to the Life of Man . . . are
generally things of short duration” (II:46). As such, nature, in Locke’s view,
nudges human beings into primitive forms of economic association like the
barter system. The barter system also has the salutary effect of allowing one
individual to pick the plums before they rot on the ground and trade the
surplus for more durable nuts. As Locke initially presents it, far from being
a tremendous hardship, the spoilage limitation actually generates a form of
a natural division of labor.
There is, however, a central contradiction in Locke’s initial account of the
original common. If God and nature provide the great abundance Locke in-
dicates, why is there any need for natural law limits on appropriation at all?
Is God’s bounty, the natural common, actually a ticking time bomb threat-
ening human preservation? Locke begins to address this complex issue in his
treatment of land. He baldly states that the main matter for understanding
the natural common is not the goods of the Earth, but the Earth itself: “The
chief matter of Property being now not the Fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts
that subsist on it, but the Earth itself, as that which takes in and carries
with it all the rest” (II:32). Locke now admits that God’s original provision
to humankind had a major catch; He commanded humans to labor “and
the penury of his Condition required it of him” (II:36). God supported his
commandment – as though His command was not good enough in itself –
by making the original condition one of “penury.” The reader has not been
left entirely unprepared for this shift in Locke’s argument. A little earlier,
he admitted that human “Wants forces him to Labour” (II:35). This labor,
Locke indicates, would extend beyond merely harvesting the goods offered
by the “spontaneous Hand of Nature.” Land is the “chief matter of Property”
because agriculture is the only hope for redemption from this state of natural
penury.
To illustrate, then, how human beings came to cultivate the vast natural
common, Locke presents his theory of labor value. Locke initially defended
labor as the source of private property on the grounds that the natural goods
of the Earth are worthless unless they are acquired for human use through
labor. The apples on the ground or on the branches are of no use to anyone
unless they are gathered. Later Locke extends this logic to the act of cul-
tivation and claims that “the provisions serving to the support of humane
life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are . . . ten times
more than those, which are yielded by an acre of Land, of an equal richnesse,
lyeing wast in common” (II:37). When human beings apply their labor to
the cultivation of the Earth, they add to its value by tenfold. Over the course
of the next six sections, Locke radicalizes this principle of labor value to one
thousand times the value of uncultivated land (cf. II: 37, 40, 43).
In this way Locke makes two significant points. First, he underscores the
incredible service agriculture offers for human preservation. If gathering the
fruits of one acre of uncultivated land can support only 1 individual and
the harvest from one acre of cultivated land can nourish 1,000, then clearly
preagricultural society would face severe natural limitations on population
growth. Second, and more importantly, Locke uses this discussion of the
value of labor to make the point that the penury of nature should not be
underestimated. Locke boldly states that “Nature and the Earth furnished
only the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves” (II:43; cf. II:40). The
benefit derived from the uncultivated “waste” is “little more than nothing”
(II:42). Locke reveals that the massive scale of waste under the rule of nature
dwarfs any spoilage that could be produced by the selfish accumulation of
human beings.58 With this argument for the almost unimaginable poverty
and harshness of nature, Locke delivers the final hammer blow to the naive
and reassuring assumptions underlying the transcendent law of nature em-
bodied in the divine workmanship model. The lack of material provision for
human needs from God and nature parallels Locke’s contention that the di-
vine or natural failure to provide human beings with reliable and structured
passions conducive to social life has left human beings in the state of nature
in a very dangerous and fragile condition. Indeed, Locke’s discussion of prop-
erty caps his earlier treatment of the natural executive power by drawing the
clear inference that perhaps the chief factor contributing to conflict in the
natural, pre-political condition is the brutal competition among human be-
ings for scarce resources.59 For Locke, it is natural rights, the universal right
of self-preservation, rather than a natural duty to conform to transcendent
laws that is the fundamental moral fact. The only natural duty is to oneself.
This is true, for Locke, because the right of self-preservation both conforms
to our deepest natural passions and reflects a realistic assessment of the great
hostility of nature toward human preservation. In Locke, Hobbes’ war of all
against all becomes the war of each against everything.
Locke’s presentation of the barrenness of unassisted nature lays the
groundwork for his overturning of his initial natural law limitations on ac-
quisition and appropriation. In the process, he both justifies the principle of
unlimited acquisition and defends the proposition that human labor, espe-
cially the labor of the mind, must and should work to overcome the natural
obstacles to abundance and comfortable self-preservation. The “enough, and
as good” for others limitation is steamrolled by Locke’s defense of agriculture
and the value of labor. Locke contends that through the act of appropriat-
ing land an individual does not, in principle, deny the goods of the Earth
to others, but rather increases “the common stock of mankind” (II:37). As
proof of this statement, Locke offers the contrast between a preagricultural
society like precolonial America and a modern European state. The univer-
sal poverty of people living in the conditions offered by unassisted nature in
wild America means that “a King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds,
58 Goldwin, “Locke,” p. 491.

59 Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 235.
lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England” (II:41). With this
statement Locke does two major things.
First, he suggests that the inequality of property introduced by agriculture
does not in itself produce political inequality.60 Despite the universal poverty
in America and the great abundance in England, there are still kings in
America and day laborers in England. But the Englishman lives better and
is more secure, and in this crucial sense freer, than the American monarch.
Second, Locke uses this discussion to introduce his doctrine of increase. He
argues that the recognition of the natural right to acquire unlimited amounts
of property serves the common interest of humanity by encouraging the
industry necessary for material and technological advance. The key to the
doctrine of increase is the invention of money. The invention of money,
according to Locke, overturns both the “enough, and as good” limit and
the spoilage prohibition. With the invention of money, “Men had agreed,
that a little piece of yellow Metal,” a durable but scarce resource of some
kind “which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great
piece of Flesh, or a whole heap of Corn” (II:37). Locke explains that the
implications of this invention were enormous. Money gave individuals a
rational incentive to produce far beyond their need by facilitating a system
of exchange much more dynamic than the barter system (II:48). Insofar as
the invention of money encouraged a potential for the inequality of property,
it actually benefited the whole of humanity, or at least those in commercial,
monetarized societies.
Locke insists that the institutions of money and commerce were products
of consent. He claims that money derives from “the consent of Men, where of
Labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain, that Men have agreed
to disproportionate and unequal Possessions of the Earth, they having by a
tacit and voluntary consent found a way, how a man may fairly possess more
land than himself can use the product of” (II:50). Locke also contends that
the institution of money occurred in pre-political society. By this argument,
Locke demonstrates that there are many forms of contract and agreement
that serve the cause of human association but fall short of political society.61
He reveals that the rational capacity demonstrated in the invention of money
indicates a latent potential in human reason that operates independently of
political society. Thus, Locke posits the economic foundations of political
life. Furthermore, by insisting that money predates and operates indepen-
dently of civil society, Locke claims that individuals could leave the state of
60 Indeed, Locke suggests that hierarchical social and political institutions are more character-
istic of primitive and subsistence conditions than they are of advanced capitalist societies
(II:107, II:111). I believe this would be part of Locke’s response to the thesis of Rousseau’s
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.
61 By separating the institution of money from political society, Locke disputes one of the
traditional absolutist claims for the right of sovereignty. As we noted in Chapter 2, this
position was shared by the secularist Bodin and the divine rightist Filmer.
nature not only with some property, but potentially with a great deal of it.
Locke hereby lays the groundwork for the central argument of his theory of
political individualism, namely, that individual natural rights, particularly
to property, exist before political society and, in fact, that political society
exists and is created by human beings for the purpose of protecting these
natural, pre-civil rights.
Locke’s doctrine of increase and his insistence on the political implications
of the natural right to property are unique among natural rights theorists
of the seventeenth century. While Grotius, for example, affirmed a natural
occupancy right to property, he did not emphasize the importance of labor.
This was because while he made the settlement of property rights a key rea-
son for forming civil society, he did not want to enhance natural claims to
property that would interfere with the supremacy of contract. Grotius made
contract the key to the obligation to respect property rights, not the natural
claims derived from labor. In contrast to Tyrrell and Pufendorf, who present
a much less harsh picture of nature, Locke did not rely on a series of multiple
compacts in order to establish the property right. Rather, his clear intention
was to establish the core right of property, and the right to expanded hold-
ings made possible by money, semi-independently of the consent of others. In
this way, Locke ensured that property rights would be freer of communal or
governmental interference than did Tyrrell or Pufendorf.62 With respect to
Filmer’s other Whig critic, while Sidney suggested that individuals create po-
litical societies in order to secure their lives and goods, he was generally not
concerned to develop a state of nature concept that would account for the
origin of private property rights as such.63 The difference between Locke’s
liberal individualism and Sidney’s republican treatment of individual rights
was not, however, simply a matter of emphasis. For Sidney, the solution to
the fundamental human problem of tyranny, both political and intellectual,
was available essentially at the political level with the creation of popular
regimes. Locke, on the other hand, saw the solution operating both on the
economic level, with the need to secure the material conditions necessary for
comfortable self-preservation, and on the political level, with free govern-
ments devised to secure rights. Liberal constitutionalism was the necessary
concomitant of Lockean property rights.
62 Marshall, John Locke, pp. 234–5.

63 Sidney, D 1.10.
9
Lockean Liberal Constitutionalism
Lockean constitutionalism represents an important dimension of his critique

of Filmer’s divine right absolutism. In response to Filmer’s charge that com-
munities and/or individuals lack the moral capacity to generate sovereign
political power, Locke maintains that the principle of natural liberty indi-
cates not only that the people can institute sovereign power, but that the
people are the only true repository of sovereignty. The chief postulations
that flow from Locke’s argument are the delegation theory of sovereignty
and the notion of the dissolution of government. Together these principles
affirm that inasmuch as all political power derives from the natural power
of individuals, political power can and does, in the event of abuse of power,
devolve to the people. Moreover, Locke affirms that the people may delegate
their natural sovereign power to whichever arrangement of institutions they
wish. In order to understand the main features of Lockean constitutional-
ism, we will first have to examine Locke’s treatment of the origins of political
society.
The Origins of Political Society

Locke’s discussion of the origins of political society logically follows from his
account of the state of nature. This is a state of perfect freedom and equality,
but because of the individual natural right to execute the law of nature, the
state of nature always either is or hovers dangerously close to the state of
war. In order to solve the “Inconveniencies” of the state of nature, especially
the lack of “settled Standing Rules” and an impartial common “Umpire” to
settle disputes, particularly those relating to property, Locke indicates that
individuals consent to form political society:
Those who are united into one Body, and have a common established Law and
Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them, and
punish Offenders, are in Civil Society one with another. (II:87)
247
Locke indicates that the chief end of government is “the preservation of

the property of all the Members of Society, as far as possible” (II:88), but
the primary institutional means of attaining this end is the creation of a
common legislative power that will “make laws . . . as the public good of So-
ciety shall require” (II:89). In arguing that the political society originates in
the creation of a legislative power, Locke agrees with Sidney that founding
is essentially a legislative process.1 For Locke, political society emerges, at
its moral core, as a community of laws. He defends the postulation of the
legislative character of the political compact on the grounds that no other
formulation of the contract would resolve the problems he identifies with
the state of nature. Locke argues that given the partiality and self-regarding
character of the human passions, especially in the state of nature, where
every individual is the “Judge in his own Case,” the Hobbesian solution of
absolute monarchy must be “inconsistent with Civil Society, and can be no
Form of Civil Government at all” (II:90). By placing one individual above
the law as a means to enforce the law for everyone else, Hobbes exposes the
property and lives of the subjects to the unlimited passions of the monarch.
Locke indicates that it is precisely because society is created by the consent
of discrete individuals that the prospect of unrestrained sovereign power is
so contrary to the logic informing civil society. He also suggests that the
simplicity of Hobbes’ theory of absolute monarchy belies the power of hu-
man reason to escape the dangers of the state of nature. Locke claims that
absolutism is so contrary to the manifest experience of the human ratio-
nal enterprise, and the sensations of fear and hope for future security that
drive individuals into civil society, that it “is to think that Men are so fool-
ish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done to them by
Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by
Lions” (II:93).
For Locke, majority rule, rather than absolutism, is the animating prin-
ciple of civil society. The consensual origins of political society require that
unanimity be the condition for consolidation into one people, and that major-
ity rule be the condition for the construction of political institutions. Locke
states: “When any number of Men have consented to make one Community or
Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body
Politick, wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest”
(II:95). Locke gives two reasons for the operation of majority rule in the
construction of political society. The first is the practical impossibility of
achieving perfect agreement on any decision other than the agreement to
unite into one society (II:98). The general desire to escape the “Inconvenien-
cies” of the state of nature and the need to secure the consent of each individ-
ual to lay down the full exercise of his or her natural liberty makes unanimity
1 Cf. Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Rebecca Balinski, trans. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994): p. 48.
Lockean Liberal Constitutionalism 249
the precondition for the creation of society. But with the introduction of a
majority rule argument, Locke sharpens the distinction between society and
government and in so doing reveals that the unanimity underlying society
differs from the majoritarianism animating the construction of governing
authority.
There are two strands of Locke’s majority rule argument that stand in
considerable tension with each other. The first strand relates to what Locke
identifies as the law of “greater force.” He employs a kind of institutional
physics to defend the proposition that the contract to form society includes
an irreducible claim for majority decision regarding the political structures
that society adopts. Locke claims: “It is necessary the Body should move that
way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority:
or else it is impossible it should act or continue one Body, one Community”
(II:96). Locke presents majority rule as a form of the natural law of polit-
ical society; political society properly construed cannot be formed in any
other way.2 He also, however, emphasizes the consensual principles under-
lying majority rule. Locke’s admission that majority rule must be informed
by a deeper layer of unanimous consent gives majoritarianism a dubious
status as a principle of natural law.3 Clearly, Locke sets limits to what the
majority may decide. They cannot, for example, create an absolute monar-
chy because such an action would undermine the principle of legitimacy by
which the majority is empowered to act. In a crucial sense, society reflects
rather than creates or defines the rights of individuals.4 In fact, Locke more
or less concedes the conventionality of the majority rule principle when he
affirms that society may have “expressly agreed in any number greater than
the majority” (II:99). Of course, Locke’s suggestion of the legitimacy of su-
permajority rule does not efface the law of greater force simply, but rather
indicates that the core of Locke’s majoritarianism is the belief that anything
less than a majority would be illegitimate for the construction of political so-
ciety, not that majorities are omnipotent. Individuals in society may specify
supermajority regulations, but in so doing they point to the bedrock of indi-
vidual rights – supermajorities protect minorities – that give moral legitimacy
to the law of greater force.
However, Locke maintained that there were several forms of human as-
sociation that did not produce civil society or end the state of nature. Locke
2 Robert Goldwin, “John Locke,” in The History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., Leo Strauss
and Joseph Cropsey, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987): p. 498.
3 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980)
pp. 256–7.
4 I believe Locke’s concern to demonstrate the individualistic core of governmental power and
his argument for the possibility of supermajorities proves Kendall’s presentation of Locke as
a radical majority rule democrat (à la Rousseau) to be overdrawn. See Willmore Kendall,
John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965): esp.
pp. 66, 101.
speculated that wherever any number of individuals “however associated”

have no common legislature to appeal to, “they are still in the state of na-
ture.”5 The patriarchal family and the government of fathers constituted
such a form of association. Locke identifies an additional form of quasi-
natural rule in the election of war leaders to conduct the military affairs
of the loosely assembled tribes of primitive society. The two parallel tracks
of primitive monarchy were the habituation to one-man rule in the family
and the requirements of military necessity in the precarious state of nature.6
Locke’s presentation of primitive peoples loosely assembled along blood lines
of the extended family could not be further from his theoretical account of
the origins of political society in contract and majority rule. How then does
this historico–anthropological account of primitive societies relate to Locke’s
more theoretical account? He admits that his intention is to justify the prin-
ciple of consent against the historical claims of patriarchy and monarchy
(II:112). Locke also indicates that primitive societies were natural, as op-
posed to political, societies precisely because, though products of consent,
they registered faulty attempts to respond to natural necessity. These early
patriarchal–monarchical societies reflected the weakness of undeveloped hu-
man reason, the lack of self-conscious awareness of the true gravity of the
human condition, and the enormous economic and psychological causes of
conflict.7 By demonstrating that the primitive forms of human association
evinced in paternal government and tribal war leaders do not constitute
political society or satisfy the proper ends of such a society, Locke offers a
theoretical template by which the improvement of societies may be measured
and formulated. Locke’s deeply ironic appeal to the “Golden Age” of virtue
and simplicity in early societies (II:110, II:111) suggests that what has histor-
ically been understood as political society appears, to Locke, as something
much less secure or rational.
Locke’s theoretical account of the origins of political society suggests
two central features of his argument for political individualism. First, the
theoretical criteria for legitimate political society provide the standard for
5 II:89 (emphasis mine).

6 II:108 and Locke’s rather impious example of the biblical judges as the sort of one-man
rule typical in primitive societies (II:109). Ironically, Locke calls the elevation of military
leaders an example of the “peaceful beginnings” of political society (II:112). These “peaceful
beginnings” rooted in military necessity foreshadow Locke’s later admission that the most
common historical origin of political societies was in conquest (cf. II:175). This admission
demonstrates even more clearly the distinction between Locke’s theoretical criteria for political
legitimacy and the faulty governments displayed in history.
7 Note II:101, where Locke argues that the origins of historical societies usually predated the
development of the arts, letters, and recorded history. Cf. Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Mod-
ern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988): p. 245 and Geraint Parry,
“Locke on Representation in Politics,” History of Political Thought, vol. 3, no. 4 (1982):
pp. 409–10.
understanding Locke’s conception of the relation of the individual to civil

government. The close-knit and trusting communities of early society based
on ethnic and familial ties stand in stark contrast to the fully self-conscious
form of political obligation Locke identifies with full citizenship in political
society. Locke contends that nothing can make any individual a member of
a political society “but his actually entering into it by positive Engagement,
and express Promise and Compact.” It is this express consent of a ratio-
nal being, rather than the tacit or presumed consent of natural societies,
that Locke argues marks “the beginning of Political Societies” (II:122). It is
for this reason that Locke rejects the Grotian assumption that the compact
reached by one generation binds their posterity. Locke boldly charges that
no compact any individual may agree to can “bind his Children or posterity”
(II:116). Political obligation must always be reducible to the express consent
of the individual.
Second, the chief difference between political societies and natural soci-
eties, such as the family or the tribe, is that, for Locke, political societies
are constituted by representative institutions, such as a common legislature,
whereas natural societies signify the direct, personal, and noninstitutional
practices of the paternal ruler and temporary war leader.8 The representa-
tive character of political society derives from its status as the edifice in-
tended to protect the right of self-preservation of all its members. Locke
states: “The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Common-
wealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of
their Property” (II:124).9 It is important to note that Locke’s emphasis on
property as the end of government must be understood in light of the ex-
panded notion of property he develops throughout the Second Treatise. Locke
reveals that property extends beyond simply ownership of physical goods to
the “Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Prop-
erty” (II:123; cf. II:87, II:131). The full scope of the protective and preser-
vationist duties of civil society includes the recognition of the individual’s
property in the right to life and liberty, which are, Locke claims, as vital to
self-preservation as shelter and food. In affirming not only a right to prop-
erty but also a property in rights, Locke rejects the notion that political
power may be understood as the property of the government. In making the
protection of property, and by derivation the natural rights grounding the
property right, the chief end of government, Locke once again signals his
departure from the absolutist possibilities of contract theory posited by ear-
lier figures such as Grotius, Hobbes, and even the moderate Whig authority
Pufendorf.
8 II:87. Cf. James Tully, An approach to political philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993): pp. 20–2.
9 See also II:88, 94–5, and 127.
The Powers of Government

The limited character of governmental power, for Locke, derives from the
natural foundation of the two principal powers of government: the legisla-
tive and the executive powers. As we saw earlier in Locke’s state of nature,
he was concerned to demonstrate that these traditional and characteristic
powers of government have their basis in the natural powers of individu-
als existing independently of political society. In defining these powers as
they operate on the political level, Locke also signals their inherent, indeed
natural, limits. The executive and legislative powers of government emerge
from the uncertainty and dangers of the state of nature as the product of
an agreement among all the members of society to “willingly give up every
one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be
appointed to it amongst them; and by such Rules as the Community, or those
authorised by the purpose, shall agree on.”10
For Locke, the executive and legislative powers of government derive
from different aspects of the individual’s natural power, and the transfer of
these powers occurs in different ways and to differing degrees. The legislative
power, which marks the crucial step from natural to political society, involves
the right of the individual to do “whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation
of himself, and the rest of Mankind.” This natural self-defense right, which
is at the core of the natural law, the individual “gives up to be regulated by
Laws made by the Society.” The individual, however, gives up this power
only “so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of Society shall
require” (II:129). The legislative power in nature is only partially surrendered
to civil government because it is the direct extension of the individual’s desire
for self-preservation. It is supreme because it directly expresses the univer-
sal desire for preserving property, which is the chief end of government.11
Thus, Locke indicates that the surrender of natural liberty required for the
creation of civil government is limited by the end or purpose of the contract
and not by the origin of government in the act of contracting. He empha-
sizes that the power of civil legislation derives from and must ultimately
conform to some principle of natural legislation rooted in the right of self-
preservation.
Locke indicates that the legislative power is “first and fundamental posi-
tive Law of all Commonwealths,” inasmuch as it sets the structure and form
of the entire constitutional order and is logically prior to any other aspect of
political authority (II:134). He nevertheless establishes four distinct natural
limits on the extent of legislative power. First, “it is not, nor can possibly
10 II:127. As we noted earlier, this marks one of Locke’s big breaks from the Christian-
Aristotelian tradition associated with Hooker and Bellarmine.
11 Manent, Intellectual History, p. 50. Thus, I disagree with Kendall (Majority Rule, pp. 103–
4), inasmuch as Locke is clear that the surrender of this power to society is limited by the
universal concern for individual self-preservation.
be absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and Fortunes of the People.”12 To

support this claim, Locke refers back to the power of individuals in the state
of nature. Just as in this condition no one could willingly consent to a legal
despotic subjection, so too is civil law prohibited from enjoining a com-
plete and arbitrary subjection to political authority. Second, Locke contends
that civil legislation cannot assume the character of “Arbitrary Decrees,”
but rather must issue in “promulgated standing Laws” (II:136). Here Locke
uses “arbitrary” in the more technical sense of the partial administration of
justice. The natural equality underlying the formation of civil government
must find expression in the operation of legislation. Third, Locke claims
that the supreme legislative power cannot take the property of the people
without their consent. Locke emphasizes the connection between individual
liberty and self-preservation: “For I have truly no Property in that, which
another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent”
(II:138–39). Thus, taxation, for Locke, can be legitimate only if it is levied by
“the Consent of the Majority . . . or their Representatives chosen by them”
(II:140).13 Finally, Locke claims that the “Legislative cannot transfer the
Power of Making Laws to any other hands” (II:141). Inasmuch as the leg-
islative power reflects “a positive voluntary Grant and Institution” by the
people, this condition precludes its alteration by any power other than the
people.
Locke’s treatment of the executive power differs considerably from that
of the legislative power. First of all, Locke states that the natural executive
power of the law of nature, from which the civil executive derives its power,
is a power the individual “wholly gives up” (II:130). Whereas the natural
legislative power to do whatever is necessary for self-preservation is surren-
dered only in part to society, the natural executive or punishment right is
given up entire, “to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of
Society shall require” (II:131). Locke hereby establishes the ground of leg-
islative supremacy in the capacity of the legislature to organize the “natural
force” of the members of society for the good of the entire community. The
executive power reflects the need to create a “Power always in Being, which
12 II:135. Contrast this with Algernon Sidney’s treatment of the arbitrary power of the legislature
in Discourses Concerning Government, Thomas West, ed. (indianapolis: Libery Fund Press,
1996): ch. 3, sec. 45 (hereafter D, ch., sec.), where Sidney means by “arbitrary” having no
higher political authority.
13 The famous Lockean rallying cry of American Whigs “No Taxation without Representa-
tion” is, surprisingly, Locke’s only indication that the legislative power must, in principle,
reside at least in part in some sort of representative body. Yet given the seminal importance
of the preservation of property to the end of government, Locke quietly but unmistak-
ably makes the representative principle central to his constitutional theory. For a decid-
edly populist reading of Lockean constitutionalism, see Robert Faulkner, “The First Liberal
Democrat: Locke’s Popular Government,” Review of Politics, vol. 63 Fall (2001): pp. 17–19,
28, 36.
should see to the execution of the Laws that are made.”14 That this necessity
extends beyond the practical difficulty of enforcing civil legislation is demon-
strated by Locke’s concern to associate the executive power with the power
over foreign affairs, which he calls the “Federative” power. Whereas the
executive power relates to the provision of a perpetual enforcement mecha-
nism for existing laws, the federative power employs the natural force of the
community in the sphere of foreign relations, a sphere independent of the
operation of civil jurisdiction. They are distinct powers, but Locke considers
that given their similarities – both employ the whole force of the commu-
nity and require perpetual maintenance – “they are always almost united”
(II:147).
Two important features of liberal constitutionalism emerge from this dis-
cussion. First, while Locke states that the federative and executive powers
are typically, almost naturally, united, he emphatically cautions that the leg-
islative and executive power should be divided. Given that it is “too great
a temptation to humane frailty apt to grasp at power,” Locke cautions that
it is best that those who have the power to make the laws not be given the
power to execute them (II:143). If these two powers are not separated, Locke
implies that civil society will experience and replicate the problems of the
state of nature, only on a much larger scale. The self-regarding nature of
the human passions ensures that individuals will not apply the law equally
to themselves and others unless the legislative power resides in an impartial
and common judge for society as a whole. The second and related feature of
Locke’s discussion is his association of the executive and federative powers.
This association is somewhat ambiguous given the fact that the executive
power is, at least in theory, limited to performing the functions assigned by
antecedent and standing laws, whereas Locke baldly states that the federa-
tive power that operates in the state of nature conditions of foreign relations
relies ultimately on the “Prudence and Wisdom of those whose hands it is
in” (II:147). As Locke presents it, the same person may be asked to per-
form very different tasks, the one delimited by law and the other largely
discretionary. Locke’s endorsement of discretionary power eventually seeps
into his treatment of the executive in the form of prerogative. The neces-
sity underlying the preservation of society in the lion’s den of foreign rela-
tions does not in fact differ so greatly from the necessity informing domestic
politics.
The argument that the legislative power is the supreme constitutional
power because it is the “first given by the Majority” to a distinct political
authority has serious implications for Locke’s treatment of government in
14 II:144. The secondary but ineradicable character of the executive power draws our attention
back to the disorderly structure of the human passions (II:3). The dangerous tendencies
of the state of nature remind us that in Locke’s view, individuals must be forced to obey
the law.
general and England in particular. Locke shows his fundamental disagree-

ment with traditional Aristotelian regime analysis by emphasizing the impor-
tance of the powers of government rather than the forms of regime. Powers
replace forms as the primary consideration in Lockean constitutionalism.
Democracy, oligarchy, monarchy – elective and hereditary – and mixed or
compound regimes are, in Locke’s view, simply the product of the commu-
nity’s choice regarding where to locate the supreme legislative power.15 Thus,
for Locke, the form of a particular government derives entirely from the dis-
posal of the individual power of the members of the community. The natural
power of individuals contains the capacity to produce political forms. One
important implication of Locke’s argument about powers and forms is his
radical reconceptualization of the theoretical underpinnings of the English
mixed regime. Rather than viewing the English regime as a composite of
three distinct forms of regime representing unique interests or claims to rule,
Locke justifies the principle of constitutional balance on the grounds of an
original societal disposition meant to reflect the universal concerns of the
preservation of property and, ultimately, of self-preservation.16 The primacy
of powers over forms in Lockean constitutionalism removes the veil of tra-
ditional Aristotelian authority from England’s ancient Constitution and thus
exposes the individualistic underpinnings of what to moderate Whigs like
Tyrrell was better understood as an organic political whole.
The issue of the status of the English constitutional system recurs through-
out Locke’s treatment of the complex relation between the legislative and
executive powers of government. His theoretical account of the origins of
political society asserts the priniciple of legislative supremacy; however, this
principle is seriously qualified by Locke’s argument for the fiduciary charac-
ter of all political power. Locke claims that in any existing government or
“Constituted Commonwealth” there can be but “one Supreme Power, which
is the Legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate” (II:149).
However, Locke qualifies this institutional supremacy with a more funda-
mental popular supremacy: “yet the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power
to act for certain ends, there remains still in the People a Supreme Power to
remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to
the trust reposed in them” (II:149). If the legislative power fails in its task of
15 II:132. Cf. Faulkner, “First Liberal Democrat,” pp. 11–12.

16 See ibid., pp. 24–6. I disagree with the thrust of Peter Myers’ argument (“Equality, Property,
and the Problem of Partisanship: Lockean Constitution as Mixed Regime,” Interpretation,
vol. 22, no. 1 [Fall 1994:]: pp. 39–64). Although Aristotelian regime analysis may provide
useful insights into a Lockean state, it is pivotal to recognize that Locke himself abandons
this approach in his reflections on constitutionalism. For an excellent treatment of the dif-
ference between Lockean constitutionalism, with its emphasis on natural powers, and the
Aristotelian regime analysis directed to particular forms representing claims to justice and
the best kind of life, see Harvey Mansfield, Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern
Executive Power (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 184–7.
preserving society, it may be subject to a more fundamental and sovereign

power in the people.
Locke’s notion of popular sovereignty anchors what we will call his “del-
egation theory of sovereignty.” The logical implication of Locke’s argument
that the power of government derives from the natural power of the indi-
vidual is that all the powers of government are essentially delegated pow-
ers. Even the legislative power, in this view, is a delegated power. As a
result, Locke maintains both that the power of the legislature cannot be
truly supreme, being a creature of the people, and that the people may lo-
cate the legislative function in a wide variety of institutional structures and
forms. In this respect, Locke’s understanding of legislative supremacy differs
from that of Sidney, for example. Whereas the modern republican Sidney
defended legislative supremacy on the grounds that large representative as-
semblies embody the will of the sovereign people, and thus cannot do real
harm to the people without harming themselves, Locke’s separation of soci-
ety and government reduces all political institutions to instruments designed
to protect society’s interests. This institutional instrumentality derives from
Locke’s premise of political individualism.17 Thus, for Locke, even though
the legislative power reflects both the act of its creation in the consent of the
individuals in society and its proper end, the preservation of its members’
property, the principle of legitimation in the former process does not, and
cannot, preclude a divestiture of right for failure to provide the latter service.
The second major proviso Locke makes to the argument for legislative
supremacy relates to his crucial discussion of the subordination of powers in
Chapter Thirteen. Here Locke’s theoretical reflections on the origin and na-
ture of political society most closely intersect with his considerations of the
actual condition of the English constitutional system. Although Locke does
not refer to England directly in this chapter, he presents a hypothetical con-
stitutional model identical to that of his native land. It is also here that Locke
demonstrates a central tenet of his delegation theory of sovereignty: The peo-
ple may legitimately divide the legislative power among a number of consti-
tutional actors. Locke qualifies his earlier defense of legislative supremacy
by turning to examine “some Commonwealths where the Legislative is not
always in being, and the Executive is vested in a single Person, who has also
a share in the Legislative; there that single Person in a very tolerable sense
may also be called Supream” (II:151). In this virtual England, the executive
may “in a very tolerable sense” be identified as supreme not because “he has
in himself all the Supream Power, which is that of Law-Making,” but rather
by virtue of the fact that this executive has no legislative power above him.
This is true both in the sense that no law can be made without his or her
consent and in the sense that all inferior magistrates derive their subordinate
17 Sidney, for example, generally saw the executive as an office of trust but not, strictly speaking,
the legislative power, which he argued should be by definition representative of society.
power from the “Supream Executive” (II:151). Locke is careful to indicate

that the powers of the “Supream Executive,” most notably the power of
convoking and dismissing the legislature, are also fiduciary powers and thus
do not denote a superiority over the legislature (II:152, II:156).
Two important arguments emerge from Locke’s treatment of the subor-
dination of powers. First, he employs this discussion to affirm indirectly his
position that the English monarch is independent of Parliament. The king
properly derives his authority from the community, not from the positive
grant of the legislative. In contrast to Tyrrell and Pufendorf, Locke insists
that the ideal English Constitution is a mixture of coordinate authorities with
no manifest supremacy within the constitutional order itself.18 Moreover, by
arguing that Parliament has no more inherently valid claim to represent the
national interest than does the king, Locke rejects both the resistance the-
ories of the civil war radicals and the ideas of the republican Whig Sidney.
Second, Locke reveals that the powers of government may be divided among
the governing institutions. Thus, the executive may be a person who is not
necessarily in a position subordinate to the legislature.19 The introduction of
the personalistic character of the executive power into the societal formula-
tions of the legislative power implies Locke’s recognition of a deep ambigu-
ity in the notion of constitutional supremacy. The community may not only
trump the authority of existing institutions with a more fundamental claim
to supremacy, it may also design and ascribe the powers of those institutional
actors in such a way as to locate constitutional supremacy in an authority
other than the legislature.20 The subordination of powers introduces the no-
tion of personalism into an otherwise abstract account. Locke admits that
the supreme executive in England will “be subordinate and accountable to”
the legislature no “farther than he himself shall joyn and consent,” which
Locke suggests “one may certainly conclude will be but very little” (II:152).
Locke’s assessment of the self-regarding character of the human passions
practically precludes the plausibility of the voluntary submission to funda-
mental law, which anchors Tyrrell’s theory of limited, as opposed to mixed,
monarchy.
18 Julian Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978): pp. 91–2. Whereas Faulkner (“First Liberal Democrat,” pp. 26–7) takes Locke
to be critical of the idea of an independent executive, I believe Locke sees such an executive
as a salutary counterforce to the dangerous concentration of power even in a representative
legislature.
19 Mansfield (Taming the Prince, pp. 201, 211) argues that Locke’s teaching on the legislative
and executive power built “a divided mind into constitutional government.” Cf. Manent,
Intellectual History, p. 51.
20 Locke does admit, however, that the legislature may resume the executive power it has
given up and punish maladministration (II:153), but how it can do this effectively when
the executive has a share in the legislative power is not so clear. Presumably, the legislature
would have no such power with respect to an independent executive unless this power was
stipulated in a written constitution.
The third major proviso Locke proposes to the idea of legislative

supremacy has to do with prerogative. Here too Locke relies on the dele-
gation theory of sovereignty to demonstrate that the people may delegate
even discretionary power to the executive. Locke defines prerogative as the
“power to act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the pre-
scription of the Law, and sometimes even against it.”21 The connection be-
tween discretionary power and the public good (practically antipodes for
Sidney) rests on Locke’s fundamental premise that the authority of gov-
ernment must be informed by the natural law command to preserve the
whole of society. Locke states: “‘Tis fit that the Laws themselves should
in some Cases give way to the Executive Power, or rather to this Funda-
mental Law of Nature and Government, viz. That as much as may be, all
the Members of Society are to be preserved” (II:159). A seminal feature of
Lockean constitutionalism is his effort to incorporate discretion, one of the
major causes of disorder in the state of nature, into government through
prerogative.
The exactness and predictability Locke identifies with the rule of the law-
making body appears in tension with his justification of discretionary power.
Clearly, Locke qualifies his original position that the natural executive power
is given up wholly upon the formation of political society. He admits that the
individual retains the natural executive power insofar as the law can never
be completely effective – for example, when one faces a robber on a lonely
highway (II:130–1). But Locke similarly suggests that society retains the
executive power of government through prerogative when the law is either
ineffective or injurious to the good of society.22 Remarkably, Locke offers
very standard royalist arguments for the regal pardon power and equity
claims as justification for prerogative (II:159). However, he makes these ar-
guments while operating from much more radical premises than his royalist
opponents in England. For example, he employs the radical parliamentarian
slogan “Salus populi, Suprema Lex” as a vindication of regal prerogative.
Locke justifies prerogative much less in terms of sovereign majesty than by
the constant flux and change in the natural order of things (II:157, II:160).23
Locke’s practical objection to the principle of absolute legislative supremacy
21 II:160 (emphasis mine). Faulkner (“First Liberal Democrat,” pp. 33–4) interprets Locke to
be hostile to the idea of prerogative and concerned to place legal and institutional limits on
it. However, by my reading, Locke offers no legal or institutional limits, but rather only the
extralegal limit of public opinion, which, of course, is no necessary endorsement of legislative
supremacy.
22 Manent, Intellectual History, p. 50.
23 Mansfield (Taming the Prince, p. 203) identifies this as a sign of Locke’s break from Aristotelian
regime analysis in favor of a Machiavellian conception of the flux and change in nature. See
Peter Josephson, The Great Art of Government: Locke’s Use of Consent (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2002): pp. 23–43 for an interpretation of Locke’s use of prerogative that
emphasizes the distinction between rationality and consent.
reflects a deep tension in his thought between the notions of legitimacy and
utility. Locke argues, on the one hand, that the legislature is supreme because
it most emphatically represents the community, being itself the product of the
majority in society. Yet Locke also indicates that the harsh realities of polit-
ical necessity may require some qualification of the representative principle
embodied in the legislature by recognizing the great service discretionary, as
opposed to legislative, power can do for society.24 In this respect, Locke and
Sidney are mirror images.
Republican Whigs detested the principle of prerogative. Sidney argued
that by the logic of individual natural rights and the principle of represen-
tation it supports, the claim to constitutional supremacy of large popular
assemblies rests on their capacity to reflect the general will of society. In
this view, the executive power is a delegated power inasmuch as it derives
its source from and its scope is defined by the legislature. Locke, however,
indicates that an independent executive derives legitimacy from the power
delegated by the people. The people may choose to make the executive and
the members of the legislative assembly equal partners in the exercise of
sovereign constitutional authority. For Locke, every branch of the govern-
ment exercises power delegated by society. In this respect, Locke points to
the existence of a sovereign constitutional will of the people expressed in
the original compact forming political institutions, which is distinct from,
and superior to, the will of the people expressed in normal legislation. It
is this crucial theoretical distinction that informs Locke’s understanding of
the relation between the legislative and executive power. Whereas Sidney
saw the subjection of the executive power to the legislative as the sine qua
non of constitutional legitimacy and the survival of liberty, Locke suggests
that the delegatory character of sovereignty, and nature in all its complex-
ity and stubborn resistance to human flourishing, offer the individual and
society two diverging though not necessarily antithetical means of securing
preservation.
24 Two major examples Locke adduces for the salutary benefits of prerogative relate to the
issues of representation and toleration. Locke appeals to the flux and change in population
as justification for an executive’s redrawing electoral districts in order to preserve the “true
proportion” necessary for any representative body (II:158). In granting this sweeping power
to the executive, Locke suggests certain inherent limits on the legislature’s capacity to effect
reform. I disagree with Richard Ashcraft (Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of
Government [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986]: p. 238) that Locke’s argument
here is a tactical ploy meant to push the burden of reform on the king. However, I maintain
that it suggests the great theoretical and practical import Locke ascribes to the executive
power. The connection between prerogative and religious toleration is not a major theme in
the Two Treatises, but given Locke’s work with Shaftesbury in the 1670s, it would seem to
suggest that toleration is more likely to be established by the executive than by a legislature
controlled by members of the established church. For Locke on prerogative and toleration,
see Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 111 and Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography
(London: Macmillan, 1957): pp. 129, 144.
The executive power is manifestly a central feature of Locke’s reflections

on constitutionalism. His account of prerogative is not restricted simply to
the practical issue of the operation of the English system. Indeed, Locke’s
caution that the legislature should not be in perpetual session effectively pre-
cludes the possibility of locating the executive power within the structure of
the legislature.25 The executive, we recall, must be a “Power always in being”
(II:144). Moreover, Locke admits that the executive may have some share in
the legislative power, but he offers no operational guidance for the reverse.
However, Locke admits that there are dangers to the practice of prerogative.
As we saw earlier, Locke identified prerogative with the early age of society
when “Commonwealths differed little from Families in number of People”
(II:107, II:111). Given the lack of political sophistication of these primitive
peoples and the inability of uncultured reason to devise institutions capable
of producing the rule of law, Locke admits that these early patriarchal gov-
ernments were “almost all Prerogative” (II:161). In this light, prerogative
appears at least in part as a residual practice from a distant and unlamented
past.
However, Locke affirms that the personalistic and discretionary nature of
the executive power persists in any constitutional order. He presents this as
a natural condition out of which society cannot progress. Insofar as Locke
defines prerogative as a “power to do good,” there appears to be no in-
herent limits on how far this power may legitimately extend. The deeply
personalistic character of prerogative means that this practice can in princi-
ple extend as far as the executive chooses to exercise it. Locke reduces the
difference between the legitimate and illegitimate use of prerogative down to
the psychological and moral traits of the executive himself. The good prince
“is mindful of the trust put into his hands,” whereas the bad prince views
prerogative as “belonging to him by Right of the Office” (II:164). Given
Locke’s discussion, it appears that these two conditions or perspectives are
not mutually exclusive. It is rather the end to which the executive aims – the
good or harm of society – that determines the legitimacy of the action. Locke
suggests that the reigns of good princes “have always been most dangerous
to the Liberties of their People” because they set extralegal precedents that
may disguise the ill intentions of their lesser successors.
Locke and Sidney agree that a people used to the exercise of executive
prerogative is one dangerously close to losing a sense of the true grounds
of political legitimacy.26 Locke’s only safeguard against executive abuse of
25 Faulkner, on the contrary, argues (“First Liberal Democrat,” p. 30) that Locke envisages
something like modern cabinet government, although even in the cabinet system there is
always some, even if largely formal, permanent executive, whether an Israeli president, a
British monarch, or a Canadian governor-general.
26 Locke perhaps echoes Sidney’s concern for the quasi-religious character of prerogative when
he refers to “God-like Princes” at II:166.
the prerogative right is the right of the people to reassert their primal extra-
constitutional supremacy. In answer to the question of who decides when
prerogative does or does not intend the public good, Locke baldly states:
“The good or hurt of the People, will easily decide the Question” (II:161).
It is important to notice that Locke does not reserve this judgment to the
legislature. With respect to the relations of the English monarch and Parlia-
ment, “between an Executive Power in Being, with such a Prerogative, and
a Legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be
no Judge on Earth” (II:168). The independence of the monarchy in Locke’s
interpretation of the English Constitution suggests two things: that prerog-
ative will be an essential component of this system and that the people or
society, understood independently of any existing political authority, will be
the final arbiter in any constitutional dispute.
Resistance and Dissolution

The heart of Locke’s constitutional theory is the principle that governmental
power derives from the natural power of individuals and is held by the
governors as a form of trust. By this logic, if the government breaks its trust
to pursue the public good, then power devolves back to the individuals who
compose society. This in itself constitutes a radical break from traditional
justifications of resistance in the natural liberty school, but Locke goes even
further to radicalize this notion of the devolution of power into a theory
of the dissolution of government. The issue of trust provides the intrinsic
connection between Locke’s accounts of legislative and executive power. He
affirms that the natural status of the legislature as the supreme constitutional
power is severely qualified by its basis in a fiduciary power delegated by and
ultimately responsible to the community (II:150). He also introduces the
concept of trust as a limitation to the notion of executive power inasmuch
as he maintains that even prerogative reflects a societal power held in trust
(II:156). Locke treats at some length the most important element of trust
in the English system – the king’s power to call and dissolve Parliament –
and finds this power more worthy of attention on the part of society than
any other.27 He relates that political power derives from “that Power which
every Man having in the state of Nature” then gives to society and “therein
to the Governours, whom the Society hath set over itself, with this express
or tacit Trust, That it shall be imployed for their good, and the preservation
of their Property.”28 This is Locke’s clearest statement about the concept
27 II:154–6. Cf. Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 230.

28 II:171. In Chapter fifteen of the Second Treatise, where Locke recaps his view of the character
of paternal, despotic, and political power, only the last is presented as a form of rule based
on trust. Compare II:170 and II:172 with II:171.
of trust inasmuch as he makes trust and the devolution of power features

of all political compacts. Whether this fiduciary relationship is expressly
stated or not, it is implicit in the very fabric of the compact forming political
society.
The concept of trust has serious implications for Lockean liberal consti-
tutionalism. On a general and theoretical level, Locke employs this concept
to reformulate the relations of the governors and the governed in terms con-
sistent with his individualistic account of the origin of political power. In
contrast to the absolutist tendencies and possibilities in Hobbes, Grotius,
Pufendorf, and the moderate Whigs, Locke not only argues that sovereignty
rests outside the strict confines of contract, but he also asserts the commu-
nity’s right to reassert supremacy irrespective of the explicit terms of the
political contract.29 On a more immediate and practical level, Locke’s use of
the concept of trust suggests his dissatisfaction with the ability of the English
constitutional order to prevent the abuse of power. For Locke, trust replaces
faith in checks and balances by offering a justification of popular sovereignty
that can solve what he takes to be the problem of the moderate Whig idea
of the conjoint sovereignty of the king-in-Parliament.30 One crucial reason
for Locke’s rejection of the English mixed regime theory and its praise of
the balance of parliamentary and monarchical power is his skepticism of
this theory’s capacity to account for and resist the tendency of political in-
stitutions, legislative or executive, to slide into corruption and tyranny over
time.
A central feature of Locke’s theory of the dissolution of government is his
concern to demonstrate that the principle of lawful resistance to unlawful
government action is not inherently anarchic. In the last chapter of the Second
Treatise, however, Locke shifts the emphasis away from trying to counter
royalist charges against the dangers of resistance theory toward his effort
to develop a unique theory of the devolution of power, which justifies such
resistance. This theory departs from all prior accounts of resistance inasmuch
as it confirms the people’s right to resist a monarch and to restore a legislative
assembly. However, Locke also extends this right of the people to a legitimate
power to alter or replace the legislative power in any manner they see fit.31
The dissolution of government extends far beyond a communal self-defense
right of restoration, restoring the terms of the original compact. Locke claims
that “when the Government is dissolved, the people are at Liberty to provide
for themselves, by erecting a new Legislative, differing from the other, by
29 Tully, Locke in Contexts, p. 30.

30 Ibid., pp. 36, 38.
31 Although Franklin (Theory of Sovereignty) offers an interesting study showing Locke’s rela-
tion to George Lawson’s account of dissolution, I believe that by basing his theory on the
devolution of power to individuals in society, as opposed to certain communal institutions,
Locke shows his great difference from Lawson.
the change of Persons, or Forms, or both as they shall find it most for their
safety and good” (II:220).32 It is perhaps because of the radical implications
of dissolution, the possibility of creating a new government ex nihilo from
the preexisting soil of society, that Locke makes no reference to the authority
of Parliament as a justification for popular resistance. Such authority would,
it seems, be utterly superfluous.
The dissolution of government, according to Locke, occurs by virtue of
executive or legislative action. However, he distinguishes the dissolution of
government that occurs through domestic forces and the dissolution of so-
ciety that can apparently result only from foreign conquest. When a foreign
conqueror makes it impossible for a people “to maintain and support them-
selves, as one intire and independent Body,” through the scattering of the
population and the destruction or confiscation of their material resources,
then Locke argues that the social union “is dissolved” and every individual
returns “to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself, and
provide for his own Safety as he think fit in some other Society” (II:211).33
The dissolution of government, on the other hand, has different causes and
consequences.
The fundamental cause of the dissolution of government is the alteration
of the legislature without the consent of the people. From this premise, Locke
immediately draws the reader’s attention to the particular case of the con-
ditions for the dissolution of government in England. Locke suggests that it
is hard to construe properly how governments dissolve “without knowing
the Form of Government in which it happens” (II:213). He then proceeds
to sketch an exact, if supposedly fictitious, duplicate of the English consti-
tutional system. While Locke asserts that, at least in principle, the executive
or the legislature may be responsible for the dissolution of government if
either submits the nation to foreign subjection or acts contrary to the trust
established by the people, it also becomes clear in this discussion that the
most typical culprit in the dissolution of a mixed monarchy will be the exec-
utive. There are three ways Locke considers that a monarch can commonly
dissolve the government.
32 Locke’s account of the dissolution right strangely parallels the language of his earlier treat-
ment of the divine workmanship right. Now, however, the property is government rather
than individuals, and the owners or workmen are the individuals composing society rather
than God.
33 For the complexity in distinguishing these two kinds of dissolution in Locke, see John
Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1993): pp. 161–63; Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953): p. 232; and Nathan Tarcov, “Locke’s Second Treatise
and the ‘Best Review of Politics, vol. 43 (April 1981): Fence Against Rebellion,’” pp. 207–10.
Locke’s discussion of the natural law limits on the rights of conquerors in Chapter sixteen
went some distance to reduce, if not preclude, the awful destruction Locke describes in the
dissolution of an entire society. Cf. II:177–82.
The first is when “a single Person or Prince sets up his own Arbitrary
Will in place of the Laws, which are the Will of the Society” (II:214). Locke
claims that when any “Rules [are] pretended, and inforced” other than those
enacted by the legislature, then the “Legislative is changed” and the govern-
ment is dissolved. A second way the monarch in such a system can dissolve
the government is when “the Prince hinders the Legislative from assembling
in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends, for which it
was Constituted” (II:215). Executive interference with the legislative process
and the freedom of parliamentary debate cuts to the heart of the rule of law:
“For it is not Names, that Constitute Governments, but the use and exercise
of those Powers that were intended to accompany them” (II:215). The third
way a government like England’s is typically dissolved occurs when “the
Supream Executive Power, neglects and abandons that charge, so that the
Laws already made can no longer be put in execution” (II:219). Locke claims
that the failure to perform the executive duty is equivalent “to reduc[ing]
all to Anarchy.” Moreover, the English king has the power of dissolving the
legislature and thus making the representatives of the people in Parliament
private persons.34 Simply put, the legislators in Parliament cannot alter the
legislative power without the monarch’s approval anyway.
To those royalists and others who would invoke the radical ghosts of 1649,
Locke is deeply concerned to demonstrate that the theory of dissolution does
not produce anarchic consequences. However, Locke largely conceals, rather
than denies, the radical implications of his dissolution theory – implications
Tyrrell, for example, was not prepared to accept – beneath a veil of conserva-
tive rhetoric. Locke dismisses the charge that dissolution theory will produce
frequent rebellions on several grounds. First, he claims that people will re-
volt when oppressed irrespective of the form of government or any particular
ideological justification of obedience (II:224). In this respect, Locke clearly
obviates discussion of the ubiquity of tyrannies in the world both historically
and contemporaneously, and as such he self-consciously and self-servingly
diminishes the importance of his own role as political philosopher and ed-
ucator of a citizenry conscious and suspicious of guarding their liberty.35
Locke also concludes that recognition of the popular right to make a new
legislature acts as “the best fence against Rebellion” by encouraging caution
and political moderation in rulers (II:226).36
34 II:218. I disagree with Tully regarding his view that Locke held England to be the best regime
(Locke in Contexts, p. 38). Rather, I believe that the political implications of his natural rights
theory are considerably more radical than the traditional English Constitution.
35 Pangle, Spirit, p. 258.
36 Tarcov, “Best Fence Against Rebellion,” pp. 212–17. Locke premises this contention on his
argument that the real rebels in the event of a dissolution of government are not the people
but the putative rulers. Note the similarity in Locke’s use of the notion of rebellare at II:226
and Sidney’s use of it at D 3.36.
Locke is also careful, however, to temper this line of argument by appeal-

ing to the natural conservatism of the people. He charges that the people
will allow the dissolution of government only when the oppression affects
the majority of the population, and even then they will act not after isolated
examples of “mismanagement in publick affairs,” but rather when they per-
ceive “a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending the
same way.”37 Finally, Locke claims that even in the event of a dissolution
of government there is a general “Slowness and Aversion in the People to
Quit their old Constitutions,” as the longevity of the English Constitution
testifies, despite the various concatenations in English history (II:223). In
brief, as James Tully observes, “Locke plays the conservative trump card of
partiality and habit against his conservative opponents, showing that these
causal factors make popular sovereignty more stable than absolutism.”38 For
Locke, the people are generally loath to do that which they have a perfect
right to do.
The theory of dissolution is the cornerstone of Locke’s account of the right
of revolution. This right constitutes Locke’s celebrated “Appeal to Heaven.”
With language identical to that in his discussion of the state of war, Locke
ascribes a natural right of the people to resist oppressive government and to
retain the legislative power of society in themselves in order to restore the old
government or to erect a new one. It is important to recognize that Locke
does not designate the community in toto as the determinant of whether
government has been dissolved or not; rather, he claims that “every Man is
Judge for himself, as in all other Cases, so in this, whether another has put
himself into a State of War with him.”39 In contrast to Tyrrell, Locke does
not place any moral prohibitions on the individual’s right to resist govern-
ment. Rather, Locke merely observes that an individual or even a minority
group would be very unlikely to effect a change in the government with-
out majority support (II:209, II:230). Whereas the moderate Whig Tyrrell
criticized individual resistance to political authority as immoral and anti-
thetical to the natural law requirements of peaceful social existence, Locke
offers merely practical objections based on the feasibility of success. The pri-
mary reason Lockean liberal constitutional thought does not contain such
a natural law moral prohibition against individual resistance is that Locke
understands revolution as the exercise of the natural power of the people, a
power finally reducible to individuals.40 With this much greater emphasis on
37 II:230, II:225. Cf. II:209–10.

38 Tully, Locke in Contexts, p. 45.
39 II:241. Cf. Simmons, Anarchy, pp. 155–6 for the distinction between breach of trust and state
of war.
40 Franklin, Theory of Sovereignty, p. 96; John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and
Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): p. 236; Simmons, Anarchy,
pp. 148–9, 173–9; and Tully, Locke in Contexts, p. 41.
the individual’s natural right to decide the means for self-preservation and
the protection of property, Lockean resistance theory slips the leash of the
natural law duties of political obedience so central to Tyrrell, Pufendorf, and
Grotius.
Locke’s theory of dissolution is clearly a radical departure from the po-
sition of his contemporaries. His claim that the dissolution of government
does not mean the dissolution of society points to his argument that a society
of individuals primarily concerned with economic activity can exist indepen-
dently of government for a time.41 More particularly, Locke’s position differs
from that of the modern republican Sidney inasmuch as Locke does not iden-
tify the sovereign right of the people solely with the right of the legislative
body. For Sidney, the right of revolution was essentially a rallying cry to sup-
port Parliament against the king. Locke, on the other hand, makes little or no
reference to Parliament, or any legislative body, to justify the people’s right to
resist and alter the government. Lockean natural rights theory indicates that
the foundation of all government in a society of individual rights bearers is
emphatically democratic, although the actual forms of government may be
more representative than purely popular.42 Locke’s openness to a variety of
regime forms, in contrast to the modern republicans, presupposes this firmly
democratic foundation for legitimacy in a social entity that transcends partic-
ular institutional arrangements. In contrast to moderate Whigs like Tyrrell
and William Atwood, Locke does not restrict the right of resistance to a
self-defense right or even to a purely restorative right. As Julian Franklin
amply demonstrates, these moderate Whigs feared the radical implications
of Lockean dissolution theory, and they hoped to show that it was Parlia-
ment’s right to restore or modify the Constitution in the event of any crisis
with the monarchy. Tyrrell and Atwood followed Pufendorf in maintaining
that the political compact that forms society implicitly precludes dissolu-
tion and the radical democratic implications such a theory would invite.43
41 Simmons, Anarchy, pp. 167–72; Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 232; and Tarcov, “Best
Fence Against Rebellion,” pp. 205–10.
42 Parry, “Locke on Representation,” pp. 409–13; Tarcov, “Best Fence Against Rebellion,”
pp. 205–6; and Simmons, Anarchy, p. 184. By this measure, Faulkner (“First Liberal Demo-
crat,” pp. 24–39) pushes Locke too far in the democratic republican direction, while
MacPherson and Wood go too far in the other direction by attributing characteristically
moderate Whig arguments to Locke that were considerably more conservative than his own
(C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism [Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1962]: p. 224 and Ellen Meiskins Wood, “Locke Against Democracy: Consent,
Representation and Suffrage in the Two Treatises,” History of Political Thought, vol. 13, no.
4 [Winter 1992]: pp. 671–7, 685–9).
43 Franklin, Theory of Sovereignty, pp. 105–10. Samuel Cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium
Libri Octo (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1934): bk. 7, ch. 7, sec. 9 (hereafter DJNG) for his
rejection of dissolution. It is interesting to note that Atwood’s The Fundamental Constitution
of the English Government (1690) was written in part as a critical response to the dissolution
theory in the Second Treatise.
Locke forcefully concludes that every political contract contains a unilateral

popular right of dissolution. This is as true of the English Constitution as of
any other; indeed, for Locke, no contract could preclude such a possibility.
The parting shot in Locke’s break from traditional English constitutional
theory is the assault on the Scottish arch-royalist William Barclay that prac-
tically concludes the Two Treatises. Locke’s strategy in his treatment of
Barclay is twofold. First, he attempts to exploit the radical potential in Bar-
clay’s admission of a severely limited right of a people to resist a tyrant.
Second, Locke skillfully employs Barclay as a stand-in for other thinkers,
like Grotius and Pufendorf, who had considerable prestige among many
Whigs and had developed potentially absolutist theories of sovereignty from
the premise of natural liberty. The main thrust of Locke’s criticism relates to
Barclay’s admission that there is a limited right of resistance against tyrants.
Locke quotes Barclay to the effect that “Self-defense is a part of the Law of
Nature; nor can it be denied the Community, even against the King himself”
(II:233). However, Barclay places two potentially serious limitations on this
right of self-defense. First, it must not “exceed the bounds of due Rever-
ence and Respect.” Second, this resistance must be “without Retribution,
or Punishment” because “an Inferior cannot punish a Superiour” (II:235).
Predictably, Locke ridicules the first limitation, savagely charging: “He that
can Reconcile Blows and Reverence, may, for ought I know, deserve for his
pains, a Civil Respectful Cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it” (II:235).
With respect to the second limit, Locke agrees with Barclay that punishment
cannot proceed from a position of inferiority, but Locke seizes on Barclay’s
admission that a king “becomes no King” when he endeavors “to overturn
the Government” or when he “makes himself the dependent of another, and
subjects his Kingdom which his ancestors left him.”44 Locke thus radicalizes
the principle of forfeiture, which was the final safety valve against tyranny
traditionally held even by many royalist thinkers, and turns this rather con-
servative principle into the more radical proposition of dissolution. Locke is
wholly disingenuous in his claim that he is simply supplying “the Principle”
from which Barclay’s notion of forfeiture flows (II:239). Locke’s theory of
dissolution operates from a premise of the derivation of political power from
the natural power of individuals, a premise clearly anathema for Barclay.
This use and abuse of Barclay serves Locke’s larger aim of breaking new
ground in the theory of natural rights constitutionalism. While Locke tries
to make Barclay’s once reputable natural liberty theory of absolutism ap-
pear more populist than it is, he also establishes his own distance from
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hobbes. For instance, while Grotius admitted that
44 II:237, 239. Here Locke attempts to capitalize on the English fear that Charles II was taking
bribes from Louis XIV and threatening to subject Parliament to the crown and, by extension,
subject England to France. Given the circumstances surrounding the secret Treaty of Dover,
there was probably some truth to these suspicions.
the people, individually or collectively, could resist an intolerable tyrant,

he did not follow Locke in asserting that the entire society could exercise
political power.45 Likewise, with respect to Pufendorf, Locke rejects the ar-
gument that the right of resistance must be construed as a self-defense right.
For Pufendorf and his moderate Whig followers, political power does not
revert to the people in the event of a constitutional crisis, but rather to the
representative bodies or “great councils,” which are entitled to settle the is-
sue definitively.46 Neither the Grotian nor the moderate Whig Pufendorfian
strain of natural law theory would allow or countenance Locke’s argument
that political power derives from and ultimately devolves to a society of
morally autonomous individuals. Quite the contrary, these thinkers explicitly
sought to establish some ground of sovereignty, even absolute sovereignty,
somewhere within the political structures and institutions of any given con-
stitutional order.
On the other hand, both Hobbes and Locke posit a source of political
right independent of any contract. Hobbes’ sovereign, free of any contrac-
tual obligations, and Locke’s society of individuals, bound to observe none
they may not freely break, are essentially two sides of the same coin. Locke,
we may say, simply turns Hobbes on his head. The moral and political im-
plications of this inversion, however, are enormous. We need only look back
to Hobbes’ powerful criticism of the principle of independent judgment as
a cause of civil war to recognize how far Locke takes a Hobbesian principle
in a radically different direction.47 Hobbes views resistance as a natural act,
one that threatens literally to restore the state of nature. Locke, on the other
hand, sees revolution itself as a political act, an expression of the natural
political power of the people. For Locke and Hobbes, the primacy of natural
rights and the inherent fragility of political society produce very different
theories of the right of resistance.
The paradox of Lockean constitutionalism is that while it asserts the gen-
eral principles of political legitimacy, it pairs these principles not with a
specific form of regime, but rather with a theoretical and moral justification
of the dissolution of government itself. Locke is a less doctrinaire defender
of parliamentary supremacy than the republican Sidney – indeed, he up-
holds the independence of the monarchy in his understanding of the English
Constitution – precisely because Locke views the right of dissolution, rather
than the right of Parliament, as the ultimate guarantee of political liberty
and natural rights. Locke’s dissolution theory is not merely a theoretical
contrivance designed to resolve the serious constitutional problems and
45 Cf. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1925): ch. 1,
sec. 4, pp. 7–11 (referring directly to Barclay) and Tully, Locke in Contexts, pp. 18, 41–2.
46 James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica (London, 1718): p. 643 and Pufendorf, DJNG 7.7.9, 7.8.7.
47 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edwin Curley, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994): ch. 29 and
Tully, Locke in Contexts, p. 44.
issues in seventeenth-century England.48 Rather, it is essentially a product

of his more fundamental natural rights theory, a direct consequence of his
radical argument for the derivation of political power from the natural ex-
ecutive power of individuals. Constitutional government, for Locke, can be
a legitimate expression of the natural political power of individuals only in-
sofar as it contains or represents the moral justification of its own demise or
dissolution. Locke presents his dissolution theory as the logical culmination
of what the idea of political individualism at the heart of Lockean liberalism
means for the relation of the individual to government.
The theoretical core of Lockean liberal thought is individual natural
rights. In his assessment of both the character of rights and the political impli-
cations of natural rights, Locke departed from nearly all his predecessors and
contemporaries. The liberal rights theory underlying Locke’s political teach-
ing provided a much more democratic foundation for the origin, end, and
dissolution of government than the vast majority of moderate Whigs could
countenance. With his endorsement of a delegation theory of sovereignty
and a refurbished separation of powers theory, albeit based on functional
instrumentality rather than historical socioeconomic interests, Lockean lib-
eralism differed from the radically populist version of modern republicanism
introduced to England by Sidney. Liberal constitutionalism, as Locke con-
ceived it, broke from both radical republican and moderate Whig ideas by
reconceptualizing government power in such a way as to make political
sovereignty difficult, and perhaps impossible, to locate. Neither the moder-
ate Whig king-in-Parliament nor the modern republican popular assembly
would be sovereign in Lockean society. In a fundamental sense, society would
be sovereign, not institutions.
The theoretical and practical implications of Lockean liberal thought for
the English Constitution were momentous. Locke’s emphasis on the societal
as opposed to the institutional grounding of legitimacy reveals a subtle crit-
icism of the historical understanding of the English Constitution. By tracing
constitutional development from the powers of individuals in a state of na-
ture, Locke undermines the sacrosanctity, if not the fundamental integrity,
of the existing and cherished political institutions in England. Locke implies
that granting too much reverence to political forms and structures inculcates
an understanding of the end of political society as the preservation of exist-
ing institutions, rather than the true or natural end of preserving the pre-civil
rights these institutions were meant to protect. In trying to resist the reifi-
cation of the idea of liberty in particular institutions, Locke points to the
concerns of civil society, primarily the realm of economic activity, as repre-
senting the best human response to the deep problem of natural scarcity. For
Locke, it is a mistake, even if an understandable one, to view the defense of
48 In this respect I disagree with Franklin (Theory of Sovereignty) and rather follow the main
lines of Tully’s argument (Locke in Contexts).
what is familiar to us as an end in itself.49 In an England informed by Lockean

principles, the Constitution would be an object of obligation and respect only
to the extent that it protected property and facilitated the material and tech-
nological advances necessary for ensuring the comfortable self-preservation
of the people and the security of their rights. Locke cautiously suggests that
the government of England must undergo deep and fundamental reforms,
far beyond the limited goal of Exclusion, if it is to satisfy these demands. In
the early stages of the Glorious Revolution, Locke expressed his concern that
if the Convention “think of themselves as a Parliament, and put themselves
in a slow method of proceeding usual therein, and think of mending great
faults piecemeal, or anything less than the great frame of government, they
will let slip an opportunity.”50 As we shall see in what follows, few Whigs
in England at the time were prepared to follow Locke’s lead.
49 See, for example, Locke’s criticism of the natural “Slowness and Aversion” to correct con-
stitutional “defects” (II:223). Even Locke’s defense of prerogative rested on a natural rather
than a historical or divine form of right.
50 Letter to Edward Clarke, February 7, 1689 (quoted in Franklin, Theory of Sovereignty,
p. 121).
10
The Glorious Revolution and the Catonic Response
The themes and issues raised in the writings of the Exclusion era Whigs
foreshadowed the constitutional and legal arguments supporting the Whig
triumph in the Glorious Revolution less than a decade later. However, the
dramatic events of 1688–9 came to represent a victory primarily for a par-
ticular strain of Whig thought. The official Whig account of the revolution
rested on the theoretical premises of the moderate brand of Whiggism we saw
in Tyrrell. The radical Whig positions and theories associated with Locke and
Sidney were largely marginalized. In both form and substance, the actions
of the Convention Parliament in replacing the errant James II with William
and Mary were accounted for and defended in terms counter to the central
premises of radical Whiggism. The spirit of 1689 was not the stuff of radical
Whig dreams.
The Glorious Revolution and the Exclusion crisis of a decade or so earlier
are linked on a number of levels. First, both situations raised many of the
same issues about the extent of prerogative and parliamentary authority, the
character of the English Constitution, and the very nature of the political
and religious settlement in the nation. Second, the actors involved in the
Glorious Revolution operated in a complex historical and ideological context
that was in many respects unchanged from that of a decade earlier. Fear of
civil war, popular revulsion at the idea of republicanism, and virulent anti-
Catholicism once again dominated the political scene, but in the late 1680s
this complex dynamic of deeply rooted social attitudes and potent political
imagery produced a different outcome from that of the Exclusion period
precisely because these same forces acted differently than they had in 1679–
81. Whereas the ideological and historical context of the Exclusion years
tended to act as a centrifugal force driving Whigs and Tories apart, in 1688–9
the fear of civil war and profound suspicion of a Catholic monarch forced
many Tories to join, however reluctantly, with the Whigs in removing James
from the throne.
271
A third connection between the Exclusion crisis and the Glorious Revolu-
tion was one of personalities and pamphlets. While some of the key figures
of the Exclusion era were gone from the scene by 1688 – the enigmatic Whig
leader Shaftesbury dying a broken man in exile in Holland and accumulated
years of hard court living finally separating Charles II from his mortal coil –
many of the key actors in the Glorious Revolution were veterans on both
sides of the Exclusion battles. Moreover, the great Whig writings of the Ex-
clusion period resurfaced during and after the revolution, with Locke’s Two
Treatises anonymously and Sidney’s Discourses posthumously seeing the light
of day only in the 1690s, and with Tyrrell riding a wave of acclaim originat-
ing in the success of Patriarcha, Non Monarcha on his way to becoming the
“doyen among Whig intellectuals” in the decade after the Glorious Revo-
lution.1 The most important connection between Exclusion and revolution,
however, had to do with the fact that the man targeted for exclusion from
the line of succession in 1679–81 was finally removed from the throne in
1689, just four years after he ascended to it. What happened to bring most
Whigs and most Tories, bitter opponents in the Exclusion period, into an
unlikely union to remove James from the throne? The most obvious expla-
nation for the cause of the revolution is the actions of James himself as king.
Whether or not James consciously and in a programmatic manner aimed
to subvert the Constitution and establish an absolute monarchy, his actions
between 1685 and 1688 succeeded in alarming Whigs and Tories alike, and
ultimately produced the alienation of all but his most steadfast supporters.
Four main policies and events mark the descent of James’ rule into revolution
and removal.
First, James’ religious policy with its assertive pro-Catholic agenda alien-
ated many of the strongest supporters of the crown among the Anglican
clergy and country gentry. The legacy of the Exclusion crisis for the victori-
ous Tories was the intellectual inheritance of Filmerism and the hardening
of the commitment to the divine right principles of indefeasible hereditary
succession and the doctrine of nonresistance, which reached a peak in the
Oxford Decrees of 1683 condemning all resistance to the sovereign as sinful.
However, many Tories came to see James’ suspension of the Test Acts with the
Declaration of Indulgence and the establishment of Ecclesiastical Commis-
sions to enforce his policies on the Church of England as a clear indication
of the Catholic monarch’s hostility to the established church. James’ per-
ceived depredations toward the Anglican Church climaxed with the second
Declaration of Indulgence in May 1688 and the arrest and imprisonment
of the seven bishops who refused to read the declaration from the pulpit.
For the London crowds who cheered the “not guilty” verdict of the bishops,
traditional anti-Catholic sentiment and genuine concern about James’ harsh
1 Mark Goldie, “The Roots of True Whiggism 1688–94,” History of Political Thought, vol. 1,
no. 2 (Summer 1980): p. 202.
The Glorious Revolution and the Catonic Response 273
treatment of the venerable church leaders undermined the Tories’ ideological

commitment to the principle of absolute obedience to the monarch.
Second, James’ explicit efforts to maintain a standing army in a time of
peace, especially one packed with Irish Catholic officers and troops, evoked
vivid cultural memories in Protestant England of the massacres of 1641 and
enflamed suspicions that he sought to rule without Parliament. Third, James’
policy of altering the charters of local government in the boroughs and plac-
ing his own handpicked loyalists in the electorally sensitive offices of sheriff
and justice of the peace raised fears among Whigs and Tories alike that
James’ interference in the electoral process would dangerously undermine
the independence of Parliament. The calls for a newly elected “free and legal
Parliament” in 1688 largely transcended the ideological differences between
Tories and Whigs. The final link in the chain of events dragging the nation
toward a major crisis was the birth in June 1688 of a male heir to James. At
this point, even Tories who had hoped to bear patiently with James’ political
excesses and offensive religious policy on the grounds that the aging king’s
successor would be a staunchly Protestant daughter were now jarred into
facing the new reality of a potentially long line of Catholic Stuart monarchs.
The rumors of the mysterious circumstances surrounding the birth of the
new prince only fed the growing charges that the baby boy was the product
of a “suppositious” and darkly suspicious plot to fabricate a Catholic heir
when nature and grace would not comply with James’ long-term ambitions.
To many of James’ royalist supporters, the news of the birth of a Catholic
heir was the last straw testing their absolute loyalty.
The players in the revolutionary drama were each in their own way mo-
tivated by the circumstances created by James’ policies from 1685 to 1688.
To the Whigs at home demoralized by the failure of Exclusion and the Mon-
mouth debacle, and those like Locke watching events closely from the relative
safety of exile in Holland, James’ brief reign signified all the fears of the Ex-
clusion period coming to pass. The establishment of popery and arbitrary
government was, in their view, the clear trajectory of events during James’
rule. Disaffected Tories painfully balanced their commitment to the princi-
ples of nonresistance and indefeasible hereditary succession with their alarm
at James’ obvious hostility to the Church of England and his contempt for
Parliament. James’ son-in-law William, the prince of Orange, saw the Dutch
interest in keeping England among the Protestant powers of Europe, espe-
cially with a renewed war with Louis XIV’s France on the horizon.2 William
2 For excellent discussions of the Dutch interest in William’s invasion of England, see Jonathan
Israel, “William III, the Glorious Revolution, and the Development of Parliamentary Democ-
racy in Britain,” in Foundations of Democracy in the European Union: From the Genesis of
Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament, John Pinder, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s,
1999): pp. 36–40 and Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political
Instability in European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): pp. 454–64.
and the Dutch Estates proved quite prepared to advance the Dutch interest,
as well as William and Mary’s claims to the English throne, through armed
intervention. By the time William landed in England in early November
1688 with a small Dutch force, there was a broad bipartisan consensus in
the nation at large that new elections for a free and legal Parliament were
desperately needed to check James’ ambitions and restore the constitutional
balance.
Interpreting the Glorious Revolution

The rapidly unfolding series of events in the winter of 1688–9, including
James’ flight from the country, the request of the Assembly of Lords and
Commons for William of Orange to assume temporarily the executive power
in order to call the Convention, and the debates of the Convention that
ultimately produced the Declaration of Rights and offered the crown to
William and Mary are well known and do not need repetition here.3 What
is significant for our purposes is to examine the theoretical principles and
issues raised by James’ removal from office and the installation of William
and Mary.
The Glorious Revolution and the settlement established by the Conven-
tion Parliament are often seen as a triumph for the partisans of extreme
moderation.4 While there is a good deal of truth in this assessment of the
Convention as a contest won by the Trimmers, it is important to distinguish
the practical imperatives toward compromise circa 1689 from the philo-
sophical principles at issue in this period. Four central questions and issues
emerged in the Convention debates that would have serious implications for
the Whig understanding of the meaning of the Glorious Revolution. The
first had to do with the question of James’ status after his flight to France.
By allowing (even encouraging) James to flee the country, William and the
Whigs pointedly avoided any repeat of the regicide of 1649. James would
not be allowed to play the role of another Stuart martyr, however unwill-
ing, on the altar of political radicalism. But his flight left unclear how his
removal from office was to be understood. Was this a case of deposition, for-
feiture, or abdication? Had the nation experienced a Lockean dissolution of
3 For good general treatments of the events leading up to and surrounding the Revolution, see
J. R. Jones, The Revolution of 1688 in England (New York: Norton, 1973); W. A. Speck, The
Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 1688 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988): esp. chs. 4 and 5; and J. R. Western, Monarchy and Revolution: The English State
in the 1680’s (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1972): chs. 8–10.
4 Perhaps the most famous expression of the “compromise” account of the events in 1689 is
by Thomas Babbington Macaulay, who identifies the settlement produced by the Convention
as the catalyst for the progressive “Whig” interpretation of history (The History of England
from the Accession of James the Second [London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1898]: Vol. I, pp. 1–4
and Vol. IV, pp. 350–2).
government? The Convention adopted the rather implausible interpretation

of abdication not only as a concession to Tory sensibilities about legitimacy,
but also out of a very genuine concern on the part of most Whigs to avoid
the populist and even republican implications of deposition and dissolution
so anathema to the Tory ideology of monarchy and obedience.5 The Tory
lawyer Sir Robert Sawyer exploited the moderate Whig dilemma, incisively
pointing out that if James’ flight caused a dissolution of government, then
power should logically devolve to the “people,” including “all men under
40s a year” who were not represented in Parliament. Sawyer continued to
observe that in the Lockean logic of dissolution the Convention Parliament
would have no authority to settle the crown unless all the people were con-
sulted in a process that would open the possibility of radical constitutional
revision not only regarding the monarchy, but all three estates.6 The poten-
tial for dramatic political, social, and economic change implicit in the radical
idea of dissolution was as shocking to most Whigs as to the Tories. While
some of the more radical Whigs at the Convention were prepared to support
the idea of deposing James, most were not.
The second major constitutional issue that emerged in the Convention
had to do with the notion of contract. The philosophical debate over the
contractual character of government was, of course, closely related to the
difficult question of James’ status. If the king had been deposed or somehow
forfeited his right to rule, what legal or moral grounds justified this course of
events? One obvious interpretation is that James had violated the contract
binding ruler and ruled. The Whig lawyers called to give expert counsel to
the House of Commons, including Tyrrell’s old friend William Petyt, gener-
ally concluded that there was an “original contract” underlying the English
Constitution. The date at which this contract originated and its substantive
features were, however, subject to widely divergent interpretations. The more
radically inclined Whigs at the Convention, such as Sir Robert Howard and
John Maynard, advanced the idea that James had been deposed for violating
5 Alternative interpretations include Miller’s argument that the idea of abdication was suffi-
ciently ambiguous to allow Tories to interpret it one way and Whigs to interpret it in a more
radical direction as a kind of deposition, and Slaughter’s suggestion that the verb “to ab-
dicate” was used in a transitive sense at the time and thus can be interpreted to mean that
James was deposed for breaking the original contract and fundamental laws (see John Miller,
“The Glorious Revolution: ‘Contract’ and ‘Abdication’ Reconsidered,” The Historical Journal,
vol. 25, no. 3 [September 1982]: pp. 541–5 and T. P. Slaughter, “‘Abdicate’ and ‘Contract’
in the Glorious Revolution,” Historical Journal, vol. 24 [1981]: 323–37). Frankle argues that
William’s well-known opposition to a radical interpretation of the removal of James stifled
Whig hopes for more serious constitutional reform in 1689 (Robert Frankle, “The For-
mulation of the Declaration of Rights,” The Historical Journal, vol. 17, no. 2 [June 1974]:
pp. 277–8).
6 See the discussions of Sawyer in H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1977): p. 74; Lois Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981): pp. 178–9; and Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, p. 247.
this original contract. It is important to recognize, however, that even the

Whig proponents of contract theory in the Convention were careful to frame
the discussion in the moderate Whig philosophical terms of traditional con-
stitutional practice and fundamental laws rather than the radical Whig idea
of a general natural right of revolution.7 The king, they claimed, had vi-
olated “ancient” and “undoubted rights.” The Declaration of Rights and
earlier resolutions made no reference to natural rights. Moreover, the for-
mulation of contract theory in the Convention rested on the Pufendorfian
idea of a contract between a king and the people, a version of contract theory
rejected by the radical Whig Locke.8 Most Whigs and some Tories were pre-
pared to accept the idea of fundamental laws and monarchical obligations
to protect the traditional liberties of the subject, but even then, the final res-
olution of the House of Commons that tentatively accused James of having
“endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the kingdom, by breaking the
Original Contract between king and people” did not present these actions
as grounds for his rightful deposition, but rather asserted the legal fiction of
abdication. Perhaps the final proof that the Convention Whigs did not make
radical contract theory the centerpiece of their argument is the fact that all
mention of an original contract was expunged from the final version of the
Declaration of Rights presented to William and Mary by the Convention.
While the Convention Parliament generally avoided pressing the theoreti-
cal issues of deposition and contract that had very clear radical and populist
implications, on the two other major issues of the day the Convention was
much less cautious. Regarding the issue of succession following James’
removal/abdication, Tory efforts to preserve some measure of the principle of
indefeasible hereditary right through proposals to install James’ Protestant
daughter Mary alone as queen, and Nottingham’s suggestion to establish
William as temporary regent, were defeated by the combined pressure of
the Whigs and by William and Mary’s determination to establish joint rule.
A combination of factors including fear of civil war and concern that a
Catholic Stuart might eventually succeed James if his right was not extin-
guished forced the Tories to accept the installation of William and Mary on
7 J. P. Kenyon, Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party 1689–1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1977): pp. 7–8. Cf. Dickinson, Liberty and Property, p. 74.
8 Jeffrey Goldsworthy (The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy [Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1999]: p. 159) and Schwoerer argue that the idea of contract expressed in the first
draft of the resolution is analogous to Locke’s argument about political power as a form of
“trust” (Lois Schwoerer, “Locke, Lockean Ideas, and the Glorious Revolution,” Journal of the
History of Ideas, vol. 51, issue 4 [October–December 1990]: pp. 538–9). For a fuller treatment
of Schwoerer’s argument for the Convention Parliament’s radicalism, see Schwoerer, The
Declaration of Rights. However, I argue that the idea of contract the Whigs presented at the
Convention was more like the Pufendorfian idea of an original pact of subjection, including
stipulations about fundamental laws and institutional forms, than the popular sovereignty
argument of Locke.
Whig terms. The Whig victory on the issue of James’ successor was carried
even further in the Bill of Rights that enacted the Declaration of Rights into
law, and that proscribed any future Catholic monarch or one married to a
Catholic. The one Tory sting in the tail in this matter was the removal of
the terms “rightful and lawful” from the prescribed oath of allegiance to
the new rulers. Perhaps the clearest victory for the Whig philosophy coming
out of the Convention was the explicit affirmations of the rights of Parlia-
ment. Seven of the thirteen declaratory statements in the Declaration had
to do more or less directly with the central role of Parliament in the legisla-
tive process, such as the prohibition on the royal suspending and dispensing
power, the affirmation of Parliament’s control over revenue, and a statement
of the importance of freely and regularly elected Parliaments.9 The Decla-
ration, then, stood as a vindication of the moderate Whig commitment to
parliamentary authority dating back to the Exclusion period. It not only es-
tablished the principle of making Parliament a more regular and permanent
feature of the constitutional order, it also laid the foundation for the idea of
parliamentary sovereignty that would come to characterize Whig philosophy
in the eighteenth century.10
Who, if anyone, actually carried the day at the Convention Parliament?
On many issues, Whigs and Tories reached a compromise position keenly
attuned to the uncertain political context of the time. However, the marginal-
ization of radical ideas at the Convention and the persisting Tory unease with
the settlement after 1689 suggest that the moderate Whigs did more to shape
the way the revolution and its settlement would be understood than any
other group. The moderate Whig position in the formation of the revolu-
tion settlement was not, however, simply a product of practical compromise
made to win Tory support. Most Whigs avoided radical Whig arguments
for individual natural rights and popular sovereignty because they did not
agree with this philosophy.11 When the Declaration speaks of rights, it typ-
ically refers to the powers of the different estates, which formed the mixed
government in England. Individual rights are understood primarily in terms
9 See Articles 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 13 of the Declaration of Rights. Schwoerer (Declaration of

Rights, pp. 100–1) argues persuasively that the authors of the Declaration were innovating
more than they let on. She observes that the bans on the royal dispensing power and ecclesi-
astical courts were not matters of “ancient” and “undoubted rights,” but rather reflect Whig
efforts to reform the monarchy on the quiet.
10 George L. Cherry, “The Role of the Convention Parliament (1688–9) in Parliamentary Sup-
remacy,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 17, no. 3 (June 1956): pp. 390–406; Goldsworthy,
Sovereignty of Parliament, pp. 159–64; and Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, pp. 242–6.
11 See, for example, Pocock’s interesting observation that the term “dissolution” had nega-
tive Hobbesian connotations for most Glorious Revolution era Whigs (J. G. A. Pocock,
“The Fourth English Civil War: Dissolution, Desertion, and Alternative Histories in the Glo-
rious Revolution,” in The Glorious Revolution: Changing Perspectives, Lois Schwoerer, ed.
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992]: p. 60).
of one’s place in the balance of hierarchical estates in society.12 In their de-

fense of legal parliamentary sovereignty composed of the social class–based
estates, the moderate Whigs who shaped the revolution settlement operated
on the conservative premises of Pufendorf’s constitutional and political phi-
losophy.13 The spirit of 1689 had a distinctively Pufendorfian stamp. Three
examples of moderate Whig Pufendorfians are the prominent champions
of the revolution and settlement Gilbert Burnet, William Atwood, and the
ubiquitous James Tyrrell.
The remarkable career of the Scotsman Gilbert Burnet established him
as one of the most important Whig bishops and all-round politicos in the
revolution period. Burnet was one of William’s closest British advisors and
confidantes. His 1688 pamphlet The Measures of Submission, which was dis-
tributed widely upon William’s landing in England, is the closest thing to
an official Williamite statement on the revolution. This statement of the
philosophical principles justifying resistance to James is saturated with the
language and logic of Pufendorfian natural and constitutional jurisprudence.
Burnet’s aim in this work was to prove that the Filmerian Anglican royalist
doctrine of absolute nonresistance had no basis in natural law, Scripture, or
the English constitutional tradition. He begins with the proposition that “the
Law of Nature has put no difference or subordination among Men.”14 This
apparently Lockean or Sidneyan statement of natural liberty is, however,
soon revealed to be not a radical but a Pufendorfian conception of natural
liberty. For example, Burnet insists that an individual may alienate his liberty
entirely by selling “himself to be a slave.” The thrust of Burnet’s argument
12 Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1996): pp. 100–1. Regarding the one right identified in the British Declaration that
resembles an individual natural right, namely, the right to bear arms in Article 13, Schwoerer
astutely observes that the restriction of this right to Protestants suggests that it reflects more
of a neo-Harringtonian concern to preserve Protestant militias against the threat of a Catholic
standing army than an individual natural right (Schwoerer, Declaration of Rights, pp. 75–6).
For a contrary reading that sees the Declaration of Rights expressing a universal right to
bear arms, see Joyce Lee Malcolm “The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The
Common Law Tradition,” in Gun Control and the Constitution, Robert J. Cottrol, ed. (New
York: Garland, 1994): pp. 247–56. For a fuller treatment of the historical development of
the right to bear arms in England and America, see Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep and Bear
Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1994).
13 In his own reflections on the Glorious Revolution, Pufendorf expressed great admiration
for the results of the revolution and the moderate spirit in which it was carried out. He
congratulated the English people on having “executed their rightful duty, under the pressure
of necessity, of guarding the safety of the state through which their religion, liberty, life, and
property are secured” (quoted in Leonard Krieger, The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and
the Acceptance of Natural Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965): pp. 197–8).
14 Gilbert Burnet, “The Measures of Submission” (1688), in The Struggle for Sovereignty: Sev-
enteenth Century English Political Tracts, Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund
Press, 1999): pp. 850, 852.
is the claim that the right of resistance is not universal and unlimited, but
rather is determined from “the express Laws of any State.”15 The underlying
premise of Burnet’s argument is the Pufendorfian dictum that the degree of
submission to government is set by the terms of the compact of subjection,
not by any reference to an abstract standard of radical natural rights. While
Burnet, like most of the Convention Whigs, generally eschewed the authority
of the ancient constitution, he did emphasize the point that the fundamental
compact underlying the English Constitution established limited monarchy.
Burnet argued that the king recognized by his oath constitutional and legal
restraints on his power set by Parliament’s role in legislation, “determined”
limits on prerogative, and a public commitment to protect certain liberties of
the subject.16 Insofar as James’ actions subverted the Constitution, Burnet
claimed that he undermined the ground of his own authority and ceased
to be a lawful ruler. With this argument Burnet foreshadowed the logic of
the abdication thesis and presented resistance to James as a form of self-
defense, effecting not so much a revolution as a restoration of the traditional
Constitution. Moreover, Burnet’s essentially conservative reading of the re-
sistance to James presaged the Convention’s rejection of the radical idea of
dissolution. The corruption and subversion of the Constitution by James
would be rectified, in Burnet’s view, by the election of a free and legal Par-
liament, not by the reactivation of the supposed constituent power of the
people.
William Atwood’s celebrated defense of the revolution settlement in The
Fundamentals of the English Government (1690) reiterated and in some senses
clarified the Pufendorfian premises of the moderate Whig argument in
Burnet’s pamphlet. The argument of the Whig lawyer Atwood is particu-
larly useful for distinguishing the moderate and radical Whig positions. As a
public admirer of Locke and a veteran of the Brady Controversy (marked by
his own offering to the dispute Jus Anglorum ab Antiquo [1681]), Atwood has
been identified as a soulmate of the radical Whigs who sold out to the estab-
lishment.17 While he did praise Locke’s account of the origin of government
in consent and even made the radical claim that the English monarchy is in
some sense elective, Atwood was not simply a timid or politic Lockean.18
Indeed, in the Fundamentals he took the opportunity to reject emphatically
the Lockean idea of dissolution. His argument was not that Locke’s posi-
tion was theoretically sound but practically inapplicable because no disso-
lution of government had occurred in 1688–9. Quite the contrary, Atwood
15 Ibid., p. 853.
16 Ibid., p. 856.
17 Mark Goldie, “The Roots of True Whigism 1688–94,” History of Political Thought, vol. 1,
no. 2 (Summer 1980): pp. 203, 225.
18 Howard Nenner, The Right to Be King: The Succession to the Crown of England, 1603–1714
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995): p. 196.
argued that the notion that Parliament was the organ of continuity to which
authority naturally reverted upon the king’s abdication/flight was rooted
in the Pufendorfian argument that every compact of subjection implicitly
includes a provision against dissolution. Atwood pointedly referred to the
authority of Pufendorf to counter Locke:
They who once came together in a civil society and subjected themselves to a
king; . . . cannot be presumed to have been so slothful as to be willing to have their
civil society extinct upon the death of a king, and to return to their natural state and
anarchy, to the hazarding of the safety now settled.19
The appearance of Atwood’s legalistic defense of the revolution and set-

tlement, then, is somewhat misleading. It actually involves the utilization
of the principles of Pufendorfian philosophy not only, or even primarily,
to supply a historically based rationale for the Convention, but rather to
provide a natural law authorization for Parliament’s assumption of the au-
thority to restore the limited monarchy and settle the succession. It was the
legal sovereignty of Parliament rooted in contract that gave it the author-
ity to act in an emergency situation to fill a vacancy on the throne, just as,
Atwood argues, the king-in-Parliament is the supreme power in the normal
course of constitutional operation.20 Atwood followed Pufendorf in arguing
that popular sovereignty was incompatible with his most cherished ideas
about sovereignty, the nature of contract, and the character of the English
Constitution.
The third and perhaps most influential defense of the Glorious Revolution
settlement was James Tyrrell’s Bibliotheca Politica. This massive volume of
thirteen dialogues, first published in separate segments but finally compiled
in 1694, stands as a tour de force among the moderate Whig apologies for
the revolution.21 In the series of exchanges between Mr. Meanwell, a Tory,
and Mr. Freeman, a Whig, Tyrrell advanced an argument for the essentially
moderate and conservative character of the revolution. He reiterated his ar-
gument from Patriacha, Non Monarcha establishing that the English Consti-
tution must be understood as a limited monarchy. While generally avoiding
natural law arguments or the idea of original contract, Tyrrell maintains
that the essence of the compact between king and people regulates monar-
chical authority through Parliament’s role in legislation and taxation and
19 William Atwood, The Fundamentals of the English Government (London, 1690): 100–1 and
Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934):
bk. 7, ch. 7, p. 9 (hereafter DJNG, bk., ch., pages). Cf. Julian Franklin, John Locke and the
Theory of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978): p. 106.
20 Nenner, The Right to Be King, pp. 235–6.
21 See Kenyon’s high praise for Bibliotheca Politica (Revolution Principles, p. 69). Tyrrell published
a fourteenth dialogue to defend the Glorious Revolution against latter-day critics in 1704.
by certain fundamental laws.22 Tyrrell has Freeman rehearse a long passage

from Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae et Gentium to the effect that resistance to
royal power is justifiable only if the king’s actions subvert the Constitution
established in the express compact of subjection. Moreover, Tyrrell rejects the
Lockean idea of dissolution, arguing instead that the legally established in-
stitutions of Parliament are authorized to restore the constitutional order by
filling a vacancy on the throne.23 He is also at pains to dissociate the actions
of the Convention from the radical populism in the Lockean or Sidneyan
idea of resistance, reminding the reader frequently that the people as such,
or the “rabble” and “Vulgar or Mobile,” possess no moral right to revolt
and do not become the repositories of political power through a dissolution
of government. Only the various estates represented in the institutions of
government can provide the legal sanction to legitimize resistance.24 Just as
with Burnet and Atwood, Tyrrell’s reasoning in Bibliotheca Politica is replete
with Pufendorfian assumptions about the nature of contract and the limits
of obedience. Tyrrell fused a Pufendorfian conception of legal sovereignty in
Parliament with a conservative understanding of the fundamentally restora-
tive purpose of resistance to produce a defense and rationale for the Glorious
Revolution that not only echoed the arguments of Burnet and Atwood but,
perhaps more importantly, struck a deep chord among most English Whigs
and gave voice to their most fundamental political instincts and philosophi-
cal commitments.
Although moderate Whiggism provided the intellectual nerve running
through the revolution and the settlement, radical Whigs and Tories did
not go gently into that good constitutional night. They continued to rage,
after a fashion, during the crucial days in the winter of 1689 and well after-
ward. The radicals, while marginalized in the formation of the final product
of the Convention Parliament, were not without articulate spokesmen and
leaders in the Convention such as Sir Robert Howard, John Wildman, and
John Hampden in the Commons and Delamere, Macclesfield, and Wharton
in the Lords. Generally speaking, the radicals argued that the Convention
should act as a constituent assembly authorized by the people to enact a
major constitutional revision. As we have seen, the tenor of the moderate
Whigs in the Convention and in the writings of Burnet, Atwood, and Tyrrell
was to conceptualize the proceedings of the Convention as an extraordi-
nary, but by no means unprecedented, act of constitutional restoration by
the Houses of Parliament to fill a vacancy on the throne and reestablish the
Constitution. And while Locke appears to have supported the radicals’ view
of the populist foundation and ambitious possibilities for the Convention,
22 James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica (London, 1718): p. 704 (hereafter BP). Cf. Kenyon, Revo-
lution Principles, pp. 35–7.
23 Tyrrell, BP: 696, 781. Cf. Pufendorf, DJNG 7.7.7, 10.
24 Tyrrell, BP: 182, 690, 773, 778, 781.
Lockean philosophical principles were typically ignored or rejected by most

respectable Whigs at the time.25 To the extent that radical Whig ideas suffered
from the association with republicanism in an England still haunted by the
memory of 1649 and deeply hostile to the idea of a republic, it is not surpris-
ing that moderate Whiggism would be more appealing to the broad center
of the political spectrum in the revolution period. Yet while the radicals may
have seen their political program calling for severe restrictions on executive
power and harsh penalties on hard core Tories and sympathizers of the
Stuarts systematically defeated, a persistent voice of radical Whig dissent to
the Williamite Junto Ministry persisted throughout the 1690s. A submerged
but nonetheless very real countertradition to moderate Whiggism can be seen
in the Lockeanism of Bishop Hoadly, in the arguments by the anonymous
author of Political Aphorisms, and in William Molyneux’s employment of
Lockean arguments in his case for self-government in Ireland.26 In addition,
a distinctively Sidneyan opposition Whig tradition based on the necessity of
frequent and broadly elected Parliaments, and a hostility to executive power
and standing armies, would flower toward the end of the century and, fusing
with elements in the Tories, become a central ideological component of the
emerging country party.
The central paradox in the radical Whig ideology in Britain in the postrev-
olution years lay in the fundamental tension between the two most common
arguments employed by the radicals. On the one hand, there was the ar-
gument that something revolutionary had occurred in 1688–9, namely, the
deposition of an aspiring tyrant by a broad-based national uprising. On
the other hand, radical Whigs often appealed to the countervailing logic of
the argument that the Convention had not been truly revolutionary, or had
not seized the opportunity to institute the dramatic constitutional reforms
required to establish the English Constitution on a more populist and natural
rights foundation. The inability of the radical Whigs in Britain to harmonize
fully the rationale underlying their view of the moral and political claims
25 For arguments affirming the irrelevance of Lockean ideas in the revolution, see John Dunn,
“The Politics of Locke in England and America,” in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives,
John Yolton, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); M. M. Goldsmith and
Richard Ashcraft, “Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology,”
The Historical Journal, vol. 26, no. 4 (1983): pp. 773–800; Kenyon, Revolution Principles,
pp. 1–4; and Martyn P. Thompson, “The Reception of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,
1690–1705,” Political Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 (1976): pp. 184–91. For the argument that
Locke’s irrelevance in this period is frequently exaggerated, see Schwoerer, “Lockean Ideas,”
and Zuckert, Natural Rights, esp. ch. 10.
26 The best treatment of the radical or “Real Whig” opposition to the Junto is Goldie, “Roots of
True Whiggism.” For Hoadly’s Lockeanism, see Reed Browning, Political and Constitutional
Ideas of the Court Whigs (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982): pp. 81–2
and for the Lockeanism of Political Aphorisms, see Zuckert, Natural Rights, pp. 289–91, 293.
Interestingly, after the public furor produced by it, Locke publicly condemned the radical
arguments of his friend William Molyneux’s The Case of Ireland’s being Bound by Acts of
Parliament in England (1698).
implicit in the revolution and their dissatisfaction with its settlement made
the Glorious Revolution a historical phenomenon they could neither simply
repudiate nor wholly embrace.
If radical Whig opposition to the revolution settlement continued only
on the margins of English political opinion, the same cannot be said for the
Tories. Tory unease with the revolution and its results reflected deep and
abiding strains in English public sentiment. The unpopularity of William
and his ministries often translated into a more serious disaffection with the
revolution itself. While only hard-core Jacobites and clerical nonjurors ut-
terly rejected the revolution, most Tories only reluctantly accommodated to
the new political reality after 1689.27 However, the internal tensions in the
logical premises of Tory ideology were as fundamental as those embedded
in the position of the radical Whigs. Filmerism persisted as the philosoph-
ical bedrock of Tory opposition to the Whigs in church and country until
well into the eighteenth century. But the two central premises of Filmerian
divine right, the principle of indefeasible hereditary right and the doctrine
of nonresistance, were difficult to reconcile with the events and aftermath
of the revolution. Tory efforts to rationalize the new political reality, one
that many Tories were complicit in creating, were often a painful exercise
of soul searching and self-justification. Some Tories tentatively embraced
the argument that William could be accepted as a legal conqueror in the
Grotian sense, thereby allowing the rigidly scrupulous to transfer their al-
legiance with few moral qualms. But after an initial flurry of interest, both
Tories and Whigs rejected the conquest idea as a rather distasteful way to
construe the events of 1688–9.28 Ultimately, most Tories in the decade after
1689 adopted a quasi-Filmerian stance toward the revolution. They accepted
William and Mary as de facto rulers, and thus as the proper objects of obe-
dience, but could not bring themselves to abandon entirely the principle
of indefeasible hereditary succession by recognizing them as “rightful and
lawful” sovereigns. No doubt the two major underlying motivations in the
Tory de facto argument were simply fear of civil war and a deep distrust of a
27 Dickinson, Liberty and Property, ch. 1 and Kenyon, Revolution Principles, pp. 3–4 and
chs. 5 and 9. Goldsworthy perhaps identifies the Tory acceptance of the idea of parlia-
mentary sovereignty prematurely at 1700–1 with the Act of Settlement debate (Sovereignty
of Parliament, p. 164). As Holmes demonstrates, many Tories were still wedded to indefea-
sible hereditary right as late as 1714–15 (Geoffrey Holmes, “Harley, St. John and the Death
of the Tory Party,” in Britain after the Glorious Revolution, Geoffrey Holmes, ed. [New York:
St. Martin’s, 1969]: pp. 232, 234–5).
28 See, for example, the negative reaction to Charles Blount’s fabulously titled King William
and Queen Mary Conquerors (1693) in Kenyon, Revolution Principles, pp. 31–2. For good
treatments of the use of conquest theory as it was employed by leading Tory apologists
for the revolution such as Charles Blount, Robert Sherlock, and Edmund Bohun (Blount’s
licensee), see Mark Goldie, “Edmund Bohun and Jus Gentium in the Revolution Debate,
1689–1693,” The Historical Journal, vol. 20, no. 3 (September 1977): pp. 573–86 and Martyn
P. Thompson, “The Idea of Conquest in Controversies Over the 1688 Revolution,” Journal
of the History of Ideas, vol. 38, no. 1 (January–March 1977): pp. 33–46.
return to England by the Catholic James II, of whom most Tories were happy
to be unburdened. One particularly interesting strain of reasoning among
Anglican royalists after 1689 rested on a version of the Filmerian idea of
divine providence. These Tories argued that there was divine sanction for
James’ removal (but not a popular right of resistance); hence obedience to
William and Mary was compatible with the divine ordination of political
rule.29 In this respect, the Tory dilemma after 1689 resembled Filmer’s moral
anguish in the Engagement controversy of the 1650s, with the added twist
that many Tories, unlike Filmer under the Commonwealth, were themselves
partly the reluctant accomplices in the creation of this new order. The pro-
visional character of the Tory view of allegiance to the revolution settlement
would contribute to the continuing political instability of the country for
decades until 1714.
Two major developments in the period spanning the Glorious Revolu-
tion and the Hanoverian accession that exposed the important philosoph-
ical cleavages in England were the Standing Army controversy of 1697–9
and the trial of Henry Sacheverell in 1710. The context of the Standing
Army controversy was the debate over the reduction in the size of William’s
army following the Peace of Ryswick with the French in 1697.30 The To-
ries under the leadership of the former Whig Robert Harley had by this
time assumed the role of champions of the landed gentry, who bore the
major costs of William’s continental wars through the land tax. The Tories
and anti-Junto Whigs displayed an unprecedented degree of cooperation in
their successful efforts to decrease dramatically the size of the army against
strong opposition from William and the Junto ministry. Animating the anti-
army forces was the fear that a standing army in peacetime could be used
by an unscrupulous court to intimidate Parliament by a show of force and
corrupt it through the distribution of patronage. Anti-army pamphleteers
such as the old Whig John Trenchard and the Scot Andrew Fletcher made
Sidney’s argument concerning the inherent danger a standing army in peace-
time posed for the delicate constitutional balance in a limited monarchy.31
The counterargument of the pro-army establishment Whigs such John
Somers and Daniel Defoe that Parliament’s control over taxation was a
29 Gerald Straka, The Anglican Reaction to the Revolution of 1688 (Madison: State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1962): esp. ch. 6.
30 For a comprehensive treatment of the context of the controversy, see Lois Schwoerer,
No Standing Armies! Anti-army Ideology in Seventeenth Century England (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1974).
31 For a fuller treatment of Fletcher and the other anti-army spokesmen, see Hiram Caton,
The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600–
1835 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988): pp. 301–4; J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue,
Commerce and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): pp. 235–9; Paul
Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992): pp. 341–4; and Schwoerer, No
Standing Armies, pp. 180–1.
sufficient safeguard to the constitutional order did not carry the day, and
by 1699 William’s army was seriously reduced in size and his beloved Dutch
Guards were sent packing.
The significance of the Standing Army controversy was threefold. First,
it generated a degree of partisan mobilization not seen in England since the
days of the Exclusion crisis. Former Whigs Paul Foley and Robert Harley
(the future earl of Oxford) cobbled together a disparate coalition of groups
in opposition to William that included new Whigs like themselves, as well
as Tories and radical old Whigs disaffected by the Junto. On the other side,
William’s supporters, including Montague (later the earl of Halifax), Somers,
and John Churchill (soon to be duke of Marlborough) pursued a vigorous
campaign on their leader’s behalf. Harley’s anti-army parliamentary oppo-
sition showed remarkable political skills and organizational abilities that
proved to be infectious, as diverse groups of kindred spirits began meeting
regularly in political clubs in coffee houses all over the capital such as the
famous Grecian Coffee House.32 In many respects, Harley’s success in re-
sisting the crown and the ruling Whigs in the Standing Army controversy
foreshadowed his even bolder and unsuccessful attempt to impeach Somers
a few years later. The Standing Army controversy not only produced the nu-
cleus for the party machinery that would emerge in postrevolution Britain,
it also adumbrated the ideological cleavages already forming around the in-
terpretation of the meaning of revolution. Harley’s new Whigs and Tories
feared the idea of a large standing army in time of peace principally because
of the implications they saw in it for constitutional balance and the dan-
gerous expansion of royal prerogative. The issue for Harley and the Tories,
as it would be later for the country opposition, had much more to do with
preserving their conception of the institutional design of the Constitution
than with William’s foreign policy.33 For their part, radical Whigs during
the Standing Army controversy such as John Trenchard and Walter Moyle
not only feared that prerogative endangered the power of the Commons,
they also worried that a standing army would effectively nullify the natural
right of revolution so central to radical Whig philosophy.34 As would be the
case with the country party of Bolingbroke in years to come, the anti-army
coalition held together, however loosely, partisans of often widely divergent
political persuasions.
In addition to the practical partisan dimensions of the debate, another
important element in the Standing Army controversy was its impetus to a
rebirth of interest in republican and radical Whig thought among a certain
32 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies, p. 161.

33 Ibid., p. 162. As Linda Colley observes, England successfully prosecuted a very large and
very expensive continental war during the period of Tory strength in the Commons in the
early 1700s (Linda Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy; The Tory Party, 1714–1760 [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982]: p. 16).
34 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies, pp. 180–1.
segment of Whigs. The radical John Toland republished works about and by
the commonwealthmen Ludlow, Milton, and Marvell, as well as publishing
the first full edition of Sidney’s Discourses in 1698.35 Thus, the legacy of the
Standing Army controversy was complex. It not only had great symbolism
for the emerging country ideology as an example of a parliamentary bloc
successfully defying the court and ministry. It also sparked a new interest
in radical literature that would leave its mark on the coming years. With
respect to both of these legacies, the Standing Army controversy brought the
adequacy of the postrevolution settlement into question.
The impeachment trial of Henry Sacheverell a decade after the Standing
Army controversy forced to the forefront once again crucial constitutional
issues and heated speculation about the nature and meaning of the Glori-
ous Revolution. The immediate context of the trial was the angry reaction
of the Whig government to a controversial sermon by the outspoken high
Anglican clergyman Henry Sacheverell at St. Paul’s Cathedral on Novem-
ber 5, 1709, in which he castigated the revolution on the Filmerian grounds
of the immorality of the resistance to James II and thereby challenged the
legitimacy of the entire revolution settlement. Whig leaders in the govern-
ment determined that this brazen attack casting “black and odious colours”
on the revolution in the capital and on the anniversary of William’s land-
ing at Torbay could not go unchallenged and unpunished.36 The quandary
for the Whig establishment, however, was that in defending the resistance
to James, they ran the risk of legitimizing more radical principles than they
deemed consistent with the revolution. What followed in the impeachment
trial in early 1710 was a classic statement of the moderate Whig conserva-
tive interpretation of the revolution. The Whig trial managers took the op-
portunity to clarify definitively the Whig position on the events of 1688–9.
They largely eschewed the language and logic of radical contract theory and
scrupulously avoided the argument that James had been deposed for violating
the original contract. The Whigs cautiously affirmed the right of resistance
narrowly construed in Pufendorfian terms as an emergency measure taken
out of dire necessity to restore, rather than radically revise, the constitutional
order.37 A young Robert Walpole, one of the trial managers and a rising star
in the Whig establishment, expressed the deep ambiguity felt by many Whigs
35 Ibid., p. 174–6. Cf. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975): pp. 427–
46 and Blair Worden, Roundhead Reputations: The English Civil Wars and the Passions of
Posterity (London: Penguin Press, 2001): pp. 131–3.
36 The general consensus appears to be that Sacheverell was intentionally provocative in his
sermon (e.g., Reed Browning, Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs [Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982]: p. 15; Kenyon, Revolution Principles, p. 131;
and J. H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole: The Making of a Statesman [Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1956]: pp. 146–7).
37 Dickinson, Liberty and Property, pp. 76–7 and Kenyon, Revolution Principles, pp. 134–6.
toward the principle of resistance, arguing that while “resistance is nowhere

enacted to be legal but to be subjected by all laws now in being to the great-
est penalties; [it] ought never to be thought of but when an utter subversion
of the realm threaten the whole frame of the constitution and no redress
can otherwise be hoped for.”38 Walpole’s commonsense recognition of the
legitimacy of resistance in extraordinary circumstances and his defense of
principled moderation stand firmly in the moderate Whig tradition voiced
by Burnet, Atwood, and Tyrrell.
Although Sacheverell was narrowly convicted by the Lords, the whole
affair was a public relations disaster for the Whigs. Sacheverell’s conciliatory
posture in the trial and the popular outrage at the perceived vindictiveness
in the Whig government’s handling of the affair culminated in two nights of
rioting in London. The fact that the Lords reduced Sacheverell’s punishment
to a merely symbolic gesture also contributed to a loss of face for the Whigs.
In the elections of 1710 they suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the
Tories. Despite the tactical miscalculation in their dealings with Sacheverell,
the moderate Whigs did achieve the more strategic aim of setting forth a
rigorous and comprehensive interpretation of the revolution that would in
time dominate the English political landscape.
The accession of George I and the installation of the Hanoverian line
after Anne’s death in 1714 marked a sea change in English political history.
The solid Whig support for the Hanoverians and the Protestant succession
ushered in a period of Whig hegemony that defined the political system for
most of the eighteenth century. The Tory renaissance in the closing years
of Anne’s reign after 1710, already endangered by their palpable hesitation
about the transfer of the crown to the Hanoverians, absolutely collapsed with
the repercussions of the abortive Jacobite rising in 1715. The public’s and
the crown’s association of Toryism with Jacobitism diminished the Tories as
a political force throughout Bolingbroke’s ascendancy as leader during the
long Walpole administration. With the evisceration of Tory political power,
the early period of the Whig establishment after 1714 witnessed a renewed
battle within Whiggism between its ruling moderate bloc and its radical
fringe. The long-simmering tension between these two elements of Whiggism
was exacerbated by the passage of the Septennial Act in 1716, in which a
solidly Whig Parliament annuled the Triennial Act increasing its own life
from three to seven years. The growing tension between moderate Whig
ideas about parliamentary sovereignty and the more radical ideas of contract
and popular representation of the Whig opposition motivated much of this
internal Whig conflict. The first radical Whig champion to lay a glove on
38 Quoted in Plumb, Walpole, p. 149. In contrast to Caton, I argue that the philosophical
principles underlying the Whig idea of contract and resistance presented at the trial is based
on the more conservative conception associated with Pufendorf than that of Locke or Sidney.
For a Lockean reading of the Sacheverell Whigs, see Caton, Politics of Progress, pp. 267–9.
Britain’s ruling Whigs, the complacent children of the spirit of 1689, was
Cato’s Letters.
Cato’s Letters
Cato’s Letters were a series of 138 short essays published by John Trenchard
and Thomas Gordon under the pseudonym Cato between November 1720
and July 1723. The partnership between Trenchard, the radical veteran of
the Standing Army controversy, and Gordon, a somewhat mysterious young
Scotsman, began as a scathing criticism of the public officials and company
directors involved in the financial scandal known as the South Sea Bubble.
The South Sea Company originally established by Harley’s Tory government
in 1711 proposed eight years later to assume most of the national debt in
exchange for monopoly trading privileges and a handsome rate of interest.
In the fever of speculation and the precipitous crash that followed, many
fortunes were ruined and the Sunderland government was rocked.39 In the
investigations that followed Walpole’s rise to power and his plan to restore
the system of national credit, several members of the former government and
influential courtiers were implicated in a vast bribery and corruption scan-
dal. While the Letters began as an impassioned appeal to punish severely the
government officials and company directors involved in the scandal, they
grew into a sustained campaign calling for new elections and ultimately into
a collection of general reflections on the character and importance of politi-
cal, civil, and religious liberty and the meaning of the Glorious Revolution.
Trenchard and Gordon used these letters to redefine the legacy of the revo-
lution in a more radical direction than the moderate Whig trial managers in
the Sacheverell affair. Cato’s Letters represent an effort to rehabilitate radi-
cal Whig theory in England – in effect, to reclaim the Whig mantle for the
radicals so as to firm up resistance to court corruption, reexamine the idea
of constitutional balance, and restore the notion of the importance of freely
and regularly elected Parliaments.
Cato’s Letters hold an important place in the radical Whig tradition for a
number of reasons. First, they signify a seminal instance in the development
of opposition Whig thought, whereby the establishment moderate Whigs
were attacked, as it were, from the left by a radical Whig opposition. In the
Letters we see an early instance of the events and theoretical implications of
the Glorious Revolution interpreted through a radical Whig lens. Trenchard
and Gordon offered a provocative counterargument to the prevailing
39 For good discussions of the events surrounding the South Sea scandal, see Browning, Court
Whigs, pp. 19–20; Caton, Politics of Progress, pp. 275–80; Ronald Hamowy, “Cato’s Let-
ters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm,” History of Political Thought, vol. xi, no. 2
(Summer 1990): pp. 279–81; Jerome Huyler, Locke in America (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 1995): pp. 213–15; and Plumb, Walpole, pp. 293–328.
Pufendorfianism of England’s ruling Whigs and their sense of the spirit of

1689. Second, the Letters were enormously popular in the American colonies,
being published, republished, and widely distributed in every major colo-
nial center.40 Indeed, Cato gained much greater currency as an authority in
America than in England. Third, in recent times, Cato’s Letters have been
keenly examined with respect to their role and place in the heated liberal
versus republican revisionist debate.41 The Letters have been claimed by
both schools as support for their general positions.
I suggest that the fundamental significance of Cato’s Letters is their posi-
tion as a unique example of the attempt to combine the distinct strains of
radical Whig constitutional and rights theory. The undeniable presence of
both liberal and republican themes in the Letters suggests that radical Whig
thought resists the dichotomy advanced by scholars today. What makes the
Letters so interesting is this attempt to synthesize the distinct elements of
radical Whiggism.42 It is not difficult to detect the liberal and republican ele-
ments in them. Frankly, Cato’s Letters often plagiarized important discussions
in Locke (a not uncommon practice in the period) and devoted two entire
letters to a verbatim and candidly attributed use of extended passages from
Sidney’s Discourses. So the question for us is not whether Cato’s Letters drew
40 For statements of Cato’s influence in America, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins
of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967): pp. 35–7,
44, 53; Colin Bonwick, “The United States Constitution and Its Roots in British Politi-
cal Thought and Tradition,” in Foundations of Democracy in the European Union: From the
Genesis of Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament, John Pinder, ed. (New York:
St. Martin’s, 1999): pp. 45–6; Ronald Hamowy, “Cato’s Letters, John Locke, and the Repub-
lican Paradigm,” History of Political Thought, vol. xi, no. 2 (Summer 1990): p. 278; Forrest
McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985): pp. 47, 70,
77, 89, 93; and Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic: 1776–1787 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969): pp. 14–16. For views to the contrary, which
suggest that Cato’s influence in America has been exaggerated, see Steven Dworetz, The
Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution (Durham: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1990): p. 44 and Donald S. Lutz, “The Relative Influence of European Writers
on Late-Eighteenth Century American Political Thought,” American Political Science Review,
vol. 78 (March 1984): p. 193.
41 For Cato as an important part of the republican synthesis, see Bailyn, Ideological Ori-
gins, pp. 34–5; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, pp. 468, 507; Caroline Robbins, The
Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen (New York: Atheneum, 1968): pp. 115–25; and
Robert Shalphope, “Towards a Republican Synthesis,” William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 29
(January 1972): p. 58. For Cato as fundamentally a Lockean liberal, see Shelley Burtt, Virtue
Transformed: Political Argument in England, 1688–1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), p. 81; Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, pp. 85, 89; Hamowy, “Republican
Paradigm,” pp. 281–4, and 293; Jerome Huyler, Locke in America (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1995): pp. 225–6; Rahe, Republics, p. 532; and Zuckert, Natural Rights,
pp. 300–2.
42 Others who have identified this synthezing character in Cato include Lance Banning, The Jef-
fersonian Persuasion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978): p. 55; Huyler, Locke in America,
p. 224; and Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 299.
on these radical Whig sources – Trenchard and Gordon emphatically did –

but rather why and how the authors employed these theoretical resources in
their dispute with England’s ruling moderate Whig establishment.
The Lockean features of Cato’s argument related primarily to the philo-
sophical foundation of natural rights. For Cato, the source and purpose of
government must be understood in Lockean terms. Government originates
in the consent of free and equal individuals, and its proper end is the secu-
rity of individual liberty and rights. The Letters present a distinctly Lockean
conception of the centrality of property for understanding rights, as well as
an emphatic endorsement of the principle of dissolution. The Sidneyan ele-
ments in the Letters are equally prominent. Cato shares Sidney’s republican
sympathies and presents a theory of sovereignty stressing the need to reflect
the interests of the people as much as possible through such institutional
devices as regular Parliaments, rotation of delegates, and more equal and
numerous representation. In addition to a strong statement of a Lockean
conception of individual liberty, Cato presents a more Sidneyan ideal of po-
litical liberty emphasizing the importance of the public share in government
and reinterpreting the classical notion of republican virtue as the spirited
defense of rights. The Letters’ fusion of Locke and Sidney produced a radical
defense of liberty, which went beyond merely criticizing the informal tech-
nique of royal “influence” and corruption, extending to a serious criticism of
the British Constitution itself as it was understood by the majority of English
Whigs.
Cato’s Liberalism
A little over a year into the serial publication of the Letters, the authors
temporarily suspended their treatment of the specific issues surrounding the
South Sea scandal and its implications for British constitutional practice in
order to devote a series of ten letters to the general topic “the advantages of
liberty.” Cato begins this discussion with a treatment of the philosophical
foundations of natural rights. Cato’s natural rights are emphatically Lockean
in form and substance. Echoing Locke, Cato asserts:
All men are born free; liberty is a gift which they receive from God himself; nor can
they alienate the same by consent, though possibly they may forfeit it by crimes.
No man has power over his own life, or to dispose of his own religion; and cannot
transfer the power of either to anybody else.43
Thus, Cato premises the discussion of the advantages of liberty with a strong
endorsement of natural rights. In typical radical Whig fashion, Cato emphat-
ically denies the Grotian or Pufendorfian version of natural liberty, which
43 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters, Ronald Hamowy, ed. (Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1995): Letter 59, pp. 406–7 (hereafter letter and page number).
allows the possibility of an individual’s freely contracting away or alienating

his or her liberty. Actually, Cato states boldly what is left largely implicit
in Locke or Sidney when he asserts: “liberty is the unalienable right of all
mankind.”44 To the Grotian idea of absolute contract, Cato replies that even
if an individual were to make such a contract, “he is relievable by the eternal
laws of God and reason.” In addition to denying the moral validity of abso-
lute contract, Cato makes the characteristically Lockean connection between
natural rights and natural law, deriving the latter from the former: the “first
law of nature, that of self-preservation.”45 Cato thus begins his treatment of
liberty on solid Lockean ground.
Cato’s understanding of the origin and end of government is also in-
fused with the concepts of Lockean natural jurisprudence. He asserts that
government is rooted in consent and that the powers of government derive
from the natural executive power of individuals. In Letter 60 Cato states:
“Government . . . can have no power, but such as men give, and such as they
actually did give, or permit for their own sakes: Nor can any government be
in fact framed but by consent.” The principle of consent, Cato concludes,
excludes the possibility of establishing legitimate rule on the basis of con-
quest, heredity, or prescription.46 Moreover, Cato also proclaims his support
for Locke’s “strange doctrine” of the natural executive power: “The right
of the magistrate arises only from the right of private men to defend them-
selves, to repel injuries, and to punish those who commit them.” By affirming
this natural punishing power, Cato exemplifies the radical Whig departure
from the older Christian-Aristotelian assumptions of scholastic and Calvinist
consent theory and commits to the core Lockean liberal premises of the
conventionality of political society and the fiduciary character of political
power. He states: “What is government but a trust committed by all, or
the most, to one, or a few, who are to attend upon the interests of all, that
everyone may, with the more security, attend upon his own.”47 From this
premise, Cato draws the Lockean conclusion that the scope and range of
political power are inherently limited by its source, namely, “the measure
of power, which men in the state of nature have over themselves and one
another.”48
44 Ibid., p. 405. Cf. Simmons, who points out that Locke generally eschews the language of
inalienability of rights, which has become so familiar to us as a central premise of the
Declaration of Independence (see John Simmons, “Inalienable Rights and Locke’s Treatises,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12 [1983]: pp. 176, 185–6, 192). Simmons’ observation
leaves us with the interesting possibility that Jefferson may have drawn the language of
inalienability from Cato.
45 Letter 60, p. 415; 33, p. 239.
46 Letter 60, pp. 413–14; 59, p. 406.
47 Letter 59, p. 407 (cf. 11, p. 87); 38, p. 267.
48 Letter 60, p. 414.
For Cato, the ends and limits of political power are known by reference
to the state of nature. This recourse to the state of nature in an explicit way
further demonstrates the underlying Lockeanism of Cato’s position. Sidney,
we recall, did not advance a clearly articulated state of nature theory largely
because he did not locate the primary unit of political analysis in the natu-
ral power of the individual, but rather in the collected power of individuals
characterizing the natural democracy. Cato follows Locke by arguing that
individuals form government and leave the state of nature because of “the
distrust that men have of men,” which produces in a state of “boundless
liberty” perpetual “interfering and quarreling.” In this natural condition,
Cato affirms, individual rights are not secure: “everyman would be plunder-
ing the acquisitions of another.” To get out of this state, individuals create a
“mutual compact” agreeing on certain terms of society; thus, Cato claims,
men “quitted part of their natural liberty to acquire civil security.” Given
the purpose for individuals quitting the state of nature, namely, the insecu-
rity of their property and preservation, Cato determines that the sole end of
government is “the mutual protection and defense” of individual rights.49
Cato’s discussion of the “inconveniences” of the state of nature parallels
Locke’s emphasis on and concern for the natural right of property. Four of
the ten letters Cato assigns to discussing the advantages of liberty deal largely
or exclusively with issues relating to property.50 One of the primary purposes
for which individuals enter civil society, according to Cato, is to secure their
property. Indeed, Cato practically equates the natural right of life and liberty
to the natural property right: “Nor has any man in the state of nature power
over his own life, or to take away the life of another, unless to defend his
own, or what is as much his own, namely, his property.”51 By interjecting the
issue of property into his discussion of the natural self-defense right (a classic
Lockean move), Cato strongly suggests the profound connection between
property rights and a more comprehensive notion of human liberty. More-
over, Cato derives the property right not from a Tyrrellian or Pufendorfian
moderate Whig notion of occupancy, but rather directly from the Lockean
principle of labor: “Nor could any man in the state of nature, have a right to
violate the property of another; that is, what another had acquired by his art
or labour.”52 In contrast to the moderate Whig view, which gave compact
49 Letter 33, p. 236; 11, p. 87 (cf. 62, p. 429).

50 Letters 62, 64, 67, 68. For Cato’s Lockean view of property, see Dworetz, Unvarnished
Doctrine, pp. 85, 89; Hamowy, “Republican Paradigm,” pp. 281–4; and Zuckert, Natural
Rights, pp. 300–2. I do not agree with Dworetz’s claim that Cato’s Lockeanism does not
extend to the issue of consent and representation (p. 89). While Cato may say little about
these issues in Letter 97 (the letter that Dworetz focuses on to draw Cato’s connection to
Locke), he has a great deal to say about these issues in Letters 59–61, and much of what he
says is distinctively Lockean.
51 Letter 60, p. 414.
52 Ibid., p. 415.
considerable normative status in the determination of property rights, Cato

shares Locke’s emphasis on the naturalness of this right and its centrality to
the very source and end of government.
It is in this discussion of property that Cato really earns his libertarian
credentials. One way Cato defines liberty is the individual’s control over his
or her own actions and goods. Cato’s presentation of this individualist view
of liberty is saturated with references to the importance of private property:
By liberty, I understand the power which every man has over his own actions, and
his right to enjoy the fruit of his labour, art, and industry, as far as by it he hurts
not the society, or any members of it, by taking from any members, or by hindering
him from enjoying what he himself enjoys. The fruit of a man’s honest industry are
the just rewards of it, ascertained to him by natural and eternal equity, as is his title
to use them in the manner which he thinks fit: And thus, everyman is sole lord and
arbiter of his own private actions and property.53
A clearer statement of Lockean liberal economic individualism would be

hard to imagine. Limited government is by its very nature one that protects
individuals in the free enjoyment of their property. According to Cato, gov-
ernment exists merely to protect the private sphere, not to direct or manage it:
“Let people alone, and they will take care of themselves, and do it best . . . to
think what he will, and act as he thinks . . . to spend his money himself, and
lay out the produce of his labour his own way; and to labour for his own
pleasure and profit.”54 With this undeniable emphasis on private property
and the close connection between civil, political, and economic liberty, Cato
shows his true Lockean colors.
Perhaps the most striking Lockean feature in the Letters is its treatment of
the dissolution of government. This discussion is telling inasmuch as Cato
provides an account of the people’s natural constitutive power, which is
taken practically verbatim from Locke’s Second Treatise. Cato demonstrates
a commitment to one of the central tenets of Lockean constitutionalism, and
a principle that was vociferously opposed by Trenchard and Gordon’s mod-
erate Whig opponents. Cato’s discussion of the logic of resistance underlying
dissolution is, however, ambiguous inasmuch as he does not advocate revo-
lutionary action in the Britain of the 1720s. While the alleged corruption of
the Walpole government was certainly vexing to Cato and his radical Whig
readers, the broader constitutional context of the period does not have the
seriousness of the heated, indeed overcharged, atmosphere of the Exclusion
era. Locke and Sidney were willing to, and in a sense did, topple a reigning
monarch, but Cato offers no such prescriptions for England’s constitutional
problems. The Letters represent the transformation of radical Whig thought
in England from a revolutionary to a reformist or opposition stance. Though
53 Letter 62, p. 427.

54 Ibid., pp. 428–9.
Trenchard and Gordon were on the fringes of respectable opinion in their

time, they can still be identified, in contrast to the hard-core Jacobites, as the
loyal opposition.
Cato begins his treatment of the right of resistance with the perennial
question “Who shall judge whether the magistrate acts justly, and pursues
his trust?” He claims that neither the magistrate nor the aggrieved party is
the proper judge. The former would produce tyranny, and the latter would
place an authority above the sovereign authority. With this argument, Cato
signifies his departure from the parliamentary resistance theory of the civil
war era exemplified by Hunton and Parker, which gave the houses of Par-
liament the right to judge the crown, ostensibly a coequal element in the
Constitution. Facing the prospect that no constituted body can settle the
matter, Cato takes the familiar Lockean turn:
If neither magistrates, nor they who complain of magistrates, and are aggrieved by
them, have a right to determine decisively . . . then everyman interested in the success
of the contest, must act according to the light and dictates of his own conscience,
and inform it as well as he can.55
The right of resistance, Cato maintains, is a natural right lodged in the con-
science of every individual composing society. In language practically plagia-
rized from Locke, Cato contends: “Where no judge is nor can be appointed,
every man must be his own; that is, where there is no stated judge upon
the earth, we must have recourse to heaven.”56 By referring to the right of
resistance as an extra- or transconstitutional right, an appeal beyond the
authority of institutions to the ultimate authority of arms, Cato posits the
radical Whig theory of resistance, which so disgusted and alarmed the mod-
erate Whigs who practically framed the Glorious Revolution settlement.
The logical corollary of Cato’s theory of resistance is, of course, the Lock-
ean principle of dissolution. Cato argues that individuals surrender only part
of their natural liberty to form society; thus, when government becomes in-
jurious to securing life and property, “the individuals must return to their
former state again” inasmuch as “no constitution can provide against what
will happen, when that constitution is dissolved.”57 The contention that
no constitution is a guarantee against dissolution was precisely contrary to
what Pufendorfian Whigs like Tyrrell and Atwood maintained did occur in
the event of a constitutional crisis. Cato denies the Pufendorfian proposi-
tion that all social compacts provide for the continuous and legal transfer
of power in all cases. For Cato, as for Locke, when the trust between ruler
and ruled is broken, the “power must return of course to those who gave
55 Letter 59, p. 407.

56 Ibid., p. 407–8 (cf. Locke, II:168, II:240–3).
57 Ibid., p. 411 (see also p. 408 for Cato’s example of republican Rome as an illustration of
a constitutional dissolution). Notice that Cato appears to make the same logical leap from
dissolution directly to the state of nature, which moderate Whig critics usually made.
it.” Cato is careful, as was Locke, to demonstrate that dissolution theory is

not an anarchic principle introducing instability into every and any govern-
ment whatsoever. In language again almost identical to Locke’s “long train
of abuses” argument, Cato claims:
Obedience to authority is so well secured, that it is wild to imagine, that any number
of men, formidable enough to disturb a settled state, can unite together and hope
to overturn it, till the publick grievances are so enormous, the oppression so great,
and dissatisfaction so universal, that there can be no question remaining, whether
their calamities be real or imagined, and whether the magistrate has protected or
endeavored to destroy the people.58
While Cato’s calming assurance that people never (or almost never) revolt
for light and transient causes may have been designed to massage the sense
of propriety and love of order in his English audience, the more radical im-
plications of his argument are unmistakable for his treatment of England’s
recent constitutional past. Despite the official moderate Whig portrayal of
the Glorious Revolution as the very model of continuity and peaceful po-
litical change, Cato strongly implies that it did signify the dissolution of
government. He repeatedly refers to James II as a “tyrant,” implicitly doing
what the Declaration of Rights pointedly avoided doing, namely, identifying
James’ tyrannical or abusive actions as the cause of his deposition.59 In one
of the last letters in the series, Cato strongly suggests the incoherence of the
legal fiction of James’ “abdication” and challenges his fellow countrymen to
deny that “you yourselves did not help to expel him.”60 While Cato asserts
the obviousness of the revolutionary character of 1688–9, it is nonetheless
apparent that Trenchard and Gordon understood these events in much more
radical terms than did the moderate Whig majority in the country at large.
We are, in effect, left to consider whether Cato believed that the radical
principles underlying the Glorious Revolution should result in a more pop-
ular form of government than the resulting restored mixed and balanced
constitutional settlement of 1689.
Cato’s Republicanism
We have seen that Cato’s Letters, a central text in the republican revision’s
non-Lockean Whig canon, is deeply penetrated by Lockean ideas. This is not
to deny, however, the strong republican elements in the Letters. Whereas
Locke provided the theoretical foundation for Cato’s ideas on natural rights
and consent, Sidney’s influence came to the fore in his treatment of the struc-
ture of government and the political implications of popular sovereignty.
58 Ibid., pp. 412–13 (cf. Locke II:223, II:225).

59 Letters 80, 94, 128 (cf. Dickinson, Liberty and Property, p. 175).
60 Letter 132, p. 918.
Cato, if not an open advocate of abolishing the monarchy (a position un-

palatable to even most opposition radical Whigs), nonetheless shares strong
republican sympathies with Sidney. In his treatment of the separation of pow-
ers, Cato echoes Sidney’s argument that the popular element must anchor any
legitimate form of government. Moreover, Cato follows Sidney’s dictum that
the interests of the governors must be united to those of the governed through
several institutional devices such as regular elections, rotation of delegates,
and numerous representation meant to guarantee popular sovereignty in a
constitutional order. In fundamental respects, Cato drew more emphatically
populist implications from Lockean natural rights theory than Locke did
himself.
Cato’s reflections on constitutionalism appear at least very much as a
tribute to the Settlement of 1689, “our late happy Revolution.” Cato con-
firms his heartfelt support for the major principles of that revolution, which
centered on the ideas of mixed government and parliamentary sovereignty.
The virtue of England’s mixed government, according to Cato, is its proven
capacity to place legal restraints and checks on public power. In a moving
passage Cato states:
Power is naturally active, vigilant, and distrustful: which qualities in it push it upon
all means and expedients to fortify itself, and upon destroying all opposition. . . . It
would do what it pleases, and have no check. Now, because liberty chas-
tises and shortens power, therefore power would extinguish liberty, and conse-
quently liberty has too much cause to be exceeding jealous, and always upon her
defense.61
This natural antithesis of power and liberty ensures that any government that
can plausibly be said to protect liberty must be one in which public power is
checked and restrained by law. England’s mixed and balanced Constitution,
according to Cato, may be said to fulfill the criteria of free government be-
cause the different parts of the Constitution can legitimately check the power
of the others. Herein lies Cato’s deep concern for the corrupting effect of royal
“influence.” This element of Trenchard and Gordon’s argument against ex-
ecutive corruption is perfectly compatible with the country party ideology.
When the crown employs patronage and bribery to acquire illegal or un-
constitutional control over the members of Parliament, the monarch is thus,
in effect, subverting the mixed and limited character of the Constitution. In
Cato’s view, the dangerous consequences of official corruption should not
be underestimated. Political corruption, for Cato, is not understood in terms
of a personal failing or dismissed as a regrettable, but inevitable, demonstra-
tion of human frailty among public officials. Rather, political corruption in
England is a problem that strikes at the heart of the Constitution.
61 Letter 33, p. 239.

The major difference between free and unfree governments is, according
Cato, that in the former “there are checks and restraints appointed and ex-
pressed in the constitution itself.” In free governments, the limits on power
are established by law and institutional checks rather than the personal dis-
cretion of a ruler or ruling body. Cato’s analysis goes beyond an assessment
of the unreliability of a ruler’s good intentions, however; he argues in lan-
guage foreshadowing Madison in Federalist 51 that free peoples constitute
government and delegate power cognizant of the fact that private interests
may be turned to public good. In Letter 60 Cato claims:
The power and sovereignty of magistrates in free countries was so qualified, and so
divided into different channels, and committed to the direction of so many different
men, with different interests and views, that the majority of them could seldom
or never find their account in betraying their trust in fundamental instances. Their
emulation, envy, fear, or interest, always made them spies and checks upon one
another.62
It is this salutary and finely calibrated institutional distrust and rivalry that
Cato believes is threatened by royal “influence.” His solution to the problem
of political corruption is the typically republican remedy of strengthening the
popular element in the mixed government.
Cato sees strengthening and revivifying the Commons as the way to pre-
serve England’s constitutional balance. He expresses this goal in terms strik-
ingly similar to those of Sidney, emphasizing the need to counter political cor-
ruption by returning to the “first principles” of the “original constitution.”63
Implicit in Cato’s reasoning is the modern republican claim advanced by
Sidney and Spinoza for the naturalness of democracy. To argue that the first
principles of a mixed constitution are emphatically popular is essentially to
propose the conclusion that moderate Whigs generally sought to avoid or at
least mute, namely, that all the elements of the British Constitution, including
the hereditary Lords and the crown, derive from this popular foundation.
Cato urges for new elections ostensibly to replace the corrupt ministry in
power that officiated over the South Sea scandal. His more fundamental and
subtle intention, however, is to reveal and revitalize the popular foundations
of the British government. In his appeal to the electors of Britain, Cato calls
them, and pointedly not their representatives, “the first spring that gives
life” to the government. This is not to suggest that Cato does not believe
that the representative element in the British mixed government is the key to
liberty – he emphatically does – but rather to observe that the people under-
stood as electors are in Cato’s view “the Alpha and Omega” of any and all
legitimate government.64 The renewal of popular consent expressed through
62 Letter 60, p. 417. Cf. James Madison, Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor, 1961): #51,
p. 322.
63 Letter 69, p. 497 (cf. Sidney D 3.25.462).
64 Letter 69, pp. 499, 503.
elections in the near future would, Cato hopes, remind parliamentarians that
their positions and future security depend not on the favors of the crown or
the ministry, but on the will of the people.
Thus, from Cato’s reflections on the British Constitution, it appears that
the fundamental problem of mixed and balanced constitutionalism, the sub-
version of the power of the Commons, can be remedied by measures perfectly
in keeping with resources made available by the Constitution itself. If Cato
can persuade the crown to dissolve the existing Parliament and call for new
elections (admittedly a big if), then the electors can return delegates who
will hopefully act independently of the executive. It is important, however,
to recall that Cato quite explicitly limits much of this discussion to issues
pertinent to “free monarchical constitutions” such as the one in England.65
It is in this vein that Cato calls on England’s electors to select men with
the same interests as themselves, individuals constitutionally impervious to
bribery and patronage. In this appeal for new elections and vigilant electors,
Cato offers a means to strengthen the popular element in the Constitution in
a way consistent with the principles of the mixed and balanced constitution.
However, in the places where the Letters abstract from the particulars of
the British Constitution and focus instead on the more general philosophical
issues surrounding representation and sovereignty, Cato’s populist procliv-
ities come into visible conflict with the principles of mixed and balanced
constitutionalism. When Cato expressly limits his discussion to the English
political context, namely, mixed monarchy, his call is to strengthen and re-
new the popular element in the government. But when he abstracts from
the English situation to a more theoretical account, the tension between his
republican populism and his professed admiration for mixed constitution-
alism becomes more pronounced.66 In his general treatment on the issue of
representation, Cato’s position comes very close to Sidney’s reflection theory
of sovereignty: “The only secret . . . in forming a free government, is to make
the interests of the governors and of the governed the same, as far as human
policy can contrive. Liberty cannot be preserved any other way.”67 For Cato,
as for Sidney, the sovereign authority must reflect as directly and distinctly as
possible the interests of the people collectively. In the theoretical, as opposed
to particularly British, account, the means to achieve this goal is not, as we
would expect, the separation and balance of the institutions and powers of
government. Rather, Cato affirms: “Human wisdom has yet found out but
one certain expedient to effect this; and that is, to have the concerns of all
65 Letter 61, p. 421.

66 Here I would disagree with Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 55, 64; Burtt, Virtue Trans-
formed, p. 72; and Huyler, Locke in America, pp. 212–13. I maintain that Cato’s defense of the
British constitution is largely pragmatic, and not based on a commitment to mixed regime
theory.
67 Letter 60, p. 417.
directed by all, as far as possibly can be.”68 In this view, Britain’s mixed
government, with two important hereditary elements, would flow neither as
a direct consequence of natural rights nor as a particularly effective product
of “human wisdom.”
What, then, is Cato’s actual stance toward mixed and balanced constitu-
tionalism in general and the British system in particular? It is ambiguous.
On the one hand, at times he suggests that the Constitution needs little more
than a tune-up, a renewal of consent through elections and some new blood
in the system. On the other hand, he indicates that good government must
operate on the principle that “the concerns of all [must be] directed by all,
as far as possibly can be.” This standard suggests that the British balanced
Constitution has some way to go before it can satisfy the Catonic criteria for
good government. Indeed, for Cato, as for Sidney, the three measures nec-
essary to ensure that the government reflects the interests of the people are
regular elections, increased representation “to make the deputies so numer-
ous” that they can adequately represent the nation as a whole, and changing
the delegates “so often, that there is no sufficient time to corrupt them.”69
Cato rages against the repeal of the 1694 Triennial Act limiting Parliaments
to three-year terms and the replacement of this salutary measure by the per-
nicious Septennial Act that extended Parliament’s life to seven years. Insofar
as Britain’s mixed Constitution was unable to guarantee even so basic a prin-
ciple as regular elections, Cato suggests that there is a fundamental structural
problem in the government.
One obvious source of concern for Cato is, of course, the monarchy. Cato
shares Sidney’s modern republican distrust of executive power. He often indi-
cates that the checks and restraints on power in free government are typically
directed against the executive.70 Cato’s call for a more popularized order
amounts to a demand for legislative supremacy. When he offers an illustra-
tion of a good constitutional model based on the structural implications of
natural rights, he does not point to the British Constitution of his time, but
rather to “the constitution of our several great companies.” In these cor-
porations, Cato explains, “the general court, composed of all its members,
constitutes the legislature, and the consent of that court is the sanction of their
laws; and where the administration of their affairs is put under the conduct
of a certain number chosen by the whole.”71 Cato’s model constitution, then,
is composed of a legislature of all the society’s members (or in this instance
shareholders), which holds supreme power and an executive administra-
tion drawn from and responsible to the legislature. In addition to rejecting
the principle of executive independence, Cato relates that the companies
68 Ibid., p. 417 (emphasis mine).

69 Ibid., pp. 418, 419.
70 See, for example, Letter 59, p. 405 and Letter 60, p. 416.
71 Letter 60, p. 418.
originally incorporated a provision whereby “a third part of directors are

to go out every year,” thus establishing the principles of regular elections
and rotation. This constitutional model, Cato informs us, while clearly not
what resulted from the Glorious Revolution, was “the ancient constitution
of England.”72 Again in the spirit of Sidney, Cato establishes that the original
and true animating principle of Britain’s free government was and still is its
popular, rather than its mixed and balanced, character.
The Catonic emphasis on the popular foundations of limited government
is closely connected to his argument for the importance of virtue in a free
people. Cato’s frequent appeals to the characteristically republican princi-
ple of virtue certainly give credence to those scholars who identify Cato as
a champion of the republican idea of liberty and government. This appeal
to virtue does not, however, denote a reliance on a classical conception of
virtue and does not in any way make Cato, any more than Sidney, a di-
rect opponent of Lockean individual natural rights. As we have seen, Cato
quite unabashedly offers a thoroughly Lockean definition of liberty as the
individual’s control over his or her own actions. Moreover, Cato offers an as-
sessment of the human passions that gives pride of place to self-interest. The
classical notion of virtue as self-sacrifice is virtually nonexistent in Cato.73
Cato also, though, and despite his melancholy assessment of the primacy
of self-interest, advances a more decidedly republican notion of liberty as a
public share in government than we see in Locke. Cato, like Sidney, believes
that more populist implications flow from natural rights than did Locke,
and as such they offer different analyses of the states of character and the
institutional ethos required to preserve popular governments.
The unifying thread linking Cato’s argument for liberty and his under-
standing of virtue is his notion of the public or common good. For Cato,
the common good cannot be understood as requiring a subsuming or denial
of private interests. He claims: “The chief inducement which men have to
act for the interest of one state before another is, because they are members
of it, and that their own interest is involved in the general interest.”74 In
this view, the public interest is the accumulation of all the private interests
in society. The republican modification of Lockean individualism is seen in
Cato’s assertion that the only way to protect the private interests of all is to
give them all some meaningful share in the government. Thus, when Cato
appeals to the virtue of Britain’s electors, he is calling on them to be vigilant
72 Ibid., pp. 418–19.

73 See Letter 108 for Cato’s utter rejection of the classical ideal of virtue. For good discussions
of Cato’s very modern and very natural rights based understanding of virtue, see Burtt, Virtue
Transformed, pp. 70–1, 73–89 and Zuckert, Natural Rights, pp. 304–5. For the contrary view,
which maintains that Cato does signify a classical conception of virtue, see J. P. Diggins, The
Lost Soul of American Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1984): p. 19 and Pocock, Machiavellian
Moment, p. 471.
74 Letter 90, p. 643.
and spirited defenders of liberty against a corrupt and abusive crown and
ministry. Virtue becomes inseparable from the defense of rights, and corrup-
tion is identical to violation or nonprotection of rights. As we have seen,
one vital right Cato was convinced needed protection was private property.
Cato’s notion of virtue contains no hostility to capitalism. Given Cato’s im-
passioned defense of economic liberty, it is not surprising that he includes
with the “privileges of thinking, saying and doing what we please” the further
right “of growing as rich as we can.”75 Even the classical republican bugbear
luxury escapes Cato’s censure. He points out that luxury is as much a spur
to “invention and industry” as necessity, and may be said to have at least
as much to do with the progress of the “arts and sciences, which alone can
support multitudes of people.”76 Clearly, Cato is no threadbare republican.
Cato’s fusion of Sidney and Locke, of republican and liberal ideas, crys-
tallizes and unifies in a cohesive way the distinct notions of liberty among
the radical Whigs. Liberty, for Cato, is good and noble, both instrumental
to self-preservation and good in itself. This duality in Cato’s idea of liberty
reflects the underlying complexity of his understanding of human nature.
On the one hand, Cato offers a very melancholy view of human nature. He
opines: “It cannot but be irksome to a good natured man, to find that there
is nothing so terrible or mischievous, but human nature is capable of it.” The
root of the problem that underlies “the violent bent of human nature to evil”
and the “restless appetites of men” is self-love, or “an ill-judging fondness
for themselves.”77 Despite the negative effects of self-love, this self-regarding
passion also grounds “the first law of nature, that of self-preservation.” In
this view, liberty is instrumental: I must be free to preserve myself because
I cannot trust anyone else to put my preservation before their own. On the
other hand, Cato also maintains that the love of liberty, itself an intrinsic
human passion, is a healthy form and expression of self-love. Cato even
suggests that the love of liberty may touch a deeper chord in the human
soul than concern for self-preservation. He claims: “The love of liberty is
an appetite so strongly implanted in the nature of all living creatures, that
even the appetite of self-preservation, which is allowed to be the strongest,
seems to be contained in it.” It is this love of liberty that is the source of such
virtues as law-abidingness and the spirited defense of rights. Slavery is worse
than death for more reasons than its tendency to endanger preservation – a
position more consistent with Locke. It is repugnant to the deeper love of
liberty, which contains and in some sense animates our preservationist con-
cerns. For Cato, as for Sidney, the psychological effects of liberty, which
support such things as the progress of the arts, sciences, and commerce, are
simply good.
75 Letter 62, p. 432.

76 Letter 67, pp. 473–4.
77 Letter 31, p. 221.
How then did Cato’s argument for liberty as a public share in govern-
ment affect his attitude toward the British Constitution? For one thing, Cato
defends the settlement of 1688–9 on the basis of radical Whig principles,
which were far more revolutionary than those of the architects of the settle-
ment. The ultimate standard for judging the merits of a constitutional order
is, according to Cato, its capacity to protect natural rights: “The nature of
government does not alter the natural right of men to liberty, which in all
political societies is alike their due. But some governments provide better
than others for the security and impartial distribution of that right.”78 By
this standard, Cato concludes that Britain’s Constitution, “if duly adminis-
tered, provides excellently well for general liberty.” Thus, the British system
of government appears to be basically sound.
The deep ambiguity in Cato’s attitude to the mixed monarchy mainly
comes to light later in the crucial Letter 85. Here Cato claims to offer a
favorable comparison between Britain and the Dutch Republic. A careful
reading of Cato’s argument, however, reveals that his defense of Britain is
largely pragmatic, and his criticism of Holland is not a condemnation of re-
publicanism at all, but rather a specific criticism of the flawed federal system
in the United Provinces. In answer to the hypothetical question of whether
republicanism is superior to monarchy or vice versa, Cato finesses the issue
by cautioning that a relative “equality of estate” is necessary for a republic;
as such, “the distribution of property in England” at present makes repub-
licanism not only impractical but more or less impossible. The point Cato
makes is that the “nobility and gentry have great possessions” in England
and thus are naturally inclined to support the current system, in which they
“have great privileges and distinctions by the constitution.” The success of
Britain’s mixed monarchy relies on its capacity to link the economic interests
and social status of certain classes with considerable political privilege. Cato
claims: “these must ever be in the interest of monarchy whilst they are in
their own interest.”79 While here Cato does appear to follow Harrington’s
dictum that “power follows property,” it would be a mistake to associate
Cato too closely with Harrington.80 Cato’s realistic assessment of the British
situation does not indicate partisan support for mixed government or sug-
gest any incongruity between his Lockean understanding of property and
the political and constitutional implications of the unequal distribution of
property. The essence of Cato’s argument is that Britain’s chances of becom-
ing a successful republic at present are seriously injured because of the deep
constitutional connection between property and political power. It is this
connection that threatens the integrity and vitality of the popular element in
78 Letter 60, p. 416, and Letter 85, p. 616.

79 Letter 85, p. 614.
80 James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, J. G. A. Pocock, ed. (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992): pp. 52, 54–6.
the government, the one part of the Constitution so vital for securing liberty.
Apart from the nobility and gentry, Cato’s list of the other mainstays of the
current mixed monarchy amounts to a veritable rogues’ gallery drawn from
the pages of the Letters: the established clergy, those with interests in the
monopoly companies, place men with royal salaries, and court favorites.81
Suffice to say that these are not Cato’s kind of people.
Cato defends the British Constitution largely on pragmatic grounds. It
does a reasonably good job of securing liberty, and it is just as well, because
the obstacles impeding radical constitutional alteration are insuperable, at
least in the near term. For Cato, the limited aims, and indeed achievements, of
the Glorious Revolution testify to these practical obstacles to serious consti-
tutional reform. With respect to the hypothetical question of whether limited
monarchy or republicanism is the best form of government, Cato concedes
that it is a moot issue because, with so many powerful interests behind the
status quo, “it is impossible to contend against all these interests, and the
Crown too, which is almost a match for them all.” But Cato does not entirely
relegate the question of republicanism to the realm of intellectual margina-
lia. In his own treatment of Holland he finds a regime where the people have
the “real and natural power.” For Cato, as for Sidney, Spinoza’s Holland
is the example of modern republicanism par excellence. The Dutch Repub-
lic does, Cato admits, have serious structural problems, primarily relating
to issues of federalism, but it is important to observe that he also calls the
Dutch Republic “the most virtuous and flourishing state which ever yet ap-
peared in the world,” as well as a “state which, ever since its institution, has
been the champion of publick liberty.”82 This is higher praise than he ever
extends to the British Constitution. Cato’s qualified and pragmatic defense
of Britain’s mixed government speaks volumes when set beside his praise
of the Dutch Republic. While Cato is careful to spare the sensibilities of
his English audience, which would be shocked at the republican alternative
in their own country, he does show his republican sympathies, sympathies
probably originating in Cato’s admiration for Algernon Sidney, whom he
claims “has written better upon government than any Englishman, as well
as foreigner.”83
Cato’s Letters stand as a classic expression of radical Whig political and
constitutional thought. In the Letters we see a more fully articulated notion
of individual rights than in Sidney combined with more robust populism and
republican principles than in Locke. Trenchard and Gordon’s attempt to syn-
thesize Lockean liberal individualism and Sidneyan modern republicanism
produced a much more volatile cocktail than most moderate Whigs in Britain
could digest. Cato’s endorsement of Lockean natural rights and dissolution
81 Letter 85, pp. 615–16.

82 Ibid., pp. 617–18.
83 Letter 26, p. 188.
theory, as well as his support for seriously strengthening the popular element
in the British polity, ran counter to the way most Whigs conceived of their
Constitution. Cato’s argument did, however, take firm root in the American
colonies, where the Letters became a central part in the canon of American
Whig thought. In order to defend limited government against the apparent
and incipient abuses of the crown and the ministry, Cato reconceptualized
the foundations of the British Constitution in terms of radical Whig phi-
losophy. In the process, he exposed radical Whiggism’s uneasy relationship
with the mixed monarchy, a disquietude that would become even more vocal
throughout the course of the imperial debate between the British government
and the American colonists in the 1760s and 1770s.
11
Eighteenth-Century British Constitutionalism
The British Constitution in the middle of the eighteenth century in many

respects attained its historical prime. Looking back on two decades of po-
litical stability and economic growth under the pragmatic administration of
Walpole and his successors and the final demise of the Jacobite threat on the
heath of the windswept fields of Culloden in 1746, the subjects of the now
firmly United Kingdom understandably enjoyed a general spirit of content-
ment and self-congratulation. On the political level, the bitter partisan and
theological divisions in the nation during the reigns of William and Anne
and the early Hanoverian period were for the most part relegated to an un-
lamented past.1 On the intellectual level, the British Constitution reached its
zenith in philosophical circles with the praise of observers of such import
as David Hume, Montesquieu, and later Sir William Blackstone. The philo-
sophical framework and ideological commitments of the dominant forces
in the British political nation during the imperial crisis with America were
firmly installed, practically without domestic rival, during this period.
The conservative tendencies present in moderate Whig thought since the
Exclusion and Glorious Revolution periods solidified throughout the first
half of the century, further marginalizing radical Whig ideas and attaining
a degree of theoretical sophistication hitherto unseen. When British politi-
cal elites and the public faced the challenges of empire posed by American
resistance to parliamentary sovereignty in the 1760s and 1770s, they under-
stood the dispute over the order of the empire and the nature of the British
Constitution primarily in terms of the philosophical and constitutional prin-
ciples of moderate Whiggism that achieved ascendancy in Britain throughout
the course of the eighteenth century. In order to understand the nature of
the moderate Whig ideological hegemony in eighteenth-century Britain, it is
important to trace the pattern of British constitutional development in the
1 Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968): p. 11.
305
Hanoverian period and consider the influential observations on the Consti-

tution offered by some of the leading philosophical and legal minds of the
century.
The Moderate Whig Ascendancy in Eighteenth-Century Britain

The period from the Hanoverian accession in 1714 until the eve of the out-
break of the conflict with the American colonies in the early 1760s is often
characterized as the era of “Whig supremacy” in Britain. By this is meant
the period of political stability in which Britain was ruled by a Whig regime
brought to power by the installation of George I and then consolidated and
maintained under the leadership of Walpole and his successors. For more
than four decades, the ruling Whigs managed to drape themselves in the
mantle of the Glorious Revolution and convince the first two Georges that
all Tories were really Jacobites and could not be trusted with any share
of political power. One-party dominance was not, however, the cause but
rather the effect of deeper underlying sources of political stability in Augustan
Britain.2 The most significant feature of the ideological development in the
period was the intellectual hegemony of moderate Whig principles across
the political spectrum. Both the crypto-republicanism of the radical Whig
Cato’s Letters and Filmerian divine right were expelled from respectable po-
litical opinion in eighteenth-century Britain. The British political nation ex-
perienced a gradual process of philosophical and ideological homogeniza-
tion at the level of first political principles as the overwhelming majority of
Whigs and Tories, seventeenth-century antipodes, underwent an eighteenth-
century convergence regarding their fundamental philosophical and political
commitments.
Moderate Whig philosophy provided the dominant intellectual paradigm
through which all the politically relevant classes in Britain came to under-
stand the Constitution. This meant that there was overwhelming agreement
with the moderate Whig interpretation of the nature, if not necessarily the
actual practice, of the constitutional order produced by the Glorious Rev-
olution settlement. Britons almost universally recognized the political order
as a limited monarchy constructed on the basis of a Constitution balancing
the various classes, interests, and estates of the realm in a system of shared
legislative power including king, Lords, and Commons. This period also wit-
nessed the emergence of an as yet inchoate but identifiable public doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty as Britons of all political stripes increasingly
recognized the joint action of the constituent elements of king-in-Parliament
as the supreme legal authority in the nation. On a more theoretical level,
2 For the classic treatment of the sociopolitical forces informing the emergence of this period
of political stability, see J. H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725
(London: Macmillan, 1967).
Eighteenth-Century British Constitutionalism 307
moderate Whig philosophical principles defined the way people understood

the origin of government. Neither Filmerian divine right political theology
nor radical Whig contract theory remained credible accounts of the origins
and nature of political power. The more conservative moderate Whig idea of
compact rooted in Pufendorf’s theory of natural sociability and the multiple
layers of agreement and social context informing civil society, avoiding as it
did the radical ideas of individualism, dissolution, and the general right of
revolution as well as divine right absolutism and passive obedience, provided
a conceptual model of political first principles that was well adapted to the
British intellectual taste and temper in the years after 1714.
This is not, of course, to suggest that Britain in the first half of the eigh-
teenth century did not experience a considerable degree of partisanship.
What is significant, however, is the narrow range of philosophical ideas
underlying these partisan positions. In the years of Whig supremacy, the
nature and character of political divisions in Britain altered and reduced
dramatically from what they had been in the seventeenth century. The mod-
erate Whig convergence of political ideology produced a much less serious
division than the theologically and philosophically based divide between
Exclusion Whigs and Tories or Cavaliers and Roundheads. The Court and
Country parties that emerged in a political order characterized by funda-
mental agreement on the nature of the Constitution superimposed a new
set of issues, attitudes, and interests on the increasingly anachronistic Tory
and Whig labels inherited from the period prior to the consolidation of the
revolution settlement. Although there is some truth to the view that the
eighteenth-century parties of competing interests replaced the seventeenth-
century parties divided over principles as fundamental as divine right and
natural liberty, it is important not to exaggerate the pragmatic character of
Augustan politics or to diminish the depth of hostility possible in a partisan
divide based on interest, policy, and even petty rivalries and personal frustra-
tions.3 Even if partisans of the Court and Country operated on a common
set of received categories and fundamental assumptions about the virtues
of balanced constitutionalism and limited monarchy drawn from the well-
spring of moderate Whig thought, they disagreed bitterly about the political
mechanisms and constitutional norms required to maintain the delicate con-
stitutional balance and limits. They also battled over the virtues and vices
of the new economic order of commercial interests, public credit, and taxes
that survived the South Sea collapse and became an increasingly central
element in the British polity.4 These differences were keenly felt by large
segments of the political nation and produced enough of a partisan edge
3 See Harvey Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government: A Study of Burke and Bolingbroke
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965): esp. ch. 1, in which Mansfield lays out the
various approaches to this question.
4 Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, ch. 2.
to Augustan politics to refute any impression of political quietism in the

period.
A brief outline of the dynamic of the Court–Country division will expose
both the fundamental continuity and the inherent cleavages in the British
political system after 1714.5 To the extent that both the loosely organized
Court and Country parties expressed a fundamental commitment to the
principles of the Glorious Revolution and to the balanced Constitution, they
were philosophically in the moderate Whig camp. However, they disagreed
seriously about how best to achieve and maintain the constitutional balance
or even what was the greatest danger to this cherished balance. The Court
Party, composed almost entirely of Whigs, believed in the need to strengthen
the executive against the growing power of the commons, primarily by main-
taining the king’s prerogative in choosing ministers, ensuring a source of
public money independent of parliamentary provision, and defending the use
of royal patronage to secure parliamentary majorities. In the transformation
of the Whigs from Shaftesbury’s party of resistance to executive power in the
1680s to the governing party representing social order, royal influence, and
the national debt after 1720, the pragmatic and conservative tendencies we
have identified in moderate Whiggism from its earliest appearance became
more pronounced with the quotidian vagaries of day-to-day administration.6
With the responsibility of power, most Whigs shed the remaining traces of
their radical heritage.
The Country Party, composed mainly of Tory country squires and dis-
affected Whigs, developed as the loosely affiliated opposition to the ruling
Whigs. They believed the great danger to the constitutional balance lay in the
extension of executive power through patronage or royal “influence” and
the emerging system of cabinet government, both of which undermined the
Country ideal of the independent landed Member of Parliament. The Coun-
try position sought to preserve the independence of the commons through
measures such as Place Bills prohibiting membership in the Commons to
anyone holding an office of profit under the crown and by repeal of the
5 For more in-depth accounts of the Court–Country system there are many excellent studies,
including Reed Browning, Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1982): esp. ch. 1; Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The
Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600–1835 (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 1988): pp. 246–50; H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property (London: Weidenfeld
and Nilcolson, 1977): chs. 4, 5; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, chs. 5, 6; J. G. A.
Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): esp.
“Varieties of Whiggism” (pp. 239–53); and W. A. Speck, Stability and Strife: England 1714–1760
(London: Edward Arnold, 1977): chs. 6, 10.
6 Dickinson, Liberty and Property, p. 125. For the classic sociological study of the oligarchic
tendencies in modern political parties, see Roberto Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological
Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy, Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, trans.
(New York: Free Press, 1958).
Septennial Act, which Country spokesmen argued contributed to the in-

sulation of Parliament from public accountability.7 Moreover, they saw in
the system of national debt and commercial interests dangerous innova-
tions with serious implications for the proper relation of property and po-
litical power, innovations that undermined politically the independent gen-
try representing the Commons, transferred too much independence to the
crown and its financial supporters, and allowed the corruption of Parlia-
ment by the number of civil offices now available to the crown. With their
program of “economical” and electoral reform, the Country Party aspired
to reverse what they took to be the oligarchic trend and the demoraliz-
ing effect the Court policies and practices had on the British constitutional
order.
The causes of the Court–Country system and of the partisan divide op-
erating at a level of abstraction from first principles were twofold. First, in
one sense the Court–Country cleavage originated in the very structure of
a balanced Constitution. Some form of partisan divide, however vaguely
understood and loosely organized, is built into the logic of balanced consti-
tutionalism. The process of retrenchment of the moderate Whig ideological
commitment to the principle of constitutional balance did not preclude but
actually contributed to the Court–Country division. General agreement on
the importance of constitutional balance did not automatically resolve ques-
tions over the location and source of this balance. Which element of the
Constitution requires particular safeguards to preserve its integral position
in the larger framework, and which element is most likely to grow in strength
of its own accord in extralegal ways and threaten encroachment on the other
branches? Even if some measure of agreement can be achieved regarding a
particularly vulnerable or predatory part of the Constitution, what measures
may be needed to secure or limit these powers? The debates about the Peerage
Bill in 1719 and the various Place Bills and economical reforms were of this
nature.
Moreover, a balanced Constitution is, as Sidney and Trenchard and
Gordon suggested, always in need of adjustment to changing social, politi-
cal, and economic conditions such as those happening in Britain in the first
half of the eighteenth century. Despite serious differences of interpretation
about constitutional matters, neither wing of the Augustan era party divide
embraced the radical Whig idea of popular sovereignty. The balanced Con-
stitution they envisaged was composed of the politically relevant interests,
classes, and estates of the nation. Much like the moderate Whig defenders
of the revolution settlement in the 1690s, neither Court nor Country sup-
porters countenanced the radical principle of dissolution or believed that
7 For the long-term oligarchic effects of the Septennial Act on the electoral system, see Pocock,
Virtue, Commerce, and History, p. 239. Cf. M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation
of Powers, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998): pp. 78–9.
Parliament represented the whole “people” in a direct way.8 For example,

the Country appeals for frequent Parliaments did not include demands for
radical extension of the franchise or reflect the visceral hostility to the idea
of monarchy seen in the Whig republicanism of Sidney or Cato’s Letters.
The second major cause of the Court–Country divide had to do with the
transformation of the party ideologies inherited from the seventeenth cen-
tury. Both Whigs and Tories experienced significant changes in the Augustan
period. For the Whigs, the transformation from Shaftesbury’s party of ex-
clusion to Walpole’s party of administration involved, as we have seen, both
the marginalization of radical Whig arguments in the post-1689 years and
the gradual process of legitimization that came with the regular exercise of
power in developing institutional norms. The transformation of the Tories in
the years after 1714 was even more dramatic than that of the Whigs. Some-
where on the road from the Stuart Court to the Hanoverian Country, the
Tories transformed from the party of Filmer and divine right into the Patriot
Party of Bolingbroke and commitment to the idea of liberty and the balanced
Constitution. It was the transformation of Tory ideology in the eighteenth
century that, more than any other factor, made possible the domestication of
party division into Court and Country. A brief examination of Bolingbroke’s
political and constitutional thought should suffice to illuminate the profound
change in Toryism.
The colorful Viscount Bolingbroke was the intellectual voice of the Tory
Party throughout much of the first half of the eighteenth century. Despite
his own early flirtation with Jacobitism, this English Alcibiades did more in
his writings to express the gradual Tory acceptance of the revolution settle-
ment than probably any of his contemporaries. It is perhaps a good indica-
tion of the philosophical distance between Bolingbroke’s Tories in the 1720s
and 1730s and the Tories of the Exclusion, Glorious Revolution, and even
Sacheverell trial periods that Bolingbroke deplored the continuing, and he ar-
gued anachronistic, distinction between Whigs and Tories favoring rather the
dichotomy between a corrupt Court ministry and a virtuous Country. Under
Bolingbroke’s influence, the Tories finally rejected the Filmerian doctrine of
divine right and embraced the principles of limited monarchy and balanced
constitutionalism. Bolingbroke even identified Filmer’s patron, James I, as
the “anointed pedant” first responsible for bringing to England the “system
8 Dickinson, Liberty and Property, pp. 189–92 and Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle,
pp. 150, 171–4. However, Kramnick does, I think, go too far in characterizing Walpole’s
court Whigs as Lockeans (117–19; see also Caton, Politics of Progress, pp. 316–20) on the
basis of a few radical statements in the government press. As a matter of political and consti-
tutional philosophy, Walpole demonstrated his moderate Whig credentials in the Sacheverell
trial (see Chapter 10), and I find no suggestion that he became radicalized in the course of
his long career in power. There is perhaps a problem in identifying precipitately the nascent
bourgeois capitalist system espoused by the court with Locke’s radical Whig philosophy of
government.
of absurdity” that became divine right royalism.9 His own account of the
origin of political authority rested on the twin notions of natural sociabil-
ity and compact more akin to the conservative contractualism of Pufendorf
than the Lutheran political theology of Filmer.10 The major implication of
Bolingbroke’s reorientation of the Tories away from divine right was an ac-
ceptance, and indeed a celebration, of the constitutional settlement following
the Glorious Revolution. He praised “our present settlement” as one “built
on the foundation of liberty.” In a stunning co-opting and incorporation
of standard Whig historiography, Bolingbroke identified the genius of the
British Constitution in its traditional commitment to the ideal of constitu-
tional balance: “In a constitution like ours, the safety of the whole depends
on the balance of the parts, and the balance of the parts on their mutual
independency on one another.”11
In his bitter Country polemic against the Walpole administration,
Bolingbroke positioned the Tory opposition as the defenders of the Com-
mons against the corrupt Court practices of royal patronage and the con-
centration of parliamentary power in the ministry. What is most striking
about Bolingbroke’s Tories, given their party’s origins in Filmerian divine
right monarchy, is the expressed concern to resist the extension of executive
power. In response to the Court argument that the monarch needed the ad-
vantage of royal influence to counterbalance the strength of the Commons
and to “oil the wheels” of government by producing a proper degree of
dependence on the crown, Bolingbroke claimed:
It is [the] division of power, [the] distinct privileges attributed to the king, to the lords,
and to the commons, which constitute a limited monarchy. . . . The power which the
several parts of our government have of controlling and checking one another, may
be called a dependency on one another, [however] . . . this mutual dependency cannot
subsist without such an independency . . . that the resolutions of each part, which
direct these proceedings, be taken independantly [sic] and without any influence,
direct or indirect, on the others.12
For Bolingbroke and his Country supporters, the independence and protec-
tion of the Commons from extraparliamentary executive influence was a
9 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (Philadelphia: Carey
and Hart, 1841): Vol. II, pp. 26–7, 29–30, “Dissertation on Parties,” and pp. 372, 379,
“Patriot King.”
10 Bolingbroke, Works, Vol. II, p. 390, “Patriot King.” Cf. Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle,
p. 106 and Mansfield, Statesmanship, p. 75.
11 Bolingbroke, Works, Vol. I, pp. 335, 306, “Remarks on the History of England.” Cf.
Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, pp. 127–36, 177–81.
12 Bolingbroke, Works, Vol. I, pp. 332–3, “Remarks” and Vol. II, pp. 93–6, “Dissertation
of Parties.” Cf. Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the
American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992): pp. 434–7,
440 and Vile, Separation of Powers, pp. 80–1.
crucial ingredient for maintaining the limited monarchy. However, one mea-
sure of the ideological distance between Bolingbroke’s Country opposition
and radical Whig philosophy was his openness to the essentially monarchic
solution to the problem of constitutional dependence and corruption offered
by the “standing miracle” of a Patriot King who refused to use the preroga-
tives of his office to benefit a particular faction in Parliament.13 In the idea of
a Patriot King, we see that Bolingbroke’s primary concern was to maintain
the constitutional balance rather than the populist institutional foundation
favored by Sidney or Trenchard and Gordon.
According to Bolingbroke’s constitutional theory, the only legitimate
kinds of influence the various elements of the Constitution can have on
each other are determined by the legal forms and political structures em-
bodied in the Constitution since the very origin of the English government
in the age of Saxon liberty before the Norman Conquest and lately restored
by the revolution against King James Stuart.14 With this formulation of the
British Constitution, Bolingbroke does more than simply mobilize Whig his-
tory in the Country cause; he also signals the Tories’ new commitment to
the principle of limited monarchy. In Bolingbroke we see a particularly vivid
demonstration of the Tory transfer of allegiance from the Filmerian absolute
monarch to the eighteenth-century moderate Whig doctrine of parliamen-
tary sovereignty. With language and logic practically identical to those of
the moderate Whig patron Pufendorf, Bolingbroke described the principle
of sovereignty and limited monarchy:
The distinction should always be preserved in our notions, between two things that
we are apt to confound in speculation, as they have been confounded in practice,
legislative and monarchical power. There must an absolute, unlimited, and uncontrol-
lable power lodged somewhere in every government; but to constitute monarchy . . . it
is not necessary that this power should be lodged in the monarch alone. It is no
more necessary that he should exclusively and independently establish the rule of his
government, than it is that he should govern without any rule at all.15
Even if it would take some decades before the idea of parliamentary

sovereignty became the established orthodoxy it was as the time of the crisis
with America, it is clear that Bolingbroke offers evidence of a Tory move-
ment in that direction that parallels the first seminal arguments for legal
sovereignty in Tyrrell and the Glorious Revolution era moderate Whigs.16
13 See Bolingbroke, Works, Vol II, pp. 372–429. Cf. Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle,
pp. 163–9 and Mansfield, Statesmanship, ch. 4.
14 See Bolingbroke, Works, Vol I, pp. 317–19, 335, 363–98, 398–443, “Remarks on the History
of England.”
15 Compare Bolingbroke, Works, Vol II, p. 382, “Patriot King” (emphasis mine) and Samuel
Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934): bk. 7,
ch. 6, sec. 1, 7 (hereafter DJNG, bk., ch., and sec.). Cf. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty
of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999): p. 176.
16 As Dickinson observes (Liberty and Property, pp. 182, 187), the Country challenged Walpole’s
ministry because they saw it as a corruption of Parliament; but the Country ideal is that of
Bolingbroke, the scourge of Walpole and the Court Whigs in the partisan
battles of the 1720s and 1730s, reflects on the level of philosophical principles
about sovereignty and the Constitution the more fundamental convergence
of political ideology toward moderate Whig hegemony in eighteenth-century
Britain.
The change in British politics that occurred upon the accession of
George III in 1760 on the eve of the outbreak of the imperial crisis with
America heralded the end of the long period of Whig supremacy.17 The old
party distinctions between Whig and Tory, which had become increasingly
anachronistic since the time of Bolingbroke, were largely swept aside by a
new quasi-Patriot King who offered the levers of power in the government to
Whig and Tory alike, to a Bute, a North, a Grenville, or even a Rockingham.
The formal legitimization of the Tories by George III signaled the final con-
summation of a process of convergence of fundamental philosophical princi-
ples between the parties that had been developing in some sense since 1714.
While differences between and within the loosely identified parties persisted
well into the 1760s and 1770s over the best means to preserve the British
constitutional balance, these debates occurred within the context of a general
philosophical framework informed by the moderate Whig principles of lim-
ited monarchy, balanced constitutionalism, parliamentary sovereignty, and
the rejection of radical contract theory. By the 1760s, the Tories bore little
less relation to their divine right forbears than the Whigs did to the radical
elements in their philosophical heritage. In the spirit of Thomas Jefferson’s
First Inaugural Address delivered at the opening of a similar period of ideo-
logical consolidation in American history, the British were in a fundamental
sense all Whigs and all Tories now.
Reflections on British Constitutionalism: Hume, Montesquieu,

and Blackstone
When David Hume published his essays on political and moral issues in the
early 1740s, he offered them not as a partisan of the Whigs or the Tories but
as an unabashed “friend to moderation.”18 While he certainly challenged
a reformed Parliament, not popular sovereignty. See also Colin Bonwick for the distinction
between parliamentary and popular sovereignty (“The United States Constitution and Its
Roots in British Political Thought and Tradition,” in Foundations of Democracy in the Eu-
ropean Union: From the Genesis of Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament, John
Pinder, ed. [New York: St. Martin’s, 1999]: pp. 43–4).
17 For two classic studies of the state of British politics at the beginning of George III’s reign,
see Lewis Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1930),
and Richard Pares, King George III and the Politicians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953). For a
good discussion of how the breakdown of the period of Whig supremacy affected the various
elements of the old Whig governing party, see John Brewer, “Rockingham, Burke, and Whig
Political Argument,” The Historical Journal, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 1975): pp. 188–201.
18 David Hume, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science,” in Essays Moral, Political and
Literary, Eugene Miller, ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985): p. 15.
the orthodox Whig interpretation of the British Constitution and of English

history in a number of important respects, Hume’s reputation as a Tory is un-
justified. Certainly Hume’s History of England, denying as it did some of the
central Whig arguments for the ancient constitution, for example identifying
the Norman Conquest as a conquest, was castigated by many Whigs as a
Tory or even Jacobite revisionist history. Moreover, his scathing criticism of
the writings of radical Whig luminaries including Locke, Sidney, and Hoadly
as “the most despicable, both for style and matter,” did not endear him to
even the more moderate Whig establishment.19 However, the central ideas
in Hume’s treatment of the British Constitution were many of the essen-
tial tenets of moderate Whiggism. For example, he lauded the genius of the
constitutional system of “checks and controls” in Britain that made it “the
interest even of bad men to act for the public good.”20 Hume’s pessimism
regarding human nature demonstrates the emphatically modern as opposed
to classical basis of his thought, and it was this same political realism that
located him in the moderate Whig camp.21 Given his skepticism about the
political reliability of moral virtue, Hume followed the moderate Whig path
rejecting both absolute monarchy and popular government. Neither the peo-
ple as a collectivity nor a single ruler could be expected to govern wisely, but
a system including the firmly planted interests of king, Lords, and Commons
could provide the basis for an arrangement of mutual checks and limits.
He praised the British Constitution as a complex, compound instrument of
government delicately balanced between the two objectionable poles of ab-
solute monarchy and democracy. Moreover, he steadfastly maintained the
importance of the independent executive and a body of hereditary Lords to
counteract the growing strength of the commercial classes in the Commons,
even advocating a salutary measure of royal corruption or “influence” and
defending cabinet government as a way to ensure a “proper degree of depen-
dence” of the Commons on the crown and ministry.22 Hume, then, was less
an adherent of the Tory tradition of Bolingbroke and Harley, and even less
a disciple of Filmer, than a Court Whig with Country sympathies on some
issues, such as the national debt and the question of a standing army.
19 For a good account of Hume’s philosophical history, see Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975): pp. 233–323 and David Miller,
Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981): pp. 167–
72.
20 Hume, Essays, “Politics Reduced to a Science,” pp. 15–16 and “Of the Independency of
Parliament,” p. 42.
21 Rahe, Republics, pp. 439–40.
22 Hume, Essays, “Independency of Parliament,” pp. 44–6 (cf. “Of the First Principles of Gov-
ernment,” pp. 35–6). Notice also Hume’s praise for the ameliorating effects of representa-
tion on the populist tendencies of the Commons in terms reminiscent of Tyrrell, Burnet, and
Atwood fifty years earlier (“Politics Reduced to a Science,” p. 16 and “Whether the British
Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy or to a Republic,” pp. 52–3). For Hume’s
court Whig credentials, see Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, pp. 173, 178–9.
The philosophical kinship between Hume and the moderate Whig tradi-
tion is seen most clearly in his criticism of the potent mixture of speculative
principles and partisan politics. Hume’s rejection of both the theology of
divine right monarchy and the speculative philosophy animating the doc-
trine of popular sovereignty reflected an important Pufendorfian dimension
of moderate Whig thought that elevated the moral claims of practical utility
above abstract theoretical standards of legitimacy and supplied a compelling
normative status for established governments.23 Even Hume’s scathing at-
tack on the Whig idea of original contract did not cast him outside the orbit
of moderate Whiggism, because as we have seen, most Whigs since the time
of the revolution were quite prepared to jettison radical contract theory for
fear of its populist implications. In most respects, Hume, like the moderate
Whigs of two generations earlier, sought to defend the balanced Constitu-
tion of king, Lords, and Commons.24 Hume’s argument against the direct
political relevance of state of nature theory and popular consent, and his em-
phasis instead on the “effect of established governments” and the authority
of custom and opinion, had deep philosophical roots in the pragmatic natural
jurisprudence of Pufendorf and his English followers.25 Pufendorf’s idea of
compact, stressing the importance of social context and natural sociability,
was much more in line with Hume’s thinking than the radical individualism
expounded by Locke. However, the constitutional thrust of Hume’s criticism
of Locke as a philosopher “who embraced a party” is that the Lockean po-
litical principles championed by radical Whigs were inimical to the delicate
balance between liberty and authority achieved in Britain since the revolu-
tion. Here again Hume is no proponent of Filmerian Toryism. Hume had
absorbed far too much of Locke’s theological skepticism to ever countenance
old school divine right. He balanced his rejection of the radical doctrine of
resistance with an equally emphatic denunciation of the divine right idea of
23 For Hume’s critique of Locke’s philosophical partisanship, see Dickinson, Liberty and Prop-
erty, p. 137 and Rahe, Republics, pp. 537–40.
24 We should note that in the “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” Hume proposed a model
constitution that preserved the “opposition of interests” that was “the chief support of the
British government,” but did so on the basis of a pyramid-shaped federal scheme built on
elected local institutions rather than a hereditary nobility and monarchy. Yet as a matter
of practical reform in Britain, Hume suggested strengthening the Lords by increasing the
number of life peers as a check to the crown and Commons (Hume, Essays, pp. 525, 527). This
measure, Hume argued, would maintain the system of checks and balances while reducing
the problem of faction.
25 Hume, Essays, “Original Contract,” pp. 456–66, 468–9. See also the Treatise, in which he
calls the state of nature “a mere philosophical fiction” and an “imaginary state” (David
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967]:
bk 3, sec. 2, pp. 493–4, 501). For Hume’s rejection of radical contract theory, see Forbes,
Philosophical Politics, pp. 91–101 (and 27–31 and 72 for Hume’s agreement with Pufendorf’s
social context based understanding of property and the origin of society) and Miller, Philos-
ophy and Ideology, ch. 4.
passive obedience, favoring instead the narrowly construed resistance right

based on extreme necessity that had been a feature of moderate Whig thought
since the time of Walpole at the Sacheverell trial and the defenses of the rev-
olution in the 1690s.26 Likewise, Hume’s rejection of the Lockean argument
for dissolution rested on the Pufendorfian grounds of its incompatibility with
the requirements of social life rather than a refutation of the idea of natural
liberty.
Hume celebrated the Glorious Revolution and the Protestant Succession,
which together he identified as the “firmest foundation for British liberty,” in
terms practically indistinguishable from those of the moderate Whig archi-
tects of the revolution settlement. While rejecting the radical interpretation
of the events in 1688–9, Hume eulogized the “happy effects” of the now
firmly established constitutional order such as the commercial prosperity,
political stability, public liberty, and flourishing of the arts and sciences en-
joyed in mid-century Britain. For Hume, the partisan of moderation, the
greatest tribute to the genius of the British Constitution, and implicitly to
the moderate Whigs who fashioned it, was the gradual dilution of the fierce
partisan and theological controversies that had plagued the kingdom for
decades, and now were replaced by widespread agreement on the nature, if
not the practical operation, of the Constitution.27 Even if some potentially
fruitful tension over the operation of the government and its policies contin-
ued to be manifest in the Court–Country partisan divide, Hume acknowl-
edged the demonstrable fact that the balanced and complex Constitution
was reasonably secure against the zealots of both divine right monarchy and
radical popular sovereignty.
Perhaps the most dramatic celebration of the British Constitution by any
major thinker at mid-century was Montesquieu’s reflections in the Spirit of the
Laws, published in 1748. England stood as the centerpiece of Montesquieu’s
teaching on moderate constitutionalism. In Walpolean Britain, Montesquieu
found “a nation where the republic hides under the form of a monarchy.”28 It
26 Hume, Essays, “Original Contract,” p. 480 and “Passive Obedience,” pp. 489–92. Cf. “Orig-
inal Contract,” pp. 472–3, for Hume’s rejection of the principle of dissolution. For a good
discussion of the moderate philosophy informing Hume’s theory of limited resistance, see
Nicholas Phillipson, “Propriety, Property, and Prudence: David Hume and the Defence of the
Revolution,” in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin
Skinner, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): pp. 311–16. For Hume’s fun-
damental agreement with Locke’s secularizing project, see Rahe, Republics, pp. 537–40.
27 Hume, Essays, “Coalition of Parties,” pp. 500–1 and “Protestant Succession,” p. 508. Cf.
Dickinson, Liberty and Property, pp. 124–5.
28 Charles Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Anne Cohler, Basia Carolyn
Miller, and Harold Summel, trans. and eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989;
hereafter Spirit): bk. 5, ch. 19, p. 70. For good general treatments of Montesquieu’s ac-
count of the British Constitution, see Ann Cohler, Montesquieu’s Comparative Politics and the
Spirit of American Constitutionalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988): esp. ch. 5;
Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Rebecca Balinski, trans. (Princeton:
was a free government to the extent that the British Constitution had “politi-
cal liberty for its direct purpose,” but this purpose was sufficiently channeled
or “hidden” through a series of institutional devices that protected the in-
dividual from arbitrary government, whether monarchical or democratic.29
Montesquieu shared Hume’s distrust of emphasizing the contractual origins
of government and his criticism of the twin evils of unrestrained democracy
and absolute monarchy. Montesquieu saw in the eighteenth-century British
Constitution a concrete manifestation of the sort of enlightened practical
wisdom that evaded what he took to be the logical fallacy of radical re-
publicanism, in which “the power of the people has been confused with
the liberty of the people.”30 For Montesquieu, the moderate government in
Britain contrasted favorably with the public-spirited and warlike democra-
cies of classical antiquity, as well as with the system of centralized autocracy
he identified with the Ottoman East but perceived to be spreading into the
postfeudal monarchies of continental Europe, including France.31 In both
the austere virtues of the classical republics and the routinized terror of
oriental despotism, Montesquieu recognized ruling principles that did vio-
lence to the human material composing government and society. In contrast,
for Montesquieu, Britain’s balanced Constitution, with its internal dynamic
resisting the concentration of power, conformed admirably to the natural
human desire for the comfortable and benign hedonism denied to the classi-
cal demos and the sense of physical security impossible to achieve in despotic
regimes.
The core of Montesquieu’s account of the British Constitution was his
admiration for its system of checks and balances, especially the division of
power between the independent hereditary executive and the bicameral leg-
islature composed of Lords and Commons. Through its separation of the
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, Montesquieu claimed, the British
government could reliably avoid the arbitrary power of royal or democratic
absolutism: “The form of these three powers should be rest or inaction, but
Princeton University Press, 1994): ch. 5; Thomas Pangle, Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liber-
alism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973): ch. 5; Rahe, Republics, pp. 293–7, 440–4
and “Forms of Government: Structure, Principle, Object and Aim,” in Montesquieu’s Science
of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of the Laws, David W. Carrithers, Michael A. Mosher, and Paul
A. Rahe, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001): pp. 71–2, 80–90, 94–7; and
James Stoner, Common Law and Liberal Theory: Coke, Hobbes, and the Origin of American
Constitutionalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992): ch. 9.
29 Montesquieu, Spirit, 11.5.156.
30 Ibid., 11.2.155.
31 For Montesquieu’s treatment of despotism, see Spirit, 2.5, 3.8–10, 4.3, and 5.13–15; for
the classical republic, see 2.2, 3.3, 4.4–8, and 5.2–7. For Montesquieu’s complex mixture
of genuine admiration and profound revulsion at the severity of the classical republic, see
Rahe, “Forms of Government,” p. 75 and Schaub’s excellent discussion (Diana Schaub, Erotic
Liberalism: Women and Revolution in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters [Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield], 1995: pp. 19, 37, 137–42).
as they are constrained to move by the necessary motion of things, they

will be forced to move in concert.”32 It is important to recognize that in his
account of the British balanced Constitution, Montesquieu did not identify
Britain as a mixed regime. The British separation of powers system was,
according to Montesquieu, grafted onto historical institutions such as the
hereditary Lords and monarchy, but it was in the decisive sense a product
of political prudence embodied in the compendium of legislation including
the Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Act of Settlement of 1701 that formed
the revolution settlement. Montesquieu was as concerned to disavow the
legacy of constitutional irregularity and instability of English civil war era
mixed regime theory as were the moderate Whig architects of the revolu-
tion settlement.33 The point of Montesquieu’s admittedly idealized, and in
some respects more prescriptive than descriptive, account of the British Con-
stitution was to expose the theoretical foundations of the British system of
legal sovereignty that emerged from the revolution of 1688–9. Montesquieu
demonstrates that postrevolution Britain at the very least suggested the pos-
sibility of creating, through legislation and policy, the matrix of institutional
power relations necessary to provide constitutional balance without the ben-
efit of the intermediary feudal institutions he claims helped moderate other
European monarchies such as France. The distribution of powers embedded
in the moderate Whig idea of legal sovereignty had successfully, according
to Montesquieu, shifted the emphasis in thinking about constitutional mod-
eration away from the claims of societal representativeness by the various
composite elements of the older idea of mixed regime toward the more sound
principle of relying on the inevitable relations of legally interconnected and
interdependent structures and institutions.34 It was by virtue of the neces-
sary interaction of the institutional elements of the British sovereign that the
British Constitution was, in Montesquieu’s assessment, the closest thing to
a government truly of laws that had yet appeared in human history.
It was in light of the profoundly legalistic character of British consti-
tutionalism that Montesquieu offered his most original and perhaps most
significant contribution to the study of the British Constitution: his analysis
of the judicial power. For Montesquieu, Britain’s treatment of the judicial
power, a power “so terrible among men,” whereby the entire power of the
state comes crashing down on the individual, pointed to an essential feature
of moderate government. Montesquieu recognized in the British jury system,
in which the power of judging is “exercised by persons drawn from the body
32 Montesquieu, Spirit, 11.6.157–9, 11.6.164.

33 See Spirit, 3.1.22, for Montesquieu’s disparaging assessment of the results of the English civil
war. Cf. Rahe, “Forms of Government,” p. 103, n. 41.
34 Perhaps this is one reason why, in contrast to his procedure in his regime analysis in Books
III–VIII, Montesquieu does not offer a single “principle” animating the English regime. By
virtue of the structural design of the Constitution, a multiplicity of passions necessarily
acquire political saliency in Britain. Cf. Rahe, “Forms of Government,” pp. 71–2.
of the people,” an awareness of the important psychological dimension in

the experience of political liberty. Montesquieu argued that the many legal
and institutional supports for civil liberties in Britain encouraged in the in-
dividual “that tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one
has of his security.”35
While his praise for the system of checks and balances presented a de-
cidedly moderate Whig view of the balanced Constitution, Montesquieu’s
celebration of British civil liberties signified an element of Whig thought em-
bodied in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the Toleration Act of 1689, and
the establishment of an independent judiciary in the Act of Settlement of
1701 that generally transcended the moderate–radical cleavage in the Whig
ranks.36 In Humean terms, Montesquieu positively evaluated the diluted par-
tisanship in Britain, where he saw loose and ephemeral coalitions of interests
colliding as Court and Country, rather than theological and fiercely ideolog-
ical parties battling to the death over the fundamentals of government. In
the partisan struggles characterizing midcentury Britain, Montesquieu saw
real “hatred” that would endure precisely “because it would always be pow-
erless” to alter the Constitution significantly in a monarchical or democratic
direction.37 In the established tradition of moderate Whiggism, Montesquieu
emphasized the direct political relevance of considerations of utility: Does
this system of government effectively protect individuals from each other
and from the awesome power of the state? Of Britain in the eighteenth cen-
tury, Montesqieu said, mais oui! In many respects, Montesquieu’s high praise
for the British commercial society established after the Glorious Revolution,
with its enlightened system of criminal justice and its balanced Constitution,
could only reinforce moderate Whig triumphalism at midcentury.
The last of the troika of important intellectual voices that did so much
to articulate and define the way the British political nation understood itself
and its system of government in the years leading up to and during the
imperial crisis with America was the legendary jurist Sir William Blackstone.
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, published between 1765
35 Montesquieu, Spirit, 11.6. 157–8. Cf. Rahe’s discussion in Republics, pp. 441–3. Rahe makes
the interesting claim that insofar as individuals detached from their feudal institutional moor-
ings experience, in Montesquieu’s view, great uneasiness (inquietude) in their relations with
others, the government of England “has an undeniable kinship with despotism” (“Forms of
Government,” pp. 83–4; cf. C. P. Courtney, “Montesquieu and English Liberty,” in Mon-
tesquieu’s Science of Politics, p. 284 for the contrary view). The qualitative difference, then, be-
tween English uneasiness and despotic terrorism would rest not only in the softening of mores
produced by commerce in England but also, somewhat paradoxically, by the heightened
vigilance the individual feels about ensuring the institutional and legal safeguards against
government oppression (cf. Rahe, “Forms of Government,” 94–6).
36 Rahe, Republics, p. 211. Cf. Montesquieu, Spirit, 6.17.92 for Montesquieu’s praise for
Britain’s prohibition on torture.
37 Montesqieu, Spirit, 19.27.325. Compare Courtney, “English Liberty,” p. 283 and Rahe,
“Forms of Government,” p. 88.
and 1769, were in many respects an echo of the ideological self-confidence

of moderate Whig hegemony at midcentury. Blackstone’s reputation as a
Tory is perhaps even less justified than that of Hume. Even at the height
of the imperial crisis, Americans referred to Blackstone as a champion of
individual property rights against the abuse of legislative power.38 Moreover,
Blackstone never supported the unrestrained exercise of monarchal power.
In a manner almost identical to that of Hume and Montesquieu, Blackstone
celebrated the system of checks and balances characterizing Britain’s complex
and compound Constitution:
Herein indeed consists the true excellence of the English government, that all the
parts of it form a mutual check upon each other. In the legislature, the people are a
check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people, . . . while the king
is a check upon both, which preserves the executive power from encroachments. And
this very executive power is again checked and kept within due bonds by the two
houses. . . . Thus every branch of our polity supports and is supported, regulates and
is regulated, by the rest.39
Blackstone emphasizes the importance of an independent hereditary exec-

utive proven by the legislative tyranny of the 1640s that “overturned both
church and state,” even as he advocates “more complete representation of
the people” in the Commons. In classic moderate Whig fashion, Blackstone
locates the genius of the British Constitution in its capacity to achieve a
harmonious equipoise between absolute monarchy and democracy by bal-
ancing the great sociopolitical estates of the nation in the legal sovereignty
of king-in-Parliament.40
While never explicitly rejecting the idea of the ancient constitution,
Blackstone did reject the central tenets of radical contract theory. For ex-
ample, he referred to the authority of Pufendorf to demonstrate that the
Lockean state of nature in which individuals are “unconnected with other
individuals” was a historical and logical nullity given natural human socia-
bility. Much like the Whig managers at the Sacheverell trial, he understood
the right of resistance in terms of extreme necessity rather than popular
sovereignty, and he viewed the Glorious Revolution as an event occasioned
38 H. T. Dickinson, “The Eighteenth Century Debate on the Sovereignty of Parliament,” Trans-

actions of the Royal Historical Society, fifth ser., vol. 26 (1976): p. 206 and Rahe, Republics,
pp. 530–3. For a good treatment of the Americans’ use of Blackstone as a champion of
property rights, see Gerald Stourz, “William Blackstone: Teacher of Revolution,” Jährbuch
für Amerikastudien, vol. 15 (1970): pp. 184–200 and Glendon’s argument for Blackstone’s
formative role in the development of the American understanding of property rights (Mary
Ann Glendon, Rights Talk [New York: Free Press, 1991]: pp. 22–4). For a dissenting view that
asserts the essential irrelevance of Blackstone in America, see David Mayer, “The English
Radical Whig Origins of American Constitutionalism,” Washington University Law Quarterly,
vol. 70 (1992): esp. pp. 196–204.
39 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London, 1791): Vol. 1, pp. 154–5.
40 Ibid., pp. 154, 171–2. Cf. Rahe, Republics, p. 439.
by “a palpable vacancy of a throne” in which, echoing Tyrrell, Burnet, and

Atwood, he claimed that “the body of the nation, consisting of lords and
commons, would have a right to meet and settle the government.” Blackstone
also shared Hume’s deep distrust of the highly speculative theory of the dis-
solution of government advanced by “Mr. Locke and other theoretical writ-
ers.” Blackstone concluded that “however just this conclusion is in theory,
we cannot practically adopt it.”41 By this he did not mean that dissolution
theory, while logically sound, did not apply to the conditions of 1688–9.
Rather, Blackstone, following Atwood, adopted the identifiably Pufendorfian
dictum that the principle of dissolution is antithetical to the very nature of
organized social life: “No human laws will therefore suppose a case, which
at once must destroy all law, and compel men to build afresh upon a new
foundation; nor will they make provision for so desperate an event, as must
render all legal provisions ineffectual.”42 Blackstone’s opposition to radical
dissolution theory, and its essential corollary, popular sovereignty, was then
based on principle, not simply pragmatism, although the principle at issue
was itself profoundly pragmatic.
However, Blackstone’s most momentous contribution to British consti-
tutional theory in the eighteenth century was his argument for parliamen-
tary sovereignty. It was on the matter of parliamentary sovereignty that
Blackstone’s argument ran directly contrary to American colonial aspirations
and interpretations of the imperial order and the meaning of British liberty.
On the issue of sovereignty, Blackstone collected, formalized and solidified
theoretical premises implicit in Hume, Montesquieu, and moderate Whig
thinkers tracing back through Tyrrell to Pufendorf.43 The structural limits
on the British government supplied by internal checks and balances meant
that Parliament could combine a claim of absolute legal sovereignty with
a relative assurance against arbitrary power. While Blackstone agreed with
41 Blackstone, Commentaries, pp. 43–8, 152, 161–2.

42 Ibid., p. 162; see also p. 213 (cf. Pufendorf, DJNG 7.8.9; 7.7.9). Stoner (Common Law,
ch. 10) and Storing argue that Blackstone fundamentally agrees with Lockean premises but
offers a constitutionalist formula for Lockean natural rights (Herbert Storing, “William
Blackstone,” History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds.
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987]: pp. 622–33). While there is much in these
interpretations with which I agree, I believe Blackstone’s rejection of the individualist and
radical implications of Locke’s dissolution theory reflects a fundamental disagreement with
Locke over the natural constituent power of the people to form new societies that is so central
to radical Whig ideology and thus seriously qualifies Blackstone’s prudential Lockeanism.
43 Stoner identifies Blackstone as a Hobbesian on the issue of sovereignty, whereas Vile argues
that he is by and large a replica of Montesquieu (Stoner, Common Law, pp. 166–75 and
Vile, Separation of Powers, pp. 111–12). While Goldsworthy (Sovereignty of Parliament, pp. 7,
188) is correct to dissociate Blackstone from the legal positivism of Hobbes, it is mistaken
to derive his argument from the parliamentary theories of the civil war era, which had failed
signally to achieve constitutional balance. In contrast, I contend that Blackstone’s absolutism
has a Pufendorfian root in the moderate Whig tradition.
Locke about the natural law limits placed on the legislature’s interference
with property rights, he seriously diverged from the radicals in his argument
for parliamentary sovereignty against the claims of popular sovereignty. His
argument for parliamentary sovereignty reflects the two central Pufendorfian
ideas at the foundation of the moderate Whig constitutional theory. The first
is Blackstone’s reliance on the Pufendorfian principle that the essence of law
is to be a command of a superior directed to an inferior: “Unless some su-
perior be constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members [of
society] are bound to obey, they would still remain in a state of nature, with-
out any judge on earth to define their several rights, and redress their several
wrongs.”44 Thus, in Blackstone’s view, the voluntaristic basis of law makes
the mutual coherence of a sovereign government and a sovereign people a
logical and moral impossibility.
The second major element of Blackstone’s argument for parliamen-
tary sovereignty drew from Pufendorf’s notion of the inescapable need
for one legally constituted sovereign authority in any constitutional order.
Blackstone claims that in any form of government “there is and must be . . . a
supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority in which . . . the rights
of sovereignty reside.”45 In Britain this sovereign authority, he continues,
rests in Parliament, which has authority “in the making, confirming, enlarg-
ing, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws”
and can “change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom
and of parliaments themselves.”46 With Blackstone we see the hardening
of the orthodoxy of parliamentary sovereignty identifiable as far back as
the Convention debates and the Septennial Act, and even further back to
44 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 48. Cf. Pufendorf, DJNG 1.6.1–4; 8.1.1. See also John V.
Jezierski, “Parliament or People: James Wilson and William Blackstone on the Nature
and Location of Sovereignty,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 32, issue 1 (January–
March, 1971): p. 100 and James Wilson, “Of Municipal Law,” American Political Writing
during the Founding Era, 1760–1805, Vol. II, Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds.
(Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983): pp. 1266–7, 1278, 1287, 1289 for Pufendorf’s influ-
ence on Blackstone.
45 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 49. Cf. Pufendorf, DJNG 7.6.1,7; 4.7.9–13.
46 Blackstone, Commentaries, pp. 160–1. Reid and Dickinson make the correct observation
that in Blackstone’s ideas of the 1760s we see “a new constitution of arbitrary parliamen-
tary sovereignty” emerging in Britain (see Dickinson, “The Eighteenth Century Debate Over
Parliamentary Sovereignty,” pp. 190, 194–6 and John Philip Reid, Constitutional History of
the American Revolution: The Authority to Legislate, [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1991]: 4; cf. Jezierski, “Parliament or People,” p. 96). I would only add with Goldswor-
thy (Sovereignty of Parliament, p. 7) the important caveat that the idea of parliamentary
sovereignty had deep roots at the very origin of moderate Whiggism in the Exclusion era
and the Glorious Revolution, even if the idea did not achieve general acceptance or mature
articulation until a good deal later. However, in contrast to Goldsworthy, I would not trace
this idea as far back as medieval theorists such as Dante, Marsilius, and Ockham who oper-
ated in a very different theologically charged period (Goldsworthy, Sovereignty of Parliament,
pp. 18–19).
Tyrrell and the moderate Whigs in the Exclusion period. This was a process
of ideological solidification that saw even the Tories transfer allegiance from
absolute monarch to absolute king-in-Parliament.
What were the implications of Blackstone’s argument regarding parlia-
mentary sovereignty for the coming dispute with American Whigs in the
years leading up to the revolution in the colonies? Blackstone explicitly ex-
tended the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to America, arguing that
American colonists enjoyed a limited right of self-government but were “also
liable to . . . the general superintending power of the legislature in the mother
country.”47 Blackstone, then, not only advanced parliamentary sovereignty
as the governing principle of the British Constitution, he also confirmed it
as the principle by which Britain ruled the empire. In so doing, Blackstone
crystallized ideas with deep roots in moderate Whig philosophy, conservative
ideas about sovereignty and rights that had, if anything, only strengthened
their hold on the British Whig imagination in the little less than a century
since the Glorious Revolution. These ideas would play a major role in guid-
ing British policy and informing British political ideology throughout the
imperial crisis with America.
47 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 108. Blackstone voted against the repeal of the Stamp Act as a
member of Parliament in 1766. Despite this opposition to the colonial position, Samuelson
shows that Blackstone’s authority as an expert in the common law gave him great influence
among lawyers in the colonies (see Richard Samuelson, “The Constitutional Sanity of James
Otis: Resistance Leader and Loyal Subject,” Review of Politics, vol. 61, no. 3 [Summer 1999]:
pp. 503–4, 510). For Blackstone’s legacy as the authority in America on the common law,
see Bonwick, “United States Constitution,” pp. 52–3 and Stoner, Common Law, chs. 12
and 13.
part three
THE WHIG LEGACY IN AMERICA
As we have seen, the common front against divine right absolutism that
united the various strands of English Whig thought in the Exclusion era
soon splintered when the Stuart line, or at least from the Whig perspective
the most unsavory (i.e., Catholic) elements of it, were packed off to forced ex-
ile and eventual oblivion. The very term “Whig” came to represent differing,
often conflicting, and eventually quite separate ideas of liberty and govern-
ment. Our analysis of the distinct strands of Whiggism present at the origin
of this diverse body of thought provides a conceptual framework by which
we can trace the development of the modern politics of liberty in eighteenth-
century England and America. I have argued that the diversity within the
Whig school reflects the enormous impact of modern natural jurisprudence
on English constitutional and political thought. Such thinkers as Pufendorf
and Spinoza made their impact on Anglo-American thought largely indi-
rectly through the medium of the Whigs. Imagine the foundational works
of Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke to be intellectual and philosophical genetic
markers placed in the bloodstream of the tradition. In the following discus-
sion, we will identify and analyze the full panoply of Anglo-American Whig
thought including moderate, liberal, and republican strains of Whiggism as
they emerged, intersected, and even quarreled in the twelve-year period span-
ning the beginning of the Anglo-American imperial dispute in 1764 and the
American Declaration of Independence in 1776.
Whigs came in a variety of flavors, and the various strains of Whiggism
made their presence felt in different times and among different groups. Iron-
ically, the moderate Whiggism of James Tyrrell, by far the least celebrated
of the major Exclusion Whigs today, reflected the conception of rights and
sovereignty that governed England politically and philosophically through-
out the eighteenth century. The Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, or at least
the official Whig version of events, heralded the eventual triumph of moder-
ate Whiggism in England. In the century that followed the Glorious Revo-
lution, most Englishmen would understand and defend their constitutional
325
326 The Whig Legacy in America
monarchy in terms first articulated by Tyrrell. Through the medium of mod-

erate Whigs like Tyrrell, Gilbert Burnet, and William Atwood, and later a
modified version of moderate Whiggism through David Hume and William
Blackstone, Britons imbibed Pufendorfian principles of sovereignty and law.
These principles, once duly modified for the British political and constitu-
tional context, provided Britain’s ruling Whigs with the theoretical resources
to resist the historical claims and philosophical pretensions of both royal ab-
solutism and radical popular sovereignty. For its part, the radical Whig legacy
of liberal individualism and populist republicanism survived on the margins
of British political thought but took root in the rich soil of America, and
came to revolutionary fruition in the imperial dispute of the decade or so
prior to American independence.
It is perhaps an irony that the Anglo–American dispute preceding in-
dependence amounted to ideological internecine warfare among the Whig
descendants of the Exclusion era heroes. British and American Whigs quar-
reled over fundamental questions of sovereignty, the character of rights, the
importance of representation, and the best form of government. They did so,
moreover, within the broad but identifiable framework of Whig philosophy
established many decades earlier. All Whigs, moderate and radical, agreed on
the principle of natural liberty and the contractual origins of government in
consent. However, they differed over the constitutional, political, and moral
implications flowing from these basic premises. The radical Whig philosophy
of liberal individualism and populist republicanism, though marginalized in
the official Whig ideology in Britain, became the fundamental political creed
in the colonies. The American spokesmen drew on the theoretical resources
and guiding principles of radical Whiggism identified with Locke, Sidney,
and the opposition Whigs Trenchard and Gordon to justify their claims for
colonial self-government. The British government countered with charac-
teristically moderate Whig arguments drawn from the pages of Pufendorf,
Tyrrell, and the architects of the settlement of 1689. In the colonial camp,
American Whigs like James Otis, John Dickinson, Thomas Jefferson, and
Tom Paine drew freely from both the liberal and republican strains of rad-
ical Whiggism, creating the complex, philosophically pluralistic, and intel-
lectually heterogeneous whole that was to typify the early republic. In what
follows, we shall see that the Whig legacy in America was a song of liberty
with many parts and several distinct voices.
12
British Constitutionalism and the Challenge of Empire
The glorification of the British Constitution during the middle of the eigh-
teenth century seen in Hume, Montesquieu, and Blackstone was not ex-
clusively a British or even a European phenomenon. Deep admiration for
the constitutional order produced by the Glorious Revolution was manifest
in clear evidence on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans typically cele-
brated what they took to be the great virtues of British constitutionalism,
such as the separation of powers, representative government, and the de-
fense of civil liberties or “rights of Englishmen” with as much enthusiasm
as their British brethren in the “transatlantic community” formed by the
bonds of common sentiments, regular commercial contact, and, perhaps
most importantly, a shared intellectual and political tradition.1 From Hume,
Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the host of Whig writers including Trenchard
and Gordon, Locke, and Sidney, Americans took enormous pride in what
they perceived to be their constitutional heritage. The success of the revolu-
tion settlement touched the colonies in a particularly palpable way when the
British government, primarily under Pitt’s energetic leadership, fought and
won a global war with its old foe, France, from 1756 to 1763 that ensured
British supremacy over most of North America. With the defeat of Bourbon
France in the New World and the colonies thriving with their own experi-
ence of self-government, political stability, and commercial prosperity under
the benign neglect of the mother country, Americans in the middle of the
eighteenth century by and large enjoyed as much contentment and political
self-assurance as their complacent Whig brethren in the Old World.
1 For good discussions of the “transatlantic community” between Britain and its American
colonies at midcentury, see Colin Bonwick, English Radicals and the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977): ch. 2 and “The United States Consti-
tution and Its Roots in British Political Thought and Practice,” Foundations of Democracy in
the European Union: From the Genesis of Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament,
John Pinder, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999): pp. 42–3.
327
The Challenge of Empire

With the last shot in the Seven Years War, the global power struggle between
Britain and France, barely spent, a new constitutional and philosophical
dispute simmered to the surface in the Anglo-American world over British
and colonial interpretations of the empire. While both British and American
Whigs lauded the virtues of British constitutionalism, it became increasingly
apparent throughout the course of the crisis that they understood the mean-
ing of the Glorious Revolution, the idea of sovereignty, and the character
of rights very differently. Radical and moderate Whig ideas came in con-
tact, and indeed conflict, in the imperial dispute in a direct and visceral way
that had not occurred in Britain since the early Hanoverian period. The
same radical ideas and principles that had been thoroughly marginalized
by the moderate Whig hegemony in Britain shared a place with British bal-
anced constitutionalism at the core of the political creed of American Whigs.
American Whigs in the early stages of the imperial crisis incorporated radical
Whig philosophical principles and moderate Whig political commitments to
British constitutionalism in a delicate balance that would prove increasingly
untenable under the pressure of events in the 1760s and 1770s. These events
forced American Whigs not only to reconsider their commitment to British
constitutionalism, but also to reexamine the first principles of government
simply.
The immediate impetus to the imperial crisis was the effort of the Grenville
ministry after the war with France to reorganize the colonial administration
and to raise revenue in the colonies. The Grenville program brought to the
fore questions surrounding parliamentary sovereignty in the colonies that
had remained largely dormant during the long period of British neglect of
colonial affairs prior to the Seven Years War. In the Sugar Act of 1764, Par-
liament extended its traditional power to regulate imperial trade, a power
the Americans had always conceded, by designing trade policy with the ex-
plicit intention of raising revenue in the colonies. Initial colonial opposition
to this blurring of the distinction between what they took to be Parliament’s
legitimate power over external trade policy and the illegitimate practice of
internal taxation was largely confined to the northern colonies most directly
affected by the duty on molasses.2 However, with the passage of the Stamp
Act in 1765, the colonists recoiled at Parliament’s most assertive claim ever
of sovereignty over the colonies. This act, which imposed duties on goods
and services in the colonies to raise money for military expenses in America,
represented an unambiguous claim for Parliament’s power to impose an in-
ternal tax on the colonies. The easy passage of the bill through Parliament,
2 For good treatments of the Sugar Act and its effects in America, see Bernard Knollenberg,
Origin of the American Revolution: 1759–1766 (New York: Macmillan, 1960): pp. 27–33 and
Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953): pp. 139–49.
British Constitutionalism and the Challenge of Empire 329
with the Pittite Barré as the lone significant voice in opposition, indicates the
general presumption in Britain of Parliament’s authority over the colonies.3
In the colonies, however, the hostility to the Stamp Act was overwhelming.
Colonial opposition to the act was based more on the matter of constitutional
principle than on the expense (which was minimal), and it took several forms.
In major ports like Boston and Charleston, organizations such as the Sons
of Liberty and the Charles Town Fire Brigade mobilized mass street demon-
strations and orchestrated systematic intimidation of the crown-appointed
stamp distributors. Colonial assemblies, against the opposition of royal gov-
ernors, issued resolutions condemning the act and denying Parliament’s right
to tax the colonies. The Virginia House of Burgesses led the way for the other
colonies, declaring: “The taxation of the people, by themselves, or by per-
sons chosen by themselves to represent them, . . . is the only security against
a burthensome taxation, and the distinguishing characteristic of British free-
dom.”4 Champions for the colonial cause emerged during the crisis, such as
Patrick Henry in Virginia and James Otis in Massachusetts. Otis originated
the idea of uniting the various assembly committees into a single Stamp
Act Congress, to which nine of the thirteen colonies sent delegates. And,
perhaps most ominously from the British perspective, the colonists adopted
retaliatory trade practices including the nonimportation of British goods.
With the alarming spread of civil disobedience in the colonies, the protests
of influential British merchant groups, and the fortuitous replacement of
Grenville with a ministry led by the Marquis of Rockingham, who was
much more sympathetic to the Americans, the movement for repeal of the
act gained ground in Britain in the winter of 1766. The dilemma confronting
Parliament at this time was how to repeal the repugnant act without appear-
ing to countenance the American challenge to the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty over the empire. Ultimately Parliament decided to repeal the
Stamp Act on prudential grounds, but resolved to maintain the ideological
commitment to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty by passing almost
simultaneously with its repeal the Declaratory Act, which affirmed that the
British Parliament “had, hath, and of right ought to have, full power and
authority to make laws and statutes, of sufficient force to bind the colonies
3 See Colonel Barré’s impassioned speech in the first parliamentary debate over the Stamp
Act proposal (T. C. Hansard, The Parliamentary History of England, Volume XVI: 1765–1771
[London: Hansard, 1813]: pp. 38–40).
4 Hansard, Parliamentary History, pp. 120–1. For good discussions of the Stamp Act crisis in
America, see Knollenberg, Origin, chs. 20, 21; Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution:
Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776 (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972): chs. 3, 4; and Morgan and Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, chs.
8–11. For the general effect in Britain, see P. D. G. Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act
Crisis: The First Phase of the American Revolution, 1763–1767 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975),
and for the response of the radicals in Britain to the Stamp Act crisis, see Bonwick, English
Radicals, pp. 57–61, 75, and 79.
and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases
whatsoever.”5 Perhaps no single measure during the imperial crisis more
clearly demonstrated the depth of the British political nation’s commitment
to the moderate Whig principles of sovereignty articulated by Blackstone,
Tyrrell, and Pufendorf than the Declaratory Act.
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty was affirmed even by the
Americans’ strongest supporters in Parliament, such as Rockingham and
Edmund Burke, with even Pitt never entirely rejecting the doctrine of par-
liamentary sovereignty.6 Burke expressed the fundamental ambiguity in the
Rockinghamite Whig position in a speech during the debate over the Declara-
tory Act in which he stated that with respect to the colonies “we have the
clearest right imaginable, not only to bind them generally with every Law, but
with every mode of Legislative Taxation, that can be thought on.” However,
he qualified this idea by cautioning that “the practical exertion of many clear
rights may by change of time and circumstances become impossible, may be
inequitable, may clash with the genius of the very constitution that gives them
or at least may clash entirely with liberty.”7 While the initial response to the
repeal of the Stamp Act was relief on both sides of the Atlantic, the more
serious questions about Parliament’s authority over the colonies remained
unresolved. When asked under examination by a parliamentary committee
whether repeal of the Stamp Act would induce the assemblies in America
to acknowledge the right, even if only in theory, of Parliament to tax them,
the most important colonial agent in London, Benjamin Franklin, replied
unequivocally: “No, never.”8 The tumultuous consequences of Parliament’s
later, albeit more subtle, attempt to raise revenue in the colonies through the
Townshend duties were clearly foreshadowed in the fundamental dispute
over the nature of imperial sovereignty in the Stamp Act crisis.
The legacy of the Stamp Act debacle in Britain was complex. On the
one hand, the repeal movement demonstrated that America had influential
friends in the British government and polity. On the other hand, the sup-
port for the Declaratory Act expressed by mainstream British leadership and
public opinion signified the hardening of the orthodoxy of parliamentary
5 Hansard, Parliamentary History, p. 165.

6 Bonwick, English Radicals, pp. 60, 66; H. T. Dickinson, “The Eighteenth Century Debate on
the Sovereignty of Parliament,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, fifth ser., vol. 26
(1976): p. 190 and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999): pp. 192–3, 196. However, note that in some respects Pitt
and his follower, Lord Camden, criticized the idea of parliamentary sovereignty in favor of
Locke’s popular sovereignty argument – if not with respect to all forms of legislation, at
least with regard to taxation of the colonies (see Camden’s speech in the Lords in Hansard,
Parliamentary History, pp. 177–81).
7 Edmund Burke, “Speech on the Declaratory Resolution, February 3 1766,” The Writings and
Speeches of Edmund Burke, Volume II: Party, Parliament, and the American Crisis 1766–1774,
Paul Langford, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981): pp. 48–9.
8 Hansard, Parliamentary History, p. 160.
sovereignty and the central role of this doctrine in the British vision for the
future government of the empire. The legacy of the Stamp Act in America was
momentous. It signified the most successful, broad-based resistance move-
ment to imperial authority in American history up to that time. The colonial
opponents to the Stamp Act developed sophisticated techniques to mobilize
opposition groups and public sentiment, and effectively organized and ad-
ministered extralegal institutions such as the Stamp Act Congress and later
the Committees of Correspondence. Moreover, the colonial opposition to
the Stamp Act demonstrated a degree of practical cooperation among the
colonies hitherto unknown. In many respects, the Stamp Act Congress rep-
resented the seedbed of colonial union with the identification of a common
American interest, as opposed to thirteen separate colonial interests, distinct
from Britain.9 But the most profound legacy of the first parliamentary at-
tempt to tax the colonies occurred on the level of ideas. This was, after all,
primarily a dispute about principle, and the gifted colonial spokesmen who
championed the colonial cause in the early stages of the imperial crisis began
the process of articulation, modification, and consolidation of philosophical
principles that would mark the ever-widening ideological cleavage between
British and American Whigs.
We can now begin to trace the radical Whig core of American resistance
theory by examining the works of the two most influential colonial spokes-
men in the early stages of the quarrel with Britain, James Otis and John
Dickinson. These early colonial champions developed arguments for limited
colonial self-government that rested on distinctively Lockean ideas of natural
rights, property, and political representation. Where they differed from later
and more radical colonial spokesmen like Thomas Jefferson and Thomas
Paine, however, was in their ultimate, albeit reluctant, acceptance of the
moderate Whig conception of constitutional sovereignty as it applied to the
empire. They admitted that some legally constituted body must be sovereign
in the empire, that is, a body with no higher body to command it, and they
duly identified this sovereignty in Parliament. This distinctive combination
of radical and moderate Whig principles would mark the early colonial at-
tempts to devise a moderate theory of the empire, which tried to combine
supreme sovereignty in Westminster with considerable self-government in
the colonies.
Otis’ Rights Asserted

Massachusetts lawyer James Otis’ The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted
and Proved (1764) was the first important work in the pamphlet war initiated
by the imperial dispute between the British government and the American
9 In a sense, the degree of colonial cooperation in the Stamp Act crisis made manifest the
underlying thrust of the logic of Franklin’s Albany Plan of Union devised a decade earlier.
colonists. The issue that prompted Otis’ effort was the debate over Parlia-
ment’s presumptive right to tax the colonies. The historical context of the
Rights is the colonial opposition to the Sugar Act of 1764 and the colonists’
anticipation of the Stamp Act the following year. Otis had first come to the
attention of many in the colonies three years earlier, when he represented
a group of Boston merchants in a suit challenging the extension of general
writs of assistance. These writs, which had been introduced near the begin-
ning of the war with France to stop illegal trade with the French West Indies,
authorized colonial courts to permit customs officers to enter warehouses,
stores, and even private homes in order to search for smuggled goods. Otis
acquired widespread celebrity not only for his eloquent attack on the writs
but, more importantly, for his willingness to claim that Parliament’s right
to legislate for the colonies was subject to limitations set by British consti-
tutional practice and the principles of natural justice. He argued, echoing
Sir Edward Coke’s opinion in Dr Bonham’s Case (1610), that regardless of
parliamentary sanction “An Act against the Constitution is void: an act
against natural equity is void.” One portentous witness to the proceedings,
a young John Adams, later reflected on the significance of Otis’ argument:
“then and there the Child Independence was born.”10
Otis’ argument in the Rights is in many respects an amplification of his
position in the writs case. He provides a theoretical account for the philo-
sophical foundations of colonial self-government that draws heavily on the
natural rights teaching of John Locke. Using the logic of the Lockean prin-
ciple of consent, Otis argues that only the colonial legislatures may legit-
imately tax the colonists, because these are the only bodies by which they
have consented to be taxed and in which they are represented. Otis also inter-
prets British constitutional principles and Anglo-American imperial history
through a decidedly radical Whig lens. In this sense, the Rights provides
a wonderful demonstration of how thoroughly Lockean liberal principles
could be used to defend mixed and balanced constitutional forms.
However, Otis also reveals the complex relation between the radical
and moderate Whig principles underlying the early colonial position in the
imperial crisis. Otis offers glowing, often effusive, praise for the British
Constitution and what he takes to be the principles of the Glorious Rev-
olution. Even though the theoretical foundation of Otis’ argument for
colonial self-government was radical Whig rights and contract theory, his
guiding authorities on matters of constitutional design and political archi-
tecture were the eighteenth-century moderate Whig apologists for the British
10 Knollenberg, Origins, pp. 67–9 and James Stoner, Common Law and Liberal Theory: Coke,
Hobbes, and the Origins of American Constitutionalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1992): pp. 190–1. For Otis’ prominent role as a political organizer and intellectual leader of
the colonies in the Stamp Act period, see Morgan and Morgan (Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 34, 38,
104–5, 209–10, 273).
Constitution. In defending the mixed and balanced constitutional model as it

applied to the colonial context, with the British crown an integral element of
colonial constitutionalism, Otis rejected the radical republican conclusions
advanced by Sidney and implied by Trenchard and Gordon, favoring rather
the tried and tested compound government praised by Bolingbroke, Hume,
and Montesquieu. Despite John Adams’ assessment of the radical impact of
Otis’ arguments, the spirit of abiding moderation in the Rights made Otis
an advocate for neither revolution nor independence as the solution to the
imperial crisis. More importantly, however, Otis’ radical rights theory is se-
riously qualified by elements of an essentially moderate Whig conception
of sovereignty. While he denies Parliament the power to tax the colonies,
Otis simultaneously affirms that Parliament is the supreme legislature in the
colonies and as such is empowered to manage imperial affairs by regulat-
ing trade and coordinating defense policy among and between the various
colonies and the mother country. Otis accepted the moderate Whig principle
of parliamentary sovereignty, and the Pufendorfian ideas underlying it, but
wanted to retain considerable autonomy for the subordinate colonial legisla-
tures. He wanted to demonstrate in the Rights that a high degree of colonial
self-government is not incompatible with either British constitutional prin-
ciples or parliamentary sovereignty in the empire. It is this uneasy balance
of the radical and moderate Whig elements in America’s English political in-
heritance that characterized the early colonial position in the imperial crisis.
From the opening pages of the Rights, it is apparent that Otis is not averse
to applying radical Whig natural rights theory to the issues facing Ameri-
cans in the mid-1760s. Otis refers to Locke often and presents him as the
chief authority for the colonial position. Indeed, Otis’ introduction to the
Rights, entitled “Of the Origin of Government,” is a veritable compendium
of Lockean radical Whig principles. Otis asserts that the natural human con-
dition is one of perfect freedom and equality. With direct quotations from
Locke’s Two Treatises, Otis draws the fundamental premises: “There is noth-
ing more evident, says Mr. Locke, than ‘that creatures of the same species
and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and
use of the same faculties, should also be equal one among another without
subordination and subjection” and “the natural liberty of man is to free
from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or leg-
islative authority of man, but only to have the law of nature for his rule.”
The starting point for any explication of the origin of government, then, is
what Otis calls “the natural and original rights of each individual.” Natural
liberty, according to Otis, anchors the “great law of self-preservation,” the
natural law principle animating the purpose of government.11 Otis’ natural
11 James Otis, “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved” (1764), in Pamphlets
of the American Revolution, 1750–1776, ed. Bernard Bailyn, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1965), pp. 440, 439, 426 (cf. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government
rights are emphatically Lockean. They signify the natural liberty and equality
of individuals.
Predictably, Otis’ account of the origins of government also draws heav-
ily from Locke. He frames his account of the origins of political society
as a response to a series of objections to the doctrine of natural liberty.
These objections amount to a rehearsal of Filmer’s criticisms of contract
and include Sir Robert’s remonstrations against the feasibility and desirabil-
ity of the universal consent of all individuals to government. In fine Whig
fashion, Otis rejects practically out of hand the arguments that government
originates in divine grace, in conquest, or in a proprietary right.12 Otis’ con-
cern in this introduction to the Rights is to establish the principle of the
contractual origins of government as the only basis of any rational discus-
sion of politics. In other words, Otis assumes that British Whigs and the
Americans could agree on this fundamental question. To be a Whig was, of
course, to disagree with Filmer. However, rather than demonstrate through
detailed analysis the truth of contract theory to British Whigs, who pre-
sumably would not quarrel with the idea of contract, Otis simply refers the
reader to “Mr. Locke’s discourses on government, . . . and their own con-
sciences.”13 While it is unfortunate that Otis did not present a fuller account
of the origins of government, it is important to note his explicit criticism
of the Grotian position on the legitimacy of absolute contracts. Here Otis
shows mildly, but firmly, an important departure from a theoretical possibil-
ity left somewhat unresolved in moderate Whig thought. Otis queries: “Is it
possible for a man to have a natural right to make a slave of himself or his
(1690), Peter Laslett, ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988]: II:4, II:22). For
Otis’ appeal to natural rights, see Robert Webking, The American Revolution and the Politics
of Liberty (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988): p. 25 and to Locke in
particular, see Steven Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American
Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990): p. 85 and Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of
Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988): p. 304, n. 9. Given
Otis’ clear and articulate appeal to Lockean natural rights as the foundation of his argument
in the introduction to the rights, John Phillip Reid’s argument (Constitutional History of the
American Revolution: The Authority to Legislate. [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1991]: p. 5) that the American leaders appealed exclusively to rights defined by the British
Constitution appear singularly unpersuasive.
12 Otis, Rights, pp. 419–20 (cf. Jerome Huyler, Locke in America [Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 1995]: pp. 221–2).
13 Otis, Rights, p. 421. This probably says more about Locke’s great stature in the colonies than
about Otis’ understanding of the mindset of the architects of British imperial policy in the
1760s. Alan Houston draws on Otis’ other writings to make the interesting observation that
Otis believed that Sidney was widely held in the colonies in the 1760s to be more radical
than Locke (Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America [Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991: p. 238). This is not surprising considering that Lockean
principles were consistent with mixed monarchy – the system familiar to Americans –
whereas Sidney’s ardent republicanism would not really find an audience in the colonies
until the publication of Paine’s Common Sense in 1776.
posterity?” He later responds that natural liberty, “this gift of God cannot be
eliminated.”14
Otis’ position on natural rights, then, follows that of the radical Whigs, es-
pecially Locke and presumably Cato, in affirming the ultimate inalienability
of natural liberty. No absolute contract may be valid. In this way, Otis shows
the vast conceptual chasm between the radical Whiggism of the American
defenders of colonial rights and the Pufendorfian (and on this issue Grotian)
assumptions of most English Whigs. The more generally restrictive charac-
ter of Grotian and Pufendorfian compact theory drew from their reflections
on the logical possibilities flowing from natural liberty. Even very bad con-
tracts, or contracts gone bad, entail a binding obligation on individuals. Otis
follows Locke in favoring popular sovereignty over contractual originalism.
He asserts that the “supreme absolute power” in any government is found
both “originally” and “ultimately” in the people.15 Otis’ understanding of
the nature of contract and the origins of political society reflects the radical
Whig notion that political power is “given in trust and on condition the
performance of which no mortal can dispense with, namely, that the person
or persons on whom sovereignty is conferred by the people shall incessantly
consult their good.”16 Accepting the fiduciary character of political power
leads Otis to endorse the principle of dissolution. This meant Otis supported,
at least in principle if not in the immediate American context, a more radical
right of revolution than the moderate Whigs who shaped the Glorious Rev-
olution. This is important to keep in mind when we consider that Otis is, as
we shall see, a relative moderate among the colonial spokesmen. Perhaps the
most signal feature of the philosophical dimension of the imperial dispute is
the fact that even the moderates in America effortlessly and naturally artic-
ulated principles that would have put them on the radical fringes of political
discourse in England. Otis reminds us of the extent to which the American
and British wings of Whiggism were talking past each other in the imperial
crisis.
The end of government, the purpose for which individuals contract to
form political society, is, in Otis’ view, the “good of all the people.” While
the “supreme legislative and executive ultimately” reside in the “people or
whole community where God has placed it,” Otis concedes that the imprac-
ticality of “simple democracy” led to the necessity of establishing a system of
representation.17 Otis follows Locke in asserting that the original supreme
legislative and executive power of the people is delegated to governing insti-
tutions. The choice of the form of government and the distinct institutional
arrangement of this natural power rest with the people as a whole. Otis gives
14 Otis, Rights, pp. 420, 440 (cf. p. 424).

15 Ibid., p. 424.
16 Ibid., (emphasis in the original).
17 Ibid., p. 427.
no indication that the popular origins of government in consent necessarily

lead to a republican or highly democratic form of government. Like Locke,
Otis finds various forms of mixed government, including limited monarchy,
to be fully consistent with natural liberty. The end of government, accord-
ing to Otis, is “to provide for the security, the quiet, and happy enjoyment
of life, liberty, and property” for every individual in society.18 Individuals
form limited government because neither the state of nature nor absolute
monarchy can secure their life, liberty, and property. In the state of nature,
Otis claims, insecurity is guaranteed without a “common, indifferent, and
impartial judge.” The Hobbesian solution of absolute monarchy is equally
or more insecure than the state of nature inasmuch as “it is evidently con-
trary to the first principles of reason that supreme unlimited power should
be in the hands of one man.”19 For Otis, the end of government necessarily
implies limited government, though not necessarily republicanism.
Otis’ discussion of property rights signifies one point where Locke’s theory
was particularly germane to the central issue in the imperial debate regarding
the Sugar and Stamp Acts. Why is Parliament not legitimately able to tax the
colonies? Otis does not appeal primarily to historical custom or constitu-
tional precedent, but rather to natural rights. Echoing Locke, Otis contends
that control over property is intimately connected to an individual’s right to
life and liberty: “If a shilling in the pound may be taken from me against
my will, why may not twenty shillings; and if so, why may not my liberty
and my life?” It is precisely in order to secure property that individuals leave
the state of nature and form society.20 For Otis, property is so central to lib-
erty that no tax may be levied on any individual except by a body to which
that individual has consented and in which he is represented. The violation
of this principle of property rights and representation is an attack on the
very essence of liberty. Otis charges: “The very act of taxing exercised over
those who are not represented appears to me to be depriving them of one of
their most essential rights as freemen, and if continued seems to be in effect
an entire disenfranchisement of every civil right.”21 For Parliament to tax
the colonists is, according to Otis, to trample on their most fundamental
freedoms.
The aim of Otis’ argument in this discussion is twofold. First, he wants
to demonstrate that the right of property is natural and not derived solely or
even primarily from compact. With this he rejects the Pufendorfian idea that
property rights originate in the multiple layers of compact that form soci-
ety. Given the natural basis of the property right in the more comprehensive
18 Ibid., p. 425.
19 Ibid. (emphasis in the original). Cf. Locke II:90–4.
20 Ibid., p. 461; see also pp. 422–3. Notice that Locke makes the same point in practically
identical language at II:17–18.
21 Ibid., p. 447.
notion of natural liberty, Otis concludes: “It will never follow . . . that gov-
ernment is rightfully founded on property alone.”22 Rightful property claims
originate in nature and provide the logic for the end of government; they do
not originate concurrently with government. By following Locke as opposed
to Pufendorf on the issue of property, Otis establishes the philosophical nerve
of the argument linking the colonists’ property rights and their right to repre-
sentation. For Otis, the Americans did not, and logically could not, ever have
consented to a government over which they had no measure of legal control.
Second, Otis attempts to prove that Parliament’s plan to tax the colonies
is a violation of their natural rights and a dangerous departure from the
proper end of government. Insofar as the connection between representa-
tion and legitimate taxation power is a natural one, only legislatures directly
responsible to the colonists can tax them. Otis’ use of Locke’s notion of the
natural right to property supports his claim that the lack of colonial repre-
sentation in Westminster means that Parliament has no right to tax them.
Moreover, by basing his claim on natural, as opposed to merely constitu-
tional and historical, rights, Otis tries to put this issue beyond the realm of
competing constitutional interpretations of the empire. However, Otis does
grant Parliament sovereign authority to regulate imperial trade. He admits
this right of Parliament on the grounds that “[i]t may be for the good of the
whole that a certain commodity should be prohibited, but this power should
be exercised with great moderation and impartially over dominions which
are not represented in the national Parliament.”23 Otis accepts in principle
that as the supreme legislative power in the empire, Parliament may prohibit
the importation of certain goods into the colonies and restrict American trade
with the rest of the world, although he advises as a matter of prudence that
Parliament exercise this right cautiously. Otis views this regulatory power in
Britain as the price, if you will, of membership in the empire, and in no sense
as a justification for taxing the colonies directly. At the core of the moderate
theory of empire expressed by Otis is the notion that the legitimate taxing
power lodged in the colonial assemblies flows from natural rights, whereas
Parliament’s regulatory power is a matter of principle of a different order.
The Glorious Dissolution

In order to understand Otis’ conception of the colonies’ relations to Britain,
it is necessary to examine his use of another key Lockean principle: the
dissolution of government. Otis employs this standard Lockean idea in an
innovative way. In the imperial context, Otis applies the theory of dissolution
to give an account of the status of the colonial governments in the imperial
22 Ibid., p. 423 (cf. Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturale et Gentium Libri Octo [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1934]: bk. 4, ch. 4, pp. 5–8).
23 Ibid., pp. 460, 468.
order. Surprisingly, Otis does not, as we might expect, assert the colonists’
right to dissolve the imperial connection. Rather, he appeals to dissolution
theory to explain that connection. Unlike moderate Whigs in Britain such as
Hume and Blackstone, Otis viewed the Glorious Revolution as an example
of dissolution. In this respect, Otis is even more open in his Lockeanism
than Cato. He asserts that the British Constitution was “reestablished”
in 1688–9 in response to Stuart usurpations. Otis has great praise for the
British constitutional model that emerged from this period. He argues that
it is a stellar example of a government designed on the principles needed
to secure liberty, claiming that “No country has been more distinguished
for these principles than Great Britain, since the Revolution.” Moreover, he
glowingly cites long passages from the Declaration of Rights pointing to and
detailing the rights of Parliament and the civil rights guaranteed therein.24
Otis goes so far as to claim that with respect to the “grand political problem
in all ages” of how to combine and distribute the supreme powers of legis-
lation and execution, “the British Constitution in theory and in the present
administration of it in general comes closer to the idea of perfection of any
that has been reduced to practice.”25 Thus, Otis celebrates the settlement
of 1689 and shows that he has no quarrel with the principle of parliamen-
tary supremacy either in England’s mixed monarchy or, by extension, in the
empire at large.
Of course, to argue that the dissolution of the British government in 1689
resulted in a very good constitutional system is still not to square the imperial
circle. Good government in England does not immediately translate into a
settlement of how the Parliament should relate to the colonies. Otis’ more
fundamental point in this discussion is to demonstrate that not only was
the British Constitution reformed in 1688, but so was the entire empire.
Otis maintains that the events of the Glorious Revolution demonstrated the
Lockean principle that the form of government is left to be settled by the
individuals in society, who may alter or abolish it as they see fit. Otis claims
that the actions of the Convention Parliament in 1689 were consented to
and ratified by the entire free population of the empire. In contrast to later
and more radical colonial spokesmen like Jefferson and Paine, who more
or less denied any fundamental societal link between England and America,
Otis includes Americans in the collection of “the people” that consented to
the Glorious Revolution.26 Otis affirms that through a form of tacit consent
24 Ibid., pp. 449, 446–8, 430–4.

25 Ibid., p. 428.
26 Greene’s observation that in the wake of the Glorious Revolution the colonies experienced
increased localization of power and the growth of their own parliamentary institutions
provides an experiential basis for Otis’ argument, which gives it some air of plausibility, at
least practically, if not theoretically (see Jack P. Greene, “The Glorious Revolution and the
British Empire, 1688–1783,” in The Revolution of 1688–1689: Changing Perspectives, Lois G.
Schwoerer, ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], p. 269).
whereby had the people “not liked the proceedings it was in their power to
control them,” every individual in the empire except hard-core Tory “bigots
to the indefeasible power of tyrants” consented to the settlement. Notice that
in Otis’ version of events, those not consenting to the Glorious Revolution
are determined on ideological as opposed to geographical or jurisdictional
grounds. By this logic, the Americans consented to “the present happy and
most righteous establishment,” which was “founded on the law of God and
nature [and] was begun by the Convention with a professed and real view
in all parts of the British Empire.”27
Otis uses his treatment of dissolution to demonstrate two things: the legit-
imacy of parliamentary rule in England and the extension of that principle
throughout the free parts of the empire. According to Otis, the Glorious
Revolution affirmed the Lockean principle that in the event of an abuse of
political power
[i]t devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty and by
the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their
own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society.28
Since it is a natural right, Otis concludes that this right to form new societies
that was operative in Britain in 1689 must extend as much to the Americans,
who are “entitled to all the natural, essential, inherent, and inseparable rights
of our fellow subjects in Great Britain.”29 How, then, does Otis believe the
Glorious Revolution impacted on the colonies? He claims that it left a double
legacy. First, it established the formal constitutional principle of legislative
supremacy. In Britain, this meant the sovereignty of Parliament and, by ex-
tension, Parliament’s absolute legislative supremacy in the empire. This part
of the legacy seems to offer little in support of the colonial position in the
dispute over taxation. However, Otis contends that the revolutionary legacy
in America also secured a more substantive constitutional principle, namely,
that the purpose of government is to secure liberty and rights, especially
property.30 The question is then: Can Parliament secure this notion of sub-
stantive, as opposed to simply formal, justice for the Americans? Otis clearly
answers, no. While it is not my intention to examine the argument for virtual
representation made by British leaders, it suffices to note that Otis unhesi-
tatingly rejects this idea. He claims that only the colonial legislatures, in
which the colonists are actually represented, can fulfill this substantive prin-
ciple of securing liberty. Only the colonial legislatures, which are, according
to Otis, a product of the act of empirewide consent issuing in 1688–9, can
provide the legitimate institutional devices for raising taxes and governing
27 Otis, Rights, pp. 429–30, 441, 430.

28 Ibid., pp. 434–5.
29 Ibid., p. 441.
30 Ibid., p. 446.
domestic affairs in the colonies. Thus, by appealing to Lockean dissolution

theory, Otis seeks to guarantee the legitimacy of parliamentary sovereignty
in Britain and, in a brilliant theoretical double move, to affirm the broader
principle of legislative supremacy as the chief bulwark protecting the peo-
ple’s rights in the colonies as elsewhere. Otis concludes that fidelity to the
broader and deeper substantive principle of legislative supremacy requires
abridging and trimming the formal principle of parliamentary rule in the
empire.
Delegation and Subordination

The main theoretical problem emerging for the colonial position from Otis’
discussion of dissolution and the Glorious Revolution relates to how one
can reconcile the formal principle of right (legislative supremacy) with the
substantive principle of right (the security of rights only by a representative
legislature) in the imperial context. In order to resolve this thorny question
Otis turns, once again, to two characteristically Lockean ideas: the theory of
delegated powers and the constitutional principle of subordination. When
the Rights moves from the foundational discussion of natural rights and the
Glorious Revolution to the specific question of the colonists’ rights in the
empire, Otis notes that the subject of the natural rights of colonists has
been largely neglected or misunderstood by continental natural law theo-
rists. He claims that in particular “Grotius and Pufendorf find themselves
much mistaken” on this matter.31 Given Otis’ radical Whig sympathies, it is
not surprising that he finds the characteristically Grotian and Pufendorfian
argument that colonial rights are entirely subject to the specific compact re-
solved with the mother country far too restrictive to be palatable. Rather,
Otis claims that the true teaching on the natural rights of colonists is “chiefly
drawn from the purer fountains of one or two of our English writers, par-
ticularly from Mr. Locke.” To determine the legitimate rights of colonists
in general, and of Americans in particular, Otis adapts Locke’s delegation
theory of sovereignty to the British imperial situation.
As we have seen, Otis started his analysis of the natural rights of colonists
from the Lockean premise that the people are the original and ultimate
supreme power in any constitutional order. As such, the people can locate
the supreme legislative and executive power wherever they wish, including,
of course, in a supreme legislature in which the executive has a share of
the legislative power, like the British mixed monarchy. This system of del-
egated powers, according to Otis, is precisely what was created in 1688–9.
In order to explain the status of the colonial legislatures in the empire, Otis
modified another feature of Lockean constitutionalism, the subordination
31 Ibid., pp. 436–7.

of powers, and adapted this principle to the imperial context.32 In Chapter

thirteen of the Second Treatise, Locke claimed that the supreme legislative
power can delegate some measure of its authority to “several subordinate
Powers.”33 Otis adapted this Lockean idea to the imperial context by arguing
that the colonial legislatures have subordinate legislative status with respect
to Parliament’s overarching supremacy in the empire. The principal role of
these subordinate legislatures, in Otis’ view, is to exercise exclusive power
over domestic taxation in the colonies. Otis combined the Lockean notions
of delegation and the subordination of powers to argue for the idea of co-
ordinate constitutional powers, the Parliament and the colonial legislatures,
with their own spheres of legitimate power and jurisdiction. In this way, Otis
hoped to draw from Locke the theoretical materials necessary to accommo-
date colonial demands for self-government within a broader framework of
imperial unity. Thus, when Otis claimed that Americans consented to the set-
tlement of 1689, he meant that they agreed to an imperial constitution that
reconciled obligations to Britain with considerable colonial self-government
over domestic affairs.
Otis’ defense of the natural right of the colonists to tax themselves is
based on his idea of a three-pronged system of delegated powers. He claims
that the people can create and arrange subordinate constitutional powers
with relatively complete competence in their own defined jurisdiction. By
this logic, the people of the colonies exercised their natural rights in order
to produce a complex system whereby (1) they assigned supreme legislative
power to Parliament for managing imperial relations through trade and de-
fense policy, (2) they also delegated certain powers to the British crown to
participate in the legislative process in the colonies through the veto and
dissolution powers, and (3) they delegated certain powers exclusively to the
colonial legislatures to raise taxes and govern domestic affairs with royal as-
sent. In this multifarious system of consent and imperial constitutionalism,
the people of the colonies retained ultimate sovereignty because each element
of their government, domestic and imperial, could be traced back to a del-
egation of their natural power. Simply put, Otis presents the argument that
the colonial legislatures exist by virtue of a constitutional agreement more
32 The importance Otis and others attached to Locke as a constitutional authority supports
Dworetz’s claim (Unvarnished Doctrine, p. 70) that it was Locke the constitutional theorist,
rather than Locke the prophet of property rights and capitalism, who primarily fired the
colonial imagination during the imperial dispute. However, it should be noted that colo-
nial spokesmen like Otis and Dickinson often emphasized the Lockean connection between
property rights and representative government.
33 Locke, II:151. It is important to notice that Otis uses the idea of subordination of powers
in ways quite different from Locke. The “several” subordinate powers Locke imagines refer
mainly to inferior magistrates, municipal corporations, or executives without a share of the
legislative power (II:133, II:151). It is not at all clear that Locke would see the principle of
subordination applying to colonies.
fundamental than an act of Parliament: a primary act of consent rooted in

the natural rights of the colonists.
While it is true that Otis’ argument is based on Lockean principles, it is
important to note his significant modification of Locke’s teaching. In Locke’s
understanding of subordinate powers, they are completely subject to alter-
ation or abolition by the supreme legislative power. The practical implication
of this principle in the imperial context – namely, that Parliament can alter
or dissolve the colonial legislatures – is clearly a theoretical possibility that
Otis wants to avoid. Otis seeks to balance two competing, perhaps ulti-
mately contradictory, claims. On the one hand, he admits that the colonial
legislatures are subordinate to Parliament in the sense that there is no higher
legislative authority in the empire than Parliament, but, on the other hand,
he claims that Parliament cannot legitimately legislate the internal affairs of
the colonies through taxation. While conceding that the colonial legislatures
are not supreme or independent of the British government, Otis maintains
that they possess a legal and constitutional integrity of their own as a product
of the people of the colonies themselves.
In Otis’ complex formulation of the imperial constitution, he foreshad-
ows something like a federal arrangement in which Parliament has its proper
sphere of rule and the colonial legislatures have theirs. The central question
regarding which body has the supreme power in the event of a conflict be-
tween two legally constituted bodies – essentially the issue in question in
1764 – is one Otis assiduously tries to avoid. This ambiguity in Otis’ posi-
tion comes to the surface in his account of the limits of legislative power.
Otis presents this account as though it were taken verbatim from Chapter
Eleven of Locke’s Second Treatise. However, there is one crucial modification
of Locke’s argument in Otis’ account. In his version of the second limit on
legislative power in an otherwise faithfully Lockean list of limits, Otis im-
ports the notion of subordination into the discussion. Otis claims that one
crucial limit on legislative power is that “[t]he supreme national legislative
cannot be altered justly till the commonwealth is dissolved, nor a subordi-
nate legislative taken away without forfeiture or other good cause.”34 Locke, of
course, makes no mention of the distinction between national legislatures
and any other kind. He also places no qualification on the supreme legis-
lature’s power to alter or abolish subordinate powers. In fact, Locke never
discusses subordinate powers in his account of the limits on the legislative
power. Even Locke’s far from absolute commitment to the principle of leg-
islative supremacy ensured that he would see no inherent right of subordinate
bodies that the supreme legislature would be obliged to observe.35 Otis im-
ports the principle of subordination into Locke’s discussion of the limits
on legislative power in order to create an additional limit on the extent of
34 Otis, Rights, p. 444 (emphasis mine). Compare with Locke II:134.

35 See Locke, II:135–41 (cf. II:133, II:151).
supreme legislative power, a limit tailored to the imperial context but one
not explicitly countenanced by Locke. Otis modifies Locke to argue that
not only the supreme legislative power but also “the subordinate powers of
legislation” should be “free and sacred in the hands where the community
have once rightfully placed them.”36 Thus, in order to adapt Lockean prin-
ciples to serve the colonial position, Otis departs from a strict construction
of Locke’s constitutional theory for the purpose of appealing to the deeper
Lockean natural rights teaching underlying this constitutional theory.
The Moderate Theory of Empire

Otis employs a Lockean argument to demonstrate that only the ultimate
and natural supreme power of the people can alter or abolish a subordinate
legislature; the supreme constitutional legislative power cannot. Is this a
tenable argument? Otis wants the subordinate colonial legislatures to have
sole and inviolable authority within their proper sphere. This sphere includes
the power of taxation rooted in the natural right of the colonists to protect
their property by means of their own representative assemblies. Yet Otis
does not want to assert the general supremacy of the colonial legislatures.
He passionately denies that the colonies want “to assume the right of an
independent legislative or state.”37 Thus, by admitting the supremacy of
Parliament, Otis, albeit reluctantly, is forced to concede that the supreme
legislative power, in this case Parliament, can unilaterally alter or dissolve the
subordinate colonial legislatures in the event of “forfeiture or other good
cause.”38 By admitting parliamentary supremacy in the empire, Otis does
not, however, concede that Parliament’s legislative authority is absolute or
arbitrary. For Otis, Locke’s natural law limits on legislative power apply as
much to Parliament as to any legislative body. In keeping with the logic of
his argument in the writs of assistance case, Otis contends that no legislature
may legitimately endanger the lives, liberties, and property of the people. Otis
claims that these constitutional limits on legislative power are as natural and
self-evident as the proof that “[t]he Parliament cannot make 2 and 2, 5.”39
Thus the British government’s right to rule the empire cannot in any way be
construed to countenance the violation of the colonists’ natural rights. Otis
maintains that the colonial legislatures are an integral part of the panoply
of constitutional structures set in place by the consent of the people of the
colonies in order to secure their rights.
36 Otis, Rights, p. 444.

37 Ibid., p. 457.
38 Ibid., p. 444. Cf. Goldsworthy, Sovereignty of Parliament, p. 205.
39 Otis, Rights, p. 454; Locke II:135–42. Cf. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967): pp. 205–6.
The moderate theory of empire tried to combine parliamentary supremacy

in the empire with a considerable measure of colonial self-government. The
major problem in Otis’ formulation of the theoretical foundations of the
moderate imperial theory is the difficulty in reconciling the Lockean liberal
idea of consent with the system of delegated powers in the imperial con-
text. In particular, Locke’s constitutional principle of subordinate powers
did not have the normative bite that Otis sought in order to defend the
legislative assemblies at the heart of his idea of colonial self-government.
However, the deeper problem in Otis’ imperial argument was his underly-
ing commitment to the moderate Whig theory of constitutional sovereignty
rooted in Pufendorf and refashioned for the Anglo-American transatlantic
community of the 1760s by Blackstone. Whereas Locke’s radical Whig ac-
count of sovereignty emphasized the natural constituent power of the people
and the resulting ambiguity and difficulty in identifying political sovereignty,
the moderate Whig position on sovereignty maintained by Blackstone and
many prominent leaders on both sides of the Atlantic stressed the necessity
of recognizing one legally instituted, easily identifiable, and duly constituted
supreme power in any constitutional order. Drawing from the authority of
Pufendorf, Blackstone argued that “there is and must be in all [forms of
government] a supreme, irresistible, absolute, and uncontrolled authority, in
which the jura summi imperii, or rights of sovereignty reside.”40 As we have
seen, soon after the publication of the Rights, the British moderate Whig
position on sovereignty would find its most extreme legal expression in the
Declaratory Act of 1766, which affirmed Parliament’s authority “to make
laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and
people of America . . . in all cases whatsoever.”41
In his effort to defend some measure of colonial self-government, Otis
clearly rejected the logic and spirit of the Declaratory Act’s claim for Parlia-
ment’s sweeping power to legislate for the colonies “in all cases whatsoever.”
But while he tried to maintain the constitutional integrity of the separate
spheres of authority, in effect to combine parliamentary supremacy in the
empire and limited colonial autonomy over issues of taxation and domestic
affairs, Otis was driven by his commitment to the moderate Whig view of
sovereignty to concede that as Parliament was the highest legislative author-
ity in the empire, there was simply no legal or constitutional way to impede
or reverse its will. As Otis stipulated: “The power of Parliament is uncon-
trollable but by themselves, and we must obey. They can only repeal their
own acts.” Should push come to shove, Otis and later Dickinson advocated
passive resistance in America (for example, a voluntary embargo on British
40 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol. I (London, 1791 [1765]):
p. 49; cf. pp. 108–9 and 160–1 for his argument in support of parliamentary supremacy in
the empire.
41 Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History (New York: Appleton, 1963): p. 61.
imports) and diplomatic efforts to persuade Parliament to change its con-

duct toward the colonies.42 For Otis, in keeping with the moderate Whig
Blackstonian–Pufendorfian understanding of sovereignty, there must be one
supreme legislative power in the empire, and that power logically and legally
must lie in Parliament. In this respect, the arguments of Otis, and later of
Dickinson, were much closer to the logic of the Declaratory Act than were
the later arguments expounded by Jefferson and Paine.
In order to maintain logical consistency, Otis reluctantly concedes that
Parliament can alter or abolish the colonial legislatures. He thinks he has to
do this if he wishes to maintain the colonies’ links with the imperial govern-
ment in England. One way out of the imperial dispute, which Otis raises,
is the possibility of colonial representation in an imperial Parliament. While
Otis rejects the notion of virtual representation, he does propose this alter-
native to the present situation, which would, at least theoretically, meet the
requirement of representation necessary for taxation.43 Otis argues: “A rep-
resentation in Parliament from the several colonies . . . can’t be thought an
unreasonable thing, nor if asked could it be called an immodest request.”44
Despite the obvious practical difficulties in securing effective representation
in an assembly 3,000 miles across the sea in the eighteenth century, Otis
demonstrates that this idea was not unthinkable among the colonists, at
least in the very early stages of the imperial dispute. It is important to re-
call, however, that for Otis, parliamentary representation is not intended to
replace the colonial legislatures, but rather to supplement them: “No repre-
sentation of the colonies in Parliament alone would, however, be equivalent
to a subordinate legislative among themselves.”45 Only the colonial legisla-
tures close to the colonial situation and directly responsible to the people
of the colonies could effectively secure “the end of increasing their pros-
perity.” Perhaps Otis’ ideal solution to the imperial dispute would involve
maintaining exclusive taxation power in the colonial legislatures, and gain-
ing American admission at Westminster to secure an American voice in the
formulation of imperial policy. Predictably, this was a solution unacceptable
to the British government.
42 Otis, Rights, pp. 448–9.

43 For good discussions about the complex issues surrounding the idea of virtual representa-
tion, see Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, pp. 82–3; Jack P. Greene, “Origins of the American
Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation,” in Framing and Ratifying the Constitution,
Leonard Levy and Dennis Mahoney, eds. (New York: Macmillan, 1987): p. 37; and Webking,
American Revolution, p. 27. Samuelson observes that in the period following publication of
the Rights, Otis would propose an idea of imperial federalism similar to those devised years
later by Jefferson, Wilson, and John Adams (Richard Samuelson, “The Constitutional Sanity
of James Otis: Resistance Leader and Loyal Subject,” Review of Politics, vol. 61, no. 3 [Summer
1999]: pp. 517–20).
44 Otis, Rights, p. 445.
45 Ibid. (emphasis mine).
In the final analysis, Otis’ argument is characterized by an abiding mod-

eration. While asserting the rights of limited colonial self-government, he
also emphatically denies the alternative of full independence. He does not
employ Lockean dissolution theory to justify revolt. Rebellion, for Otis, is
a kind of doomsday scenario: “The ministry in all future generations may
rely on it that British America will not prove undutiful till driven to it as a
fatal last resort against ministerial oppression, which will make the wisest
mad, and the weakest strong.”46 Though Otis affirms that it is the colonists’
“duty to submit and patiently bear” whatever burdens the supreme legisla-
tive power in Parliament may place on them, he claims that “our mouths
are not stopped” and that the people of America may plead, appeal, and
shame the British government until it repeals its obnoxious measures.47 If
the colonists were to maintain an imperial presence characterized by parlia-
mentary sovereignty in Britain and only subordinate or limited sovereignty
in the colonies, they could do little else.
Dickinson’s Farmer Letters

James Otis’ impact on the defenders of the colonial position was palpable.
A century later, Lord Acton would echo Adams in calling Otis “the founder
of the revolutionary doctrine.”48 In the years immediately following the
Stamp Act crisis, colonial spokesmen continued to advance their arguments
on the basis of premises and principles originally articulated by Otis. While
many of Otis’ immediate successors lacked his relish and aptitude for ex-
amining philosophical first principles, they inevitably drew on the enormous
theoretical resources of radical Whiggism that Otis had unearthed. Prob-
ably the most important of Otis’ immediate successors was the Delaware
native John Dickinson.49 Although Dickinson was less apt to make direct
appeals to the authority of radical Whig philosophy, his influential Letters
from a Farmer in Pennsylvania assumed Otis’ basic theoretical position but
applied these principles to a different situation in the changing dynamics of
the ongoing imperial dispute in the late 1760s. In the nearly four-year span
between the publication of the Rights and Dickinson’s Farmer Letters, much
had changed in the colonial situation. The repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766
seemed to signal the apparent success of Otis’ moderate appeal for limited
colonial self-government. America’s Rockinghamite and Pittite champions
46 Ibid., p. 458.
47 Ibid., pp. 448–9.
48 John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Essays in the History of Liberty (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund Press, 1985): p. 200 and James Ferguson, “Reason and Madness: The Political Thought
of James Otis,” William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2 (April 1979): p. 194.
49 For Dickinson’s status as the authority on the colonial position in Britain in the late 1760s,
see Bonwick, English Radicals, pp. 38, 44 61–2.
in Parliament successfully argued for the repeal of this act with great encour-
agement from the colonies. The British government, however, presented the
repeal as a matter of political expedience and not as an implicit acceptance
of Otis’ argument. In keeping with its aim to assert the purely prudential
character of its decision, Parliament took the bold measure of passing the
Declaratory Act, which asserted an unqualified and legitimate right inhering
in Parliament to make laws for the colonies “in all cases whatsoever.” Par-
liament’s position was clearly hardening on the principle, if not the practice,
of British rule over the colonies.
The Farmer Letter appeared in the American press from December 1767
to February 1768. Dickinson offered them as a response to Parliament’s
passage of the Townshend duties, to be paid at American ports on goods
imported from Britain. The Americans were also prohibited from import-
ing these products from anywhere else except Britain. While the Townshend
duties, unlike the stamp tax, were not a direct tax on American consumers,
Dickinson believed that the principle behind these duties was no different
from that of the Stamp Act, namely, to raise revenue from the Americans
without their consent. Dickinson echoes Otis’ argument that only the colo-
nial legislatures could legitimately tax the colonies. He also agrees with Otis
that Parliament, as the supreme legislative authority in the empire, has the
power to regulate imperial trade policy. Dickinson worries, however, that
the Townshend Act demonstrates that the distinction between the idea of
direct internal taxation and external regulatory duties provides cover for
Parliament to use its traditionally accepted power to regulate imperial trade
in order to impose what really amounted to a tax on the colonies.50 In re-
sponse to the parliamentary command that American merchants buy British
goods with a duty attached to them, Dickinson queries: “What tax can be
more internal than this?”51
The theoretical grounding for Dickinson’s defense of the colonists’ right
to tax themselves is radical Whig natural rights. He derives the core of the
argument for self-government from the Lockean natural right of property.
Dickinson argues: “If they have any right to tax us – then . . . There is noth-
ing which we can call our own; or to use the words of Mr. Locke – WHAT
PROPERTY HAVE WE IN THAT, WHICH ANOTHER MAY, BY RIGHT,
TAKE, WHEN HE PLEASES, TO HIMSELF.”52 Like Otis, Dickinson fol-
lows Locke in linking the individual’s control over personal property to a
more comprehensive notion of freedom including the natural rights to life
50 Webking, American Revolution, p. 48.

51 John Dickinson, “The Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania,” in Empire and Nation, William
E. Leuchtenberg and Bernard Wishy, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962): Letter
6, p. 24.
52 Dickinson, Letter 7, p. 44 (capitalization in the original). Cf. Locke II:138 and Dworetz,
Unvarnished Doctrine, p. 75.
and liberty. Dickinson fears that the imposition of even a minuscule tax by
Parliament sets a very dangerous precedent. It will stand like “a sword in the
scabbard,” waiting to plunge at the heart of American liberty. Dickinson’s
fundamental concern is that British taxing of the colonies will undermine
the position of the colonial legislatures. Like Otis, he believes that a free
people must have control over “the purse strings.”53 The colonists’ natural
right to control their own property, according to Dickinson, means that
the colonial legislatures were the primary guarantors of American freedom.
Unlike Otis, however, Dickinson makes no appeal in the Farmer Letters for
American representation in Parliament. The message of the Farmer Letters is
simply an emphatic warning to the British government to leave the colonies
alone to tax themselves. British rule over the empire, Dickinson argued, does
not make the power of the colonial legislatures nugatory. Even more clearly
than Otis, Dickinson expands the right of taxation to include the broader
range of issues relating to self-government. He claims that if Parliament takes
upon itself the “administration of justice” in the colonies, “what will they
[the colonial legislatures] have to do, when they are met? To what shadows
will they be reduced?”54 Always present in the background of the dispute
over taxes and duties is Dickinson’s concern to defend the legitimacy and
constitutional integrity of the colonial legislatures.
The theory of empire propounded in the Farmer Letters is profoundly in-
fluenced by the moderate Whig conception of sovereignty. Dickinson, no less
than Otis, remains committed to the moderate Whig idea of parliamentary
sovereignty over the empire. He consciously frames his argument as an appeal
to British constitutional principles and practices enshrined by the Glorious
Revolution.55 The first letter is auspiciously dated November 5, the anniver-
sary of William’s landing at Torbay. Moreover, Dickinson has high praise for
the British Constitution, claiming that it is “incontestably our duty, and our
interest, to support the strength of Great Britain.”56 Despite minor differ-
ences in the manner and extent to which they applied Lockean principles to
53 Dickinson, Letter 9, p. 50.

54 Ibid., p. 57.
55 Dickinson’s status as one of the most important nonsigners of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence has no doubt contributed to the debate over his status as a “conservative” revolution-
ary. Bailyn (Ideological Origins, p. 145) and Forrest McDonald (introduction to Empire and
Nation, William E. Leuchtenberg and Bernard Wishy, eds. [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1962]: p. xi) make the case that Dickinson was the most conservative of the colonial
champions. Webking (American Revolution, pp. 41–2) counters by arguing that insofar as
Dickinson did not emphasize “sources of order” in the community such as institutions and
precedents, he was “more radical, than the other major revolutionaries.” While I agree with
Bailyn and McDonald that Dickinson was clearly a moderate in important respects, I am also
sensitive to Webking’s objection, although I would locate the radical character of Dickinson’s
argument in his use of Lockean principles of property rights and representation, not in any
supposed tendency to avoid discussing institutions or precedents.
the particular situation they were addressing, the logical and practical impli-
cations of Dickinson’s argument differ little from those of Otis. By affirming
parliamentary supremacy in the empire, Dickinson is driven by concern for
theoretical consistency and British patriotism to admit the incapacity of the
colonists to counter parliamentary abuses in a legal or constitutional way.
For Dickinson, the colonial options are seriously limited. He rejects the radi-
cal alternative of independence even more emphatically than Otis, claiming:
If once we are separated from our mother country, what new form of government
shall we adopt, or where shall we find another Britain to supply our loss? Torn
from the body, to which we are united by religion, liberty, laws, affections, relation,
language and commerce, we must bleed at every vein.57
With no certain legal or constitutional means of relief, Dickinson calls for

his fellow colonists to join in a sustained and voluntary American policy
of nonimportation of British goods to hit the ministry in the pocketbook.
Dickinson assumes that only then will they see not only the imprudence but
also the injustice of their actions.
Otis and Dickinson represent the fullest and most articulate expression
of the moderate formulation of colonial rights in the empire. Their argu-
ments sought to accommodate the colonial demands and position within the
framework of the empire and British constitutional and imperial practice.
While they remained adherents to the moderate Whig idea of parliamentary
sovereignty, these early colonial spokesmen drew their most fundamental
ideas about rights and government from the radical Whig philosophy. Even
in the early stages of the imperial crisis, Americans were not afraid to em-
ploy core Lockean principles like natural rights, dissolution of government,
delegation, and subordination of powers in innovative ways. Indeed, they
applied Locke’s teaching to their own colonial situation in order to defend
the exclusive powers of the subordinate colonial legislatures to secure lim-
ited self-government for the colonies. Their use of Locke reminds us that his
brand of radical Whiggism was both compatible with the principle of mixed
government and adaptable to understanding composite imperial structures.
However, Lockean principles, at least as they were applied by Otis and
Dickinson, had serious limits for the colonial position. When push came to
shove over the issue of sovereignty in the empire, Otis and Dickinson fell
back on the inherited moderate Whig notions of constitutional supremacy
and sovereignty, which elevated Parliament above the colonial legislatures.
Thus, despite the radical foundation of the early colonial position in Lockean
natural rights theory, Otis and Dickinson displayed an abiding moderation
in their view of the empire, seeing parliamentary supremacy in the empire as
the cost of maintaining the colonial links with Britain. They did so even as
they sought to defend a considerable degree of colonial autonomy. However,

justifying American membership in an imperial order headed by Parliament

left the rights of colonial self-government on tenuous ground. As the supreme
legislative power in the empire and, by extension, in the colonies, Parliament
could, by this theory, legitimately abolish or alter the colonial legislatures.
The question of exactly what conditions would legitimate this forfeiture of
colonial rights was a source of bitter dispute as the imperial crisis heated up in
the 1770s. Ultimately, the later American position in the crisis represented by
Thomas Jefferson and Tom Paine would remove this theoretical ambiguity,
or even obstacle to colonial self-government, by denying that the colonies had
any constitutional or legal connection, let alone subordination, to Parliament
whatsoever.
13
Thomas Jefferson and the Radical Theory of Empire
Thomas Jefferson’s Summary View of the Rights of British America differed

in both form and substance from the work of earlier colonial spokesmen like
Otis and Dickinson. Written in the highly charged atmosphere of 1774, the
Summary View was originally intended as a set of instructions for the Virginia
delegation to the First Continental Congress, a distinguished group including
Patrick Henry, Edmund Randolph, and George Washington. It was, however,
soon recognized to be much more than that, as much a statement of general
principles underlying the colonial resistance to British rule as a specific set
of proposals to resolve the imperial crisis. As such it was later published
anonymously and was a major contribution to the pamphlet war between
the colonists and Britain. In contrast to earlier colonial statements of their
rights, the Summary View put much less emphasis on the painful details
and dangerous implications of parliamentary efforts to tax the colonies,
and dealt primarily with the constitutional and philosophical issues raised
by the Coercive Acts disabling the Massachusetts Assembly and by the Act
Suspending the New York Legislature. In this sense, Jefferson responded to
the rapidly deteriorating situation affecting imperial relations in the early
1770s. By 1774 Otis and Dickinson’s nightmare scenario, the theoretical
possibility that Parliament could annihilate colonial self-government, had
become a practical reality in at least two colonies and an increasingly likely
possibility in the others.
Jefferson drew on the theoretical resources of Lockean political philoso-
phy to articulate and support the American position in this critical period.
In this respect he did not differ greatly from Otis and Dickinson, who also
appealed to the authority of Locke. However, Jefferson’s use of Locke sig-
naled a departure from the position of his earlier compatriots. While both
the early and later colonial positions were grounded on radical Whig natural
rights theory, Jefferson drew from this foundation a different understand-
ing of the colonists’ relation to the British government than did Otis and
Dickinson. Whereas most colonial leaders in 1774 were still inclined, in
351
Jefferson’s words, to stop “at the half-way house of John Dickinson,” ad-
mitting parliamentary authority to regulate American commerce but not to
raise revenue in the colonies, in Jefferson’s radical formulation of the empire
Parliament could not legitimately govern the colonies in any form because
there was no constitutional and legal link between the colonial governments
and Parliament whatsoever.1 The only connection between the colonies and
Britain was the crown, which acted as the supreme executive power in both
Britain and the colonies. For this reason, the Summary View, unlike Otis’
Rights and Dickinson’s Farmer Letters, is addressed to the king, not Par-
liament. Jefferson calls on the king to restrain the actions of an abusive
Parliament. In the broader view of Jefferson’s proposed theory of imperial
federalism, the empire is seen as a collection of sovereign and equal com-
monwealths united only by their common acceptance of the same king. Thus,
both constitutionally and in terms of natural rights, Jefferson argues, the leg-
islatures of Delaware and Rhode Island, as well as those of the rest of the
colonies, were equal to Parliament. This meant, of course, that Jefferson
denied that Parliament had any legal status in the colonies, certainly not
the potentially sweeping powers that Otis and Dickinson granted it as the
supreme legislative power in the empire.
A Statement of “Our Rights”: Emigration and Self-Government

The Lockean influence on Jefferson’s expression of the core principles of nat-
ural rights and government in the Summary View is unmistakable. Jefferson
grounds the claims of the colonists on “their rights, as derived from the laws
of nature.” These “rights of human nature” include, first and foremost, the
power to create governments dedicated to securing liberty.2 For Jefferson,
government is the product of human artifice generated by the consent of
free and equal individuals. In classic Lockean form, Jefferson asserts that
the people are the ultimate supreme power in any constitutional order. The
people are free to delegate their natural power to officers and institutions
“appointed by the laws, and circumscribed with definite powers, to assist in
working the great machine of government, erected for their use, and conse-
quently subject to their superintendance [sic].”3 This statement of popular
1 Thomas Jefferson, “Autobiography” (6 January 1821), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,

10 vols., Paul Leicester Ford, ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892–9): vol. 1: p. 12.
2 Thomas Jefferson, “Summary View of the Rights of British America,” in Thomas Jefferson
Writings, Merrill Peterson, ed. (New York: Norton, 1984), pp. 121, 105 (hereafter Jefferson,
SV, and page number). For good but too brief treatments of natural rights in the Summary
View, see Harry Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil
War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): pp. 22–5 and David Mayer, The Con-
stitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994):
pp. 35–7.
3 Jefferson, SV, p. 105 (cf. p. 121).
Thomas Jefferson and the Radical Theory of Empire 353
sovereignty confirms the radical conventionality of this “great machine of

government” and asserts the inherent limits on the legitimate use of political
power. Throughout the course of the Summary View, Jefferson lays before
his reader both the most important of the colonists’ natural rights, “Our
Rights,” and the frequent, and increasingly dangerous, “violations of them”
by the British government.
The primary natural right Jefferson treats in his opening salvo in the
Summary View is the natural right of emigration. It is in this discussion
that he most fully considers the philosophical foundations of natural lib-
erty theory. The origin of the colonies, Jefferson argues, lies in the right of
emigration, a “right which nature has given to all men.” The individual’s
right “of departing from the country in which chance, not choice, has placed
[him]” acts as both a logical and a practical demonstration of the state of
nature, serving to illustrate how naturally free and equal individuals may
be understood to come together and form political societies.4 This natural
right of emigration contains within it the ground of the Lockean principle
that all government rests on consent. Implicit in Jefferson’s argument is the
notion that one alternative to consenting to a government is the exercise of
the natural right to leave the sphere of that government.5 This, according
to Jefferson, is precisely what the original settlers of America and all immi-
grants since have done. Thus, when several of the “free inhabitants of the
British dominions in Europe” chose to leave and then left their homeland,
they effectively returned to a state of nature with full possession of all the
natural liberties attending that state. Jefferson’s aim here is to demonstrate
that the act of emigration constituted a severing of the constitutional links
and legal obligations of the colonists to Britain.
The deeper right embodied in the bare act of emigration is the natural right
of free people to form “new societies under such laws and regulations as to
them shall seem most likely to promote public happiness.”6 In this respect,
4 Jefferson, SV, p. 105. Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, pp. 9–12 asserts with little textual or
logical evidence that Jefferson’s understanding of “public happiness” (and, for that matter,
Locke’s) was indistinguishable from the classical republican conception Jaffa identifies with
Plato and Aristotle. However, Jefferson and Locke ground their idea of public happiness on
the principle of securing rights, the logic of natural rights being alien and ultimately contrary
to the classical idea of natural sociability and civic education (cf. Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient
and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution [Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1992]).
5 Locke claimed that there was a natural right “of Men withdrawing themselves, and their Obe-
dience, from the Jurisdiction they were born under, and the Family or Community they were
bred up in, and setting up new Governments in other places” (John Locke, Two Treatises of
Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): bk. II: sec. 115
(hereafter Locke, book, and section, e.g., Locke II:115).
6 Jefferson, SV, pp. 105–6. John Zvesper argues persuasively that Jefferson demonstrates the
emphatically political character of his natural rights teaching in the Summary View by drawing
from the Lockean assertion of natural freedom the idea that this freedom, in Jefferson’s view,
Jefferson draws a Lockean natural rights teaching out of the actual experi-
ences of colonial history: emigration, settlement, and government building.
It perhaps goes without saying that the Lockean emigration right to which
Jefferson appeals constitutes a milder form of the natural right of revolu-
tion. The first Americans, in Jefferson’s view, showed their dissatisfaction
with the British government by voting with their feet.7 These first settlers
were as free to establish their own form of government as England’s “Saxon
ancestors had, under this universal law, in like manner left their native wilds
and woods in the north of Europe, had possessed themselves of the island of
Britain . . . and had established there that system of laws which has so long
been the glory and protection of that country.”8 By logically connecting
the historical origins of the British Constitution in Saxon England and the
America colonies in their first settlement, and citing these events as examples
of the construction of new societies by free individuals, Jefferson attempts
to demonstrate that by nature, Britain and the American colonies are free
and equal with respect to each other.
Jefferson employs this discussion of the natural right of emigration to
explain the colonists’ relations with Britain and its government. Emigration
replaces the Glorious Revolution as the fulcrum for the colonial position.
Whereas an earlier colonial spokesman such as Otis could advance the claim
that the Americans consented to the settlement of 1688–9, and thus consented
to both subordinate colonial legislatures and parliamentary supremacy
in the empire, Jefferson derives the colonial connection to Britain solely
is “valuable only because it is the freedom to form a people by establishing a government”

(John Zvesper, “Jefferson on Liberal Natural Rights,” in Reason and Republicanism, Gary
McDowell and Sharon Noble, eds. [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997]: pp. 15–
17). I concur with Zvesper’s conclusion that Jefferson’s robust and complex idea of natu-
ral rights may provide a salutary correction to the “unreasonable fear of nature and the
ethical and political implications of human nature” (what Zvesper calls “physiophobia”)
seen in nineteenth- and twentieth-century critics of natural rights theories. Cf. Ralph Lerner,
The Thinking Revolutionary (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987): p. 61 and Jean Yarbor-
ough, “Thomas Jefferson and Republicanism,” in Thomas Jefferson and the Politics of Na-
ture, Thomas Engeman, ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000):
pp. 66, 74–5.
7 Hannah Arendt suggests that Jefferson’s emigrants settled what amounted to “breeding
grounds for revolutionaries from the beginning” (Hannah Arendt, On Revolution [New York:
Viking Press, 1963], p. 123). For a similar analysis, see Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of
the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 83; William
Hedges, “Telling off the King: Jefferson’s Summary View as American Fantasy,” Early American
Literature, vol. 22, no. 3 (Fall 1987): p. 166; and James Stoner, Common Law and Liberal
Theory: Coke, Hobbes, and the Origins of American Constitutionalism (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1992): p. 194.
8 Jefferson, SV, p. 106. Cf. Algernon Sidney, The Discourses Concerning Government, Thomas
West, ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1996): ch. 3, sec. 28, pp. 481–2, for a similar appeal
to the libertarian origins of the British Constitution in the original Saxon democracy.
from the first settlements in America. Moreover, Jefferson’s understanding

of this connection is much more restricted that it was for Otis. He claims:
The settlements having been thus effected in the wilds of America, the emigrants
thought proper to adopt that system of laws under which they had hitherto lived
in the mother country, and to continue their union with her by submitting themselves
to the same common sovereign, who was thereby made the central link connecting
the several parts of the empire thus newly multiplied.9
The natural liberty of the immigrants to America included the total freedom
to establish whichever form of government they pleased. They chose to adopt
the British system of laws, namely, representative assemblies and the common
law, and they retained the British monarch as their supreme executive power.
Whereas for Otis, asserting the colonial component in the empirewide act of
consent to the Glorious Revolution settlement left the colonial legislatures
in a theoretically unstable subordinate status vis-à-vis Parliament, Jefferson
declares that each colonial legislature was made supreme by the people of the
several colonies. In conformity with Locke’s delegation theory of sovereignty,
Jefferson argues that the colonial assemblies were the bodies to which the
colonists delegated supreme legislative power. That they chose to retain their
links with the crown was entirely, in this view, a matter of prudence, habit,
or affection, not a preceding obligation or legal tie.
What, then, is Parliament’s constitutional relation to the colonies? Ac-
cording to Jefferson, there is none. The colonies were not established by
Britain: “America was conquered, and her settlements made, and firmly es-
tablished at the expence [sic] of individuals, and not of the British pub-
lic.” Once again, Jefferson’s central contention is that the first settlers of
the colonies were free individuals who were, he states, quoting Locke, “free
from any Superiour Power on Earth, and not . . . under the Will or Legislative
Authority of Man.”10 Subsequent actions of the British government, such as
9 Jefferson, SV, p. 107.

10 Jefferson, SV, p. 106 and Locke, II:22. Jefferson’s claim that Britain and the American colonies
constituted distinct states held together only by a common connection to the British crown
was echoed in the months following the writing of the Summary View by John Adams and
James Wilson (John Adams, “Novanglus Letters,” The Political Writings of John Adams,
George Peek, ed. [New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954): pp. 42, 46–7 and James Wilson,
“Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Par-
liament,” Selected Political Essays of James Wilson, Randolph G. Adams, ed. [New York:
Knopf, 1930]: pp. 66, 75–82). However, Jefferson’s argument was more radical than that of
Adams and Wilson inasmuch as the latter two both maintained that the American colonists
remained subject to the crown before, during, and after they settled the colonies. In this
view, the colonists were in no way subject to Parliament but had never ceased to be sub-
ject to the crown (Adams, “Novanglus,” pp. 60–1; Wilson, “Considerations,” pp. 76–7; cf.
Anthony Lewis, “Jefferson’s Summary View as Chart of Political Union,” William and Mary
Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1 [January 1948]: p. 45 and Mayer, Constitutional Thought, p. 39).
Thus Jefferson’s use of the Lockean natural right of emigration had the effect of producing
sending troops to defend the colonies during the wars with France, should
not, according to Jefferson, be construed as explicit or even implicit recog-
nition of British sovereignty over America. “Such assistance,” he argues,
“they had often given before to Portugal, and other allied states . . . , yet
these states never supposed that by calling in her aid, they thereby submit-
ted themselves to her sovereignty.”11 Notably, it is on the basis of natural
jurisprudence rather than British constitutional custom that Jefferson makes
the astonishing claim that the American colonies are no more legally or con-
stitutionally bound to the British government than are foreign allied states
such as Portugal.12 Jefferson asserts that despite the undoubted value of
British assistance to America in the past, if such support had compromised
American sovereignty, the colonists “would have rejected them with disdain,
and trusted for better to the moderation of their enemies, or to a vigorous
exertion of their own force.”13 Far from granting Parliament supreme power
to regulate imperial trade and defense policy, in this radical formulation of
the empire the colonies stand in relation to Britain as at most allies, and
increasingly as estranged ones.
In his statement of colonial rights, “Our Rights,” Jefferson claims a nat-
ural right of complete self-government based on the natural liberty of the
first settlers in America. The retention of the British monarch as the supreme
executive office in the constitutional orders of the various colonies is, he
argues, in no way inconsistent with this natural liberty. The British king is
the American king, “the chief officer” of the American people “appointed”
by their laws.14 His constitutional status in America, according to Jefferson,
is in no way derived from the settlement of the British Constitution in the
Glorious Revolution. Despite this statement of the natural rights principles
informing “our rights,” Jefferson uses much of the Summary View to illus-
trate the frequent and increasingly serious “invasions of them” by the British
government. His treatment of the British violations of American rights is
an even more emphatic statement of colonial autonomy than these others, inasmuch as, in
Jefferson’s view, the connection to the crown was the function of a deliberate act of consent
on the part of the colonists.
12 Jefferson’s explicit and articulate formulation of Lockean natural rights as the basis of the
colonial position undermines Stephen Conrad’s claim that Jefferson had no single, coherent
notion of rights in the Summary View. While I agree with Conrad that Jefferson’s rights
teaching is complex, I do not believe this complexity indicates “the manifest contingency of
rights talk” in the Summary View (Stephen Conrad, “Putting Rights Talk in Its Place: The
Summary View Revisited,” in Jeffersonian Legacies, Peter Onuf, ed. (Charlottesville: University
of Virginia Press, 1993), p. 216 (see also pp. 262–3, 265, 273).
14 Ibid., SV, p. 105. This presentation of the British monarch as the “chief officer” of the people
is clearly as subversive of British moderate Whig constitutional theory as it is of British
imperial policy (cf. Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, pp. 8, 13–14).
divided into two parts: a discussion of past historical abuses and the more
recent (and more dangerous) invasions of the 1770s.
Historical Violations of “Our Rights”: Property and Trade

Jefferson’s historical account of Anglo-American relations is little short of a
litany of abuses perpetrated by Britain on the colonies. He uses this account to
demonstrate the natural rights of the colonies by illuminating the principles
of right violated in each particular instance. By demonstrating that imperial
relations have not historically been as sanguine as Otis or Dickinson suggest,
Jefferson tries to justify the radical implications of his theory of empire.
That British constitutional practice and past imperial policy have consistently
injured the colonists’ natural rights does not in any way legitimize these
injuries.15 Just as Jefferson’s discussion of the natural right of emigration
effaced the normative status of the Glorious Revolution for the colonies, so
too does his treatment of past British abuses undermine the legitimacy of
claims to parliamentary sovereignty based on past imperial policy.
Jefferson’s discussion of these past historical abuses extends back to the
Stuart era long before 1689. The first issue he addresses is the customary prac-
tice of royal land grants dating back to the very infancy of the colonies. As
we recall, a key part of Jefferson’s argument, for the colonists’ natural right
to form new societies was his claim that the colonies were established by the
blood and treasure of the individual emigrants, not the “British public.”16
However, after the first settlements, Jefferson argues, the “treasonable”
Stuart kings “parted out and distributed among the favorites and follow-
ers of their fortunes” titles to lands in America. Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and the Carolinas were all granted to these royal dependents by letters of
the crown to right “in propriety” to American lands. These actions were
taken generally without the consent of the inhabitants.17 Jefferson charged
15 Jefferson uses history as a supplement to his more fundamental natural rights argument. It
is not his primary source for understanding the basis of colonial claims in the sense Colbourn
suggests, nor is history used, as Conrad argues, simply to demonstrate the inefficacy of rights
claims without constitutional and legal support (see H. Trevor Colbourn, “Jefferson’s Use of
the Past,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., vol. 15 [January 1958]: pp. 56–70 and Conrad,
“Rights Talk,” pp. 262, 273). For a good discussion of the way Jefferson used both historical
and logical demonstration in the Summary View to support the natural rights foundation of
the colonists’ position, see Mayer, Constitutional Thought, pp. 29–37 and Robert Webking,
The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1988): pp. 94–5.
17 Ibid., pp. 107–8. Jefferson notes, however, that the Whig lords who were granted title to the
Carolinas were only given the power to make laws and to tax “with the consent of the inhab-
itants.” We recall that John Locke himself was the framer of the prototype “Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolina” (see John Locke, “Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina,” in
that this alleged royal power “of dividing and dismembering a country” has
never occurred or been asserted “in his majesty’s realm of England.”18 The
natural right of the colonists to resist or prevent the dismemberment of their
lands is as valid, according to Jefferson, as the right of Englishmen precisely
because this is a natural right. With this argument, he makes the startling as-
sertion that the natural right of colonial self-government has been threatened
by Britain since practically the first settlement of America.
This discussion of the dismemberment of American lands by royal grants
points to Jefferson’s reflections on the natural right to property. He begins
these reflections by taking “notice of an error in the nature of our land hold-
ings, which crept in at a very early period of our settlement.” The error was
the introduction of the English system of “feudal tenures” into the colonies.
According to the feudal system, which was established in England after the
Norman Conquest in order to pacify and suppress the native Saxons, the fun-
damental notion of property rights was the general principle that “all lands
in Europe were held either mediately or immediately of the crown.” Prior
to the Conquest, Jefferson claims, “our Saxon ancestors” held their lands
on the basis of fee simple, that is, with none of the military and labor obli-
gations associated with feudalism, and their personal property in “absolute
dominion, disencumbered with any superior.”19 This pre-Conquest princi-
ple of property rights, which Jefferson terms the “allodial system,” generally
conforms to the Lockean idea of property rights as natural, deriving from
an individual’s labor.20 By this principle, people in a state of nature can ap-
propriate lands or goods through their own labor without the sanction of
any higher authority. As a general principle of property rights in civil society,
the allodial systems would establish proprietary rights in any vacant land on
which the individual should choose to occupy and labor. Jefferson draws this
distinction between the feudal and allodial systems to demonstrate that land
in America is held on the basis of allodial right, not by feudal right as the
original and mediate property of the crown. He argues: “America was not
conquered by William the Norman, nor its lands surrendered to him, or any
of his successors. Possessions there are undoubtedly of the ‘allodial nature’.”
Political Essays, Mark Goldie, ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997]: pp. 160–
82).
18 Jefferson, SV, p. 108. Cf. Locke II:117.
19 Jefferson, SV, pp. 118–19.
20 See Locke II: ch. 5, esp. 25–7. Richard Matthews contends that Jefferson did not assert any
natural right to property, but rather expounded solely a natural right of expatriation that
implied the power to settle new positive laws regarding property in the colonies (Richard
Matthews, The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson [Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1984]: pp. 24–6). I believe Matthews’ mistake is to misread a moderate Whig Pufendorfian
argument for property (as he identifies Jefferson with Blackstone on the issue of property)
into Jefferson’s decidedly radical Whig emphasis on the connection between labor and a
natural, as opposed to purely civil, property right.
Even if, as Jefferson admits, “our ancestors . . . were farmers, not lawyers,”
and were unfortunately “early persuaded to believe” in “the fictitious prin-
ciple that all land belongs originally to the king,” this nonetheless did not
in any way diminish the colonists’ natural right to appropriate vacant land
through their own labor or to establish a system of property laws consistent
with this core Lockean principle.21
Jefferson’s point in this discussion is not to illustrate that the Americans
have a different system of property rights than the British. His aim, rather,
is to demonstrate that the colonists possessed the natural right of self-
government available to all people. And a central feature of self-government
is a society’s control over its system of property holdings. In a clear parallel to
Locke’s account of the civil status of property in a self-governing community,
Jefferson argues:
From the nature and purpose of civil institutions, all the lands within the limits which
any particular society has circumscribed around itself are assumed by that society,
and subject to their allotment only. This may be done by themselves, assembled collec-
tively, or by their legislature, to whom they may have delegated sovereign authority;
and if they are allotted in neither of these ways, each individual of the society may
appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant.22
Given that the purpose of “civil institutions” is to secure the property of

the individuals in society, it is illogical to assume that any agent extrinsic to
that society could exercise a form of control over its property. This Lockean
principle had, of course, been at the core of the imperial dispute over taxation
at least since the time of the Stamp Act.
The second major historical abuse of the colonists’ natural rights by
Britain had to do with the issue of trade. Jefferson argues: “The exercise of a
free trade with all parts of the world, possessed by the American colonists, as
of natural right, and which no law of their own had taken away or abridged,
was next the object of unjust encroachment” by the British government.23
Jefferson’s assertion of a natural right of free trade sheds some light on the
complex character of his rights teaching. His point is not to deny that cer-
tain natural rights, like trade, are never subject to legitimate public control
or regulation; actually, he emphasizes that these natural rights may be “taken
away or abridged” by law. The point Jefferson makes in this discussion is
that only laws made by the colonists can regulate or restrict this natural right.
In one fell swoop, Jefferson more or less demolishes the earlier colonial po-
sition, the “half-way house” of Otis and Dickinson, which admitted that
Parliament had the right, to regulate imperial trade. This “natural right” of
free trade means that only the colonial governments can legitimately place

22 Ibid., pp. 119–20. See also, Locke II: 125, 127, 138–40.
any commercial restrictions on their citizens. The free trade right, and the
broader issue of commercial freedom more generally, flow from Jefferson’s
fundamental premise of the individual natural right to property. From this
bedrock Lockean principle Jefferson concludes that the Americans not only
may manufacture “for our own use the articles we raise on our own lands
with our own labor,” they may also trade these goods with whomever is
allowable by their own laws. He claims that the historical restrictions placed
by Parliament on this natural right are “instances of despotism to which
no parallel can be produced in the most arbitrary ages in British history.”24
From this discussion, it is apparent that Jefferson’s emphasis on the natural
basis of property rights perceptibly and logically extends to a broader treat-
ment of the natural right of self-government. Inasmuch as the individuals
in the colonies hold their property under a system of laws devised by them-
selves, Parliament has no ground to claim an antecedent right to regulate
their trade.
Jefferson’s discussion of the natural right of free trade is notable for sev-
eral reasons. First, it signals his radical departure from the earlier colonial
position of the 1760s. For Jefferson, in contrast to Otis and Dickinson,
Parliament may well have passed laws regulating American trade, but it
never had a right to do so. The general thrust of Jefferson’s reasoning is to
undermine the normative status of British imperial practice and to expose
the many invasions of colonial natural rights, which have been accepted by
the Americans themselves simply out of an uncritical and trusting respect
for tradition and precedent. Second, Jefferson’s opposition to Parliament’s
regulation of imperial trade demonstrates his willingness to abandon the
conceptual distinction between internal and external controls. The earlier
colonial position maintained that the internal affairs of the colonies should
be governed by the colonial legislatures, but that external affairs – issues
that could plausibly fall into the category of imperial affairs – afforded the
British government considerable scope for regulating key aspects of life in
the colonies such as commerce and trade. In Jefferson’s view, however, the
British government had always interfered with colonial internal affairs, not
only by imposing trade restrictions and banning domestic manufactures, but
also by such measures as “establishing a post office in America,” in which
the British government has “intermeddled with the regulation of the internal
affairs of the colonies.”25 Once again, Jefferson does not legitimize the un-
deniable example of parliamentary intrusion witnessed in the creation of the
post office. He does not even attempt to connect this action with any prior
evidence of colonial consent. His point is not to argue against the utility of
a continental postal service, but rather to focus on what he takes to be the
24 Ibid., p. 109.
25 Ibid., p. 110.
disturbing question of where the British government ever acquired the right
to introduce such a system into the colonies.
The third important feature of Jefferson’s historical treatment of Anglo-
American relations is his attempt to demonstrate to the king and to his fellow
colonists that legislative assemblies provide no guarantee against oppression.
He claims: “History has informed us that bodies of men, as well as individ-
uals, are susceptible to the spirit of tyranny.”26 Jefferson asserts that one
important constitutional lesson emerging from Anglo-American historical
relations is the potential for legislative tyranny arising even from representa-
tive bodies. This problem is emphatically more acute in the American situa-
tion, in which the legislature assuming this authority over the colonists is one
in which they are not represented. In Jefferson’s view, insofar as Parliament
is not directly responsible to the colonists, “they are beyond the reach of fear,
the only restraining motive which may hold the hand of a tyrant.”27 Fear and
distrust of the oligarchical tendencies in even the most representative assem-
blies would come to mark Jefferson’s general approach to the question of the
proper limits on legislative power.28 This fear of legislative tyranny, of course,
takes on greater poignancy when the government resides 3,000 miles away
from the people it aspires to govern and, as Jefferson suggests, cannot even
claim to represent the entire British people in any meaningful sense. By this
measure, the extension of parliamentary rule throughout the empire on the
basis of the Glorious Revolution or any other pretense is simply illegitimate.
Despite the seemingly inherent instability of Anglo-American relations since
the very origins of the colonies, Jefferson argues that these historic abuses
of the colonists’ natural rights were tolerable inasmuch as they “were less
alarming, because repeated at more distant intervals than that rapid and
bold succession of injuries which is likely to distinguish the present from all
other periods of the American story.”29 To Jefferson’s account of the present
period of the “American story” we now turn.
Recent Invasions of “Our Rights”: Coercion and Dissolution

The theoretical innovation in Jefferson’s position from the one advanced by
the colonial moderates prior to the Summary View is linked to a material
change in the character of the imperial dispute. In his treatment of the more
26 Ibid., SV, p. 108.

27 Ibid., SV, p. 112.
28 See, for example, Jefferson’s criticism of the 1776 Virginia Constitution for concentrating
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government in the legislative branch: “The
concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It
will be no alleviation that these powers be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a
single one. 173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one” (Jefferson, Notes on the State
of Virginia [New York: Penguin, 1999]: Query XIII, p. 126).
recent British abuses of the colonies, Jefferson asserts that by 1774 “a se-
ries of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period, and pursued unalterably
through every change of ministers, too plainly prove a deliberate and system-
atical plan of reducing us to slavery.” The dire situation facing the colonists
at this time was caused by the specific nature of the recent parliamentary
actions. Whereas the debate in the 1760s had to do primarily with the issue
of taxation, by the 1770s Jefferson mentions the Stamp Act and Townshend
duties only in passing, focusing rather on parliamentary measures such as the
act suspending the New York legislature and the Coercive Acts, which struck
against the very existence of the colonial institutions of self-government. As
Robert Webking explains: “The taxation acts violated the principle of self-
determination, but the suspension of the legislature rejected it.”30 By the time
Jefferson added his own pen to the authors of the “American story,” the is-
sue was no longer simply dangerous precedents; now it was the arbitrary
dissolution of colonial legislatures and the practical imposition of martial
law in the colonies.
The two foci of Jefferson’s account of the recent British violations of
American natural rights are the act suspending the New York legislature
and the Coercive Acts, the most important of which closed Boston harbor as
punishment for the illegal destruction of goods in the celebrated Tea Party of
1773. In describing the illegitimacy of the parliamentary measure suspend-
ing the New York legislature for its refusal to sanction the quartering of
British troops in the colony, Jefferson appeals far beyond imperial custom
and British constitutional practice to support his position. The standard to
which he appeals is nature: “One free and independent legislature hereby
takes upon itself to suspend the powers of another, free and independent as
itself; thus exhibiting a phoenomenon [sic] unknown in nature, the creator
and creature of its own power.”31 Here Jefferson’s argument rests on the
Lockean teaching that the power of a legislative body derives from the nat-
ural executive power of the people who created it. Insofar as the people of
the colonies never delegated to Parliament any power over their assemblies,
this act is an unwarranted and unjustifiable violation of their natural rights.
Could Parliament dissolve the Cortes of Spain or the Diets in Germany and
Poland? Of course not. Then, Jefferson’s reasoning goes, on what grounds
can the British government act so arbitrarily with respect to New York?
Any assertion of parliamentary authority over the colonies is a prima facie
violation of their natural rights.
The standard to which Jefferson appeals to criticize the suspension of one
legislature by the act of another is emphatically natural, not British consti-
tutional custom and practice. He contends that the colonists would have
to renounce “the common feelings of human nature” if they were to admit
30 Webking, American Revolution, p. 96.

31 Jefferson, SV, p. 111 (cf. Locke, II:87, II:123–31).
“that they hold their political existence at the will of a British parliament.”32
The political existence of the colonies derives solely from the consent of the
individuals inhabiting them. Thus, by suspending the legislature of the peo-
ple of New York, in effect destroying their political existence, the people of
this colony are “reduced to a state of nature.” Jefferson suggests that the
radical consequences of this act are dissolution of the government and de-
volution of political power to the individuals in the colony. This is precisely
the Lockean principle that British constitutional theorists like the influential
William Blackstone could not accept as the legitimate juridical or even logi-
cal consequence of Parliament’s action.33 Implicit in Jefferson’s argument is
the notion of the people of New York’s absolute liberty to alter or abolish
the old form of government and to establish a new political society. In pure
Lockean form, Jefferson argues:
While those bodies are in existence to whom the people have delegated the powers
of legislation, they alone possess and may exercise those powers; but when they are
dissolved by the lopping off of one or more of their branches, the power reverts to
the people, who may exercise it to unlimited extent, either assembling together in
person, sending deputies, or in any other way they may think proper.34
Jefferson claims that the practical consequence of Parliament’s action is the

theoretical possibility that British moderate Whig constitutionalists most
abhorred: the dissolution of government. According to Jefferson, this con-
sequence is inevitable given that “every society must at all times possess
within itself the sovereign powers of legislation,” and as such, the people of
the colonies, who are reduced to this state of nature, must, and are perfectly
free to, reconstitute the legislative power of their society.
This discussion of the suspension of the New York legislature exempli-
fies Jefferson’s use of radical Whig theory to counter the intensified scope of
Parliament’s pretensions to ruling the colonies. Denying that the colonists
have delegated any authority to Parliament provides Jefferson with stronger
theoretical resources than were available to Otis and Dickinson. In straight
Lockean terms Jefferson can, and does, insist on the independence of the
colonial governments vis-à-vis Parliament. There is no question of subor-
dinate powers for Jefferson. Otis and Dickinson’s argument for a colonial
subordinate legislative status may be a more reasonable explanation for the
actual practice of Anglo-American relations than Jefferson’s view – that to
the naked eye, Parliament always looked like the biggest fish in the impe-
rial pond and Americans seemed to accept it with some limitations, at least
prior to the 1770s. Jefferson’s argument, while counterintuitive given his

33 For Blackstone’s explicit criticism of Locke’s argument for the principle of dissolution, see
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London, 1791): vol. 1, p. 213.
own admission of Parliament’s constant interference in the colonies, does at

least provide the theoretical resources to indict any British effort to legis-
late in the colonies. In the Summary View the logic of colonial resistance is
simpler, less restrictive, and more internally consistent than in any previous
statement of the colonial position.
The other recent example of British encroachments against the colonies
that Jefferson cites is the closing of Boston harbor. This component of the
Coercive Acts produced his longest discussion of any single British misdeed.
By this act, he argues, “a large and populous town, whose trade was their sole
subsistence, was deprived of that trade, and involved in utter ruin.”35 Here
Jefferson introduces another dimension in his argument against Parliament.
It is not surprising that he finds that Parliament has no legal or constitutional
right to close Boston harbor, because it has no legitimate authority over the
colonies whatsoever. However, Jefferson also goes on to muse: “Let us for
a while suppose the question of right suspended, in order to examine this
act on principles of justice.”36 It should be noted that Jefferson’s distinction
between matters of “rights” and matters of “justice” at this point in his
argument does not indicate, as some have claimed, the secondary importance
of natural rights in Jefferson’s complex and multifaceted rights teaching. As
is clear from the context of this discussion, namely, the closing of Boston
harbor, Jefferson intends to illustrate how natural rights claims constitute
the core of his understanding of justice. He goes beyond the issue of the
constitutional or legal competence of Parliament’s action regarding Boston
harbor to examine the character of the legislation itself.37 With this example,
Jefferson addresses the question of whether not only Parliament, but any
government, could legitimately take a measure like closing a city’s harbor as
a punitive action. In other words, Jefferson widens the lens of his analysis
of this act in order to ponder whether even the Massachusetts legislature
would be justified in closing down the commercial activity in one area under
its jurisdiction as punishment for disobedience of its laws. The answer he
gives is a resounding no.
First, Jefferson argues that this sweeping government action is completely
out of proportion to the alleged offense. It is inherently wrong and contrary
35 Ibid., p. 112.
36 Ibid., Stephen Conrad (“Rights Talk,” p. 266) takes this to mean that here Jefferson “moves
beyond arguments based on ‘rights’ to arguments based on the larger, ultimate standard
of ‘justice’.” Conrad (p. 269) even goes so far as to suggest that Jefferson’s various uses
of “rights” in the Summary View “evinces ambivalence and ambiguity to the point of in-
coherence.” While I agree with Conrad that Jefferson’s use of the concept of rights is very
complex in this document, I believe Conrad exaggerates the importance of Jefferson’s distinc-
tion between justice and rights. Indeed, I maintain that justice is the core principle animating
Jefferson’s rights teaching in the Summary View.
37 Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame,
IN: Press, 1996): p. 262, n. 35.
to the principles of natural equity to punish an entire city for the crimes of
a few individuals – in this case, the small band who “threw the tea into the
ocean, and dispersed without doing any other act of violence.”38 Thus, ac-
cording to Jefferson, if any government, even presumably an American one,
had acted in this arbitrary and disproportionate way, it would have been
unjustified. Second, and more importantly, Jefferson affirms that no govern-
ment whatsoever may produce legislation that intentionally endangers the
property and self-preservation of its people. Here he draws on Locke’s first
limit on legislative power, which states that the supreme legislative power
may not act arbitrarily “over the Lives and Fortunes of the People.” Locke
even claims that there are serious natural law limitations on the right of con-
querors in a just war with respect to confiscating property and restricting
the economic activity of the rightfully conquered.39 Jefferson argues that by
passing a measure intended to reduce Boston, “that antient [sic] and wealthy
town,” from “opulence to beggary” and to force its citizens “on the world
for subsistence by its charities,” Parliament is assuming a power that no
government, not even a victor in a just war, may legitimately exercise.40 The
Lockean premise underlying Jefferson’s argument is that the purpose of gov-
ernment is to protect the lives and property of all the individuals in society.
Government may not arbitrarily deny individuals the natural right to the
means of self-preservation. Thus, Jefferson’s purpose in discussing the clos-
ing of Boston harbor is to abstract somewhat from the particular question
of parliamentary encroachments on the colonies in order to reflect on the
fundamental Lockean teaching on the natural limits on government power.
By this means Jefferson assimilates the concepts and universalist reasoning
of Lockean philosophy into an examination of specific issues of right.41 This
discussion is clearly not anomalous in the Summary View because it serves to
highlight the Lockean natural rights principles underlying Jefferson’s com-
prehensive position.
Jefferson’s account of the colonists’ rights and the British government’s
frequent violations of these rights is replete with recourse to distinctively
Lockean principles of natural rights and government. In effect, Jefferson
employs historical analysis in order to demonstrate the natural, as opposed

39 Locke, II:135, II:182–4.
41 While I agree with Stoner that Jefferson displays a keen capacity to apply abstract notions
of right to the settlement of particular issues, I am not convinced that this illustrates the
workings of a “common law mind” (Stoner, Common Law, p. 189). The general thrust of
the argument in the Summary View for the most part avoids appeals to the common law
tradition. In the Boston harbor example, as well as in his fundamental treatment of the
natural emigration right, it appears that Jefferson is relying on a natural, as opposed to
a constitutional or common law, authority to explain colonial relations with the mother
country.
to the simply constitutional or contingent, character of the violation of those

rights. Through his detailed treatment of Parliament’s historic abuses of the
rights of American self-government from the infancy of the colonies up to
the very brink of the revolution, Jefferson tries to prove that Parliament has
undermined both the formal legal basis of the colonies’ limited relations with
Britain and the substantive principles of Lockean natural rights philosophy
informing these relations.
The Problem of the British Executive

Whereas Parliament, according to Jefferson, has no legal or constitutional
role in the colonies, in his version of the empire the British crown most
emphatically does. A central aim of the Summary View is both to articulate
the proper role of the king in the empire and colonies and to illustrate the
obvious failure of the present king, George III, to perform the constitutional
function assigned to him by the colonists. Jefferson claims that any serious
reflection on the king’s conduct as the holder of “the executive powers of the
laws of these states” will “mark out his deviations from the line of duty.”42
One aspect of the monarch’s deviation from his constitutional responsibility
is his failure to recognize the inherently limited character of any delegated
authority. This authority must be used nonarbitrarily and only for the pub-
lic good. A prime example of this breach of trust is the stationing of troops
in the colonies. Jefferson argues that the king, “in order to enforce the ar-
bitrary measures” of Parliament, has sent to the colonies “large bodies of
armed forces, not made up of the people here, nor raised by the authority
of our laws.”43 He claims that the king was never granted the power to
bring foreign troops to America, and as such, these troops are legitimately
subject to American law made for the suppression of riots, sedition, and
unlawful assemblies. Behind Jefferson’s reasoning is the Lockean teaching
and the “Old Whig” tenet that any people who do not have legal control
over the public use of force are incapable of securing their lives, property,
and liberty. The king threatens to place civil authority in the colonies un-
der the British military. With rhetoric and logic deeply rooted in the radical
Whig anti–standing army literature of the late seventeenth and early eigh-
teenth centuries, Jefferson charges, “did his majesty possess such a right
as this, it might swallow up all our other rights whenever he should think
proper.”44

43 Ibid., p. 120.
44 Ibid., Cf. Locke, II:90–4. A prime example of the Old Whig anti–standing army literature
with which Jefferson was familiar is by Cato’s Letters’ coauthor, John Trenchard, entitled
An Argument shewing that a Standing Army Is Inconsistent with a Free Government (London,
1697). Cf. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, p. 62.
In addition to violating the natural rights of the colonists by thrusting

upon them an armed force to which they did not consent, Jefferson charges
that the king’s conduct shows a clear double standard in his behavior towards
the colonies and Britain. He points out that when during the Seven Years
War the king wanted to bring over Hanoverian troops to defend Britain
against the French, he applied to Parliament first, which passed an act for
that purpose that limited the number of troops and how long they could
stay in the country. Jefferson claims that this supplies more than precedent,
but is in fact the only legitimate course of action the monarch could have
taken, and thus “in like manner is his majesty restrained in every part of the
empire.”45
Another example of the king’s failure to attend to the limited character
of delegated power, and his double standard toward the colonies, relates to
the issue of dissolution. This power must be distinguished from Locke’s dis-
solution of government theory. The king’s dissolution power is a legal one,
established in the Constitution, but consists only of providing the monarch
with the capacity to dissolve a legislature with the purpose of providing for
new elections whenever the public good requires them. Jefferson does not
deny that the executive may exercise this power, but he specifies that it is
restricted to occasions “when the representative body have lost the confi-
dence of their constituents.” Indeed, given that the frequent dissolution of
the Exclusion Parliaments by Charles II was one of the key whig indictments
against Stuart tyranny, Jefferson is more or less correct to observe that since
the early part of the eighteenth century, “neither his majesty, nor his an-
cestors, have exercised such a power in the island of Great Britain.”46 The
importance of a free Parliament was one of the core principles of the 1689
settlement. This, however, has not been the case in America, Jefferson ar-
gues, where the representative assemblies of “the colonies have repeatedly”
been dissolved by the crown and its agents, who “after dissolving one house
of representatives . . . have refused to call another, so that, for a great length
of time, the legislature provided by the laws has been out of existence.”47
By charging that the king has carried the dissolution power beyond “every
limit known, or provided for, by the laws,” Jefferson essentially accuses him
of having done repeatedly in the various colonies what Parliament is now
being called to account for in New York.

46 Ibid., p. 117. For evidence that the architects of the Glorious Revolution era settlement were
deeply concerned with the need to guarantee free and regular Parliaments, see Articles 1, 2,
4, 8, and 9 of the Declaration of Rights and especially Article 13, which stipulates, “For the
redress of all grievances and for the amending strengthening and preserving of the Lawes,
Parliaments ought to be held frequently” (“Declaration of Rights,” in Lois Schwoerer, The
Declaration of Rights, 1689 [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981]: pp. 295–8).
Jefferson’s point here is not simply, or even primarily, to expose British

hypocrisy toward the colonies, but rather to articulate the natural rights prin-
ciples underlying American Whig reasoning in the crisis. The problem is not
that the king is merely inconsistent in applying a perfectly legitimate consti-
tutional power to Britain and the colonies. The fundamental problem is that
in the colonies the king uses his dissolution power to invade the colonists’
natural right to self-government as reflected in their laws. Jefferson’s ulti-
mate authority, the idea to which he assigns the highest normative status,
here as throughout the Summary View, is nature: “From the nature of things,
every society must at all times possess within itself the sovereign powers of
legislation.”48 As such, the king’s failure to call new assemblies in a timely
fashion has undermined the purpose for which he was delegated the disso-
lution power in the first place.
Not only has the king broken the bounds of legitimate authority and
acted in ways inconsistent with the spirit of the British Constitution, at least
as he has acted toward the colonies, he has also neglected to do things he
ought to do. For example, the king ought to give his assent to measures
of the colonial legislatures manifestly directed to the public good. Rather
than doing this, however, Jefferson charges, “for the most trifling reasons,
and sometimes no conceivable reason at all, his majesty has rejected laws of
the most salutary tendency.” Once again, the crown’s proclivity for vetoing
colonial legislation is not in keeping with contemporary British constitu-
tional practice, inasmuch as “his majesty, and his ancestors . . . for several
ages past have modestly declined the exercise of this power in that part of
the empire called Great Britain.”49 Jefferson cites two important examples
of the malignant consequences of this breach of British constitutional custom
in the colonies. The first relates to the issue of slavery. Jefferson, speaking
for the Virginia delegation, asserts: “The abolition of domestic slavery is the
great object of desire in those colonies, where it was unhappily introduced
in their infant state.” The first step in such a project of abolition is the pro-
hibition of the African slave trade. But Jefferson charges that every effort by
the colonial legislatures to effectively ban this trade by imposing prohibitive
duties has “been hitherto defeated by his majesty’s negative.” By placing the
interests of a “few African corsairs” above the interests of the American
people, the king, according to Jefferson, has violated “the rights of human
nature.”50 This charge goes beyond a simple criticism of a specific royal ac-
tion; it constitutes a stinging indictment of a constitutional actor brutally
indifferent to the natural rights to life and liberty. Jefferson strongly hints
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 115.
50 Ibid., p. 116. Jefferson leveled an almost identical charge against George III in the list of
grievances in his original draft of the Declaration of Independence, which was later omitted
by the Committee at the Continental Congress.
that the king’s failure to use the veto power in the colonies in a measured,
prudent, and morally enlightened way may force dramatic constitutional
change in the form of “some legal restrictions” on the crown.
Another example of the king’s failure to assent to clearly salutary laws
is his instruction to his governor in Virginia not to agree to any law for
the establishment of new counties “unless the new county will consent to
have no representation in assembly.”51 The practical effects of such a mea-
sure are to restrict the westward expansion of the colony and to confine the
legislative body in Virginia to its present number. The people of the west-
ern counties, which, Jefferson argues, are “of indefinite extent,” would be
substantially injured in their civil rights, often having to travel hundreds of
miles to seek relief for injuries in their county courts. Apart from the obvious
practical difficulties created by the crown’s decision, Jefferson finds an even
more serious objection to the king’s willingness to violate the principle of
representation. By denying many citizens of Virginia “the glorious right of
representation,” the crown threatens to tear away at a principle woven into
the very fabric of colonial liberty. At the heart of the colonial rallying cry,
Locke’s dictum of “No taxation, Without Representation,” lay the natural
rights principle that government exists for the protection of life, liberty, and
property.52 The effect of creating new counties without representation in the
colonial assembly is to impose taxes and laws on these individuals without
their consent. In this sense, the Virginia county issue was the broader colonial
issue writ small: In both cases, the abusive action of the king or Parliament
worked to subvert the proper end of government.
The Radical Theory of the Empire

In the closing section of the Summary View Jefferson turns from recounting
the crown’s and Parliament’s abuse of the colonies to constructing a posi-
tive formulation of the proper relations between the British and American
constitutional orders. It is here in his closing statement, as it were, and only
after he has treated the issue of natural rights and their violations in the
colonies at considerable length, that Jefferson outlines his radical theory of
the empire.
Jefferson’s radical theory of imperial relations is a direct manifestation
of his Lockeanism. As we have seen, it is based on three central principles.
51 Ibid. Jefferson’s complaint about the abuse of the principle of representation in the colonies
also pointed to what he took to be serious inadequacies in the representative system in Britain
at the time. In this respect, Jefferson’s argument parallels the concern of British radicals such
as James Burgh and Granville Sharp, who saw faulty representation as one of the deepest
constitutional problems in Britain (see Colin Bonwick, English Radicals and the American
Revolution [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977]: pp. 145–9 and Mayer,
Constitutional Thought, pp. 36–7).
52 See Locke, II:140.
First, Parliament has no jurisdiction over the colonies whatsoever. Since the
people of the colonies never delegated any of their natural executive power
to the British Parliament, there can be no legitimate grounds for the British
government to interfere in the colonies, even in the limited and historically
exercised role of regulating imperial trade and defense policy. In this respect,
Jefferson went further in denying parliamentary involvement in the colonies
than earlier luminaries like Otis and Dickinson.53 In Jefferson’s formula-
tion of imperial relations, any parliamentary effort to govern the colonies
is tantamount to a state of war, or as Locke put it, the use of “Force with-
out Right.”54 Second, Jefferson argues that the colonies retained the British
monarch as the supreme executive power in their constitutional orders. In
Lockean terms, the supreme executive is a power “vested in a single Person,
who has also a share in the Legislative.”55 Thus, Jefferson allows that the
king has a legitimate role in the colonial legislative process through such
measures as the veto and dissolution powers. These powers are, however,
delegated to the crown only on the condition that they are exercised demon-
strably for the public good. Third, Jefferson contends that not only is the
king, or his representative, a part of the colonial legislatures, but also that
the king is “thereby made the central link connecting the several parts of
the empire thus newly established.”56 As supreme executive power of the
various units constituting the empire, the king thus plays a mediating role
between and among them all; a kind of hereditary glue holding the empire
together in a federated commonwealth of self-governing peoples, in which
the legislatures of Rhode Island and Delaware are the constitutional equals
of Westminster.
Jefferson’s proposal for a remedy to the imperial dispute is based on this
radical theory of the empire and focuses on two major issues: the king’s
position as supreme executive agent in the colonial governments and the
king’s role as the only juridical or constitutional link between Britain and
the colonies. If, according to Jefferson’s radical theory of the empire, the
king is the sole constitutional actor with authority in both the colonies and
Britain, it is apparent that Jefferson believes George III has done a shabby job.
Clearly, one focus in the Summary View is to encourage the king to perform
his role in the colonial legislative process better, with more attention to the
specific needs of the colonies and with greater respect for the inherent limits
53 Apparently Jefferson’s theory of the empire was too radical for the cautious Virginia House
of Burgesses in 1774–5, which did not support Jefferson’s instructions to their delegates in
Philadelphia. For good discussions of the immediate practical effect of the Summary View in
America and England, see Conrad, “Rights Talk,” pp. 256–9 and Douglas Wilson, “Jefferson
and the Republic of Letters,” in Jeffersonian Legacies, Peter Onuf, ed. (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1993): p. 53.
54 Locke, II:19 (see also II:18).
55 Locke, II:151.
on delegated powers. The deeper thrust of the logic of Jefferson’s radical

imperial theory is, however, to force the king to change the way he relates to
Parliament. Jefferson calls on the king, as the only mediatory power between
the several states of the British Empire, “to recommend to his parliament
total revocation” of all acts injurious to the colonies.57 His appeal to the
king to defend the colonies against parliamentary encroachments extends
so far as to encourage the king to veto parliamentary legislation affecting
the colonies. Jefferson claims: “It is now . . . the great office of his majesty,
to resume the exercise of his negative power, and to prevent the passage of
laws by any one legislature of the empire which bear injuriously on the rights
and interests of another.”58 This pointed statement is clearly directed against
Westminster. Jefferson is calling on the king to use his veto power liberally
in Britain while restraining his use of the same power in the colonies! In
terms of British constitutional practice since the Glorious Revolution and of
imperial policy since the first settlements in America, this would truly signify
the world turned upside down. By Jefferson’s own admission, the veto power
had fallen into desuetude in Britain because monarchs since the demise of the
hapless James II have come to recognize “the impropriety of opposing their
single opinion to the united wisdom of two houses of parliament.”59 The
clear implication of Jefferson’s radical theory of the empire is that one of the
core elements of the British constitutional principle of legislative supremacy
must be altered, or even abandoned, if the king is to play his proper role as
the mediatory power between the several states of the British Empire.
The logical peak of Jefferson’s radical imperial theory is the postulation
that the king must protect the colonists against parliamentary encroachment
through the use of his veto power. Such a departure from British constitu-
tional practice and the doctrine of legislative supremacy enshrined in the
Glorious Revolution is necessary because of a “change of circumstances”
caused by “the addition of new states to the British empire,” which “has pro-
duced an addition of new, sometimes opposite interest.”60 The logic of this
imperial theory runs contrary to Robert Dawidoff’s claim that the Summary
View represents Jefferson’s attempt to reclaim the heritage of “English
Constitutionalism” for service in the colonial cause.61 The implication of
57 Ibid., p. 115.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. Webking (American Revolution, p. 97) suggests that Jefferson’s claim that the king has
not used his veto power properly “is far and away the most important of the grievances
against the king that Jefferson offers.”
61 Robert Dawidoff, “Rhetoric of Democracy,” in Thomas Jefferson and the Politics of Nature,
Thomas Engeman, ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), p. 106 (and
see also Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, pp. 14, 28–9). By presenting Jefferson’s argument in
the Summary View as torn between competing commitments to Lockean natural rights and
moderate Whig constitutionalism, Jaffa and Dawidoff attribute to Jefferson a position more
Jefferson’s argument is that the 1689 constitutional settlement in Britain is

untenable because of the imperial pressures produced by the inclusion of
numerous colonial governments directed to securing the natural rights of
their people. Jefferson forcefully argues that the practice of English consti-
tutionalism must change dramatically in the new imperial order. Could the
British government have accepted this formulation of imperial relations and
the implications it would hold for the British constitutional order? Theo-
retically, yes. British leaders, including the king and Parliament, could have
taken Jefferson’s proposal as simply another colonial warning to Parliament
to abandon its pretensions to ruling the colonies. Thus, if they had taken
Jefferson’s argument to heart and desisted from legislating for the Americans,
then the king, again at least in theory, would never have to use his veto to
protect the colonists. However, this scenario was always extremely unlikely,
especially given the express language of Parliament’s official statement on im-
perial relations in the 1766 Declaratory Act, which affirmed that it had the
authority “to make laws . . . to bind the Colonists and People of America . . . in
all cases whatsoever.”62 To retreat from this position to the one proposed by
Jefferson would be almost unthinkable to the British government.
From the British perspective, the theoretical objections to Jefferson’s rad-
ical theory of the empire cut to the heart of the way they understood their
own system of government. To accept that the British king had a share
in the colonial government that he held independently of the authority of
Parliament, a share of rule in the colonies rooted, à la Locke, exclusively in
the consent of the American people, would be to accept a principle of royal
independence that could potentially subvert the power of the two houses in
Britain’s balanced Constitution. In order to accommodate the colonial for-
mulation of the empire expressed by Jefferson, the British people would have
to countenance a potentially dangerous reversal of the principle of legislative
supremacy established in 1689. An imperial king with colonial sympathies
who actively employed the veto in Britain could raise money or even troops
in America for use in Britain. In British constitutional history prior to 1689,
there were several important examples suggesting the dangers such royal
independence posed for Britain’s balanced Constitution.63 In the celebrated
akin to that of Otis and Dickinson. Jefferson’s argument in the Summary View is actually
deeply subversive of the British constitutional tradition.
62 Declaratory Act, 6 George III, c. 12 in Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American
History (New York: Appleton, 1963): p. 61.
63 Jack Greene and Paul Rahe also observe the subversive potential that Jefferson’s imperial
theory held for the British Constitution as understood at least since the Glorious Revolu-
tion (Jack Greene, “Origins of the American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation,”
Framing and Ratification of the Constitution, Leonard Levy and Dennis Mahoney, eds. [New
York: Macmillan, 1987]: p. 52 and Paul Rahe, “The American Revolution,” in The American
Experiment: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Liberty, Peter Augustine Lawler and Robert
Martin Schaefer, eds. [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994]: p. 45). Bonwick (English
Ship Money case of the 1630s and in the crown’s use of Irish troops in the
civil war, supporters of parliamentary supremacy in Britain saw dangerous
historical precedents in the executive’s use and abuse of the crown’s control
over the nation’s foreign affairs and national security. In more recent times,
in the secret Treaty of Dover concluded in 1670 by the penultimate Stuart
king, Charles II drew on French money and promises of French troops with
a plan of asserting royal independence from an obstructionist Parliament.
These examples of royal pretensions to subvert the balanced Constitution
seared painful lessons into the British Whig constitutional consciousness in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The core British constitutional principle since the Glorious Revolution
was the nullification of any legal, and indeed irregular, means by which
the crown could circumvent parliamentary assent in the raising of revenue
or troops. Jefferson’s radical theory of the empire threatened to make such
constitutional safeguards nugatory. While the prospects of a British monarch
using American taxpayers’ money to circumvent parliamentary supply and
employing American troops to form a standing army in Britain may have
been rather improbable, even farfetched, there was much in this theoretical
and juridical possibility, however unlikely, that struck at the very core of
British constitutional theory and practice. An imperial king, perhaps in the
future, could slip his British constitutional leash. In this sense, Jefferson
appears to have made the British government an offer of a wide-ranging
and innovative new theory of imperial relations, that it could never have
accepted in 1774 and would not even begin instituting until the formation
of the Commonwealth in 1931.64
Jefferson’s Summary View is a classic example of the Lockean basis of
the colonial position in the imperial dispute with Britain. However, his au-
dacious assertion of the colonists’ natural rights to self-government went
far beyond the claims of earlier colonial spokesmen, extending to a call
for the crown to use its constitutional power as supreme executive in the
several states of the empire to nullify proposed parliamentary legislation.
Jefferson’s radical Whig principle of popular sovereignty collided directly
with the moderate Whig tenet of parliamentary sovereignty. By proclaiming
the independence of the colonial legislatures from Parliament, Jefferson es-
tablished an imperial theory that would have enshrined the equality of all
the legislatures in the empire. In this way, his position escaped the theoretical
difficulties in justifying colonial resistance that faced Otis and Dickinson’s
admission that Parliament was the supreme legislative power in the em-
pire. In the process, Jefferson cleared away some of the theoretical obstacles
Radicals, p. 251) observes that, for their part, British radicals also found cause to fear that
the British monarch might use authoritarian measures in the colonies as a way to circumvent
parliamentary control over revenue.
64 Mayer, Constitutional Thought, p. 35.
to legitimizing American independence. Now the only link to be cut from

Britain was with the crown, not the entire British system of government.
Despite this theoretical achievement, Jefferson’s argument offered less prac-
tical possibility for accommodating colonial self-government within the im-
perial system than did those of his earlier compatriots. It is more conceivable
that the British would have been persuaded to see the prudence and recti-
tude of respecting the exclusive rights of America’s subordinate legislatures
than they would ever have acknowledged the equality of all the states in the
empire. Thus, both in theory and in practice, Jefferson’s efforts in 1774 did
much to break the path for independence in 1776.
14
Tom Paine and Popular Sovereignty
In the opening days of 1776, Tom Paine’s influential tract Common Sense
rolled off the presses and rushed straight into the swirling firestorm that
increasingly consumed the imperial dispute. The newly arrived English im-
migrant appeared on the scene as though sent from central casting as one of
Jefferson’s emigré revolutionaries in the Summary View, and promptly set his
distinctive stamp on the events and philosophical debate in the six months
or so prior to the formal declaration of American independence. By the time
Paine’s pamphlet reached his American audience, much had changed in even
a few years, and what little goodwill that remained in Anglo–American rela-
tions after years of strain had largely disappeared. American blood had been
shed by British troops, and a hastily recruited Continental Army lay siege to
the British garrison in Boston. Quite in keeping with the turbulent passions of
the time, Paine’s incendiary rhetoric advanced the colonial position in a way
hitherto unseen in the more than decade-long dispute between the colonists
and the British government. Common Sense marked a departure from pre-
vious statements of the colonial position in several ways. First, Paine ex-
pressly and unambiguously made the case for American independence from
the British Empire. He showed no desire to quibble over legitimate spheres
of imperial jurisdiction or to engage in extended discussions of the colonists’
legal and constitutional links with the mother country. For Paine, Britain
ruled the empire, and the Americans should and must leave it. He drew both
on natural rights theory and on realpolitik to argue that the separation of
America from Britain was inevitable, and given the deteriorating relations
between the two peoples, now more than ever it was desirable.
Second, Paine’s philosophical and theoretical justification for indepen-
dence was based on a potent blend of distinct radical Whig republican ideas.
While Paine shared the view of the earlier colonial champions that govern-
ment should be directed to securing rights, Paine combined this essentially
Lockean notion of liberty as individual autonomy with a deep commitment
to the modern republican notion of political liberty as popular control of
375
376 The Whig Ligacy in America
government. In this regard, the Englishman Paine’s explicit and determined

advocacy of republicanism in Common Sense located his thought on the ex-
treme fringe of British radicalism, from which many of his ideas originated
but that for the most part rejected outright republicanism. The primary con-
cern of the British radicals during the period of the imperial crisis was the
movement for electoral reform and more equitable representation catalyzed
by the Wilkes Affair of the late 1760s and 1770s, in which the notorious
radical John Wilkes was repeatedly expelled from the Commons despite his
repeated reelection in Middlesex. Most British radicals sought the more lim-
ited goal of fairer popular representation rather than quantum democratic
change in the fundamental structure of the British Constitution.1 Paine ex-
pressed republican ideals that displayed substantive connections not so much
to the contemporary British radical reform movement as further back in
the radical Whig tradition to seminal thinkers like Sidney, Trenchard, and
Gordon. Like Sidney, Paine incorporated the classical republican hostility to
monarchy and the principle of heredity into his natural rights – based theory
of government. Gordon Wood suggests that Paine expressed antimonarchi-
cal sentiments “that had not been said before” in the colonies.2 Perhaps
Paine more than any other thinker ensured that the result and goal of the
revolution in America would be emphatically republican.
Paine’s unambiguous republicanism also marked an important depar-
ture from previous statements of the colonial position in the imperial cri-
sis. Whereas Otis and Dickinson’s moderate imperial theory expressed high
praise for the British constitutional model, and while even Jefferson’s radical
theory of the empire still retained the British crown as the fulcrum link-
ing the several states of the empire, Paine expressed little short of contempt
for the British Constitution. Paine’s strident republicanism dealt a power-
ful blow to American confidence in the British Constitution at a decisive
1 Colin Bonwick, English Radicals and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1977): pp. 21–3, 148–9, 259 and Gregory Claeys, Thomas Paine: Social and
Political Thought (Boston: Unwin & Hyman, 1989): pp. 14–15. Bonwick (pp. 265–6) observes
that in many respects the overwhelming majority of British radicals in the American Revolu-
tion period were committed to a “sentimentalized” version of the fundamentally conservative
principles of the moderate Whig revolution of 1688–9. Unlike Paine, he argues, British radical
reformers at the time, such as Price, Priestley, Sharp, and Cartwright, denied any association
with republicanism and expressed a genuine fear of social and political upheaval.
2 Gordon Wood, “The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolution,” in The Moral
Foundations of the American Republic, 3rd ed., Robert Horwitz, ed. (Charlottesville: Univer-
sity Press of Virginia, 1987): p. 117–18. Bernard Bailyn (“Common Sense” in Fundamental
Testaments of the American Revolution [Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1973]: pp. 8–9)
argues that in early January 1776 only “a fool or a fanatic” openly advocated American
independence. Therefore, Paine not only had to make his own radical case in a persuasive
and coherent form, he also had to reverse deeply ingrained habits of thought and presump-
tions about government. Bailyn contends that Paine played a significant but far from deter-
minative role in changing and shaping the worldview of the colonists (“Common Sense,”
pp. 18–19, 22).
Tom Paine and Popular Sovereignty 377
moment in Anglo-American relations following years of growing frustration

and resentment on both sides of the imperial crisis.
Common Sense accelerated and radicalized the process of American dis-
enchantment with Britain and its system of government already manifest
in Jefferson’s Summary View. In contrast with the Lockean liberal delega-
tion theory of sovereignty that was amenable to the construction of mixed
constitutions, Paine followed the more clearly Sidneyan form of Whig re-
publicanism, which deeply distrusted the principle of constitutional mixture
and balance. In language much more critical than even that of Trenchard and
Gordon’s Cato, Paine rejected outright the British system of mixed govern-
ment with its complex balance of king, Lords, and Commons. Paine was the
first major colonial spokesman to criticize explicitly not only British policy
toward the colonies, but the very concept of the British Constitution itself,
the product of 1688–9 that was so revered for so long on both sides of the
Atlantic. In a particularly potent sense, Paine was the first to say that the
emperor, so long dishabille in America, really had no clothes.
Government and Society

In many respects, Paine’s discussion of the origins of government is simply
a collection of axioms drawn from radical Whig philosophy. Government is
a product of consent and is properly directed to the security of individual
rights. What is striking, however, in Paine’s account of the origins of gov-
ernment is his radical separation of the concept of government from that of
society. Paine practically begins Common Sense with the statement “Some
writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or
no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have
different origins.”3 Paine’s point with this assertion is one not unfamiliar in
radical Whig thought. He, like Locke and Sidney, wanted to demonstrate
that government is emphatically conventional, a product of human will. But
Paine goes beyond even Locke and Sidney in arguing that society and govern-
ment not only constitute differing forms of human association with different
legal and ethical claims on the individual, they actually reflect something
like two moral poles in human experience. Simply put, Paine believes society
is good and government is bad, or at least stands as a testament to human
frailty. He argues:
Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former
promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by
restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions.
The first is a patron, the last a punisher.4
3 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, Ronald Herder, ed. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1997):
pp. 2–3 (hereafter Paine, CS, and page number).
4 Ibid., p. 3 (emphasis in the original).
Society, then, is an informal system of human relations rooted in the natural

communal passions and social sentiments, whereas government is a system
of laws, commands, and coercive power embedded in the logic of rights
and interests. Insofar as society reflects the deep human need and desire for
community, Paine claims that it is “in every state . . . a blessing.” For its part,
government, being a regulator of the antisocial passions and the injurious
effects of extreme self-interest, is “even in its best state . . . but a necessary
evil.”5
How are we to understand Paine’s premising his theoretical account of
the origin of government on this discussion of a radical dichotomy between
government and society? One effect of his method of argumentation is to fo-
cus our attention on the limited goals of government. Given that, due to our
fallible nature, the individuals composing society cannot flourish peacefully
in an unregulated state for long, each individual “finds it necessary to sur-
render up a part of his property to furnish the means for the protection of the
rest.” The surrender of natural liberty necessary to form government is, ac-
cording to Paine, at best “a necessary evil,” and thus reflects the self-limiting
character of political power and the utilitarian considerations that should
guide our analysis of differing forms of government. In fine radical Whig
fashion, Paine states: “security being the true design and end of government,
it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof appears most likely to
secure it to us with the least expence and greatest benefit, is preferable to
all others.”6 Government in general not only has a limited end, but also
in its particular forms is subject to change, variation, and alteration based
on its capacity to secure the rights of its citizens. The rhetorical effect of
Paine’s opening discussion is clear. When we follow Paine’s lead and accept
his account of government’s limited aims and humble (not to say vicious)
origins, the reader feels little desire or logical ground to revere any particular
government, especially the British government then practically at war with
America.
Paine’s discussion of the government–society dichotomy thus appears to
make two points. First, he wants to establish the theoretical claims for a
form of human association that exists independently of formal constitutional
government. There is a natural harmony of interests, according to Paine, but
they are still individual interests.7 Society is a realm of individuals bound
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 5.
7 Francis Canavan, “Thomas Paine,” in The History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., Leo Strauss
and Joseph Cropsey, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987): p. 681. David Mayer
(The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson [Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1994]: pp. 70–2) makes an interesting argument that Paine’s natural society represents a syn-
thesis between Lockean natural rights theory and Scottish moral sense philosophy. Eric Foner
(Tom Paine and Revolutionary America [New York: Oxford University Press, 1976]: pp. 92–
4) attributes Paine’s natural society argument to a “Newtonian frame of mind” stressing
by habits, sentiments, and necessity in which rights are inherently insecure

because of the fallibility of human virtue. Virtue plays a more significant role
in Paine’s analysis than in that of any of the other radical Whigs save Sidney
and Cato. The end of government is not to replace the organic connections
of society or even to supplement them; rather, government is meant solely to
protect individual rights through law and punishment. The state of liberty
characterizing society must be in part surrendered in the contract that estab-
lishes government. In this respect, Paine makes the very Lockean argument
that government exists to secure the private realm of activities in society.
Paine’s second aim in this discussion is to lay the theoretical foundation
of the more polemical argument for American independence. The practical
effect of Paine’s conceptual bifurcation of government and society, especially
in the turbulent early days of 1776, is to reinforce the idea for his audience
that there is an American society that exists independently of Britain and
its government.8 According to Paine, America in 1776 is for all intents and
purposes a society (or collection of societies) in want of a government. With
Britain practically at war with the colonies, Parliament and the king had
essentially forfeited any legal or constitutional right to govern America that
they may or may not have possessed in the past. The legal rights of Parliament
or the king over the colonies was by 1776 a moot point for Paine. Moreover,
independently of the actions of the British government, America had no
societal link with British society 3,000 miles away. This is particularly true,
Paine claims, since American blood has been shed by British hands. What
bond of affection and sentiment between the colonies and Britain could
survive this strain? Paine asks.9 By affirming that the constitutive power
to form a government lies with the individuals composing society, Paine
reinforces the idea that Americans can rightfully and should expeditiously
abandon whatever association they had with Britain previously and form a
new system of government.
Paine’s concept of society plays a double role in his larger argument for
independence. On the one hand, society represents a form of human associ-
ation independent of the formal obligations and laws coincident with gov-
ernment. It thus stands as a principle to which Paine can have recourse in
explaining the devolution of political power within the empire. The concept
cosmic harmony and, perhaps paradoxically, Paine’s own observations of American society
in the process of throwing off British rule. Given the eclectic and amalgamating bent of Paine’s
largely autodidactic mind, both Mayer’s and Foner’s suggestions are plausible. However as
I argue in Chapter 7, one of the central features of modern Whig republican thought since
Spinoza and Sidney was the conscious blurring of the distinction between nature and society.
This is, of course, a theoretical postulation that can with only minor modification support an
argument for the comparative naturalness of society in contrast to the strictly limited ends
and scope of government.
8 Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, p. 92.
9 Paine, CS, pp. 23–4.
of society operates as an intermediary condition between government and

natural liberty. By severing its ties with Britain, America does not revert to a
state of nature because there is a society or societies on these shores entirely
derived from the circumstances and common life of the American people.
In this sense, Paine’s notion of society serves to assuage the fears of those
reluctant patriots in the colonies who view separation from Britain as an
invitation to anarchy and disorder, the spectral nightmare of a loose collec-
tion of individuals existing with no legal and moral obligations whatsoever.
Paine assures these cautious colonists, with their essentially moderate Whig
antipathy to the idea of dissolution of government, that society without gov-
ernment is not a brutal state of nature. On the other hand, society operates in
Paine’s thought as a seedbed for government. Society is not only the Lockean
repository to which political power would devolve in the event of separa-
tion, it also supplies the preexisting materials out of which government can
be established or reconstructed. Paine’s vision of the promise for Americans
is one in which their government fully reflects their own society with no
admixture from Britain.
The Origins of Government

In order to demonstrate the constituent power of the individuals composing
society, Paine provides an account of a proxy state of nature based on the
experience of emigration and colonization. In a move strikingly similar to
Jefferson’s in the Summary View, Paine contends that “[i]n order to gain a
clear and just idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a
small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, un-
connected with the rest, they will then represent the first peopling of any
country, or of the world.”10 This thinly veiled allusion to the first European
settlement of the New World operates as a quasi-theoretical construction
meant to demonstrate the origin of government in a manner loosely based
on the actual American experience of emigration and colonization. Whereas
Jefferson used this motif somewhat narrowly to establish the colonists’ nat-
ural right of self-government, Paine extrapolates from Jefferson’s premise to
produce a broader account of the complex social mechanisms contributing
to the formation of government. In this respect, Paine employs the American
experience as indicative of the primordial human relation to society and gov-
ernment. Of these “newly arrived emigrants,” Paine argues, “society will be
their first thought.” The first movement out of the “state of natural liberty”
is the transition to society, whereby the stirrings of the heart and the prac-
tical necessity of securing survival in a harsh and uncultured environment
will drive these individuals “to seek assistance and relief of one another.”11
10 Ibid., p. 3.
11 Ibid.
The movement to the next stage, from society to government, is occa-

sioned by “the defect of moral virtue,” its inability to be a reliable guarantor
of just action. As Paine understands it, government is necessary only after
people have attained a degree of relative security. He claims: “In propor-
tion as they surmount the first difficulties of emigration, which bound them
together in common cause, they will begin to relax in their duty and at-
tachment to each other; and this remissness, will point out the necessity, of
establishing some form of government.”12 This discussion of the origins of
government bears a more than passing resemblance to Rousseau’s descrip-
tion in his Second Discourse of the transition from the golden age of simplicity
and social cohesion to the corruption and inequality characterizing advanced
government.13 However, Paine, more emphatically than Rousseau, attempts
to demonstrate the Sidneyan–Spinozist postulation about the naturalness of
democracy. Paine’s concern is to show that the condition of natural liberty
and equality that human beings originally enjoy and the social experience of
their intercourse in society produce more or less immediately a democratic
form of government. Rousseau’s argument that the first imaginative sparks
of human vice necessarily, almost spontaneously, produce inequality in soci-
ety, and between governors and the governed, is a conclusion Paine roundly
denounces. He claims:
Some convenient tree will afford them a State-House, under the branches of which,
the whole colony may assemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more than
probable that their first laws will have the title only of REGULATIONS, and be
enforced by no other penalty than public disesteem. In this first parliament every
man, by natural right, will have a seat.14
12 Ibid., p. 4.
13 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality,” in Rousseau’s Political Writings, Alan
Ritter and Julia Conaway Bondanella, eds. (New York: Norton, 1988): esp. Part II, pp. 34–
57. Paine is a fascinating example of the modifications and adjustments in English radical
Whig thought after it has been exposed to philosophical influences from France. With his
emphasis on society and on the sentiments generally, Paine shows the strong influence of
Rousseau. But for Rousseau, in contrast to Paine, the golden age of social relations soon,
and apparently inevitably, degenerated into a brutal state of war, out of which political society
finally emerged. While Paine appears to imply that the original social harmony of the pre-civil
period comes to an end when individuals “begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each
other,” he avoids the implication of a general state of war. Perhaps because he rejects this
Rousseauian conclusion, Paine can assert the radically egalitarian character of the origins of
government; that is, people do not need to select a warlord/chief to provide security; instead,
they can institute broad-based self-government.
14 Paine, CS, p. 4. Wilson Carey McWilliams observes that one of the most important moral im-
plications of Paine’s egalitarianism is his claim that political distinctions, as opposed to sexual
and economic distinctions, are simply unnatural (Wilson Carey McWilliams, “On Equality
as the Moral Foundation for Community,” in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic,
Robert Horwitz, ed. [Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987]: pp. 304–5).
This observation supports my argument that Paine’s antimonarchism denotes more than
a criticism of the structural or institutional problems attending monarchy as a form of
The strong egalitarian root in Paine’s natural rights theory produces dis-
tinct moral and constitutional implications. Paine’s colonists assembled un-
der “some convenient” oak play a role in his argument similar to that of the
citizen-soldiers in Sidney’s account of the Saxon democracy at the origins of
the English regime. In both cases, the intention is to demonstrate the nat-
ural foundations of democracy. This is where for Paine, as for Sidney and
to a lesser extent Cato, the individualist notion of natural rights and the
characteristically republican argument for political liberty coalesce. Paine
reveals that the necessary implication of the need for government as a means
to secure individual liberty is a guarantee of general, if not even universal,
political liberty. A public share in government is the natural precondition for
securing rights. This is not simply a matter of employing citizenship instru-
mentally to secure private interests. In the preceding passage, Paine calls this
individual share in government a “natural right.” The principle and practice
of representation, in this view, emerge only as a matter of “convenience”
when the colony becomes too large and populous to allow a realistic way of
calling a universal assembly of all the citizenry. Even so, Paine qualifies the
idea of representation by cautioning that it will be necessary “to augment the
number of representatives” as the colony grows and to guarantee “having
elections often” in order to ensure that the representatives “well establish
a common interest with every part of the community.”15 This modern re-
publican understanding of the radical egalitarianism underlying the origins
of government means that Paine’s constitutionalism will be based on the
principle of government reflecting the interests of all the naturally free and
equal individuals composing society. Paine appeals to nature as the mother
of political and constitutional art.
Another important feature of Paine’s discussion of the origins of govern-
ment is his treatment of moral virtue. One serious implication of Paine’s
argument for the moral and logical primacy of society over and against gov-
ernment is the ambiguous status of virtue in his argument. As we have seen,
Paine believed that government is necessary because of “the defect of moral
virtue.” With an appeal to Miltonic rhetoric, Paine asserts: “Government,
like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built on the
ruins of the bowers of paradise.”16 If we could count on conscience to direct
government. For radical Whig republicans like Sidney and Paine, monarchy is fundamen-
tally a moral problem. It is unnatural because it requires suppression or distortion of the
moral and political implications of natural equality and hence denies the naturalness of
democracy. For Paine’s view of the naturalness of democracy, see Gordon Wood, The Cre-
ation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1969): pp. 100, 222–4.
15 Paine, CS, pp. 4–5.
16 Ibid., p. 4. For Paine’s rhetorical parallels with Milton, see, for example, John Milton,
“Areopagitica,” in Areopagitica and Other Political Writings of John Milton, ed. John Alvis
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 1999): pp. 17, 23 and Paradise Lost, ed. Christopher Ricks
(New York: Signet Classics, 1968): Book IX, lines 1052–131, pp. 263–6.
human actions in a reliable way, then government would not be necessary.

Paine concludes, in contrast to classical republican thinkers, that human
beings are able to develop the moral qualities of “duty and attachment”
without intense civic education and almost spontaneously by dint of their
proclivity for mutual assistance and social intercourse. According to Paine,
modern society rather than the classical polis provides the psychic plane
on which moral virtue flourishes.17 But given the psychology of the human
passions, government will always be necessary to some extent. Implicit in
Paine’s argument is an assessment of human nature similar to that of Cato
and Sidney. Self-interest, while in part a manifestation of our natural liberty,
is also a feature of human nature that can distort our duty to refrain from
injuring the rights of others. Paine’s republicanism, his concern for political
liberty and equality, flows from his assessment of this melancholy but inerad-
icable dimension of human liberty. Individuals must be directly involved in
public affairs, even if through the means of representation, because it is both
foolish and base to rely on others to protect one’s own rights without this
relatively direct and unmediated form of popular control. In this sense, for
Paine, as for Cato and Sidney, the logic of rights and interests is not anti-
thetical to the concern for civic virtue. While individual virtue may be too
slender and brittle a reed to cling to in the hope of securing liberty, the direct
participation of an entire citizenry in political affairs will, in Paine’s view,
provide some reliable guarantee that government will remain committed to
the limited aim it is assigned by nature.
The British Constitution

This account of the origins of government lays the foundation for Paine’s
critical analysis of the British Constitution. The opening discussion of natural
rights in Common Sense is distinctly Lockean. In the following treatment
of British mixed constitutionalism, Paine injects a decidedly radical Whig
republican dimension into his argument.18 Herein lies one of Paine’s most
important departures from the position of earlier colonial spokesmen in
the imperial dispute. He offers little or no praise for British constitutional
17 Compare Paine’s argument with Aristotle, The Politics, Carnes Lord, trans. (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1984): 1253a25–9.
18 In this sense, I agree with Kramnick regarding his interpretive division of Common Sense by
the Lockean character of the first section and the more republican arguments that follow
(Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism [Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1990]: p. 146). Where I differ from Kramnick is in his assessment that Paine’s republicanism
bears the formative influence of late eighteenth-century English dissenting radicals. My point
is not to dispute the influence of dissenting Protestant radicals on Paine, but rather to trace
the core elements of his republicanism back in the Whig tradition to Sidney and ultimately
to Spinoza.
theory or practice. Whereas Otis, Dickinson, and even Jefferson all sought
to defend colonial rights in terms consistent with the British constitutional
model of mixed sovereignty, Paine rejects this notion outright.19 His primary
objection to British constitutionalism is twofold: its origins in clear violation
of popular sovereignty and its adherence to what Paine takes to be the absurd
doctrine of mixed sovereignty.
First, Paine traces the origins of the modern British government not to
a universal act of popular consent, whether in 1689 or at any other date,
but rather to the “dark and slavish times in which it was erected.” That
it may have been noble and enlightened for the time it was first estab-
lished Paine grants. But this nobility is radically contingent on the context
of “the dark and slavish times” in which the British Constitution emerged.
Paine employs a notion of historical and intellectual progress akin to that of
Sidney. His argument rests on the assumption that the central lessons of the
radical Whig theory of government were only imperfectly understood by the
people of early English civilization. As such, the historical development of
British constitutional ideas and practice represents a distortion of the true
egalitarian natural rights teaching. Paine claims that the British Constitution
as it currently exists includes the “remains of two ancient tyrannies, com-
pounded with some new republican materials.”20 In a sense, Paine agrees
with the framers of the 1689 Declaration of Rights, who saw the constituent
parts of the constitutional order as the estates – king, Lords, and Commons –
and not as the individuals composing society. For Paine, however, the signal
features of the British government are the remains of “monarchical tyranny”
and “aristocratical tyranny” embodied in the king and Lords. Paine’s point
here is that these two historical tyrannies are not the product of popular con-
sent. Indeed, he claims that inasmuch as they are still hereditary offices, the
constitutional authority invested in the king and Lords is “independent of
the people.”21 Moreover, Paine makes this claim in the face of the contrary
position maintained even by other American Whigs like Otis and Dickinson,
who looked to the Glorious Revolution, or in Jefferson’s case to emigration,
as the point at which the entire British people and the people of the empire
consented to a certain constitutional and imperial arrangement.
The only salutary feature of the British Constitution, in Paine’s view, is
the “new republican materials, in the persons of the commons.” It is this
element of political or public liberty “which Englishmen glory in.”22 It is
only this single element of the British government that can plausibly be said
19 For good accounts of the revolutionary impact of Paine’s harsh criticism of the revered British
Constitution in the colonies, see Bailyn, “Common Sense,” pp. 10, 12, 15–16; Claeys, Thomas
Paine: Social and Political Thought, pp. 43–5; and Foner, Tom Paine and the American Revolution,
pp. 76–7.
20 Paine, CS, p. 6.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., pp. 6, 17.
to provide the continuous flow of popular consent necessary to secure free

government. What Paine sees in the British Constitution, then, is a radically
truncated form of popular government severely handicapped by two pow-
erful institutions rooted in the country’s “dark and slavish” feudal past. He
repudiates the moderate Whig idea of balanced constitutionalism, arguing of
the king and the Lords that “in a constitutional sense, they contribute nothing
toward the freedom of the state.”23 By this Paine suggests that the hereditary
offices are empowered by the Constitution to check, restrain, and ultimately
emasculate the popular will expressed, albeit imperfectly, through the House
of Commons. Needless to say, Paine equates the expression of popular will
with the freedom of the state.
In order to understand Paine’s antipathy to Britain’s mixed regime, it is
important to recall his account of the origins of government. In that discus-
sion, Paine claimed that the move from natural society to political society
eventuates in a radical democracy, a parliament where “every man, by natu-
ral right, will have a seat.” What is notable in this account is Paine’s silence
regarding the institution of magistracy or executive power. Presumably, the
executive power is created by the people as a definitively subordinate power,
clearly subject to the people and/or their representatives in the legislative
body. Paine’s silence on the exact mechanics involved in the construction
and delegation of executive power may be explained as an effort to make
Sidney and Spinoza’s point that the strength of government derives not from
institutions, but from the collected power of individuals in society.24 Paine
says as much by arguing that “the strength of government, and the happi-
ness of the governed” depend on the legislature’s capacity to form a com-
mon interest with every part of the community, and “not on the unmeaning
name of king.”25 Thus, British constitutional development marks a clear
violation of Paine’s argument for the popular foundations of government.
The principle of natural democracy articulated in his theoretical account of
the origins of government has, Paine argues, been distorted and effaced by
English historical development from feudal times. Although the introduction
of “new republican materials” to the constitution by the improved status of
the Commons, at least since the revolutions of the seventeenth century, is
clearly a salutary development, Paine suggests that these popular victories
are fragile and dangerously diluted by the considerable constitutional powers
of the nondemocratic elements in the government.
Paine’s second major objection to the “much boasted constitution of
England” flows from his opposition to the doctrine of mixed sovereignty.
23 Ibid., p. 6 (emphasis in the original).

24 Cf. Sidney, D 3.11 and D 3.45; Benedict Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political
Treatise, R. H. M. Elwes, trans. (New York: Dover, 1951) and Spinoza, Ethics, Edwin Curley,
trans. (Amhert: Prometheus, 1989).
25 Paine, CS, p. 5.
Paine follows Sidney and Spinoza in basing his objection to the idea of con-
stitutional mixture on the basis of a certain understanding of nature. He
argues: “I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in na-
ture, which no art can overturn, viz. that the more simple any thing is, the
less liable it is to be disordered, and the easier repaired when disordered.”
Paine claims that “the constitution of England is so exceedingly complex,
that the nation may suffer for years together without being able to discover
in which part the fault lies.”26 For Paine, the interaction of various con-
stitutional actors with independent powers in a single complex system of
relations is anathema to the very essence of limited government. It was this
aspect of Paine’s thought that drew the fire of one of his harshest American
critics, John Adams. Adams’ defense of the principle of mixed constitution-
alism in his Thoughts on Government may be seen in large measure as a
critical response to Paine and an effort to counteract the latter’s influence on
early American constitution making.27 Paine’s objection to mixed govern-
ment rests on several postulations. First, as we have seen, he believes that
complex constitutional structures obscure the responsibility of public offi-
cials to the people. When it is not entirely clear who or what body effects
measures injurious to the public or impedes the passage of salutary acts,
the security of the people will suffer. This concern resembles Cato’s effort
to identify and punish the public officials involved behind the scenes in the
South Sea scandal.28 For both Paine and Cato, the people must be able to
see public corruption as it begins so as to be able to defend their rights.
Paine’s other major objection to the principle of mixed sovereignty is his
rejection of the notion of constitutional checks and balances. The central
tenet of Paine’s radical Whig republicanism is the idea that political freedom
and individual liberty are best preserved by the body that directly reflects
the popular will. As such, he scorns the system of checks and balances in the
British constitutional model: “To say the constitution of England is a union
of three powers reciprocally checking each other is farcical, either the words
have no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.”29 He tries to demonstrate
both that on a practical level the powers in England do not reciprocally check
each other and on a theoretical level that the very idea of mixed sovereignty
is absurd. With respect to the practical question of whether the branches of
26 Ibid.
27 John Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” in The Political Writings of John Adams, George
Peck, ed. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954). For a good discussion of Adams’ criticism
of Paine’s support for unicameralism as well as Paine’s unfortunate, but unintentional, role
in precipitating one of the nastier episodes in the stormy Adams–Jefferson relationship, see
C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty (Lawrence: University of Kansas
Press, 1998): pp. 175, 205, 212–13, 270–3.
28 See John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters, Ronald Hamowy, ed. (Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1995): Letters #2–8, 11, 12.
29 Paine, CS, p. 6.
government in England are coequal in their capacity to check each other,

Paine baldly states: “That the crown is the overbearing part in the English
constitution needs not to be mentioned.”30 Paine even goes so far as to
suggest that the crown in England constantly threatens to swallow up what
little power the Commons do have. In terms echoing Cato’s fears more than
fifty years earlier, Paine opines:
The corrupt influence of the crown, by having all places in its disposal, hath so
effectually swallowed up the power, and eaten out the virtue of the house of commons
(the republican part in the constitution) that the government of England is nearly as
monarchical as that of France or Spain.31
This unflattering comparison of Britain to notorious absolute monarchies

like France and Spain could only stun and enrage moderate and mainstream
English Whigs and like-minded Americans.32 But behind Paine’s objection to
the actual practice of British government, with its constant tendency to lurch
toward absolutism, rests his suspicion that any notion of mixed sovereignty
will ultimately reduce to a veil for monarchical hegemony.
On a more theoretical level, Paine contends that the principle of mixed
sovereignty is a logical absurdity. If we accept the logical and moral premise
that all power originates in the people, he argues, then how can they be said
to create a power to check their own power, namely, the king, and then also
create a power, the House of Commons, to check the power of the king?
Paine claims:
To say that the commons is a check upon the king presupposes two things. First-
That the king is not to be trusted without being looked after, or in other words, that
a thirst for absolute power is the natural disease of monarchy. Secondly- That the
commons, by being appointed for that purpose, are either wiser or more worthy of
confidence than the crown.33
Paine asks, where did the king obtain this power, which cannot be trusted
without legal restraint? If from the people, why would they grant such a
dangerous authority? Moreover, if the people’s representatives are wise and
competent enough to check the king (who cannot be trusted, we recall),
then why do we need a king at all? Clearly, the implication drawn from the
check on royal power is the idea that the Commons can perform the role of
government on its own. But, given the Constitution’s assurance of a royal
veto power on legislation, the clear intent of the Constitution is to prevent
30 Ibid., p. 7.
31 Ibid., p. 16.
32 See Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 287–91 and Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America,
pp. 120–3 for an account of the many enraged Tory and even moderate Whig responses to
Paine that followed the publication of Common Sense.
33 Paine, CS, p. 6.
such direct popular rule. Paine blurts out that the entire premise of the British
system is “a mere absurdity!”
The Problem of Monarchy

The fundamental constitutional errors embedded in the British system of
government are, in Paine’s view, monarchy and the principle of heredity.
Paine’s detailed and impassioned account of the defects of monarchy is drawn
practically straight from the pages of Algernon Sidney. The first and deepest
problem with monarchy is its violation of the moral principle of natural
equality. Paine compares the distinction between rich and poor, on the one
hand, and monarch and subject, on the other:
Mankind being originally equals in the order of creation, the equality could only be
destroyed by some subsequent circumstances; the distinctions of rich and poor, may
in great measure be accounted for. . . . But there is another and greater distinction for
which no truly natural or religious reason can be assigned, and that is, the distinction
of men into KINGS and SUBJECTS.34
The unnaturalness of monarchy is, for Paine, a prima facie case against its
inherent reasonableness. By “unnatural,” however, Paine means that monar-
chy is inconsistent with the principle of equality; he does not suggest that
it is rare. Quite the contrary, Paine argues that the historical ubiquity of
monarchy has two explanations.
First, a people may in ignorance and primitive simplicity offer their vol-
untary assent to a king. Paine cites the example of the establishment of the
Hebrew monarchy in I Samuel 8 to show the Bible’s disapproval of monar-
chy.35 The second explanation for the prevalence of monarchy is more omi-
nous. Here Paine draws on English history to demonstrate that another fre-
quent cause of monarchy is conquest and force. He claims that of the current
kings of Europe and their noble lineage, if “we take off the dark covering
of antiquity, and trace them to their first rise, . . . we should find the first
of them nothing better than the principal ruffian of some restless gang.”36
With a further allusion to William I of England, the dubious implication
for the British Constitution and its origins is obvious as Paine continues:
“A French bastard landing with an armed banditti, and establishing himself
King of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain terms a very
paltry, rascally original.”37 Contrary to the moderate Whigs of the Glorious
Revolution period such as Tyrrell, Burnet, and Atwood, who sought to deny
or deflate the importance of the Norman Conquest, Paine is brutally candid
34 Ibid., p. 8.
35 Ibid., pp. 10–12.
36 Ibid., p. 13.
37 Ibid., p. 14.
about the origin of England’s monarchy and hereditary nobility. In his view,
there was no fundamental act of popular consent to the Norman estab-
lishment. That these “remains” of feudal tyranny are still venerated in the
country and remain key parts of the Constitution says more to Paine about
the human capacity for self-deception than it does about the possibility of
consenting to such a “rascally original.”
Paine’s republicanism is born of his moral objections to the principle of
monarchy. While criticizing England’s mixed monarchy, Paine is not shy
about praising Spinoza’s Dutch Republic.38 If Paine believes monarchy is
unnatural and morally objectionable, then perhaps it would be fair to say that
he found the idea of hereditary office absolutely mystifying. The problems
he identifies with heredity are legion. To start with, even good rulers cannot
guarantee worthy successors. Nature simply does not generate merit in this
way.39 Moreover, the only even mildly plausible argument for heredity –
that it clearly delineates lines of succession and thus prevents disorder –
has, according to Paine, proved to be a dangerous fallacy. The manifest
problems of regency demonstrate that succession by a minor will always be
problematic. Beyond this, however, Paine argues that “the whole of English
history disowns the fact that hereditary succession preserves civil peace.” Far
from securing peace, the prize of hereditary monarchy dangling before the
eyes of proud and ambitious nobles produced devastating periods in English
history like the War of the Roses. Paine concludes: “In short, monarchy and
[hereditary] succession have laid (not this or that kingdom only) but the
world in ashes and blood.”40 For Paine, the British constitutional system
of mixed monarchy, this “house divided against itself,” is not the product
of enlightened popular consent and the prudence of brilliant statesmen. It
is rather a sad species of habitual and unthinking reverence for institutions
rooted in conquest, ignorance, and tyranny.
Paine’s reflections on monarchy and the British Constitution are a scathing
criticism of this “much boasted” system. The principal goal of Paine’s rhetor-
ical strategy in this discussion is to uproot the British Constitution’s privi-
leged status in the intellectual purview of politically minded American Whigs
by means of a passionate and logical assault in language accessible to the
general public.41 There is no elegizing of 1689 in Paine’s treatment of British
history. He claims that the core structures of the British Constitution predate
the halting Glorious Revolution and originate in England’s “dark and slav-
ish” past. As such, the Glorious Revolution and the domestic and imperial
38 Ibid., pp. 9, 29. Cf. Cato’s Letters, #85, pp. 616–18 and Sidney D 2.11.143 and 3.10.371.
39 Paine, CS, p. 12.
40 Ibid., pp. 15–16.
41 For a good discussion of Paine’s seminal role as a founder of modern republican politi-
cal rhetoric designed to enlighten and mobilize a mass audience, see Foner, Tom Paine and
Revolutionary America, pp. 80–7.
order it settled have no normative status or binding character for Paine’s

Americans. By discrediting the underlying principles of the British Constitu-
tion with language and arguments hitherto unheard in the imperial debate,
Paine seeks to buttress the case for independence with his claim for the the-
oretical and practical superiority of republicanism over mixed government.
Notably, Paine has no ideological or temperamental animus to the House
of Commons. Of course, he believes it has no right to govern the colonies –
that is a given – but what little praise he offers the British system is reserved
solely for the popular body. Unlike Jefferson, Paine does not draw from the
imperial dispute a lesson in the dangers of legislative tyranny.42 Actually,
Paine argues that the only reason England has not slipped into despotism
is the vigilance of the people and their representatives in Parliament. He
claims: “It is wholly owing to the constitution of the people, and not to
the constitution of the government that the crown is not as oppressive in
England as in Turkey.” It is not the restraint on popular power promoted by
moderate Whig mixed regime theory that ensures free government; rather,
it is the character of the English people and their flawed but still crucial
representation in the Commons.
The Case for Independence

The conclusion the reader is meant to draw from Paine’s account of the
fundamental constitutional errors in the British system of government is
unavoidable: the British government rules the empire, and the British gov-
ernment is bad both in theory and in practice. Therefore America must leave
the empire and go it alone. Needless to say, for Paine, going it alone means
that the American states must adopt the republican form of government.
Paine’s case for independence, then, rests in part on a stinging indictment
of the British Constitution and the principle of monarchy. In the context
of the imperial dispute, the malignancy of the British government takes on
a particularly poignant form. Paine argues that all government should be
directed toward securing individual rights through a robust institutional ex-
pression of popular sovereignty. The British government, according to Paine,
has clearly ceased to be a government for the colonies. He adduces the exam-
ple of Boston to demonstrate how far the British government has departed
from fulfilling even a modicum of its proper role in the colonies. It not only
fails to secure American rights, it actively injures them. In a stirring passage,
Paine intones:
Let our imaginations transport us for a few moments to Boston, that seat of wretched-
ness will teach us wisdom, and instruct us forever to renounce a power in whom we
can have no trust. The inhabitants of that unfortunate city, who but a few months ago
42 Compare Paine, CS, pp. 4–5 and Jefferson, SV, p. 108.

were in ease and affluence, have now, no other alternative than to stay and starve, or
turn “out to beg,” endangered by the fire of their friends if they continue within the
city, and plundered by the [British] soldiery if they leave it. In their present condition
they are prisoners without the hope of redemption.43
The British government, Paine argues, is at war with America. This obvious
rhetorical appeal to popular emotion does, however, resonate with Paine’s
natural rights teaching on the fundamental relation between the individual
and government. To those in the colonies who still seek reconciliation with
Britain, even at this late stage in the quarrel, Paine questions whether an in-
dividual ever can or should be reconciled with a government that attacks the
people over whom it claims jurisdiction: “Bring the doctrine of reconcilia-
tion to the touchstone of nature, and then tell me, whether you can hereafter
love, honour, and faithfully serve the power that hath carried fire and sword
into your land?”44 For Paine, the time for any reconciliation has long passed.
Common Sense is unique among the important colonial statements not
only because Paine so explicitly and unambiguously calls for independence
but also because of the reasoning behind his argument. As we have seen,
even colonial moderates like Otis and Dickinson defended the colonists’
right to dissolve the imperial connection. While legitimating the principle of
dissolution as a theoretical possibility for the colonies, they also, however,
genuinely recoiled from what they saw as the disastrous consequences of
independence. In the words of John Dickinson: “If once we are separated
from our mother country, what new form of government shall we adopt, or
where shall we find another Britain to supply our loss?”45 For Paine, both
the justification for and the bright promise of American independence are
understood in emphatically naturalistic terms. He views independence less in
terms of formal dissolution theory – that is, as the severing of legal links with
the empire – and more in terms of the natural structure of power relations.
That the British government has broken its trust with the colonies is for
Paine a point clearly proven, but a deeper reason he cites for independence
is that “it is repugnant to reason, to the universal order of things to all
examples from former ages, to suppose, that this continent can long remain
subject to any external power.”46 This appeal extends beyond a dispute over
the particular structure of government and imperial relations to which the
Americans may or may not have consented at some point in the past. Rather,
Paine bases his analysis of the imperial situation and the natural rights of the
colonists on the Spinozist–Sidneyan conception of nature and power. Paine is

44 Ibid.
45 John Dickinson, “The Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania,” in Empire and Nation, William
Leuchtenberg and Bernard Wishy, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962): Letter 3,
p. 18.
such an interesting example of radical Whig republicanism precisely because

the philosophical principles of nature underlying this brand of Whiggism are
brought so forcefully to the surface in his argument.
Quite simply, Paine argues that the British do not have the power – the
natural right, in the Spinozist view – to govern the colonies, and thus they
should not. That Paine draws this normative conclusion from a principle of
power inhering in raw nature sets him clearly in the Spinozist republican
camp. Paine tries to demonstrate that there is something deeply perverse and
unnatural about British rule in America. He argues:
Small islands not capable of protecting themselves; are the proper subject for king-
doms to take under their care; but there is something absurd, in supposing a continent
to be perpetually governed by an island. In no instance hath nature made the satellite
larger than its primary planet, and as England and America, with respect to each
other, reverses the common order of nature, it is evident they belong to different
systems.47
In sum, British rule in America is, according to Paine, qualitatively differ-

ent from imperial sovereignty over St. Helena or the Falkland Islands. The
Americans can govern themselves; they have the raw natural power of over
a million individuals to animate and defend their own governments. Should
the Americans harness this natural power in the cause of independence, the
British government will be unable to coerce adherence to its laws and recog-
nition of its sovereignty over the colonies. Notice Paine’s language in the
preceding passage. He makes the case for independence by drawing graphic
allusions to raw natural characteristics of size, strength, and volume. He
suggests a certain affinity between human political and moral affairs, on the
one hand, and nonsentient nature such as the relation of planets and orbit-
ing satellites, on the other.48 In a fundamental sense, Paine is a disciple of
Spinoza’s project to articulate an understanding of human things that is in
harmony with the operation of power in the nonhuman physical universe.
Paine and Sidney’s modern Anglo-American republicanism is rooted in this
Spinozist insight. They claim that monarchy and aristocracy violate the nat-
ural order of power relations that underlies popular sovereignty. Paine takes
Sidney a step further to argue that it is as natural for a people to govern
themselves domestically in a republican form as it is for America to gov-
ern itself independently of the empire. It is not a huge theoretical leap to
transpose radical Whig republican theory into foreign relations. For Paine,
monarchical rule over a naturally free people is an illustrative analogue to
47 Ibid., p. 25.
48 While Kramnick is correct to point out the almost messianic promise Paine assigns to
America, its “world-historical mission,” this interpretation rests mainly on Paine’s rhetorical
aims – which are certainly important – but largely overlooks his core argument for indepen-
dence, which is profoundly naturalistic and in keeping with a Spinozist perspective on the
character of power and natural rights (Kramnick, Bourgeois Radicalism, pp. 149–50).
British rule over America; both situations are a product of custom, habit,
and unthinking allegiance, and both situations reflect a serious distortion of
natural right.
The case for independence in Common Sense also has a decidedly practi-
cal dimension. Paine argues that independence is both natural and beneficial
for America. Far from losing the protection of Britain, the American states
would not only be able to defend themselves, they would actually avoid en-
tanglements in Britain’s European wars.49 To those who fear the economic
consequences of independence and the loss of imperial trade protection,
Paine rejoins: “America would have flourished as much, and probably much
more, had no European power had anything to do with her. The commerce,
by which she hath enriched herself are the necessaries of life, and will always
have a market while eating is the custom of Europe.”50 Apart from the is-
sue of America’s economic and politico-military viability as an independent
state, Paine also tries to address the perhaps even deeper concerns of those in
America who feared loosening the intellectual and moral bands of consan-
guinity, sympathy, and affection that underlay the transatlantic community.
Paine responds to these concerns in a number of ways.
First, as we have seen, he argues that any emotional tie with a power that
attacks one’s own people is simply illusory and self-destructive. Second, he
denies that there is any genuine societal link between Britain and America.
Nature has set the two peoples at such variance that it is inevitable that
Americans would develop customs, habits, and ways of life distinct from
those of Britain. Once again, raw physical nature – nature in the Spinozist
sense – plays its part in Paine’s analysis of human affairs: “Even the distance
at which the Almighty hath placed England and America, is a strong and nat-
ural proof, that the authority of one, over the other, was never the design of
heaven.” For Paine, continentalism replaces imperialism as the primary soci-
etal link among Americans. He claims: “Now is the seedtime of continental
union, faith and honour.”51 The basis of this new continental consciousness
is admittedly, at least in part, simply a manifestation of anti-British animus.52
Paine claims that Americans have a common interest in resisting Britain be-
cause all are in danger of similar oppression. He does, however, frame the
promise of a common American identity drawn not only from crisis and

50 Ibid., p. 19. Cf. A. Owen Aldridge, “The Collapse of the British Empire as Seen by Franklin,
Paine, and Burke,” in Revisioning the British Empire in the Eighteenth Century, William G.
Shade, ed. (London: Associated University Press, 1998): pp. 88–9.
51 Paine, CS, pp. 22, 18. Cf. Aldridge, “The Collapse of the British Empire,” p. 91.
52 See Lincoln’s assessment of the crucial role the original anti-British animus produced in the
revolutionary period played in at least temporarily cementing American unity in the founding
era (Abraham Lincoln, “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address Before the
Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838,” in Abraham Lincoln: His
Speeches and Writings, Roy Basler, ed. [New York: Da Capo, 1990]: pp. 83–4).
war, but also from shared interests, common democratic principles, and a
love of liberty. Moreover, this new American identity derives not only from
one ethnic root, an English original, but also from the rest of Europe and
the world. Paine envisions a new form of continental citizenship in which
“all Europeans meeting in America, or any other quarter of the globe, are
countrymen.”53
The promise of continental union and a rising new American identity in
Common Sense is also the promise of republican government. The repub-
lican emphasis on political liberty, the public share in government, is the
guiding principle of Paine’s constitutionalism. In his proposal for the cre-
ation of a government of continental union, all the republican elements in
radical Whig thought come to the fore. With regard to the assemblies of
the various states, Paine offers the modern republican formula for radical
legislative supremacy. Given the displacement of royal power in the colonies
that independence would create, Paine sees the opportunity to make the as-
semblies more democratic: “Let the assemblies be annual, with a President
only. The representation more equal.”54 In addition to reforming the colonial
legislatures, Paine also boldly proposes the creation of a continental congress
with much greater popular representation than the one created in defiance of
Britain in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. This
new continental congress would have at least 390 members, with at least
30 sent from each colony, which would devise a convenient number of dis-
tricts to elect members. As a replacement for the royal executive power, each
congress would choose a president drawn from one state delegation selected
by lot on a thirteen-year rotating system, so that a member of each state
delegation would hold office in successive years. The measure of legitimacy
for Paine, as for Sidney, is the extent to which government action reflects the
popular will. Thus, to ensure that a law “is satisfactorily just,” Paine pro-
poses an unambiguous standard of popular assent by agreeing that “not less
than three-fifths of the Congress . . . be called a majority.”55 With these mea-
sures, Paine incorporates the central tenets of radical Whig republicanism
into his proposed continental union. The intention of his proposal with its
call for annual elections, broad representation, supermajorities, and severely
restricted executive power is to ensure popular sovereignty and to guarantee
that the government reflects the interests of the people and their will.
Tom Paine’s Common Sense not only proposed a federal republic, it also
foreshadowed the process of constitution making in the United States. He
called for a “Continental Conference” to act as an intermediate body be-
tween the governors and the governed. The numbers were to be drawn from
the Congress, the various state assemblies, and the people at large, and it

54 Ibid., p. 30.
55 Ibid., pp. 30–1.
was to be elected by “as many qualified voters as shall think proper to at-
tend from all parts of the province for that purpose.”56 Paine hoped that
the radically democratic character of this conference would ensure its le-
gitimacy and responsibility. This conference would be charged solely with
the responsibility of devising a national “Charter.” Paine suggests that the
“Charter of the United Colonies” would establish the manner of elections,
parliamentary rules, and federal–state relations and jurisdiction, and, most
importantly, would secure the right of “freedom and property to all men.”57
With this proposal, Paine went beyond even Sidney’s suggestion for a ra-
tionalized republican system of laws by firmly connecting the principle of
popular government with the idea of a written constitution. According to
Paine’s version of modern republican regime analysis, the British Constitu-
tion was barely a rational or legitimate system of government at all precisely
because British institutions were not anchored in a written charter signify-
ing popular consent.58 In Paine’s new continental republic the rule of law,
Sidney’s “invisible king,” would now be visible on parchment for all to see.
He claims: “In America THE LAW IS KING.” However, Paine reminds his
readers that the crown of law may be broken “and scattered among the peo-
ple whose right it is.”59 In Paine’s America, the people would be king.
56 Ibid., p. 30.
57 Ibid., p. 31.
58 Bonwick, English Radicals, p. 260 and Claeys, Tom Paine: Social and Political Thought, p. 50.
15
Revolutionary Constitutionalism
Laboratories of Radical Whiggism
Within six months after Americans first heard Paine’s clarion call for sepa-
ration from the British Empire, the entire political landscape of the colonies
transformed dramatically. In the Declaration of Independence in July 1776,
the representatives of the colonies assembled in the Continental Congress
announced the formal severance of their connection with Britain. It was an
event many American Whigs still considered unlikely when Jefferson made
his appeal for radical imperial reform in 1774 and almost unthinkable when
Otis and Dickinson protested parliamentary duties and taxes in the 1760s.
However, the rhetoric and logic of the Declaration of Independence, satu-
rated as it was with radical Whig principles of popular sovereignty, essentially
represented an extension of arguments drawn from the radical Whig philos-
ophy that had supplied the theoretical foundations of the American Whig
position from the very beginning of the imperial crisis with Britain.
The Declaration of Independence was in many respects a classic expres-
sion of radical Whig philosophy.1 In contrast to the conservative formulation
1 For an interpretation of the intellectual influences in revolutionary America that is diametri-

cally contrary to mine and rejects the significance of radical natural rights philosophy alto-
gether, see John Philip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority
of Rights (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986). Reid argues that the American use
of the language and logic of natural jurisprudence was largely rhetorical and thus “irrele-
vant” compared to the substantive core of the American position, which he identifies with
the idea of English constitutional rights (pp. 5, 18, 87–92; See also Reid, “The Irrelevance
of the Declaration,” in Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in Law: A Collec-
tion of Review Essays in American Legal History, Hendrik Hartog, ed. [New York: New York
University Press, 1981]: pp. 46–89). While Reid is correct to observe that rights understood
in the English constitutional sense since the Glorious Revolution were not derived from rad-
ical Whig thought, I believe he fails to distinguish adequately between the moderate and
radical Whig conceptions of rights, and thus tends to overread British moderate Whig rea-
soning into American radical Whig arguments. The passing resemblance between moderate
and radical rights theories can, as I have shown, be traced back to their common source in
the fight against divine right monarchy a century before. For a detailed response to Reid,
396
Revolutionary Constitutionalism 397
of the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, which accused James II of vio-

lating the “knowne lawes and statutes” and the “antient rights and liberties”
of the English nation, the American Declaration of 1776 reached conclu-
sions and pronounced principles of rights and government that had proven
to be politically unpopular and theoretically unpersuasive to their English
Whig forbears. It clearly identified an unexhaustive list of “certain unalien-
able rights” and boldly asserted a universal right of popular revolution. For
American Whigs the philosophical justification for revolution and resistance
lay not in the Pufendorfian moderate Whig principle of original compact,
but in radical natural rights theory. American radical Whigs proclaimed that
“whenever any form of government becomes destructive” of the proper end
of securing rights, then “it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it,
and institute new government.” The Americans utterly rejected the mod-
erate Whig logic underlying the legal fiction of “abdication” employed in
England in 1689. Instead they clearly identified George III as a tyrant and
utilized the Lockean “long train of abuses” argument to establish the moral
and prudential criteria for legitimate popular resistance and the creation of
a new government.
In several crucial respects, the principles of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence flowed from the natural continuum of radical Whig arguments em-
ployed by the colonists since the earliest phases of the imperial crisis. In keep-
ing with the model of colonial opposition exemplified by Jefferson, Adams,
and Wilson in the years immediately preceding independence, the Declara-
tion operated on the premise that the only historical legal link between Britain
and the colonies lay in the crown. Thus the Declaration of 1776 directed its
primary criticism toward the British monarch, as seen in its direction of twice
as many grievances against the king as against Parliament.2 If the immedi-
ate thrust of the Declaration was clear, namely, American independence, the
political and constitutional implications of the principles justifying indepen-
dence were comparatively inchoate. The overwhelming majority of American
Whigs agreed that the process of separation necessarily entailed a hectic pro-
cess of constitution making in the newly sovereign states. However, the nat-
ural rights-based justification for independence in 1776 did not immediately
or unambiguously prescribe the proper design, composition, or form of gov-
ernment in the states. The principles of the Declaration of Independence are
in a pivotal sense nonpartisan, in theory at least legitimating a diversity of
pure and mixed regime types including monarchical as well as republican.3
see Michael P. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University
Press, 1996): pp. 108–17.
2 However, both in the Summary View and in the Declaration of Independence, even the
grievances against Parliament were framed as complaints against the king for allowing
Parliament to interfere with the colonies.
3 Martin Diamond, “The Revolution of Sober Expectations,” The American Revolution: Three
Views (New York: American Brands, 1975): pp. 57–85, esp. pp. 67–8.
Moreover, even though the general sentiment among American Whigs in

1776 was profoundly antimonarchical, there was no universal agreement
in American political culture about the meaning of republicanism. Indeed,
to many American Whigs at the time, republicanism still carried pejorative
connotations inherited from the British political tradition dating back over
a century to the civil war era in England.4 The task of replacing royal or
parliamentary sovereignty with new regimes based on popular sovereignty
made necessary by the palpable American desire for independence in fact left
many new theoretical questions and practical issues unresolved for American
Whigs.
On one ground at least there was practically universal agreement among
American Whigs. The Congressional Resolution of May 1776 and Paine’s
call in Common Sense for the several colonies to draft written constitutions
as part of the process leading to independence reflected a firm commitment
and general presumption in America regarding the importance of written
constitutions. On a practical level, this predisposition was reinforced by the
usefulness of the colonial charters in the conflict with the crown during
the imperial crisis of the 1760s and early 1770s. The colonists frequently
pointed to the charters to illustrate British violations of prescribed American
rights. However, as we have seen with Jefferson and Paine, the heart of
the mature American case against the crown and Parliament was based on
natural, as opposed to charter, rights. On a more philosophical level, the
American commitment to the idea of written constitutions reflected a fun-
damental connection in the American Whig mind between the principles of
radical contract theory and the imperatives of constitutional government.5
Despite the universal recognition of the importance of written constitutions,
the American Whig political spectrum in 1776 established no single, defini-
tive constitutional design. A proposal for the Congress to draft a uniform
constitution for the several states never gathered much support. However,
with the disintegration of royal authority in the colonies in the months pre-
ceding formal independence, the political reality on the ground spurred the
process of constitution making with great rapidity and urgency.6 Even if
American Whigs did not voice universal support for Patrick Henry’s asser-
tion that the colonial government was dissolved and the colonists had now
reverted to a “state of nature,” there was in the early summer of 1776 a
4 For the ambiguity about the meaning of republicanism in revolutionary America, see Willi
Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State
Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980):
p. 100 and Donald S. Lutz, Popular Control and Popular Consent: Whig Political Theory in the
Early State Constitutions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Sate University Press, 1980): pp. 16–17.
5 Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1760–1860: A
Study in the Evolution of Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1930):
pp. 51–2.
6 For a good account of the reversion of royal power to provincial congresses in this period,
see Adams, First American Constitutions, pp. 27–48.
pervasive recognition of the need for drafting fundamental legal instruments

to reconstitute government in the former colonies. American Whigs soon
came to the conclusion that the twin goals of achieving military victory and
establishing new state constitutions were, as Gordon Wood argues “the very
essence of the Revolution.”7
The period of revolutionary constitutionalism was unique in Anglo–
American history. It was a time, as John Adams celebrated, “when the great-
est lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to live.”8 In contrast to the
moderate Whig architects of the Glorious Revolution, American Whigs in
1776 were self-consciously aware that they had been given an unprecedented
opportunity to devise new systems of government on a foundation of natural
rights philosophy in relative freedom from the pressures and constraints of
deeply rooted customs, habits, and conventions. However, the philosophical
fabric of the period was inherently complex, combining elements of great
novelty and experimentation, as well as witnessing some enduring continu-
ity of colonial political forms.9 This combination of novelty and continuity
cohered to locate nascent American constitutionalism within the intellectual
and ideological folds of the Anglo-American tradition understood in the
broadest and most inclusive sense. Whig political philosophy in all its var-
ious strains and dimensions provided a rich source of theoretical materials
for American constitutional development.
While the Pufendorfian moderate Whig idea of parliamentary sovereignty
was badly discredited in America during the imperial crisis, the British model
of balanced government and the principle of representation based on his-
torical socioeconomic interests still retained considerable attraction among
many American Whigs after 1776. In some respects, the conservative philoso-
phy of British moderate Whigs, which appeared to have been superannuated
by the radicalization of the colonial position in external relations during
the imperial crisis, actually reemerged with renewed significance during the
7 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1969): p. 128.
8 John Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” The Political Writings of John Adams, George Peek,
ed. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954: p. 92.
9 For accounts of the period that stress its novelty, see Willi Paul Adams, “The State Con-
stitutions as Analogy and Precedent,” in The United States Constitution: Roots, Rights, and
Responsiblities (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992): p. 8; Wood, Creation,
p. 134 and Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic. For accounts that identify sources of underlying
continuity with the Anglo-American tradition, see Colin Bonwick, “The United States Consti-
tution and Its Roots in British Political Thought and Tradition,” in Foundations of Democracy
in the European Union: From the Genesis of Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parlia-
ment, John Pinder, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999): p. 49; George Dargo, Roots
of the Republic: A New Perspective on Early American Constitutionalism (New York: Praeger,
1974); Green, Constitutional Development, pp. 97–8; Lutz, Popular Control, pp. 44–5 as well
as Donald Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1988): esp. ch. 8; and J. R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the
Origins of the American Republic (New York: St. Martin’s, 1966): p. 508.
debate about constitution making within the states during the revolution-
ary period. For their part, the liberal and republican elements in the Whig
political tradition that had seemed so harmonious in the struggle against
parliamentary sovereignty rapidly became more discrete in the context of
revolutionary constitutionalism. In contrast to both the moderate Whig sup-
porters of parliamentary sovereignty and the Whig republican champions
of radical legislative supremacy, the Lockean liberal advocates registered a
repugnance to any concentration of political power whatsoever. The Whig
republican concern to ensure popular control of government and the deep
distrust of the idea of the separation of powers did not typically evince the
same degree of concern for the concentration of power. Whig republican
philosophy stressed the dangers of tyranny from the executive and oligarchy
from an upper chamber of the legislature, but maintained that a single repre-
sentative assembly regulated by populist procedural controls such as annual
elections, broad franchise, and regular rotation of delegates could responsi-
bly and accountably express what Sidney identified as the primal constitu-
tional truth: “The Legislative Power is always Arbitrary.”10 Armed with the
philosophical premises of Spinozist sociological naturalism, Whig republi-
canism presented an argument for direct and egalitarian democracy that was
in some respects as distinct from Lockean liberal principles as it was from
the more conservative ideas of moderate Whiggism.
The revolution era state constitutions were in effect laboratories of radical
Whig philosophy in which American Whigs set to the task of constitution
making with divergent, overlapping, and often even conflicting philosophical
commitments regarding sovereignty, rights, and the principle of representa-
tion. In their effort to convert the doctrine of popular sovereignty into the
practical reality of effective limited government, American Whigs drew on
the various liberal, republican, and even moderate Whig elements of their
English philosophical inheritance. To some extent, all the distinct elements
of the Whig politics of liberty played a part in revolutionary constitution-
alism as American Whigs grappled with the political meaning of natural
rights, the proper formulation of the separation of powers, and the legal or
institutional significance of popular constituent power. The end product of
this first independent experience of American constitution making was an
important step toward the development of a uniquely American conception
of constitutionalism and divided sovereignty.
The American Declaration of Rights

The idea of a bill or declaration of rights was firmly embedded in the Anglo-
American political tradition long before the celebrated Declaration of Rights
10 Algernon Sidney, The Discourses Concerning Government, Thomas West, ed. (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund Classics, 1996): ch. 3, sec. 45.
of 1689. From the time of Magna Carta, the 1628 Petition of Right, and
the earliest colonial charters, written statements of fundamental rights and
laws had acquired considerable normative and political value in the Anglo-
American constitutional tradition. A declaration of rights was also a feature
of many of the first state constitutions, whether these declarations stood as a
discrete statement of rights typically preceding the main plan of government
or were included in it. By the end of the period of revolutionary constitu-
tionalism in 1780, nearly half of the states had included a formal declaration
of rights in their constitution.
The 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, drafted by George Mason, set
the pattern for states such as Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland, and
North Carolina. The preamble to the Virginia declaration presents it as a
statement of the rights that form “the basis and foundation of government.”
Most of the declarations included a statement of the radical Whig natural
rights philosophy, typically at the very beginning in Article 1. The scope of
these natural rights statements ranged from the comprehensive treatment
in Virginia, “That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of so-
ciety, they cannot by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity . . .” to
the more pithy Maryland statement: “That all government of right origi-
nates from the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for
the good of the whole.”11 The universalistic thrust of the American decla-
rations stands in stark contrast to the particularism of the English Declara-
tion of 1689, which explicitly limited itself to vindicating and asserting “the
antient rights and liberties” and “knowne lawes and statutes” of the historic
British realm.12 The confident radical Whiggism of the American declara-
tions thus represented a clear departure from the British model that stressed
the moral saliency of continuity, original compact, and fundamental laws.
In this regard, the inspiration for the American state declarations was less
the British legal inheritance than the radical Whig spirit of the Declaration
of Independence. In language strikingly similar to that of the Declaration
of Independence, practically all of the state declarations enshrined some
version of the natural right to revolution. Ironically, relatively conservative
Maryland went beyond any other state by not merely asserting the people’s
right to “reform, alter, or abolish” tyrannical government, but even explicitly
11 Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776, article 1 and Maryland Declaration of Rights, 1776,
article 1 (hereafter in notes, all state constitutions and declarations will be cited by ar-
ticle and, if appropriate, by section number). For all the revolution era state constitu-
tions, see The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and Other Organic Laws of
the States and Territories Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America, Francis
Newton Thorpe, ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909) or online at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states.
12 British Declaration of Rights, 1689, in Lois Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 296.
denouncing the Tory “doctrine of non-resistance, against arbitrary power

and oppression” as “absurd, [and] slavish.”13 Thus, even the more moder-
ate statements of American revolutionary philosophy rejected the premises of
the English Whigs of 1689 and Walpole at the Sacheverell trial by attempting
to incorporate the natural right of revolution into the fundamental law of the
state.
Although all the revolution era declarations share a radical Whig univer-
salistic basis, the precise substance of these bills of particulars was typically
diverse, often decidedly eclectic. The variety of rights identified in the state
declarations generally fell into three categories. First, there were restate-
ments and amplifications of the rights listed in the English Declaration of
1689. These were rights that Whigs of almost all philosophical varieties and
ideological hues considered foundational for any proper understanding of
limited government. For example, the American declarations typically in-
cluded a prohibition on the suspension and dispensing of laws and amplified
the English right to petition against grievances into a more general right
of assembly. Americans often repeated the British prohibition on standing
armies in peacetime and universalized the right to bear arms, extending this
right from the preserve of “qualified” Protestants to “the people” gener-
ally.14 As a general rule, the state declarations amplified the British Country
party animus against standing armies to cover a wide range of civil–military
relations including clear statements of civil supremacy and the need for reg-
ulated militias.15 Also, many English rights of criminal procedure were re-
stated in the state declarations and, given the American experience of mar-
tial law in several of the colonies, were fortified with clear and emphatic
statements regarding the importance of reasonable bail, jury trials, and the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. With respect to the British
Declaration’s concern to ensure free elections and frequent Parliaments, the
American states uniformly adapted this principle to their own legislatures,
echoing Article 13 of the 1689 Declaration, which sought frequent Parlia-
ments in order to ensure “the amending, strengthening, and preserving of
laws.”16 The American Whig concern for the rights of the accused, legal
control of the military, and regular legislative assemblies reflected general
continuity with the important underlying areas of broad consensus in Whig
thought that more or less spanned the radical and moderate philosophical
divide.
13 Maryland Declaration, 1776, art. 4. In other respects, relatively conservative Maryland, with
its statement that its inhabitants “are entitled to the common law of England,” was singular
among the states in its emphasis on custom and British legal convention (1776: art. 3).
14 See, for example, the Pennsylvania Declaration, 1776, art. 13.
15 See, for example, Maryland 1776 arts. 25–9, North Carolina 1776 arts. 17–18, and
Pennsylvania art. 13.
16 Compare the English Declaration of 1689, art. 13, with Massachusetts 1780, art. 22 and
Maryland 1776, art. 10.
In other respects, however, the state declarations established a unique

American contribution to the tenets of Whig constitutionalism. One element
of this specifically American brand of constitutionalism related to the much
deeper populist commitments in America than in Britain. For example, the
state declarations uniformly asserted the principle of a broad franchise typ-
ically extending the right of suffrage to any free adult male possessing some
measure of “property in and attachment to” the community.17 The crucial
issue of the suffrage that was neglected or avoided in the Declaration of 1689,
and would prove to be a source of great frustration for English radicals in the
second half of the eighteenth century, was settled in a decidedly egalitarian
direction in the American states. The state declarations established broad
suffrage rights as a veritable precondition of representative government and
thus, not surprisingly, reaffirmed the American practice stretching back to
the colonial period of a much broader franchise than in eighteenth-century
Britain.18 Other distinctly American contributions to the Whig idea of rights
were clearly drawn from the painful lessons of British policy toward the
colonies during the imperial crisis. For example, many state declarations
asserted a Jeffersonian right of emigration, formally confirmed the Lockean
principle of no taxation without representation, prohibited the establishment
of monopolies, and guaranteed freedom of the press. They even frequently
asserted a right of sole control over “internal police,” in effect pointedly
cautioning Congress against attempting any repeat of Parliament’s Coercive
Acts.19 Thus, on matters of suffrage and crucial elements of public policy,
the drafters of the state declarations radically transformed the more tradi-
tional British understanding of rights and in many cases even established
new, uniquely American varieties of rights.
The third category of rights often seen in the state declarations were not
so much rights in the conventional sense as general exhortations about right
principles of government. These statements typically included general pro-
nouncements that government exists for the “common benefit” and for the
administration of “impartial justice.” Many statements referred to the im-
portance of the principle of separation of powers: “That the legislative and
executive powers of the State should be separate and distinct from the ju-
diciary.”20 Another striking feature of many state declarations is the almost
ubiquitous exhortation regarding the importance of “frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles.”21 The explanatory clauses following this state-
ment in most declarations indicate the American intention to replicate the
17 See, for example, Pennsylvania 1776, art. 7 and Maryland 1776, art. 5.
18 Pole, Representation, p. 272.
19 See, for example, Massachusetts 1780, art. 4 and Maryland 1776, art. 2.
20 See Virginia 1776, arts. 3 and 5; Massachusetts, 1780 art 30; and Maryland art. 6.
21 See, for example, Massachusetts 1780, art. 18; Pennsylvania 1776, art. 14; North Carolina
1777, art. 21; Virginia 1776, art. 15; and Vermont 1777, art 16.
Sidneyan modification of Machiavelli’s teaching on first principles. This ef-

fort reflected both the republican emphasis on equality in America and the
pairing of the idea of frequent renewal of consent with a concern for en-
suring the justice, honesty, and virtue of the electors. In keeping with the
Sidneyan–Spinozist modern republican tradition, the logical thrust of the
state constitutions’ affirmation of the importance of frequently recurring to
“fundamental principles” was to establish consent as the essential condi-
tion of free government and civic virtue as a kind of vital corollary.22 In
contrast to the Lockean idea of revolutionary (and presumably infrequent)
dissolution of government, the state declarations in the revolutionary period
favored the Sidneyan model of “frequent recurrence” to the popular base
of the regime.23 Rather than the Lockean “long train of abuses” argument
in the Declaration of Independence, the first state declarations generally af-
firmed the more direct and continuous notion of consent substantiated by
frequent and regular elections.
The question remains, however, how precisely did the drafters of the state
declarations envision the legal or practical constitutional effects of their state-
ments of rights? Did they intend these declarations of rights to be understood
as part of the constitution, with specific legal content, or were they meant
primarily to be normative statements of sociocultural values? Donald Lutz
points to the preponderant use of the aspirational “ought” rather than the
imperative “shall” in the state declarations to demonstrate their largely sym-
bolic or normative character.24 Further proof that the declarations were not
generally meant to be incorporated into the fundamental law is suggested by
the explicit inclusion of the declarations into the plan of government in a few
states such as North Carolina and Delaware. While the evidence clearly sug-
gests that the declarations were in large measure intended to be normative
rather than strictly legal statements of rights, there is sufficient indication
that they were not intended to be merely symbolic or elaborate pronounce-
ments of sociocultural values. For example, some states, such as Maryland
and Pennsylvania, deliberately identified the legal, or even supralegal, char-
acter of the rights expressed in their declarations either by stating that their
rights statements were amendable only in the same manner as the rest of
the constitution or by explicitly placing these statements beyond the nor-
mal amendment process.25 It is perhaps best to understand the declarations
as being meant to illuminate the natural rights principles at the core of the
22 For a contrary view that identifies the early American idea of virtue with Calvinist theology,
compare Lutz, Popular Control, p. 57 and Lutz, American Constitutionalism, pp. 24–7 with
Chapter 2.
23 Thus, I believe Locke and Sidney are considerably more different on the idea of consent than
Pole (Representation, pp. 13–27) suggests.
24 Lutz (Popular Control, pp. 61–70), see especially the informative table on p. 67.
25 See Maryland 1776, art. 42 and section 46 in the main body of the Pennsylvania Constitution
of 1776.
early American idea of limited government. This process of illumination was

meant both to limn the parameters of legitimate state action and to manifest
the principles of right in which legal enforcement would be supplied through
variable constitutional structures.
Reflection on the character of the stipulated rights in many state decla-
rations reveals the underlying complexity of the revolution era American
understanding of rights. Clearly, many of the rights were understood to be
alienable. For example, the right to property was consistently qualified by
the principle of taxation by consent and by the notion of just compensation.
Even the “sacred” right of individual conscience was qualified in some states,
such as Massachusetts and Maryland, by affirmations of the legitimacy of
public support for religion.26 Thus, to a considerable extent and in some ma-
jor areas of legal and moral concern, the American declarations presented a
seriously qualified notion of individual rights, in effect asserting the moral
primacy of the community over and against individual rights claims.27 How-
ever, it is important to recall that the state declarations frequently asserted
a complex combination of various kinds of rights. The rights relating to
broad suffrage and frequent elections, for example, tend to be expressed as
absolute preconditions for representative government. Likewise, the rights
relating to criminal procedure, while perhaps not absolute, certainly contain
an emphatically individualist tendency. A prime example of this individualist
rights reasoning is the clause in the Pennsylvania Declaration that identified
a natural right of emigration: “That all men have a natural inherent right
to emigrate from one state to another . . . that thereby they may promote
their own happiness.”28 This statement, bearing clear echoes of Jefferson’s
argument in the Summary View, posits “vacant countries” as a proxy for the
Lockean state of nature to which any individual may go and help establish
new governments. This individual natural right to dissolve personal and po-
litical bonds with a given community, while not stated explicitly in all the
state declarations, could not logically have been rejected except by refuting
practically the same reasoning that justified American separation from the
British Empire in the Declaration of Independence.
How, then, should we interpret the composite rights teaching in the first
state constitutions? The distinct kinds of rights in the state declarations,
resting as they did in delicate, sometimes uneasy, balance, were the complex
philosophical inheritance of the Whig politics of liberty in America. One
aspect of the American rights philosophy at the time paralleled the moderate
Whig tradition in Britain. The repetition of rights pronounced by English
26 Massachusetts 1780, arts. 2 and 3, and Maryland 1776, art. 33.

27 Lutz, Popular Control, pp. 50–2 and Ronald M. Peters, The Massachusetts Constitution of
1780: A Social Compact (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978): pp. 76–87,
137.
28 Pennsylvania 1776, art. 15.
Whigs in 1689 and the attempt by some states to link these rights with a
notion of fundamental law illustrate clear echoes of British constitutional-
ism. However, the preponderant thrust of the rights philosophy in the state
declarations was much more radical than traditional moderate Whiggism.
For example, practically all the states asserted the Lockean liberal principle
of delegated powers and typically placed greater emphasis on civil liberties
relating to property, the press, and the right to bear arms than did the English
Declaration. The first state declarations also contained important modern re-
publican elements. The formal statement of rights relating to broad suffrage
and frequent elections was meant to assert the principle of popular con-
trol over government. However, the primary thrust of the declarations from
the republican perspective was to play an educative function and provide
an informed citizenry with an accessible measure for legitimate government
action. As we have seen, in Whig republican thought, the concentration of
power is acceptable, even desirable, as long as this power is popular. Thus
written statements of rights are fully compatible with the republican distrust
of the separation of powers insofar as modern republicans in the Sidneyan–
Spinozist tradition saw popular vigilance as a better security of rights than
institutional complexity.
The liberal and republican elements of American Whig thought in the pe-
riod of revolutionary constitutionalism were in essence groping to establish
the same thing: a way to limit government by basing it on a written constitu-
tion derived from the consent of the people and directed to securing natural
rights. The question of how well the first state constitutions succeeded in
achieving this goal and how successfully American constitutionalists blended
their complex Whig inheritance would prove to be inextricably linked to
the gradual development of a uniquely American idea of the separation of
powers.
The Separation of Powers

The formal commitment to the principle of the separation of powers was,
as we have seen, a prominent feature of most of the state constitutions and
declarations of rights. But what did this mean? There was no universal agree-
ment on the political or legal implications of this general constitutional prin-
ciple. The diversity of opinion regarding the meaning of the separation of
powers reflects the complexity and underlying ambiguity in the American
understanding of representative government in the revolutionary era. On
the one hand, many of the drafters of the state constitutions intended the
separation of powers to mean no more than a prohibition on multiple office-
holding.29 This limited conception of the “separation of persons” was fully
consistent with the moderate Whig view of parliamentary sovereignty, more
29 Lutz, Popular Control, pp. 96–7 and Peters, Massachusetts Constitution, pp. 63–4.
a reflection of the legacy of the British Country Whig opposition to political

corruption than a statement of principle regarding fundamental constitu-
tional design.
The more expansive understanding of the separation of powers in America
circa 1776 related to the idea of the due process of law. Many American
Whigs believed that in order to secure what John Adams called “an empire
of laws, not of men,” constitutions had to carefully structure the interaction
of a variety of institutions involved in the creation of laws. Drawing from
the classic Whig anti-absolutist doctrine of the seventeenth century, most
American Whigs supported the idea of institutional checks and balances de-
signed to ensure the responsible formulation and impartial application of
laws. Of course, this traditional Whig principle of due process took sev-
eral different forms. Moderate Whigs in Britain envisioned the separation of
powers in terms of historic institutions representing socioeconomic interests
and classes in a balanced compound legislature. The Lockean liberal idea
of the separation of powers emphasized the functional as opposed to the
interest-based principle of separation and representation. Only radical re-
publicans in America shared Sidney’s modern republican distrust of the very
notion of a meaningful separation of powers.
The development of the American idea of the separation of powers was
inextricably linked to the larger debate over the proper structure of gov-
ernment in the revolutionary period. In its most general form, this debate
was a dispute between the partisans of simple and complex structures. At
one extreme in this debate were the radical republicans, most notably those
in Pennsylvania. It was in Pennsylvania that the most radical and demo-
cratic ideas came to light in the revolutionary period.30 Not surprisingly,
it was here also that Paine’s influence, both philosophically and even di-
rectly in the drafting process, was most palpable. The constitution adopted
in Pennsylvania and imitated in Georgia and Vermont was the epitome of
simplicity, with a unicameral legislature and very weak executive and judi-
ciary. The debate over the structure of government in Pennsylvania, which
had a tradition of unicameralism dating back to the colonial period, was
more skewed in the radical republican direction than in any other state in
America.
However, the republican argument in Pennsylvania was far from simply an
imitation of Paine’s philosophy or merely an endorsement of colonial history.
In contrast to the ahistorical republicanism of Paine and Sidney, Pennsylvania
radical leader George Bryan, writing under the pseudonym Demophilus, un-
apologetically appealed to the ancient Saxon constitution. Demophilus drew
heavily from English radical sources such as Obadiah Hulme to support the
case that the model for simple, democratic government was Saxon England
30 Wood, Creation, p. 226. In revolutionary Pennsylvania at least, if scarcely anywhere else in

America, Common Sense thoroughly discredited the British model of mixed government.
prior to the Norman Conquest.31 In Saxon England, Demophilus discovered

the historical evidence that supported Sidney and Spinoza’s case for the nat-
uralness of democracy. Demophilus argued that the model for Pennsylvania
should be the democratic Saxons with their tradition of unicameralism, di-
rect and broad representation, weak executive power, and emphatic localism.
In the unicameral legislature proposed by Demophilus, with its annual elec-
tions and broad representation, the concentration of political power would
be a reflection of the natural truth that “the elective power of the people is
the first principle of the constitution.”32 For Demophilus, in keeping with
the Whig republican tradition stretching back to Sidney, popular control
over a simple governmental structure was a surer guarantee of liberty than
a substantive separation of powers and institutional complexity.
At the opposite end of the spectrum in colonial thought in the revolution-
ary era was the Virginian Carter Braxton. This spokesman for the Tidewater
faction in the state hoped to steer the constitution-making process in Virginia
in a decidedly conservative direction with the publication of his Address to the
Convention. In contrast to the simple form of popular government advocated
by Demophilus and Paine, Braxton’s address was a paean to the glories of the
British model of mixed and balanced constitutionalism. He hoped to repli-
cate as much as possible the “happy edifice” of the British Constitution on
Virginia soil.33 While criticizing the corruption of the present British system
in fine Country opposition fashion, Braxton nonetheless extolled the purity
of the 1689 settlement, from which more recent times should be viewed as
degenerate. Rather than Demophilus’ simple, freedom-loving pre-Conquest
Saxons, it is the sober Whig and Tory gentry of 1689 who occupy the place of
honor in Braxton’s historical account of Anglo-American constitutionalism.
For Braxton, the demonstrated utility and organic character of the British
Constitution, with its unparalleled capacity to represent the divergent inter-
ests of society, was the touchstone of moderate government.
In order to best adapt the British constitutional model to the American
context, Braxton advocated life tenure for the governor and the two dozen
members of an upper-chamber Council of State. These institutions of order
and stability were balanced in Braxton’s plan by a regularly elected represen-
tative assembly modeled on the House of Commons. While admitting that
a de jure policy of hereditary right would not suit the temper of revolution-
ary Virginia, Braxton believed that life tenure was necessary, especially for
31 For the importance of the ancient constitution idea for British radicals of the period, see
Colin Bonwick, English Radicals and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1977): pp. 256–7.
32 Demophilus (George Bryan), “The Genuine Principles of the Ancient Saxon, or English Con-
stitution ”(1776), in American Political Writings During the Founding Era, 1760–1805, Charles
S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983): pp. 342–3.
33 Carter Braxton, “An Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of
Virginia” (1776), in Hyneman and Lutz, eds., American Political Writings, pp. 331–2.
the governor, to secure the “dignity to command necessary respect and au-
thority.”34 By institutionalizing the kinds of reforms long advocated by the
British Country opposition, Braxton hoped that Virginia could “adapt and
perfect the British system” through the establishment of a government with
carefully distributed powers that would still retain a connection with each
other in the legislative process. In language strikingly reminiscent of that of
the moderate Whig doyen James Tyrrell nearly a century earlier, Braxton
suggested that the virtues of his plan would be as much of a counterbalance
to the dangers of executive tyranny as to the leveling horrors of unqualified
democracy.35 Whereas Demophilus and Paine did seriously affect the process
of constitution making, at least in Pennsylvania, Braxton’s overt advocacy of
an American quasi-monarchy and aristocracy was met by almost universal
hostility in his home state.36 In the broad range of ideas in revolutionary con-
stitutionalism, most American Whigs saw Demophilus’ unicameral popular
assembly as too democratic and Braxton’s surrogate British Constitution as
practically reactionary. The voice of mainstream American Whig constitu-
tional thought would come from elsewhere.
John Adams’ Thoughts on Government, published in 1776, provided an
articulate middle ground between the radical republicans and the conser-
vatives in the states that was much closer to the natural predisposition of
the American Whig mind than Demophilus or Braxton. Although it was
written ostensibly as a critical response to the French champion of simple
government, Turgot, Adams’ primary target was actually the Pennsylvania
constitutional model then in vogue in radical circles in America. Adams
feared that the simple populist plan in Pennsylvania would establish itself
as the authoritative expression of constitutional government.37 Adams’ plan
called for a bicameral legislature, with both the executive and the upper
chamber possessing a veto on the popular assembly. He argued that only
a complex constitutional structure with interdependent parts could provide
the institutional mechanisms needed to delegate power from the popular
many to the representative “few most wise and good.”38 Adams excoriated
the Pennsylvania idea of unicameralism, listing its many defects, including
the inadequacy and imprudence of a single deliberative body, the inability
34 Ibid., p. 333.
35 Ibid., pp. 334–5.
36 For the hostility to Braxton’s constitutional proposal, including Richard Henry Lee’s shot
that it was “a contemptible little tract,” see Green, Constitutional Development, pp. 64–5 and
Wood, Creation, p. 204.
37 Adams, First American Constitutions, pp. 121–4; Bonwick, English Radicals, pp. 176–7;
Gregory Claeys, Thomas Paine: Social and Political Thought (Boston: Unwin & Hyman, 1989):
pp. 51–3; and Edward S. Corwin, “The Progress of Constitutional Theory between the
Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention,” The American
Historical Review, vol. 30, no. 3 (April 1925): p. 520.
38 Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” p. 86.
of a representative assembly to assume the executive and judicial functions,

and, perhaps most importantly, the tendency of a single-chamber legislature
to place itself above the constitution by exempting itself from the law and
even enacting its own perpetuity.
The significance of Adams’ Thoughts was manifold. He was one of the
first voices to awaken Americans to the unexpected danger that the specter of
parliamentary sovereignty was more likely to return to the states through the
radical republicanism of Paine or Demophilus rather than the nostalgic con-
servatism of Braxton. Adams’ argument for complex government reflected
the mixture of diverse elements embedded in the Anglo-American consti-
tutional tradition. On the one hand, he asserted the republican principle
of popular control through annual elections, repeating the populist maxim
“where annual elections end, there slavery begins.”39 On the other hand,
he endorsed the Braxtonian conservative principle of carefully distributed
and balanced powers in order to represent the various interests in society.
But the most striking and innovative feature of Adams’ argument was his ef-
fort to blend the traditional British idea of institutional complexity with the
goal of mirror representation advocated by radical republicans. He advised
that the representative assembly “should be in miniature an exact portrait
of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them.”40 In
Adams’ contribution to the evolving American idea of representation, the
institutional mirroring of society meant reflecting not only the popular will,
but also the variety of regional and socioeconomic interests in the land. He
implicitly endorsed the British ideal of compound government and sought
to incorporate into it republican elements such as a broad franchise and
annual elections. In certain crucial respects, the English balanced constitu-
tion was still the model for Adams and for most American Whigs in 1776,
although it was a distinctly Americanized version of balanced government
including important popular elements adapted from radical Whig political
philosophy.41 This blending of the principles of constitutional balance and
popular will would become the central feature of the American conception
of the separation of powers as it developed in the hard political reality of
constitution making in the revolutionary era.
The first wave of revolutionary constitutionalism occurred in the period
immediately preceding and following the publication of the Declaration of
Independence in July 1776. In that year New Hampshire, South Carolina,
Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina drafted
and ratified new constitutions. Rhode Island and Connecticut preferred
to retain slightly revised versions of their old colonial charters, and New
York, Georgia, Massachusetts, and the territory of Vermont, for a variety of
39 Ibid., p. 89.
40 Ibid., p. 86.
41 Wood, Creation, p. 200.
war-related reasons, would not produce new constitutions until the following
years. The immediate result of the spirited and highly publicized theoreti-
cal debate over the virtues of simple and complex government was that few
states followed the Pennsylvania unicameral model propounded by Paine and
Demophilus. The large majority of states in the first wave adopted bicam-
eral legislatures, but this was far from indicating the formulation of a clearly
developed separation of powers theory. The centerpiece of the first-wave
constitutions was invariably the representative assembly, the same body that
John Adams identified as the crucial component for securing mirror repre-
sentation of society at large. First-wave assemblies were characterized by
frequent elections, with annual elections being the norm and only South
Carolina adopting biennial elections. Predictably given the emphasis on suf-
frage rights in all of the state declarations of rights, the franchise for elections
to the representative assembly was typically very broad.42 Property or other
requirements for members of the assembly were generally minimal, and sev-
eral state constitutions included provisions securing the right of petition and
instructing delegates. The central premise of the first-wave constitutions was
ensuring popular control over the central lawmaking body in an effort to
make the engine of government reflect the thoughts, opinions, and feelings
of the public as closely as possible.
The inevitable consequence of producing such strong popular assemblies
was to diminish the other branches of government. In particular, the ex-
ecutive power in the first-wave constitutions was typically very weak. As
Gordon Wood describes it, “the Americans’ emasculation of their governors
lay at the heart of their constitutional reforms of 1776.”43 Seven of the eight
first-wave constitutions stated that the governor would be appointed by the
assembly or by a combination of both legislative houses. The effect of de-
priving the executive of an independent source of authority was to make
him a veritable creature of the legislature. The entire thrust of first-wave
thinking about executive power was to control and minimize it by denying
it an effective veto and establishing very short terms of office often with
a strict system of rotations and exclusions. First-wave governors were also
given little or no direct control over appointments and were typically sad-
dled with some form of executive council, again generally appointed by the
legislature.44
42 Pole, Representation, pp. 515–16.

43 Wood, Creation, p. 149; cf. Lutz, Popular Control, pp. 60–1, 92–3. For the contrary view,
which maintains that Americans were remarkably attached to the idea of strong executive
power even in the earliest phases of revolutionary constitutionalism, see Adams, “State
Constitutions,” p. 8.
44 The only first-wave executives to enjoy more than one-year terms were those in Delaware
(three years) and South Carolina (two years). Cf. Lutz, Popular Control, pp. 92–3 and Wood,
Creation, p. 148.
The source of the real animus against the idea of an independent executive
in the firstwave constitutions is twofold. First, in the turbulent opening year
of the war, many constitutional framers in the states felt a palpable, almost
reflexive, hostility to executive power given the colonial experience of mis-
trust and accusation toward crown officials in the years of the imperial crisis.
In addition to this anti-British feeling, another source of American distrust
of independent executive power was deeply rooted in the tradition of Whig
political thought on both sides of the Atlantic. Both the more conservative
elements of American Whiggism and the most radical republicans traced the
intellectual lineage of their suspicion of executive power to elements in their
English philosophical inheritance. Whether American Whigs in 1776 drew
their distrust of executive power from the example of the Glorious Revo-
lution and the Country party opposition to executive “influence” or from
the robust republicanism of Sidney, the result, constitutionally speaking, was
the same. As such, there was no coherent philosophical or political consen-
sus in America in 1776 supporting the idea of a vigorous and independent
executive power.
The status of the judiciary and the upper chamber or senate in the first-
wave constitutions was little better than that of the executive. The judiciary
was typically the creature of the legislature, which often had, as in Virginia,
sole control over the appointment of the judges. The states generally adopted
the British practice of life tenure for good behavior, a tradition also deeply
rooted in colonial legal history, although radical Pennsylvania set a seven-
year term for judges with a possibility of reappointment.45 The senate in
first-wave constitutions was intended to be distinct from the popular as-
sembly. There were generally higher property qualifications for electors and
members of the senate than for the assembly. Moreover, while practically all
of the first-wave constitutions established annual elections for the general
assembly, more than half of them preferred multiple-year terms and some
form of staggered elections for the senate.46 The drafters of the first-wave
constitutions generally intended to design the senate to perform the primary
role of protecting property interests. The early American idea of property
representation was perhaps most clearly articulated by the Massachusetts
political commentator Theophilus Parsons in the Essex Result. Parsons de-
termined that on matters concerning the general welfare, the representa-
tive assembly was adequate, but on matters pertaining more specifically to
property, large holders should have a distinct institutional voice directed
45 Judges in Virginia were appointed by both houses of the legislature, and in Pennsylvania
either by the president and the executive council or by the general assembly alone (see
Virginia 1776, sec. 20 and Pennsylvania 1776, sec. 23).
46 The terms for senators ranged across the first-wave states: New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina (one year), South Carolina (two years), Delaware (three years), Virginia (four
years), and Maryland (five years). Maryland and Delaware also had staggered elections. Cf.
Lutz, Popular Control, pp. 87–91 and Wood, Creation, pp. 209–15.
exclusively to representing property interests.47 Parsons’ distinction between

the proper modality for representing “persons” and “property” reflected the
intellectual basis for the first-wave theory of representation in the Senate.
By replacing the traditional British idea of estates and classes with the more
fluid conception of property, first-wave constitutionalists established an im-
portant American modification of the British principle of representing the
diverse socioeconomic interests in society.
In addition to the countermajoritarian role of the senate as protector of
property interests, some states explicitly associated the more exclusive mem-
bership of the senate with an effort to introduce an aristocratic element into
American constitutionalism. In conservative Maryland, for example, the sen-
ate was elected by its own select electoral college, which was designed with
the aim of electing men the caliber of Adams’ “wise and good,” men of “the
most wisdom, experience and virtue.”48 Most of the first-wave senates em-
bodied this aristocratic principle to an extent, with longer terms and higher
property qualifications intended to insulate the institution somewhat from
popular pressures. Predictably, the twin justifications of senatorial institu-
tional exclusivity – aristocratic virtue and property protection – were deeply
connected in the minds of both the supporters of senatorial prestige and its
opponents. However, regardless of how the drafters of the constitutions en-
visaged the precise qualities of the senate, it was almost universally expected
to provide some kind of institutional check on the popular representative
assembly.
One of the fundamental problems in first-wave revolutionary constitu-
tionalism was that the outline of a formal separation of powers in the states
bore little resemblance to the emerging political reality. The Whig principle
of legislative supremacy in the state constitutions rapidly devolved to the
practice of the popular assembly assuming and absorbing all the other func-
tions of government. The dangers of concentrated power so dramatically
exposed by Locke and Montesquieu were in clear evidence, as the state leg-
islatures frequently assumed executive and judicial functions.49 The weak
first-wave executives possessing no veto or independent source of authority
offered no real check on the legislature. Looking back on the track record
of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 with a few years of hindsight, Jefferson
described it as an “elective despotism” wherein “173 despots would surely
be as oppressive as one.” While in the bicameral first-wave constitutions the
concentration of power in the representative assembly was a perpetual dan-
ger, in unicameral Pennsylvania and Georgia the supremacy of the popular
47 Theophilus Parsons, “The Essex Result” (1778), in Hyneman and Lutz, eds., American
Political Writings, pp. 481–2, 491–2. Cf. Pole, Representation, pp. 182–9.
48 For the unique design of the Maryland senate, see Green, Constitutional Development, p. 88;
Lutz, Popular Control, p. 113; and Wood, Creation, pp. 251–4.
49 Wood, Creation, pp. 162–3.
assembly was virtually guaranteed. The main obstacle to an effective sena-

torial check to the assembly was, as Jefferson again perceptively observed,
that the upper and lower houses were typically “too homogeneous.”50 The
property qualification for the election of senators was too low to repre-
sent effectively a distinct propertied interest separate from the general public
will. In the relatively egalitarian socioeconomic conditions of revolutionary
America, the senate and the assembly were invariably elected by practically
the same people. The conundrum facing the first-wave framers was that in
setting sufficiently high property qualifications, the new constitutional or-
der would face serious resentment from the public and run contrary to the
egalitarian spirit of the suffrage clauses in the state declarations of rights.
However, by settling for minimal requirements, the senate was unable to
fulfill its role as the representative guardian of the propertied interests.
The extent of legislative supremacy in the first-wave constitutions typically
extended beyond even the assumption of other strictly political functions.
The several efforts to preserve constitutional limits on legislative action such
as the explicit provisions in New Jersey and Pennsylvania proved to be inad-
equate. First-wave legislatures altered and amended their constitutions with
abandon in the revolutionary period. The variety of amendment procedures
in the first-wave states, such as the Pennsylvania Council of Censors that
was to convene every seven years, or the Georgia model of petitions from
the counties, or the Maryland idea of a delayed amendment process ratified
by two-thirds of a newly elected legislature, were all intended to preserve
the fundamental distinction between constitutional law and normal statute
law.51 The desire of first-wave constitutionalists to check ephemeral legisla-
tive will by more fundamental popular consent embodied in the written con-
stitution was practically universal. Even the radical republican Demophilus
confided that his greatest fear was that legislatures would alter the constitu-
tion illegitimately, thus distorting the popular foundation of government.52
However, the inability of first-wave constitutions to preserve constitutional
authority against the claims of legislative supremacy was rooted in philo-
sophical principles not merely adventitious.
For many American Whigs in 1776, the legacy of inherited assumptions
about parliamentary sovereignty proved much harder to dislodge than the
fears of any vestigial attachment to monarchy. Overcoming the residual con-
nection to the moderate Whig idea of parliamentary sovereignty, with its or-
ganizing principle of balancing interdependent, rather than clearly separated,
50 Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the States of Virginia,” in Thomas Jefferson Writings, Merrill
Peterson, ed. (New York: Northan, 1984): pp. 125–6. Cf. Lutz, Popular Control, p. 292.
51 Adams, “State Constitutions,” pp. 15–16 and Green, Constitutional Development, pp. 96–
7. Cf. Jefferson’s consternation about omnipotent state legislatures in the period operating
without regard for constitutional limits (“Notes on the State of Virginia,” pp. 127–31).
52 Demophilus, “Genuine Principles,” pp. 360–1.
parts would prove to be a vital precondition for the development of a

uniquely American theory of separation of powers. In many respects, the
first-wave American legislatures exceeded even the Blackstonian idea of par-
liamentary sovereignty insofar as many first-wave constitutions gave the leg-
islature power even over proroguing, assembling, and matters of war and
peace.53 Radical republicans proved no less susceptible to a version of the par-
liamentary sovereignty doctrine than the more conservative elements among
American Whigs. The democratized legislature envisioned by republicans
such as Demophilus and Paine could claim nearly absolute sovereignty as
the only truly representative body in the new constitutional order. As such,
first-wave constitutions were typically more concerned to ensure that the
popular assembly was made accountable and responsible through annual
elections and broad franchise than they were to limit the legislature’s power.
The second wave of revolutionary constitutionalism began in New York
in 1777 and concluded with the ratification of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion of 1780. The framers in the second wave in large measure reacted to
the problems and criticisms of their first-wave predecessors. A general loss
of confidence in the legislature set in quickly in many of the first-wave states.
The multiplicity of laws, the usurpation of executive and judicial power, and
the frequent alterations of the constitution produced a curious phenomenon
as the old popular suspicion of the crown often gave way to a new ambiva-
lence and even hostility to the state legislatures.54 The central thrust of the
second wave was to rehabilitate the idea of executive power in America. New
York, for example, established an executive with direct popular elections for
three-year terms and a qualified legislative veto shared with the majority of a
Council of Revision. Massachusetts also established direct popular election
(but only one-year terms) and a veto with a two-thirds override clause. The
main theoretical innovation in second-wave thinking about executive power
was to provide a source of constitutional and popular authority indepen-
dent of the legislature. While in principle the enhanced executive veto may
be defended or criticized on the basis of a separation of powers argument,
the clear intention of the second-wave framers was to establish a formidable
and ultimately accountable check on legislative power. The flaws revealed in
first-wave thinking had in fact confirmed the fears of the more conservative
American Whigs such as Carter Braxton and John Dickinson, who worried
53 Colin Bonwick, “The United States Constitution, and Its Roots in British Political Thought
and Tradition,” in Foundations of Democracy in the European Union: From the Genesis of
Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament, John Pinder, ed. (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1999): p. 43; Corwin, “Progress of Constitutional Theory,” pp. 515, 523, 525, 530; and
Wood, Creation, pp. 154–5. In contrast to Blackstone, however, first-wave constitutionalists
often ran the risk of slipping back into the logic of English civil war parliamentary radicalism
exemplified by Henry Parker, in which the elected assembly assumed the role of supreme
representative of the nation as a whole.
54 For the popular resentment against the first-wave legislatures, see Wood, Creation, pp. 404–9.
that the authority of the crown could not be replaced and thus that consti-
tutional imbalance would be irremediable.55 The framers in New York and
Massachusetts sought to restore the executive power as a means to provide
a new and generally more populist version of the separation of powers than
seemed possible or even desirable in the America of 1776.
With respect to the senate the second-wave constitutions also adopted
plans for strengthening the upper chamber in relation to the assembly. The
rehabilitation of senatorial power in the second wave was not as dramatic
as that of the executive, principally because even in the first wave there was
a general tendency to try to set the upper house apart with higher property
qualifications and longer terms. Both Massachusetts and New York con-
tinued or even extended this trend, with New York establishing four-year
staggered terms and Massachusetts explicitly charging its annually elected
senate with the job of representing property rights and providing a delibera-
tive check on the popular assembly.56 Ironically, the clearest indication of the
shift in attitude regarding the senate came from unicameral Pennsylvania,
where opposition to the constitution was particularly vehement and well or-
ganized. Pennsylvania anticonstitutionalists saw the lack of an upper cham-
ber as one of the most serious defects in the Constitution of 1776. The most
effective argument among Pennsylvania bicameralists was not, however, that
a senate was required to protect property interests against popular passions.
Significantly, the strongest case for a senate was based on the perceived fear
of the concentration of power in any single institution, even one as emphat-
ically popular as the Pennsylvania General Assembly.57 This was a charge
to which even radical republicans were sensitive. With the rehabilitation of
executive and senatorial power in the second wave, American Whigs were
clearly trying to reconceptualize the meaning of popular control over gov-
ernment in a way consistent with the Lockean liberal functional separation
of powers. Whether or not second-wave constitutionalists believed that the
senate had a unique societal role as property protector, the underlying as-
sumption of all but the most extreme republicans was that stable government
and civil liberty required a dispersal of political power among a multiplicity
of institutions.
American constitutional theory and practice in the revolutionary period
thus attempted to harmonize several distinct strains of Whig thought. The
second-wave reaction to the perceived populist excesses of the republican
first wave was at root a blending of the moderate Whig principle of consti-
tutional balance with the Lockean liberal ideas of a functional separation
of powers and the fundamental limits on the legislature. In their efforts to
functionalize both separation of powers theory and traditional notions of
55 Ibid., p. 205.
56 Ibid., pp. 218, 433–6.
57 Ibid., pp. 246–7.
constitutional balance, American Whigs were groping to devise an insti-

tutional means to preserve the Lockean distinction between constitutional
authority and legislative will.
The central theoretical problem facing the framers of the first American
constitutions – the difficulty in distinguishing effectively constituent and leg-
islative power – derived from the fundamental tension between the two com-
peting ideas of popular sovereignty in radical Whig thought. The Lockean
liberal idea of popular sovereignty stressed the need to base all political au-
thority on a written or at least notionally “fundamental” constitution pro-
duced by popular consent. In this view, the separation of powers was com-
patible with a plan of government reflecting the natural constituent power of
the people. On the other hand, the modern Whig republican notion of pop-
ular sovereignty sought to base all legitimate power on the direct will of the
people expressed through a more or less continuous process of consent. This
view of popular sovereignty slanted heavily toward the supremacy of the
representative assembly in any constitutional system and thus effectively un-
dermined the principle of separation of powers. The first-wave constitutions
assumed a greater degree of congruity between these two understandings
of popular sovereignty than proved warranted. The fundamental challenge
then confronting American Whigs in the second wave of revolutionary con-
stitutionalism was not simply how to implement the separation of powers,
but rather how to formulate and institutionalize a theory of consent that
embraced and harmonized the liberal and republican conceptions of pop-
ular sovereignty. What was needed was an innovative American blend of
the diverse elements of their Whig philosophical inheritance that combined
a considerable measure of direct popular consent to and control over gov-
ernment action with a principle of foundational constituent consent to a
supralegal instrument regulating, separating, and limiting the organs of gov-
ernment power. American Whigs in the revolutionary period strove for noth-
ing less than an unprecedented new understanding of the idea of a written
constitution.
Constitutionalizing Constituent Power

The central feature in the period of revolutionary constitutionalism was the
effort to diagnose and remedy the problems in the nascent American doctrine
of the separation of powers. The nature of the problem these early consti-
tution makers were grappling with was the ambiguous relation between
the legislature, especially the popular branch, and the constitution. For most
American Whigs, a written constitution was meant to preclude tyranny from
either the garden variety monarchical absolutism typical in history or the
uniquely British (and admittedly more popular) configuration of absolute
parliamentary sovereignty. The idea of a written constitution was strongly
connected in the American Whig mind with the notion of a social contract
derived originally from the consent of rights-bearing individuals. American

Whigs intuited this connection viscerally, but how exactly did it work? All
American Whigs may have agreed that political sovereignty derived from
popular sovereignty, but what did that mean institutionally? Did popular
sovereignty require that constitutions be drafted by special conventions or
were elected legislatures competent to devise and revise the constitution? Did
written constitutions require popular ratification to be legitimate, or again,
would legislative imprimatur suffice?
During the period of revolutionary constitutionalism, American Whigs
struggled to find a steady and settled understanding of the complex relation
between the Lockean idea of natural constituent power and the principle of
fundamental constitutional law. The first six constitutions were written and
ratified by state legislatures. However, most first-wave legislatures showed
little regard for constitutional niceties. This is not really surprising given
that, in a concrete sense, the constitutions were the creatures of these same
legislatures. In the transition phase from the first- to second-wave consti-
tutions, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York held special conventions
to draft their constitutions, but they were enacted by the legislatures rather
than through a special system of popular ratification.58 The basic problem
of legislative supremacy in these early state constitutions can be traced back
in large part to the fact that these constitutions came into force lacking a fun-
damental expression of popular consent. Given that the institutional devices
intended to check the legislatures did not originate in natural constituent
power in a direct sense, the predictable tendency was for the popular assem-
blies that did reflect popular consent in a direct, albeit ephemeral, way to
ensure that, as Jefferson deplored, “the ordinary legislature may alter the
constitution itself.”59 The idea and practice of strong, practically omnipo-
tent, legislatures had, as we have seen, deep roots in both the radical republi-
can and more conservative moderate Whig elements of the Anglo-American
tradition. What was lacking throughout most of the period of revolutionary
constitutionalism was the practical formulation of an idea foreshadowed
clearly by Locke and somewhat ambiguously by Paine of a constitution with
teeth in it, a source of sovereign authority derived from society at large un-
derstood independently of any of the particular institutions it articulated and
limited.
In order to appreciate the depth and subtlety of the issues confronting the
first state constitution makers, it is important to reconsider the intellectual
context informing the period of revolutionary constitutionalism. As we have
seen, the core of the debate between the colonies and Britain during the im-
perial crisis focused on the issue of divided sovereignty. The common thread
unifying the early colonial position of the moderates Otis and Dickinson
58 Adams, First American Constitutions, pp. 74–6 and Lutz, Popular Control, pp. 44–5.
59 Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia,” p. 127.
with the later, more radical formulation of imperial relations advanced by

Jefferson, Adams, and Wilson was the argument that the people of America
lived under a system of divided sovereignty that was under threat from the
ministry in London. American Whigs argued that the people of the colonies
possessed the natural constituent power to delegate authority both to their
colonial assemblies and to the British crown. The idea of divided sovereignty,
then, derived its intellectual premises from the Lockean liberal principle of
delegated powers that may be distributed to a variety of organs and, at
least in principle, measured out with discernible limits deducible from the
express will of the people. The heart of the matter in the process of revolu-
tionary constitutionalism was the difficulty of adjusting and modifying the
idea of divided sovereignty, which had been so crucial for the American idea
of government in the imperial context, to the practical reality of internal
constitution making in the states following independence.
The problem of divided sovereignty took two forms after 1776. First, there
was the tortuous process of establishing institutions of continental union that
culminated in the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781. The
need for a continental union of the states was the underlying national issue
during the revolutionary period. However, the continental or quasi-federal
structure embodied in the Articles could hardly be considered an example of
divided sovereignty given that supreme power so clearly rested in the indi-
vidual states. State legislatures sent delegates to Congress and reserved prac-
tically plenary power in relation to it. Montesquieu’s idea of democratic fed-
eralism, which maintained that democratic republics were necessarily small
and must form security alliances with other small democratic states, was the
dominant philosophical paradigm informing the drafting and passage of the
Articles.60 Clearly, the Montesquieuian idea of federalism afforded a much
less cohesive idea of national government than would emerge in America
after 1787.
The second area in which the principle of divided sovereignty only grad-
ually began to develop in the revolutionary period was internally within the
states. The general rule, especially in the first-wave constitutions, was for
the most directly representative body in the constitutional system to assume
supreme sovereignty, even over the constitution itself. The frequent failure of
the revolutionary era constitutions to preserve the principle of the separation
of powers and to prevent legislative encroachments on the constitution left
the idea of divided sovereignty inherited from the imperial context in tatters.
The combination of diverging tendencies, of centripetal forces internally in
the states and centrifugal forces in the broader federation, only reinforced
the concentration of political power in the revolutionary and confederation
60 See Baron Charles Secondat Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws (1748), Anne M. Cohler, Basia
Carolyn Miller, and Harold Summel Stone, trans. and eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1989): bk 9, chs. 1–3, pp. 131–3.
periods. The state legislatures were the only real power in their states and
thus collectively in the federation as a whole.
With respect to the problem of divided sovereignty within the states, the
central dilemma appeared to be how to make the idea of divided sovereignty
consistent with popular sovereignty, especially in the republican sense of pop-
ular control over government. The experience of divided sovereignty during
the colonial period may have left the imperial connection in shards, but the
idea of distributing and limiting delegated powers had deep roots in rev-
olutionary America. The Declaration of Independence asserted the natural
constituent power of the people to make and indeed break forms of govern-
ment. There was no widespread opposition to this radical premise among
American Whigs. Braxton’s emphasis on continuity between colonial and
postindependence American political life was quite singular and largely un-
palatable in the revolutionary period. The Declaration of Independence was
explicit and emphatic in advancing the principle of delegated powers under-
lying the idea of divided sovereignty; however, it was much more reticent
about the workaday practical reality of implementing this principle. British
constitutional practice was no real help in the matter either. The conven-
tions of 1660 and 1689 were, as we have seen, never widely understood
to be reflective of the natural constituent power of the people. They were
generally recognized as at most irregular parliaments assembled in extraor-
dinary times (typically on the basis of monarchical disability) and charged
with specific restorative tasks.61 The custom of assembling conventions as
understood in British constitutional practice was, then, much more in keep-
ing with the moderate Whig emphasis on temporary measures to restore
the original compact than it was to any radical understanding of natural
constituent power and the dissolution of government. Thus, the first-wave
failure to apply the principle of popular sovereignty directly to the pro-
cess of constitutional ratification was partially a function of the novelty of
America’s situation in 1776 and partially a reflection of the deep ambiguity
in the Whig understanding of consent.
The ambiguity in the Whig understanding of consent related to more than
just the cleavage between moderates and radicals. In the context of 1776–80,
the most important tension within American Whiggism lay in the difference
between the republican and liberal understanding of consent. Both the lib-
eral and republican strains of radical Whig thought made consent central
to their argument, but they offered differing approaches to the question of
the application of the principle of consent to the formation and operation
of political institutions. The republican strain placed the emphasis on direct
consent and majority rule as the legitimizing principle of government action.
The institutional mechanisms prescribed by Paine and Demophilus to ensure
61 Adams, “State Constitutions,” p. 10; Bonwick, “United States Constitution,” p. 55; and
Wood, Creation, pp. 310–12.
democratic accountability provided no real check on majority rule. The

Pennsylvania Council of Censors and the New York Council of Revision,
foreshadowed by Spinoza’s Council of Syndics, were also intended to pro-
vide an institutional check, a constitution-protecting counterforce, against
straight majority rule populism.62 While these innovative institutions de-
signed to ensure constitutional fidelity on the part of the legislature proved
to be unreliable, they clearly indicated that even American Whigs who were
committed to the ideal of popular government questioned whether legisla-
tive enactment was the sole basis of legitimacy.63 Given the hard lessons
of the imperial crisis, American Whigs had imbibed an inherent distrust of
Pufendorfian and Blackstonian legal positivism, even if it was dressed up in
the populist garb of broadly representative assemblies.
In the first-wave constitutions, the republican desire to maintain popu-
lar control over government trumped the liberal aspiration to preserve the
integrity of the written constitution vis-à-vis the legislature. This was the
constitutional price many American Whigs were prepared to pay for pop-
ulist goods. The second wave, however, saw liberal arguments acquiring a
new saliency in the states. The second-wave corrections to the pallid first-
wave separation of powers were largely salutary but ultimately inadequate
on their own because the effective separation of powers means more than
just a certain institutional arrangement. The idea of the dispersal of pow-
ers that became more urgent following the first wave rested on a notion of
functional instrumentality for political institutions. This Lockean argument,
however, rested on the deeper liberal premises about the requirements of
limited government.
The core principle informing the renewed prominence of liberal ideas in
the second wave was the distinction between government and society rooted
in Lockean Whig philosophy. Lockean liberals tended to internalize and
presuppose a more articulated state of nature theory than did Whig republi-
cans. The Lockean state of nature was intended not only to demonstrate the
grounds of individual political obligation but also to highlight the profound
artificiality of government. Government in the liberal view was the result
neither of a Pufendorfian pact of submission nor a republican direct conduit
of popular will. Rather, government in Lockean liberal philosophy is prop-
erly understood as the product of a more variegated form of consent and
delegation of power. The people may delegate their natural authority to dif-
ferent institutions performing various functions, but they may also delegate
62 See New York 1777, sec. 3, in which the governor and at least two judges could veto
legislation, and Pennsylvania 1776, sec. 47, in which the elected council of censors meant
to assemble every seven years, could call a new constitutional convention with a two-thirds
vote. Cf. Spinoza’s proposal for a council of syndics that represents a prototype for the
New York and Pennsylvania councils (Benedict Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise and
A Political Treatise, R. H. M. Elwes, trans. [New York: Dover, 1951]: p. 380).
63 Wood, Creation, p. 455.
different forms of power with carefully defined parameters of legitimate

spheres of action. Thus, the Lockean liberal strain of Whig thought provided
a coherent account of the properties of political power that was compati-
ble with the palpable predisposition of Americans for written constitutions.
Lockean liberalism advanced a conception of consent that was more adapt-
able to the construction of complex governments than was Whig republican-
ism. In the Lockean model, some institutions could reflect relatively direct
consent and others a more indirect form. This flexibility in applying the prin-
ciple of delegated powers was related to the core Lockean idea that a society
of rights-bearing individuals may regulate their political life by the known
and general laws establishing the form of government.64 In addition, the
Lockean liberal emphasis on the centrality of property rights was generally
shared by nearly all American Whigs in this period. However, the first-wave
constitutions were unable to operationalize this principle effectively because
success in the goal of protecting property rights, even against elected ma-
jorities, rested on the more fundamental idea of a conceptual space and a
moral hierarchy distinguishing constitutional provision and statute law. It
was this latter idea that remained to be substantiated in the second wave of
revolutionary constitutionalism.
In some respects, the Lockean liberal idea of flexible consent and delegated
powers was in tension with the general current of revolutionary constitu-
tional thought. In the first wave, the liberal concern to distinguish popular
and political sovereignty paled beside the republican passion to ensure that
the supreme institutions were emphatically popular. The liberal constitu-
tionalism that began to emerge in the second wave can be understood as
a conscious effort to reaffirm the moral primacy of society above political
institutions. By devising a method of indirect consent to institutions deriv-
ing their authority from a more fundamentally popular written constitution,
American framers in the states hoped thereby to develop a means to check
the absolutizing tendency of the popular will. The Lockean liberal strain of
Whig thought offered at least a theoretical outline for a method of parcel-
ing out sovereign power in limited and more or less clearly defined units to
various institutions. The experience of constitution making in the states in
the first-wave and much of the second wave demonstrated with urgency the
need to devise procedural mechanisms of consent to solidify the connection
between society and the written constitution establishing a government.
The theoretical peak of revolutionary constitutionalism occurred in
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 remains the old-
est (albeit much amended) written constitution in active use today. More
significantly for our purposes, the Massachusetts Constitution represented
the first fully articulated formulation of the uniquely American form of
constitutional government. As we have seen, under the driving intellectual
64 Peters, Massachusetts Constitution, pp. 155, 169, 173–5.

leadership of John Adams the Massachusetts Constitution, along with that

of New York, revivified the Lockean idea of a functional separation of pow-
ers theory in America.65 However, the key innovation in Massachusetts lay
not in its plan of government, but rather in the process of its creation.
Massachusetts was the first state to draft the constitution in a special con-
vention and then submit the proposal for popular ratification in the many
townships in the state. Moreover, this process of popular ratification of the
constitution was no mere symbolic gesture or simply pro forma event inas-
much as the framers of the 1780 Constitution were keenly aware of the
stinging rebuke dealt by the people to the previous constitutional proposal
in 1778. No state prior to Massachusetts had attempted to determine fun-
damental popular consent for the constitution drafted by their conventions
or the legislature, and the prickly, politically sophisticated, and demanding
citizens of Massachusetts ensured that the process of popular ratification
would have substantive meaning.
The process of popular ratification in Massachusetts represented the most
ambitious effort in the revolutionary period to institutionalize and opera-
tionalize the Lockean liberal understanding of the origin of government.
The constitutional and legal implications of the Lockean turn in revolu-
tionary constitutionalism were twofold. First, the Massachusetts process of
constitution making and ratification illuminated a new way to understand
the relation between written constitutions and the instruments of govern-
ment. In the prior efforts at revolutionary constitutionalism, the states were
unable to demonstrate the direct and palpable connection between the will
of the majority of individuals in society, what Locke identified as the natural
law of “greater force,” and the basic structure of government. Due to their
incapacity to demonstrate direct popular consent to the fundamental rules
of government, as opposed to the actual operation of the legislative power,
these first state constitutions were unable to solidify the majoritarian social,
in contrast to simply political, premises of Lockean liberal constitutionalism.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was the first American constitution
to elevate constitutional provision securely above normal statute law through
popular consent, in effect to provide the constitution with the normative bite
in law and the political culture to resist legislative encroachment.66 By flesh-
ing out the process required to distinguish the fundamental popular consent
implied in the idea of natural constituent power so central to Lockean Whig
philosophy from the operational consent required in quotidian governance
65 For Adams’ role in the drafting of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, see C. Bradley
Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998):
pp. 202–22.
66 As Peters observes, the Massachusetts ratification process underlined the difference between
constituent power and operational political consent by establishing a broader suffrage for the
ratification process than it did for the normal electoral process (Constitution of Massachusetts,
pp. 135–6). Cf. Lutz, Popular Control, pp. 81–3 and Locke II:96.
and normal legislation, the Massachusetts constitutional framers advanced

the American idea of consent materially toward a coherent theory of divided
sovereignty.
The second major advance in American constitutional theory produced
by the Massachusetts model had to do with the evolving conception of the
separation of powers. The general shift toward independent executives and
judiciaries that occurred in the movement from the first to the second wave
of revolutionary constitutionalism reached a level of theoretical sophistica-
tion in Massachusetts hitherto unseen in America. The idea of governors
and judges, or for that matter senators, with a source of legitimacy inde-
pendent of both the popular assembly and the electorate broadly speaking,
became more plausibly consistent with popular government inasmuch as the
Massachusetts constitutional ratification process provided these institutions
with a representative function ultimately rooted in the authority of the peo-
ple. In principle at least an independent executive, judge, or senator with
multiple-year terms or an indirect mode of election and appointment was
no less representative of natural constituent power than the popular as-
sembly. In its precise formulation in Massachusetts in 1780, the separation
of powers was still profoundly influenced by populist republican principles
such as annual elections for all the political branches. However, this idea
of direct consent through institutions was fused with the more indirect no-
tion of foundational consent amenable to the Lockean liberal principle of
separation of powers and the delegation theory of sovereignty. Even if the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was still wedded to some extent to re-
publican and moderate Whig ideas in terms of constitutional structure and
electoral process, it introduced a very flexible Lockean understanding of the
principle of consent into American constitutionalism. With the broad pop-
ular base supplied by direct fundamental consent, not only did the idea of
indirect consent to particular institutions and offices become more palatable
to an essentially democratic people, but also future American constitutional
framers were shown the practical application of means to distinguish be-
tween making, executing, and interpreting law more clearly than at any
prior point in Anglo-American history.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 marked the end of the period of
revolutionary constitutionalism in the states. It also signified the first true ex-
ample of the uniquely American form of constitutionalism with a powerful
independent executive and judiciary, a bicameral legislature, and a system
of popular ratification and amendment. As the theoretical peak of revolu-
tionary constitutionalism, the Massachusetts example of popular ratification
became the model for subsequent American constitutions including the U.S.
Constitution of 1787. At the philosophical level, the Massachusetts Con-
stitution of 1780 represented a watershed in the historical development of
Anglo-American constitutionalism. The Lockean liberal principle of concep-
tually dividing society and government produced an idea of consent that was
inherently flexible and could operate in a variety of ways, impacting diverse

institutions with particular functions in the constitutional system. Under the
guidance of Lockean liberal philosophy, American constitutionalists would
begin to articulate and develop a notion of indirect consent and represen-
tation that was largely devoid of the aristocratic and class-based elements
of British moderate Whig constitutionalism. While modern republican ele-
ments such as frequent elections, broad franchise, and suspicions about the
oligarchic tendencies in the separation of powers would remain important
features of American constitutional development after 1780, the republican
idea that direct popular consent to legislative activity is the sole basis of legit-
imacy would no longer be the central tenet of American constitutionalism.
The modern theory of divided sovereignty was slowly and rudimentarily
worked out internally in the period of revolutionary constitutionalism in the
states. By the time of the creation of the last revolutionary era constitution
in Massachusetts, a combination of advanced theoretical rigor and dearly
bought lessons of experience pointed American Whigs toward a means to
combine fundamental consent to a written constitution with the idea of ef-
fective operational consent to government. The combination of these two
distinct aspects of consent produced the conceptual model for distributing
and dividing sovereign power that would become the hallmark of American
constitutionalism. Both the shortcomings and achievements of revolution-
ary constitutionalism prepared the theoretical ground for 1787 by providing
flexible concepts of consent and delegated powers that would come to un-
dergird the American idea of federalism and separation of powers, each fully
competent within its own sphere. In time American Whigs would go beyond
even the parameters foreshadowed by Locke by applying the principle of
delegated powers to an unprecedentedly complex federal system of inter-
connected but relatively autonomous governments and jurisdictions. In the
Confederation period following the Revolution, many Americans gradually
came to the conclusion that further comprehensive adaptation of Lockean
liberal principles to the American context would be necessarily federal in
character.
Conclusion
A decade or so after the fires of revolution were expended in America, and as

the first sparks of conflagration were beginning to spread in France, the self-
professed Old Whig Edmund Burke identified a surprising source of ideolog-
ical solidarity with the emerging New Whig radicals occupying the opposite
end of the British political spectrum. He assured all concerned that “the old
fanatics of single arbitrary power . . . maintained, what I believe no creature
now maintains ‘that the crown is held by divine hereditary and indefeasible
right’.”1 Burke’s utterance and the political context from which it emerged
exposed in a particularly acute manner the dual character of the Whig poli-
tics of liberty that formed the foundation of Anglo-American thought in the
early modern period. I have tried to show that Whig political philosophy
was both a capacious repository for practically all limited constitutionalist
thought and sentiment in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-
American world and a complex, heterogeneous body of divergent, distinct,
and even conflicting ideas and philosophical commitments.
Burke perceptively identified the common source of Whig political
thought in the constitutional and theological battles of seventeenth-century
England. As we have seen, in their quarrel with Filmerian divine right and
its political theology of monarchical absolutism and scriptural literalism,
the first English Whigs built upon, modified, and in important ways de-
parted from the venerable natural liberty tradition of their philosophical
predecessors. Each of the various strains of Whig thought we have identi-
fied in Exclusion era England shared both this anti–divine right philosophi-
cal heritage and the goal of purging the classical and Christian elements of
the anti-absolutist principles of contract and consent seen in Catholic and
Calvinist early modern thought. The Whigs did so, moreover, while simulta-
neously trying to reform and disable the absolutist tendencies of Hobbesian
1 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1987): p. 30.
426
Conclusion 427
and Grotian natural jurisprudence in order to produce a version of mod-

ern natural rights theory consistent with limited government. The diverse
and multifarious body of thought that emerged from this revolution in the
doctrine of natural liberty shaped and animated the development of Anglo-
American thought from the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688–9 to
the revolution in America nearly a century later. So profound and pervasive
was the impact of Whig thought on the Anglo-American tradition in this pe-
riod that even fierce political rivals and ideological opponents such as Paine
and Burke or Blackstone and Jefferson were each, in a sense, heirs of the
Whig politics of liberty.
In this study, I have tried to cast our vision backward from the ideo-
logical cleavages in Anglo-American thought at the time of the American
Revolution to their source in the philosophical battles of the turbulent sev-
enteenth century in the expectation that by clarifying and examining these
philosophical sources, we are better situated to appreciate various aspects
of the Anglo-American tradition that are now often neglected or misunder-
stood. By exaggerating the influence of liberal or modern republican ideas
and by hypersystematizing the elements of this tradition in rigid paradigms,
we not only fail to account for the heterogeneity of philosophical influences
on the development of Anglo-American thought, we also obscure the under-
lying threads of intellectual unity connecting Anglo-American democratic
traditions with the broader Western philosophical heritage of political ra-
tionalism. In an age called to renewed contemplation of the meaning and
promise of liberal democracy by new global challenges and threats to demo-
cratic principles, we thus run the risk of depriving the student of the Anglo-
American tradition today of important sources of wisdom and reflection
embedded in our political history.
The Lockean liberal, modern republican, and moderate Whig strains of
thought we have examined in this study each played a role in establishing
the philosophical foundations of our political and constitutional tradi-
tions. The formation of two competing doctrines within the British Empire,
with the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty in Britain and popular
sovereignty in America, reflected the gradual solidification of tendencies
rooted in the philosophical premises of early English Whiggism. I have tried
to demonstrate not only that the origin of American political and consti-
tutional ideas lay in English Whig thought, but also that English thought
was deeply penetrated by seventeenth-century continental natural jurispru-
dence. The English Whig tradition that produced the theoretical foundations
of American political and constitutional thought was itself a hybrid of in-
digenous and foreign intellectual influences as the concepts, categories, and
reasoning of continental thought were injected into English political, consti-
tutional, and theological controversies by the philosophically minded Whigs.
I have aimed in essence to restore a sense of the original depth and multi-
plicity of philosophical sources composing Whig thought that included not
428 Conclusion
only such English luminaries as Locke, Sidney, and Tyrrell, but also at one
remove important continental thinkers in Europe’s natural law heritage such
as Spinoza, Pufendorf, and Grotius, who are typically not associated with
the Anglo-American tradition. The development of Anglo-American politi-
cal and constitutional thought in the seminal period between the Revolution
in England in the 1680s and the American Revolution in 1776 must be un-
derstood in the larger context of the Enlightenment philosophical project,
of which the Anglo-American experiment in liberty proved a fruitful and
world-changing branch.
I certainly do not believe that my tripartite structure of Whig thought fully
explains every aspect of Anglo-American or modern political development
beyond the eighteenth century, but I offer some conjectures as perhaps a
useful heuristic. In America the U.S. Constitution of 1787 represented both
the culmination of early modern Whig thought and a new beginning for a
uniquely American version of constitutionalism. By the end of the period of
revolutionary constitutionalism in America, the long-running battle between
British and American Whigs over the moral, legal, and political meaning of
natural rights, the Glorious Revolution, and the British Constitution quite
obviously had moved to a different plane as the young American Republic
assumed its place among the independent nations of the world. However,
the formal and institutional triumph of the principle of popular sovereignty
and written constitutionalism in 1787 also reflected a deeper underlying
continuity of thought rooted in the diverse strains of the radical Whig in-
heritance in America. The American application of the elusive principle of
divided sovereignty in the formation of a complex federal system delimiting
the distribution of powers between the national and state governments rep-
resented an immense theoretical achievement with deep roots in the Lockean
liberal strain of English radical Whig thought. The Framers of 1787 not only
imitated the Massachusetts model for institutionalizing popular sovereignty
through popular ratification of the written legal instrument, they also mod-
ified traditional notions of constitutional balance and the Lockean idea of a
functional separation of powers to produce the elaborate system of checks
and balances that has come to embody the American system of government.
With regard to both the principle of federalism and the separation of pow-
ers theory, the Framers in Philadelphia sought to make manifest the great
mystery of liberal constitutionalism: the independence of dependent things.
The modern republican elements of American Whig thought that had
been so influential in the period of revolutionary constitutionalism did not,
however, disappear from the American political landscape with the appar-
ent triumph of Lockean liberalism in 1787. The Antifederalist opponents
of the Constitution in the ratification debates of 1787–8 drew many of
their most influential arguments from the philosophical resources of the re-
publican strain of the radical Whig tradition. Recalling the words of Sidney,
Spinoza, Trenchard and Gordon, Tom Paine, and the framers of the first state
Conclusion 429
constitutions from the historical past for the polemical battles of the consti-
tutional present, Antifederalists from the fishing villages of Massachusetts to
the plantations of Georgia expressed deep concern that the establishment of a
distant national government with a complex system of separation of powers
would undermine the cherished American principle of popular sovereignty.
Free government, in the eyes of these American Whig republicans, was syn-
onymous with government close to the people, accountable to the elec-
torate, and subject to the direct control of a vigilant and public-spirited citi-
zenry. While the Antifederalists lost the immediate debate over ratification in
1787–8, the impact of their republican philosophy of popular sovereignty on
the future of American constitutionalism was far from nugatory. Even with
regard to the Constitution of 1787, important features of republicanism were
grafted into the separation of powers in the national government and were
woven into the fabric of the complex federal system. The regular election
of members of the House of Representatives and of the president (albeit
through the medium of the Electoral College) reflected the characteristically
republican concern for frequent recourse to first principles of consent and
for a significant degree of popular control over the national government.
Moreover, within the federal system for long after 1789 (arguably until well
into the twentieth century), most of the important matters of actual govern-
ing in America took place at the level of the state governments, which were
subject to the authority of their own typically more populist constitutions
expressing an egalitarian franchise and created and amended according to
the sovereignty of the people in the separate states.2
American political and constitutional development can be understood in
a fundamental sense as a result of the perpetual interaction of the liberal and
republican elements composing the philosophical foundations of the regime.
The amended Constitution, which extended the franchise to women and
African Americans, and established direct popular election to the Senate and
term limits on the president, further demonstrated the incorporation of es-
sentially republican principles into the framework of a liberal Constitution.
Even the development of extra-constitutional institutions such as the mass
political party, a phenomenon practically invented in the early American
republic, originated in the profoundly democratic impulses of the modern
republican tradition with its palpable tension concerning the separation of
powers and its characteristic concern to mobilize popular will and structure
a more or less continuous flow of consent to the operation of government.
2 Colin Bonwick, “The United States Constitution and Its Roots in British Political Thought
and Tradition,” in Foundations of Democracy in the European Union: From the Genesis of
Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament, John Pinder, ed. (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1999): pp. 54–5 and Donald Lutz, Popular Control and Popular Consent: Whig Political
Theory in the Early State Constitutions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980):
pp. 221–2.
430 Conclusion
Far from indicating the crushing victory of Lockean liberalism over all com-
ers, the process of constitutional framing in 1787–9 inaugurated patterns of
thought and political behavior signifying the synergetic relation of construc-
tive antagonism between liberal and republican principles that has histori-
cally characterized the core dynamic of American constitutional and political
development.
Beyond the shores of America, the strands of thought we have identified
in Whig political philosophy would emerge from their common Enlight-
enment source and appear in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century
Britain and Europe in various mutations, evolutions, and parallels. Lockean
liberal constitutional philosophy would by and large find the ancien régimes
of continental Europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries much
less suitable soil for implantation than the Anglo–American world. While
Lockean liberalism in this period would generally find its intellectual voice
on the Continent subsumed or drowned out by the fervent appeals of na-
tionalism and working-class radicalism, modern republicanism proved to
make a more immediate and even explosive impact. Notably in revolution-
ary France, the Spinozist roots of modern republicanism would, if anything,
be more apparent than in America. The democratic philosophy of revolution
in France, with its deep antipathy to executive power and its reliance on the
mass mobilization of ideologically charged artisan radicalism, would lead in
short order to the complete absorption of all the power and privileges of the
historical estates of the realm into the ideal of popular sovereignty expressed
through a single omnicompetent national assembly. Following the collapse
of constitutional republican government in revolutionary France lay the hy-
perexecutive populism and military la gloire of Bonaparte and eventually the
restoration of an eviscerated ancien régime with nowhere left to go but down.
For its part, across the channel in Britain, the deeply entrenched practice of
parliamentary sovereignty would undergo important liberalizing and even
republicanizing modifications through the electoral and constitutional re-
forms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it would persist in form
and substance as the central organizing principle of the British system of gov-
ernment through to the present-day debates over European integration and
Scottish and Welsh devolution. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the moderate Whig conservative natural law theory of Pufendorf
that lay at the core of eighteenth-century British political and constitu-
tional thought also experienced important modifications as new philosoph-
ical doctrines emerged. The early- and mid-eighteenth-century rearticula-
tions of the moderate Whig rejection of radical rights and contract theory by
Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, Hume, and Blackstone provided in many re-
spects the theoretical foundations for later British philosophical movements
in the direction of Burkean prescription and Benthamite utilitarianism. My
reading of the conservative natural law theory underlying British constitu-
tional and political thought in the eighteenth century suggests that, ironically,
Conclusion 431
these bitter philosophical foes championing the conservative principle of pre-

scription, on the one hand, and the progressive ideal of utility, on the other,
shared a deeply rooted and largely obscured common intellectual source in
the seventeenth-century moderate Whig rejection of radical natural rights
theory.
This study intends to illuminate the complex philosophical heritage under-
lying the Anglo-American political and constitutional tradition. By uncov-
ering the roots of this tradition in the political and theological controversies
surrounding the early modern idea of natural liberty and reexamining its
development in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this study suggests
that in many ways contemporary modes of thought and patterns of political
behavior are rooted in much deeper and richer philosophical sources than
we generally realize. I hope that by restoring a vision of the original hetero-
geneity and scope of moral and intellectual resources in the Enlightenment
philosophical foundations of Anglo-American thought, twenty-first-century
enlightened friends of liberal democracy will be able to draw on these re-
sources in order to respond to the dangerous alternatives to our way of life
in the world today, both fanatical and banal.
Bibliography
Aarsleff, Hans. “The State of Nature and the Nature of Man in Locke.” John Locke:
Problems and Perspectives. John Yolton, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1969: 99–136.
Acton, Lord Emerich Edward Dalberg. Essays in the History of Liberty. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund Press, 1985.
Adams, John. “Thoughts on Government.” The Political Writings of John Adams.
George Peek, ed. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954: 84–92.
The Adams–Jefferson Letters. Lestor J. Capon, ed. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1959.
Adams, Willi Paul. The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the
Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1980.
“The State Constitutions as Analogy and Precedent.” The United States Constitution:
Roots, Rights, and Responsibilities. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution
Press, 1992: 3–22.
Ahrensdorf, Peter and Thomas Pangle. Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of
Power and Peace. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999.
Aldridge, A. Owen. “The Collapse of the British Empire as Seen by Franklin,
Paine, and Burke.” Revisioning the British Empire in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury. William G. Shade, ed. London: Associated University Press, 1998: 76–
101.
Allen, W. J. A. English Political Thought, 1603–1644. London: Archon, 1967.
History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century. London: Methuen, 1977.
Appleby, Joyce. Capitalism and a New Social Order. New York: New York University
Press, 1984.
Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. Literally translated by the Fathers of the
English Dominican Province. 3 vols. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947.
Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York: Viking Press, 1963.
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. H. H. Rackham, trans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1934.
The Politics. Carnes Lord, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
433
434 Bibliography
Aschcraft, Richard and M. M. Goldsmith. “Locke, Revolution Principles, and the

Formation of Whig Ideology.” The Historical Journal, vol. 26, issue 4 (December
1983): 773–800.
Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. Princeton: Princeton
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.
Atwood, William. The Fundamentals of the English Government. London, 1690.
Augustine, St. The City of God. New York: Penguin, 1984.
Bailyn, Bernard. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1967.
“Common Sense.” Fundamental Testaments of the American Revolution.
Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1973: 7–22.
Balibar, Etienne. Spinoza and Politics. Peter Snowdon, trans. New York: Verso,
1998.
Banning, Lance. The Jeffersonian Persuasion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978.
“The Republican Interpretation: Retrospect and Prospect.” The Republican Synthe-
sis Revisited: Essays in Honor of George Athan Bilias. Milton M. Klein, Richard D.
Brown, and John Hench, eds. Worcester: American Antiquarian Society, 1992:
91–118.
Beard, Charles. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. New York: Macmillan,
1935 [1913].
Becker, Carl. The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas.
New York: Knopf, 1942 [1922].
Bellarmine, Roberto. De Laicis. Kathleen Murphy, trans. New York: Fordham
Supreme Pontiff. George Moore, trans. Chevy Chase, MD.: Country Dollar Press,
1951.
Bennett, Joan. Reviving Liberty: Radical Christian Humanism in Milton’s Great Poems.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Vol. I. London, 1791
[1765].
Bodin, Jean. The Six Books of the Republic (1606). Trans. by Richard Knolles from the
original Les six livres de la republique (Paris, 1580). K. D. McRae, ed. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Bolingbroke, Viscount Henry St. John. The Works of Lord Bolingbroke. Philadelphia:
Carey and Hart, 1841.
Bonwick, Colin. English Radicals and the American Revolution. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1977.
“The United States Constitution and Its Roots in British Political Thought and
Tradition.” Foundations of Democracy in the European Union: From the Genesis of
Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament. John Pinder, ed. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1999: 41–58.
Brailsford, H. N. The Levellers and the English Revolution. Stanford: Stanford
Braxton, Carter. “An Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient
Dominion of Virginia” (1776). American Political Writings During the Found-
ing Era: 1760–1805. Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1983: 328–39.
Bibliography 435
Brett, Annabel. Liberty, Right, and Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997.
“Individual and Community in the ‘Second Scholastic’: Subjective Rights in
Domingo de Soto and Francisco Suarez.” Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle. Constance Blackwell and Sachiko
Kusukawa, eds. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999: 146–68.
Brewer, John. “Rockingham, Burke, and Whig Political Argument.” The Historical
Journal, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 1975): 188–201.
Browning, Reed. Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1982.
Burke, Edmund. The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Volume II: Party,
Parliament, and the American Crisis, 1766–1774, Paul Langford, ed. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981.
Reflections on the Revolution in France. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1987.
Burnet, Gilbert. “The Measures of Submission (1688).” The Struggle for Sovereignty:
Seventeenth Century English Political Tracts. Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund Press, 1999: 850–64.
Burns, J. H. “George Buchanan and the Anti-Monarchomachs.” Political Discourse in
Early Modern Britain. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, eds. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993: 3–22.
Burtt, Shelley. Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in England, 1688–1740.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Butler, Melissa. “Early Liberal Roots of Feminism: John Locke and the Attack on
Patriarchy.” American Political Science Review, vol. 72, no. 1 (March 1978):
135–50.
Calvin, Jean. Institutio of the Christianae religionis. Trans. from the 1559 Latin edition
by Ford Lewis Battles. Library of Christian Classics, 2 vols. John T. McNeill, ed.
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967.
Canavan, Francis. “Thomas Paine.” The History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed. Leo
Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987:
680–86.
Carr, Craig L. and Michael J. Seidler. “Pufendorf, Sociality and the Modern State.”
History of Political Thought, vol. 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 355–78.
Caton, Hiram. The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial
Republic, 1600–1835. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988.
Chapman, Richard Allen. “Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family.”
American Political Science Review, vol. 69, no. 1 (March 1975): 76–90.
Cherry, George L. “The Role of the Convention Parliament (1688–89) in Parlia-
mentary Supremacy.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 17, no. 3 (June 1956):
390–406.
Churchill, Winston. A History of the English Speaking Peoples: The New World, Volume
II. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1956.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. The Republic and the Laws. Niall Rudd, trans. Oxford: Oxford
Claeys, Gregory. Thomas Paine: Social and Political Thought. Boston: Unwin & Hyman,
1989.
Clarke, Captain John. “Speech during the Putney Debates.” The English Levellers.
Andrew Sharp, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998: 102–30.
436 Bibliography
Cohler, Ann. Montesquieu’s Comparative Politics and the Spirit of American Constitu-
tionalism. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988.
Colbourn, H. Trevor. “Jefferson’s Use of the Past.” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
ser., vol. 15, no. 1 (January 1958): 56–70.
The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American
Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965.
Colley, Linda. In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party, 1714–1760. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Commager, Henry Steele. Documents of American History. New York: Appleton,
1963.
Conniff, James. “Reason and History in Early Whig Thought: The Case of Algernon
Sidney.” The Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 43 (July 1982): 397–416.
Conrad, Stephen. “Putting Rights Talk in Its Place: The Summary View Revisited.”
Jeffersonian Legacies. Peter Onuf, ed. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1993: 254–80.
Corwin, Edward S. “The Progress of Constitutional Theory between the Declaration
of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention.” The American
Historical Review, vol. 30, issue 3 (April 1925): 511–36.
Courtney, C. P. “Montesquieu and English Liberty.” Montesquieu’s Science of Politics:
Essays on the Spirit of Laws. David W. Carrithers, Michael A. Mosher, and Paul
A. Rahe, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001: 273–90.
Cox, Richard. Locke on War and Peace. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.
“Hugo Grotius.” History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph
Cropsey, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987: 386–95.
Cranston, Maurice. John Locke: A Biography. London: Macmillan, 1957.
Daly, James. Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1979.
Dargo, George. Roots of the Republic: A New Perspective on Early American Constitu-
tionalism. New York: Praeger, 1974.
Dawidoff, Robert. “Rhetoric of Democracy.” Thomas Jefferson and the Politics of
Nature. Thomas Engeman, ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2000: 99–122.
Demophilus (George Bryan). “The Genuine Principles of the Ancient Saxon, or
English, Constitution.” American Political Writings During the Founding Era:
1760–1805. Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds. Indianapolis: Lib-
erty Fund, 1983: 340–67.
Diamond, Martin. “The Revolution of Sober Expectations.” The American Revo-
lution: Three Views. New York: American Brands, 1975: 57–85.
Dickinson, H. T. “The Eighteenth Century Debate on the Sovereignty of Parliament.”
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, fifth ser., vol. 26 (1976): 189–210.
Liberty and Property. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977.
Dickinson, John. “The Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania.” Empire and
Nation. William E. Leuchtenberg and Bernard Wishy, eds. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962: 3–85.
Dictionary of National Biography. 24 vols. Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds. London:
Oxford University Press, 1921–2.
Diggins, John Paul. The Lost Soul of American Politics. New York: Basic Books,
1984.
Bibliography 437
Dowling, Paul. Polite Wisdom: Heathen Rhetoric in Milton’s Areopagitica. Lanham,

MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996.
Dufour, Alfred. “Pufendorf.” The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700.
J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press,
1991: 561–88.
Dunn, John. The Political Thought of John Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1969.
“The Politics of Locke in England and America.” John Locke: Problems and Perspec-
tives. John Yolton, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969: 45–80.
Dworetz, Steven. The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American
Revolution. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.
Edwards, Charles S. Hugo Grotius, the Miracle of Holland: A Study in Political and Legal
Thought. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981.
Elshtain, J. B. Public Man, Private Woman. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1981.
Engeman, Thomas. “Liberalism, Republicanism and Ideology.” Review of Politics,
vol. 55 (Spring 1993): 331–43.
Faulkner, Robert. “The First Liberal Democrat: Locke’s Popular Government.”
Review of Politics, vol. 63 (Fall 2001): 5–39.
Ferguson, James. “Reason and Madness: The Political Thought of James Otis.”
William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2 (April 1979): 194–214.
Ferne, Henry. “The Resolving of Conscience.” Cambridge: 1642.
Feuer, Samuel. Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958.
Figgis, J. N. “On Some Political Theories of the Early Jesuits.” Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, new ser., vol. XI (1897): 89–112.
The Divine Right of Kings. New York: Harper, 1965.
Filmer, Robert. Patriarcha and Other Writings. Johann Somerville, ed. Cambridge:
Fink, Zera. The Classical Republicans. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1962.
Finnis, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Foner, Eric. Tom Paine and Revolutionary America. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976.
Forbes, Duncan. Hume’s Philosophical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975.
Ford, Paul Leicester, ed. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 10 Vols. New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons: 1892–9.
Fortin, Ernest. “St. Augustine.” The History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed. Leo Strauss
and Joseph Cropsey, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987: 176–205.
Foster, David. “Taming the Father: John Locke’s Critique of Patriarchal Fatherhood.”
Review of Politics, vol. 56, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 641–70.
Frankle, Robert. “The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights.” The Historical
Journal, vol. 17, no. 2 (June 1974): 265–79.
Franklin, Julian, ed. Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three
Treatises by Hotman, Beza, and Mornay. New York: Pegasus, 1969.
John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978.
Furley, O. W. “The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet Literature in the Exclusion Crisis,
1679–81.” Cambridge Historical Journal, vol. 13, issue 1 (1957): 19–36.
438 Bibliography
Glendon, Mary Ann. Rights Talk. New York: Free Press, 1991.
Glenn, Gary. “Inalienable Rights and Locke’s Argument for Limited Government:
Political Implications of a Right of Suicide.” Journal of Politics (February 1984)
vol. 46, no. 1: 80–105.
Goldie, Mark. “Edmund Bohun and Jus Gentium in the Revolution Debate, 1689–
1693.” The Historical Journal, vol. 20, no. 3 (September 1977): 569–86.
“The Roots of True Whiggism 1688–94.” History of Political Thought, vol. 1,
no. 2 (Summer 1980): 196–236.
“The Reception of Hobbes.” Cambridge History of Political Thought. J. H. Burns
and Mark Goldie, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991: 589–615.
“John Locke’s Circle and James II.” Historical Journal, vol. 35, no. 3 (September
1992): 557–86.
Goldsmith, M. M. and Richard Ashcraft, “Locke, Revolution Principles, and the
Formation of Whig Ideology.” The Historical Journal, vol. 26, no. 4 (1983): 773–
800.
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey. The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy. Oxford:
Goldwin, Robert. “John Locke.” The History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed. Leo
476–512.
Goodwin, William. “A Sermon Preached Before the King’s Most Excellent Majestie”
(1614). The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth Century English Political Tracts.
Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed. Indianapolis; Liberty Fund, 1999: 21–52.
Gough, John. John Locke’s Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973.
“James Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend of John Locke.” The Historical Journal,
vol. 19, no. 3 (1976): 581–610.
Grant, Ruth. John Locke’s Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Green, Fletcher M. Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776–1860:
A Study in the Evolution of Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1930.
Greene, Jack P. “Origins of the American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpre-
tation.” Framing and Ratification of the Constitution. Leonard Levy and Dennis
Mahony, eds. New York: Macmillan, 1987: 36–53.
“The Glorious Revolution and the British Empire, 1688–1783.” The Revolution
of 1688–89: Changing Perspectives. Lois Schwoerer, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992: 260–71.
Grotius, Hugo. De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres. Vol. I, photographic reproduction of
the edition of 1646, Amsterdam, and Vol. II, translation of the text by Francis
Kelsey. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.
Haakonssen, Knud. “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought.” Political
Theory, vol. 13, no. 2 (May 1985): 239–65.
Haller, William and Godfrey Davis, eds. The Leveller Tracts, 1647–1653. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1944.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. New York:
Mentor, 1961.
Hamowy, Ronald. “Cato’s Letters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm.”
History of Political Thought, vol. xi, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 274–94.
Bibliography 439
Hancock, Ralph. Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics. Ithaca: Cornell
Hansard, T. C. The Parliamentary History of England, Volume XVI: 1765–1771.
London: Hansard, 1813.
Harrington, James. The Commonwealth of Oceana. J. G. A. Pocock, ed. Cambridge:
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955.
Hedges, William. “Telling off the King: Jefferson’s Summary View as American
Fantasy.” Early American Literature, vol. 22, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 166–74.
Heylyn, Peter, “A Briefe and Moderate Answer” (1637). The Struggle for Sovereignty:
Seventeenth Century Political Tracts. Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed. Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, 1999: 73–89.
Hobbes, Thomas. Man and Citizen. Bernard Gert, ed. Indianapolis: Hackett,
1991.
Leviathan. Edwin Curley, ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994.
Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition. New York: Vintage, 1957.
Holmes, Geoffrey. “Harley, St. John and the Death of the Tory Party.” Britain after
the Glorious Revolution. Geoffrey Holmes, ed. New York: St. Martin’s, 1969:
216–37.
Hont, Istvan. “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the
Theoretical Foundations of the ‘Four-Stages Theory’.” The Languages of Political
Theory in Early-Modern Europe. Anthony Pagden, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
Hooker, Richard. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593). George Edelen, W. Speed
Hill, and P. G. Stanwood, eds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977–
81.
Höpfl, Harro. The Christian Polity of John Calvin. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982.
Höpfl, Harro and Martyn P. Thompson. “The History of Contract as a Motif in
Political Thought.” American Historical Review, vol. 84, no. 4 (October 1979):
919–44.
Houston, Alan Craig. Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and
America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
“Republicanism, the Politics of Necessity and the Rule of Law.” A Nation
Transformed: England after the Restoration. Alan Houston and Steve Pincus, eds.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001: 241–71.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967.
Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Eugene Miller, ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
1985.
Hunton, Philip. “A Treatise of Monarchie” (1643). Divine Right and Democracy.
David Wootton, ed. Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Classics, 1986:
175–211.
Huyler, Jerome. Locke in America. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995.
Israel, Jonathan I. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806. Oxford:
“William III, the Glorious Revolution and the Development of Parliamentary
Democracy in Britain.” Foundations of Democracy in the European Union: From
440 Bibliography
the Genesis of Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament. John Pinder,

ed. New York: St. Martin’s, 1999: 33–40.
Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001.
Jaffa, Harry V. A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil
War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 2000.
James I, King of England (James VI of Scotland). “Trew Law of a Free Monarchie.”
Divine Right and Democracy. David Wootton, ed. Hammondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Classics, 1986.
Jefferson, Thomas. “Autobiography” (6 January 1821). The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, 10 vols., Paul Leicester Ford, ed. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,
1892–99.
“Summary View of the Rights of British America.” Thomas Jefferson Writings.
Merrill Peterson, ed. New York: Viking Press, 1984.
“Notes on the State of Virginia.” Thomas Jefferson Writings. Merrill Peterson, ed.
New York: Viking Press, 1984.
“From the Minutes of the Board of Visitors, University of Virginia,” March 4,
1825. Thomas Jefferson Writings. New York: Viking Press, 1984.
Notes on the State of Virginia. New York: Penguin, 1999.
Jezierski, John V. “Parliament or People: James Wilson and William Blackstone on
the Nature and Location of Sovereignty.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 32,
no. 1 (January–March 1971): 95–106.
Jones, J. R. The First Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678–1683. London:
The Revolution of 1688 in England. New York: Norton, 1973.
Josephson, Peter. The Great Art of Government: Locke’s Use of Consent. Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2002.
Karsten, Peter. Patriot Heroes in England and America. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1978.
Kendall, R. T. Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979.
Kendall, Willmore. John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule. Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1965.
Kenyon, J. P. The Stuart Constitution, 1603–1688. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1966.
The Popish Plot. New York: St. Martin’s, 1972.
Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party 1689–1720. Cambridge: Cambridge
Kingdon, Robert. Geneva and the Consolidation of the French Protestant Movement,
1564–1572. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1967.
“Calvinism and Resistance Theory, 1550–1580.” The Cambridge History of Political
Thought, 1450–1700. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge
Kishlansky, Mark. A Monarchy Transformed. London: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Knollenberg, Bernard. Origin of the American Revolution, 1759–1766. New York:
Macmillan, 1960.
Kramnick, Isaac. Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of
Walpole. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.
Bibliography 441
Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Krieger, Leonard. The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural
Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
Lamont, William. “Arminianism: The Controversy That Never Was.” Political
Discourse in Early Modern Britain. Phillip Nicholson and Quentin Skinner, eds.
Lerner, Ralph. The Thinking Revolutionary. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
Lewis, Anthony. “Jefferson’s Summary View as Chart of Political Union.” William
and Mary Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1 (January 1948): 34–51.
Lincoln, Abraham. “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address Before
the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838,” in Abraham
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings. Roy Basler, ed. New York: Da Capo, 1990:
76–85.
Locke, John. The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke. Benjamin Rand,
ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927.
Two Treatises of Government (1690). Peter Laslett, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
“Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina.” Political Essays. Mark Goldie, ed.
Luther, Martin. The Works of Martin Luther. 6 vols. H. E. Jacobs, ed. Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1915–32.
Selections from His Writings. John Dillenberger, ed. Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1961.
Lutz, Donald S. Popular Control and Popular Consent: Whig Political Theory in the Early
State Constitutions. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980.
“The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late-Eighteenth Century Ameri-
can Thought.” American Political Science Review, vol. 78, no. 2 (March 1984):
189–97.
The Origins of American Constitutionalism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1988.
Macaulay, Thomas Babbington. The History of England from the Accession of James
the Second. London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1898.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Harvey C. Mansfield, trans. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1985.
Discourses on Livy. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, trans. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996.
MacPherson, C. B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Oxford: Oxford
Madison, James. Federalist Papers. New York: Mentor, 1961.
Maier, Pauline. From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development
of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.
Makus, Ingrid. Women, Politics, and Reproduction. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1996.
Malcolm, Joyce Lee. “The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common
Law Tradition.” Gun Control and the Constitution. Robert J. Cottrol, ed. New
York: Garland, 1994: 227–56.
To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1994.
442 Bibliography
Manent, Pierre. An Intellectual History of Liberalism. Rebecca Balinski, trans.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Mansfield, Harvey C. Statesmanship and Party Government: A Study of Burke and
Bolingbroke. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
New Modes and Orders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1979.
“On the Political Character of Property in Locke.” Powers, Possessions, and
Freedoms: Essays in Honour of C. B. MacPherson. Alkis Kontos, ed. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1979: 23–38.
Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power. New York: Free
Press, 1989.
Machiavelli’s Virtue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Marshall, John. John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility. Cambridge:
Matthews, Richard. The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson: A Revisionist View.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984.
Mayer, David. “The English Radical Whig Origins of American Constitutionalism.”
Washington University Law Quarterly, vol. 70 (1992): 131–208.
The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson. Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 1994.
Maynwaring, Roger. “Religion and Allegiance” (1627). The Struggle for Sovereignty:
Seventeenth Century English Political Tracts. Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1999: 53–71.
McClure, Kirstie M. Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
McDonald, Forrest. Novus Ordo Seclorum. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1985.
Introduction to Empire and Nation, William E. Leuchtenberg and Bernard Wishy,
eds. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962: i–xvi.
McWilliams, Wilson Carey. “On Equality as the Moral Foundation for Commu-
nity.” The Moral Foundations of the American Republic. Robert Horwitz, ed.
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1987: 282–312.
Mendle, Michael. Dangerous Positions: Mixed Government, the Estates of the Realm,
and the Making of the Answer to the XIX Propositions. University, AL: University
of Alabama Press, 1985.
“Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Very English Absolutism.” Political Discourse in
Early Modern Britain. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, eds. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993: 97–119.
Henry Parker and the English Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995.
Michels, Roberto. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies
of Modern Democracy. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, trans. New York: Free Press,
1958.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. New York: Penguin, 1985 [1859].
Miller, David. Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1981.
Miller, John. “The Glorious Revolution: ‘Contract’ and ‘Abdication’ Reconsidered.”
The Historical Journal, vol. 25, no. 3 (September 1982): 541–55.
Bibliography 443
Milton, John. Paradise Lost. Christoper Ricks, ed. New York: Signet Classics, 1968.
Areopagitica and Other Political Writings of John Milton. John Alvis, ed. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund Press, 1999.
Montesquieu, Charles Secondat, Baron. The Spirit of the Laws (1748). Anne M.
Cohler, Basia Carolyn Milller, and Harold Summel Stone, trans. and eds.
Morgan, Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan. The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revo-
lution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953.
Myers, Peter. “Equality, Property, and the Problem of Partisanship: Lockean Consti-
tution as Mixed Regime.” Interpretation, vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall 1994): 39–64.
Namier, Lewis. England in the Age of the American Revolution. London: Macmillan,
1930.
Nelson, Scott. The Discourses of Algernon Sidney. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University
Presses, 1993.
Nenner, Howard. The Right to Be King: The Succession to the Crown of England, 1603–
1714. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
Nichols, Mary. Citizens and Statesmen: A Commentary of Aristotle’s Politics. Savage,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.
Oakley, Francis. “Christian Obedience and Authority, 1520–1550.” The Cambridge
History of Political Thought, 1450–1700. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds.
The Politics of Eternity: Studies in the History of Medieval and Early-Modern Political
Thought. Leiden: Brill, 1999.
Orwin, Clifford. “On the Sovereign Authorization.” Political Theory, vol. 3, no. 1
(February 1975): 26–44.
Otis, James. “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved” (1764).
Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750–76. Bernard Bailyn, ed. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1965: 419–70.
Overton, Richard. “An Arrow against All Tyrants.” The English Levellers. Andrew
Sharp, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998: 54–72.
Paine, Tom. Common Sense. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1997.
Pangle, Thomas. Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1973.
The Spirit of Modern Republicanism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
Pangle, Thomas and Peter Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of
War and Peace. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999.
Pares, Richard. King George III and the Politicians. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.
Parker, Henry. “Observations upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Ex-
presses” (London: 1642).
Parry, Geraint. “Locke on Representation in Politics.” History of European Ideas,
vol. 3, no. 4 (1982): 403–14.
Parson, Theophilus. “The Essex Result” (1778). American Political Writings During
the Founding Era: 1760–1805. Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds.
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983: 480–522.
Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract: Aspects of Patriarchal Liberalism. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1988.
“‘God hath ordained Man a Helper’: Hobbes, Patriarchy and Conjugal
Right.” Feminist Interpretations in Political Theory. Carole Pateman and Mary
444 Bibliography
Shanley, eds. University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991: 53–

73.
Pease, Theodore Calvin. The Leveller Movement. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith,
1965.
Peters, Ronald M. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact. Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1978.
Phillipson, Nicholas. “Propriety, Property, and Prudence: David Hume and the
Defence of the Revolution.” Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain. Nicholas
Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991: 302–20.
Plato. The Republic. Allan Bloom, trans. New York: Basic Books, 1968.
Plumb, J. H. Sir Robert Walpole: The Making of a Statesman. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1956.
The Growth of Political Stability: England, 1675–1725. London: Macmillan, 1967.
Plutarch. The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. John Dryden, trans. New York:
Everyman, 1952.
Pocock, J. G. A. “Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Inter-
disciplinary History, vol. 3 (1972): 119–34.
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican
Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987.
“The Fourth English Civil War: Dissolution, Desertion, and Alternative Histories
of the Glorious Revolution.” The Glorious Revolution: Changing Perspectives. Lois
Schwoerer, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 52–64.
“England’s Cato: The Virtues and Fortunes of Algernon Sidney.” Historical Journal,
vol. 37, no. 4 (December 1994): 915–35.
Pole, J. R. Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966.
Polybius. The Histories. Evelyn Shuckburgh, trans. Lake Bluff, IL: Regnery Gateway,
1987.
Pufendorf, Samuel. De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo. Vol. I, photographic re-
production of the edition of 1688, Amsterdam, and Vol. II, translation of the
text by C. H. and W. A. Oldfather. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934.
On the Duty of Man and Citizen. James Tully, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991.
Rager, John Clement. The Political Philosophy of the Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine.
Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1926.
Rahe, Paul. “John Locke’s Philosophical Partisanship.” Political Science Reviewer,
vol. 20 (1991): 1–43.
Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
“The American Revolution.” The American Experiment: Essays on the Theory and
Practice of Liberty. Peter Augustine Lawler and Robert Martin Schaefer, eds.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994: 27–55.
“Situating Machiavelli.” Renaissance Civic Humanism. James Hankins, ed.
Bibliography 445
“Forms of Government: Structure, Principle, Object, and Aim.” Montesquieu’s

Science of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of the Laws. David W. Carrithers, Michael
A. Mosher, and Paul A. Rahe, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001:
69–108.
Reid, John Phillip. “The Irrelevance of the Declaration.” Law in the American Revo-
lution and the Revolution in Law: A Collection of Review Essays in American Legal
History. Hendrik Hartog, ed. New York: New York University Press, 1981:
46–89.
Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1986.
Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority to Legislate.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
Robbins, Caroline. “Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Government: Textbook
of Revolution.” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., vol. 4 (July 1947): 267–96.
The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen. New York: Atheneum, 1968.
Rosen, Stanley. “Benedict Spinoza.” The History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed. Leo
456–75.
Rossiter, Clinton. Seedtime of the Republic. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Rousseau’s Political Writings. Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway
Bondanella, eds. New York: Norton, 1988.
Rudolph, Julia. Revolution by Degree: James Tyrrell and Whig Political Thought in the
Late Seventeenth Century. New York: Palgrave, 2002.
Samuelson, Richard. “The Constitutional Sanity of James Otis: Resistance Leader
and Loyal Subject.” Review of Politics, vol. 61, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 494–
523.
Schaub, Diana. Erotic Liberalism: Women and Revolution in Montesquieu’s Persian
Letters. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995.
Schneewind, J. B. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy.
Schochet, Gordon. Patriarchalism in Political Thought. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1975.
Schwoerer, Lois. No Standing Armies! Anti-army Ideology in Seventeenth Century
England. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.
The Declaration of Rights, 1689. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
“Locke, Lockean Ideas, and the Glorious Revolution.” Journal of the History of
Ideas, vol. 51, no. 4 (October–December 1990): 531–48.
Scott, Jonathan. Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677. Cambridge:
Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683. Cambridge: Cambridge
England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Con-
text. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Seliger, Martin. The Liberal Politics of John Locke. New York: Praeger, 1969.
Shalhope, Robert. “Towards a Republican Synthesis.” William and Mary Quarterly,
vol. 29 (January 1972): 49–80.
Shanley, Mary. “Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Seventeenth Century
England.” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 1 (March 1979): 79–91.
446 Bibliography
Shapiro, Ian. The Evolution of Rights Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1986.
Sidney, Algernon. The Discourses Concerning Government. Thomas West, ed.
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Classics, 1996.
Court Maxims. Hans Blom, Eco Haitsma Molier, and Donald Janse, eds.
Simmons, John. “Inalienable Rights and Locke’s Treatises,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, vol. 12 (1983): 175–204.
Simmons, John. The Lockean Theory of Rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992.
On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993.
Skinner, Quentin. “The Ideological Context of Hobbes’ Political Thought.” Historical
Journal, vol. 9 (1966): 286–317.
The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge
“Machiavelli’s Discorsi and the Pre-Humanist Origin of Republican Ideas.” Machi-
avelli and Republicanism. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, eds.
“Machiavelli.” Great Political Thinkers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Liberty before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Slaughter, T. P. “‘Abdicate’ and ‘Contract’ in the Glorious Revolution.” Historical
Journal, vol. 24 (1981): 323–37.
Smith, Steven. Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1997.
Somerville, J. P. “From Suarez to Filmer: A Reappraisal.” The Historical Journal,
vol. 25, no. 3 (1982): 525–40.
“John Selden, the Law of Nature, and the Origins of Government.” Historical
Journal, vol. 27, no. 2 (June 1984): 437–47.
Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640. London: Longman, 1986.
Speck, W. A. Stability and Strife: England 1714–1760. London: Edward Arnold, 1977.
The Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 1688. Oxford:
Spinoza, Benedict. A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, R. H. M.
Elwes, trans. New York: Dover Books, 1951.
Ethics. Edwin Curley, trans. Amherst: Prometheus, Books, 1989.
Stoner, James. Common Law and Liberal Theory: Coke, Hobbes, and the Origins of
American Constitutionalism. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992.
“Sound Whigs or Honeyed Tories? Jefferson and the Common Law Tradi-
tion.” Reason and Republicanism: Thomas Jefferson’s Legacy of Liberty. Gary L.
McDowell and Sharon L. Noble, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
1997: 103–17.
Storing, Herbert. “William Blackstone.” The History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed.
Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987: 622–34.
Stourz, Gerald. “William Blackstone: Teacher of Revolution.” Jährbuch für
Amerikastüdien, vol. 15 (1970): 184–200.
Bibliography 447
Straka, Gerald. The Anglican Reaction to the Revolution of 1688. Madison: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1962.
Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
Thoughts on Machiavelli. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958.
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion. New York: Schocken Books, 1965.
“German Nihilism.” Interpretation, vol. 26, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 353–78.
Suarez, Francisco. Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez, S. J. Volume I,
photographic reproduction of original editions, and Volume II, English version
of the text prepared by Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown, and John Waldron.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944.
Extracts on Politics and Government. George Moore, trans. Chevy Chase, MD:
Country Dollar Press, 1950.
Sullivan, Vickie B. Machiavelli’s Three Romes: Religion, Human Liberty, and Politics
Reformed. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996.
“Muted and Manifest English Machiavellianism: The Reconciliation of Machi-
avellian Republicanism with Liberalism in Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Gov-
ernment and Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s Letters.” To appear in Machiavelli’s
Republican Legacy. Paul Rahe, ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Tarcov, Nathan. “Locke’s Second Treatise and the ‘Best Fence Against Rebellion’.”
Review of Politics, vol. 43 (April 1981): 198–217.
Locke’s Education for Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Tarlton, Charles D. “The Exclusion Controversy, Pamphleteering, and Locke’s Two
Treatises.” The Historical Journal, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 1981): 49–68.
Thomas, P. D. G. British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the American
Revolution, 1763–67. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Thompson, Bradley C. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1998.
Thompson, Cargill W. D. J. The Political Thought of Martin Luther. Brighton, MA:
Harvester, 1984.
Thompson, Martyn P. “The Reception of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,
1690–1705.” Political Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 (1976): 184–91.
“The Idea of Conquest in Controversies over the 1688 Revolution.” Journal of the
History of Ideas, vol. 38, no. 1 (January–March 1977): 33–46.
Ideas of Contract in English Political Thought in the Age of John Locke. New York:
Garland 1987.
Thorpe, Francis Newton, ed. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and
Other Organic Laws of the States and Territories Now or Heretofore Forming the
United States of America. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office,
1909.
Tierney, Brian. The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and
Church Law, 1150–1625. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. George Lawrence, trans. New York:
Harper, 1966 [1850].
Trenchard, John. An Argument Shewing That a Standing Army Is Inconsistent with a
Free Government. London, 1697.
Trenchard, John and Robert Gordon. Cato’s Letters. Ronald Hamowy, ed.
Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1995.
448 Bibliography
Tuck, Richard. Natural Rights Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1979.
“Grotius, Carneades, and Hobbes.” Grotiana, vol. 4 (1983): 43–62.
“Grotius and Selden.” Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700. J. H.
Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991:
499–529.
Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993.
Tully, James. A Discourse on Property: Locke and His Adversaries. Cambridge:
An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1993.
Tyrrell, James. Patriarcha, Non Monarcha (London: Richard Janeway, 1681).
Bibliotheca Politica (London: R. Baldwin, 1718).
Vile, M. J. C. Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2nd ed. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1998.
Waldron, Jeremy. The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Walsh, Mary. “Locke and Feminism on Private and Public Realms of Activities.”
Review of Politics, vol. 57, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 251–77.
Walzer, Michael. The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origin of Modern Radical
Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
Ward, Lee. “The Natural Rights Family: Locke on Women, Nature, and the Problem
of Patriarchy.” Nature, Woman, and the Art of Politics. Eduardo Velasquez, ed.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000: 149–79.
“Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Govern-
ment.” Interpretation, vol. 28, no. 2 (Winter 2000–1): 119–45.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Talcott Parsons, trans.
New York: Vintage, 1958.
Webking, Robert. The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1988.
Weil, Rachel. “The Family in the Exclusion Crisis: Locke versus Filmer Revis-
ited.” A Nation Transformed: England after the Restoration. Alan Houston
and Steve Pincus, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001: 100–
24.
West, Thomas. “Introduction” to The Discourses Concerning Government. Indianapo-
lis: Liberty Fund Press: xv–xxxvi.
Western, J. R. Monarchy and Revolution: The English State in the 1680’s. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1972.
Weston, Corinne. “Theory of Mixed Monarchy Under Charles I and After.” English
Historical Review, vol. 75 (July 1960): 426–43.
“England: Ancient Constitution and Common Law.” Cambridge History of Political
Thought, 1450–1700. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge
Wilenius, Reijo. The Social and Political Theory of Francisco Suarez. Helsinki:
Suomalaisen Kirjallisuvden Kirjapaino, 1963.
Wilson, Douglas. “Jefferson and the Republic of Letters.” Jeffersonian Legacies. Peter
Onuf, ed. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1993: 50–76.
Bibliography 449
Wilson, James. “Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Author-
ity of the British Parliament” (1774). Selected Political Essays of James Wilson.
Randolph G. Adams, ed. New York: Knopf, 1930: 42–108.
“Of Municipal Law.” American Political Writing during the Founding Era: 1760–
1805, Volume II. Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds. Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1983: 1264–98.
Wolin, Sheldon. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political
Thought. London: Methuen, 1969.
Wood, Ellen Meiskins. “Locke against Democracy: Consent, Representation and
Suffrage in the Two Treatises.” History of Political Thought, vol. 13, no. 4 (Winter
1992): 657–89.
Wood, Gordon. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787. Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1969.
“The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolution.” The Moral Founda-
tions of the American Republic, 3rd. Robert Horwitz, ed. Charlottesville: Univer-
sity of Virginia Press, 1987: 109–35.
Wood, Neal. “The Value of Asocial Sociability: Contributions of Machiavelli,
Sidney and Montesquieu.” Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought. Martin
Fleisher, ed. New York: Atheneum, 1972: 282–307.
John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Woolrych, Austin. Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002.
Wootton, David. “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution.” The Cambridge
History of Political Thought, 1450–1700. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds.
Worden, Blair. “The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney.” Journal of British
Studies. vol. 24, no. 1 (January 1985): 1–40.
“Marchmount Nedham and the Beginnings of English Republicanism, 1649–
1656,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649–1776. David
Wootton, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994: 45–81.
“Republicanism and the Restoration, 1660–1683.” Republicanism, Liberty, and
Commercial Society, 1649–1776. David Wootton, ed. Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1994: 139–93.
Roundhead Reputations: The English Civil Wars and the Passions of Posterity. London:
Penguin Press, 2001.
Yarborough, Jean. “Thomas Jefferson and Republicanism.” Thomas Jefferson and the
Politics of Nature. Thomas Engeman, ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2000: 59–80.
Zagorin, Perez. A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954.
“Hobbes without Grotius.” History of Political Thought, vol. 21, no. 1 (Spring
2000): 16–40.
Zucker, Ross. “Unequal Property and Its Premise in Liberal Theory.” History of
Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1 (January 2000): 29–49.
Zuckert, Michael P. “Fools and Knaves: Reflections on Locke’s Theory of Philosoph-
ical Discourse.” Review of Politics, vol. 36 (1974): 544–64.
“Of Wary Physicians and Weary Readers: The Debate on Locke’s Way of Writing.”
Independent Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2 (Fall 1977): 55–66.
450 Bibliography
“An Introduction to Locke’s First Treatise.” Interpretation, vol. 8 (1979): 58–74.

Natural Rights and the New Republicanism. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994.
The Natural Rights Republic. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1996.
Zvesper, John. “Hobbes’ Individualistic Analysis of the Family.” Politics, vol. 5
(October 1985): 28–33.
“Jefferson on Liberal Natural Rights.” Reason and Republicanism. Gary McDowell
and Sharon Noble, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997: 15–30.
Index
Abraham, 158 164, 168, 169, 189, 206,

absolutism, 8, 12, 19, 28, 34, 49, 52, 61, 255
70, 72, 95, 100, 103, 111, 143, Articles of Confederation, 419
166, 172, 186, 234, 248, 267, Ashcraft, Richard, 8, 130, 259
317, 387, 417 Athens, 147
Acton, Lord Emerich Edward Dahlberg, Atwood, William, 14, 266, 278,
346 279–80, 281, 287, 294, 321, 326,
Adam, 25, 27, 31, 32, 36, 44, 49, 64, 388
81, 82, 86, 113, 127, 157, 215–18, Augustine, St., 26, 29
222, 227, 241 Augustus, 179
Adams, John, 332, 333, 346, 355, 397,
399, 407, 409–10, 411, 413, 419, Bacon, Sir Francis, 73
423 Bailyn, Bernard, 3–4, 376
critic of Paine, 386, 410 balanced constitutionalism, 307, 308,
Alexander I, Tsar, 232 309–10, 311, 313, 315, 316, 317,
Allegiance Oath Controversy, 23, 134 333, 372, 385, 399, 407, 408, 410
Allen, W.J., 49, 55 Banning, Lance, 7, 9
American Revolution, 13, 16, 323, 427, Barbeyrac, Jean, 74
428 Barclay, William, 23, 267–8
ancient constitutionalism, 48, 49, 59, Barré, Isaac, 329
60, 62, 70, 97, 255, 320, 408 Becker, Carl, 2
Anglican Church, 195, 203, 204, 219, Bellarmine, Roberto, 22, 33, 34, 35–6,
272, 273, 278, 284, 286 37, 54, 62, 63, 75, 123, 124, 159,
Anne, Queen of England, 287, 305 160, 161, 163, 173, 214, 215,
anti-Catholicism, 20–1, 101–2, 271, 217, 220
272, 276, 284, 325 on consent, 24, 34, 36
anti-federalists, 428, 429 Beza, Theodore, 55, 56
Appleby, Joyce, 5 Bill of Rights (1689), 277, 318
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 50, 238 Blackstone, Sir William, 16, 197, 305,
Arendt, Hannah, 3, 354 319, 323, 326, 327, 330, 427, 430
Aristotle, 9, 35, 38–40, 58, 68, 77, 92, on checks and balances, 320
95, 97, 124, 138, 161, 162, 163, critic of Locke, 321, 363
451
452 Index
Blackstone, Sir William (cont.) Charles I, King of England, 20, 48, 51,
on parliamentary sovereignty, 57, 59, 96, 102, 140, 148, 153
321–3, 344, 415, 421 Charles II, King of England, 99, 100,
Bodin, Jean, 22, 34, 61, 83, 111, 186 102, 103, 133, 135, 153, 155, 267,
Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, 272, 286, 367, 373
1st Viscount of, 16, 285, 287, Charron, Pierre, 73
310–13, 314, 333, 430 Churchill, John (Duke of
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 232 Marlborough), 285
Bonwick, Colin, 327, 376 Churchill, Sir Winston, 180
Boston Tea Party (1773), 362 Cicero, 38, 81, 127
Brady, Robert, 95, 113, 279 civic humanism, 1, 3–4, 5
Braxton, Carter, 408–9, 410, 415, civic republicanism, see civic humanism
420 civic virtue, 3, 5, 317
Brett, Annabel, 42 Cleves, Duchy of, 210
British Constitution, 305, 312, 314, 317, Coercive Acts, 351, 362, 364–5, 403
318, 320, 327, 332, 338, 348, 354, Coke, Sir Edward, 332
368, 376, 384, 406, 408, 428 Colbourn, H. Trevor, 141
British Empire, 339, 340, 341, 352, 427 committees of correspondence, 331
British radicals, 376 common law, 204
Buchanan, George, 57 Common Sense, 375, 377, 391, 394, 398
Burgh, James, 3, 5 (see also Paine, Tom)
Burke, Edmund, 17, 330, 426, 427, 430 Conrad, Stephen, 356, 364
Burnet, Gilbert, 14, 153, 278–9, 281, consent, 420–2, 424, 425, 429
287, 321, 326, 388 Contarini, Gasparo, 34
Bute, Lord, 313 continental army, 375
convention parliament, 271, 274–8,
Cain, 229 279, 280, 281, 322, 338, 420
Calvin, Jean, 52–4, 57 corruption, see influence
Calvinism, 21, 50, 51, 74, 76, 79, 85, country party, 282, 285, 296, 307,
95, 98, 160, 189, 291, 426 308–10, 312, 314, 402, 407, 408,
Camden, Lord, 330 409, 412
Canada, 260 court party, 307, 308–10, 311, 313, 314
Carneades, 74 Cromwell, Oliver, 71, 106, 153, 207
Catholicism, 95, 98, 102, 110, 117, 123, Cyrus, 170, 174
160, 228, 272, 291, 426
Caton, Hiram, 52 Daly, James, 34, 49, 73
Cato’s Letters, 3, 312, 327, 333, 338, 376, Danby, Earl of, 102, 155, 210
379 Dawidoff, Robert, 371
criticism of influence, 296–7 de la Court, Jean and Pieter, 193
impact in America, 3, 5, 17, 289, Declaratory Act (1766), 329, 330, 344,
304, 428 345, 347, 372
and liberal natural rights, 290–2, Declaration of Independence, 396–8, 401,
335, 382 404, 405, 410, 420
on property, 292–3, 301 Declaration of Rights (1689), 276, 277,
republicanism of, 290, 296, 295, 338, 367, 384, 397, 400, 401,
298–300, 303, 306, 310, 377, 386 402, 403, 406
right of resistance, 293–5 Defoe, Daniel, 284
and virtue, 300–1, 383 Delamere, Lord, 281
Index 453
Delaware, Constitution of 1776, 404, and absolute sovereignty, 61, 65,

418 66–7, 69, 105, 312, 426
democracy, naturalness of, 184, 196, attack on classical republics, 39–40
381, 385, 408 critique of consent, 46–7, 93, 120
Demophilus (George Bryan), 407–8, on divine providence, 44–5, 78, 82,
409, 410, 411, 414, 415, 420 88–9, 124, 215
Denmark, 45, 69, 152, 153 and divine right monarchy, 8, 11, 19,
DeWitt, Jan, 194, 201 78, 148, 193, 202, 306, 307, 310,
Dickinson, H.T., 104, 312 426
Dickinson, John, 17, 326, 331, 344, doctrine of obedience in, 30–1, 44,
346–7, 351, 352, 357, 359, 363, 53, 64, 79, 94
370, 373, 376, 384, 391, 396, 415, patriarchalism of, 26–8, 32, 38, 40,
418 86–7, 120, 217
and natural rights, 347–8 rejection of natural liberty, 11–12,
and parliamentary sovereignty, 43, 45, 46, 47
348–50 scripturalism of, 22, 28, 33, 38, 58,
Diggins, John Patrick, 5, 6 81, 87, 91, 223, 426
divided sovereignty, 400, 418–20, 424, Finch, Sir John, 59
425, 428 Fletcher, Andrew, 284
Dunn, John, 4 Foley, Paul, 285
Dworetz, Steven, 5 Foner, Eric, 378
France, 100, 136, 152, 154, 210, 273,
Edward VI, King of England, 136 284, 317, 327, 332, 356, 367, 387
Edwards, Charles, 76 franchise, 310, 376, 403, 406, 410, 411,
Elizabeth I, Queen of England, 61 425, 429
England, Church of, see Anglican Franklin, Benjamin, 330, 331
Church Franklin, Julian, 262, 266
English Civil War, 48, 71, 133, 152, 373, French Revolution, 426, 430
398, 415 Furly, Benjamin, 194, 211
Essex, Earl of, 107, 155
Essex Result, 412 George I, King of England, 287, 306
Euclid, 161 George III, King of England, 313, 366,
Eve, 216, 217, 222, 238 370, 397
Exclusion Crisis, 7–9, 100, 101–4, Georgia, Constitution of 1777, 407,
113, 136, 155, 191, 211, 270, 413, 414
271–2, 273, 293, 305, 323, 325, Germany, 55, 362
367, 426 Glorious Revolution, 13, 16, 17, 113,
214, 270, 271–4, 283, 286, 288,
Falkland Islands, 392 295, 300, 303, 305, 306, 308,
federalism, 342, 352, 419, 425, 428, 320, 323, 325, 327, 328, 332, 335,
429 338, 348, 354, 356, 357, 361, 371,
Federalist Papers, 138, 297 373, 384, 389, 399, 412, 427,
Ferne, Henry, 61, 64, 80 428
feudalism, 185, 317, 318, 358, 385, 389 Goldie, Mark, 85, 282
Figgis, J.N., 28 Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, 322
Filmer, Sir Robert, 19–22, 97, 102, 113, Goodwin, William, 32
123, 139, 156, 186, 206, 220, Gordon, Thomas, 288, 326 (see also
227, 284, 314, 334 Cato’s Letters)
454 Index
gothic constitution, 171, 185 on sovereignty, 91, 92, 93, 94–7,

Greene, Jack, 338 111, 181, 194, 196, 234, 239,
Grenville, Lord, 313, 328, 329 248, 251, 268, 336
Grotius, Hugo, 11, 12, 71, 91, 110, 124, Hofstadter, Richard, 2
126, 136, 166, 187, 214, 215, Holland, 154, 193, 195, 211, 272, 273,
217, 220, 227, 237, 267, 283, 302, 303
340, 428 Hooker, Richard, 50, 81, 161, 226,
contractualism of, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 237–8
84, 95, 111, 227, 251, 334, 335 Horn, Friedrich, 125
law of nations in, 77 Hotman, François, 55–6, 171
on natural law, 71, 73, 74–5, 90, Houston, Alan, 186, 199, 206, 334
145, 266 Howard, Lord John, 107, 155
on natural rights, 75–7, 238, 290, Howard, Sir Robert, 275, 281
427 huguenots, 55, 56, 57, 68, 101, 171
on property, 77, 80–1, 127, 174, Hulme, Obadiah, 407
216, 220–1, 246 Hume, David, 16, 305, 313–16, 317,
and resistance, 79, 80, 188 319, 321, 326, 327, 333, 430
secularism of, 73–4 critic of Locke, 315
on sovereignty, 82–5, 111, 135, 267 and Glorious Revolution, 316
moderate Whiggism of, 314–16
Haakonsen, Knud, 77 Hunton, Philip, 48, 49, 56, 62–7, 68,
Habeas Corpus Act (1679), 319 71, 76, 112, 113, 117, 137, 139,
Hale, Sir Matthew, 61 140, 145, 215, 217, 220, 222–3,
Hampden, John, 107, 155, 300 294
Hannibal, 179 Huyler, Jerome, 11, 58, 116
Hanover, House of, 287, 305, 306, 310,
328, 367 imperial trade policy, 333, 347, 359,
Harley, Robert (Earl of Oxford), 284, 360, 393
285, 288, 314 influence, 387, 412
Harrington, James, 3, 4, 302 interregnum, 70
Hartz, Louis, 2 Ireland, 152, 273, 282, 373
Hayward, John, 23 Isaac, 115
Henry V, King of England, 206 Israel, 260
Henry VIII, King of England, 136
Henry, Patrick, 329, 351, 398 Jacobites, 283, 287, 294, 305, 306, 310,
Heylyn, Peter, 33, 195 314
Hoadly, Bishop, 282, 314 James I, King of England, 19, 23, 32,
Hobbes, Thomas, 12, 22, 61, 71, 85, 51, 58, 61, 97, 136, 310
108, 118, 126, 139, 147, 163, James II, King of England, 100, 101,
172, 173, 174–6, 180, 182, 186, 102, 103, 107, 271, 272–4, 275,
187, 190, 196, 215, 220, 229, 276, 278, 284, 286, 295, 371,
230, 234, 237, 239, 267 397
contractualism of, 90, 92, 93 Jefferson, Thomas, 18, 313, 326, 331,
on the family, 86–7, 88, 91 338, 345, 350, 351, 352, 375, 376,
on law, 97–8 384, 396, 397, 398, 414, 418,
natural law in, 71, 89–90, 110 419, 427
natural rights in, 85–6, 87, 93, 145, on legislative tyranny, 361, 390,
181, 193, 231, 426 413
Index 455
and Lockean natural rights, 352–3, on legislative power, 252–3, 255,

354, 362, 363, 365 256–7, 258, 341, 407
on property, 358–60, 365 natural executive power in, 15,
right of emigration, 353–5, 357, 380, 228–30, 231, 232–5, 237–40,
384, 403, 405 247, 253, 291
role of British king in empire, 355, natural rights in, 2, 15, 241, 244,
356, 366–9, 370–3 246, 268, 269, 290, 300, 335
on slavery, 368–369 on property, 2, 15, 220–2, 240,
Jeffreys, Chief Justice, 155 241–6, 248, 292, 337, 347, 358,
John of Antioch, St., 36, 37, 38 422
Junto Whigs, 282, 284, 285 on prerogative, 258–61
revolution and dissolution in, 262–9,
King’s Answer to the Nineteen 274, 279, 281, 294, 337, 367,
Propositions, 60–1, 96 397, 404
kingship, the idea of, 388, 395 on slavery, 235–7
Kramnick, Isaac, 5, 383 on sovereignty, 15, 219, 247, 256,
258, 259, 344, 355, 377, 417, 422
Laslett, Peter, 8 Louis XIV, King of France, 101, 154,
Laud, Archbishop, 51, 52, 67 267, 273
Lee, Richard Henry, 409 Ludlow, Edmund, 286
Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, see Luther, Martin, 28–31, 33, 52–3, 70,
Dickinson, John 311
Levellers, 134 Lutz, Donald, 404
liberalism, 1–2, 5, 289, 326, 427, 428,
429 Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, 274
limited monarchy, see balanced Macclesfield, Lord, 281
constitutionalism Machiavelli, Niccolo, 3, 4, 34, 156, 163,
Lincoln, Abraham, 393 167, 168, 169–71, 172, 174–6,
Locke, John, 7, 9, 101, 102, 103, 104, 177, 193, 195, 205, 206, 404
106, 109, 130, 209–12, 272, 273, MacPherson, C.B., 2
276, 278, 279, 289, 291, 314, Madison, James, 297
315, 321, 322, 325, 327, 333, 377, Magna Carta, 178, 184, 401
379, 413, 428 Marvell, Andrew, 286
and consent, 216, 245, 421, 424 marxism, 1
critic of divine right, 214, 215–18 Mary Stuart, Queen of England, 211,
critique of patriarchy, 222–3, 212, 271, 274, 276, 283
250 Mary Tudor, Queen of England, 100,
and executive power, 253–4, 257, 136
260, 263 Maryland, Constitution of 1776, 401,
formation of political society in, 404, 405, 413, 414
247–51, 423 Mason, George, 401
on Glorious Revolution, 281 Massachusetts, Constitution of 1780,
impact in America, 2, 4, 5–6, 9, 17, 18, 405, 415, 416, 422–5, 428
18, 331, 332, 340, 351, 369, 400, Mayer, David, 378
416, 418, 419, 421, 422, 424, Maynard, John, 275
425, 428, 430 Maynwaring, Roger, 33
law of nature in, 226–8, 231, 233, Mendle, Michael, 51, 58
240, 241, 242–4 Milton, John, 99, 153, 382
456 Index
Mill, John Stuart, 53 opposition or “old” Whigs, 285, 288,

mixed government, 397 296, 326, 366
and Calvin, 53–4 Orange, House of, 155, 201, 207, 212
in classical republicanism, 3, 39, Orwin, Clifford, 94
165–6 Otis, James, 17, 326, 329, 331, 346,
and Locke, 15, 212, 255, 262, 336, 349, 351, 357, 359, 363, 370, 373,
340 376, 384, 391, 396, 418
in moderate Whiggism, 14, 112, 140, delegation and subordination of
147, 277, 318, 333, 338, 390 powers in, 344, 345, 346
and parliamentary theory, 48, 49, departure from Locke, 342–3
57, 60, 62, 65, 69, 70, 71 on the Glorious Revolution, 338–40,
republican critique of, 14, 297–8, 354, 384
302, 383, 385 Lockean natural rights in, 333–6
moderate Whigs in America, 380, 387, parliamentary supremacy in, 343,
420, 424 344–6
Molyneux, William, 282 on property rights, 336–7
Monck, General John, 99 Ottoman Empire, 317, 390
Monmouth, Duke of, 107, 155, 211, Overall, Bishop, 32
273 Overton, Richard, 134
Montague, John (Earl of Halifax), 285 Oxford Decrees (1683), 272
Montaigne, Michel de, 73
Montesquieu, Baron de, 16, 305, Paine, Tom, 5, 331, 338, 345, 350,
316–19, 321, 327, 413, 419, 430 375–7, 396, 398, 407, 408, 409,
balance of powers in, 317–19 410, 411, 418, 420, 427,
on moderate government in Britain, 428
317 and American independence, 375,
Moses, 158, 169, 205 379, 391–4
Moyle, Walter, 285 critique of British constitution, 383,
384–8, 389–90
Nebuchadnezzar, 170 republicanism of, 376, 382, 389, 394,
Nelson, Scott, 183 415
Nero, 180, 204 and rights, 379, 381, 391
New York, Constitution of 1777, 18, separation of government and
415, 416, 418, 421, 423 society in, 377–80, 393
New York Legislature, Act suspending and virtue, 379, 381, 382–3,
the, 351, 362–4 387
Nichols, Mary, 164 Pangle, Thomas, 5, 225
Noah, 27, 32, 82 Parker, Henry, 48, 49, 56, 67–70, 71,
Norman Conquest, 312, 314, 358, 389, 112, 143, 188–9, 294, 415
408 parliamentary sovereignty, 17, 69, 305,
North, Lord, 313 306, 312, 329–30, 331, 333, 339,
North Carolina, Constitution of 1776, 346, 373, 398, 399, 400, 406,
404, 418 410, 414, 417, 420, 427
Nottingham, Earl of, 276 Parsons, Robert, 23
Parsons, Theophilus, 412
Oakley, Francis, 12, 23, 50, 58 Paul, St., 26, 30
Oates, Titus, 102 Peerage Bill (1719), 309
Index 457
Pennsylvania, Constitution of 1776, 18, Rights of the Colonies Asserted and

326, 404, 405, 407, 409, 411, Proved, see Otis, James
412, 413, 414, 416, 418, 421 Robbins, Caroline, 3
council of censors in, 414, 421 Rockingham, Marquis of, 313, 329,
Petition of Right (1628), 401 330, 346
Petyt, William, 95, 141, 275 Rome, 39, 147, 166, 167, 168, 176,
Pitt, William, 327, 330, 346 178, 207
place bills, 308, 309 Roses, War of the, 184, 185, 389
Plato, 163, 164, 169, 206, 207 Rossiter, Clinton, 2
Plutarch, 167 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 174, 249, 381
Pocock, J.G.A., 3, 4, 141 Rudolph, Julia, 108, 114
Poland, 45, 69, 362 Russell, Lord John, 107, 155
Polybius, 38, 167
Pompey, 166 Sachaverell, Henry (trial of), 284,
popish plot, 102 286–7, 288, 310, 316, 320, 402
popular sovereignty, 17, 18, 36, 68, 309, Samuel, Book of, 148–9, 388
326, 335, 373, 390, 392, 398, 400, Saxons, 183–4, 185, 186, 192, 201, 312,
417, 418, 427, 428, 429, 430 354, 358, 382, 407, 408
Portugal, 356 Sawyer, Sir Robert, 275
Presbyterianism, 51 Schochet, Gordon, 28, 45, 86
Price, Richard, 3, 5 scholasticism, see Catholicism
Priestley, Joseph, 3, 5 Schwoerer, Lois, 277
protestant succession, 316 Scott, Jonathan, 13, 194
Prynne, William, 67 Selden, John, 81–2, 113, 216
Pufendorf, Samuel, 14, 16, 108, separation of powers, 400, 403, 406–7,
109–10, 187, 220, 230, 237, 238, 413, 415, 416, 417, 419, 421,
246, 267, 278, 315, 320, 321, 424, 425, 428, 429
325, 340, 428 Septennial Act (1716), 287, 299, 309,
contractualism of, 111, 113, 251, 322
276, 290, 294, 307, 311, 335, 336, Settlement, Act of (1701), 318, 319
397, 421 Seven Years War, 328, 367
on natural law, 110–11, 266, Shaftesbury, Earl of, 100, 102, 106,
430 107, 155, 210, 259, 272, 308, 310
and resistance, 112–13, 266, 278, Shakespeare, William, 153
279, 281, 286 Shalhope, Robert, 2
on sovereignty, 14, 111–13, 137, 139, Shanley, Mary, 114
147–50, 191, 196, 257, 267, 280, Ship Money Case (1638), 59, 67, 373
312, 322, 326, 330, 333, 344, 399, Sidney, Algernon, 3, 7, 9, 14–15, 101,
421 102, 103, 104, 107, 152–5, 209,
Putney debates, 134 213, 234, 239, 248, 257, 258,
268, 269, 272, 284, 286, 289,
Rahe, Paul, 10, 92, 319 291, 297, 300, 303, 314, 325,
Randolph, Edmund, 351 327, 333, 376, 377, 379, 381, 384,
realpolitik, 375 428
Reid, John Philip, 396 and classical republicanism, 163–7,
republicanism in America, 398, 427, 169, 193
429 and commerce, 206–7
458 Index
Sidney, Algernon (cont.) state constitutions (see also specific states)

civic virtue in, 164–5, 166, 189–91, bicameralism in, 412–13, 416
198–200, 300, 383 executive power in, 411–12, 413,
critic of English mixed regime, 156, 415, 416, 424
176–80, 182, 184–5, 193, 203, first wave of, 410, 411, 414–15, 416,
388 418, 419, 420, 421, 422
critic of Filmer’s patriarchalism, legislative power in, 417, 418, 419,
157–60 421
and Enlightenment philosophy, second wave of, 415–17, 421, 422
203–6 Strauss, Leo, 2
impact in America, 9, 17, 18, 157, Suárez, Francisco, 22, 23, 36, 37, 62,
400, 404, 406, 407, 412, 428 63, 75, 76, 123, 124, 159, 160,
on natural liberty, 160–3, 278 162, 163, 173, 238
natural rights in, 172–6, 199, 382 on Adam’s economic power, 36, 38
on popular sovereignty, 14, 15, 156, consent in, 42, 43
181, 182, 186–9, 197–8, 200–2, on resistance, 41
256, 259, 296, 298, 310, 312, suffrage, see franchise
377 Sugar Act (1764), 328, 332, 336
and property, 173–4, 246 Sweden, 45, 69
on revolution, 181–2, 201, 266
Sidney, Sir Philip, 152 Tacitus, 200
Simmons, John, 236 Tarcov, Nathan, 91
Skinner, Quentin, 28 Test Acts, 272
Somers, Lord John, 284, 285 Tierney, Brian, 12, 42
Somerville, J.P., 35, 51, 81 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 53
Sons of Liberty, 329 Toland, John, 155, 156
South Carolina, Constitution of 1776, Toleration Act (1689), 319
411 Tories, 95, 107, 155, 215, 273
South Sea bubble, 288, 290, 297, 307, in Exclusion crisis, 8, 19, 100, 102,
386 103, 271, 307, 310
Spain, 362, 387 indebtedness to Filmer, 19, 25, 101,
Sparta, 167, 168, 177 102, 272, 283, 284, 286, 315
Spinoza, Benedict, 15, 109, 156, 172, in Glorious Revolution, 275, 276,
174, 180–1, 187, 188, 190, 234, 277, 310, 339, 408
239, 297, 303, 325, 381, 385, 391, in Augustan period, 283–4, 287,
421, 428, 430 306, 308, 310, 313, 323
critique of orthodoxy in, 205 Townshend Duties, 330, 347, 362
and Dutch republicanism, 194, 195, Trenchard, John, 284, 285, 288, 326,
389 366; (see also Cato’s Letters)
influence on Sidney, 193–4, 195–7, Triennial Acts (1664 and 1694), 99, 100,
198, 199, 207, 392 287, 299
natural rights in, 186, 196, 392–3, trimmers, 274
400, 408 Tuck, Richard, 73, 76, 77, 81, 130
Stamp Act (1765), 328, 329, 330, 331, Tully, James, 8, 72, 265
332, 336, 346, 347, 359, 362 Turgot, Jacques, 409
Stamp Act Congress, 329, 330 Tyrrell, James, 7, 9, 14, 95, 101, 102,
standing army controversy, 284–6, 288, 103, 104, 105–9, 186, 187,
314, 366, 402 209, 210, 213, 230, 232, 237,
Index 459
238, 255, 266, 271, 272, 275, Walpole, Robert, 286, 287, 288, 293,
321, 325, 409, 428 305, 306, 310, 311, 313, 316, 402
consent in, 120–4 Washington, George, 351
contractualism of, 117–19, 123, Weber, Max, 53
141 Webking, Robert, 362
and Glorious Revolution, 278, Weston, Corinne, 58
280–1, 287, 321, 388 Wharton, Lord, 281
indebtedness to Pufendorf, 118, 119, Whigs, 6–7, 9, 19, 37, 94, 95, 96, 98,
125, 129, 130, 131, 134, 137, 100, 209, 325, 426
140–1, 142, 145, 146 in Exclusion crisis, 97, 100–4, 107,
natural law in, 115–16, 119–20, 121, 271, 307
227 in Glorious Revolution, 274, 276,
natural rights in, 114, 116–17, 119, 277, 279, 309, 399, 402, 406, 408
122, 131, 145 period of Whig supremacy, 306–8,
on property, 122, 126–31, 242, 246, 313, 320, 326, 328
292 radical philosophy of, 377, 378, 384,
on resistance, 143–5, 146, 264, 265, 392, 394, 396, 400, 401, 410
294 Wildman, John, 134, 281
on sovereignty, 124–6, 137, 139–41, Wilenius, Reijo, 42
212, 257, 312, 330 Wilkes affair, 376
William I, King of England, 358, 388
United Provinces, see Holland William III, King of England, 211, 214,
United States Constitution (1787), 424, 271, 273, 274, 276, 278, 283,
428, 429 284, 286, 305, 348
Ussher, Archbishop, 105, 106 Wilson, James, 355, 397, 419
Wolin, Sheldon, 31
Vane, Sir Walter, 210 Wood, Gordon, 4, 376, 399, 411
Venice, 207 writs of assistance, 332
Vermont, Constitution of 1777, 407 written constitutions, 395, 398–9, 406,
veto power, 140, 371, 372, 387, 411, 417, 422, 425, 428
413, 415
Vindicae contra Tyrranos, 56, 63 Zagorin, Perez, 73, 90
Virginia, Constitution of 1776, 361, Zuckert, Michael, 11, 58, 116
401, 408, 413 Zvesper, John, 353

Lee Ward-The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America (2004)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lee Ward-The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America (2004)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lee Ward-The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America (2004)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America

With in-depth analysis of political philosophy and careful attention to

Lee Ward is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Campion Col-

cambridge university press

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

First published 2004

Printed in the United States of America

Typeface Sabon 10/12 pt. System LATEX 2ε [tb]

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

isbn 0 521 82745 0 hardback

Introduction: Reexamining the Roots of Anglo-American

part one: the divine right challenge to natural liberty

part two: the whig politics of liberty in england

part three: the whig legacy in america

15 Revolutionary Constitutionalism: Laboratories of

This project grew out of my dissertation at Fordham University. My teach-

thank the editors of Interpretation for their permission to use parts of an

This project is as an effort to address some of the problems contempo-

of the liberal-versus-republican debate is the dispute over the dominance,

diverse, but interrelated, body of work.4 Caroline Robbins’s classic Eight-

root in late-seventeenth-century England? These are the questions that con-

pre-Revolutionary America.25 A third important study, and one to which this

The Whig Politics of Liberty

Revolution lay in the mirror image of parallel processes of ideological con-

THE DIVINE RIGHT CHALLENGE

Robert Filmer is usually remembered by posterity, if at all, as the ideolog-

Kentshire gentry, young Robert Filmer established strong connections to the

to political order than the Protestant–Catholic controversies during James’

The Attack on the Catholic Natural Law

In 1613 a book was officially condemned and ceremonially burned in

as the principle of consent, the legitimacy of popular resistance to political

The Adamite Thesis

The unifying thread in Filmer’s account of creation, the guiding principle

and subjection. Moreover, while Filmer strongly adhered to Luther’s prin-

The patriarchalist and Adamite arguments popularized by Filmer had

The Assault on the Scholastics

35 Suarez, De Leg.: III. 3.2.378.

38 Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 24 and Filmer, Patriarcha, 5.

by God it has been conferred, and by succession it ought to remain always in

50 Suarez, De Leg. III.2.2. 373.

[t]he Grecians, when they left to be governed by Kings, fell to be governed by an

Contract and Consent

divine conferral of papal authority.69 What is not so apparent, though, are

a particular collectivity of people into a “mystical body” infused with the

It is typical of Filmer’s dichotomous approach to theologico–political

incapacity of human beings to freely form governments. Thus, these laws

79 Schochet, Patriarchalism, p. 122.

In addition to stating the practical and moral impossibility of popular

87 Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, pp. 90–1.

Calvinism and Parliamentary Resistance Theory

The Problem of Calvinist Politics

permanently limiting the powers of the king.8 However, Filmer perceived a

institutional checks on monarchy that legitimize resistance resonated in both

Divine Right and the Ancient Constitution

24 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 3. For good discussions of Buchanan, see Kingdon, “Calvinism

coin of the realm in English political discourse. He complained: “There is

26 Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 133.

the English Constitution was natural and, though an organic composition,

30 J. P. Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution: 1603–1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

mixed government was sufficiently protean to allow for its appropriation by