GOTIS vs PEOPLE, September 14, 2007

In order to determine the sufficiency of a provocation for the purpose of mitigating a crime, one must look into the act
constituting the provocation, the social standing of the person provoked, and the place and time when the provocation
is made.1 In the present case, a finding that the act of the victim did not constitute unlawful aggression does not
automatically negate the attendant circumstance of sufficient provocation.

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 seeks the annulment of the August 30, 2002 Decision3 and
February 12, 2003 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22536 entitled People of the Philippines
v. Nemrod Gotis. The assailed Decision affirmed the October 29, 1997 Decision5 of the Irosin, Sorsogon Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 55, convicting petitioner Nemrod of the crime of homicide. The assailed Resolution denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

On October 21, 1990, at around six o’clock in the evening, petitioner, Nemrod Gotis, and his brother, Nahom, arrived
at Eddie Bautista’s coconut plantation in Barangay Bonga, Bulan, Sorsogon looking for Serafin Gotis. Serafin’s wife,
Carmen, and daughter, Nilda, were then at the plantation. Petitioner and Nahom, who were both armed with bolos,
angrily approached Carmen and Nilda and asked them where Serafin was. Not being able to find Serafin, Nahom
pointed his bolo at Nilda and said, "We will kill your father!"6

After petitioner and Nahom had left, Carmen and Nilda went to the house of Adolfo Malinao to wait for Serafin. When
Serafin arrived, Carmen told him what had happened at the plantation and prevented him from going home. Serafin,
however, disregarded Carmen’s warning and insisted on going home.7

On their way home, Serafin and his family had to pass by Nahom’s house. Upon reaching the gate of Nahom’s house,
Serafin called for Nahom and asked him to come out. When Nahom heard the shouts of Serafin, he immediately called
petitioner for help. Petitioner came over and advised Serafin to go home, but he refused to leave. Instead, Serafin
attempted to hack petitioner and tried to enter the gate of Nahom’s house.8 Thereafter, Nahom struck Serafin on the
head with a bolo.9 Meanwhile, petitioner entered his brother’s house to look for a bolo.10

After being hit, Serafin ran away. Petitioner, however, pursued him, and hit him several times on the back and arm. 11
Carmen, who was then following Serafin, saw the incident and cried for help. Serafin’s brother, Jose, responded, but
before he could extend any help, petitioner poked a Batangas knife on his neck. Jose, however, was able to parry the
blow with his arm. Thereafter, petitioner ran away.12

Serafin was brought to a hospital in Irosin, Sorsogon, but he eventually died during treatment.

On January 16, 1991, the following Information was submitted before the trial court:

That on or about the 21st day of October, 1990 at about [seven] o’clock in the evening at Barangay Bonga, Municipality
of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with bolos and with intent to kill, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and hack one
Serafin Gotis in the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of
his legal heirs.13

Petitioner admitted having killed Serafin. He, however, interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He
claimed that he hit Serafin merely to defend himself against the latter’s attack.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment in Crim. Case No. 676 finding the accused Nahom Gotis and Nemrod Gotis
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined in Article 249, of the Revised Penal Code. With
respect to Nahom Gotis[,] the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and defense of relative should be
appreciated in his favor. Applying the provisions of Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code[,] the court hereby sentences
the accused Nahom Gotis to suffer imprisonment of an indeterminate [s]entence of six (6) months of arresto mayor
maximum as the minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as the maximum. The accused Nemrod
Gotis is to be credited the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and voluntary surrender and applying the
provisions of Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code[,] the said accused is to suffer imprisonment for an
[i]ndeterminate [s]entence of [f]our (4) years [and] two (2) months of prision correccional medium as the minimum to
[t]en (10) years of prision mayor medium as the maximum. The accused Nahom Gotis shall jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of Serafin Gotis the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost.

PEOPLE vs ARPA, April 25, 1969

Automatic review by this Court of the death penalty imposed by the trial court on the accused for the crime of Robbery
with Triple Homicide.
In the information filed before the Court of First Instance of Davao, the accused, Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa, were
charged with the crime of Robbery with Triple Homicide (Criminal Case No. 9694); alleged to have been committed as
follows:

That on or about February 20, 1966, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, having boarded a motor banca named "MAMI I", owned by
Epimaco Mola together with other passengers bound for Talicud Island, Davao, and once the motor banca was
in the middle of the sea and when it developed engine trouble, the accused, conspiring together and helping
one another, with intent to steal the motor banca and by means of intimidation, the accused Dicto Arpa firing
his .22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers of the banca, and fired at one of the passengers, hitting the said
passenger at the right shoulder, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously took and carried away the said motor
banca "MAMI I" belonging to the said Epimaco Mola valued at P2,100.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
above-named owner in the aforementioned amount of P2,100.00, and as a result of the jumping into the sea of
all the passengers of the motor banca, Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas, all passengers
of the motor banca were drowned and died.

On the scheduled date of arraignment on March 7, 1966, the accused, through their counsel de oficio, Atty. Bernardino
Bolcan Jr., manifested their desire to plead guilty only as to the fact of "the killing of one of the persons mentioned in
the information," 1 denying the killing of the two other persons. The fiscal, however, manifested that the State could not
agree to the accused's offer to plead guilty to only one homicide, since "the two other persons were lost on the same
occasion, ... because of the incident. They jumped overboard after the firing at one of the victims, ..." 2 The trial judge,
Hon. Manases G. Reyes, accordingly did not accept the plea and reset the arraignment for the next day, informing the
accused that as the prosecution was not agreeable to their qualified plea, they would have to enter into trial.

When the case was called on the following day, the information was read to the accused in the dialect they understood,
and both accused pleaded guilty, their counsel de oficio invoking, in their favor two mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The fiscal objected to the appreciation of the latter circumstance,
demonstrating that "there could be no lack of intent when they immediately fired at one of the victims point blank with
a pistol, that is fatal." 3

The case was submitted and the trial court rendered thereafter on March 11, 19661, its decision, crediting the accused
with the mitigating circumstance of their voluntary plea of guilty, but rejecting the claimed mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, in view of "the nature and gravity of the offense committed." The trial court
further found two aggravating circumstances against the accused, as follows;

A perusal of the information reveals the following, allegation in the information:

...and once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea and when it developed engine trouble....

These allegations to the mind of the Court constitute two aggravating circumstances. The first underlined
portion constitutes the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place.
(People vs. Rubia 52 Phil. 172). And the second constitutes the aggravating circumstance that the crime is
committed on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.

The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea is a misfortune which tends
to create confusion and apprehensions of the passengers and, thereby, to commit a crime such a time the
accused manifested greater perversity and instead of rendering help increased their affliction by taking
advantage of the said misfortune.

As it is, therefore, the accused in the commission of this crime has one mitigating circumstance in their favor
and two aggravating circumstances against them, and offsetting one another there is still remaining one
aggravating circumstance to the accused.4

Consequently, the trial court sentenced each of the accused to the penalty of death and order both of them, jointly and
severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the
amount of P6,000.00 for each of them, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty
imposed, and to indemnify Epimaco Mola in the sum of P2,100.00, and to pay the costs proportionately.

For purposes of this review, Atty. Antonio L. Africa was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused, upon the latter's
request for such counsel. Said Counsel urges the reversal of the death sentence, and the Solicitor-General recommends
the affirmance thereof. Counsel for the accused in a well-prepared brief, assigns the following errors: —

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS ROBBERY WITH TRIPLE
HOMICIDE.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS ATTENDED BY THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNINHABITED PLACE AND ON THE OCCASION OF A MISFORTUNE.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF LACK OF
INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED.

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
The accused, leaving voluntarily pleaded guilty to the information, come under the firmly settled doctrine of being
deemed to have admitted all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances
therein alleged. 5

The first error assigned that "if the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend homicide, (in view of the
allegations in the information that the accused's intent was to steal the motor banca and that accused Dicto Arpa fired
his 22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers of the banca), but homicide follows the robbery as an incident of the latter,
the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses, and not as a single special offense (of robbery with
homicide)" 6 is without merit. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code which defines the special, single and
indivisible crime of robbery with homicide with the use of violence against, or intimidation of any person, imposes one
distinct penalty of reclusion perpetua to death "when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed." In the case of People vs. Mangulabnan, et al., 7 this Court pointed out that the "English
version of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of sale paragraph, which reads as
follows:lawphi1.nêt

I. o Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte cuando con motivo o' con occasion del robo resultare
homicidio.

We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough
that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal code, p. 267 and 259-260,
respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the
homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of
September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be
produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference
or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in commission of the crime, that
has to be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal p. 501-
502).

In that case, one of the two unidentified co-participants of the appellant Mangulabnan climbed up a table and fired at
the ceiling, which was conceded to be "an unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of the moment and possibly
without any idea that Vicente Pacson was hiding therein" that resulted in the killing of said Vicente Pacson, but said
appellant having been shown to have participated in the criminal design to commit the robbery with his co-defendants
was held guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. Here, upon the accused carrying out their criminal design to
steal the motor banca, one of them, Dicto Arpa, started firing his revolver to scare the passengers and fired directly at
one of the passengers, hitting him at the right shoulder, and as a result, the three passengers jumped into the sea and
met their death by drowning. Even if we were to concede appellants' contention that their original criminal design did
not clearly comprehend homicide, and that homicide followed the robbery "as an incident of the latter", still the deaths
clearly resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery and the trial court therefore correctly found them guilty
of the crime of robbery with triple homicide.

The remaining errors assigned concern the trial court's appreciation and finding of two aggravating circumstances as
against one mitigating circumstance of a voluntary plea of guilty in the commission of the crime and the mandatory
imposition, as a consequence, of the penalty of death.

We hold that the trial court correctly held that the crime committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place. The accused, in having boarded at Davao City the motor banca, together with other passengers
bound for Talicud Island, Davao, and carrying out their criminal design of stealing the said motor banca, once it was in
the middle of the sea and when it developed engine trouble, with one of them firing revolver shots in order to forestall
any resistance, certainly cannot disclaim that they sought the isolation of the sea to attain their criminal objective
without interference. As held by this Court in People vs. Rubia, 8 the aggravating circumstance of the crime of homicide
having been committed in an uninhabited place must be considered, where the deed was committed at sea, where it
was difficult for the offended party to receive any help, while the assailants could easily have escaped punishment, and
the purely accidental circumstance that another banca carrying the eyewitnesses to the crime was also at sea in the
vicinity at the time without the assailants' knowledge is no argument against the appreciation of said circumstance.

We hold, however, against the trial court's finding of a second aggravating circumstance in that the crime was
committed "on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity or misfortune." 9 In
so holding, the trial Court reasoned:

The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea is a misfortune which tends
to create confusions and apprehensions of the passengers and, thereby, to commit a crime at such a time the
accused manifested greater perversity and instead of rendering help increased their affliction by taking
advantage of the said misfortune. (Decision, p. 3).

The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come within the context of the phrase "other
calamity or misfortune" as used in Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code, which refer to other conditions of
distress similar to those precedingly enumerated therein, namely, "configuration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic",
such as the chaotic conditions resulting from war or the liberation of the Philippines during the last World War. The
reason for the provision of this aggravating circumstance "is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who,
in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted adds to their suffering by taking advantage of
their misfortune to despoil them." 10 Clearly, no such condition of great calamity or misfortune existed when the motor
banca developed engine trouble.
It should be added that there is nothing in the record whatever to indicate that the engine trouble developed was a
serious one such as to create confusion and apprehension on the part of the passengers as perceived by the trial court,
and that the same was not easily repaired; if at all, the indications are to the contrary, for as alleged in the information,
the accused succeeded in stealing the motor banca at sea.

We hold also against the accused's claim of a second mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong. The trial court correctly held that this circumstance could not properly be appreciated in favor of the accused
"viewed from the nature and gravity of the offense committed." As previously pointed out by this Court in the case of
People vs. Boyles, 11 the true nature of this circumstance "addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the
particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act; not to his intention during the planning stage.
Therefore, when, as in the case under review the original plan was only to rob, but which plan, on account of the
resistance offered by the victim, was compounded into the more serious crime of robbery with homicide, the plea of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be rightly granted." In the present case, the accused embarked on
their most reprehensible criminal design of pirating a motor banca at sea, firing a volley of shots at the passengers
notwithstanding the lack of indications of any resistance, thus forcing them to jump overboard in a desperate act of
self-preservation only to be swallowed by the sea. The accused cannot now disclaim their lack of criminal intent and
responsibility for the direct, logical and fearsome consequences of their unlawful acts.

As thus established, therefore, the crime committed was Robbery with Triple Homicide, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of the same having been committed in an uninhabited place which is offset by the accused's voluntary
plea of guilty, and the proper imposable penalty is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. (Article 294, paragraph 1 in
relation to Article 3, Revised Penal Code.) The compensatory damages awarded to the heirs of the victims should
properly be increased to P12,000.00. (People vs. Pantoja, G.R. L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968.)

It may be noted that even if the accused were to be granted the additional claimed mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent, the said imposable penalty would still be the same. 12 The question of the fact of death of the two other
passengers, since the accused deny knowledge of the fact of their death, as their counsel in the lower court claimed
that there was no showing of such fact, 13 although both counsels in this Court as well as in the lower court do not
dispute the "judicial admission by the accused appellants of the fact of killing (death) of one of the persons named in
the information" 14 would not affect the nature of the single and indivisible crime of Robbery with Homicide committed
by the accused nor the proper imposable penalty as herein established, since all the homicides perpetrated by reason
or occasion of the robbery are merged in the composite, integrated whole that constitutes the crime of robbery with
homicide. 15

Nevertheless, we feel constrained to add that in reviewing the records of the case, we were struck with the paucity of
facts and evidence attending the commission of the crime other than those stated in the information and other
circumstances that would aid the Court in its ordained task of passing en consulta upon the legality and propriety of
the death penalty imposed by the trial court, e.g. the age and education or lack thereof of the accused, and whether
there were other passengers who survived, aside from the three persons named in the information as having drowned,
as well as what the crew did, if anything, during the commission of the crime. Were it not for the conclusion here
reached of imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, by virtue of our disallowance of the additional aggravating
circumstance of calamity or misfortune found by the trial court, we might have been constrained to remand the case
for new trial to the court a quo in order to satisfy ourselves as to the degree of culpability of the accused in relation to
the death penalty imposed, especially since the information did not expressly designate as such the aggravating
circumstances found by the trial court and there was no discussion nor spelling out thereof whatever in the eight-page
transcript of the entire proceedings. We therefore reiterate the rule of practice recommended since the early cases of
U.S. vs. Talbanos 16 and U.S. vs. Rota. 17 set out in Rule 118 section 5 of the Rules of Court, 18 and thereafter suggested
a number of cases, lastly, in the case of People vs. Bulalake, 19 where this Court said:

It is of course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the extreme penalty of death are subject to review
by the Supreme Court as law and justice shall dictate, whether the defendant appeals or not, which automatic
review neither the Court nor the accused could waive or evade it would seem that the proper and prudent
course to follow where the accused enters a plea of 'guilty' to capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant
person with little or no education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but to aid the
Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the
meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is modified: the accused are imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes
Villegas in the amount of P12,000.00 for each of them, and Epimaco Mola in the sum of P2,100.00, and
proportionately to pay the costs.