G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990 fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178.

o. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier

however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)
MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased),
substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers,
CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute
vs. Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by
COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on
LABRADOR, respondents-appellees. March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I,
being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.
Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents. After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial
court rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of
the holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The
court a quo had also directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No.
934-I) to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the
PARAS, J.:
redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with
legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one retro.
Melecio Labrador is dated, as provided for in Article 8102 of the New Civil
Code.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on
March 10, 1988 modified said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio allowance of the probate of the will for being undated and reversing the order of
Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988.
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Hence, this petition.
Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and
Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.
Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by respondent court, to
wit:
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his
heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a I
petition for the probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged
holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND
APPROVING THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but THE TESTATOR MELECIO LABRADOR; and
substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the
petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by
implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before II
Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator
Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT DIRECTING THE
 REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE THOUSAND PESOS Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is
REPRESENTING THE REDEMPTION PRICE WAS ERRONEOUS. this that should be followed and complied with in order that any
differences or troubles may be forestalled and nothing will happen
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, along these troubles among my children, and that they will be in good
is quoted as follows: relations among themselves, brothers and sisters;

ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THE And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos
LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANO and all coconut trees and all others like the other kind of bamboo by
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ name of Bayog, it is their right to get if they so need, in order that
there shall be nothing that anyone of them shall complain against the
other, and against anyone of the brothers and sisters.
I — First Page
III — THIRD PAGE
This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned
and shared or the partition in favor of SAGRADO LABRADOR
which is the fishpond located and known place as Tagale. And that referring to the other places of property, where the said
property is located, the same being the fruits of our earnings of the two
mothers of my children, there shall be equal portion of each share
And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a measurement among themselves, and or to be benefitted with all those property,
of more or less one hectare, and the boundary at the South is the which property we have been able to acquire.
property and assignment share of ENRICA LABRADOR, also their
sister, and the boundary in the West is the sea, known as the SEA as it
is, and the boundary on the NORTH is assignment belonging to That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing
CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, who likewise is also their brother. That (WILL) which I am here hereof manifesting of the truth and of the
because it is now the time for me being now ninety three (93) years, fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am signing my signature
then I feel it is the right time for me to partition the fishponds which below hereof, and that this is what should be complied with, by all the
were and had been bought or acquired by us, meaning with their two brothers and sisters, the children of their two mothers — JULIANA
mothers, hence there shall be no differences among themselves, those QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA
among brothers and sisters, for it is I myself their father who am Your father who made this writing (WILL), and he is, MELECIO
making the apportionment and delivering to each and everyone of LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)
them the said portion and assignment so that there shall not be any
cause of troubles or differences among the brothers and sisters. The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated,
although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
II — Second Page
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the with Article 810.1âwphi1 It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said second page of the holographic will, viz:
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
 followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are directed to
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 46, REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
Rollo)

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed
in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the
subject will.

Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the
testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about
"the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond,"
and was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is
more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the
prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure
to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree
the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."

Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of
the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a
unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing
was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as
the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador
was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the
character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his
estate.

Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing
the redemption price as erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect.
When private respondents sold the property (fishpond) with right to repurchase
to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to another
and which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void.
Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to
immediately regain possession of the property for its disposition in accordance
with the will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March

10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994 by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was
likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said
vs. property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents. owner.

Miguel D. Larida for petitioners. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic
will to probate. It found, inter alia:
Montilla Law Office for private respondent.
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must
decide only the question of identity of the will, its due execution
and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court
finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its
PUNO, J.: failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for
lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in
of which reads; question is different from the will actually executed by the
testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix
November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and
SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged
DISMISSED. No costs. to have been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein
presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the
identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e.,
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will
2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is actually executed by the testatrix.
the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25,
1982.
xxx xxx xxx

In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and
Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in
Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the
children. petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the
holographic will in question was indeed written entirely, dated
and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3)
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have
of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with
was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. which the holographic will in question was written to be the
genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the
body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the
and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
 xxx xxx xxx Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law
on succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no
(private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in convincing grounds were presented and proven for the
Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the
he visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate. 3
around which time the holographic will in question was (Citations omitted.)
executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient
that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew the value On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's
of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to
and the character of the testamentary act . . . The will itself meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply
shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and
square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a
of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
considering that she had even written a nursing book which disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the dispositions.
character of the testamentary act.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by
and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved his full signature.
in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated,
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations
for the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the
testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any
the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the of the following cases:
will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary
celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a very (a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence
of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which
has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to
being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to make the make a will, at the time of its execution;
aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or
improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or
a will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein threats;
which is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under
the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for
the disallowance of the will herein.
 (d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were
influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
for his benefit;
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that
and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it
time of fixing his signature thereto. disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.

In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads: We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills
cases; is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
(1) If the formalities required by law have and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
not been complied with; interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But,
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it
is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
mentally incapable of making a will, at the assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
time of its execution; nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
(3) If it was executed through force or under disregarded.
duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include
(4) If it was procured by undue and the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805
improper pressure and influence, on the part and 806 of the New Civil Code.
of the beneficiary or of some other person;
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
(5) If the signature of the testator was requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7
procured by fraud; as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
intend that the instrument he signed should written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It
be his will at the time of affixing his is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
signature thereto. Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by
whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; the testator.
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects
the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate.
If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words,
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole the testator must identify them over his signature.
testament void.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held: requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in
Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and holographic will.
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have
not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety.
words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical This is correct and must be affirmed.
commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula
el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.) As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional
instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do,
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent
on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in
not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to
disallowance of such changes. question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by
respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and with her father's other heirs.
signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)
separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and
of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire
wills are taken. They read as follows: house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19,
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby
himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No
688. costs.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of

full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper

corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety
by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement
of the year, month and day of its execution.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984 alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs. Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents. same by his full signature.

Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner. ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given
effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3,
reading in part:

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation for examination. The NBI reported that
the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be and the initial were made by one and the same person.
the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent,
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question is whether the win,
holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968. Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to probate although the
alterations and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned were
The holographic Will reads in full as follows: not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix pursuant to
Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends that the
My Last will and Testament oppositors are estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the
ground that they themselves agreed thru their counsel to submit
the Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is
In the name of God, Amen. untenable. The parties did not agree, nor was it impliedly
understood, that the oppositors would be in estoppel.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City,
being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of
last will and testament. the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the
insertions, alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K.
City. In accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit
named provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to "C".
perpetuate my memory.
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the
xxx xxx xxx holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.

The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the SO ORDERED.
testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw
opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal omision solo
alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her puede afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca
holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. al testamento mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo
Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground aparte de aquel que determine las condiciones necesarias para la
that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no validez del testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo
necessity for interpretation." contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no
salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated del testamento, vinieran a anular este, y ya porque el precepto
November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on contenido en dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta armonia
certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not the original unaltered text y congruencia con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara
after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of nulas las adiciones apostillas entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with tachados en las escrituras matrices, siempre que no se salven en
her as sole heir. la forma prevenida, paro no el documento que las contenga, y
con mayor motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas, tachadas,
o entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni susciten duda
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the alguna acerca del pensamiento del testador, o constituyan
testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is meros accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin
not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words trascendencia alguna(l).
erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical commentary when he
said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de
jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2 Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida
en este ultimo fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o
entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la express voluntad del
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la sentencia
another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento
full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or olografo por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could guarismo ultimo del año en que fue extendido3 (Emphasis ours).
remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent
law by affixing her full signature, Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.

The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, SO ORDERED.
erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the
altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real
intention cannot be determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his Relova, J., took no part.
commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the
new Civil Code was derived:

... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688)

la sentencia que no declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo
que contenga palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones
no salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun previene el Separate Opinions
 inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as "sole executrix" is initialed.) Probate of the
radically altered will replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied,
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: since the same was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the executrix as
mandatorily required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered will
naming Rosa as sole heir cannot, however, be given effect in view of the trial court's
I concur. Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is bound by factual finding that the testatrix had by her own handwriting substituted Gregorio for
the trial court's factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the holographic will Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole heir. The net result is
crossing out Rosa's name and instead inserting her brother Gregorio's name as sole that the testatrix left no valid will and both Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill
heir and "sole executrix" were made by the testatrix in her own handwriting. (I find succeed to her intestate estate.
it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously an educated person would
unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead of consulting her lawyer and
writing an entirely new holographic wig in order to avoid any doubts as to her
change of heir. It should be noted that the first alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K.
Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as sole heir is not even initialed by
the testatrix. Only the second alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and
inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as "sole executrix" is initialed.) Probate of the
radically altered will replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied,
since the same was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the executrix as
mandatorily required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered will
naming Rosa as sole heir cannot, however, be given effect in view of the trial court's
factual finding that the testatrix had by her own handwriting substituted Gregorio for
Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole heir. The net result is
that the testatrix left no valid will and both Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill
succeed to her intestate estate.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur. Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is bound by
the trial court's factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the holographic will
crossing out Rosa's name and instead inserting her brother Gregorio's name as sole
heir and "sole executrix" were made by the testatrix in her own handwriting. (I find
it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously an educated person would
unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead of consulting her lawyer and
writing an entirely new holographic wig in order to avoid any doubts as to her
change of heir. It should be noted that the first alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K.
Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as sole heir is not even initialed by
the testatrix. Only the second alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960 of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is
fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company,
TRUST CO., executor-appellee, named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such
vs. executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00,
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY let letters testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed
LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants. oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its trust.
(pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).
Jose D. Cortes for appellants.
Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee. It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on
appeal. The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956,
making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the following
LABRADOR, J.:
adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and
Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which
Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena consists of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary
C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B.
submitted by the executor and approving the said project. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash
and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson;
On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana,
Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly
Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the said order, installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00;
the court made the following findings: Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings,
P2,000;
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born
in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting
of California where some of his properties are located. This administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his
contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining
decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he
and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his
days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the
United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner
selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that
death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his the laws of the form concede to them.
domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive
personal right.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena
C. Bohanan, should be entitled to received. The will has not given her any
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the
the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State
trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and
his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only,
declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs. and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in
Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate
Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. left by the testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-
Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with
widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a the laws of the forum valid?
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him
to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator
Compiled Laws of 1925 provides: died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal
property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
by last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the
same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts. Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
to a share in the testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
against her in an order dated June 19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the
Court of First Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which
does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the
sum of P20,000 from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was
the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had
Instance), and the court in its said error found that there exists no selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision
community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether the
the decree of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena C. Bohanan estementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of
may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is
community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his
during their converture. properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It
does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's
Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in
him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as
married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death follows:
of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a
divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record
already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by
portion of the estate left by the testator. the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy,
 and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and
we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of
Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign
law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in
evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79,
VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said
laws presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as
Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge
Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the
above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the
above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925,
can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been
offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of

testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the
testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national
law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above,
which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will,
as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition
made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994 to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be
presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance
vs. with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18,
RTC, Bulacan, respondent. Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last
will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her
Natividad T. Perez for petitioner. husband. Article VIII of her will states:

Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents. If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under
such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed
that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered
and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such
QUIASON, J.: presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were
set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for
Proceedings No. 1793-M. the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New
York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters
We grant the petition. testamentary were issued in his favor.

II On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a
American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in
U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of
New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14. the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San
Miguel, Bulacan.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament,
bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided
the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of
would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a
grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her
as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as oath as special administration.
substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the
under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan
with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the
trial court granted the motion. Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner
was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised
manifestation, stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of
said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan
representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner
rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan,
Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father,
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael
be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the
P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan"
certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
(Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case
be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed
heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto
Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an
petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they
should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for
deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983. In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir"
of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan
collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1)
not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and
that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose
address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently
F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect"
mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American
and "no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr.
surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76,
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance
because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and
with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in
that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to
this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil
the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary
Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came
husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to
distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G.
institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs,
112-113).
misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the
estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983.
However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner
proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as
and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to
special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn
settle and divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the
Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and
"court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be
the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184- Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills
185). of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that
the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement of the
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court Philippine law.
for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating
money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws
New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets of New York governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant
to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52). On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of
petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from arrival in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same
claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. day. Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to
They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the
provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would
heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an
inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial
surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order
appointed the regular administrator. stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the
case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring
decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the
disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records,
Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had p. 302).
"to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in
New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of
a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three
Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order
November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248). of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a
period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge
reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the
property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter,
incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee,
failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix,
the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance she (the counsel) should be named substitute special administratrix. She also
with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984,
that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent
Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits . . . will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were
which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings"
Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in (Records, p. 395).
connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which
August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel. provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a
the motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive,
petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that
letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for
tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records,
and circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time
admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge said that and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her
the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the
allowance of wills (Records, p. 381). counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her
supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further
evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for
respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate
evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot
adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
evidence to that effect.
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State
respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the
compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.
petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the
testator" (Records, p. 391). II

The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted
reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:
law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the
opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has
on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393). (a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of
Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Exhs. "F" and "G");
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the
probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the
typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New (j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that
York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4"
Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country of and "I-5");
Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and
seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly (k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were
authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said
and Jose instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1"); valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-
5"); and
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald
E. Moore stating that they have in their records and files the (l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the
said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" genuineness and authenticity of each other’s signatures in the
and "G-2"); exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters
testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F- 6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
6" and Exh. "G-3" — "G-6");
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk Court’s Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on
certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the November 29, 1984.
exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision
General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F"). of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect
Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by
decree of probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
had and proofs duly taken formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1"); those which this Code prescribes.

(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
"H-2" and "I-2");
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the
Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the
been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to
executor (Exhs. "H-3" and probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court,
"I-10"); and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III
Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v.
Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring
the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. fact — petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal
v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]). or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall
to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard
special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original
to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner, are required.
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on
allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim,
interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section
wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of
view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall
allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers
the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all
Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]). pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses
executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same
provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in
nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held
a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation
(Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the
said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs. xxx xxx xxx
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter,
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees. the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney),
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant. now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of
LABRADOR, J.: my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. during her lifetime: ....
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
and contains the following provisions: Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that
the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
CHRISTENSEN DANEY. decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that
the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged
xxx xxx xxx that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child
of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN,
now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal. following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

The most important assignments of error are as follows: In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record
show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
I 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines,
as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S.
Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED until 1904.
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and
stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he
II resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years
LAW. later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
III
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation,
in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines
IV in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS. In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California
shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question
V herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5,
1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in of the country where it is situated.
that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines
and make home in the State of California.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
on Conflict of Laws, p. 29) where said property may be found.

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
Laws. to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the
same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the
which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by
he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of the law of his domicile.
choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness.
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that
most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law
only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29) thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination
of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines. land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the
forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus: person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every
court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule
of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the
reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?" movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to
accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the
which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would
Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open
theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
the rule of reference. what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it
will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi
plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-
views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This
whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process
renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case
stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the
with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion
renvoi. by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
 "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative (b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent,
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. same system of law.
872.)
xxx xxx xxx
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced.
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal
determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance
of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English
Am. Jur. 296) law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
quoted herein below: each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
whole of its law. person of the owner.

xxx xxx xxx When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and
leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses: to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the
law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity
application of foreign laws. of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is
not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
shall respect: Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of
question occurred. the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse
 and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that California, not by the internal law of California..
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If
we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against
the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those appellees.
domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of
the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the
law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent
was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4)
and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock,
52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support
the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e.,
the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States
but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that
G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922 The first error assigned by the appellants as committed by the court below is
its finding to the effect that Exhibit A, said to be the will of the deceased
In re will of Josefa Zalamea y Abella, deceased. Josefa Zalamea, was executed with all the solemnities required by the law.
PEDRO UNSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs. The arguments advanced by appellants' counsel in support of the first
ANTONIO ABELLA, ET AL., opponents-appellants. assignment of error tend to impeach the credibility of the witnesses for the
proponent, specially that of Eugenio Zalamea. We have made a careful
Crispin Oben for appellants. examination of the evidence, but have not found anything that would justify
Pedro Guevarra and Carlos Ledesma for appellee. us in disturbing the finding of the court a quo. The attesting witnesses,
Eugenio Zalamea and Gonzalo Abaya, clearly testify that together with the
other witness to the will, Pedro de Jesus, they did sign each and every page
VILLAMOR, J.:
of the will and of the inventory in the presence of each other and of the
testatrix, as the latter did likewise sign all the pages of the will and of the
On July 19, 1918, Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who inventory in their presence.
was residing in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna,
executed her last will and testament with an attached inventory of her
In their brief the appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will was not
properties, Exhibits A and A-1, in the presence of three witnesses, who
signed by the testatrix, nor by the witnesses on the day of the execution of
signed with her all the pages of said documents. The testatrix died on the
6th of January, 1921, and, as the record shows, the executor appointed in the will, that is, on the 19th of July, 1918, basing their contention on the
the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the court of First Instance of Laguna on the testimony of Aurelio Palileo, who says that on one occasion Gonzalo Abaya
told him that one of the pages of the will had not been signed by the
19th of January of the same year an application for the probate of the will
witnesses, nor by the testatrix on the day of its execution. Palileo's
and the issuance of the proper letters of administration in his favor.
testimony is entirely contradicted by Gonzalo Abaya not only in the direct,
but in the rebuttal, evidence as well. To our mind, Palileo's testimony
To said application an opposition was presently by Antonio Abella, Ignacia cannot prevail over that of the attesting witnesses, Gonzalo Avaya and
Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the supposed will Eugenio Zalamea. The appellants impeach the credibility of Eugenio
of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the provinces Zalamea, for having made a sworn declaration before the justice of the
of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was peace of Santa Cruz, Laguna, before the trial of this case, to the effect that
there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the he was really one of the witnesses to the will in question, which fact was
witnesses in the presence of each other. corroborated by himself at the trial. The appellants take Zalamea's
testimony in connection with the dismissal of a criminal case against a
Trial having been held, the judge a quo overruled the opposition of the nephew of his, in whose success he was interested, and infer from this fact
contestants, and ordered the probate of the will, Exhibit A, and the the partiality of his testimony. We deem this allegation of little importance
inventory, Exhibit A-1, holding that both documents contained the true and to impeach the credibility of the witness Zalamea, especially because his
last will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea. testimony is corroborated by the other attesting witness. Gonzalo Abaya,
and by attorney Luis Abaya, who had prepared the testament at the instance
From the judgment of the court below, the contestants have appealed, and in of the testatrix. The foregoing is sufficient for us to conclude that the first
their brief they assign three errors, which, in their opinion, justify the assignment of error made by the appellants is groundless.
reversal of the judgment appealed from.
The appellants contend that the court below erred in admitting the will to the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917,
probate notwithstanding the omission of the proponent to produce one of until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no
the attesting witnesses. formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing;
and it is probable that the attorney for the • proponent, believing
At the trial of this case the attorneys for the proponent stated to the court in good faith that probate would not be contested, repaired to the
that they had necessarily to omit the testimony of Pedro de Jesus, one of the court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and
persons who appear to have witnessed the execution of the will, for there upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the
were reasonable grounds to believe that said witness was openly hostile to case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial
the proponent, inasmuch as since the announcement of the trial of the in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses.
petition for the probate of the will, said witness has been in frequent
communication with the contestants and their attorney, and has refused to Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses
hold any conference with the attorneys for the proponent. In reply to this, were not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for
the attorney for the contestants, said to the court, "without discussing for the changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and
present whether or not in view of those facts (the facts mentioned by the were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would
attorneys for the petitioner), in the hypothesis that the same are proven, they probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the
are relieved from producing that witness, for while it is a matter not execution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of
decided, it is a recognized rule that the fact that a witness is hostile does not attesting witnesses.
justify a party to omit his testimony; without discussing this, I say, I move
that said statement be stricken out, and if the proponent wants these facts to It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant
stand to stand in the record, let him prove them." The court a quo ruled, in the lower court either upon the submission of the cause for
saying, "there is no need." determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the
motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee
To this ruling of the court, the attorney for the appellants did not take any that this question cannot now be raised for t he first time in this
exception. court. We believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment
of error must be declared not to be well taken. This exact question
In the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), recently has been decided by the Supreme Court of California adversely to
decided by this court, in deciding the question whether a will can be the contention of the appellant, and we see no reason why the same
admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single rule of practice should not be observed by us. (Estate of McCarty,
attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the 58 Cal., 335, 337.)
other two, it was said; "while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will
may be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses, There are at least two reasons why the appellate tribunals are
nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared disinclined to permit certain questions to be raised for the first time
after an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that in the second instance. In the first place it eliminates the judicial
when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, criterion of the Court of First Instance upon the point there
if alive and within reach of the process of the court. presented and makes the appellate court in effect a court of first
instance with reference to that point, unless the case is remanded
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why for a new trial. In the second place, it permits, if it does not
all three of the attesting witnesses were not produced, but the encourage, attorneys to trifle with the administration of justice by
probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for concealing from the trial court and from their opponent the actual
point upon which reliance is placed, while they are engaged in
other discussions more simulated than real. These considerations In the case at bar, we do not think this question properly to have been raised
are, we think, decisive. at the trial, but in the memorandum submitted by the attorney for the
appellants to the trial court, he contended that the will could not be admitted
In ruling upon the point above presented we do not wish to be to probate because one of the witnesses to the will was not produced, and
understood as laying down any hard and fast rule that would prove that the voluntary non-production of this witness raises a presumption
an embarrassment to this court in the administration of justice in against the pretension of the proponent. The trial court found that the
the future. In one way or another we are constantly here evidence introduced by the proponent, consisting of the testimony of the
considering aspects of cases and applying doctrines which have two attesting witnesses and the other witness who was present at the
escaped the attention of all persons concerned in the litigation execution, and had charge of the preparation of the will and the inventory,
below; and this is necessary if this court is to contribute the part Exhibits A and A-1, was sufficient. As announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado,
due from it in the correct decision of the cases brought before it. supra, the general rule is that, where opposition is made to the probate of a
What we mean to declare is that when we believe that substantial will, the attesting witnesses must be produced. But there are exceptions to
justice has been done in the Court of First Instance, and the point this rule, for instance, when a witness is dead, or cannot be served with
relied on for reversal in this court appears to be one which ought process of the court, or his reputation for truth has been questioned or he
properly to have been presented in that court, we will in the appears hostile to the cause of the proponent. In such cases, the will may be
exercise of a sound discretion ignore such question upon appeal; admitted to probate without the testimony of said witness, if, upon the other
and this is the more proper when the question relates to a defect proofs adduced in the case, the court is satisfied that the will has been duly
which might have been cured in the Court of First Instance if executed. Wherefore, we find that the non-production of the attesting
attention had been called to it there. In the present case, if the witness, Pedro de Jesus, as accounted for by the attorney for the proponent
appellant had raised this question in the lower court, either at the at the trial, does not render void the decree of the court a quo, allowing the
hearing or upon a motion for a new trial, that court would have had probate.
the power, and it would have been its duty, considering the tardy
institution of the contest, to have granted a new trial in order that But supposing that said witness, when cited, had testified adversely to the
all the witnesses to the will might be brought into court. But application, this would not by itself have change the result reached by the
instead of thus calling the error to the attention of the court and his court a quo, for section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a
adversary, the point is first raised by the appellant in this court. We will can be admitted to probate, notwithstanding that one or more witnesses
hold that this is too late. do not remember having attested it, provided the court is satisfied upon the
evidence adduced that the will has been executed and signed in the manner
Properly understood, the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, prescribed by the law.
contains nothing inconsistent with the ruling we now make, for it
appears from the opinion in that case that the proponent of the will The last error assigned by the appellants is made to consist in the probate of
had obtained an order for a republication and new trial for the the inventory, Exhibit A-1, despite the fact that this exhibit has no
avowed purpose of presenting the two additional attesting attestation clause in it, and its paging is made in Arabic numerals and not in
witnesses who had not been previously examined, but nevertheless letters.
subsequently failed without any apparent reason to take their
testimony. Both parties in that case were therefore fully apprised In the third paragraph of the will, reference is made to the inventory,
that the question of the number of witnesses necessar to prove the Exhibit A-1, and at the bottom of said will, the testatrix Josefa Zalamea
will was in issue in the lower court. says:
 In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more
including the page containing the signatures and the attestation of difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages of the testament are
the witnesses; I have likewise signed the inventory attached to this signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of
will composed of ten folios in the presence of Messrs. Gonzalo forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the
Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea, Pedro de Jesus, in this municipality of more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C,
Pagsanjan, Laguna, Philippine Islands, this 19th of July, 1918. etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures. And as in the
present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of the testament,
And the attestation clause is as follows: consisting in the signatures on the left margins of the testament and the
paging thereof as declared in the attestation clause, the holding of this court
in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), might as well be repeated:
The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one
whereunto we have affixed our signatures, as well as the inventory
of the properties of Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, was read to "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the latter affixed her name to to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
the last, and each and every page of this will and inventory of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
composed of ten folios in our presence; and she declared this to be Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
her last will and testament and at her request we have affixed way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
hereunto our respective signatures in her presence and in the one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
presence of each other as witnesses to the will and the inventory to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So
this 19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P.I. when an interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands
more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded."
(Sgd.) GONZALO ABAYA,
EUGENIO ZALAMEA,
PEDRO DE JESUS. In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation
clause on another. Neither one of these pages was numbered in any way,
and it was held: "In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral
contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the
part of it, we find that the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with
testator and three witnesses, and the second contains only the attestation
section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires this solemnity for the validity of
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses it is not
a will, and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the
inventory. necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator
and the witnesses, or be paged."
As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we
This means that, according to the particular case, the emission of paging
adhere to the doctrine announced in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (p. 378,
does not necessarily render the testament invalid.
ante), recently decided by this court. In that case the validity of the will was
assailed on the ground that its folios were paged with the letters A, B, C,
etc., instead of with the letters "one," two," "three," etc. It was held that this The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed
way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of the on the upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be placed in the
law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the correlation of the lower part, would the testament be void for this sole reason? We believe
pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them. In the course of not. The law also provides that the testator and the witnesses must sign the
the decision, we said: "It might be said that the object of the law in left margin of each of the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on
the right margin, would this fact also annul the testament? Evidently not. should be, as is hereby, affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So
This court has already held in Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phi., ordered.
145):

"It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and
every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the
effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills
must be fully complied with. The same execution for wills must be
fully complied with. The same doctrine is also deducible from
cases heretofore decided by this court."

"Still some details at time creep into legislative enactments which

are so trivial that it would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature
could have attached any decisive importance to them. The
provision to the effect that the signatures of the testator and
witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page — rather
than on the margin — seems to be of this character. So far as
concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it
can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the
left or on the right margin, provided they are on one or the other. In
Craig vs. Tatlonghari (G. R. No. 12558, decided March 23, 1918,
not reported), this court declared a will void which was totally
lacking in the signatures required to be written on its several pages;
and in the case of Re Estate of Saguinsin (41 Phil., 875) a will was
likewise declared void which contained the necessary signatures on
the margin of each leaf (folio), but not in the margin of each page
containing written matter."

We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of no

importance. But since its principal object is to give the correlation of the
pages, we hold that his object may be attained by writing one, two, three,
etc., as well as by writing A, B, C, etc.

We see no reason why the same rule should not be applied where the paging
is in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, as in the inventory in question.
So that, adhering to the view taken by this court in the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan, and followed in Aldava vs. Roque, with regard to the appreciation
of the solemnities of a will, we find that the judgement appealed from