Law of excluded

middle

In logic, the law of excluded middle (or

the principle of excluded middle) states
that for any proposition, either that
proposition is true or its negation is true.
It is the third of the three classic laws of
thought.

The law is also known as the law (or

principle) of the excluded third, in Latin
principium tertii exclusi. Another Latin
designation for this law is tertium non
datur: "no third [possibility] is given".

The earliest known formulation is in

Aristotle's discussion of the principle of
non-contradiction, first proposed in On
Interpretation,[1] where he says that of
two contradictory propositions (i.e.
where one proposition is the negation of
the other) one must be true, and the
other false.[2] He also states it as a
principle in the Metaphysics book 3,
saying that it is necessary in every case
to affirm or deny,[3] and that it is
impossible that there should be anything
between the two parts of a
contradiction.[4] The principle was stated
as a theorem of propositional logic by
Russell and Whitehead in Principia
Mathematica as:

.[5]

The principle should not be confused

with the semantical principle of
bivalence, which states that every
proposition is either true or false.

Classic laws of thought

The principle of excluded middle, along
with its complement, the law of non-
contradiction (the second of the three
classic laws of thought), are correlates of
the law of identity (the first of these
laws).

Analogous laws
Some systems of logic have different but
analogous laws. For some finite n-valued
logics, there is an analogous law called
the law of excluded n+1th. If negation is
∨
cyclic and " " is a "max operator", then
the law can be expressed in the object
language by (P ∨ ~P ∨ ~~P ∨ ... ∨
~...~P), where "~...~" represents n−1
negation signs and " ∨ ... ∨" n−1
disjunction signs. It is easy to check that
the sentence must receive at least one of
the n truth values (and not a value that is
not one of the n).

Other systems reject the law entirely.

Examples
For example, if P is the proposition:

Socrates is mortal.

then the law of excluded middle holds

that the logical disjunction:

Either Socrates is mortal, or it is not the

case that Socrates is mortal.

is true by virtue of its form alone. That is,

the "middle" position, that Socrates is
neither mortal nor not-mortal, is excluded
by logic, and therefore either the first
possibility (Socrates is mortal) or its
negation (it is not the case that Socrates
is mortal) must be true.

An example of an argument that depends

on the law of excluded middle follows.[6]
We seek to prove that there exist two
irrational numbers and such that

is rational.

It is known that is irrational (see

proof). Consider the number

Clearly (excluded middle) this number is

either rational or irrational. If it is rational,
the proof is complete, and

and .

But if is irrational, then let

and .

Then

and 2 is certainly rational. This concludes

the proof.

In the above argument, the assertion

"this number is either rational or
irrational" invokes the law of excluded
middle. An intuitionist, for example,
would not accept this argument without
further support for that statement. This
might come in the form of a proof that
the number in question is in fact
irrational (or rational, as the case may
be); or a finite algorithm that could
determine whether the number is
rational.

The law in non-constructive

proofs over the infinite

The above proof is an example of a non-

constructive proof disallowed by
intuitionists:
 The proof is non-constructive
because it doesn't give specific
numbers and that satisfy the
theorem but only two separate
possibilities, one of which must
work. (Actually is
irrational but there is no known
easy proof of that fact.) (Davis
2000:220)

(Constructive proofs of the specific

example above are not hard to produce;
for example and
are both easily shown to be irrational,
and ; a proof allowed by
intuitionists).

By non-constructive Davis means that "a

proof that there actually are mathematic
entities satisfying certain conditions
would not have to provide a method to
exhibit explicitly the entities in question."
(p. 85). Such proofs presume the
existence of a totality that is complete, a
notion disallowed by intuitionists when
extended to the infinite—for them the
infinite can never be completed:

In classical mathematics there

occur non-constructive or
indirect existence proofs, which
intuitionists do not accept. For
example, to prove there exists
an n such that P(n), the classical
mathematician may deduce a
contradiction from the
assumption for all n, not P(n).
Under both the classical and the
intuitionistic logic, by reductio
ad absurdum this gives not for
all n, not P(n). The classical logic
allows this result to be
transformed into there exists an
n such that P(n), but not in
general the intuitionistic... the
 classical meaning, that
somewhere in the completed
infinite totality of the natural
numbers there occurs an n such
that P(n), is not available to him,
since he does not conceive the
natural numbers as a completed
totality.[7] (Kleene 1952:49–50)

Indeed, David Hilbert and Luitzen E. J.

Brouwer both give examples of the law of
excluded middle extended to the infinite.
Hilbert's example: "the assertion that
either there are only finitely many prime
numbers or there are infinitely many"
(quoted in Davis 2000:97); and Brouwer's:
"Every mathematical species is either
finite or infinite." (Brouwer 1923 in van
Heijenoort 1967:336).

In general, intuitionists allow the use of

the law of excluded middle when it is
confined to discourse over finite
collections (sets), but not when it is used
in discourse over infinite sets (e.g. the
natural numbers). Thus intuitionists
absolutely disallow the blanket assertion:
"For all propositions P concerning infinite
sets D: P or ~P" (Kleene 1952:48).

For more about the conflict between the

intuitionists (e.g. Brouwer) and the
 formalists (Hilbert) see Foundations of
mathematics and Intuitionism.

Putative counterexamples to the law of

excluded middle include the liar paradox
or Quine's Paradox. Certain resolutions of
these paradoxes, particularly Graham
Priest's dialetheism as formalised in LP,
have the law of excluded middle as a
theorem, but resolve out the Liar as both
true and false. In this way, the law of
excluded middle is true, but because
truth itself, and therefore disjunction, is
not exclusive, it says next to nothing if
one of the disjuncts is paradoxical, or
both true and false.
History
Aristotle

Aristotle wrote that ambiguity can arise

from the use of ambiguous names, but
cannot exist in the facts themselves:

It is impossible, then, that "being

a man" should mean precisely
"not being a man", if "man" not
only signifies something about
one subject but also has one
significance. ... And it will not be
possible to be and not to be the
same thing, except in virtue of
 an ambiguity, just as if one
whom we call "man", and others
were to call "not-man"; but the
point in question is not this,
whether the same thing can at
the same time be and not be a
man in name, but whether it can
be in fact. (Metaphysics 4.4, W.D.
Ross (trans.), GBWW 8, 525–
526).

Aristotle's assertion that "...it will not be

possible to be and not to be the same
thing", which would be written in
propositional logic as ¬(P ∧ ¬P), is a
statement modern logicians could call
the law of excluded middle (P ∨ ¬P), as
distribution of the negation of Aristotle's
assertion makes them equivalent,
regardless that the former claims that no
statement is both true and false, while
the latter requires that any statement is
either true or false.

However, Aristotle also writes, "since it is

impossible that contradictories should be
at the same time true of the same thing,
obviously contraries also cannot belong
at the same time to the same thing"
(Book IV, CH 6, p. 531). He then proposes
that "there cannot be an intermediate
between contradictories, but of one
subject we must either affirm or deny any
one predicate" (Book IV, CH 7, p. 531). In
the context of Aristotle's traditional logic,
this is a remarkably precise statement of
the law of excluded middle, P ∨ ¬P.
Leibniz

Its usual form, "Every judgment

is either true or false" [footnote
9]..."(from Kolmogorov in van
Heijenoort, p. 421) footnote 9:
"This is Leibniz's very simple
formulation (see Nouveaux
Essais, IV,2)...." (ibid p 421)
Bertrand Russell and Principia
Mathematica

Bertrand Russell asserts a distinction

between the "law of excluded middle"
and the "law of noncontradiction". In The
Problems of Philosophy, he cites three
"Laws of Thought" as more or less "self-
evident" or "a priori" in the sense of
Aristotle:

1. Law of identity: "Whatever is, is."

2. Law of noncontradiction: "Nothing
can both be and not be."
3. Law of excluded middle:
"Everything must either be or not be."
 These three laws are samples of
self-evident logical principles... (p.
72)

It is correct, at least for bivalent logic—

i.e. it can be seen with a Karnaugh map—
that Russell's Law (2) removes "the
middle" of the inclusive-or used in his law
(3). And this is the point of Reichenbach's
demonstration that some believe the
exclusive-or should take the place of the
inclusive-or.

About this issue (in admittedly very

technical terms) Reichenbach observes:

The tertium non datur

29. (x)[f(x) ∨ ~f(x)]
 is not exhaustive in its major terms
and is therefore an inflated formula.
This fact may perhaps explain why
some people consider it
unreasonable to write (29) with the
inclusive-'or', and want to have it
written with the sign of the exclusive-
'or'
30. (x)[f(x) ⊕ ~f(x)], where the
⊕
symbol " " signifies exclusive-or[8]
in which form it would be fully
exhaustive and therefore
nomological in the narrower sense.
(Reichenbach, p. 376)

In line (30) the "(x)" means "for all" or "for

every", a form used by Russell and
Reichenbach; today the symbolism is
usually x. Thus an example of the
expression would look like this:

(pig): (Flies(pig) ⊕ ~Flies(pig))

(For all instances of "pig" seen and
unseen): ("Pig does fly" or "Pig does
not fly" but not both simultaneously)
A formal definition from
Principia Mathematica

Principia Mathematica (PM) defines the

law of excluded middle formally:

*2.1 : ~p ∨ p (PM p. 101)

Example: Either it is true that
"this is red", or it is true that
 "this is not red". Hence it is true
that "this is red or this is not
red". (See below for more about
how this is derived from the
primitive axioms).

So just what is "truth" and "falsehood"? At

the opening PM quickly announces some
definitions:

Truth-values. The "truth-values"

of a proposition is truth if it is
true and falsehood if it is false*
[*This phrase is due to
Frege]...the truth-value of "p ∨
 q" is truth if the truth-value of
either p or q is truth, and is
falsehood otherwise ... that of "~
p" is the opposite of that of p..."
(p. 7-8)

This is not much help. But later, in a

much deeper discussion, ("Definition and
systematic ambiguity of Truth and
Falsehood" Chapter II part III, p. 41 ff )
PM defines truth and falsehood in terms
of a relationship between the "a" and the
"b" and the "percipient". For example
"This 'a' is 'b'" (e.g. "This 'object a' is 'red'")
really means "'object a' is a sense-datum"
and "'red' is a sense-datum", and they
"stand in relation" to one another and in
relation to "I". Thus what we really mean
is: "I perceive that 'This object a is red'"
and this is an undeniable-by-3rd-party
"truth".

PM further defines a distinction between

a "sense-datum" and a "sensation":

That is, when we judge (say)

"this is red", what occurs is a
relation of three terms, the
mind, and "this", and "red". On
the other hand, when we
perceive "the redness of this",
there is a relation of two terms,
 namely the mind and the
complex object "the redness of
this" (pp. 43–44).

Russell reiterated his distinction between

"sense-datum" and "sensation" in his
book The Problems of Philosophy (1912)
published at the same time as PM
(1910–1913):

Let us give the name of "sense-

data" to the things that are
immediately known in
sensation: such things as
colours, sounds, smells,
 hardnesses, roughnesses, and so
on. We shall give the name
"sensation" to the experience of
being immediately aware of
these things... The colour itself is
a sense-datum, not a sensation.
(p. 12)

Russell further described his reasoning

behind his definitions of "truth" and
"falsehood" in the same book (Chapter
XII Truth and Falsehood).

Consequences of the law of

excluded middle in Principia
Mathematica
From the law of excluded middle, formula
✸2.1 in Principia Mathematica,
Whitehead and Russell derive some of
the most powerful tools in the logician's
argumentation toolkit. (In Principia
Mathematica, formulas and propositions
are identified by a leading asterisk and
two numbers, such as "✸2.1".)

✸2.1 ~p ∨ p "This is the Law of

excluded middle" (PM, p. 101).

The proof of ✸2.1 is roughly as follows:

"primitive idea" 1.08 defines p → q = ~p
∨ q. Substituting p for q in this rule
yields p → p = ~p ∨ p. Since p → p is
true (this is Theorem 2.08, which is
proved separately), then ~p ∨ p must be
true.

✸2.11 p ∨ ~p (Permutation of the

assertions is allowed by axiom 1.4)
✸2.12 p → ~(~p) (Principle of double
negation, part 1: if "this rose is red" is
true then it's not true that "'this rose is
not-red' is true".)
✸2.13 p ∨ ~{~(~p)} (Lemma together
with 2.12 used to derive 2.14)
✸2.14 ~(~p) → p (Principle of double
negation, part 2)
✸2.15 (~p → q) → (~q → p) (One of the
four "Principles of transposition". Similar
to 1.03, 1.16 and 1.17. A very long
demonstration was required here.)
✸2.16 (p → q) → (~q → ~p) (If it's true
that "If this rose is red then this pig flies"
then it's true that "If this pig doesn't fly
then this rose isn't red.")
✸2.17 ( ~p → ~q ) → (q → p) (Another of
the "Principles of transposition".)
✸2.18 (~p → p) → p (Called "The
complement of reductio ad absurdum. It
states that a proposition which follows
from the hypothesis of its own falsehood
is true" (PM, pp. 103–104).)

Most of these theorems—in particular

✸2.1, ✸2.11, and ✸2.14—are rejected by
intuitionism. These tools are recast into
another form that Kolmogorov cites as
"Hilbert's four axioms of implication" and
"Hilbert's two axioms of negation"
(Kolmogorov in van Heijenoort, p. 335).

Propositions ✸2.12 and ✸2.14, "double

negation": The intuitionist writings of L. E.
J. Brouwer refer to what he calls "the
principle of the reciprocity of the multiple
species, that is, the principle that for
every system the correctness of a
property follows from the impossibility of
the impossibility of this property"
(Brouwer, ibid, p. 335).

This principle is commonly called "the

principle of double negation" (PM,
pp. 101–102). From the law of excluded
middle (✸2.1 and ✸2.11), PM derives
principle ✸2.12 immediately. We
substitute ~p for p in 2.11 to yield ~p ∨
~(~p), and by the definition of implication
(i.e. 1.01 p → q = ~p ∨ q) then ~p ∨ ~
(~p)= p → ~(~p). QED (The derivation of
2.14 is a bit more involved.)

Criticisms
Many modern logic systems replace the
law of excluded middle with the concept
of negation as failure. Instead of a
proposition's being either true or false, a
proposition is either true or not able to be
proved true.[9] These two dichotomies
only differ in logical systems that are not
complete. The principle of negation as
failure is used as a foundation for
autoepistemic logic, and is widely used in
logic programming. In these systems, the
programmer is free to assert the law of
excluded middle as a true fact, but it is
not built-in a priori into these systems.

Mathematicians such as L. E. J. Brouwer

and Arend Heyting have also contested
the usefulness of the law of excluded
middle in the context of modern
mathematics.[10]

See also
Brouwer–Hilbert controversy: an
account on the formalist-intuitionist
divide around the Law of the excluded
middle
Consequentia mirabilis
Diaconescu's theorem
Intuitionistic logic
Law of bivalence
Law of excluded fourth
Law of excluded middle is untrue in
many-valued logics such as ternary
logic and fuzzy logic
Laws of thought
Liar paradox
Limited principle of omniscience
Logical graphs: a graphical syntax for
propositional logic
Peirce's law: another way of turning
intuition classical
 Logical determinism: the application
excluded middle to modal propositions
Non-affirming negation in the
Prasangika school of Buddhism,
another system in which the law of
excluded middle is untrue

Footnotes
1. Geach p. 74
2. On Interpretation, c. 9
3. Metaphysics 2, 996b 26–30
4. Metaphysics 7, 1011b 26–27
5. Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand
Russell (1910), Principia Mathematica ,
Cambridge, p. 105
6. This well-known example of a non-
constructive proof depending on the law
of excluded middle can be found in many
places, for example: Megill, Norman.
"Metamath: A Computer Language for
Pure Mathematics, footnote on p. 17," .
and Davis 2000:220, footnote 2.
7. In a comparative analysis (pp. 43–59)
of the three "-isms" (and their foremost
spokesmen)—Logicism (Russell and
Whitehead), Intuitionism (Brouwer) and
Formalism (Hilbert)—Kleene turns his
thorough eye toward intuitionism, its
"founder" Brouwer, and the intuitionists'
complaints with respect to the law of
excluded middle as applied to arguments
over the "completed infinite".
8. The original symbol as used by
Reichenbach is an upside down V,
nowadays used for AND. The AND for
Reichenbach is the same as that used in
Principia Mathematica -- a "dot" cf p. 27
where he shows a truth table where he
defines "a.b". Reichenbach defines the
exclusive-or on p. 35 as "the negation of
the equivalence". One sign used
nowadays is a circle with a + in it, i.e. ⊕
(because in binary, a ⊕ b yields modulo-2
addition -- addition without carry). Other
signs are ≢ (not identical to), or ≠ (not
equal to).
9. Clark, Keith (1978). Logic and Data
Bases (PDF). Springer-Verlag. pp. 293–
322 (Negation as a failure).
doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-3384-5_11 .
10. "Proof and Knowledge in
Mathematics" by Michael Detlefsen

References
Aquinas, Thomas, "Summa
Theologica", Fathers of the English
Dominican Province (trans.), Daniel J.
Sullivan (ed.), vols. 19–20 in Robert
Maynard Hutchins (ed.), Great Books of
the Western World, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1952.
Cited as GB 19–20.
Aristotle, "Metaphysics", W.D. Ross
(trans.), vol. 8 in Robert Maynard
Hutchins (ed.), Great Books of the
Western World, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1952.
Cited as GB 8. 1st published, W.D. Ross
(trans.), The Works of Aristotle, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK.
Martin Davis 2000, Engines of Logic:
Mathematicians and the Origin of the
Computer", W. W. Norton & Company,
NY, ISBN 0-393-32229-7 pbk.
Dawson, J., Logical Dilemmas, The Life
and Work of Kurt Gödel, A.K. Peters,
Wellesley, MA, 1997.
van Heijenoort, J., From Frege to Gödel,
A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,
1879–1931, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1967. Reprinted with
corrections, 1977.
Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer, 1923,
On the significance of the principle of
excluded middle in mathematics,
especially in function theory [reprinted
with commentary, p. 334, van
Heijenoort]
Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov, 1925,
On the principle of excluded middle,
[reprinted with commentary, p. 414,
van Heijenoort]
Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer, 1927,
On the domains of definitions of
functions,[reprinted with commentary,
p. 446, van Heijenoort] Although not
directly germane, in his (1923) Brouwer
uses certain words defined in this
paper.
Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer,
1927(2), Intuitionistic reflections on
formalism,[reprinted with commentary,
p. 490, van Heijenoort]
Stephen C. Kleene 1952 original
printing, 1971 6th printing with
corrections, 10th printing 1991,
Introduction to Metamathematics,
North-Holland Publishing Company,
Amsterdam NY, ISBN 0-7204-2103-9.
Kneale, W. and Kneale, M., The
Development of Logic, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK, 1962.
Reprinted with corrections, 1975.
Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand
Russell, Principia Mathematica to *56,
Cambridge at the University Press
1962 (Second Edition of 1927,
reprinted). Extremely difficult because
of arcane symbolism, but a must-have
for serious logicians.
Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry Into
Meaning and Truth. The William James
Lectures for 1940 Delivered at Harvard
University.
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of
Philosophy, With a New Introduction by
John Perry, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1997 edition (first published
1912). Very easy to read: Russell was a
wonderful writer.
Bertrand Russell, The Art of
Philosophizing and Other Essays,
Littlefield, Adams & Co., Totowa, NJ,
1974 edition (first published 1968).
Includes a wonderful essay on "The Art
of drawing Inferences".
Hans Reichenbach, Elements of
Symbolic Logic, Dover, New York, 1947,
1975.
Tom Mitchell, Machine Learning, WCB
McGraw-Hill, 1997.
Constance Reid, Hilbert, Copernicus:
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 1996,
first published 1969. Contains a wealth
of biographical information, much
derived from interviews.
Bart Kosko, Fuzzy Thinking: The New
Science of Fuzzy Logic, Hyperion, New
York, 1993. Fuzzy thinking at its finest.
But a good introduction to the
concepts.
David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, reprinted in
Great Books of the Western World
Encyclopædia Britannica, Volume 35,
1952, p. 449 ff. This work was
published by Hume in 1758 as his
rewrite of his "juvenile" Treatise of
Human Nature: Being An attempt to
 introduce the experimental method of
Reasoning into Moral Subjects Vol. I, Of
The Understanding first published
1739, reprinted as: David Hume, A
Treatise of Human Nature, Penguin
Classics, 1985. Also see: David
Applebaum, The Vision of Hume, Vega,
London, 2001: a reprint of a portion of
An Inquiry starts on p. 94 ff

External links
"Contradiction" entry in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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