International Journal on Future Revolution in Computer Science & Communication Engineering ISSN: 2454-4248

Volume: 3 Issue: 11 355 – 359

_______________________________________________________________________________________________
IoT Protocols : Z-Wave and Thread

Ishaq Unwala, Assistant Professor

Jiang Lu, Assistant Professor
Computer Engineering Dept.
University of Houston Clear Lake
Houston, TX, USA
Unwala@uhcl.edu, LuJ@uhcl.edu

Abstract— Today there are a multitude of IoT protocols available in the marketplace. Two protocols from different time periods are selected to
be compared. The two protocols selected are: Z-Wave which is one of the oldest and the most commercially successful protocol, and Thread
which is the latest protocol released for commercialization. This paper discusses both the protocols PAN, PHY, MAC, Routing, encryption, etc.
Z-Wave is based on propriety standards, most of which is not publicly available, although some have been reverse engineered by researchers.
Thread on other hand is based completely on open standards. All Z-Wave modules are made by a single company, while Thread modules are
expected to be available from multiple vendors. Z-Wave has a large installed base and has proven to be a commercial success. Thread is new and
has a open protocol, but Thread based devices are not yet readily available in the market for users.
Keywords-Z-Wave, Thread, Threadgroup,IoT,Internet-of-things
__________________________________________________*****_________________________________________________

motion, light, vibration, pressure, temperature, acceleration,

I. INTRODUCTION magnetic field, infrared, proximity, distance, biometric
Internet-of-Things (IoT) as a field has been growing ever parameters and many others.
since Kevin Ashton introduced the term in 1999 [1]. According • Response. The IoT PAN may also have a number of
to Gartner‟s recent press release [2], by the end of 2017, total devices that respond, i.e. perform actions. Examples include
IoT installed devices is expected to reach 8.4 billion units and relays, actuators and switches.
the IoT related spending in 2017 is expected to be $1.69 • Communication. The IoT devices in the PAN
trillion. Gartner, in the same press release, also projects that by communicate wirelessly with each other. The sensor data is
2020 the IoT installed devices will reach 20.4 billion units and communicated, by the router, to a central location, usually
spending will reach $2.9 trillion. It is expected that IoT will using Cloud computing, for processing and evaluation. Results
play an important part in everyday life. The IoT systems will be of data evaluation are then communicated back to the IoT PAN
involved in smart cities, smart workplaces, smart industries, for any required physical action.
smart cars and smart homes. This paper discusses two very • Computation. Cloud computing services are usually
different IoT protocols, Z-Wave and Thread. Z-Wave is one of used to process the IoT sensor data. Cloud computing
the first IoT protocols to be widely commercialized and Thread formulates a response and sends to the IoT router, if needed.
is the latest IoT protocol to be released. It is important to The IoT router then uses the PAN wireless communication
understand the differences and similarities between the two links, to deliver the message.
protocols. • Services. The IoT PAN is ubiquitous and provides a
number of services: item identification, collecting and
II. INTERNET OF THINGS communicating sensor data, event monitoring, performing
What is an IoT system? An IoT system is a concept of physical action(s), and device collaboration.
connecting sensors and actuators into a coherent network with • Semantics. Cloud processing software analyzes the
Cloud computing services that can provide services to the user. data and provides a context-aware response for the IoT system.
An IoT system is depicted in Fig. 1. In an IoT system, the IoT All these capabilities in the IoT PAN are provided under
devices can be localized in a home or spread across the city. practical constraints. Here are few of the major constraints on
The IoT devices are connected in a Private Area Network the IoT PAN:
(PAN) using wireless communication protocols. The PAN is • Low power. Many of IoT devices are battery powered;
then connected through the router(s) to Internet allowing it to replacing batteries is expensive, inconvenient, and unreliable.
accessing the Cloud computing services. The data processed in Even if the IoT devices are attached to the power grid, low
the Cloud can result in necessity for physical action. The action power is required for a couple of reasons. First, the IoT devices
may be as simple as sending a text message or as complex as are continuously operating and therefore even small amount of
activating a set of actuators to accomplish some task. The power consumption can quickly add up. Second, a typical IoT
action is communicated from the Cloud computer back to the installation consists of hundreds of devices. The aggregate
IoT actuator device(s) through the router and the IoT PAN. power consumption of these devices operating continuously
An IoT system, Fig. 1, has following features [5]: can be quite significant.
• Device Identification. An individual device in an IoT • Low cost. Cost is always a major factor in the
PAN has a unique address. consumer adoption of any product. Low cost promotes a wider
• Sensing. The IoT PAN has a number of sensing use of the smart technologies.
devices that collect data from a monitored event or
environment. Examples of sensors include detectors for
355
IJFRCSCE | November 2017, Available @ http://www.ijfrcsce.org
_______________________________________________________________________________________
International Journal on Future Revolution in Computer Science & Communication Engineering ISSN: 2454-4248
Volume: 3 Issue: 11 355 – 359
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
• Security. Beside physical security of the IoT devices, or actuators. The PAN routers serve multiple purposes, besides
authenticity, privacy, confidentiality, and integrity of data are being sensors or actuators, PAN routers also act as
important consideration in an IoT system. communication router for the End devices. The PAN routers
• Communication. The IoT faces communication have additional capability to connect with other PAN routers
constraints on multiple fronts. The IoT PAN radio operates on and/or Border routers. The Border router(s) have an additional
low power, short range transmission, in a restricted public capability to act as gateway to Internet/Cloud by connecting to
frequency spectrum. The operating environment is noisy with Internet router. The End devices can communicate with either
other equipment generating radio interference, and there are the PAN network router or directly with Border routers. An
many physical obstacles. The IoT communication also faces example of a Border router is Nest thermostat, which has
the challenge of frequent network route changes as IoT devices connectivity to both PAN and WiFi router, plus it is also an IoT
are moved, some of the IoT devices are mobile, plus the users sensor and actuator.
may move obstacles in its communication paths. Additionally,
the IoT data packets are small, making it harder to include
redundancy for fault tolerance. IV. Z-WAVE PROTOCOL
• User interface. Most IoT devices either have a Z-Wave (originally ZenSys) is a proprietary IoT protocol,
primitive or no user interface. The lack of graphical user owned by Sigma Designs, so only limited information is
interface (GUI) constraints the communication between the publicly available. Sigma Designs is the only supplier of Z-
user and the device. GUI-based components, like smart-phone, Wave hardware, this was done to maintain interoperability
smart-tablet, a computer or even a voice controlled device is between different IoT device producers. Z-Wave has been
normally required to set up and communicate with the IoT available for more than 10 years. A large variety of Z-Wave
device.
devices are available in the market with millions of devices
installed.
Z-Wave wireless network uses a proprietary wireless
standard. Z-Wave uses a wireless MESH network topology. Z-
Wave operating frequency is 908.42 MHz (USA) or 868.42
MHz (Europe), with a data rate of 9.6 Kbps, and uses FSK
(Freq. Shift Keying) modulation. Z-Wave has a maximum
range of 30m per hop, with maximum of 4 hops. Maximum
number of devices in one Z-Wave PAN is limited to 232. Z-
Wave network is connected to the Internet/Cloud through a
Smart Hub (Z/IP). Smart Hub, is the Border router for Z-Wave
protocol providing connection between PAN and Internet
gateway. Smart Hub is a single point of failure for the Z-Wave
network as all data traffic in and out of PAN passes through it.
Each Z-Wave Smart Hub has a unique 32-bit Home-ID. For
security purposes, the Home-ID is permanently embedded in
Smart Hub during manufacturing and cannot be reprogrammed.
All IoT devices in Z-Wave PAN receive a common Home-ID
and a unique 8-bit Node-ID after the device has been
authenticated. Multiple Z-Wave PANs in close proximity is not
an issue, since each IoT device has a unique Home-ID and a
Node-ID tag [8][9][10][23]. Z-Wave Smart Hub to Internet
connection is encrypted with AES-based pre-shared key (TLS
1.1, PSK) [12]. Two Z-Wave PANs can also be connected
through two Smart Hubs and DTLS [12]. Z-Wave accomplishes
secure key exchange using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) [12][18].
III. IOT PRIVATE AREA NETWORK
There are a number of IoT protocols currently available, Z- V. THREAD PROTOCOL
Wave, Zigbee, Thread, IoTivity, AllJoyn, and among others. Thread was announced by Threadgroup Inc. in 2015, so it is
Although particulars for each of these protocols are different, a relatively new IoT protocol [7]. Hardware boards with
they share many similarities. All these protocols establish a wireless radios, plus software libraries for Thread are now
wireless Private Area Network (PAN). PAN network topology available for research and development. Consumer devices are
is built using connectivity through wireless radios. Topologies not yet widely available, although Nest thermostat and some
commonly used for PAN are point-to-point, star and mesh. The Zigbee devices are Thread compatible. Thread is an open
mesh topology is the most popular due to its robustness, standard. Thread specification is available from the
scalability and fault resilience. A typical PAN with mesh Threadgroup. Thread was founded by seven companies (ARM
topology can be seen in Fig. 1. Generally, an IoT network have (acquired by SoftBank Group), Big Ass Fans, Freescale
three types of nodes: End devices, PAN routers, Border routers. (acquired by NXP Semiconductors), Nest (acquired by
Data from IoT devices can be transmitted across multiple hops, Alphabet/Google), Samsung, Silicon Labs, and Yale). Today,
as determined by a routing protocol, before arriving at gateway Threadgroup has more than 200 member companies. Thread
Border router(s). The End devices normally consist of sensors intends to consolidate IoT protocols by working with other IoT
356
IJFRCSCE | November 2017, Available @ http://www.ijfrcsce.org
_______________________________________________________________________________________
International Journal on Future Revolution in Computer Science & Communication Engineering ISSN: 2454-4248
Volume: 3 Issue: 11 355 – 359
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
alliances. Thread is specially designed for Home Automation B. Physical and Data Link Layer (PHY and MAC) Security
and supports a wide variety of home use applications: In Z-Wave PHY and MAC layers are proprietary. In Thread
appliances, access control, climate control, energy PHY and MAC layers are defined by IEEE 802.15.4. Although
management, lighting, safety, and security. This paper IEEE 802.15.4 allows other frequencies, Thread only uses the
discusses the latest Thread specification v1.1.1 2017. 2450 MHz related portion of the standard. This is the lowest
Thread is based on open standards such as IEEE 802.15.4 layer for which there are protocol-based security specifications.
(2450 MHz), IPv6, 6LoWPAN, wireless PAN MESH network Support for this encryption is built into the radio hardware.
topology with no single point of failure. The wireless PAN Almost all IoT protocols offer AES (Advanced Encryption
operates at 2.4 GHz with a data rate up to 250 Kbps and using Standard) 128-bit [13] [17]. However, AES does not scale well
O-QPSK modulation. Thread has a maximum range of 30m per with hundreds of devices in the network and requires very large
hop, with a default hop limit of 36 hops. Thread has the ability keys. Therefore, IoT protocols implement, ECC (Elliptic Curve
to connect 250+ devices in a single PAN. Thread can have Cryptography, RFC 4492) [18]. ECC is an asymmetric, public-
multiple Border routers, which connect to Internet, this key method that scales well and provides a higher level of
eliminates Border router failure as a single point of failure. security for the same number of bits. Other low power public
Each IoT device in Thread has an IPv6 address. The IPv6 key encryption algorithm Rabin‟s Scheme and NtruEncrypt are
address is compressed using 6LoWPAN, which is a standard also good candidates for IoT [19].
for low power devices. Readers might notice similarities Z-Wave security has an interesting history when it comes to
between Thread and the Zigbee protocol. As a matter of fact, data encryption. Initial Z-Wave, series 100, had TDES (Triple
Zigbee libraries can run as an application on Thread [24]. Data Encryption Standard) [11]. Later in series 200 silicon,
encryption was dropped according to Knight [4]. Encryption
was again added back and now it uses AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard ) [12][13]. Since then Z-Wave has taken
steps to improve security features and recently has been
evaluated by UL for security applications according to press
release by Sigma Design, “Z-Wave modules models ZM5101,
ZM5202, and ZM5304 with protocol SDK version 6.60 have
been evaluated to UL„s standards for home security” [3]. This
paper considers Z-Wave protocol, with AES-128, as it exists
today. Z-Wave Smart Hub to Internet connection is encrypted
with AES-based pre-shared key (TLS 1.1, PSK) [12]. Z-Wave
accomplishes secure key exchange using Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Figure 2. Thread protocol stack IoT system [7] Hellman (ECDH) [12][18].
Thread uses AES-128 and ECC for data link encryption
VI. NETWORK STACK [25]. AES does not scale well with hundreds of devices, as
The IoT protocol layers are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. The expected in the Thread network and requires very large keys.
main security for IoT protocols are in Perception Layer, Data Therefore, Thread [25] uses ECC (Elliptic Curve
Link Layer and Transport Layer. Although data in Cloud is an Cryptography, RFC 4492) [12] [18]. ECC is an asymmetric,
important part of the IoT system, Cloud is not part of IoT public-key method that scales well and provides a higher level
protocols and is addressed separately in [28]. of security for the same number of bits.
A. Perception Layer Security
Perception layer includes WSN (Wireless Sensor Network), Network Layer Comparison
IMD (Implantable Medical Devices), RFID (Radio Frequency
Identification), NFC (Near Field Communication), temperature Z-Wave Thread
sensors, pressure sensors, luminance sensors, vibration sensors,
accelerometer magnetometer, gyroscope, etc. Application Device & Cmd Application
Z-Wave and Thread protocol have devices with similar
functionality at perception layer, but are incompatible with Transport Routing Layer UDP RIPng
each other. The communication standard for each protocol is
very different. Network MESH MESH,IPv6 – 6LoWPAN
Perception layer requires physical security of devices.
Physically manipulated faulty nodes may have unauthorized Data Link Proprietary MAC IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
attachments, or reprogrammed boot to change their behavior.
This can be secured by running fault detection algorithms Physical Proprietary PHY IEEE 802.15.4 PHY
[14][15][16]. Encryption related data must protected by using
encryption before storing it in memory. To add new devices in Perception Sensors/Switches Sensors/Switches
PAN, strong passwords, biometric recognition (fingerprints,
Figure 3. Network Layer Comparison
iris, voice, face, etc) or a synchronized key generator must be
used. Currently, none of the major IoT protocols address the
issue of protecting data stored in the device registers and C. Transport Layer Security
memory.
Transport layer mainly consists of routing protocol and data
transport protocol.

357
IJFRCSCE | November 2017, Available @ http://www.ijfrcsce.org
_______________________________________________________________________________________
International Journal on Future Revolution in Computer Science & Communication Engineering ISSN: 2454-4248
Volume: 3 Issue: 11 355 – 359
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Z-Wave routing protocol is propriety, however researcher authenticated by the Commissioner (an authentication server).
have reverse engineered most of it [6]. Z-Wave routing has 4 Commissioner itself must be authenticated. Commissioner
possible hops plus one final hop to the destination node. authentication requires a onetime Commissioning Session, a
Thread uses standard routing RIPng [RFC 2080]. RIPng is secured client/server socket connection, between
a distance vector routing protocol [RFC 1058] for IPv6. RIPng Commissioner and the Border Router via DTLS (RFC 6347) or
has maximum of 15 hops. TLS (RFC 5246). Using the advertized UDP port, during
There are two main data protocols currently being used at discovery, Commissioner provides PSKc (Pre-Shared Key for
transport layer in IoT PANs, CoAP (Constrained Application Commissioner) credential. The Border router with human
Protocol) [20] [27] and MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry interaction than authenticates the Commissioner.
Transport) [21]. Both of these protocols were specifically A new device wishing to join the Thread network must
designed for low power IoT type devices. transmit an unsecured Discovery Request message. A router
Actual transport protocol used by CoAP is a UDP (User responds with a Discovery Response message including the
Datagram Protocol), which enforces use of DTLS (Datagram joining UDP port. The device will perform DTLS handshake to
Transport Layer Security, IETF RFC 6347). CoAP has a set of establish a secure session with router. The router will relay
security modes and mandatory-to-implement ciphers. CoAP UDP messages to the Border router, which in turn will relay
borrows some concepts from REST (Representational State them to the Commissioner. The device and Commissioner then
Transfer) protocol [22]. exchange token to establish trust. Commissioner inspects the
The transport protocol used by MQTT is TCP, which device IID (Interface Identifier) and credentials. If the
enforces TLS (Transport Layer Security, IETF RFC 5246). Commissioner is satisfied with the responses from the device, it
MQTT is a publisher/subscriber style protocol, requiring a will be provisioned with the appropriate data and services, and
server-broker. A typical MQTT session consists of establishing also provided with KEK (Key Encryption Key). Once it is
a connection, authentication, communication, termination. authenticated by the Commissioner, router will provide the
MQTT provides authentication and authorization scheme, but device network credentials.
does not have any security implementation requirements. Each Thread node also receives a master key when joining.
MQTT is designed to operate in a secure network, and thus has Two different 16-bit keys, one for MAC and other for DTLS,
no defined security mechanism. MQTT sends username and are generated using Hashed Message Authentication Mode
password in clear text and thus relies on Transport layer with SHA-256 algorithm (HMAC-SHA256) produces 32-bit
encryption, like TLS, to provide security. MQTT should not be output [RFC 6234] and the master key. The key set are rotated
used for global network as it does not scale well. TLS is based on key index changes, or the key rotation timer expiry, or
expensive protocol and not well suited for very low power incoming messages matches the next key.
devices [29] [30]. MQTT has TCP port 1883 reserved for non-
encrypted and TCP port 8883 reserved for encrypted
communication using TLS. Network Security Comparison
Although the DTLS and TLS have similar concepts, CoAP
with DTLS is preferred in IoT protocol due to low power IoT Z-Wave Thread
devices having limited memory and processing capabilities.
Both CoAP and MQTT can be operated in “no security” mode, Application Device & Cmd Application
“pre-shared key” mode and “certificate” mode. CoAPs (CoAP
secured) can also be configured in “raw public key” [IETF Transport DTLS 1.0, PSK DTLS 1.2, PSK
RFC 7250], but MQTT implementation is not yet available. In
pre-shared key mode CoAPs hashes pre-shared keys with a list Network Home Network ID IPv6-6LoWPAN
of corresponding communication nodes. Although use of
certificate mode is well established, its use in IoT is Data Link AES-128 AES-128, ECC
discouraged due to resource constraints. However, there is a
one big advantage in use of certificates; the certificate can be Physical None or facility door None or facility door
revoked if the IoT device is compromised. In raw public key
mode the IoT device holds an asymmetric key pair but without Perception Password Password

a certificate. Normally, the asymmetric key pair is generated

Figure 4. Network Security Comparison
and embedded in the device by the manufacturer. This
asymmetric key pair needs to be validated in out-of-band
(OOB) mechanism using public key. A device can have VII. CONCLUSION
multiple raw public keys. Both the protocols. Z-Wave and Thread, fulfill the
Z-Wave and Thread both utilize DTLS encryption for the requirements, features and capabilities of an IoT protocol. Both
transport layer. If the radio hardware does not support data protocols have a reliable MESH configuration for PAN. Z-
encryption than Transport layer encryption must be used. Using Wave has tried to protect the PAN from intruders by hiding the
“no security” mode is acceptable if the network is running on a information in the propriety standards. These same propriety
VPN, or if Data layer encryption is being used. Encrypting the standards also make it hard to judge the quality of Z-Wave
data twice, at Data layer and Transport layer can decrease the standards, but researchers have reverse engineered some
data compression ratio, which leads to more package aspects of the PAN [26][6]. Thread is based on open standards,
transmissions and higher power consumption. which allows everyone to study and detect any security flaws.
Thread Mesh is self-configuring and each link is Fig. 3 shows the network layer comparison, which clearly
individually encrypted. Every device in Thread holds the highlights the differences in PHY, MAC, Routing between Z-
credentials which allow it to be part of the network. However, Wave and Thread. Network security comparison is shown in
before the device can receive the credentials it has to be Fig. 4, where the differences are less discernible. The reason
358
IJFRCSCE | November 2017, Available @ http://www.ijfrcsce.org
_______________________________________________________________________________________
International Journal on Future Revolution in Computer Science & Communication Engineering ISSN: 2454-4248
Volume: 3 Issue: 11 355 – 359
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
for similarity in security is that Z-Wave seems to have been networks," 2007 IEEE Conference on Emerging Technologies
upgrading its devices. Z-Wave has been commercially and Factory Automation (EFTA 2007), Patras, 2007, pp. 1408-
1411. doi: 10.1109/EFTA.2007.4416949
successful with its Z-Alliance. Thread, with its Thread Group
[17] Federal Information Processing Standards , "Announcing the
Inc., still has to prove itself in the marketplace. ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD(AES)", Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 197 November
2001 [online] Available:
REFERENCES http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
[1] Aston, Kevin. "That 'Internet of Things' Thing", Available: [18] Z. Liu, X. Huang, Z. Hu, M. K. Khan, H. Seo and L. Zhou, "On
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986, accessed on Emerging Family of Elliptic Curves to Secure Internet of
June 2, 2017. Things: ECC Comes of Age," in IEEE Transactions on
[2] Gartner, Inc. “Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected „Things‟ Will Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 237-248,
Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent From 2016”, May-June 1 2017. doi: 10.1109/TDSC.2016.2577022
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917, accessed on [19] G. Gaubatz, J. P. Kaps, E. Ozturk and B. Sunar, "State of the art
June 2, 2017. in ultra-low power public key cryptography for wireless sensor
[3] Sigma Design press release, “Sigma Designs Announces Break- networks," Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive
Through Z-Wave(R) UL Component Recognition”, Computing and Communications Workshops, Kauai Island, HI,
http://www.sigmadesigns.com/news/sigma-designs-announces- 2005, pp. 146-150. doi: 10.1109/PERCOMW.2005.76
break-through-z-waver-ul-component-recognition , accessed on [20] C. Bormann, A. P. Castellani and Z. Shelby, "CoAP: An
June 2, 2017. Application Protocol for Billions of Tiny Internet Nodes," in
[4] M. Knight, "Wireless security - How safe is Z-wave?," in IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 62-67, March-April
Computing & Control Engineering Journal, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 2012. doi: 10.1109/MIC.2012.29
18-23, Dec.-Jan. 2006. doi: 10.1049/cce:20060601 [21] “Oasis Message Queue Telemetry Transport”, OASIS MQTT
[5] M. Al-Zyoud, T. Atkison and J. Carver, "An Overview of version 3.1.1, 2014
Emerging Privacy Issues in the Internet of Things," 2016 [22] S. Zamfir, T. Balan, I. Iliescu and F. Sandu, "A security analysis
International Conference on Computational Science and on standard IoT protocols," 2016 International Conference on
Computational Intelligence (CSCI), Las Vegas, NV, 2016, pp. Applied and Theoretical Electricity (ICATE), Craiova, 2016, pp.
212-217. doi: 10.1109/CSCI.2016.0047 1-6. doi: 10.1109/ICATE.2016.7754665
[6] C.W.Badenhop, S.R.Graham, B.W.Ramsey, B.E.Mullins, [23] M. B. Yassein, W. Mardini and A. Khalil, "Smart homes
L.O.Mailloux, "The Z-Wave routing protocol and its security automation using Z-wave protocol," 2016 International
implications" https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.04.004 Conference on Engineering & MIS (ICEMIS), Agadir, 2016, pp.
[7] Threadgroup Inc. website: http://Threadgroup.org/What-is- 1-6. doi: 10.1109/ICEMIS.2016.7745306
Thread/Connected-Home [24] “The Thread Group Expands Influence through Partnership with
[8] H. Sharma and S. Sharma, "A review of sensor networks: ZigBee Alliance, TCLA and Innovation Enabler Award”,
Technologies and applications," 2014 Recent Advances in (Accessed June 7, 2017) http://mysmahome.com/news/5905/the-
Engineering and Computational Sciences (RAECS), Thread-group-expands-influence-through-partnership-with-
Chandigarh, 2014, pp. 1-4. doi: 10.1109/RAECS.2014.6799579 zigbee-alliance-tcla-and-innovation-enabler-award-2/
[9] M. B. Yassein, W. Mardini and A. Khalil, "Smart homes [25] S. Rajesh, "Ubiquitous energy efficient aquaculture management
automation using Z-wave protocol," 2016 International system," 2016 International Conference on Advances in
Conference on Engineering & MIS (ICEMIS), Agadir, 2016, pp. Computing, Communications and Informatics (ICACCI), Jaipur,
1-6. doi: 10.1109/ICEMIS.2016.7745306 2016, pp. 1124-1128. doi: 10.1109/ICACCI.2016.7732195
[10] Galeev, M.T., S. Engineer, and M. Inc, “Catching the Z-Wave”. [26] HackersOnBoard. “Black Hat 2013 – Honey, I‟m Home!! –
Embedded Systems Design, 2006. 19(10): p. 28. Hacking Z-Wave Home Automation Systems.” Online video
clip. YouTube. YouTube, 19 Nov 2013. Web 1 Nov. 2016.
[11] M. Zareei, A. Zarei, R. Budiarto and M. A. Omar, "A URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYaEQhvodc8
comparative study of short range wireless sensor network on
high density networks," The 17th Asia Pacific Conference on [27] M. B. Tamboli and D. Dambawade, "Secure and efficient CoAP
Communications, Sabah, 2011, pp. 247-252. doi: based authentication and access control for Internet of Things
10.1109/APCC.2011.6152813 (IoT)," 2016 IEEE International Conference on Recent Trends in
Electronics, Information & Communication Technology
[12] “Introduction to the Z-Wave Security Ecosystem”, available (RTEICT), Bangalore, 2016, pp. 1245-1250. doi:
from Sigma Design, Inc., on the company website: http://z- 10.1109/RTEICT.2016.7808031
wave.sigmadesigns.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Z-Wave-
Security-White-Paper.pdf [28] J. Singh, T. Pasquier, J. Bacon, H. Ko and D. Eyers, "Twenty
Security Considerations for Cloud-Supported Internet of
[13] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, AES Proposal: Rijndael, version 2, Things," in IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 3, no. 3, pp.
1999. Available from URL: http://www.esat. 269-284, June 2016. doi: 10.1109/JIOT.2015.2460333
kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael
[29] L. Nastase, "Security in the Internet of Things: A Survey on
[14] J. Chen, S. Kher, and A. Somani, “Distributed fault detection of Application Layer Protocols," 2017 21st International
wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 2006 Conference on Control Systems and Computer Science (CSCS),
Workshop on Dependability Issues in Wireless Ad Hoc Bucharest, Romania, 2017, pp. 659-666. doi:
Networks and Sensor Networks, ser. DIWANS ‟06, 2006, pp. 10.1109/CSCS.2017.101
65–72
[30] M. B. Yassein, M. Q. Shatnawi and D. Al-zoubi, "Application
[15] C. Lo, J. P. Lynch and M. Liu, "Distributed Reference-Free layer protocols for the Internet of Things: A survey," 2016
Fault Detection Method for Autonomous Wireless Sensor International Conference on Engineering & MIS (ICEMIS),
Networks," in IEEE Sensors Journal, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 2009- Agadir, 2016, pp. 1-4. doi: 10.1109/ICEMIS.2016.7745303
2019, May 2013. doi: 10.1109/JSEN.2013.2244881
[16] I. Chatzigiannakis and A. Strikos, "A decentralized intrusion
detection system for increasing security of wireless sensor

359
IJFRCSCE | November 2017, Available @ http://www.ijfrcsce.org
_______________________________________________________________________________________