HPG Working Paper

The search for

common ground
Civil–military relations in Pakistan
Lauren Greenwood and Gowthaman Balachandran

March 2014
HPG
Humanitarian Policy
Group
About the authors
Lauren Greenwood is an independent consultant in gender and security. She has a PhD in Social Anthropology from the
University of Sussex, on gender, masculinity, identity and British civil–military relations, and has recently completed a co-
authored report on Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States and Situations for the Danish Institute for
International Studies.

Gowthaman Balachandran is an independent consultant on humanitarian policy and practice and a keen student of civil–
military interaction. He is a former Country Director of Oxfam Australia in Sri Lanka.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank all those who gave their time in interviews, shared contacts or material and offered
comments on the study. The authors are grateful to Ashley Jackson, who made valuable contributions, and Matthew Foley,
for his expert editing of the paper.

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Contents
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1 Conclusion
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4
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5
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6
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Exe
References
21
ii The search for common ground: civil–military relations in Pakistan
Executive summary
and neutrality – The result has been
were left with no that aid agencies
choice but to have been prevented
collaborate closely from engaging with
with the military. all sides of the
conflict, damaging
In recent years Pakistan These issues came perceptions of their
has experienced a to a head with the neutrality and
succession of large-scale displacement crisis independence, and
natural disasters and in 2008/09, where have been
complex emergencies that the military compelled to obey
have required significant controlled access to the rules established
humanitarian and military affected areas and by the Pakistani
responses. Many of the again subordinated military in order to
areas hit by natural the response to gain access to
disasters have also been military and affected
affected by armed conflict political objectives. populations. The
or instability, with the UN’s lack of
national military both a The development of humanitarian
belligerent in the conflict civil–military leadership
and the guidelines in 2009– contributed to this
10 was an important problem. Pakistan is
primary responder to step in creating a a priority context
disaster. This dual role has dialogue between for the roll-out of
made coordination aid agencies and the the Transformative
between aid agencies and Pakistani military Agenda and the
the military in these about humanitarian UN’s humanitarian
contexts particularly principles, operations in
complicated. particularly in the KP/FATA are
subsequent response largely
Through interviews with to floods in 2010. indistinguishable
aid workers and Pakistani While they from the
government officials, as provided some government’s
well as extensive desk clarity about the broader stabilisation
research, this report respective roles of agenda. Local
explores the complexities the military organisations also
and challenges came

of civil–military under immense

coordination in Pakistan. pressure to comply
Beginning with the with the wishes of
earthquake response in the Pakistani
2005, humanitarian actors and humanitarian military, and were
came up against military actors in response, rarely given the
efforts to utilise disaster they were never space or
response activities to ‘win endorsed by the consideration that
hearts and minds’ in the Pakistani was afforded to
fight against the government or international aid
insurgency in the North- military and the agencies.
West Frontier Province military had limited
(NWFP, known after 2010 engagement in The Pakistan
as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, civil–military government and
or KP). Because the coordination fora. military remain
military and Notably, when largely in control of
dialogue occurred, the distribution of
government tightly there was little aid and access to
controlled access, many discussion of affected areas in
aid agencies protection issues or disaster and conflict
International responses. Although
Humanitarian Law far from perfect, the
– with varying degrees of (IHL).
2010 guidelines can
reticence and concern
still provide a basis
about their independence
for dialogue and
interaction be more critical effort and the
examination by the consequences of the
– but require continual UN and aid compromises they
dissemination and agencies themselves have made in order
discussion if they are to of their own role in to reach civilians in
remain relevant. There supporting the need of their
must also Pakistani military assistance.
The search for common ground: civil–military relations in Pakistan
1 Introduction
between aid was the
agencies and the deployment of
military in these foreign military
contexts assets, including
particularly from states that
complicated. are belligerents
The succession in the conflict in
of natural The Pakistan neighbouring
disasters and military’s role Afghanistan.
complex both as first Humanitarian
emergencies responder in actors have also
that Pakistan disasters and as found it difficult
has experienced a belligerent in to take a
in recent years conflict (and a consistent line
has required key political on how to
significant player with engage with
humanitarian ubiquitous foreign military
and military influence across actors. In 2010,
responses. government) the
Three major poses Humanitarian
disasters – the conceptual and Country Team
earthquake in operational developed
Kashmir in challenges to civil–military
2005, the civil–military coordination
displacement coordination. guidelines in an
crisis in the The attempt to
North-West international ensure a clear
Frontier humanitarian and consistent
Province community’s position with
(NWFP, known premise that national and
after 2010 visible foreign
interaction with militaries. The
as Khyber military forces development of
Pakhtunkhwa, must only be as these guidelines
or KP) in a ‘last resort’, has highlighted
2008–2009 and for example in differences in
monsoon floods the use of definitions and
in 2010, military perspectives
interspersed within the
with several assets or armed spectrum of
smaller escorts, has actors involved,
disasters – been tested and adherence
affected over repeatedly, and to the guidelines
20 million international has been
people. Many humanitarian inconsistent.
of the areas hit actors have
by natural often struggled This paper
disasters have to define what analyses how
also been an appropriate civil–military
affected by level of mechanisms
armed conflict engagement have evolved
or instability, with the over time, the
with the national contextual
national military might factors that have
military both a be. A further influenced this
belligerent in complicating engagement and
the conflict and factor in both the legacy this
the primary the 2005 engagement has
responder to Kashmir left for future
disaster. This earthquake interactions in
dual role has response and this
made the 2010 floods
coordination
 Interviewees
Method were selected
ology on the basis that
they had been
involved in
disaster-prone This case study civil–military
region. is based on desk coordination,
Following this research and in- either
introduction, depth key representing
Section 2 informant their
examines the interviews and organisation or
special role consultations. A as part of
played by the preliminary forums which
military in review of had civil–
Pakistan’s literature on military
national life. civil–military coordination as
This discussion interaction and one of their
sets the scene humanitarian functions. Many
for Section 3, response in had been
which Pakistan was through all three
examines how undertaken. Key major response
experiences informants for episodes (the
from the 2005 interviews earthquake, the
earthquake included donors security
response and and UN and operations and
international the floods), and
2008/09 IDP and local NGO all had been
crisis representatives part of at least
demonstrated and a limited two major
the need for number of disaster
structured responses. The
guidance and government interviews were
prompted the officials at conducted on a
subsequent national and non-attributable
development provincial basis, mostly
levels. An via Skype with
of independent some through
Humanitarian consultant telephone
Country Team involved in conversations.
guidelines. civil–military In addition, the
Section 4 interaction was research draws
explores the also on interviews
impact of the interviewed. from YouTube
guidelines on Visa issues videos and
civil–military prevented travel presentations in
interaction in to Pakistan for conferences and
Pakistan, while fieldwork, seminars by
in Section 5 the which limited these actors.
opportunities engagement
for principled with military Given the
and effective officials in sampling
civil–military particular. The methodology
coordination in report therefore and the
Pakistan are reflects limitation
discussed. primarily the identified
perspective of above, the case
humanitarian study does not
organisations. seek to make
1.1
conclusive statements. Efforts have been made
Rather, it is a to organise and
compilation of represent all viewpoints,
competing perspectives while analysing them
on a fraught subject. with reference to
international guidelines.
Data collection was
based on a semi- What were the staff
structured set of capacities and resources
questions. Although the at the disposal of
full set of questions was different actors for
shared with key civil–military
informants, interviews coordination, and how
often focused on a few did this affect
salient issues that interaction?
informants felt strongly What were the attitudes
about. Issues and that each actor brought
themes arising in early to addressing the
interviews were probed phenomenon of mass
in subsequent displacement?
conversations. Given
the sensitivity of the A critical limitation was
subject, and to the inability to meet
encourage frank and recipients of
open communication, humanitarian aid. As a
all interviewees were result, it was not
assured that their possible to assess from
identities would not be their perspective the
disclosed and that benefits of civil–
quotes would not be military coordination.
attributed to any Since many reservations
particular organisation about interacting with
or individual. When military forces hinge on
analysing the perceptions of
interviews, more weight neutrality, impartiality
was given to those who and independence, and
had played an active many of the arguments
role in civil–military for interaction are
interaction, and those premised on the
who had played a
coordination role on
behalf of their
organisation.

The following research

questions guided the
interviews:

What developments
prepared the ground for
civil– military
interaction? For
example, what
doctrines, guidelines,
codes of conduct and
training preceded the
first humanitarian–
military interactions?
What coordination
mechanisms were
developed in the field or
at national/HQ level,
and how were they
implemented?
What were the
challenges to cohesion
amongst humanitarian
actors on civil–military
issues? What were the
challenges, if any, to
cohesion in the attitude
of military actors to
civil military issues?
humanitarian refers to the interaction
imperative to save lives, between the military
it would have been very and a wider range of
valuable to ask local civilian actors,
communities how they including civil society,
saw, experienced and government authorities,
perceived the outcomes rule of law, security
of civil– military sector reform, human
interaction. This rights and development
remains a gap in the actors, and can be
overall literature on the undertaken for a range
subject, and is of objectives’ (Metcalfe,
recommended as a Haysom and Gordon,
priority for future 2012: 2). The Inter-
studies. Agency

Standing Committee
(IASC) and the UN
1.2 Office for the
Terminology Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
and (OCHA) define
definitions humanitarian civil–
military coordination as:
Armed non-state actors
(ANSAs): ‘Over the last the essential dialogue
several decades, non- and interaction between
state armed groups have civilian and military
become a common actors in humanitarian
feature of civil conflicts emergencies that is
and internal wars. These necessary to protect
Armed Non-State and promote
Actors (ANSAs) go by humanitarian
many names, including principles, avoid
liberation movements, competition, minimize
rebel groups, inconsistency, and when
paramilitaries, appropriate pursue
insurgents and warlords, common goals (OCHA,
mercenaries and private 2008).
military and security
companies’ (Glaser,
2005: 1). Civil–Military
Cooperation (CIMIC):
Civil–Military ‘CIMIC is a military
Coordination term, for which there
(CMCoord): ‘CMCoord are varying
refers specifically to the interpretations, but
interaction between essentially it refers to
humanitarian the
organisations and
military actors for engagement of military
humanitarian purposes, actors with civilians for
whereas the broader military purposes’
term “civil–military (Metcalfe, Haysom and
relations” generally Gordon, 2012: 2).
The search for
common ground:
civil–military
relations in
Pakistan
2 The Pakistan military well-resourced. The Selection is highly
armed forces consist of competitive, but once
the Army (550,000), recruited members of
Navy (22,000) and Air the military and their
Force (70,000), families enjoy
2.1 Historical totalling 642,000
military personnel in
extensive support,
including medical care
context active service. at well-equipped
Paramilitary forces facilities and
number 304,000, and
Since independence in 1947,
there is a reserve force a patronage network.
Pakistan has experienced 30 years of
complement of According to Lieven
military rule (1958 to 1971, 1977
500,000. (2011), the military
to 1988 and 1999 to 2008); even
when not in government the military forms a separate ‘giant
has constantly sought to centralise kinship group’ that
and consolidate political power, and ‘sees itself as a breed
the military (notably military apart, and devotes
intelligence, the Inter-Services Pakistan has a long
great effort to
Intelligence (ISI)) exerts significant history of contributing inculcating in new
overt and covert control over the troops and police to UN recruits the feeling that
peacekeeping operations they belong to a
civilian authorities in both domestic and has consistently been
and foreign affairs. Given Pakistan’s in the top three of military family
volatile relationship with India, contributor nations. different from (and
centred on the decades-long conflict vastly superior to)
for control of Kashmir, Pakistan has Pakistani civilian
always been a ‘security state’, and society’. Regionally,
the national military has historically the north-west Punjab
been a key player in the geopolitical and KP and Punjabi
arena. However, information on and Pashtun/Pathan
Pakistan’s armed forces is very The Army is structured ethnicities respectively
limited, and interaction with Westernusing the traditional have provided the
civilian and military institutions is British two-tier majority of military
heavily controlled. The climate of hierarchy of officers recruits, particularly
secrecy within the Pakistan military and enlisted ranks, a for the Army (Lieven,
and its associated security services legacy of colonial rule. 2011). Moves are being
directly and indirectly affects civil– Officer ranks follow made to make the
military coordination British military naming military
conventions, the lowest
and presents humanitarian actors being Second a more national
with a highly complicated Lieutenant and the institution; recruitment
operational environment. highest Field Marshal. initiatives have focused
In addition, there are on Sindhi, Mohajir and
three ranks of Junior Baloch in an effort to
Commissioned Officer: increase their numbers
2.2 The role of the Naib Subedar, Subedar
and Subedar-Major.
in the forces, and new
cantonments have been
military in Non-Commissioned built in Sindh and
Officer (NCO) ranks Balochistan. What
Pakistani society range from Solider at effect this is having on
the lowest echelon to the ethnic make-up of
Pakistan’s military has multiple Battalion Havildar the forces is impossible
roles: preparing for and responding Major at the highest. to say as statistics are
to natural disasters, contributing Officers are not made available.
1 predominantly drawn
military personnel to UN missions,
under special circumstances from Pakistan’s middle
maintaining law and order and classes; indeed,
Preparing for disaster
defending Pakistan’s borders and employment as an
response has long been
conducting security operations, officer is the
part of military
counter-insurgency or counter- predominant profession
training. When called
terrorism operations. Pakistan’s of the middle and,
on to support civil
volatile relationship with India has increasingly, lower- authorities, military
ensured that the military has been middle classes. assistance has
predominantly been channelled into emergency health civil authorities in
less secure areas, with civilian provision and basic maintaining water
reconstruction of channels, in joint
actors responding in the more infrastructure. The inspections of flood
accessible locations. The military armed forces also have defences and
provides relief and rescue, logistical a disaster preparedness participation in pre-
support, engineering expertise, role, for example by monsoon coordination
coordinating with the

notably from the US, has been used to

meetings. In relation to complex promote stability and gain local and
emergencies, the Army feels that it has a national support for international counter-
legitimate interest not only in responding terrorism and stabilisation objectives (see
to terrorism but also in rebuilding after for example Gul, 2010; Wilder, 2010;
security operations. Given Pakistan’s Whittall, 2011). This has had an impact on
longstanding commitment and experience the provision of humanitarian aid, with
as one of the principal contributors of the Pakistan military controlling and in
troops and police to UN peacekeeping some cases blocking aid flows. As
operations, it is conceivable that the discussed in the sections that follow, the
security services consider themselves to response to the 2005 earthquake was seen
be the best organisation to address both as a large-scale ‘hearts and minds’
disaster and conflict. The experience and opportunity by national and international
expertise the Pakistan military brings is military forces, to improve local
recognised perceptions of military forces and their
respective
by the humanitarian community, and the
Army is considered to be a significant
player, with the ability to provide
personnel, logistics and key skills in
response to disasters. A cross-section of
respondents were either comfortable with
the military role in disaster response, or
felt that the armed forces were obliged to
act due to the high level of state funds
and government resources they received.

The Army’s counter-insurgency

operations against Taliban militants
began in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2001, and
continue today at various points along the
Afghan–Pakistan border (the Durand
Line). Pakistan’s counter-insurgency
strategy has been described as ‘engage,
destroy, and negotiate’, the inverse of the
‘clear, hold, build’ strategies of the
International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF)/NATO military forces in
Afghanistan (Zaidi, 2010). Local
populations are evacuated before
overwhelming force and heavy firepower
is used to attack militants head-on; this is
followed by the negotiation of a
ceasefire. Collateral damage, mass
internal displacement and the destruction
of infrastructure have been the result. A
lack of reconciliation and reconstruction
initiatives following these offensives has
exacerbated the conflict and generated
increasingly negative opinions of military
activities among local populations.

Western governments, especially the US,

have been supportive of Pakistan’s
counter-insurgency operations. Foreign
aid for disaster response operations, most
 2
governments. An essential objective association has been used to bolster
morale and create a ‘higher purpose’,
from the national military perspective
particularly with regard to the conflict
was to decrease local opposition to
with India: ‘to defend Pakistan is to
security operations in the mountainous
defend Islam’ (Fair, 2011).
region of South Waziristan on the
Afghan–Pakistan border. For the US, the
response was seen as a way to reduce As Haqqani (2005: 3) points out, the
vitriolic anti-American sentiment relationship between Islam and the
amongst local populations, which had military has waxed and waned over time,
been compounded by drone attacks and ‘its character has changed with the
against Taliban militants. With the twists and turns in Pakistani history’.
international drawdown from Afghanistan Although Islam’s role
scheduled for 2014, Pakistan is facing
increasing pressure to reform its security in the military traces its roots further back
strategy. In an attempt to stem insurgency (arguably to the country’s second military
and unrest during the transition, it is commander, General Agha Mohammad
likely that Pakistan will step up counter- Yahya), it came to the fore with General
insurgency operations along the border, Zia-ul-Haq’s rise to power in the 1970s.
with significant implications for the Islamic training was introduced in the
humanitarian response in this highly curriculum of the Command
troubled region.
and Staff College and religious groups
were allowed to distribute materials to
officers. Secular officers were either
2.3 The relationship forced to adopt Islam or retire (Gondal,
between the military 2011).

and Islam Islamic organisations have played a major

role in relief efforts. In the aftermath of
Islam has long played an important role the 2005 earthquake,
in the military, much as it has in the
broader government and nation. It has
served as a unify factor across ethnic, A World Bank study identified a measurable
political and other divides. The change in the public perception of donor
countries based on the humanitarian support
association of Pakistan itself with Islam
provided during the 2005 earthquake (Andrabi
has also had a rallying purpose, making and Das, 2010). However, Wilder (2010) has
the Army not only a defender of the argued that these positive perceptions were not
country but also of the Muslim faith. This sustained.
common ground: civil–military
The search for relations in Pakistan
jihadi and Islamist groups were the first of knowing the terrain and the people,
to provide assistance (Qureshi, 2006; and of having close ties with and support
Wilder, 2010). As Wilder (2010) from the Pakistan Army’ (Wilder, 2010:
observes, ‘members of jihadi groups, S417). By contrast, Pakistan’s civil
many of whom had been trained at administration was slow to respond, a
camps for Kashmiri militant groups in consequence of years of budgetary
the earthquake-affected areas of the neglect and military dominance
NWFP and PaK, had the tremendous (Bamforth, 2006).
advantage
The search for common ground: civil–military relations in Pakistan
The development of the
Humanitarian Country
Team guidelines and road access. With management’, recovery,
winter approaching it was rehabilitation and
imperative that disaster reconstruction (ibid.: 3).
response was provided Neither the FRC nor the
Pakistan has suffered a series of catastrophic natural quickly (Khan, 2006). ERRA was estab-lished
events in recent years, with earthquakes in 2002, with the sanction of the
2005, 2008, 2011 and 2013 and devastating floods in Pakistan parlia-ment, and
2007, 2010, 2011 and 2012. In addition, conflict and each was led by an Army
counter-insurgency operations have triggered mass general.
displacement, notably in the Swat Valley following Box 1: The Federal
security operations against the Taliban in 2008–2009. Relief Commission
Drawing on examples from the 2005 earthquake and the
response and 2008/09
In the aftermath of the
Earthquake earthquake, the Pakistan
IDP crisis, this section looks at how these Rehabilitation and Army, as has been the case
experiences demonstrated the need for structured Reconstruction in the majority of natural
guidance disasters, stepped in and
and prompted the subsequent development of the took control of the initial
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) guidelines. Authority relief response. It became
the backbone of the relief
effort, along with
international military
3.1 The need for The lack of an overarching logistic support to reach
structured guidance: the framework governing the
plethora of actors offering
isolated areas using
military aircraft.
2005 earthquake and the assistance led the International humanitarian
Pakistan government to agencies were faced
2008/9 displacement crisis create the Federal Relief
Commission (FRC), with
with conflicts of interest
funding assistance from
3.1.1 The earthquake response the UN Development
and dilemmas relating to
Programme (UNDP), and
humanitarian obligations,
On the morning of 8 October 2005 a devastating the Earthquake either through direct
earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale struck Rehabilitation and association with the Army
Pakistan, its epicentre located near Muzaffarabad in Reconstruction Authority or indirectly through the
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K). The earthquake (ERRA) (Cochrane, 2008). military-dominated
flattened towns and villages along its fault line, The FRC had both Earthquake Reconstruction
affecting both AJ&K and NWFP and killing over national military and and Rehabilitation
73,000 people. A series of aftershocks followed, civilian compo-nents, with Authority (ERRA). To be
causing landslides that compounded the effects of the the military side focusing awarded reconstruction
on initial search, rescue contracts it was necessary
disaster. The devastation left in the earthquake’s wake
and relief efforts, and the to engage with the ERRA,
was acute; for example, the
civilian side looking after and the national military
‘inter-department and was heavily involved in
town of Balakot in NWFP was destroyed, with only inter-agency issues’
reconstruction work. As a
15% of its 40,000 inhabitants surviving. Hospitals, (Khan, 2006: 2). The
result, local authorities
communication infrastructure and homes were ERRA became more
were weakened and their
decimated. Over 3.5 million people throughout the active in the later stages
legitimacy
region were affected, many of them located in hard- of the response, through
to-reach mountainous areas with poor infrastructure ‘consequence

was undermined (Bamforth, 2006). The majority of unavoidable, and the politics of the Pakistan military
humanitarian actors accepted that, in order to gain and its involvement in counter-insurgency and
access to vulnerable populations, interaction and counter-terrorism activities was set aside.
pragmatic cooperation with the military was
The earthquake response and subsequent coordination
process facilitated collaboration between the the wide spectrum of views on a variety of issues,
international humanitarian community and the including civil–military interaction, made it difficult
military-dominated national government. This to arrive at and enforce cohesive policies.
resulted in ‘one of the rare cases where national and
international coordination set-ups for emergency
response coincided’ (Péchayre, 2011: 5). In 2007,
3.1.2 The 2008/9 IDP crisis
alongside seven other countries, Pakistan volunteered
to pioneer the ‘One UN’ initiative. The initiative’s The Pakistan Army has carried out offensives against
objective was to streamline processes by designating the Pakistani Taliban, predominantly in FATA, since
one lead coordinating agency, one operational support 2001. Operations escalated in 2007, and between mid-
system and one budget framework (IASC, 2007). 2008 and 2009 the Army led a series of major
However, floods in 2007 hit the country when the offensives against Taliban militants in both the NWFP
main stakeholders were in the process and FATA. In 2008 these offensives triggered the
displacement of 500,000 people. In April and May
2009 the Pakistan Army attacked Taliban militants
of implementing the ‘One UN’ initative, and an
occupying the town of Mingora
underfunded and understaffed UN meant that extra
reliance was placed on the national military. This,
coupled with the development of a close working in the Swat valley, displacing a further three million
relationship with the Pakistan government during the people at very short notice. Although slow to react, a
emergency phase of the earthquake response, national and international humanitarian response was
compromised the UN’s ability to advocate for instigated at a number of points during the Army
humanitarian standards and undermined the trust and offensives. Relatives sheltered the majority of IDPs,
support of many aid agencies. Thus, while there were and many others settled in camps set up across
‘strong programmatic arguments for government NWFP. While the worst of the fighting had subsided
involvement in the clusters, to avoid duplication and by July 2009, allowing some IDPs to return home, an
3
facilitate impact, there was little discussion of the estimated one million were still displaced in 2013.
implications of the Pakistani military’s heavy
involvement in coordination mechanisms’. In turn, A number of coordination problems arose during the
this made it ‘difficult for humanitarians to address IDP crisis. Issues ranged from national military
some of the more obvious drawbacks in not adhering control of access to affected populations, determining
to the principles of humanitarian action’ (HPG, 2009: the phases of the disaster response based on military
4). 4
priorities, influencing needs assessment processes,
engineering the return of IDPs, for example by cutting
electricity and water supplies, and military
Meanwhile, many religious groups were not part of
discrimination against those considered to be
these discussions or coordination mechanisms. Wilder
supportive of militant factions (Péchayre, 2011).
points out that ‘[t]he failure actively to encourage
There have also been allegations of exclusion; one
Islamist organisations to participate in UN-led
example cited concerned access to cash grants, an
coordination meetings, and at times the active
entitlement under the government’s flood response
discouragement of their participation, was
scheme: ‘although the government pledged to give
each displaced family a cash grant of approximately
perceived [by some] as an important shortcoming of $300, many have been excluded [by the national
coordination efforts’ (Wilder, 2010: S419). Except in military], reportedly for reasons of financial, cultural
cases where there were contractual obligations and political expediency’ (HPG, 2009). Shah (2011:
stemming from funding relationships, none of 17) noted that, during the security operations

these bodies had any enforcement mechanisms, and in 2008/09, ‘the military [acquired] land for
cantonments under compulsory land acquisition laws.
The price offered to the owners [was] much lower
than the market rate, but owners have no option but to
accede. Compensation payments are inadequate to
meet loses’.

See ‘2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Pakistan’,

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487016.html.

HPG interview with senior humanitarian worker.

10 The search for common ground:
civil–military relations in Pakistan
3.2 The guideline The 2005 earthquake and the 2008–2009 IDP crises
development process demonstrated the need for clarity in civil–military
coordination, both in terms of leadership and written 2005 earthquake response showed an overwhelming
guidelines. In 2009–10, before the onset of the 2010 propensity among many humanitarian actors (national
floods, the Humanitarian Country Team led by the and international) to informally adopt pragmatic
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian approaches at the expense of the humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) developed a series of guidelines in an principles of impartiality, neutrality and
5 independence. Despite the Pakistan government’s
attempt to provide this clarity.
reluctance to allow international engagement in
stabilisation operations in Pakistan, this still
While the humanitarian community recognises the demonstrates the pervasiveness of wider international
need for some form of interaction with national and ‘stabilisation’ agendas and associated political and
international military forces and the important role military objectives. The shift towards complex
played by Pakistan’s military in disaster response, the emergencies and increasingly critical debate around
2005 earthquake and the 2008–2009 IDP crisis the civil–military balance in Pakistan has forced a
shift from pragmatic towards more principled
highlighted a significant lack of discussion around the approaches.
implications of extensive national military
involvement in relief response. The conflated and
interwoven roles of the national military – as
The guidelines evolved to provide clarity and unity
belligerent, first responder, leader in coordination and
for all actors involved in civil–military coordination,
gatekeeper in terms of access, in addition to the strong
increase awareness of civil–military cooperation
national military influence over civilian affairs – has
principles during natural disasters and complex
made it difficult for the international humanitarian
emergencies and act as a tool for the international
community to negotiate
humanitarian community to help address challenges
to principled approaches as they arose. Other
influential drivers included increasing national
military regulation of access to disaster-stricken areas
Guidelines for a number of complex operating environments and populations, growing concern from the
have been developed by the international humanitarian humanitarian community about the slow progress of
community, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Chad, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti. aid efforts, the need for the maintenance of
professional standards and the initial willingness of
the Pakistan government to engage in conversations
the tricky and complex boundaries between pragmatic
around civil–military interaction.
and principled approaches (HPG, 2009: 4). The

1
1
12 The search for common ground: civil–military relations in Pakistan
4 The impact of the guidelines humanitarian access, use of decision-making must be
military assets, distinction
preserved both at the
between military and
humanitarian interventions, operational and policy
joint civil–military interventions, levels.
mine action, training and Considerations of civil–
awareness-raising, civil–
military coordination in early
military coordination must
The guidelines were produced in 2009/10 by an recovery responses and civil– be guided by a
Islamabad-based Humanitarian Country Team military coordination in commitment to ‘do no
comprising a working group of key UN agencies disasters (Metcalfe, 2012). harm’.
(including OCHA, the UN High Commissioner for Humanitarian assistance
Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme occurs with the ownership
(WFP)) and NGOs and observed by the International of the civil government and
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The working disaster management
group was chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator organisations.
and led by OCHA. As Metcalfe and Berg (2012: 4) The use of military assets,
outline, ‘The process in Pakistan was comprehensive Relationship in Complex armed escorts, joint
both in terms of scope and participation … OCHA Emergencies (an IASC humanitarian–military
initially conducted a survey of the key actors on civil– Reference Paper, June interventions and any other
military issues and thematic groups addressing issues 2004) and Use of Military actions involving visible
highlighted in the survey results were created to review or Armed Escorts for interaction with the
6 Humanitarian Convoys military must be the option
the draft guidelines’. Each thematic group comprised (IASC Discussion Paper
of last resort, where
a UN representative, a national NGO representative and Non-Binding there are no comparable
and an international NGO representative, ‘thereby Guidelines, September civilian alternative to meet
ensuring a more comprehensive and inclusive process’. 2001).
a critical humanitarian
need.
The resulting country- Respect must be
The resulting Draft Guidelines for Civil–Military specific guidelines for maintained for the culture,
Coordination in Pakistan are informed by three broader Pakistan were approved by structures and customs of
sets of civil–military guidelines. The first is the UN the HCT on 5 March 2010. the communities where
Guidelines On The Use Of Military And Civil Defence They are built around nine humanitarian activities are
Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian key objectives: carried out (Draft
Activities in Complex Emergencies, otherwise known Guidelines, 2010: 4).
as the MCDA Guidelines. Developed by a consortium Humanitarian actors must
of international agencies in 2003, these are used be able to provide The guidelines differentiate
predominantly in complex emergencies. The second, assistance in accordance between ‘coexistence’
the Oslo Guidelines (also known as the with the basic principles of during complex
humanity, neutrality and emergencies and
Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military and Civil impartiality. ‘cooperation’ in times of
Defence Assets in Disaster Relief), was developed in Humanitarian assistance is peace, as the degree of
1994 and updated by a collaboration of 45 UN member extended with full respect interaction and the
states and 25 international organisations in for state sovereignty. ramifications for the safety
Humanitarian actors must of local populations and
2006 (and revised in 2007); they are used in peacetime retain their ability to access humanitarian agencies and
only. Finally, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee vulnerable people in all secure access will differ
(IASC) provides a selection of policy frameworks to crisis-affected areas. depending on the level of
help coordinate civil–military interaction. The 2008 At all times, a clear conflict and armed
IASC volume, Civil–Military Guidelines & Reference distinction must be violence. To assist the
for Complex Emergencies, draws together the updated maintained between humanitarian community in
MCDA guidelines in addition to Civil–Military humanitarian and military negotiating the use of
actors. national and international
The independence of military assets
These included groups on information-sharing and liaison,
humanitarian action and
13
(for example helicopters and boats) and safeguard the there is no appropriate civilian alternative.
concept of ‘last resort’, the guidelines outline a series The urgency of the task at hand demands immediate
of checks. As Bennett (2011: 12) summarises: action.
Use of the asset is clearly limited in time and scale.
Use of the asset is based solely on humanitarian Use of the asset is approved by the HCT.
criteria.
It is a last resort, when a highly vulnerable population To facilitate civil–military coordination the guidelines
cannot be assisted or reached by any other means and recommend the establishment of four forums: a Civil–
Military Coordination Steering Committee; Provincial On the government’s part, several informants (the
Civil–Military Coordination Working Groups; Field former head of the NDMA General Nadeem Ahmed;
Liaison Arrangements; and a Humanitarian Working the head of the PDMA in Punjab; and a civil–military
Group on Civil–Military Coordination. The Pakistan expert who provides consultancy
guidelines give more detail than comparable country
guidelines on the relationships between government, services to governments, the UN and INGOs based in
military and humanitarian actors, while also providing Pakistan) said that it was never the intention of the
guidance for the military in relation to information- government to endorse the guidelines. Government
sharing (Metcalfe and Berg, 2012). officials interviewed were of the opinion that the
guidelines were unlikely to be endorsed. As one senior
Expectations varied between participants on what the government official put it:
guidelines could achieve. Although not mutually
exclusive, some (many local and INGOs, and WFP and Yes, I am aware of the guidelines OCHA put together.
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) That does not affect us but it is, as I understand, to
among the UN agencies) saw them as a govern the relationship between the military and the
international actors. We go by our national laws and
way of engaging on access issues; others (including regulations and periodic circulars on dealing with the
OCHA and some of the more outspoken INGOs such military. Civil–military coordination for us therefore
as Oxfam, ActionAid and the International Rescue means a different thing to that which the
Committee (IRC)) saw them as a mechanism to
expand humanitarian space and safeguard guidelines are concerned with. The UN has used it to
humanitarian principles by defining roles and ensure that the meetings are not held in military
boundaries; and actors such as OCHA, Oxfam and the camps. The Government mechanism does not take the
IRC were keen to establish a basis to engage with guidelines on civil–military interactions as a formal
foreign militaries and governments that were document. It is unlikely that it will be endorsed by the
considered to be subsuming humanitarian aims Government of Pakistan and communicated to us in
beneath larger political and military objectives. As the form of a circular.
Bennett (2011: 12) has pointed out, while the HCT
guidelines aimed to establish a unified position
However, there was an expectation from the
to guide operational practice, the experience also international humanitarian community that they would
‘revealed a selective regard for agreed principles be agreed jointly, or at least be a formally recognised
among certain stakeholders (both within and outside of instrument with the backing of the Pakistan
the humanitarian community), and has raised questions government. Metcalfe and Berg (2012: 4) note that the
about humanitarian agencies’ actual understanding of process of developing the guidelines ‘faced serious
basic civil–military principles’. challenges. Gaining agreement on the need for such
guidance and then building consensus on its content
was problematic, requiring difficult and protracted
negotiations’. A more detailed and clearer definition of
the need for the guidelines may have helped in
developing consensus. While using the global template
ensured that the guidelines were consistent with the
basic principles of civil–military interaction, a well-

defined scope of work for their development could

have encouraged more open engagement with a
broader group of actors. As it was, developing
consensus

was hindered by the limited engagement of national

government bodies and the military in the process,
although a draft was shared with both the NDMA and
the military to inform them of developments.

Although the topics covered by the working groups

were comprehensive, participation was limited to
14 The search for common ground:
civil–military relations in Pakistan
a core group of INGOs. Despite the process being open, military on their security, NOC [No Objection
it was apparent that some INGOs did not participate. In 7 8
Certificate] and access’. However, those
addition, a lack of involvement of local organisations
interviewees who had been involved, either as part of
(NGOs) as well as some of the larger national
a working group or the HCT, indicated that awareness
organisations was a significant drawback. These actors
was raised to the importance of humanitarian
felt that they were outside of the guideline development
principles among international humanitarian actors.
process: ‘They were not involved and they did not care.
They think it is for regulating INGOs’ interaction with
It is unclear whether a more inclusive approach, with government, military and international and local
appropriate representation from the national NGOs during the developmental stage, would have
increased overall buy-in.

The fact that neither the government nor the military

endorsed the HCT guidelines affected their
contribution to overall interaction in the response to
the devastating floods in 2010. Flooding began in
Balochistan in late July, followed in August by
flooding in KPK, parts of FATA, Punjab and then
finally Sindh. By September Manchar Lake in Sindh
had overflowed and floodwater was being pushed
further into the province. In total, an area equivalent
to one-fifth of the country was under water. The
floods displaced over 20m people, one-tenth of
Pakistan’s population. Key infrastructure was either
Box 2: NDMA policies and
frameworks
four recommenda- compromised at more specific
tions in relation to some stages of NDMA must guidelines for
‘Civil–Military the response. enhance its role in Pakistan to bring
Cooperation and coordinating the clarity, define the
The NDMA has
Complementarity’ A guide to roles flow of information parameters of
produced a range of
(2011: 95): and between civil and interaction, and
documents to outline
policies, frameworks, responsibilities, military responders. ensure
guidelines and NDMA, in including SOPs PDMAs [Provincial humanitarian
conjunction with [standard Disaster principles are
relevant partners operating Management respected in
‘lessons learned’ in
(such as UN procedures], Authorities] and disaster response’
Pakistan’s response
to disaster. The most OCHA, should be DDMAs [District (NDMA, 2011: 95).
influential are the international Civil– prepared by Disaster Given the NDMA’s
National Disaster Military Centres of NDMA as a ‘road- Management acknowledgement
Response Plan Excellence and map’ to inform all Authorities] should of the need for
(NDRP) (March others), should stakeholders of play a similar role more
2010), Pakistan regularly conduct the expectations at provincial and
Flood 2010 – civil–military/multi- district level to specific guidelines
Learning from agency training ensure prompt for Pakistan and its
Experience courses for military, and operational resolution of any recognition of
(September 2011), humanitarian, civil–military humanitarian
Disaster Risk parameters
police, and relevantoperating in relief communication principles, an
Management Needs Government issues that arise in NDMA-led
Report efforts.
agencies. This the field. (NDMA, guideline
should also include 2011: 97). development
(2012) and the training on Discussion on process could
Disaster Risk SPHERE civil–military provide a more
Reduction (DRR) standards for issues should be Issues identified inclu-sive set of
a permanent ‘related to
policy (forthcoming). humanitarian guidelines with
adherence to inter-
The NDMA’s response, which agenda item of a national civil– greater buy-in
Pakistan Flood some stakeholders Stakeholder military guidelines, across the breadth
2010 document lists felt were Strategic Leaders of actors involved
Group. and the need for
All relief, a ‘No Objection certificate the culmination coordination a senior
humanitarian Certificate’ represents of a series of with the INGO staff
and early (NOC), issued government government. member.
recovery by the checks to
programmes or government of ensure
8 HPG
projects require Pakistan. The adequate project
interview with
15
obliterated or severely damaged, with bridges and Civil–Military Coordination were the only
roads washed away. Thousands of people became coordination mechanisms formerly established in the
marooned as the floodwaters rose. Over 1,900 lives flood response. Other civil–military coordination
were lost, 1.7m homes were damaged or destroyed, forums envisaged
200,000 livestock were killed and vast quantities of
agricultural produce perished. in the guidelines operated on an ad hoc basis without
any regularity. Instead, government forums were used.
Despite the aim of establishing new coordination The lack of engagement from national institutions,
mechanisms, the Civil–Military Coordination Steering local organisations and some INGOs has influenced the
Committee and the Humanitarian Working Group on degree to which the guidelines were used, in terms of
‘training, in operational decision-making, advocacy – government restrictions mean that tactical
[and] policy development’ (Metcalfe and Berg, 2012: implementation is primarily undertaken by local
5). While some agencies were conversant with the organisations. Three years after the guidelines were
global guidelines governing these situations, many developed, many local organisations were either
others unaware of their key features and principles, or
believed that they were not relevant to them. This is
were not. The guidelines were also criticised for being not surprising given local organisations’ very limited
inaccessible in terms of length and conceptual exposure to the debate and their absence from the
language (many interviewees said that they were not guideline development process: ‘For them this exercise
aware if the guidelines had been translated into local has remained irrelevant, they have remained outside
languages), suggesting the need to develop concise and 9
the process of guideline development and roll out’. As
accessible operational annexes. The annexes that have Shah (2011: 18) has highlighted, ‘International
been produced, for example in relation to ‘last resort’, organisations look at things in black and white in light
have been useful. of humanitarian principles’, highlighting that what is
needed is understanding that ‘matters at the local level
Frequent turnover of military and humanitarian staff are most often played out in shades of grey’.
and insufficient staff training on the guidelines have
reinforced a lack of general awareness. One key
challenge is the unrealistic expectations from
Although the great majority of local organisations
humanitarian actors with respect to what civil–
interact with military forces, levels of engagement
military coordination or the guidelines could do. For
depend on the politics of each NGO. Socio-cultural and
example, it was not possible or within their mandate
political realties mean that local organisations have
for coordination bodies to ensure that the military
some form of interaction with the military, most of
provided relevant information about its assistance.
which is informal, for survival, safety, access and
Whether the guidelines will be dropped or referred to
mobility, and to get work done. During interviews
again remains to be seen, though some interviewees
some international staff observed that it was at times
for this study were optimistic about the use of the
difficult to engage with local NGOs as they were seen
guidelines in the future and an OCHA review of the
to be too close to the military. Indeed, at times the
guidelines in 2012–2013 found them to be relevant and
military would insist on using particular local NGOs as
recommended their continued use.
implementing partners. Local organisations are acutely
aware of the risks involved in engaging with military
Many local organisations partner with international forces, but have little influence over
NGOs or the UN to implement projects. While
international organisations are heavily involved
Pakistan’s civil administration and military and receive
less considerate treatment than their international
at the operational level – through clusters and working counterparts. For local organisations, ‘Advocating and
groups with the scope to influence policy lobbying for the rights of people … is a dangerous
undertaking, and many who have tried to do so have
been silenced or killed. This makes it very difficult for
civil society organisations, whose main objective is

to ensure that ordinary people’s voices are heard, to

highlight issues involving the army’ (Shah, 2011: 18).
International organisations need to develop greater
understanding of the ways in which their local NGO
implementing partners work, in order to assist in
influencing national military forces.

The authority to allow access principally rests with the

host country government and is enforced by the
military. The Army’s 11th Corps based in Peshawar has
been in charge of providing ‘No Objection Certificates’

9 ODI interview with a senior humanitarian worker.

16 The search for common ground:
civil–military relations in Pakistan
(NOCs), which are required for travel (providing a are trustworthy, transparent and open. Respondents
form of security clearance) and all humanitarian noted that it is easier to convince the military of an
projects. NOCs are valid for three months, but can NGO/INGO’s benefit when activities were limited to
humanitarian assistance rather than civilian protection.
be extended for six and then nine months. Access is The civilian authorities seem to find it difficult to make
tightly controlled and restricted, and NGOs, especially and enforce a consistent policy regarding visas and
INGOs, must demonstrate to the authorities that they residency permits for international NGO personnel.
The process is haphazard, and left largely to the access. Since the 2010 floods, access has gradually
discretion of consular officials abroad. Similarly, there improved (although not for expatriate workers) in
is no discernible pattern in the renewal of Memoranda many parts of the country, except in more insecure
of Understanding (MoUs) for NGOs active in Pakistan, areas. Again, it was not clear how much of this was
attributable to the HCT guidelines, and how much was
or to the granting of NOCs to their staff in certain a direct result of the situation improving on the ground.
problem areas (OCHA, 2013). If current obstacles to humanitarian action are
deliberate, as opposed to mostly accidental, political
Following the 2008–09 IDP crisis, concerns lobbying through diplomatic pressure on Islamabad
surrounding accessibility increased amongst INGOs. may generate the required policy changes. However,
One informant referred to the government holding up the levers for exerting this kind of influence are at
the issuing of NOCs as a way of restricting present limited, and in any case civilian leadership of
humanitarian responses in Pakistan is largely nominal.
For contacts with external actors, the military as first
responder defers to civilian authorities, which tend

to act as a buffer against outside interference in the

humanitarian and stabilisation spheres. Alternatively,
humanitarians can opt to approach the problem

at the working level, and seek to address issues through

a more operational dialogue geared towards
streamlining current regulations and processes. This
more pragmatic approach tends to be favoured as it is
politically less contentious. The question remains as to
how well this is working.

1
7
18 The search for common ground: civil–military relations in Pakistan
5 Conclusion
government these issues in
and the need KPK and
for local FATA for
people to see years, clearly
both elaborating
government them in the
While global and military guidelines
and country- responses as appeared to
specific quick and carry more
guidelines on effective. weight with
civil–military the military.
interaction The majority
have a strong of aid workers
preference for and civilian The presence
a administrators of guidelines is
predominantl interviewed not a solution,
y civilian for this study but a means to
character to indicated that a solution. It is
assistance, relations with imperative that
the ubiquitousthe Pakistan the guidelines
role of the military had are revisited
military in improved over during crises,
Pakistan the last two and that
means that years. This
working with improvement
the functional
was attributed channels of
government to increasing
indirectly communicatio
familiarity, n and a
involves humanitarian
working with workers working
the military asaccepting the relationship
a key political rules of exist between
player with engagement, the critical
large actors (namely
budgetary OCHA,
greater clarity government
control and in approval
influence interlocutors
processes and the
over the civil (such as
administratio NOCs) and military).
n, and a coordination
constitutional mechanisms For instance, it
obligation to gradually was mentioned
respond to that military
becoming officials ‘who
both complex streamlined.
emergencies Despite were
and natural numerous negotiating
disasters. The criticisms, operational
government interviewees arrangements
and military felt that the and taking
remain decisions
draft civil– around foreign
military military
in control of guidelines had
access and established assistance did
the not have civil–
humanitarian military
distribution of principles as a
aid to guidelines as
cornerstone of one of their
vulnerable discussions
people in concerns at
with the that time. It
crisis-affected military.
areas. This is Although became an
in part due to agencies had issue only after
the fragility been raising the go ahead
of the civilian was given.
There wasn’t guideline
the required development into
working could result in consideration
relationship broader buy- the expected
either, which in. The impact on the
had to do guidelines affected
with should form community
part of an and the
overarching different
civil–military conditions in
engagement different areas
strategy that of the country.
outlines the Regular and
the leadership objectives the structured
and personnel humanitarian meetings and
at these community forums at
1 hopes to strategic,
institutions’.
0 achieve operational
This lack of through civil– and tactical
proactive military levels, which
communicatiointeraction. bring together
n in relation the range of
to principles actors involved
and criteria Based on their in civil–
was also military
experiences,
noted by most coordination
OCHA, and it international issues, are
was agencies much needed.
emphasised consider If possible, this
that early interaction should form
communicatiowith the part of the
n would have military in guidelines.
helped reduce Pakistan a
the necessity. Interviews for
misunderstan Guidelines this study also
dings lose their suggested
salience as tactical
and they pass measures that
disagreement down the chain were useful in
s that arose of practitioners improving
during the to local civil–military
2010 floods operational coordination.
(Bennett, actors These included
2011). primarily requests for a
concerned committed
The timing of with getting regional
further the job done. military liaison
guideline They must be officer who
development anchored in a was accessible
is crucial. The strategy that (by phone and
current draft local in person) and
was organisations the
developed at can relate to, development
a time when and must be of courses
relations widely based on
between the disseminated. humanitarian
military, the The principles. The
government humanitarian mandate, scope
and the community
humanitarian must develop a
community more proactive
were at a very and positive
low ebb. With set of
10 HPG
improving objectives for interview with
relations it is civil–military senior
possible that engagement humanitarian
further which takes worker.
 19
of work and explicit the essential
principled basis of prerequisites for
interaction should be financial support to
publicised at local programmes. By and
level among all those large, this is what
engaging in DFID and other
humanitarian work, European donors are
enabling local NGOs attempting to do. The
and agencies to UNDP’s early
channel concerns on a recovery programme
non-attributable basis for KP/FATA stalled
to civil–military and was finally
coordination fora. subsumed under the
However, while there UN’s larger
is a need for local
NGO involvement, it
is unclear how best to
establish relations at
the local level.

Within the constraints

of their foreign policy
aims, the question
remains whether the
key international
players are really
doing all they can to
advance – or at least
not to hold back – the
application of
humanitarian
principles in Pakistan.
A robust, concerted
stance

on this is unlikely
from external players
– regional
developments and
related security goals
leave little scope for
this at the moment.
Nonetheless, within
the limits in place, and
under the broad label
of good humanitarian
donorship, a fair
amount of latitude
does exist for bilateral
actors to help firm up
the humanitarian
community’s
compliance with its
own principles. This
involves funding
projects that
measurably contribute
to operationalising

humanitarian
standards, such as the
IDP Vulnerability
Assessment and
Profiling (IVAP)
project, and making
Humanitarian
Operational Plan for largely
that region largely due indistinguishable from
to concerns among the government’s
some donors over the broader stabilisation
risk that it might abet agenda. In the more
forced IDP returns. straightforward
More recently, at the context of natural
instigation of ECHO disasters, its
in Islamabad, a independence in
number of donors assessing needs
called on the HCT to remains minimal. The
follow its own UN’s lack of
guidelines in the assertiveness towards
course of its response the Pakistani
to population government is a
displacement from defining trait of its
Tirah Valley. humanitarian
operations in Pakistan.
Comparably, another
The UN’s lack of trait of the local
leadership in context is a near-
humanitarian seamless continuum
advocacy in Pakistan between counter-
also requires further insurgency,
attention. Pakistan is a stabilisation and
priority context for the substantive recovery
roll-out of the warranting legitimate
Transformative UN support. It takes
Agenda, which should dedicated resources
in principle enable and considerable
better overall expertise to work with
compliance with a host government
humanitarian while maintaining
principles at the independence.
operational level. However, that policy-
However, the UN’s level expertise and the
humanitarian dedication to instil it
operations in in operational
KP/FATA continue to decisions seem to be
be lacking in Pakistan.

20 The search
for common
ground: civil–
military relations
in Pakistan
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2
1
HPG
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Policy Group

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Cover photo: Pakistan Army
soldiers unload supplies from a
truck in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as
part of the response to the 2010
floods.

© US Army photo by Pfc Joshua

Kruger