VOL.

506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 685

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

*
G.R. No. 169891. November 2, 2006.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, vs.

ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA,
respondents.

Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Words and

Phrases; Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances—it is a relative or comparative, not an absolute,
term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties
and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require.— Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do. In Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674
(1969), this Court held that negligence is want of the care
required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. In determining whether or not
there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation,
jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in
doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The
law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman
law.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites to Sustain a Claim Based on
Quasi-Delict.—In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order
to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he
must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and damage.
 Same; Same; Same; Railways; Every corporation constructing
or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points
where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and
safe cross-

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

686

686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

ings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such

road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign
with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the
proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of
looking out for trains.—It may broadly be stated that railroad
companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad
crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and
in the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation
constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at
all points where such railway crosses any public road, good,
sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a
sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of
vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed
thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn
persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. This Court has
previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its
failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman,
or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and
disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or
ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said
device or equipment be installed.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
—As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory
negligence, we agree with petitioner. Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
to which he is required to conform for his own protection. To hold
a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health
and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal
sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.

687

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 687

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; The

doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that
of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with
the loss—the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude
him from recovering damages caused by the supervening
negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent
the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.—As to
whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we
rule in the negative. The doctrine of last clear chance states that
where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible
to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from
recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of
defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence. The proximate cause of the
injury having been established to be the negligence of petitioner,
we hold that the above doctrine finds no application in the instant
case.
Same; Same; Damages; A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but
must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered, and on
evidence of the actual amount thereof.—Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an
injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural
justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable,
they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A
court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to
the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon
competent proof that they have suffered, and on evidence of the
actual amount thereof. Respondents, however, failed to present
evidence for such damages; hence, the award of actual damages
cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty
undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the
latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This
is in lieu of actual damages as it would be unfair for the victim’s

688

688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason
alone that they cannot produce receipts.
Same; Same; Same; The relatives of the victim who incurred
physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not proscribed from
recovering moral damages in meritorious cases.—The relatives of
the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not
proscribed from recovering moral damages in meritorious cases.
We, therefore, sustain the award of moral damages in favor of the
heirs of Rhonda Brunty. Moral damages are not punitive in
nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person.
Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted. In the instant case, the
moral suffering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently
established by Ethel Brunty in her deposition.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Ramos, Estrada, Reyes, Brawner, Remoquillo,
Tumanda & Rafanan for petitioner.
          Bausa, Ampil, Suarez, Paredes & Bausa for
respondents.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision
 1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision
of the Court of2 Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47567 and
its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof. The assailed decision affirmed with partial
modification the

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with Associate

Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring;
Rollo, pp. 148-157.
2 Rollo, p. 171.

689

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 689

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

3
ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
20, directing petitioner Philippine National Railways
(PNR) to indemnify respondents Ethel Brunty and Juan
Manuel M. Garcia for the death of Rhonda Brunty, and to
pay actual and moral damages, attorney’s fees and cost of
suit.
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty
and an American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit
sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she,
together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia,
traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan
with plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita.
It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then,
PNR Train No. T71, driven by4 Alfonso Reyes, was on its
way to Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union
station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita
were already approaching the railroad crossing at
Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at
approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of
the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to
collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly
killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the 5
two other passengers suffered
6
serious physical injuries. A
certain James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the
Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac, where she was
pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia,
who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via
ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred to the
Manila Doctor’s Hospital, and7
later to the Makati Medical
Center for further treatment.

_______________

3 Penned by Judge Doroteo N. Cañeba; Rollo, pp. 69-73.

4 Rollo, p. 149.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.

690

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

8
On July 28, 1981, Ethel Brunty sent a deman d letter to
the PNR demanding payment of actual, compensatory, and
moral damages, as a result of her daughter’s death. When
PNR did 9not respond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a
complaint for damages against the PNR before the RTC of
Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 20 and was
docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18645. They alleged that the
death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the
physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and
proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of
PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the
railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality of
Moncada, Tarlac. They pointed out that there was no
flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were
about to cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or 10
switchman was only equipped with a hand flashlight.
Plaintiffs likewise averred that PNR failed to supervise its
employees in the performance of their respective tasks and
duties,
11
more particularly the pilot and operator of the
train. They prayed for the payment of the following
damages:

1.) P200,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages

to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;
2.) P2,800,000.00 for compensatory damages to
plaintiff Ethel Brunty representing lost or
unearned income of Rhonda Brunty;
3.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as
may be warranted by the evidence adduced, to
plaintiff Ethel Brunty;
 4.) At least P64,057.61 as actual damages representing
medical expenses to plaintiff Juan Manuel M.
Garcia and at least P1,000,000.00 as unearned or
lost income of said plaintiff;
5.) At least P72,760.00 as actual damages representing
cost of the Mercedes Benz car to plaintiff Juan
Manuel M. Garcia;

_______________

8 Records, pp. 140-141.

9 Id., at pp. 1-6.
10 Id., at p. 2.
11 Id.

691

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 691

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

6.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as

may be warranted by the evidence adduced, to
plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia; and
7.) Attorney’s fees equivalent to at 12
least 15% of the
total award to plaintiffs herein.
13
In its Answer, PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family not only 14in the selection but also
in the supervision of its employees. By way of special and
affirmative defense, it stressed that it had the right of way
on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no
legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such
crossing. It insisted that there were adequate, visible, and
clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides of the
road before the railroad crossing. It countered that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was
Mercelita’s negligence, and that he had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the
warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncoming train15 and
the flashlight signals to stop given by the guard. As
counterclaim, it prayed that it be awarded 16actual and
compensatory damages, and litigation expenses. 17
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint dated July 28,
1986 to include, as party plaintiff, Chemical Industries of
the Philippines, Inc. (Chemphil), Garcia’s employer, who
claimed to have paid for the latter’s medical and
hospitalization expenses, the services rendered by the
funeral parlor of the deceased, and the expenses in
transferring
18
the remains of Rhonda Brunty to the United
States.

_______________

12 Id., at pp. 5-6.

13 Id., at pp. 9-12.
14 Id., at pp. 9-10.
15 Id., at pp. 10-11.
16 Id., at p. 12.
17 Id., at pp. 90-95.
18 Id., at p. 94.

692

692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

19
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision on
May 21, 1990 in favor of plaintiffs. The fallo reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia and against
the defendant Philippine National Railways directing the latter to
pay the former the sum of:

1. Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) Philippine Currency,

for the death of Rhonda Brunty formerly a resident of
1595 Ashland Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois, U.S.A.;
2. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) Philippine Currency for
moral and actual damages due the heirs of Rhonda
Brunty;
3. Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos
(P72,760.00) Philippine Currency for damages sustained
by the Mercedes Benz;
4. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency as
and for attorney's fees, and;
5. Costs of suit.
20
SO ORDERED.”

Aggrieved, the PNR appealed the case to the CA, raising

the following errors:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING
DEFENDANTAPPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
RHONDA BRUNTY AND THE CONSEQUENT AWARD OF
DAMAGES DUE THE HEIRS OF RHONDA BRUNTY.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING

DEFENDANTAPPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES
SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S MERCEDES BENZ
IN THE AMOUNT

_______________

19 Supra note 3.
20 Rollo, pp. 72-73.

693

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 693

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

OF SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND

SIXTY PESOS (P72,760.00).

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING

21
ATTORNEY’S
FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES.

In its Brief, PNR insisted that the sole and proximate

cause of the accident was22 the negligence and recklessness
of Garcia and Mercelita. It insisted that it had23 provided
adequate warning signals at the railroad crossing and had
exercised due
24
care in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The RTC erred in awarding damages to
Rhonda Brunty as she cannot be allowed to receive what
she is not in a position to give, having been a non-resident
25
alien who did not own a property in the Philippines. It
likewise questioned the award of damages on 26the Mercedes
Benz as well as the grant of attorney’s fees. At the27 very
least, Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence.
For their part, appellees countered that appellant was
grossly and recklessly negligent in not properly providing
the necessary equipment
28
at the railroad crossing in Rizal,
Moncada, Tarlac; appellant was negligent in not
exercising due diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of 29
its employees, particularly the train operator
Alfonso Reyes; the car was driven in a careful and diligent
manner, and at a moderate speed, with due regard to all
traffic rules and regu-

_______________

21 CA Rollo, pp. 29-30.

22 Id., at pp. 44-55.
23 Id., at pp. 56-62.
24 Id., at pp. 62-73.
25 Id., at pp. 73-75.
26 Id., at pp. 75-77.
27 Id., at pp. 77-79.
28 Id., at pp. 98-100.
29 Id., at pp. 100-102.

694

694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

30
lations at that particular 31time; the doctrine of “last clear
chance” is not applicable; Ethel Brunty is a32 non-resident
alien who can rightfully file the instant case;
33
and they are
entitled to recover damages from appellant.34
The CA rendered the assailed Decision on August 15,
2005. The dispositive portion reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is

hereby AFFIRMED with PARTIAL MODIFICATIONS,
increasing the death indemnity award from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00, and deleting the award for damages sustained by the
Mercedes Benz. 35
SO ORDERED.”

The appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC as to

the negligence of the PNR. Considering the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, it ruled that the
alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the
railroad crossing were not merely inadequate—they did not36
satisfy the well-settled safety standards in transportation.
However, the CA did not agree with the RTC’s findings on
the contributory negligence of Mercelita, the driver of the
Mercedes Benz. It held that Mercelita could not have
foreseen the harm that would befall him and the two other
passengers under the prevailing circumstances, thus, 37
could
not be considered guilty of contributory negligence.
The PNR, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari on the following grounds:
_______________

30 Id., at pp. 103-104.

31 Id., at pp. 104-105.
32 Id., at pp. 105-106.
33 Id., at p. 106.
34 Rollo, pp. 148-156.
35 Id., at p. 156.
36 Id., at p. 152.
37 Id., at p. 154.

695

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 695

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MANIFESTLY

OVERLOOKING CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT
DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT
CONCLUSION SUCH AS: THE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER
OVERTOOK ANOTHER VEHICLE BY ACCELERATING AT 70
KILOMETERS PER HOUR WITHIN JUST 50 YARDS AWAY
FROM THE RAILROAD TRACKS.

II.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT
REGARDING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE
RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE

DOCTRINE
38
OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN THE INSTANT
CASE.

Petitioner insists that the proximate cause of the mishap

was Mercelita’s disregard of traffic rules and regulations.
Had the court considered the fact that Mercelita had
overtaken another vehicle a few yards before the railroad 39
track, it would have reached a different conclusion.
Moreover, petitioner asserts, considering that the decisions
of the RTC and the CA vary as to whether or not Mercelita
was guilty of contributory negligence, the findings of the
RTC should prevail. Thus, Mercelita’s contributory
40
negligence should not have been ignored. Lastly,
 40
negligence should not have been ignored. Lastly,
petitioner avers that since there is freedom of control and
greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is
obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear
chance to prevent
41
or avoid an unwanted accident from
taking place.

_______________

38 Id., at pp. 13-14.

39 Id., at pp. 14-16.
40 Id., at pp. 17-18.
41 Id., at p. 20.

696

696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

42
In their Comment on the petition, respondents reiterate
the findings of the RTC and the CA that the breach by
petitioner of its legal duty to provide adequate and
necessary public safety device and equipment within the
area or scene43
of the accident was the proximate cause of
the mishap. While it is true that as a general rule, the
trial court is in the best position to evaluate and observe
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses presented
during the trial, the CA, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, has the vested right to modify, reject,
44
or set
aside the trial court’s evaluation and findings. As to the
application of the doctrine of last clear chance, respondents
claim that said45issue is being raised for the first time in
this petition. Lastly, respondents cite foreign
jurisprudence stating that if the violation is one which
gives rise to liability per se for any resulting injury, the
defenses ordinarily available in actions for diligence are
barred and the contributory
46
negligence of the person
injured is no defense.
The Court is thus tasked to answer the following factual
questions: (1) As between petitioner and Mercelita, whose
negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision? (2) Is
Mercelita (the driver of the Mercedes Benz) guilty of
contributory negligence? Finally, the application in this
case of the doctrine of last clear chance is likewise in
question.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not

_______________

42 Id., at pp. 181-188.

43 Id., at p. 182.
44 Id., at p. 184.
45 Id., at p. 185.
46 Id., at p. 186.

697

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 697

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

47 48
do. In Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, this Court
held that negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance
49
which the circumstances reasonably require. In
determining whether or not there is negligence on 50
the part
of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid
down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged
negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The
law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of
the Roman law.
The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent
was thoroughly discussed by both the RTC and the CA. In
petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be put into issue, and
questions of fact as a general rule, cannot be entertained.
The finding of negligence by the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon
as it would entail going into factual
51
matters on which the
finding of negligence was based. The established rule is
that factual findings of

_______________

47 McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102, July 16,

1992, 211 SCRA 517, 539, citing Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
167 SCRA 363 (1988).
48 137 Phil. 101, 108; 27 SCRA 674, 681 (1969).
 49 Cited in McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at p. 539.
50 Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809, 813 (1918), cited in McKee v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at p. 543.
51 Estacion v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA
222, 231; Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February
23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 290; Pestaño v. Sumayang, G.R. No. 139875,
December 4, 2000, 346 SCRA 870, 878.

698

698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

the CA affirming those 52

of the trial court are conclusive and
binding on this Court.
The records of the instant case show that both the RTC
and the CA carefully examined the factual circumstances
surrounding the case, and we find no cogent reason to
disturb the same. It is, however, worthy to emphasize that
petitioner was found negligent because of its failure to
provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of
motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such, it is liable
for damages for violating the provisions of Article 2176 of
the New Civil Code, viz.:

Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to

sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some
person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3)
connection
53
of cause and effect between such negligence and
damage. Applying the foregoing requisites, the CA
correctly made the following conclusions:

“It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents

herein) sustained damage or injury as a result of the collision.
That there was negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond
cavil. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the
fatal accident, the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR
at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy
wellsettled safety standards in transportation. x x x
_______________

52 Pestaño v. Sumayang, supra.

53 CA Decision dated August 15, 2005, Rollo, p. 152, citing FGU
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 219, 224; 287 SCRA
718, 720-721 (1998).

699

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 699

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

xxxx
x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad
crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself
would yield the following: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety
railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals;
and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if
there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR
(petitioner), it would still be impossible to know or see that there
is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an
approaching train from the Moncada side of the 54
road since one’s
view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. x x x”

Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the

Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there
is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more
so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on
the part of 55the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment
in the area.
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to
the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care
to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad
crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation
56
of
trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover,
every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall
make and construct at all points where such railway
crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings
and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such
road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a
sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give
notice of the proximity of the railway,57 and warn persons of
the necessity of looking out for trains.
This Court has previously determined the liability of the
PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal
light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is
evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the
pub-
_______________

54 Rollo, pp. 152-153.

55 Id., at p. 154.
56 37 Am. Jur. PO F.2d 439.
57 Id.

700

700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

lic, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because

public safety
58
demands that said device or equipment be
installed.
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of
the CA as well as its conclusion on petitioner’s negligence.
As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of
contributory negligence, we agree with petitioner.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to59 which he is
required to conform for his own protection. To hold a
person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his
injuries in disregard of warning60 or signs of an impending
danger to health and body. To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link,
although not proximate, between the negligence of the
party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately61 to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.
The court below found that there was a slight curve
before approaching the tracks; the place was not properly
illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and
Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was also
established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes
Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a
vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track.
Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did.
However, while his

_______________

58 Philippine National Railway v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.

No. 70547, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 401, 410, citing Lilius v. Manila
Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934).
 59 Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 374, 388; 253 SCRA 303,
318 (1996).
60 Estacion v. Bernardo, supra note 51, at p. 235; Añonuevo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 130003, October 20, 2004, 441 SCRA 24, 44.
61 Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, supra.

701

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 701

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do 62not

negate petitioner’s liability. Pursuant to Article 2179 of
the New Civil Code, the only effect such contributory
negligence could have is to mitigate liability, which,
however, is not applicable in this case, as will be discussed
later.
As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable, we rule in the negative. The doctrine of last
clear chance states that where both parties are negligent
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent
negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from
recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence
of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent 63
the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. The
proximate cause of the injury having been established to be
the negligence of petitioner, we hold that the above
doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
We note that the damages awarded by the appellate
court consist of (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Rhonda Brunty; (2) P1,000,000.00 as actual and moral
damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty; and (3)
P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees. No damages,
however, were awarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia,
yet, the latter never interposed an appeal before the CA nor
even before this Court. The record is, likewise, bereft of any
allegation and proof as to the rela-

_______________

62 Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
63 Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 138569, September 11, 2003, 410 SCRA 562, 580.

702

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

tionship between Mercelita (the driver) and Rhonda

Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of contributory
negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has
the effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply.
As to the amount of damages awarded, a modification of
the same is in order, specifically on the award of actual and
moral damages in the aggregate amount of P1,000,000.00.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he
suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed
at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must
be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A
court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork
as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend
upon competent proof that they have suffered, 64
and on
evidence of the actual amount thereof. Respondents,
however, failed to present evidence for such damages;
hence, the award of actual damages cannot be sustained.
However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably
incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we
deem it proper to award temperate damages in the amount 65
of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This
is in lieu of actual damages as it would be unfair for the
victim’s heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their66 kin,
for the reason alone that they cannot produce receipts.
The relatives of the victim who incurred physical
injuries in a quasi-delict are not proscribed67
from recovering
moral damages in meritorious cases. We, therefore,
sustain the

_______________

64 Public Estates Authority v. Chu, G.R. No. 145291, September 21,

2005, 470 SCRA 495, 505; ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 361 Phil. 499, 529-530; 301 SCRA 572, 602 (1999).
65 People v. Werba, G.R. No. 144599, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 482, 499;
People v. Villanueva, 456 Phil. 14, 29; 408 SCRA 571, 581582 (2003).
66 People v. Villanueva, supra, at p. 29; pp. 581-582.
 67 Macalinao v. Ong, G.R. No. 146635, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA
740, 759.

703

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 703

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

award of moral damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda

Brunty.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a
person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages must nevertheless be somehow
proportional
68
to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted. In the instant case, the moral suffering of the
heirs of Rhonda Brunty was 69sufficiently established by
Ethel Brunty in her deposition, viz.:

Q: What have you felt as a result of the death of Rhonda?

A: I felt earnest anguish and mixed feelings of anger and
extreme sorrow because she died so far away and alone,
and because her death could so easily be prevented if
there had been adequate and appropriate warning
signals at the railroad crossing and it is just an
unbearable and irreparable loss. In so many ways, she
was my life. It seemed to me that losing her was just
like losing my own life, or worst, and even now, there is
no end to our bereavement. I am still on constant
medication to be able to sleep and to be able to perform
my duties effectively in
70
my job but it does not take
away the pain of loss.
71
In People v. Teehankee, Jr., and in72Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we awarded moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 to the heirs of the
deceased.

_______________

68 Macalinao v. Ong, supra; Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Andres

Malecdan, 442 Phil. 784; 394 SCRA 520 (2002); Equitable Leasing
Corporation v. Suyom, 437 Phil. 244, 257-258; 388 SCRA 445, 456 (2002);
Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 18, 36;
298 SCRA 495, 508 (1998).
 69 Records, pp. 78-82.
70 Id., at p. 80.
71 319 Phil. 128, 215; 249 SCRA 54, 125 (1995).
72 Supra.

704

704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty

73
In Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Malecdan, the award of
P100,000.00 as moral damages was held in keeping 74with
the purpose of the law, while in Macalinao v. Ong, the
amount of P50,000.00 was held sufficient.
Considering the circumstances attendant in this case,
we find that an award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to
the heirs of Rhonda Brunty is proper. In view of recent
jurisprudence, indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of
Rhonda Brunty and attorney’s fees amounting to
P50,000.00 is likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated August 15, 2005 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of actual damages is
deleted, and in lieu thereof, temperate damages of
P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. The
award of moral damages is reduced to P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

          Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago,

Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with modifications.

Notes.—The general rule is that if the master is injured

by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the
latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superior’s action against the third person,
assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was
the proximate cause of the injury of which the complaint is
made. (Philippine Commercial International Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 446 [2001])

_______________

73 Supra.
74 Supra.

705
 VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 705
Laguio, Jr. vs. Amante-Casicas

The rationale behind temperate damages is precisely that

from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be offered; When the court is convinced that there
has been such loss, the judge is empowered to calculate
moderate damages, rather than let the complainant suffer
without redress from the defendant’s wrongful act.
(Government Service Insurance System vs. Labung-Deang,
365 SCRA 341 [2001])

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