Far East Bank vs. Querimit

8/8/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 373
VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 665

Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Querimit
*
G.R. No. 148582. January 16, 2002.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

ESTRELLA O. QUERIMIT, respondent.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Appeals; Court is not a trier of facts and

generally does not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the
Court of Appeals.—The finding of the trial court on this point, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, is that petitioner did not pay either respondent
Estrella or her husband the amounts evidenced by the subject certificates of
deposit. This Court is not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew
the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals. The finding of
respondent court which shows that the subject certificates of deposit are still
in the possession of Estrella Querimit and have not been indorsed or
delivered to petitioner FEBTC is substantiated by the record and should
therefore stand.
Same; Civil Law; Laches; Courts will not be guided or bound strictly
by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong or injustice would result.—There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot
be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Courts will not be
guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches
when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.
Banks and Banking; A bank acts at its peril when it pays deposits
evidenced by a certificate of deposit, without its production and surrender
after proper indorsement; Debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.—The
principle that payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made to
someone authorized to receive it is applicable to the payment of certificates
of deposit. Thus, a bank will be protected in making payment to the holder
of a certificate indorsed by the payee, unless it has notice of the invalidity of
the indorsement or the holder’s want of title. A bank acts at its peril when it
pays deposits evidenced by a certificate of deposit, without its production
and surrender after proper indorsement. As a rule, one who pleads payment
has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to
prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove payment. The debtor has
the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged by payment.
Same; Same; A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care whether such accounts consist only of a few
hundred pesos or of millions of pesos.—Because the business of banks is
impressed with public interest, the degree of diligence required of banks is
more than that of a good father of the family or of an ordinary business firm.
The fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors requires them
to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. A bank
is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or of
millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance
of every kind of obligation is demandable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako for petitioner.
Manuel T. Sabillo for private respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking review of the

decision, dated March 6, 2001,
1
and resolution, dated June 19, 2001,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67147, entitled
“Estrella O. Querimit v. Far East Bank and Trust Company,” which
affirmed with modification
2
the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Manila, ordering petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co.
(FEBTC) to allow respondent Estrella O. Querimit to withdraw her
time deposit with the FEBTC.
The facts are as follows:
_______________
1 Per Associate Justice Martin S. Villanueva, Jr. and concurred in by Associate

Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Perlita J. Tria Tirona.
2 Per Judge Leocadio H. Ramos, Jr.
667
VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 667

Respondent Estrella O. Querimit worked as internal auditor of3 the

Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) for 19 years, from 1963 to 1992. On
November 24, 1986, she opened4 a dollar savings account in
petitioner’s Harrison Plaza branch, for which she was issued four
(4) Certificates of Deposit (Nos. 79028, 79029, 79030, and 79031),
each certificate representing the amount of $15,000.00, or a total
amount of $60,000.00. The certificates were to mature in 60 days, on
January 23, 1987, and were payable to bearer at 4.5% interest per
annum. The certificates bore the word “accrued,” which meant that
if they were not presented for encashment or pre-terminated prior to
maturity, the money deposited with accrued interest would be
“rolled over” by the bank and annual interest would accumulate
5
automatically. The petitioner bank’s manager assured respondent
that her deposit would be renewed and earn interest upon maturity
even without the surrender of the certificates if these were not
6
indorsed and withdrawn. Respondent kept her dollars in the bank so
that they would
7
earn interest and so that she could use the fund after
she retired.
In 1989, respondent accompanied her husband Dominador
Querimit to the United States for medical treatment. She used her
savings in the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) to pay for the trip
8
and for her husband’s medical expenses. In January 1993, her
husband died and Estrella returned to the Philippines. She went to
petitioner FEBTC to withdraw her deposit but, to her dismay, she
9
was told that her husband had withdrawn the money in deposit.
Through counsel, respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner
FEBTC. In another letter, respondent reiterated her request for
updating and payment of the certificates of deposit, including in-
_______________
3 TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 4-5, Oct. 3, 1997.

4 Id., pp. 5-6; TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 6-17, Nov. 4, 1998.
5 TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 6-11, Oct. 3, 1997; TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 11,
Nov. 4, 1998; Exhs. A, B, C, D (Certificates of Deposit).
6 TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 17, Oct. 3, 1997.
7 TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 18, Oct. 3, 1997; TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 15,
Nov. 4, 1997.
8 TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 18-20, Nov. 4, 1997.
9 TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 11, Oct. 3, 1997; TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 9-22,
Nov. 4, 1998.
668

10
terest earned. As petitioner FEBTC refused respondent’s demands,
the latter filed a complaint, joining in the action Edgardo F. Blanco,
Branch Manager of FEBTC 11
Harrison Plaza Branch, and Octavio
Espiritu, FEBTC President.
Petitioner FEBTC alleged that it had given respondent’slate
husband Dominador an “accommodation” to allow him to withdraw
12
12
Estrella’s deposit. Petitioner presented certified true copies of
documents showing that payment had been made, to wit:
1. Four FEBTC Harrison Plaza Branch Dollar Demand Drafts

Nos. 886694903, 886694904, 886694905 and 886694906
for US$15,110.96 each, allegedly issued by petitioner to
respondent’s husband Dominador after payment on the
13
certificates of deposit;
2. A letter of Alicia de Bustos, branch cashier of FEBTC at
Harrison Plaza, dated January 23, 1987, which was sent to
Citibank, N.A., Citibank Center, Paseo de Roxas, Makati,
Metro Manila, informing the latter that FEBTC had issued
the four drafts and requesting Citibank New York to debit
from petitioner’s account $60,443.84, the aggregate value
14
of the four drafts;
3. “Citicorp Remittance Service: Daily
15
Summary and Payment
Report” dated January 23, 1987;
4. Debit Ticket dated January 23, 1987, showing the debit of
US$60,443.84 or its equivalent at the time of P1,240,912.04
16
from the FEBTC Harrison Plaza Branch; and
5. An Interbranch Transaction Ticket Register or Credit Ticket
dated January 23, 1987 showing that US$60,443.84 or
P1,240,912.04 was credited to petitioner’s International
17
Operation Division (IOD).
_______________
10 TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 11-16, Oct. 3, 1997; Records, pp. 8-9 (Letters of
Demand dated July 29, 1996 and Aug. 2, 1996).
11 Records, pp. 1-5.
12 Petition, p. 15; Rollo, p. 17; TSN (Tomas Silva), pp. 14-20, Dec. 4, 1997.
13 Exhs. “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “10”, “11”, “12”, and “13”.
14 Exh. “6”.
15 Exh. “5”.
16 Exh. “7”; TSN (Raoul Reniedo), pp. 38-40, April 30, 1998.
17 Exhs. “8”, “9”; id., pp. 40-50.
669
VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 669

On May 6, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for respondent.

The dispositive portion of the decision stated:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [Estrella

O. Querimit] and against defendants [FEBTC et al.]:
1. ORDERING defendants to allow plaintiff to withdraw her U.S.$

Time Deposit of $60,000.00 plus accrued interests;
2. ORDERING defendants to pay moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00;
3. ORDERING defendants to pay exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000.00;
4. ORDERING defendants to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of
P100,000.00 plus P10,000.00 per appearance of counsel; and
5. ORDERING defendants to pay the costs of the suit.
18
SO ORDERED.
On May 15, 2000, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals

which, on March 6, 2001, affirmed through its Fourteenth Division
the decision of the trial court, with the modification that FEBTC was
declared solely liable for the amounts adjudged in the decision of the
trial court. The appeals court stated that petitioner FEBTC failed to
prove that the certificates of deposit had been paid out of its funds,
since “the evidence by the [respondent] stands unrebutted that the
subject certificates of deposit until now remain unindorsed,
19
undelivered and unwithdrawn by [her].” But the Court of Appeals
held that the individual defendants, Edgardo F. Blanco, FEBTC-
Harrison Plaza Branch Manager, and Octavio Espiritu, FEBTC
President, could not be held solidarity liable with the FEBTC
because the latter
20
has a personality separate from its officers and
stockholders.
Hence this appeal.
_______________
18 Records, pp. 305-311.

19 CA Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 43-44.
20 Id., p. 6; id., p. 45.
670

As stated by the Court of Appeals, the main issue in this case is

whether the subject certificates of deposit have already been paid by
21
petitioner. Petitioner contends that—
I. Petitioner is not liable to respondent for the value of the

four (4) Certificates of Deposit, including the interest
thereon as well as moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s and appearance fees.
II. The aggregate value—both principal and interest earned at
maturity—of the four (4) certificates of deposit was already
paid to or withdrawn at maturity by the late Dominador
Querimit who was the respondent’s deceased husband.
III. Respondent is guilty of laches since the four (4) certificates
of deposit were all issued on 24 November 1986 but she
attempted to withdraw their aggregate value on 29 July
1996 only on or after the lapse of more than nine (9) years
and eight (8) months.
22
22
IV. Respondent is not liable to petitioner for attorney’sfees.
After reviewing the records, we find the petition to be
without merit.
First. Petitioner bank failed to prove that it had already paid Estrella
Querimit, the bearer and lawful holder of the subject certificates of
deposit. The finding of the trial court on this point, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, is that petitioner did not pay either respondent
Estrella or her husband the amounts evidenced by the subject
certificates of deposit. This Court is not a trier of facts and generally
does not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court
23
of Appeals. The finding of respondent court which shows that the
subject certificates of deposit are still in the possession of Estrella
Querimit and have not been indorsed or
_______________
21 Id., p. 4; Id., p. 43.

22 Petition, pp. 11-12; Id., pp. 13-14.
23 Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, G.R. No. 141093, Feb. 20, 2001,
352 SCRA 316; Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters
Bank, G.R. No. 139437, Dec. 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 542; PAL Employees Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC,260 SCRA 758 (1996).
671
VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 671

delivered to petitioner FEBTC is substantiated by the record and

24
should therefore stand.
A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgment
by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit
which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the
order of the depositor, or to some other person or his order, whereby
the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the
depositor is created. The principles governing other types of bank
25
deposits are applicable to certificates of deposit, as are the rules
governing promissory notes when they contain an26 unconditional
promise to pay a sum certain of money absolutely. The principle
that payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made to someone
authorized to receive it is applicable to the payment of certificates of
deposit. Thus, a bank will be protected in making payment to the
holder of a certificate indorsed by the payee, unless it has notice 27
of
the invalidity of the indorsement or the holder’s want of title. A
bank acts at its peril when it pays deposits evidenced by a certificate
of deposit, 28without its production and surrender after proper
indorsement. As a rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove payment. The debtor
has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation
29
has been discharged by payment.
In this case, the certificates of deposit were clearly marked

payable to “bearer,” which means, to “[t]he person in possession of
an
_______________
24 Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, Feb. 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 100.
25 10 Am Jur 2d §455.
26 10 Am Jur §457.
27 10 Am Jur 2d §461.
28 Clark v. Young, 21 So.2d 331 (1944); Cohn-Goodman Co. v. People’s Saving
Bank of Grand Haven, 168 N.W. 1042 (1918).
29 Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp., G.R. No. 99047, April 16, 2001, 356
SCRA 451; Villar v. NLRC, 331 SCRA 686 (2000); Audion Electric Co., Inc. vs.
NLRC, 308 SCRA 340 (1999); Ropali Trading Corporation v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 309
(1998); Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. v. Ranay, 275 SCRA 717 (1997).
672

instrument, document 30
of title or security payable to bearer or
indorsed in blank.” Petitioner should not have paid respondent’s
husband or any third party without requiring the surrender of the
certificates of deposit.
Petitioner claims that it did not demand the surrender of the
subject certificates of deposit since respondent’s husband,
Dominador Querimit, was one of the bank’s senior managers. But
even long after respondent’s husband had allegedly been paid
respondent’s deposit and before his retirement from service, the
FEBTC never
31
required him to deliver the certificates of deposit in
question. Moreover, the accommodation given to respondent’s
husband was made in violation of the bank’s policies and
32
procedures.
Petitioner FEBTC thus failed to exercise
33
that degree of diligence
required by the nature of its business. Because the business of
banks is impressed with public interest, the degree of diligence
required of banks is more than that of a good father of the family or
of an ordinary business firm. The fiduciary nature of their
relationship with their depositors requires them to34 treat the accounts
of their clients with the highest degree of care. A bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care
whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or of
millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from negligence 35
in the
performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. Petitioner
failed to prove payment of the subject certificates of deposit issued
_______________
30 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1979), p. 140.

31 TSN (Alicia de Bustos), pp. 11-15, July 23, 1999.
32 TSN (Tomas de Silva), pp. 33-34, Dec. 4, 1997.
33 CIVIL CODE, ART. 1173.
34 Canlas v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 415 (2000); Ibaan Rural Bank v. Court
of Appeals, 321 SCRA 88 (1999); Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals,
269 SCRA 695 (1997); Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals,
237 SCRA 761 (1994); Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA
51 (1992).
35 Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 264 (2000); Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 309 (1999); Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 761 (1994); Araneta v. Bank of
America, 40 SCRA 144 (1971).
673
VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 673

to the respondent and, therefore, remains liable for the value of the
dollar deposits indicated thereon with accrued interest.
Second. The equitable principle of laches is not sufficient to
defeat the rights of respondent over the subject certificates of
deposit.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
36
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be
used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Courts will
not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would
37
result.
In this case, it would be unjust to allow the doctrine of laches to
defeat the right of respondent to recover her savings which she
deposited with the petitioner. She did not withdraw her deposit even
after the maturity date of the certificates of deposit precisely because
she wanted to set it aside for her retirement. She relied on the bank’s
assurance, as reflected on the face of the instruments
_______________
36 Felizardo v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137509, Aug. 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 182;
Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140311, March 30, 2001, 355 SCRA 759;
Avisado v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 137306, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 245; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366 (1999); PAL Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 758 (1996).
37 Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137566, Feb. 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 179;
Cometa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, Feb. 6, 2001, 351 SCRA 294; De Vera
v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 624 (1999).
674
themselves, that interest38 would “accrue” or accumulate annually

even after their maturity.
Third. Respondent is entitled to moral damages, because of the
mental anguish and humiliation she suffered as a result of the
wrongful refusal of the FEBTC to 39
pay her even after she had
delivered the certificates of deposit. In addition, petitioner FEBTC
should pay respondent exemplary damages, which the trial court 40
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
Finally, respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees since petitioner’s act
or omission compelled her to incur expenses
41
to protect her interest,
making such award just and equitable. However, we find the award
of attorney’s fees to be excessive and accordingly reduce it to
42
P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED and the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 67147
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of attorney’s fees
is reduced to P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr.,

JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—Banks being greatly affected with public interest are

expected to exercise a degree of diligence in the handling of its
affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary business firm. (Ibaan
Rural Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 88 [1999])
——o0o——
_______________
38 TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 6-11, Oct. 3, 1997; TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 11,
Nov. 4, 1998; Exhs. “A”, “B”, “C”, “D” (Certificates of Deposit).
39 CIVIL CODE, Arts. 2217, 2219.
40 Art. 2229.
41 CIVIL CODE, Arts. 2208.
42 Catungal v. Hao, G.R. No. 134972, March 22, 2001, 355 SCRA 29; Batingal v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128636, Feb. 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 60.
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8/8/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 373

VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 665

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Appeals; Court is not a trier of facts and

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Querimit

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking review of the

1 Per Associate Justice Martin S. Villanueva, Jr. and concurred in by Associate

VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 667

Respondent Estrella O. Querimit worked as internal auditor of3 the

3 TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 4-5, Oct. 3, 1997.

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. Four FEBTC Harrison Plaza Branch Dollar Demand Drafts

VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 669

On May 6, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for respondent.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [Estrella

1. ORDERING defendants to allow plaintiff to withdraw her U.S.$

On May 15, 2000, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals

18 Records, pp. 305-311.

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

As stated by the Court of Appeals, the main issue in this case is

I. Petitioner is not liable to respondent for the value of the

21 Id., p. 4; Id., p. 43.

VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 671

delivered to petitioner FEBTC is substantiated by the record and

In this case, the certiﬁcates of deposit were clearly marked

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

30 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1979), p. 140.

VOL. 373, JANUARY 16, 2002 673

themselves, that interest38 would “accrue” or accumulate annually

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr.,

Petition denied, judgment afﬁrmed with modiﬁcation.

Note.—Banks being greatly affected with public interest are

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