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Candido Amil

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CANDIDO AMIL, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ERNESTO GADOR and NILA


GADOR, respondents. [G.R. No. 125272. October 7, 1999]
Facts:
Amil and private respondents Ernesto and Nila Gador executed a document entitled Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale, dated
November 14, 1987, involving the land in dispute. The parties stipulated:
That Vendor A-Retro, Candido C. Amil, for and in consideration of the sum (P30,000.00) PESOS, in hand paid to him and
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged to his entire satisfaction, do by these presents, SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY,
under Pacto De Retro, unto the herein Vendees A-Retro, the spouses Ernesto T. Gador and Nila A. Gador their heirs,
successors and assigns, the parcel of land together with all the improvements thereon, free from all liens and
encumbrances.

That Vendor A-Retro, Candido C. Amil, reserve for himself the right to redeem or repurchase the property herein sold, and
the Vendees A-Retro, in turn, obligate themselves to resell the parcel of land sold, within a period of (3) YEARS, from and
after the due execution of this instrument, for the same price of (P30,000.00) PESOS, ; PROVIDED, that if the Vendor A-
Retro, Candido C. Amil, fails to exercise his right to redeem or repurchase as herein granted within the period stipulated
upon, then this conveyance shall be deemed to be an absolute and irrevocable sale, without the necessity of executing
any further deed or instituting judicial action to consolidate the ownership in the name of the Vendees A-Retro. [2]

The parties executed another document entitled Addendum to Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale, dated December 12,
1987 which provided:

The spouses Ernesto T. Gador and Nila A. Gador, are the Mortgagees of that certain parcel of land situated at Barrio
Calindagan, Dumaguete City, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14021 and the Party of the Second Part is the
Mortagor of said parcel of land, for and in consideration of the sum of (P30,000.00) Pesos, per Doc. No. 3; Book No. 1;
Page No. 1; Series of 1987 of Notary Public Jose G. Hernando, Jr., dated the 14th day of November, 1987, at Dumaguete
City.

That considering that the Party of the First Part has to pay an additional sum of One Thousand and Eight Hundred
(P1,800.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, to cover costs or expenses for Capital Gains Tax and Documentary Stamps, the
Party of the Second Part hereby agrees and covenants that his right to redeem or repurchase the parcel of land subject
matter of the Mortgage, within the period stipulated, shall cover and includes said amount of (P1,800.00) or the total sum
of Thirty One Thousand Eight Hundred (P31,800.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency

Petitioner, through a new counsel, then filed a motion for new trial, which, however, was denied. He appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which, in its decision dated January 29, 1996, affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals ruled:

We agree with the trial courts denial of respondent-appellants motion for new trial. Respondent had been given full
opportunity to answer and be heard. It is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries to counsel on matters concerning his
case (Elino Ong Reyes vs. CA, 189 SCRA 46; Florendo vs. Florendo, 27 SCRA 432). In fact, respondents alleged counsel
never even entered his appearance. Under these circumstances, including those earlier adverted to, We rule that
respondent did not exercise the ordinary prudence required of him by Rule 37, section 1(a) of the Rules of Court, and his
negligence is not excusable to justify a new trial.

Issue: Whether due process of law is observed?

Held: Yes.As already noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a new trial on the ground that the failure of
petitioners original counsel to file an answer within the reglementary period cannot be considered as excusable
negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner is
bound by the mistakes of his former counsel.

It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot
be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the
mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end
to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.

Accordingly, this Court has affirmed the denial by trial courts of motions for new trial on the ground that the failure of
counsel to file an answer within the reglementary period cannot be considered as excusable negligence.
In the instant case, petitioner was likewise declared in default because of the failure of his former counsel, Atty. Piero, to
file within the reglementary period an answer to private respondents' petition for consolidation of ownership. Atty. Piero
likewise failed to take any action to protect the interests of petitioner in subsequent proceedings before the trial court,
such as by filing an opposition to the motion to declare him in default or by moving to set aside the order of default. It was
Atty. Saleto J. Erasmes, the present counsel of petitioner, who filed the motion for new trial after a judgment by default had
been rendered against him. As a consequence of his former counsels gross negligence, petitioner was deprived of his day
in court.

Ang Tibay vs CIR, 69 Phil 635

Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that
Toribio’s act is not valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for new trial was raised by the
NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory.
The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for recon with the supreme court.
In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the national labor union, the respondent, averred:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of obligation with the Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldn’t be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.
Issue: What is the function of CIR as a special court?

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions
are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal
of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive.
It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy
or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even
in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

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