NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed

SECTION 27
BENGZON VS. DRILON

G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Facts:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as
amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided
for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA
1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992
GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows
that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away
validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the
adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.
2. Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in General Appropriation Bill is constitutional.
Held:
1. The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized,
which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the
disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be no
grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in
effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting.
The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act
1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of
existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said
item.
NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed
Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by
inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days
after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should
have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.
3 ways how a bill becomes a law.
1. When the president signed it;
2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him.
Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990

GR 87636 -EN BANC
Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it
eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional
provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and approval. On 29 December
1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special Provisions and
Section 55, a “General Provision,” were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 (“Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the
President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and
For Other Purposes”) was adopted.
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill
(Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the
following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the
item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the present case is a political question beyond the
power of the Supreme Court to determine; that Gonzales et al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55
is a “rider” because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the President’s veto; that the power of the
President to augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law,
specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the
Constitution to veto provisions or other “distinct and severable parts” of an Appropriations Bill.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the
power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
2. Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1. SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the
President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that
“provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in
the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.
2. The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the line-veto power
of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items
(Henry v. Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be struck
down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI
SEC 25 PAR 5.)
The ‘provisions’ are inappropriate because
1. They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations
2. Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill
3. It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation
Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the legislative the subject matter of the
provisions should be dealt with in separate and complete legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT passed in that
manner they attempt hide it in the GAB
If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SHOULD resort to their constitutionally
vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1)
DECISION: Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.
QUESTIONS
Section 27:
1. What is the Doctrine of Incorporate Provisions ?
.
2.

NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed

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SECTION 27

BENGZON VS. DRILON

Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990

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