MONTEVERDE v GENEROSO

FACTS:

Tomas Monteverde is the owner of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Santa Ana, municipality of
Davao, Province of Davao. He possesses a Torrens title to the land obtained in 1921.

The parcel of land is bounded on the northwest by the Agdao River. The Tambongon Creek is a branch of
the Agdao River and Runs through Monteverde's land. For fishpond purposes, Monteverde constructed
two dams across the Agdao River and five dams across the Tambongon Creek. The two dams in the
Agdao River were destroyed by order of the district engineer of Davao. The Provincial governor of Davao
also threatened to destroy the other dams in the Tambongon Creek. The motive behind the destruction
of the dams in the Agdao River and the proposed destruction of the dams in the Tambongon Creek was
to safeguard the public health.

To prevent the contemplated action with reference to the Tambongon Creek, Monteverde sought in the
Court of First Instance of Davao to obtain an order of injunction in restraint of the provincial governor,
the district engineer, and the district health officer, but in this attempt Monteverde was unsuccessful in
the lower court.

ISSUE:

WON a provincial governor, a district engineer, or a district health officer authorized to destroy private
property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever
under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance?

HELD:

No.

As to article 24 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, it provides:

"Any person may, upon his own private property, construct artificial ponds of sea water, having
communication with the sea, for use as bathing places or vivaries, or for any other commercial or
recreative purpose, notice thereof being given to the governor of the province. During two months, the
governor shall have power to order the suspension of the work if, after consultation with the naval
officer in command and the provincial engineer, it appear that the work might be substantially
prejudicial to the public interests. In such an event the interested party may appeal to the Government."
But as to the applicability of this article, it necessarily would have to conform to the principles of the
existing public law.

Of course, a dam or a fishpond may be found to be a nuisance where it endangers or impairs the health
or depreciates property by causing water to become stagnant. The public health may be conserved but
conserved only in a legal manner. Due process of law must be observed before the citizens' property or
personal rights or liberty can be interfered with. Conceding without deciding that article 24 of the Law of
Waters is in force, we reiterate that it can only be made use of by conforming to the provisions of the
organic law.

The court recognized the legislative power to regulate fishing in public waters, and the right of summary
abatement of nuisances without judicial process or proceeding for the protection of the health; but said
the court: "In the process of abating a nuisance there are limitations both in respect of the agencies
which may be employed, and as to what may be done in execution of the remedy.

In contrast with Lawton vs. Steele, supra, (1) there is no law authorizing the summary abatement of
nuisances by the provincial governor; and (2) the dams and fishponds are not of trifling value. The
question at issue is answered in the negative.

HIDALGO v BALANDAN

FACTS:

Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose
premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine.

While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with
any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the
ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and
persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased.
There was no guard assigned on the gate.

At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing
with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a
bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be
fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."

ISSUE:

WON Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. liable to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife for the death of their son
Mario Baladan.

HELD:

No.

The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.

The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance
was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the
danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own
property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable
because of having created an "attractive nuisance." Anderson vs. Reith-Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184,
185; 112 Ind. App., 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the
petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by
petitioner — that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery,
because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible
individual — needs no further discussion.

SITCHON v AQUINO

FACTS:

This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead Aquino (the City Engineer
of Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from causing the demolition of their respective
houses situated in different areas along public streets in Manila inasmuch as these constitute public
nuisances. All of the petitioners occupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent.
However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or damages for the use of the land with the
agreement that such payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to vacate. The time
came when the City Engineer demanded that petitioners vacate the occupied streets. Unheeded, he
threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power
to remove public nuisances is vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer.

ISSUES:

Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineer have authority to cause the abatement of the
nuisance?

HELD:

There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 par. 4, classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of
free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a community or
neighbourhood. The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the
streets. As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized by statute or ordinance.

Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through
demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty, among others, was placed upon him.
Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later law but also because of the
principle that special provisions prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the
action sought to be taken by respondent.

VELASCO v MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

FACTS:

Pedro J. Velasco, the appellant, complained that MERALCO, the appellee company, created a nuisance,
as defined in Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in form of noise from their substation which
was in the same street, next to Velasco’s property/residence, which the appellant also uses for his
Medical Practice as a physician. The claim cannot be proven solely by testimony however, as the
testimonies given by the locals do not corroborate with each other, or were subjective. To get a more
accurate proof, under instructions from the Director of Health, Dr. Jesus Almonte, noted as an impartial
party, used a sound level meter and other instruments within the compound of the plaintiff-appellant to
get a reading on the decibels or sound meter. It was observed that the readings range from 46-80
decibels, depending on the time and place. The appellee company also took sound level samplings, with
Mamerto Buenafe conducting the reading within and near the vicinity of the substation, whose readings
range from 42-76 decibels. The readings were compared to Technical charts, which listed the decibels of
areas from an average home: 40, to the noisiest spot of Niagara Falls: 92. Thus, the readings from the
impartial party appeared more reliable. The court concluded that the evidence pointed the noise levels
to be of actionable nuisance, and that the appellant is entitled to relief, as there was a possibility that it
had effect on the appellant’s health.

Appellee company contended that the appellant should not have a ground to complain because of:

1) the intensity inside Velasco’s house was on 46 to 47 decibels;

2) the sound level at the North General Hospital, where silence was observed, was higher that his
residence and did not take action;

3) MERALCO had received no complaint in its 50 years of operations until the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the substation constituted a public nuisance. Whether or not Velasco had the right to
claim for damages.

HELD:

The court held that the substation constituted a public nuisance in form of noise, of which they made
reference and consideration with cases in the U.S. regarding what level of noise would constitute as
public nuisance as defined in Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The court also contended that the damage claims by the plaintiff-appellant was exaggerated, taking into
consideration that

1) the appellant did not make all the possible measures, for example to perhaps lease the property to
others,

2) as for his health, it was observed that only Velasco, among the other locals seem to have the ailments
as he listed, and therefore lowered it to a more justifiable amount of 20,000 pesos in damages and
5,000 pesos in attorney’s fees, payable by the appellee. They also ordered that the appellee should take
measures in lowering the noise within 90 days.

FARRALES v CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO

FACTS:

Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary
building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent
building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent
building was completed. She did not like the location pointed out by city officials where she could install
her temporary stall. Instead, taking the law into her own hands, Plaintiff built a temporary shack at one
end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit or permission from any city
official.

The police demolished the shack, brought the materials and goods to the City Hall and subsequently
delivered both materials and goods to Plaintiff

ISSUE:

WON the demolition of the shack was in order.

HELD:

Yes. There is no doubt Plaintiff had not permit to build the shack and this shack was built in the
passageway where people pass when going to the hangar market building. Plaintiff insists that the
proper procedure should have been for either the City Engineer or the City Health Officer to commence
legal proceedings for the abatement of this "nuisance". This Court believes that the police officers
properly demolished the shack for it had been built in defiance of orders from City Hall officials.

This Court believes that they could clear the passageway on their own responsibility, just like they can
push a car that is parked in the wrong place without waiting for court proceedings.

The appellant's contention is that the shack or temporary stall put up by her inside the premises of the
Baguio City Market was not a nuisance or if it was a nuisance at all it was one per accidens and not per
se and therefore could be abated only after the corresponding judicial proceeding.

According to Article 707 of the same Code, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be
liable for damages in only two cases: (1) if he causes unnecessary injury, or (2) if an alleged nuisance is
later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.

Here no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration
that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed
it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding.

*TIMONER v PEOPLE

FACTS:

At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte,
accompanied by two uniformed policemen and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika
highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded
to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the
Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the
complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had
been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with
certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos
and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged
that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to
reopen his barbershop business.

ISSUE:

WON sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and,
therefore, under lawful authority.

HELD:

Yes. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as defined under
Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£

ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water;
or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.

The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been
recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer.

But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for having fenced
off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public
nuisance without judicial proceedings. têñ.£îhqwâ£

ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

[l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or

[2] A civil action; or

[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation
of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty,
petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
*ESTATE OF GREGORIO FRANCISCO v CA

FACTS:

Litigated herein is a quonset building situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan, which was
ordered demolished by respondent Municipal Mayor, Benjamin Valencia. Respondent municipal
employees implemented the demolition, for which reason they are also impleaded.

The quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 by
Gregoria Francisco, who died in 1976. It stands on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority and
faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said
land was declared for the exclusive use of port facilities.

On 8 May 1989, Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan Gin San
by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality;
noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and. stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal
squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." This was followed by another letter of
19 May 1989 of the same tenor.

Aggrieved, petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Basilan, Branch 2 (docketed as S.P. No. 4).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of
petitioner's quonset building.

HELD:

No. Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate of Non-conformance, the foregoing
provision should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building
by the municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of the
requirements of due process, as originally held by the respondent Court.

Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial
remedies.1avvphi1 On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause
to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances" (Local Government
Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]).

Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the
Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on
public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal
authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no
compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset
building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law.v