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Library Quarterly.
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Information and Secrecy: Vannevar Bush, Ultra, and the Other Memex. By COLIN
BuRKE.Metuchen, N.J.: ScarecrowPress, 1994. Pp. xxvi+466. $49.50 (cloth).
ISBN 0-8108-2783-2.
This book is well worth reading. Focusing on the 1930s and 1940s, Colin Burke
weavesmultipleentwininghistoriesof the developmentof machinesfor cryptog-
raphy, for retrieving bibliographicinformation, and for general information
retrieval. He has done an enormous amount of research in the archives of
privatefoundations, the military,and various government agencies. In the pro-
cess, he has unearthed materialsthat would not be available to the casual re-
searcher. This effort is reflected in seventy-four pages of chapter-by-chapter
notes at the end of the book. There is an excellent index as well, but there is
no separate bibliography.Bibliographiccitations are embedded in the notes.
MichaelBuckland'sforeword sums it up: "Readerswill find much of interest
in what follows: the strategiesof corporations such as National Cash Register;
the history of the Ultra secret; and the story of the policy battles behind the
American effort to establish its own cryptanalyticcapabilitiesto fight the Axis
powers and, then, the Cold War. There is much too, about the redefinition of
the roles of universities and of science as the United States played its role as
a world power" (p. xviii). But the book is even more than that. It is a story of
many dedicated individuals. It contains numerous illustrations of Vannevar
Bush's monumental ego and ambition. It tells of little known heroes like admi-
rals Stanford Hooper and his proteg6 Joseph Wenger who fought life-long
battlesto modernize the navy'sapproach to new science and technology. It tells
of the often fruitless and uncommunicativerelationships between the library
and documentalist communities and the engineers who were struggling to
build the information machines of the future. It is a story of how post-World
War II big science emerged over militarybureaucraticobjections.
One thread that weaves throughout this book concerns the precursors of
today's information technology. Burke traces these historical roots back to ef-
forts in the 1920s to develop information machines, first as bibliographic re-
trieval devices, then for helping the military with their cryptologic, code-
breaking problems. The cryptologic tales are the centerpieces of Burke's book.
His early stories focus on efforts to modernize the U.S. Navy. The later ones
focus on wartimeefforts to keep up with German and Japanese militarycryptol-
ogy developments. The rise of new arrangementsfor creating information ma-
chines to meet postwardefense needs is the subjectof the last part of the book.
There are lessons in these tales for those who are concerned with today's devel-
opment of the Clipper chip.
Be forewarned: this is not an easy book to read. Difficulties arise because
Burke ziagzags through time in an effort to capture the interplay of parallel
events. This is especiallytrue in the first two-thirdsof the book. The last third,
dealing primarilywith the post-World War II era is more readable. However
difficult Burke'stime travelsare to follow, they add a fascinatingand important
dimension to his tale. He managesto capture the complexity of unfolding events
and to make them intelligible. I found that I was captivated as I gained some
understanding of the personalities,ambitions, and technological developments
and disasters at work in the decades from 1930 through the 1960s.
Vannevar Bush is a central figure in this book, but the book is more about
the events surrounding information machine development during Bush's years
of influence than it is about Bush the man or Bush the engineer. Burke shows
us how those events were influenced by Bush despite his many failures. He
acknowledgesBush's greatnessearly in the book. "VannevarBush of the Massa-
chusetts Instituteof Technology was one of the outstanding academicengineers
of his time. He was also one of the greatest scientist-politiciansin American
history and a mover and shaker in the rise of Big Science during and after
World War II" (p. 9). He paints a complex but, in the end, rather unflattering
portrait of Bush. As related by Burke, Bush was wedded so tightly to his own
ideas that he was almost blind to newer, and in some cases better, developments
in other quarters. His devotion and loyalty to "his"people were exceeded only
by his single-mindednessabout his own ideas.
As the title implies, the book is not about Bush's Memex but, rather, about
other machines that preceded Bush's Memex concept. It is very much about
the concepts that were central to the Memex and about how those concepts
shaped information machine developments from the 1920s through the 1940s.
The most notable thing about these development efforts is that they failed. In
fact, the story of Bush's information machine developments over the decades
covered by this book is a story of failure.
It also is a story of Bush's persistence in the face of failure and of his ability
to continue his career advancementdespite missing numerous critical contract
deadlines and his inability to deliver on his technological promises. This is a
remarkabletale. But one wonders what elements of Bush's life are missing from
the story. Surely this "outstandingengineer," this "greatestscientist-politician"
did not build his career and reputation on failure. What then accounts for his
ability to have such great influence on events? Was it his association with the
MassachusettsInstituteof Technology, one of the premier academic institutions
of our time? Was it the acquaintancesforged into a "good old boys" network
during his formative years? Alas, except for chapter 2 ("An Institution and a
Man for AmericanTechnology"), the text is almost silent on this, only alluding
to Bush'sclose working relationshipswith other movers and shakers of his time
and to his influence on other major scientific developments of his era.
During World War 1I, Bush was instrumentalin creating and then chairing
the National Defense Research Committee; and after the war, he was a key
player in establishingthe National Science Foundation. But these culminating
accomplishmentscame at high cost. More than once, Bush made enemies in
the navy'sbureaucracyas he "sought to have the control over the new sciences
in the hands of a civilianscientificelite, even during times of national crisis....
Such civiliancontrol meant power and funds to the best scientists at the largest
institutions.... That meant vastly increasing the income of universities and
shifting their priorities from teaching to research" (pp. 14-15). In the end,
Bush's institutionalideas prevailed,but his technologicalinventions faded away
into the dust of history. Ironically,we remember Bush today not for his institu-
tional accomplishments,but for his 1946 articleoutlining the Memex, a machine
that never was.
The book containsinterestingillustrationsand photos of people and machines
at the end of each chapter. Their value, however, is marred by poor reproduc-
tion leaving the reader to make out details of too many black on gray illustra-
tions. This is a minor complaint however. Burke's work is important and his
book is a good read. I highly recommend it.