Consti Case Digests

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping &
Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr.

-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the
government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with
UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the
other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:-
it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to
maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty,
national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands
would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be
directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
Consti Case Digests

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate
the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is
not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-
lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over
maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their
archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The
contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid
of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total
maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the
Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be
violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125
nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades,
had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they
had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of
the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of
internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to
archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages,
exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether
internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its
obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international
law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed
incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of
archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the
demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
Consti Case Digests

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a
law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS
III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to
freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it
will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas,
as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that
the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as
follows:

1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the
Consti Case Digests

country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant

constitutional provisions.
3. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along
coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community
of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in
lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Consti Case Digests

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016

Facts:

Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the parental care and custody over petitioner
by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been reported and registered as a foundling
and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.

When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley (aka Fernando Poe,
Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her adoption. The trial court granted their
petition and ordered that her name be changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she applied and was
issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her passport.

She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and pursuing a degree
in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She graduated in 1991 from Boston College
where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.

She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., in San
Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to her eldest child while
in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines to support her
father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her youngest daughter. They
then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back to the Philippines to attend to
her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed suit;
acquired property where she and her children resided.

In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the
Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children which was
granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport; appointed and took her oath as
Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship before the
Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections
wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on
16 May 2013.
Consti Case Digests

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC,
the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to
the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.
The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly,
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that
her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on
the ground that she was in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a
candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship
issue.

Issue:

Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Held:

Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born Filipino.

It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized.

There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.

Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to the
customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

ARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC,et al.

GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700

March 8,2016

Perez, J.:

FACTS:
Consti Case Digests

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From
then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING
and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
Consti Case Digests

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application
to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the
SC.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Case Digest)

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152154, July 15, 2003
Corrected Version

Topic: Prohibitions/Inhibitions of President of the Philippines

FACTS:
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the
unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then
President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1,
issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers
to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino
people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly
and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and
reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long
overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let
it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and
resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.

Issue:
Consti Case Digests

Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president during his term
of office

Held:
Yes

Ratio:
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the
course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial
proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the
case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted
to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they
did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth
could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not
receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not
receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.[85] In fact, his
management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly
prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other
office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession,
participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly
or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or
any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or
controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court
inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled
corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of
Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or
manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification
as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for
determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of
the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e)
of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly
against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income from
legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and
respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful
income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated
the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the
known lawful income of respondents.
Consti Case Digests

Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of
ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of
those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of
such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL)
from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of
law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward
them for their violation of the law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al . 402 SCRA 84(2003)

The PCGG cannot vote sequestered shares to elect the ETPI Board of Directors or to amend the Articles of
Incorporation for the purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock unless there is a prima facie
evidence showing that said shares are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation.

Two sets of board and officers of Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) were elected, one
by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the other by the registered ETPI
stockholders.Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI filed a petition for Certiorari before the Sandiganbayan
alleging that the PCGG had been “illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI,” in the election of
the members of the board of directors. The Sandiganbayan ruled that only the registered owners, their
duly authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares. The PCGG filed a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition before the Court which was granted. The Court referred
the PCGG’s petition to hold the special stockholders’ meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of
evidence and resolution. The Sandiganbayan granted the PCGG “authority to cause the holding of a special
stockholders’ meeting of ETPI and held that there was an urgent necessity to increase ETPI’s authorized
capital stock; there existed a prima facie factual foundation for the issuance of the writ of sequestration
covering the Class “A” shares of stock; and the PCGG was entitled to vote the sequestered shares of stock.
The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of directors held a meeting and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital
stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was “unanimously approved”. Africa filed a motion to nullify the
stockholders meeting, contending that only the Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has the power to
authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders meeting and vote the sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motions for reconsideration of prompting Africa to file before the Court a second petition,
challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions authorizing the holding of a stockholders meeting and the one
denying the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering the holding of a
stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place, through the
amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI 2. Whether the PCGG can vote the
sequestered ETPI Class “A” shares in the stockholders meeting for the election of the board of directors.

HELD:

First Issue :
On the PCGG’s imputation of grave abuse of discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for ordering the holding
Consti Case Digests

of a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place, through the
amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI, the safeguards prescribed in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas. The Court laid down those safeguards because of the obvious need to reconcile
the rights of the stockholder whose shares have been sequestered and the duty of the conservator to
preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth. There is nothing in the Cojuangco case that would suggest that
the above measures should be incorporated in the articles and by-laws before a stockholders meeting for
the election of the board of directors is held. The PCGG nonetheless insists that those measures should
be written in the articles and by-laws before such meeting, “otherwise, the {Marcos] cronies will elect
themselves or their representatives, control the corporation, and for an appreciable period of time, have
every opportunity to disburse funds, destroy or alter corporate records, and dissipate assets.” That could
be a possibility, but the peculiar circumstances of the case require that the election of the board of
directors first be held before the articles of incorporation are amended. Section 16 of the Corporation
Code requires the majority vote of the board of directors to amend the articles of incorporation. At the
time Africa filed his motion for the holding of the annual stockholders meeting, there were two sets of
ETPI directors, one controlled by the PCGG and the other by the registered stockholders. Which of them
is the legitimate board of directors? Which of them may rightfully vote to amend the articles of
incorporation and integrate the safeguards laid down in Cojuangco? It is essential, therefore, to cure the
aberration of two boards of directors sitting in a single corporation before the articles of incorporation
are amended to set in place the Cojuangco safeguards. The danger of the so-called Marcos cronies taking
control of the corporation and dissipating its assets is, of course, a legitimate concern of the PCGG,
charged as it is with the duties of a conservator. Nevertheless, such danger may be averted by the
“substantially contemporaneous” amendment of the articles after the election of the board.

Second Issue :
The principle laid down in Baseco vs. PCGG was further enhanced in the subsequent cases of Cojuangco
v. Calpo and Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Cojuangco, Jr., where the Court developed
a “two-tiered” test in determining whether the PCGG may vote sequestered shares. The issue of whether
PCGG may vote the sequestered shares in SMC necessitates a determination of at least two factual
matters: a.) whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and thus
belong to the state; and b.) whether there is an immediate danger of dissipation thus necessitating their
continued sequestration and voting by the PCGG while the main issue pends with the Sandiganbayan. The
two-tiered test, however, does not apply in cases involving funds of “public character.” In such cases, the
government is granted the authority to vote said shares, namely: (1) Where government shares are taken
over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their own names, and (2) Where the
capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private hands. In short,
when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have
been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered
shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally
government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the
two-tiered test does not apply. The rule in the jurisdiction is, therefore, clear. The PCGG cannot perform
acts of strict ownership of sequestered property. It is a mere conservator. It may not vote the shares in a
corporation and elect members of the board of directors. The only conceivable exception is in a case of a
takeover of a business belonging to the government or whose capitalization comes from public funds, but
which landed in private hands as in BASECO. In short, the Sandiganbayan held that the public character
exception does not apply, in which case it should have proceeded to apply the two-tiered test. This it
failed to do. The questions thus remain if there is prima facie evidence showing that the subject shares
are ill- gotten and if there is imminent danger of dissipation. The Court is not, however, a trier of facts,
 Consti Case Digests

hence, it is not in a position to rule on the correctness of the PCGG’s contention. Consequently, the issue
must be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for resolution.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and MONTEJO

G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995

Ponente: Kapunan

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district of Leyte in order that
she will be able to run for Congress of that district in the 1995 elections. Her COC stated that she was a
resident of Leyte for seven months. Private Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to
cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one year residency
requirement as provided for in the Constitution. In response, Marcos amended her COC changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood". Marcos claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence." She further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC
on the ground that her original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation
or honest mistake".

The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos. It held that the animus
revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because that where she chose to live after
she went back to the Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US. It explained that while
Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became
a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of Manila and
eventually became Governor of Manila. This, according to the COMELEC debunks her claim that she was
a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.

2. Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her husband in Ilocos Norte
and in San Juan.
 Consti Case Digests

HELD:

1. YES.

The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile. The decision of the COMELEC however, shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile"
with "actual residence".

Domicile versus Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In a past case, the
Court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements
of:

1. The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and

2. Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently

Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is mere physical presence. Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which
the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if
his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. Domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.

A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note
however, that a person may abandon a domicile in favor of another.

Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban

 Consti Case Digests

Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. The fact that she has a residence in Manila does not
mean that she has lost her domicile in that province. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Applying this doctrine to the case of petitioner, the fact that she has
registered to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally point to an intention
to abandon her domicile in Tacloban. Even while residing in various places, petitioner kept close ties to
her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit
of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore
of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country
always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

2. NO

The domicile of origin

Note further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that of her
parents. Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban. Once acquired, domicile is retained until a new
one is gained. The domicile of origin is not easily lost. To effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue.

Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Consti Case Digests

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or residence does not
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon
marriage. This article clearly refers to actual residence and not domicile and merely establishes the
default rule in fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live together" in article immediately preceding
Art. 110.

When Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue
of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr.
Marcos had several places of residence at the time: San Juan and Ilocos Norte. Assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

This rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of the common law
concept of "matrimonial domicile". This underscores the difference between the intentions of the Civil
Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an
entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110.
The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening
years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.

Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an intent to reestablish a
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as early as in 1992, already obtained her residence
certificate in Tacloban.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
 Consti Case Digests

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, providing information that she is
a resident of seven months in the constituency where she seeks to be elected
immediately preceding the election. Subsequently, private respondent Montejo filed a
Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency (must have been a resident for not less than
one year). Petitioner thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since
childhood.” This amendment was refused admittance for reason that it was filed out of
time, so Petitioner filed her amended COC with COMELEC in division.

The COMELEC in division found the petition for disqualification meritorious and struck
off the amended as well as original COCs. In ruling thus, COMELEC in division found
that when petitioner chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her
intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is
a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she
spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The COMELEC en banc
affirmed this ruling.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections

HELD:

Meaning of “Residence”

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements
of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or
the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to

a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
Consti Case Digests

However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu
vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:

Residence vs. Domicile

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a

place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man
can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention
of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs.
Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does
not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election
law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere
absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon
it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Did Petitioner satisfy the residency requirement?

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
Consti Case Digests

candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy

which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in

jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period
of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district,
which was "since childhood" in the space provided.

Did Petitioner abandon her domicile of origin (Tacloban, Leyte)?

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of
April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked
for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The
Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's
domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except
Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the
election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions
if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where
the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears
repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional
commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).

How Domicile is Lost/Acquired

Consti Case Digests

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers
that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for
many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the wife automatically
gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from
the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is
one area where the two concepts are well delineated.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,

petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's
actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos
had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos
Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal
Consti Case Digests

residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose
her domicile of origin.

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in
the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not
comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the
Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven

months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s

proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself
and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers.

Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the
one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the

concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
Consti Case Digests

determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives

as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences
in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the
degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly
argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC
was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside.
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970

April 24, 2012]
FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in
Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He
then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of
Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was
eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC.
Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
Consti Case Digests

COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by
operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely
been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed,
the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it
be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of
Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Consti Case Digests

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or
wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The
Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO

G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012

Ponente: Abad

Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a reinstated

Filipino citizen running for governor of a province

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He
migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and acquired
Australian citizenship. In 2008, he returned to the Philippines
and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of
citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his
Australian citizenship.

Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga

Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain,
opposed the registration. COMELEC approved the application and
included Jalosjos in the voter's list. This decision was affirmed at
the MCTC and at the RTC.
Consti Case Digests

Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of

Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a
petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with
the one year residency requirement of the Local Government
Code (LGC).

COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a

bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the Philippines,
he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil,
and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his
domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner
did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish
domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

HELD:
NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully proven
by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living
in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay.

The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of

the province for at least one year before the elections. For the
purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile: i.e. he must have an intention to
reside in a particulaar place, but must also have personal
presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
 Consti Case Digests

The question of residence is a question of intention. To

determine compliance with the residency/domicile requirement,
jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:

(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;

(b) where once established, that domicile remains until he

acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon

city. When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became
his domicile by operation of law and by choice. On the other
hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live
with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos
did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his
allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. By his acts,
Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving
that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in

Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have
a domicile or residence somewhere.

Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to

settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his
Consti Case Digests

brother's house. A candidate is not required to have a house in

order to establish his residence or domicile in that place. It is
enough that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or
in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate
own the house where he lives would make property a qualification
for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making
it his domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who
testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented
correspondence with political leaders and local and national party
mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of
the RTC. The court also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a
lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga
Sibugay. This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent
to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated February 11,
2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4,
2010 that disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking
election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section
67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
Consti Case Digests

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane
to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
Consti Case Digests

limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and
void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval”
is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering
those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections
as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the
law before it becomes effective.
Consti Case Digests

HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation.
To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that
the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other
provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure,
some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy
as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It
is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether
it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment
of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the
range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling
of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement
Consti Case Digests

in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it
imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving
members of Congress – is achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take
effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire
law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law
is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.
That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine
whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such
transgression has been shown in this case.

G.R. 147387 December 10 2003 [En Banc]

Consti Case Digests

FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in
expressed in its title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting
of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of
the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
Consti Case Digests

provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should
be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and
scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have
not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this
case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House
of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting
their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the
provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Consti Case Digests

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined

at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness
is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the
functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by
the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states,
inter alia, that –

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
Consti Case Digests

When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted
several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical
reasons.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their
voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Held:

NO.

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position.
In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
xxx

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases

Consti Case Digests

The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement
of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by
Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public
self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all

prisoners.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners,
at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee

meetings will virtually make him a free man

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time,
he may no longer serve his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5

days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that
of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue
favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
Consti Case Digests

substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. (People vs. Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000)
Consti Case Digests

Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been
finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled
bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek
a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court
has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. Theymay be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
Consti Case Digests

ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of
a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If,
then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as
this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a
viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the
matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it
has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled
meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-
fashioned democratic theory: “Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature,
they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors
by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.”

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

Consti Case Digests

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at
bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just.

Osmena vs Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of
the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of
the Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the
petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech entitled “A
Message to Garcia” wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the President’s administration selling
pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15
months for the serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speech
and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself as stated in the provision that “xxx shall not be questioned in any other place”.

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the
judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House
knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the
suspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done by
unanimous consent.
Consti Case Digests

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed
to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the

House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against
President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to
investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the
President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to
substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing
to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the
House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly
behavior.

Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmena’s parliamentary

privilege of speech

Held: Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any
speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place.

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental

privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President

constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court
believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances
of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white
for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmena’s conduct constituted
disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
government.
Consti Case Digests

Guingona v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
Campos, Jr., J.

Facts:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that
each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a
formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD,
and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from
their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent
the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who
proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN,
two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said
compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.

Issue:

whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the

Commission on Appointments

Held:

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A
literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one
other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation
in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This
is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties.
The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation
of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for
every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a
party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve
such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.
 Consti Case Digests

Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

DECISION
(En Banc)

OZAETA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the
apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen,
of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to
determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was
one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it
– is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion
is essential to obtain what is needed.
Consti Case Digests

xxx xxx xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt
by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate
Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special
Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the
P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to
be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but
that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is
not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material
to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter
under inquiry.

xxx xxx xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to
the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body
to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be
and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for
which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the
life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . .
There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power
may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no
basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge
of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer
to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has
violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against
self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation.
Consti Case Digests

The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on
his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that
question.

ARNAULT VS NAZARENO (G.R. NO. L-3820)

Arnault v. Nazareno
Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid prison.
Denied.

FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000
and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both
to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the
original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the
Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to
complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong
Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of
P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two
estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to
investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution
called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An
intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and
irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of
only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949.
The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction
at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest
H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000;
and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he
transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
Consti Case Digests

It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave
rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then
approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is
being contested in this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent
to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of
the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and
keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those
whose rights might thus be transgressed.

3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name
of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the
bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied
that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him
unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is
punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.” Since according to
the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt
in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim
that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
Consti Case Digests

Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

November 10, 2011

504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly
ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that
“the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate
in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation.