Owing it to the Divorce Decree as ruled in Nevada, USA, the Court, in this case of VAN DORN vs

ROMILLO (1985), maintained that a divorce decree from another country is binding in the
Philippines, even to the foreign spouse, if the decree is valid in his or her country.

“It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law.”

in the case of ONG vs CA (1991), the Court dismissed the contention of Mr. Ong that an
adjudged lot belongs to their conjugal property based on tax declarations where his wife used
the surname "Ong". However, the property remains to be part of the paraphernal property of
Mrs. Ong since no evidence was submitted to further Mr. Ong's argument.

"We disagree. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject
property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is
therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's
name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such
circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, we hold that
the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife."

The case of VILLANUEVA vs CHIONG (2008) illustrated Art. 178 of the Civil Code which states
that de facto separation, without judicial approval, does not affect conjugal property.

“Anent the first issue, petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino
because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their
property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the
conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil
Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not
affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.”

The case of SOLIS vs BARROSO (1928) revolved around a donation of propter nuptias executed
in a private document, which served ineffective since Donation Propter nuptias should be in a
public document. The case also made clear that a donation of propter nuptias is neither
onerous or remuneratory. It is a resolutory condition at most, presupposing even before
fulfillment the existence of an obligation.

“We have, therefore, a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any right,
since it was not made in a public instrument, and hence, article 1279 of the Civil Code which the
lower court applied is not applicable thereto. The lastnamed article provides that, should the
law require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in order to make the
obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply
with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements
for the validity of the contract exist.”

“a donation propter nuptias is based upon the marriage as a consideration, and must be
considered onerous. Neither is this opinion well founded. In donations propter nuptias, the
marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the
obligation. This may be clearly inferred from article 1333, which makes the fact that the
marriage did not take place a cause for the revocation of such donations, thus taking it for
granted that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even without marriage, since that
which has not existed cannot be revoked.”

In the case of DE ROY vs CA (1988), following the Halabuyas precedent, it was cemented that
there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.

“Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official
Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary
to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.”

The case of UYPITCHING vs QUIAMCO (2006) explained the application of Article 19 of the Civil
Code.

“There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not
only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.”

DELA CRUZ vs DELA CRUZ (1968) helped define legal definition of abandonment as used in Art.
178 of the Civil Code. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must
have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be
real abandonment and not mere separation.

“The word "abandonment", when referring to the act of one consort of leaving the other, is
"the act of the husband or the wife who leaves his or her consort willfully, and with an intention
of causing per perpetual separation." Giving to the word "abandoned", as used in article 178,
the meaning drawn from the definitions above reproduced, it seems rather clear that to
constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation of
marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.

Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife
and children permanently. The record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to
his family despite his absence from the conjugal home.”

In the case of MACADANGDANG vs CA (1980), the Supreme Court used Art. 255 of the Civil
Code as parameters in identifying the legitimacy of a child. Under Art. 255 of the Code,
legitimacy of a child is defined by having been born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

“The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This
presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility
of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one
evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120
days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may
be caused by any of these:

1. Impotence of the husband;

2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and

3. Serious illness of the husband.

This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical
impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption (Tolentino,
Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p.
311).”
In FUJIKI vs MARINAY (2013), the court granted petitioner’s request for the RTC to reinstate
further proceedings to nullify the subsequent marriage of his wife, Marinay to Maekara on the
ground of bigamy.

“Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.”

In the concurring opinion of Justice Vitug in the case of TENEBRO vs CA (2012), he answered a
legal riddle: would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its
judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?

“I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party
or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter
explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. As early as the case of
People vs. Aragon this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does
not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior
void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy.”

In the case of TE vs YU TE (2009), the court declared null and void the marriage of Edward and
Rowena Te and held them both suffering from psychological incapacity.

“Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to
agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted
with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.”

In the case of OROPESA vs OROPESA (2012), petitioner’s request to declare respondent as

“Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real
properties registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations,
and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not
in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only
medical document on record is the aforementioned Report of Neuropsychological Screening
which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor
offered as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best,
for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of
respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average
was indeed competent.”