II.

OWNERSHIP:

A. Ownership in General (Arts. 427 – 439);

1. Who may exercise Property Rights (Natural Persons, Juridical Persons, Public
Corporations);

2. Definition;

3. Kinds;

4. Characteristics;

5. Limitations;

6. Torrens Title;

7. Rights of an Owner;

Cases:
SANDEJAS vs. ROBLES, 81 PHIL 421;

CHING vs. CA, 181 SCRA 9;.

Facts:
· Alfredo Ching is the legitimate son of Ching Leng;
· Ching Leng bought a property from Sps. Nofuente and the former registered the property
in her name on September 18, 1961, her postal address was in Pasay City;
· Ching Leng died in Boston and his legitimate son was appointed as administrator of her
estate;
· 13 years after the death of Ching Leng, a suit was commenced on December 27, 1978 by
private respondent Pedro Asedillo against Ching Leng for the reconveyance of said property;
· An amended complaint was made by private respondent alleging “that on account of the
fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known
whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and
other processes only by publication.”
· Summons by publication was made through “Economic Monitor”, newspaper of general
circulation in Province of Rizal, Pasay City. Since no responsive pleading was filed after the
lapse of 60 days, judgment on the merits in favor of private respondents was made.
· Consequently, the title of Ching Leng was cancelled and transferred to private respondent
who sold the same to Villa Esperanza Dev., Inc.
· Petitioner learned of the decision, and so he filed a petition to set it aside as null and void
for lack of jurisdiction;

Lower court decision:

 RTC: At first, granted the verified petition to set aside as null and void the prior order of the
RTC; however, on motion by private respondent, the same was set aside. So, petitioner filed
for reconsideration but was denied.
*the case was elevated directly to SC

Issue: WON reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam which cannot give
jurisdiction to the court by service of summons by publication.
(Note: private respondents argue that they are quasi in rem)

Ruling: Yes, reconveyance and cancellation of title are acts in personam.

Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific
persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole
world.

An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it
binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.

Private respondent’s action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the
judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter’s
death.

According to Dumlao v. Quality plastic products, the decision of the lower court insofar as the
deceased is concerned is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could
not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality, that its fitness
to be subject of legal relations was lost through death.

Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf
by petitioner herein, tracking back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree
of registration was issued.

The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name after one year from the date of the decree is not to set aside
the decree but respecting it and to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
damages if the property has transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.

HERNANDEZ vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 71 SCRA 290;

Facts:
· Petitioner was an employee of defendant in its Legal Department for 21 years until his
retirement due to illness;
· Petitioner was awarded a lot (810 sq-m, type E) in respondent’s Housing Project in Quezon
City;
· However, more than a week thereafter, the Chief Accountant and Comptroller of the private
respondent returned to the petitioner the checks he has paid pursuant to such award and
informed him that the private respondent, through its Committee on Organization, Personnel
and Facilities, had cancelled the award of the lot and hour previously awarded on the ground
that:
(a) He has already retired;
(b) He has only an option to purchase said house and lot;
(c) There are a big number of employees who have no houses or lots;
(d) He has been given his retirement gratuity; that the awarding of the aforementioned house
and lot in his favor would subserve the purpose;
· Petitioner protested the cancellation and so filed a complaint in the CFI of Batangas, seeking
annulment of the cancellation of the award of the lot and house in his favor and the restoration
of all his rights thereto;
· He contends that it is illegal and unwarranted because he has already a vested right thereto
because of the award;
· Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, contending that
since the petitioner’s action affects the title to a house and lot in Quezon city, the same should
have been commenced in the CFI of Quezon City where the real property is located.

Lower court ruling:

CFI of Batangas: sustained the motion to dismiss based on improper venue.

*Case immediately elevated to the SC

Issue: WON the action of petitioner was improperly laid in the CFI of Batangas

Ruling: No, the case was not improperly filed in the CFI of Batangas.

The venue of actions or, more appropriately, the county where the action is triable depends
to a great extent on the nature of the action to be filed, whether it is real or personal.

Real action is one brought for the specific recovery of land, tenements, or hereditaments. A
personal action is one brought for recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some
contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the
commission of an injury to the person or property.

The court agrees that petitioner’s action is not a real but a personal action. As correctly
insisted by petitioner, his action is one to declare null and void the cancellation of the lot and
house in his favor which does not involve title and ownership over said properties but seeks
to compel respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and subsisting one which cannot
arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered payment in full which
it had rejected and returned to petitioner.

Such an action is a personal action which may be properly brought by petitioner in his
residence.

The dismissal is overturned and the suit is remanded for further proceedings.

DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN, 448 SCRA 663;

FACTS: Petitioner FilomenaDomagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent
Vivian Jensen before the MTC alleging that the respondent by means of force, strategy and
stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and
thereafter constructing a fence thereon depriving the petitioner of a 68-square meter
portion of her property along the boundary line.

The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was
apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno
(respondent's brother), who received the same.
The court rendered judgment against the respondent.The respondent failed to appeal the
decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.

The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC for the
annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve
the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never
acquired jurisdiction over her person. Respondent claimed she was a resident of Oslo,
Norway and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and
the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar
Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for and in her
behalf.

In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where
Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of
the complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent was proper since her
brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf.

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The trial
court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the
respondent considering that she left the Philippines for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar
Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in her
behalf.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the appealed decision with
modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action
quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out
of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial
service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which
likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and
none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the
petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and
complaint upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint on the respondent.
Whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent herein is an
action in personam or quasi in rem.

HELD:
The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner
against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner
for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce
a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code,
for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession
thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his
use or occupation of the property.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership
of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the
mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some
act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment
against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the
person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an
injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered
adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for
recovery of real property are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to
subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action
quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are
intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and complaint
by the Sheriff:

In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant
who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons
as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in
accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the
following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section
8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication,
also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is null and void.

In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to
Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the
Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may
only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted
service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that
authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective. As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :

… The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in
lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and
hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here,
no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.

In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence" are
generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the
summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be.
Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is
living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the
country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that
must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the house where the Sheriff
found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is
there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent
was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo
Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him.
The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered
to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which
he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.

The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a resident
of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta
Peralta and OrlandoMacasalda cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had
executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the
house of the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo
Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house.

In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case
No. 879 is null and void.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
8. Doctrine of Self-Help and other rights to Protection and Enforcement (Legal Action – Art.
428, Quieting of Title-Arts. 476 – 481, Recovery of Pessession – Art. 434, Reconveyance,
Replevin and Damages);

Cases: