The Supreme Court ruled that former President Joseph Estrada was eligible to run for public office despite a previous conviction for plunder. The Court found that the pardon granted to Estrada by former President Gloria Arroyo fully restored his civil and political rights, including the right to seek elective office. While the pardon referenced Estrada's commitment not to run for office, the Court held this was not an explicit condition and did not limit the scope of the pardon based on the unambiguous language used. The Court also affirmed the broad pardoning power of the President under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court ruled that former President Joseph Estrada was eligible to run for public office despite a previous conviction for plunder. The Court found that the pardon granted to Estrada by former President Gloria Arroyo fully restored his civil and political rights, including the right to seek elective office. While the pardon referenced Estrada's commitment not to run for office, the Court held this was not an explicit condition and did not limit the scope of the pardon based on the unambiguous language used. The Court also affirmed the broad pardoning power of the President under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court ruled that former President Joseph Estrada was eligible to run for public office despite a previous conviction for plunder. The Court found that the pardon granted to Estrada by former President Gloria Arroyo fully restored his civil and political rights, including the right to seek elective office. While the pardon referenced Estrada's commitment not to run for office, the Court held this was not an explicit condition and did not limit the scope of the pardon based on the unambiguous language used. The Court also affirmed the broad pardoning power of the President under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court ruled that former President Joseph Estrada was eligible to run for public office despite a previous conviction for plunder. The Court found that the pardon granted to Estrada by former President Gloria Arroyo fully restored his civil and political rights, including the right to seek elective office. While the pardon referenced Estrada's commitment not to run for office, the Court held this was not an explicit condition and did not limit the scope of the pardon based on the unambiguous language used. The Court also affirmed the broad pardoning power of the President under the Constitution.
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Risos-Vidal v.
COMELEC been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by
Jan 21, 2015, Leonardo-De Castro J. former President Gloria M. Arroyo. FACTS: Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence proclaimed as Mayor of Manila. and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended ISSUE: executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which political rights. carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office? YES In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases HELD: against him prospered but he only placed second in the Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all results. his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in actually specify which political right is restored, it could be relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the text. Revised Penal Code.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former by legislative action. President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty other acts of executive clemency, to wit: of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly after conviction by final judgment. remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. The disqualification of former President Estrada under xxxx Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence granted to him for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section of the Commission. 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows the only instances in which the President may not extend any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in office, whether local or national position. which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. The third preambular clause of the pardon did not If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be operate to make the pardon conditional. conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights pardon extended to former President Estrada. to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
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