REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the 3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, 1.

Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of

Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center contacting or communicating with petitioner; 4. Respondent the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio
(AFPFC), Petitioner, is prohibited from using or possessing any firearm or deadly Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
vs. weapon on occasions not related to his job;
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent. 2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo,
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support Quezon City;
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under to the petitioner.
Rule 45 which seeks to nullify and set aside the 3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St.,
Decision1 dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution2 dated The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials Cagayan de Oro City.
March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao through the Chairman in the area where the petitioner and
Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The CA affirmed the respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
orders and decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental are directed to
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary and respond to any request for assistance from the petitioner for
permanent protection orders, and denying the motion to lift IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL
the implementation of this order. They are also directed to
the said temporary protection order (TPO). ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE
accompany the petitioner to their conjugal abode at Purok 2,
AND HEARING ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF
Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance belongings in order to insure the safety of the petitioner. SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR POSTPONE THE
of protection order under the provisions of Republic Act
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT
(R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her serve the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) upon the AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID
husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an respondent personally and to seek and obtain the HEARING.
enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in assistance of law enforcement agents, if needed, for
January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married purposes of effecting the smooth implementation of this
on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE
order.
respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in partner. OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING
ON THE MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE
In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be COURT SHALL ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows: served upon the respondent for him to file an OPPOSITION EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND RENDER
within a period of five (5) days from receipt hereof and let a JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND
Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Preliminary Conference and hearing on the merits be set on EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE
Order to be sufficient in form and substance and to prevent October 17, 2006 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.
great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, a
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER is forthwith issued to To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON directing him to respondent’s retirement and other benefits, the following
do the following acts: agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of
retirement, pension and other benefits of respondent,
the TPO, appeared during the scheduled pre-trial but
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed
informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and
committing further acts of physical abuse and violence Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp requested for time to hire his own counsel. However, he did
against the petitioner; Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders
not hire a counsel nor file an opposition or answer to the
from the court:
petition. Because of his failure to appear in the subsequent
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from hearings of the case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte
petitioner, her residence or her place of work; presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of
issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested wishing she would die and he would celebrate if it happens Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance
that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to give her spousal and by calling and sending her threatening text messages. Center (AFPFC), assisted by the Office of the Judge
support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no These incidents had caused petitioner great psychological Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a
source of livelihood since he had told her to resign from her trauma causing her [to] fear for her life and these forced her Manifestation and Motion (To Lift Temporary Protection
job and concentrate on keeping their house), the RTC to seek refuge from the court for protection. Economically, Order Against the AFP)8 dated November 10, 2008. Stating
issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give petitioner was also deprived by respondent of her spousal that it was making a limited and special appearance,
respondent spousal support in the amount of ₱4,000.00 per support despite order of the court directing him to give a petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished
month and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing, the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC)
which shall be automatically deducted and given directly to this court finds a need to protect the life of the petitioner not copy of the TPO for appropriate action. The PGMC, on
respondent.5 only physically but also emotionally and psychologically. September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the
temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon Based on the evidence presented, both oral and Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29,
never complied with the TPO as he continued making documentary, and there being no controverting evidence 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for
threats and inflicting physical abuse on her person, and presented by respondent, this Court finds that the applicant the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, and
failed to give her spousal support as ordered by the court. has established her case by preponderance of evidence. requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of releasing
the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC
that S/Sgt. Yahon’s check representing his 36 MLS had
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, 6 as WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
follows: rendered GRANTING the petition, thus, pursuant to Sec. 30 been processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC,
of A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION but to date said check has not been claimed by respondent.
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented ORDER be issued immediately and respondent, S/Sgt.
CHARLES A.YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially
in this case, this court finds that there is a need to
R. YAHON the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS discharged its obligation under the TPO, the RTC had not
permanently protect the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from
further acts of violence that might be committed by (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal support. acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack
respondent against her. Evidences showed that respondent of summons, and hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the
said court order. Additionally, petitioner contended that the
who was a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007,
AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger
assigned at the Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to
to the proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of
Cagayan de Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other
TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner
physical, verbal, emotional and economic abuse and claims that may be due or released to him from the
violence upon the petitioner. Respondent in several government and the said share of petitioner shall be lamented that it was not afforded due process and it was
instances had slapped, mauled and punched petitioner automatically deducted from respondent’s benefits and thus improper to issue execution against the AFPFC.
Consequently, petitioner emphasized its position that the
causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and D are medical claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R.
AFPFC cannot be directed to comply with the TPO without
certificates showing physical injuries suffered by petitioner Yahon.
violating its right to procedural due process.
inflicted by the respondent at instances of their marital
altercations. Respondent at the height of his anger often Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding
poked a gun on petitioner and threatened to massacre her In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the
General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed Forces of
and her child causing them to flee for their lives and sought aforesaid motion for having been filed out of time. It noted
the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the
refuge from other people. He had demanded sex from that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007
Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon
petitioner at an unreasonable time when she was sick and Decision granting Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to
City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St.,
chilling and when refused poked a gun at her. Several police Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict respondent had long become final and executory.
blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner documenting compliance.
the incidents when she was subjected to respondent’s ill Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
temper and ill treatment. Verbally, petitioner was not spared under the RTC’s Order10 dated March 6, 2009.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
from respondent’s abuses by shouting at her that he was
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its residence, school, place of employment, or any specified
before the CA praying for the nullification of the aforesaid enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family
orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to latter’s lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a or household member;
automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement and protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No.
pension benefits and directly give the same to respondent 9262. (e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an
as spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of automobile and other essential personal effects, regardless
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent filed A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement
her Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary further acts of violence against women and their children, officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the
Injunction, manifesting that there is no information as to their family or household members, and to grant other parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the
whether S/Sgt. Yahon already received his retirement necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended possession of the automobile and other essential personal
benefit and that the latter has repeatedly violated the TPO, parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their effects, or to supervise the petitioner’s or respondent’s
particularly on the provision of spousal support. daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain removal of personal belongings;
control of their life.13 The protection orders issued by the
After due hearing, the CA‘s Twenty-Second Division issued court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a (f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a
a Resolution11 granting respondent’s application, viz: Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order child/children to the petitioner;
that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the Barangay Protection Order (BPO).14 (g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the
parties, the Court finds meritorious private respondent’s woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support.
application for the issuance of an injunctive relief. While the Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall
36-month lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit: order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of
Yahon has already been given to him, yet as admitted by the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's
petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly
retirement benefits has not yet been released to him. It or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay
appears that the release of such pension could render mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child
ineffectual the eventual ruling of the Court in this Petition. without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue enjoining the Armed petitioner, directly or indirectly; (h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or
Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its employees, possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him
agents, representatives, and any all persons acting on its to surrender the same to the court for appropriate
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the
behalf, from releasing the remaining pension that may be disposition by the court, including revocation of license and
residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the
due to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon. disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court
SO ORDERED.12 violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, and take appropriate action on matter;
petition for certiorari and affirmed the assailed orders and remain there until respondent has gathered his things and
decision of the RTC. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s escort respondent from the residence; (i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence
motion for reconsideration. inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage,
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner medical expenses, child care expenses and loss of income;
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether and any designated family or household member at a
petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the
petitioner temporary shelter and other social services that garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by legislative will.19
the petitioner may need; and the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies
including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems from all financial obligations of the members, including his enactment, should be construed as laying down an
necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement
petitioner and any designated family or household member, occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares
provided petitioner and any designated family or household functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of
member consents to such relief. (Emphasis supplied.) with his position or work except when his monetary liability, the income or salary of the respondent by the employer,
contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS. which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
directive for the automatic deduction of 50% from S/Sgt. In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that
Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be given directly a court order directing the Philippine National Bank to refrain Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO
to respondent, as it contravenes an explicit mandate under from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits
the law governing the retirement and separation of military deliver one-half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds,
personnel. latter’s conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it violates citing the case of Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this
Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts Court sustained the CA when it held that the garnishment of
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) retirement benefits from execution. the amount of ₱10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply
No. 1638,15 which states: Section 31. The benefits while it was still in the possession of the Bureau of
authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void.
shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which governs The CA therein relied on the previous rulings in Director of
execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion21 and Avendano v.
assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, 39 enumerates those properties which are exempt from Alikpala, et al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void
That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is execution: the garnishment of the salaries of government employees.
entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled
money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in
active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, Pacific Products:
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that
applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.) xxxx money in the hands of public officers, although it may be
due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise (l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason
known as the "Government Service Insurance System Act of obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be
1997," which reads: the Government;(Emphasis supplied.) sued in its own courts except by express authorization by
the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of
x Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as
irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment
must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of
the Government, belong to the latter, although the
xxxx will.17 Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with
defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
other statutes as to form a uniform system of
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be
of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy
the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later
forbids it.23
We disagree. SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared that the domestic violence and provide them continued protection
State values the dignity of women and children and against threats to their personal safety and security.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
"employer," which includes in its coverage the military recognizes the need to protect the family and its members "The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does particularly women and children, from violence and threats ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section to their personal safety and security. remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk
government. Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
violence committed against women and children in keeping or household member safety in the family residence, and to
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
child support, is a support enforcement Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration the employment and support of the victim. It also enables
legislation.1âwphi1 In the United States, provisions of the of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All the court to award temporary custody of minor children to
Child Support Enforcement Act24 allow garnishment of Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed Rights of the Child and other international human rights by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."29
to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these instruments of which the Philippines is a party.27
provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
problems" and provide that "moneys payable by the Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child Decision dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution dated
Government to any individual are subject to child support support specifically address one form of violence committed March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in
enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended to against women – economic abuse. CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
"create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state
courts could issue valid orders directed against Government D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to No costs.
agencies attaching funds in their possession."25 make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following: SO ORDERED.
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is
constitutional and does not violate the equal protection 1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim
clause. In Garcia v. Drilon26 the issue of constitutionality was from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds
protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions
which justify the classification under the law: the unequal
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources
power relationship between women and men; the fact that
and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; community or property owned in common;
and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.
3. Destroying household property;
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane
to the purpose of the law, viz:
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely
controlling the conjugal money or properties.28
The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective
Declaration of Policy, as follows: of restoring the dignity of women who are victims of
 . . . The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign copy thereof, pursuant to Section 7, Article IX, of the
all appointments of the other employees of the Board. 1 Constitution. We quote:
HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as City
Mayor of Manila, petitioner, The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
vs. Personnel Bureau of the Mayor's office "comment and/or law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R. recommendation" on whether the payroll of the newly be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
LACUNA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and Presiding appointed employees of the City Council may be paid on the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
Officer of the City Council of Manila, and THE CITY basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor.2 The thereof.5
COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents. Personnel Bureau then forwarded the query to the City
Legal Officer who, in a 3rd endorsement dated September As we held, the Civil Service Commission, under the
The City Legal Officer for petitioner. 19, 1988,3 rendered an opinion that the proper appointing Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to
Lacuna, Bello & Associates Law Offices for Danilo B. officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. This the civil service and as such, its judgments are
Lacuna opinion was transmitted by the Secretary to the City Mayor unappealable and subject only to this
to the Commission. Court's certiorari jurisdiction.6

SARMIENTO, J.: On February 1, 1989, the Commission promulgated The petitioner's omission notwithstanding, we are
Resolution No. 89-075, and held that contrary to the opinion nevertheless accepting the petition and because of the
of the City Legal Officer, it is the City Council to which the important public interest it involves, we are considering it as
The only question in this petition, denominated as a "direct
appointing power is vested. The dispositive portion thereof a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, considering further
appeal under Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e), of the
is as follows: that it was filed within the thirty-day period.7
Constitution and Section 9(3), of Batas Blg. 129," is whether
the City Council of Manila still has the power to appoint
Council officers and employees under Republic Act No. 409, WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the As the petitioner contends, Section 15 of Republic Act No.
otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Manila, or Commission resolved to rule, as it hereby rules that the 409 as amended has supposedly been repealed by
whether the power is now vested with the City Mayor proper appointing authority of the officers and employees of Republic Act No. 5185, specifically, Section 4 thereof, which
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization the City Council of Manila is the City Council and the we quote, in part:
Law, and Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code. The signatory of individual appointments thus issued is the City
facts are as follows: Vice-Mayor of Manila.4 xxx xxx xxx

On September 13, 1988, the Vice-Mayor of Manila and As we stated at the outset, the issue is whether or not
The City Assessor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of Police
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, the Hon. Section 15, supra, of the Charter of the City of Manila has
and City Chief of Fire Department and other heads of offices
Danilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil Service been repealed, and as a result, the City Council can no
entirely paid out of city funds and their respective assistants
Commission, through the Regional Director of the National longer tender appointments to Council positions. or deputies shall, subject to civil service law, rules and
Capital Region, the appointments of nineteen officers and regulations, be appointed by the City Mayor: Provided,
employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the As we also mentioned at the outset, this petition has been however, That this section shall not apply to Judges,
Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the brought by way of a "direct appeal" from the resolution of Auditors, Fiscals, City Superintendents of Schools,
provisions of Section 15, of said Republic Act No. 409, as the Civil Service Commission pursuant supposedly to the Supervisors, Principals, City Treasurers, City Health Officers
amended, which reads: Constitution and Batas Blg. 129. In this connection, we have and City Engineers.
held that no appeal lies from the decisions of the Civil
Sec. 15. . . . . Service Commission, and that parties aggrieved thereby
xxx xxx xxx
may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, within thirty days from receipt of a
xxx xxx xxx All other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial,
city or municipal general funds, road and bridge funds,
school funds, and other local funds, shall, subject to civil Why a special law prevails over a general law has been put WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the by the Court as follows:
Provincial Governor, City or Municipal Mayor upon SO ORDERED.
recommendation of the office head concerned. . . .8 xxx xxx xxx

and by Batas Blg. 337, we likewise quote: . . . The Legislature consider and make provision for all the
circumstances of the particular case.1âwphi1 The
Sec. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers, Legislature having specially considered all of the facts and
and Duties. — circumstances in the particular case in granting a special
charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by
xxx xxx xxx adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to
the provisions of the charter, and without making any
mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter,
(2) The city mayor shall:
intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis
vs. Cook County, 74 I11. App., 151; Philippine Railway Co.
xxx xxx xxx vs. Nolting 34 Phil., 401.)12

(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and In one case, we held that Republic Act No. 5185 did not
regulations, all officers and employees of the city, whose divest the Mayor of Manila of his power under the Charter of
appointments are not otherwise provided in this Code; 9 the City of Manila to approve the city budget.13

There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides We also agree with the Civil Service Commission that the
specifically for the organization of the Government of the provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving mayors the
City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city
No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal funds14 and those of Batas Blg. 337, empowering local
governments in general, are general laws. As the Solicitor executives with the authority to appoint "all officers and
General points out, and we agree with him, it is a canon of employees of the city,"15 were meant not to vest the city
statutory construction that a special law prevails over a mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to
general law — regardless of their dates of passage — and underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over
the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to local officials and employees from the President to the local
the general.10 governments and to highlight the autonomy of local
governments. They were not meant, however, to deprive the
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict City Council of Manila for instance, its appointing power
between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible, the granted by existing statute, and after all, that arrangement is
laws must be reconciled in that manner. sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the
Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.
and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be
very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in In the light of an the foregoing, we do not find any grave
time repeals the other.11 abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
Commission.
G.R. No. L-55230 November 8, 1988 Perio, Jr. caused the posting of a signboard at the San On May 21, 1980, the petitioner wrote the FDA requesting
Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent closure. 8 reconsideration of its order of April 29, 1980, allowing
HON. RICHARD J. GORDON, in his capacity as City resumption of the operation of the San Sebastian Drug
Mayor of Olongapo, petitioner, Acting on the same investigation report of the "test-buy," Store. 18 The request was denied by the FDA in its reply
vs. and after hearing, FDA Administrator Arsenio Regala, on dated May 27, 1980. 19
JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II and Spouses April 25, 1980, directed the closure of the drug store for
EDUARDO and ROSALINDA YAMBAO, respondents. three days and its payment of a P100.00 fine for violation of A motion for reconsideration of the status quo order had
R.A. No. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to Yambao earlier been filed on May 1, 1980 by the petitioner. After a
CRUZ, J.: against a repetition of the infraction. 9 On April 29, 1980, the joint hearing and an exchange of memoranda thereon, the
FDA lifted its closure order after noting that the penalties respondent judge issued an order on July 16, 1980, 20 the
imposed had already been discharged and allowed the drug dispositive portion of which read as follows:
The issue before the Court is the conflict between the Food
store to resume operations. 10
and Drug Administration and the mayor of Olongapo City
over the power to grant and revoke licenses for the WHEREFORE, the defendants' motion for reconsideration
operation of drug stores in the said city. While conceding On April 30, 1980, Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a of the status quo order dated May 15, 1980, is hereby
that the FDA possesses such power, the mayor claims he letter to the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the revoca DENIED and the letter of the defendant city mayor dated
may nevertheless, in the exercise of his own power, prevent tion of Mayor's Permit No. 1954. 11 On May 7, 1980, having April 17, 1980, for the revocation of Mayor's Permit No.
the operation of drug stores previously permitted by the received no reply, she and her husband filed with the 1954 for the San Sebastian Drug Store is declared null and
former. Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint for void.
mandamus and damages, with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, against the petitioner and Vice-Mayor Accordingly, a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction is
There are two drug stores involved in this dispute, to wit, the
de Perio. 12 heretofore issued enjoining defendants from doing acts
San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug
Store, both owned by private respondent Rosalinda directed towards the closure of the San Sebastian Drug
Yambao. 1 They are located a few meters from each other On the same date, Yambao requested permission from the Store and the suspension of the Olongapo City Drug Store
in the same building on Hospital Road, Olongapo FDA to exchange the locations of the San Sebastian Drug both situated at Hospital Road, Olongapo City. Further, the
City. 2 They were covered by Mayor's Permits Nos. 1954 Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store for reasons of signboard posted at San Sebastian Drug Store by the
and 1955, respectively, issued for the year 1980, 3 and "business preference." 13 defendants is ordered removed in order that the said drug
licenses to operate issued by the FDA for the same year. 4 store will resume its normal business operation.
The request was granted. 14 But when informed of this
This case arose when on March 21, 1980, at about 5:00 action, the petitioner, in a letter to the private respondent The hearing of the main petition for damages is set on
o'clock in the afternoon, a joint team composed of agents dated May 13, 1980, disapproved the transfers and August 14, 1980, at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine suspended Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City
Constabulary conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug Drug Store. 15 The petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above
Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. worth stated order was denied in an order dated September 4,
P410.00 without a doctor's prescription.. 5 The Yambaos then filed on May 15, 1980, a supplemental 1980. 21 The petitioner thereupon came to this Court in this
complaint questioning the said suspension and praying for petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary,
A report on the operation was submitted to the petitioner, as the issuance of a preliminary writ of prohibitory injunction, to challenge the aforesaid orders.
mayor of Olongapo City, on April 9, 1980. 6 On April 17, injunction. 16 On the same day, the respondent judge
1980, he issued a letter summarily revoking Mayor's Permit issued an order directing the maintenance of the status quo We issued a temporary restraining order against the
No. 1954, effective April 18, 1980, "for rampant violation of with respect to the Olongapo City Drug Store pending respondent judge on October 2 7, 1980, 22 but lifted it on
R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A. resolution of the issues. 17 December 10, 1980, for failure of the petitioner to file his
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." 7 Later, when comment on the private respondents' motion to lift the said
the petitioner went to Singapore, Vice-Mayor Alfredo T. de order and/or for issuance of a counter restraining order. 23
First, let us compare the bases of the powers and functions However, should during the period of issue, a violation of Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances, rules and
respectively claimed by the FDA and the petitioner as mayor any provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and/or regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
of Olongapo City. the regulations issued thereunder be committed, this
License shall be subject to suspension or revocation. An application to establish a drug store in Olongapo City
The task of drug inspection was originally lodged with the must be filed with the Office of the Mayor and must show
Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners pursuant to Act 2762, When the drug addiction problem continued to aggravate, that the applicant has complied with the existing ordinances
as amended by Act 4162. By virtue of Executive Order No. P.D. No. 280 was promulgated on August 27, 1973, to give on health and sanitation, location or zoning, fire or building,
392 dated January 1, 1951 (mandating reorganization of more teeth to the powers of the FDA, thus: and other local requirements. If the application is approved,
various departments and agencies), this was assumed by the applicant is granted what is denominated a "Mayor's
the Department of Health and exercised through an office in Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary Permit" providing inter alia that it "is valid only at the place
the Bureau of Health known as the Drug Inspection Section. notwithstanding, the Food and Drug Administrator is hereby stated above and until (date), unless sooner revoked for
This section was empowered "to authorize the opening of authorized to order the closure, or suspend or revoke the cause." 24
pharmacies, drug stores and dispensaries, and similar license of any drug establishment which after administrative
establishments after inspection by persons authorized by investigation is found guilty of selling or dispensing drugs Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently
law." medicines and other similar substances in violation of the conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and Dangerous Drugs Act of instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against
The Food and Drug Administration was created under R.A. 1972, or other laws regulating the sale or dispensation of the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy
No. 3720 (otherwise known as the Food, Drug and drugs, or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto. is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing
Cosmetic Act), approved on June 22, 1963, and vested with in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same
all drug inspection functions in line with "the policy of the Sec. 2. The administrative investigation shall be summary in legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time
State to insure safe and good quality supply of food, drug character. The owner of the drug store shall be given an also according due respect to a coordinate department of
and cosmetics, and to regulate the production, sale and opportunity to be heard. (P.D. 280, emphasis supplied.) the government. It is this policy the Court will apply in
traffic of the same to protect the health of the people." arriving at the interpretation of the laws above-cited and the
Section 5 of this Act specifically empowers it: conclusions that should follow therefrom.
For his part, the petitioner, traces his authority to the charter
of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645, which inter alia empowers
(e) to issue certificates of compliance with technical the city mayor under Section 10 thereof: A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to
requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of license operate issued by the FDA is a condition precedent to the
and spotcheck for compliance with regulations regarding k. to grant or refuse municipal licenses to operate or permits grant of a mayor's permit to the drug store seeking to
operation of food, drug and cosmetic manufacturers and operate within the limits of the city. This requirement is
of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the
establishments. imperative. The power to determine if the opening of the
conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts
drug store is conformable to the national policy and the laws
prohibited by law or city ordinances are being committed
For a more effective exercise of this function, the on the regulation of drug sales belongs to the FDA. Hence,
under protection of such licenses or in the premises in which
Department of Health issued on March 5, 1968, the business for which the same have been granted is a permit issued by the mayor to a drug store not previously
Administrative Order No. 60, series of 1968, laying down the carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest. cleared with and licensed by the said agency will be a
requirements for the application to be filed with the FDA for nullity.
authorization to operate or establish a drug establishment.
The charter also provides, in connection with the powers of
The order provides that upon approval of the application, the This is not to say, however, that the issuance of the mayor's
the city health officer, that:
FDA shall issue to the owner or administrator of the drug permit is mandatory once it is shown that the FDA has
store or similar establishment a "License to Operate" which licensed the operation of the applicant drug store. This is not
"shall be renewed within the first 3 months of each year Sec. 6 (k). He and his representatives shall have the power a necessary consequence. For while it may appear that the
upon payment of the required fees." This license contains to arrest violators of health laws, ordinances, rules and applicant has complied with the pertinent national laws and
the following reservation: regulations and to recommend the revocation or suspension policies, this fact alone will not signify compliance with the
of the permits of the different establishments to the City particular conditions laid down by the local authorities like
zoning, building, health, sanitation, and safety regulations, findings on the matter and substitute them for the decision
and other municipal ordinances enacted under the general already made by the FDA.
welfare clause. This compliance still has to be ascertained
by the mayor if the permit is to be issued by his office. It would have been different if the offense condoned by the
Should he find that the local requirements have not been FDA was a violation of, say, a city ordinance requiring
observed, the mayor must then, in the exercise of his own buildings to be provided with safety devices or equipment,
authority under the charter, refuse to grant the permit like fire extinguishers. The city executive may ignore such
sought. condonation and revoke the mayor's permit just the same. In
this situation, he would be acting properly because the
The power to approve a license includes by implication,. enforcement of the city ordinance is his own prerogative. In
even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By the present case, however, the condition allegedly violated
extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to related to a national law, not to a matter of merely local
grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place. concern, and so came under the 'jurisdiction of the FDA.
Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding that the
applicant drug store has complied with the requirements of Settled is the rule that the factual findings of administrative
the general laws and the implementing administrative rules authorities are accorded great respect because of their Rosalinda Yambao
and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA may acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to c/o San Sebastian Drug Store
revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted which they are assigned. 25 Even the courts of justice, Hospital Road, Olongapo City
the permit upon his ascertainment that the conditions including this Court, are concluded by such findings in the
thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have been absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, Madame:
complied with, it is only for the violation of such conditions which is not present in the case at bar. For all his
that the mayor may revoke the said permit. experience in the enforcement of city ordinances, the Based on a report submitted by PC Major Virtus V. Gil,
petitioner cannot claim the superior aptitudes of the FDA in Chief 3 RFO, Dis. B, Task Force "Bagong Buhay," "you are
Conversely, the mayor may not revoke his own permit on the enforcement of the pharmacy and drug addiction laws. rampantly violating the provisions of Republic Act 5921
the ground that the compliance with the conditions laid down He should therefore also be prepared, like the courts of otherwise known as the 'Pharmacy Law."
and found satisfactory by the FDA when it issued its license justice themselves, to accept its decisions on this matter.
is in his own view not acceptable. This very same principle
Aside from this, there is evidence that you are dispensing
also operates on the FDA. The FDA may not revoke its The petitioner magnifies the infraction committed by the San regulated drugs contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6425
license on the ground that the conditions laid down in the Sebastian Drug Store but the FDA minimizes it. According otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
mayor's permit have been violated notwithstanding that no to the FDA Administrator, Valium is not even a prohibited
such finding has been made by the mayor. drug, which is why the penalty imposed was only a 3-day
In view of the above, Mayors Permit No. 1954 heretofore
closure of the drug store and a fine of P100.00. 26 Notably,
issued in your name for the operation of a drug store (San
In the present case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug the criminal charges filed against the private respondent for Sebastian) at the Annex Building of the Fil-Am (IYC), along
Store was ordered by the FDA for violation of its own the questioned transaction were dismissed by the fiscal's Hospital Road, this City, is REVOKED effective April 18,
conditions, which it certainly had the primary power to office. 27
1980.
enforce. By revoking the mayor's permit on the same ground
for which the San Sebastian Drug Store had already been It is also worth noting that the San Sebastian Drug Store
penalized by the FDA, the mayor was in effect reversing the PLEASE BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY.
was penalized by the FDA only after a hearing held on April
derision of the latter on a matter that came under its 25, 1980, at which private respondent Yambao, assisted by
jurisdiction. As the infraction involved the pharmacy and her lawyer-husband, appeared and testified. 28 By contrast,
drug laws which the FDA had the direct responsibility to the revocation of the mayor's permit was communicated to
execute, the mayor had no authority to interpose his own her in a letter 29 reading simply as follows:
If only for the violation of due process which is manifest from stores as approved by the mayor in the light of the needs of
this letter, the mayor's
y arbitrary action can be annulled. the city. Only the mayor could.
o
The indefiniteu suspension of the mayor's permit for We assume that Mayor's Permit No. 1954 could also have
Olongapo City rDrug Store was based on the transfer thereof been validly suspended for the same reason (as the sites of
s San Sebastian Drug Store as approved by
to the site of the the two drug stores were exchanged without amendment of
,
the FDA but without permission from the petitioner. On this their respective permits) were it not for the fact that such
matter, the Court believes that the final decision rested with permit was revoked by the petitioner on the more serious
the mayor. The condition violated ( related more to the ground of violation of the Pharmacy Law and the Dangerous
location in Olongapo City of Sbusiness establishments in Drugs Act of 1972.
general than to the regulation G of drug stores in particular. It
therefore came under the petitioner's
D jurisdiction. It is understood, however, that the suspension should be
. deemed valid only as the two drug stores have not returned
The FDA would have the right) to disapprove the site of the to their original sites as specified in their respective permits.
drug store only if it would impair the health or other interests Indefinite suspension will amount to a permanent
of the customers in contravention R of the national laws or revocation, which will not be a commensurate penalty with
policies, as where the drug store I is located in an unsanitary the degree of the violation being penalized.
site. But the local executive wouldC have reason to object to
the location, even if approved by H the FDA, where it does not
The Court adds that denial of the request for transfer, if
conform to, say, a zoning ordinanceA intended to promote the properly made by the private respondents, may not be
comfort and convenience of theRcity residents. validly denied by the judge in the absence of a clear
D
showing that the transfer sought will prejudice the residents
The reason given by the petitioner in disapproving the of the city. As the two drug stores are only a few meters
transfer was violation of Mayor'sJ Permit No. 1955, which by from each other, and in the same building, there would
.
its terms was valid only at the place stated therein. In the seem to be no reason why the mere exchange of their
letter of May 13, 1980 30 the private respondent was clearly locations should not be permitted. Notably, the location of
G
informed that for violation of the condition of Mayor's Permit the two drug stores had previously been approved in
O
No. 1955 granting her the of operating the Olongapo City Mayor's Permit Nos. 1954 and 1955.
R
Drug Store at No. 1-B Fil-Am Bldg., Hospital Road, the said
permit was "hereby suspended." D We find that that reason
O Our holding is that the petitioner acted invalidly in revoking
was valid enough. The permit clearly allowed the drug store Mayor's Permit No. 1954 after the FDA had authorized the
N
to operate in the address given and not elsewhere. No resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store
hearing was necessary because the transfer without the following the enforcement of the penalties imposed upon it.
C
mayor's permission is not disputed and was in fact impliedly However, it was competent for the petitioner to suspend
i
admitted by the private respondent.
t Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo
y City Drug Store in violation of the said permit. Such
If the private respondent wanted to transfer her drug store, suspension should nevertheless be effective only pending
what she should have done was M to secure the approval not the return of the drug store to its authorized original site or
only of the FDA but also, and a especially, of the mayor. the eventual approval by the mayor of the requested
Merely notifying the petitioner yof the change in the location transfer if found to be warranted.
of her drug stores as allowed oby the FDA was not enough.
The FDA had no authority to revoke
r that particular condition
of the mayor's permits indicating the sites of the two drug
The petitioner is to be commended for his zeal in the
promotion of the campaign against drug addiction, which
has sapped the vigor and blighted the future of many of our
people, especially the youth. The legal presumption is that
he acted in good faith and was motivated only by his
concern for the residents of Olongapo City when he directed
the closure of the first drug store and the suspension of the
permit of the other drug store. It appears, though, that he
may have overreacted and was for this reason properly
restrained by the respondent judge.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders of July 6, 1980 and

September 4, 1980, are MODIFIED in the sense that the
suspension of Mayor's Permit No. 1955 shall be considered
valid but only until the San Sebastian Drug Store and the
Olongapo City Drug Store return to their original sites as
specified in the FDA licenses and the mayor's permits or
until the request for transfer, if made by the private
respondents, is approved by the petitioner. The rest of the
said Orders are AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds
vs. Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing were available.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF Corporation. He was also associated with several civic
APPEALS, respondents. organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner. Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents. plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary complaint, without costs.
occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income
of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by
the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by
was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is
his business associates and friends. During the period of his
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the
treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for
jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the
minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a the welfare of his minor children since he was their only City of Manila.
support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated
stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present
and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 40
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section,
his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of
the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled
Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the
1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was
reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions
was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the
City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the provisions. or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella
catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 Philippines which provides:
region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by
anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said
required further medical treatment by a private practitioner office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
who charged therefor P1,400.00. and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges,
catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended to, public buildings, and other public works under their control
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico
either by immediately replacing the missing cover or or supervision.
filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint
covering the catchbasin with steel matting that because of
— which was, subsequently, amended — for damages
against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail
iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in
City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil
the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by
theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
the Court of Appeals,
the city government has changed the position and layout of
catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the
accountant, a businessman and a professor at the we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
side of the gutter; and that these changes had been application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special
University of the East. He held responsible positions in
various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards
the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and
of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location,
liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such
persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such
"to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal for the reconsideration thereof. fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to protection against injury to persons or property, and
enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and
of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making necessary for the liability therein established to attach that culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be
for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said obstructed.
— specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by
under their control or supervision." In other words, said if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated
section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the
2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides: giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities
Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective in the construction of roads and streets within their
condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely
have the following legislative powers: implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917,
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway
Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him funds. Moreover, it provides that "the
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for
took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of the laying out, construction and improvement, and construction, maintenance and improvement of national
Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith. to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and
city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District
wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the
places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of
allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and
Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the shall be financed from such appropriations as may be
amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or
defective condition of a street which is "under the the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and special appropriation Acts."
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the all structures in and under the same and the erecting of
amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos
streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of
in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in
drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were
and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of
and zealous in the performance of their respective functions provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject
and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and to our review. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
is under its control and supervision. amusements which may annoy persons using the streets City of Manila. It is so ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
and public places, or frighten horses or other animals;
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor
national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of
 contract of lease for another term, commencing November, depends upon said condition. It should be noted that a
1985 to October, 1988. 4 In reply to said letter, petitioner renewal constitutes a new contract of lease although with
FRANCISCO LAO LIM, petitioner, advised private respondent that he did not agree to a the same terms and conditions as those in the expired
vs. renewal of the lease contract upon its expiration in October, lease. It should also not be overlooked that said condition is
COURT OF APPEALS and BENITO VILLAVICENCIO 1985. 5 not resolutory in nature because it is not a condition that
DY, respondents. terminates the lease contract. The lease contract is for a
On January 15, 1986, because of private respondent's definite period of three (3) years upon the expiration of
Gener E. Asuncion for petitioner. refusal to vacate the premises, petitioner filed another which the lease automatically terminates.
ejectment suit, this time with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Natividad T. Perez for private respondent. Manila in Civil Case No. 114659-CV. In its decision of The invalidity of a condition in a lease contract similar to the
September 24, 1987, said court dismissed the complaint on one at bar has been resolved in Encarnacion vs. Baldomar,
the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired, et al. 9 where we ruled that in an action for ejectment, the
Respondent Court of Appeals having affirmed in toto on being a continuous one the period whereof depended upon defense interposed by the lessees that the contract of lease
June 30, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13925, 1 the decision of the lessee's need for the premises and his ability to pay the authorized them to continue occupying the premises as long
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLVI in Civil rents; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into in the as they paid the rents is untenable, because it would leave
Case No. 87-42719, entitled "Francisco Lao Lim vs. Benito aforesaid Civil Case No. 051063-CV constitutes res to the lessees the sole power to determine whether the
Villavicencio Dy," petitioner seeks the reversal of such judicata to the case before it. 6 lease should continue or not. As stated therein, "(i)f this
affirmance in the instant petition. defense were to be allowed, so long as defendants elected
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the
The records show that private respondent entered into a which, in its decision of January 28, 1988 in Civil Case No. rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it;
contract of lease with petitioner for a period of three (3) 87-42719, affirmed the decision of the lower court. 7 conversely, although the owner should desire the lease to
years, that is, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term continue, the lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if
expired, private respondent refused to vacate the premises, they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple
As stated at the outset, respondent Court of Appeals
hence, petitioner filed an ejectment suit against the former in expedient of stopping payment of the rentals. This, of
affirmed in full said decision of the Regional Trial Court and
the City Court of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. course, is prohibited by the aforesaid article of the Civil
held that (1) the stipulation in the compromise agreement
051063-CV. The case was terminated by a judicially Code. (8 Manresa, 3rd ed., pp. 626, 627; Cuyugan vs.
which, in its formulation, allows the lessee to stay on the
approved compromise agreement of the parties providing in Santos, 34 Phil. 100.)
part: premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid,
being a resolutory condition and, therefore, beyond the
ambit of Article 1308 of the Civil Code; and (2) that a The continuance, effectivity and fulfillment of a contract of
3. That the term of the lease shall be renewed every three compromise has the effect of res judicata. 8 lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free
years retroacting from October 1979 to October 1982; after and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing
which the abovenamed rental shall be raised automatically the payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the
by 20% every three years for as long as defendant needed Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied
owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in
the premises and can meet and pay the said increases, the by respondent Court of Appeals, this present petition is now
before us. We find the same to be meritorious. such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the
defendant to give notice of his intent to renew sixty (60) lessor and the lessee since the life of the contract is dictated
days before the expiration of the term; 2 solely by the lessee.
Contrary to the ruling of respondent court, the disputed
By reason of said compromise agreement the lease stipulation "for as long as the defendant needed the
premises and can meet and pay said increases" is a purely The interpretation made by respondent court cannot,
continued from 1979 to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. On therefore, be upheld. Paragraph 3 of the compromise
potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and
April 17, 1985, petitioner advised private respondent that he agreement, read and interpreted in its entirety, is actually to
enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will
would no longer renew the contract effective October, the effect that the last portion thereof, which gives the
of the lessee. It is likewise a suspensive condition because
1985.3However, on August 5, 1985, private respondent private respondent sixty (60) days before the expiration of
informed petitioner in writing of his intention to renew the the renewal of the lease, which gives rise to a new lease,
the term the right to give notice of his intent to renew, is
subject to the first portion of said paragraph that "the term of It is also important to bear in mind that in a reciprocal National Business Institute, but the rentals now stipulated
the lease shall be renewed every three (3) years," thereby contract like a lease, the period of the lease must be shall be subject to review every after ten (10) years by
requiring the mutual agreement of the parties. The use of deemed to have been agreed upon for the benefit mutual agreement of the parties." This is in clear contrast to
the word "renew" and the designation of the period of three of both parties, absent language showing that the term was the case at bar wherein, to repeat, the lease is fixed at a
(3) years clearly confirm that the contract of lease is limited deliberately set for the benefit of the lessee or lessor alone. period of three (3) years although subject to renewal upon
to a specific period and that it is not a continuing lease. The We are not aware of any presumption in law that the term of agreement of the parties, and the clause "for as long as
stipulation provides for a renewal of the lease every three a lease is designed for the benefit of the lessee defendant needs the premises and can meet and pay the
(3) years; there could not be a renewal if said lease did not alone. Koh andCruz in effect rested upon such a rents" is not an independent stipulation but is controlled by
expire, otherwise there is nothing to renew. presumption. But that presumption cannot reasonably be said fixed term and the option for renewal upon agreement
indulged in casually in an era of rapid economic change, of both parties.
Resultantly, the contract of lease should be and is hereby marked by, among other things, volatile costs of living and
construed as providing for a definite period of three (3) fluctuations in the value of the domestic currency. The On the second issue, we agree with petitioner that
years and that the automatic increase of the rentals by longer the period the more clearly unreasonable such a respondent court erred in holding that the action for
twenty percent (20%) will take effect only if the parties presumption would be. In an age like that we live in, very ejectment is barred by res judicata. While it is true that a
decide to renew the lease. A contrary interpretation will specific language is necessary to show an intent to grant a compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata this
result in a situation where the continuation and effectivity of unilateral faculty to extend or renew a contract of lease to doctrine does not apply in the present case. It is elementary
the contract will depend only upon the will of the lessee, in the lessee alone, or to the lessor alone for that matter. We that for a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, (1) it
violation of Article 1308 of the Civil Code and the aforesaid hold that the above-quoted rulings in Koh v. must be a final judgment, (2) the court which rendered it had
doctrine in Encarnacion. The compromise agreement should Ongsiaco and Cruz v. Alberto should be and are jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, (3) it
be understood as bearing that import which is most overruled. 15 must be a judgment on the merits, and (4) there must be
adequate to render it effectual. 10 Where the instrument is identity between the two cases as to parties, subject matter
susceptible of two interpretations, one which will make it In addition, even assuming that the clause "for as long as and cause of action. 19
invalid and illegal and another which will make it valid and the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay,
legal, the latter interpretation should be adopted. 11 said increases" gives private respondent an option to renew In the case at bar, the fourth requisite is lacking. Although
the lease, the same will be construed as providing for but there is identity of parties, there is no identity of subject
Moreover, perpetual leases are not favored in law, nor are one renewal or extension and, therefore, was satisfied when matter and cause of action. The subject matter in the first
covenants for continued renewals tending to create a the lease was renewed in 1982 for another three (3) years. ejectment case is the original lease contract while the
perpetuity, and the rule of construction is well settled that a A general covenant to renew is satisfied by one renewal and subject matter in the case at bar is the lease created under
covenant for renewal or for an additional term should not be will not be construed to confer the right to more than one the terms provided in the subsequent compromise
held to create a right to repeated grants in perpetuity, unless renewal unless provision is clearly and expressly made for agreement. The lease executed in 1978 is one thing; the
by plain and unambiguous terms the parties have expressed further renewals.16 Leases which may have been intended lease constituted in 1982 by the compromise agreement is
such intention. 12 A lease will not be construed to create a to be renewable in perpetuity will nevertheless be construed another.
right to perpetual renewals unless the language employed as importing but one renewal if there is any uncertainty in
indicates dearly and unambiguously that it was the intention that regard. 17
There is also no identity, in the causes of action. The test
and purpose of the parties to do so. 13 A portion in a lease generally applied to determine the identity of causes of
giving the lessee and his assignee the right to perpetual The case of Buccat vs. Dispo et al., 18 relied upon by action is to consider the identity of facts essential to their
renewals is not favored by the courts, and a lease will be responddent court, to support its holding that respondent maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain
construed as not making such a provision unless it does so lessee can legally stay on the premises for as long as he both causes of action. 20 In the case at bar, the delict or the
clearly. 14 needs it and can pay the rents, is not in point. In said case, wrong in the first case is different from that in the second,
the lease contract provides for an indefinite period since it and the evidence that will support and establish the cause of
As we have further emphasized: merely stipulates "(t)hat the lease contract shall remain in action in the former will not suffice to support and establish
full force and effect as long as the land will serve the that in the latter.
purpose for which it is intended as a school site of the
In the first ejectment case, the cause of action was private
respondent's refusal to comply with the lease contract which
expired on December 31, 1978. In the present case, the
cause of action is a similar refusal but with respect to the
lease which expired in October, 1985 under the compromise
agreement. While the compromise agreement may be res
judicata as far as the cause of action and issues in the first
ejectment case is concerned, any cause of action that arises
from the application or violation of the compromise
agreement cannot be said to have been settled in said first
case. The compromise agreement was meant to settle, as it
did only settle, the first case. It did not, as it could not, cover
any cause of action that might arise thereafter, like the
present case which was founded on the expiration of the
lease in 1985, which necessarily requires a different set of
evidence. The fact that the compromise agreement was
judicially approved does not foreclose any cause of action
arising from a violation of the terms thereof.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent is
hereby ordered to immediately vacate and return the
possession of the leased premises subject of the present
action to petitioner and to pay the monthly rentals due
thereon in accordance with the compromise agreement until
he shall have actually vacated the same. This judgment is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.