IPC PROJECT

Common Intention and Common Objective

Submitted to
Ms. Samia Khan

Submitted by
Alan C George
Roll Number: 7268
Section: 1D
LL.B (Semester-2)
Batch: 2017-2020

Of Amity Law School,

SR. NO. TOPIC

1. Introduction

2. Common Intention

3. Common Intention and Similar Intention

4. Cases

5. Common Object

7. Cases

8. Conclusion
 INTRODUCTION

Criminal Intention is the highest form of blameworthiness of mind or mens rea. Intention occupies a
symbolic place in criminal law. As the highest form of mental element it applies to murder and the
gravest form of crimes in criminal justice system. The term ‘intention’ is not defined in Indian Penal
Code but section 34 of IPC deals with common intention. The intention made among several person to
do something wrong and act done in that manner in which it was formulated comes under sanction of
section 34 of IPC. Section 34 deals with a situation, where an offence requires a particular criminal
intention or knowledge and is committed by several persons. Each of them who join the act with such
knowledge or intention is liable in the same way as if it were done by him alone with that intention or
knowledge. The liability of individuals under this circumstance is called Joint Liability. The principle of
Joint Liability defined in section 34 is as follows:

Section 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention – When a criminal act
is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for
that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

In this article the act is referred, which is defined under article 33 as:

Section 33. ‘Act’, ‘Omission’. – the word ‘act’ denotes as well a series of acts as a single act: the word
‘omission’ denotes as well a series of omissions as a single omission.

It is clear from s.34 and s.33 that the term criminal act refers to more than a single act and would cover
an entire series of acts.

Section 34 to section 38 in chapter II of IPC dealing with ‘General Explanation’ state the conditions in
which a person may be held constructively liable for the acts committed by the other members of group.

The chapter VIII of Indian Penal Code refers to ‘Offences against the Public Tranquility’ from section
141 to section 160. Offences against public tranquility also known as ‘Group Offences’ and lead to
disturbance of public peace. S.141 defines ‘Unlawful Assembly’ for which there should be five or more
persons, and the object should be common to all. If five or more persons are doing wrong act with
common objective then liability on each person will be same as it is done by him alone. This liability on
each person is called ‘Group Liability’. Section 149 of IPC imposes group liability on each and every
members of assembly and defined as follows:

Section 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of
common object —If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of
the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence,
is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

To impose this section under group liability there should be an unlawful assembly, which is defined
under s.141. And the offence should be committed in prosecution of common object.
COMMON INTENTION

Common intention implies a pre arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Common
intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act, which need not be a long gap. To bring
this section into effect a pre-concert is not necessarily be proved, but it may well develop on the spot as
between a number of persons and could be inferred from facts and circumstances of each case.

In Amrik Singh’s Case[i] it has been further held that though common intention may develop in course
of the fight but there must be clear and unimpeachable evidence to justify that inference. In the case
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad[ii] , Supreme court emphasised on this point that prior concert need
not be something always very much prior to the incident, but could well be something that may develop
on the spot, on the spur of the moment. In this case Ramchander Shelke (deceased) with his wife’s sister
went to the field. While Ramchander went to river side the five persons including three appellant
(Pandurang, Tukia, and Bhilia ) attacked on him. According to eyewitnesses, Pandurang, Tukia and
Bhilia were holding axes and other two accused Tukaram and Nilia had sticks in their hands. The
deceased died on the spot. In this case different eyewitnesses told different story. The trial court
convicted each of accused of charge s.302 with s. 34 and sentenced to death. Appeal lied in High court
and conviction of Pandurang, Tukia, Bhilia was maintained but other two accused persons sentence was
commuted to transportation for life. When the matter came up to Supreme Court, the learned judge said
that each are liable for their own act. The Apex Court set aside the death sentence of Pandurang and
convicted him instead under s.326, and sentenced for 10 years rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme
Court altered the sentence of Tukia and Bhilia to transportation for life. The Supreme Court elaborated
in this case that:

“In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none would be
vicariously convicted for the acts of any of the others; if the prosecution cannot prove that his separate
blow was a fatal one, he cannot be convicted of the murder, however clearly an intention to kill could be
proved in this case….”

The essence of liability to be found in existence of common intention is that the criminal act complained
against was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of common intention of all, if this is
shown, then the liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as
if the act were done by him alone.[iii]

In the case of Mahboob Shah v. Emperor[iv], the appellant Mahboob shah was of age 19 and was
convicted by Session Judge of the charge s.302 with s.34 for the murder of Allah Dad. The Session court
sentenced him for death. The High Court of Judicature also confirmed the death sentence. On appeal
before Lordship, the conviction for murder and sentence of death was quashed. It was contended before
appellant that – “when Allah Dad and Hamidullah tried to run away, Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah
Came in front of them… and fired shots” and so there was evidence of forming common intention at the
spur of the moment. Their Lordship was not satisfied upon this view and humbly advised His Majesty
that the appellant having succeeded in his appeal, his appeal should be allowed and his conviction for
murder and the sentence of death set aside.
 Common Intention and Similar Intention

Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute common intention it
is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them.
This section 34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. This section only
applies with other penal sections which deal with the punishment of the offence.

In the case of Dukhmochan Pandey v. State of Bihar[v] , the complainant had sent about 20 labours to
his field for transplanting paddy. On the mid day the accused party came as a mob of about 200 people
armed with various deadly weapons. They asked labourers to stop the work, and when the complainant
objected to this, the two accused directed the mob to kill labourers. The mob started assaulted the
labourers as a result of this two labours died. When the police party reached, the mob fled from the spot.
The death was established to have caused by injuries inflicted by shock and haemorrhage caused by
injuries inflicted with sharp pointed weapons.

The Supreme Court in this case held that: “Common intention which developed at the spur of the
moment is different from the similar intention actuated a number of person at the same time….the
distinction between a common intention and similar intention may be fine, but is nonetheless a real one
and if overlooked, may lead to miscarriage of justice….”

Mere presence of accused together is not sufficient to hold that they shared the common intention to
commit the offence in question. It is necessary that the intention of each one of ‘several persons’ be
known to each other for constituting common intention.

Inferences

From the various interpretations of Apex Court and guideline given in different cases, some inferences
could be drawn to impose Joint Liability under section 34. These are –

1. To establish common intention premeditation of minds is necessary. There should be prior meeting of
minds which activated common intention and criminal act should have been done in furtherance of
common intention.
2. There may be situation in which premeditation was not present, but intention developed at the spur of
the time, but it should must been shared among one another.
3. To prove common intention is a very hard, because it is the mental thinking of the accused at that point
of time. So it has to be culled out from the facts and circumstances of each case.
4. There is a difference between common intention and similar intention, and s.34 can be invoked only
when the accused shares common intention and not one the similar intention.
5. Unless common intention is proved, individual will be liable for his own act and not otherwise. They
will be deal as under s.38 of IPC. And if there is any doubt, the benefit of doubt should be given to the
accused.
 Cases

i. One of the earliest cases came before the court under s.34 under the principle of Joint Liability was
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor. This case is also known as the ‘Post Master Case’. In this
case, the accused Barendra with other three persons went to Shankaritola post office at about 3.30 pm on
the 3rd August 1923 armed with firearms. The accused stood outside the post office while others three
entered the post office through the backdoor of office. They asked post master Amrita Lal Roy to give
the money which he was counting. When he refused, then others three opened fire from the pistol and
fled from the place. As a result of which he died almost immediately. Seeing others running the accused
also ran away by air firing with his pistol. But he was chased and caught by post office assistant. He was
charged with others under s.302 (murder to post master) and s.394 (causing hurt in doing robbery) with
s.34 in common intention of all. He contended that he was only standing guard outside the post office
and he did not have the intention to kill the post master. Calcutta High Court confirmed his conviction of
murder under s.302 with s.34. In the appeal before the Privy Council, Lord Sumner dismissed the appeal
against the conviction and held that – “criminal acts means that unity of criminal behaviour which
results in something for which an individual would be responsible, if it were all done by himself alone,
that is, in criminal offence.”

ii. The other important case came before the Supreme Court was Rangaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu.The
occurrence took place at about 11.45 pm on 16.08.1973 in Big Bazar Street, in which one Jayaram was
murdered. In this case session court convicted A-1 under s. 302 and sentenced him to death. A-2 and A-
3 were charged under s. 307 with s.34, and sentenced rigorous imprisonment of 8 years by session
judge. While High Court considering the fact altered the decision of session court and enhanced the
sentence of A-2 and A-3 to imprisonment for life under s. 302 with s.34. And the death sentence of A-1
was modified for imprisonment for life. Against this conviction A-3 appealed in Supreme Court and
contended that he was only in friendly relation with A-1 and A-2 but he did not shared common
intention with them. It was by mere chance that he appeared at the spot of occurrence and he did not
participated in offence. In this case, there was a prior enmity between deceased and A-1 and A-2,
because the deceased was accused of murdering the brother of A-1, and he was actually on the bail.
Supreme Court held that even though the presence of A-3 was established but he did not share common
intention and he was unfamiliar with the plan. Therefore he was acquitted all of the charges.

iii. The other case before Supreme Court was Muthu Naicker and others v. State of Tamil Nadu. The dispute
arose among the village community of Karpakkam village when accused no. A-11 Kuppu Naicker who
has a well in land bearing Survey No. 102, wanted to lay a pipe-line to take water to the field bearing
No. 186/2 belonging to his wife, Dhanammal. There was another well sunk by the local Panchayat in
Survey No. 170 for the use of the village community and when A-11 wanted to take water from his well
in Survey No. 102, an apprehension was entertained by the residents of the village that there would not
be enough water in the well in Survey No. 170 and there would be water shortage. Gripped by this
apprehension, a majority of the village community resisted the attempt of A-11 to take water by laying
pipelines. Some villagers approached to collector on March 6, 1967, the collector suspended the
permission granted to A-11 to lay the pipe lines. A-11 and his companions ignored the order of collector
and continued the digging of channel. The matter arose on 27 November 1968 at around 2.30 pm when
deceased Gajarajan brother of P.W. 31 was returning from Madras by bus, a crowd of 50-60 persons
including A-1 to A-23 and A-28 attempted to waylay the deceased. Deceased tried to escape but was
chased by them and encircled by the crowd near a well and was attacked. After completing the
investigation police submitted challan against 28 accused for various offences. The learned session
judge giving the benefit of reasonable doubt, rejected the prosecution case and acquitted all the accused.
The state of Tamil Nadu preferred an appeal in High Court of Madras against A-1 to A-27. While the
acquittal of A-28 was considered as final. The High Court convicted A-1 to A-7 and A-19 for charge
under S.302 with S.34 and sentenced them for life imprisonment. They preferred criminal appeal in
Supreme Court. The conviction of accused A-1, A-2, A-4, A-5 under S.302 with S.34 was confirmed
and sentenced to life imprisonment. While conviction of A-3, A-6, A-7, A-19 under this charge of S.302
was set aside and were charged with others under Hurt and Grievous Hurt differently. Supreme Court
held that in a local community when something unusual occurs, a good number of people appear on the
scene not with a view to participate in occurrence but as a curious spectators. In such event mere
presence in unlawful assembly should not be treated that person concerned was a member of unlawful
assembly.

COMMON OBJECT

The offence dealing with Group Liability or Vicarious Liability of members comes under Chapter VIII
of the Indian Penal Code. This chapter deals with offences against Public Tranquility from s.141 to
s.160. The first section of this chapter s.141 defines Unlawful Assembly, for which there should be five
or more persons and some common objects for which they have made that assembly. The section 141 is:

Section 141. Unlawful assembly —

An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly“, if the common object of
the persons composing that assembly is—

First – To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State Government or
Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of
such public servant; or

Second – To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or

Third – To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or

Fourth – By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain
possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of
water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or
supposed right; or

Fifth – By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not
legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.

Explanation – An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an
unlawful assembly.
 From this section we can say that, to constitute an unlawful assembly the following ingredients is
necessary –

1. There should be an assembly of five or more persons.

When the number of the persons reduces from five for trial for the reason that some were acquitted for
the charges then the s. 141 will become inapplicable. But if there is clear indication that some other
unidentified persons are involved in the crime then this section can be applied. In Ram Bilas Singh v.
State of Bihar, Supreme Court held that:

“it is competent to a court to come to the conclusion that there was an unlawful assembly of five or more
persons, even if less than that number have been convicted by it if: (i) the charge states that apart from
the persons named, several other unidentified persons were also members of the unlawful assembly
whose common object was to commit an unlawful act …..(ii) or that the first information report and
evidence shows such to be the case even though the charge does not states so. (iii) or that though the
charge and prosecution witnesses named only the acquitted and the convicted accused persons there is
other evidence which discloses the existence of named or other persons”

The other ingredient of this section is common object. Object means the purpose, and it will be common
when it is shared by the members of the unlawful assembly. Common object may be formed at any stage
by all or few members of the assembly. The explanation of this section shows it clearly. However
common object is entertained in the human mind so there can be no evidence to prove directly about
this. It is a question of the fact and can be culled out on the basis of facts and circumstances of each
case. It can be determined from the nature of the assembly, the kinds of arms and their uses by it,
behaviour and the language of the members of the assembly used before and after the incident. If only
four out of the five assembled person have common object and not fifth, then that assembly is not an
unlawful assembly. Simple onlooker or family of the parties cannot become the member of unlawful
assembly unless they actively participated or encouraged the violence.

In Moti Das v. State Of Bihar, Supreme Court held that pre-concert is not necessary. An assembly may
be lawful in beginning but may turn into unlawful later.

Being a member of Unlawful assembly is itself a crime and s.143 prescribes the punishment of six
months, or fine, or both for being a member of that assembly.

The section which imposes the liability on each person of the offence committed by the members of the
assembly is section 149 of IPC. The section 149 of IPC is:

Section 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of
common object — If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution
of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence,
is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
In Bhudeo Mandal v. State of Bihar, the Apex Court held that before convicting any person with the aid
of s.149, the evidence must clearly establish not only the common object, but also show that the
common object was unlawful. In Ram Dhani v. State, there was a dispute over land and the complainant
party resorted to cutting crop grown by the accused party. The later were more than five in number and
assembled to prevent the cutting. The court held that – the persons acting in self defence of the property
cannot be members of an unlawful assembly. And so they could not be said to form an unlawful
assembly.

The word ‘knew’ is used in second part of the s. 149, which implies more than possibility but less than
might have known. An offence committed in prosecution of common object would generally be offence
which the members of the assembly knew was likely to be committed. This phrase means that the
offence committed was immediately connected with the common object of the unlawful assembly, of
which the accused were members. The word ‘in prosecution of common object’ means that the offence
committed was immediately connected with the common object of the assembly or in order to attain
common object.

Cases

In Rambilas Singh and others v. State of Bihar, the case of prosecution was that deceased Kumar Gopal
Singh found A-2, A-16 and a female relation of them plucking Khesari crops from his field. And so he
abused them and snatched away the plucked plants and their baskets. In retaliation for it the 16 accused
persons had lay in wait for him on that night and attacked him at about 9.30 P.M. when he was returning
home with his brother PW-22 and two other witnesses PWs 1 and 18 after attending a barat. PW-22
stated that 16 persons surrounded Kumar Gopal Singh and then Dinesh Singh inflicted a stab injury on
the neck of Kumar Gopal Singh as a result of which he died. The Session Judge acquitted all the persons
A-1 to A-15 who were charged under s.302 with s.149, but convicted A-16 (Dinesh Singh) who was
charged directly under s.302. In High Court A-1 and A-9 were acquitted while A-2 and A-6 died during
pendency of the appeal. The High Court convicted the rest of the accused A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-8, A-10
to A-15. On appeal further Supreme Court set aside the conviction of accused by High Court under
s.302 with s.149 and held that in order to convict persons vicariously under Section 34 or Section 149
IPC, it is not necessary to prove that each and every one of them had indulged in overt acts. Even so,
there must be material to show that the overt act or acts of one or more of the accused was or were done
in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused or in prosecution of the common object of the
members of the unlawful assembly. In this case, such evidence is lacking and hence the appellants
cannot be held liable for the individual act of Dinesh Singh.

In another case of Ram Bilas Singh v. State of Bihar, court held that an accused person cannot be held
liable vicariously for the act of an acquitted person.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMMON INTENTION AND COMMON OBJECT

Both the section 34 and s.149 imposes vicarious liability on each person for acts not necessarily done by
them. However there is a difference in the scope and nature of operation of the two offences. The charge
of s.149 is substituted by s.34 of IPC, especially when some accused are acquitted and number of the
accused falls below five. In this case the court would have to carefully examine the evidence to see
 whether some element of common intention exists for which he can be made liable under s.34. The main
differences between the two sections are as follows:

 Section 34 does not create any specific offence but only lays down the principle of joint criminal
liability. Whereas s.149 creates specific offence and being a member of an unlawful assembly is itself a
crime, which is punishable under s.143.

 ‘Common intention’ used in s.34 is not defined anywhere in IPC, while ‘common object’ in s.149 must
be one of the five ingredients defined in s. 141 of IPC.
 Common intention requires prior meeting of mind and unity of intention and overt act has been done in
furtherance of the common intention of all. Common object may be formed without prior meeting of
mind when the common object of the members of the unlawful assembly is one but intention of
participants is different. It only requires that criminal act has been done in furtherance of common
object.

 For invoking s.34 it is sufficient that two or more persons were involved. However there have to be
minimum five persons to impose s.149.
 The crucial factor of s.34 is ‘participation’ while there is no need of active participation in s.149 of IPC.

CONCLUSION

Fixing vicarious liability under s.34 or s.149 depends on their method adopted to furnish the crime.
There are two sections dealing with ‘common intention’ and ‘common object’ under two chapters of
IPC ‘General Explanation’ and ‘Of Offences Against Public Tranquillity’ respectively. Sometimes there
arises difficulty in proving with evidences that whether they shared common intention or not. And also
that how many people were the members of Unlawful Assembly with their common object same.
However these ambiguities were removed by the Supreme Court in different cases, after determining its
facts and situation of each case.

To clear and better understanding, Law Commission of India also gave many suggestions to Legislature
for amendment of some part of statute.

Even after so much effort there arises problems of which law will be applicable amongst the two in
some crucial cases, and investigators and charge sheet filers makes mistakes in this regard.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 P S A Pillai’s – CRIMINAL LAW – 11th Edition