Title: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No.

168852
Subject Matter: Applicability of the doctrine of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code to R.A. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and
Children Act of 2004)

Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and
Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a
protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

Held:

Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the offender be ralted or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the RPC. In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles
developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in
which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

DOLINA V. VALLECERA

GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.

FACTS:

In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for
alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She
based such prayer on the latter’s certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera ‘s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of
support as the RTC may deem appropriate.

Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against
woman and child abuses, that he was not the child’s father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here. He also added that
the petition is a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial support.

RTC dismissed petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for
her child?

HELD:

Yes.

RATIO:

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the
protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the
respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is
to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and
then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be
integrated and resolved.

Rosal Hubilla y Carillo vs. People

G.R. No. 176102. November 26, 2014
Note: The focus of the case is on the penalty
imposed to the accused
FACTS:Rosal Hubille was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old when he killed Jayson Espinola with a knife. He was charged with Homicide.
RTC - convicted him of homicide and imposed the penalty of indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four years and one day of prision
correcional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. CA – Rosal’s sentence was modified in that he was
sentenced to six months and one day of prision correctional as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Thecivil
aspect was also modified On motion for reconsideration, the CA partially granted the appeal and imposed on him the penalty of six months
and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and
one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Issue:
WON the CA should have suspended Rosal’s sentence in accordance with RA 9344; that he is entitled to probation or suspension of
sentence
Held:
Article 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. His minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that
lowered the penalty to prision mayor.In Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional. So
the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioner insists that the maximum of his
indeterminate sentence should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable
him to apply for probation under PD 968.A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC - the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the
minimum Sec. 38 of RA 9344 which allows the suspension of the sentence is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age.
Since he is over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction in the RTC, suspension was no longer feasible. RA 9344 reveals that
imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. Restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment: (a) the
detention or imprisonment is a
disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time
Imprisonment was imposed on the petitioner as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the
suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.
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G.R. No. 168546 Case Digest

G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
Michael Padua, petitioner
vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
Ponente: Quisumbing

Facts:

June 16, 2003, Padua and Edgar Ubalde were charged before the RTC Pasig of violation of R.A. No. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
act of 2002] for selling dangerous drugs. When arraigned, Padua assisted by counsel de officio entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-
trial, Padua’s counsel de officio manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail the
benefits granted to 1st time offenders. The prosecutor interposed no objection, thus the not guilty plea was withdrawn, Padua re-arraigned
and pleaded guilty.

Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging that he is a minor and a 1 st time offender, and that he possess all qualifications and none
of the disqualifications of the probation law. RTC ordered for the post-sentenced investigation and recommendation and comment of the
probation office and the city prosecutor relatively.
 Pasana, the chief probation and parole officer recommended Padua to be placed on probation. However, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an
order denying the petition for probation on the ground that under R.A. No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of
the privilege granted by the Probation Law.

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He filed for a petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed his petition.

Issue: Whether Padua can avail the benefits of the Probation Law.

Held:
(1) CA did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari. The requisites for the certiorari must occur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is “excess of jurisdiction” when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

(2) Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, can not avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

(3) Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated. Nor can he argue
that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has application in this case.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act
9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

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