PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka A. I answered: "Who is that?

"
TOTONG, accused-appellant.
Q. Did the person calling your name answer you?
DECISION
A. I heard, sir, "me Totong".
MELO, J.:
Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong" you are referring to
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape in whom?
Criminal Case No. 2349-272, Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th Judicial
Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the following Information: A. Rodegelio, sir.

That on or about the 8th day of July, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, (p. 15, id; Underscoring supplied)
viz., at Km. 6, Begang Barangay, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by the use of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for four (4) years and
unlawfully and feloniously grab the undersigned complainant by her neck, cover her mouth and appellant is her second cousin (p. 34, id). Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her,
forcibly make her lie down, after which the said accused mounted on top of her and removed Escelea forthwith opened the door. Appellant Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea's
her short pant and panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the use of force, threat and face. Appellant, aside from covering the victim's mouth, even placed his right hand on the
intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the undersigned complainant and finally latter's neck.
succeeded to have carnal knowledge of her, against her will.
Appellant bid Eseelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was
CONTRARY TO LAW. about twelve (12) meters away from the victim's house, appellant lost no time in laying the
victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her shortpants and panty (pp. 17-19,
(p. 6, Rollo.) id). Escelea tried to resist by moving her body but to no avail. Appellant succeeded in pursuing
his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea's private part. The victim felt terrible
At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, after pain (p. 20, id). Still dissatisfied, after consummating the act, appellant kissed and held the
which trial ensued. victim's breast. Thereafter, appellant threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the
incident to anybody, thus:
The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of its
witnesses - Alejandra Tabada, mother of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police "He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you.
officer who investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the victim; Escelea
Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos Timorata, the medical record clerk (p. 21, id; Underscoring supplied)
who used to be the medical officer under Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang, the physician who
physically examined the victim after the incident - is abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in this Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went home. Escelea, on the other
wise: hand, upon reaching home, discovered that her shortpants and panty were filled with blood (p.
23, id). For almost ten (10) days, she just kept to herself the harrowing experience until July 18,
Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang, Isabela, 1995 when she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando
Basilan, their houses being only about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.; August 19, Pioquinto, about the said incident. Orlando in turn informed Alejandro, the victim's father, about
1996). Escelea was then staying with her father, Alejandro and her deaf grandmother, the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a
Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years and six (6) months old at the time of doctor for medical examination (p. 27, id).
incident, having been born on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).
Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the Provincial Hospital. She was
The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven o'clock (7:00 examined by Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they went
p.m.) in the evening, Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was accompanied by a certain to Isabela Municipal Station and filed Escelea's complaint against appellant (pp. 30-33, id).
Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her neighbor, Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to join her grandmother who
was already sleeping in the room. About to enter the said room, Escelea heard a call from The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her granddaughter
outside. She recognized the voice and when she asked who was it, the party introduced Corazon Macapili, and accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. The
himself as the appellant, viz: defense that the victim and him were sweethearts was also advanced. Leonora Cabase
mentioned this in her direct testimony.
Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you say if any?
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase was trying to the dark night. All said, it is very difficult to be poor. Going to the court is a shout for help ... let
project that the complainant Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are us try to hear it.
sweethearts. In the case of People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the Supreme Court agrees with
the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of appellant in order to xxx
exculpate himself from criminal liability. The claim of voluntary love affair is an affirmative
defense, the allegation of a love affair needed proof. Nowhere in the record of the case that the xxx
same was substantiated, though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora Cabase. The accused and/or his
witnesses must present any token of the alleged relationship like love notes, mementos or xxx
pictures and the like. Such bare allegation of the defense, not to mention its utter lack of proof,
is incredulous. It is hard to understand how such a relationship could exculpate a person from WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds the accused
the rape of a terrified young child barely a little over the age of twelve (12) years old. Indeed, a "GUILTY" of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
love relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out force (People vs. Sergio indemnify the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral
Betonio, G.R. No. 119165, September 26, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Vol. 36, No. 3, September 1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).
xxx
There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs. Victor Abrecinoz, G.R. No.
122474, October 17, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1, October xxx
2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and they are: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in xxx
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence (pp. 33-37, Rollo.)
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
In accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged errors:
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the credibility of the complainant is a
paramount importance, and if her testimony proves credible, the accused may be convicted on
I
the basis thereof.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are second degree cousin or they are
GUILTY OF RAPE BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT ESCELEA
sixth civil degree relatives. The mother of the accused is a first degree cousin of the father of
TABADA AND HER WITNESS.
the complainant. In the culture of the Filipino family on extended family, the relationship
between the complainant and the accused being only second degree cousin, it becomes the
II
duty of an older relative (the accused) to protect and care for a younger relative (the
complainant). It is very hard to understand or comprehend why a cousin files a case of rape
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
against her cousin, unless it is true. There is no showing that there was compelling motive why
PROSECUTION, BASED ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES OF THE
the case be filed against the accused, except that the rape really happened.
COMPLAINANT AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO PROVED [sic] BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE
xxx
AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.
xxx
III
xxx
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE
ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY
It is noted that there was no underlying reason why the complainant and/or her father would
THE COMPLAINANT THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 REPRESENTING MORAL DAMAGES
bring an action against the accused, except that the accused had raped Escelea Tabada on
BASED ON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. If it were not true that she was raped by the
accused, why would she expose herself to an embarrassment and traumatic experience
(p. 101, Rollo.)
connected with the litigation of this rape case. We are aware of the Filipino culture especially
on virginity. We likened it as a mirror, once dropped and broken, it can no longer be pieced
He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt
together ... not ever. This is true among the Filipino folks that the complainant belonged, poor
considering that other than the written statement of the complainant before the Police Station of
and helpless and everything is entrusted to God. The complainant is a young girl, a little over
Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, and her testimony during
twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor
direct examination, no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there was ever
that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a
rape at all; that she only presumed that it was accused-appellant who attacked her since she
neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and expose herself to the danger of
admitted that immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face with Q When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong", you are referring to
a towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly and convincingly shows that she was able to whom?
identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator; that complainant implicated accused-appellant
only because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no actual proof was presented that A Rodegelio, sir.
the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate
was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to Q When you say "Rodegelio", you are referring to Rodegelio Turco, Jr., the accused in this
explain the same. case?

We agree with the trial court. A Yes, sir.

As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of rape Q After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as "Totong", what did you do?
cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature A I opened the door, sir.
of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution Q And when you opened the door, what happened next?
stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590 [1998]; People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 A Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir.
[1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75 [1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).
Q Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he do?
Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the
credibility of complainant's testimony. A He covered my mouth, sir.

The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and Q Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do?
almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot
A He placed his right hand on my neck, sir.
even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for the
meager joy of seeing a television show ... and exposes herself to the danger of the dark night."
Q Aside from placing his right hand ... when he placed his right hand on your neck, where was
But verily, age, youth, and poverty are not guarantees of credibility. Hence, thorough scrutiny
he? Was he infront or behind?
must be made by the Court.
A He was at my back, sir.
Complainant narrated the incident in this wise:
Q After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did "Totong" do next with that
Q While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your grandmother, did you hear
position?
anything?
A He covered my mouth, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q After covering your mouth and face, what did he do next?
Q What was that?
A He told me to walk, sir.
A I heard a call, sir.
Q Where did he bring you?
Q How was the call made?
A I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir.
A It is just by saying: "Lea".
Q But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place?
Q After you heard your name was mentioned, what did you say if any?
A I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir.
A I answered: "Who is that?"
Q Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken?
Q Did the person calling your name answer you?
A Yes, sir.
A I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q Do you have a copra kiln?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: A He put me down, sir.

The witness already answered that she does not know where she was brought, leading, Your Q When you were already down on the ground, what did the accused do next?
Honor.
A He mounted on me, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q And when the accused was already on top of you, what did he do next?
Q According to you, from your house you were brought by the accused to a place which you do
not know? A He molested me, sir.

A Yes, Your Honor. Q Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your body?

Q What place? A Yes, sir.

A Pig pen, Your Honor. Q What?

Q Do you know the owner, of that pig pen? A My shortpants and panty, sir.

A Our pig pen, Your Honor. Q You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your pants and panty, did he totally
remove it from your body?
Q Who owned that pig pen?
A Yes, sir.
A My father, Your Honor.
Q After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the accused do?
Q How far is that pig pen to your house?
A He abused me, sir.
A (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).
Q You said that he abused you, how did he abuse your?
COURT:
A He put his private part inside my private part, sir.
It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.
Q When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused you, what did you do?
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing)
A I tried to move my body, sir.
Q You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court that you were brought to the pig
pen or the place where you were sexually abused, were you place inside or outside? Q While you were trying to move your body and while the accused was on top of you, what did
the accused do?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:
A He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir.
Leading, Your Honor.
Q And was he able to insert his private part?
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:
A Yes, sir.
I will withdraw.
Q What did you feel when his private part was already inside your private part?
Q Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of the pig pen that you were
brought by the accused? A I felt pain, sir.

A Inside the grasses, sir. Q Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of the accused was already inside
your private part?
Q When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen, what did the accused do to
you? A I felt pain when he already finished, sir.
Q By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped? Will you please tell us whether the Filipino folks [to which] complainant belonged, poor and helpless everything is entrusted to
you have already experienced or you have already your menstruation at that time? God" (p. 35, Rollo).

A No, sir. The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony, having
intermingled two incidents. Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record that the
Q Now you stated to the Honorable Court ... after the accused had sexually abused you and defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion when he asked the victim what
you said you felt pains after he consumated the sexual act, after that what did he do next after transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19, 1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness'
consumating the act? testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating
and so painful to recall as rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]).Rape, as a
A After consumating his desire, he raised my panty and shortpants then he kissed me and hold harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not
my nipple, sir. something which enhances one's life experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather,
something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim for the
Q After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty, embraced you, kissed you and hold rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious mind would prefer to forget (People vs.
your breast, did he tell you anything? Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony
of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor (People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA
A He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you." 296 [1998]). Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its
entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein (People vs.
Q In what dialect? In Chavacano, sir. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).

A After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your nipple and threatened you in The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Her
Chavacano dialect, what happened next after that? testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs. Luzorata, 286
SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story
No more, sir. of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
(tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)
apprehended and punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]).

On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the defense
Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and the victim.
counsel asked her about the events that transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The query
At this juncture, we reiterate the trial court's observation thereon - the mother of accused-
prompted her to narrate the incident prior to said date when she also watched television at the
appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that makes the victim and accused-
home of Leonora Cabase, and that when she arrived home, accused-appellant came and
appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino culture, particularly in
called her "Lea" and when she asked who was it, he answered "so Totong". When she asked the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and recognizes the obligation of an
what he wanted, he said he wanted to borrow a guitar. She said that she could not lend him the older relative to protect and take care of a younger one. On the contrary, in the instant case,
guitar since her father was not yet around. He insisted but to no avail, and hence he just went
the victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the charge were not true, it is indeed difficult
home. She went to sleep afterwards. On re-direct examination, she clarified that when
to understand why the victim would charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she having
accused-appellant came to borrow the guitar on July 8, 1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the
no compelling motive to file said case against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape
afternoon. Lastly, she said that the incident of the borrowing of the guitar and the incident that
really happened is logically reinforced.
transpired at 7 o'clock in the evening on July 8, 1995 were separate incidents.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state that the
Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's youth, her apparent confusion
delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is not
concerning the events that transpired, and her fear of both accused-appellant and her father.
uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the victim's fear of her father who had
moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the incident to
At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of rape
her father because of fear both of her father as well as of accused-appellant (tsn, August 19,
victims who are young and immature deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA
1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is typical of a twelve-year-old girl and only strengthens her
317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages
credibility.
of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which
The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points presented by
they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified were not
the defense that must be passed upon:
true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we take cognizance of the trial
court's observation on the segment of the Filipino society to which the victim belongs - almost 1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between accused-
illiterate, having attended school up to the third grade only, and so poor that she had to go to a appellant and the victim? The theory initially advanced by the defense in the proceedings
neighbor's house to watch television, yet one who values her virginity which like a "mirror, once before the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory". In this regard, .we agree with the trial court
dropped and broken ... can no longer be pieced together ... not ever," this being "true among that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of accused-appellant in order to exculpate
himself from criminal liability. In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the Q Now, you stated in your direct examination that you are not related to the Tabadas in San
sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving where he failed to introduce Antonio Begang, Isabela, Basilan, is that right?
love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim. Hence, the
defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and the victim A Yes, sir, we are only close.
were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and
photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this theory Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin of the father of Escelea
that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in his brief, seemingly abandoning this Tabada?
line.
A They are cousins, sir.
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was between
accused-appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood Q So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?
relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of the incident, when accused-appellant
called upon the victim and the latter asked who he was, the victim knew right away that her A Yes, sir.
caller was accused-appellant when the latter replied "Si Totong".
Q So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you were not telling the truth?
Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the victim
Escelea Tabada and touched on the apparent friendship between them, as follows: A Yes, sir.

Q You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do you know the complainant (ibid, p. 51.)
Escelea Tabada?
2. Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually
A I only know her when I was already in jail, sir. happened since the medico-legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was not
presented in court to explain the same.
Q You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before you were arrested?
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate
A I do not know her, sir. issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate
could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records (under
COURT: (Questioning the witness) Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since
it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be
Q Why, are you not related to the Tabadas? given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the
A No, Your Honor. probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: (Continuing) admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is,
therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such
Q Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang? evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule
133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it
A The complainant is at Begang, sir. may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary
weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial
Q And you mentioned that you were not related with the complainant, Mr. Witness? Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).

A Yes, sir, we are only close. Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible
as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician.
Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant Escelea Tabada were already Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate
friends? (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foul-smelling
discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact,
A Yes, sir. reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without
medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is
(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.) well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape (People
vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55
However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled:
[1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal
officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that
the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, I ain't done, and ․ I don't care if I get half of what I want done done, as long as I get half of it
supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict. done and, and I've done my f—kin' part. But I'm ready to go down, with bullets or whatever. If
that's how they want to take me down, I'm ready today to go․I'm headed to Greene County
As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in favor of about sixt—[call abruptly drops].
Escelea Tabada as indemnification (P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is incomplete
based on established jurisprudence and must be modified. In People vs. Betonio (279 SCRA Both people recognized that Defendant was high on methamphetamine, consistent with his
532 [1977]), we held that the award of P50,000.00 to the victim as indemnity for rape not own declaration of being “raged and crazed.” At about 4:00 p.m., Lawson got into a black Ford
committed or qualified by any of the circumstances under the Death Penalty Law, needs no Taurus with Defendant, and was never seen alive again.
proof other than the conviction of the accused for the raped proved. This is different from the
P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages which also needs no pleading or proof as basis About twenty minutes after leaving Lawson's home, Defendant called one of his friends and
thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]). said, “[Y]ou'll never guess who I got with me․ [T]he blonde haired bitch that [Sims] was dating․
I've got her up at the cemetery out in Newark and I'm going to get to the bottom of this.”
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
Defendant continued, “[B]itch[,] say something”—then after a moan or gasp in the background,
accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. aka "Totong" is ordered to indemnify the offended
he said, “I guess she can't speak, talk, she's choking.” Later in the day, Defendant left several
party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in addition to the more incriminating voicemails for that friend—in one, declaring, “It's all comin' together, it's all
sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial court as moral damages.
gonna be fun when it's over․ I'm gonna be motherf—kin' laughin' about it. I don't care if I'm in
jail or prison, they can all kiss my motherf-kin' ass․” And in another, he stated “It's all over․ It's
Randy L. KNAPP, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).
already done, ․ everything done. It's all about satisfaction.” Through the rest of the day and the
first part of the following day, Defendant told two friends that he had killed Lawson—and to one
No. 28S00–1305–LW–327.
of them, smiled as he pantomimed beating her head with a large rock. And while Lawson's
Decided: June 12, 2014 boyfriend was searching for her, Defendant lied to him about where they had been.

Kimberly A. Jackson, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant. Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney The next afternoon, Lawson's body was found at a cemetery in Newark, dragged into a wooded
General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys area near the gravesite of her 10–year–old brother, who died of cancer in 2008. (A neighbor
for Appellee. later came forward, reporting that she had been walking her dog past the cemetery before 5:00
and saw a black car “with large headlights” like Defendant's Taurus backed up to that wooded
Randy L. Knapp appeals his conviction for murdering Stacey Lawson and his sentence of life area.) Lawson had been struck in the head with tremendous force, caving in a portion of her
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”). He challenges the admission of crime skull and causing a “hinge fracture” at the base of the skull—a type of injury that requires so
scene photographs and an expert witness's reliance on those photographs, the denial of his much force that it usually occurs only in auto accidents, and results in near-instant death.
motion for mistrial, and the preliminary jury instructions in the penalty phase of his trial. He also Indeed, her head struck the ground hard enough to leave a divot in the dry August soil beneath
contends that his LWOP sentence is supported by insufficient evidence, unconstitutionally her. About the same time as Lawson's body was discovered, Defendant left Walker another
based on uncharged, non-statutory aggravators, and either unconstitutionally disproportionate rambling, agitated voicemail calling himself “a smart meth-head” who would “plead insanity and
or inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm in all respects. blame it all on f—kin' meth.”

Facts and Procedural History Police arrested Defendant that same evening. During several interviews conducted
intermittently over the course of about eight hours, he admitted picking up Lawson, but claimed
Defendant was a de facto stepfather to Jeffrey Sims (having lived with Sims' mother for a he was at his Bloomington home at 4:00 and only picked up Lawson about 9:00 (and not from
number of years). Both men were methamphetamine addicts, and were living in a house (and her home). Defendant said he and Lawson had driven around for awhile, and he then dropped
living off of money) Sims had inherited. But in early August 2011, Sims committed suicide after her off at the roadside somewhere. But he admitted having his cell phone with him all day on
his then-girlfriend-victim Stacey Lawson-broke up with him. Defendant blamed Lawson for the 19th and 20th-and when police pointed out that cell-phone location records and his phone's
Sims' death, and his anger and grief intensified after Sims' family excluded him from a own call history disproved his story and matched Lawson's boyfriend's account, Defendant just
memorial service and blocked his access to Sims' finances. Ever since Sims' death, he had insisted the phone records were incorrect. He was charged with Lawson's murder.
been trying unsuccessfully to find (or at least contact) Lawson.
At trial, the State's case relied upon Defendant being the last person to see Lawson alive,
On August 19, 2011, he was able to contact her and make arrangements to meet her on the blaming her for Sims' death, making incriminating statements before, during, and after the
pretext of having money that Sims left for her. Before meeting her, Defendant told one person murder, and telling police a version of events inconsistent with his own cell-phone records. But
that he was “going to kill that bitch,” and left a voicemail for another detailing his plans: “I'm the State also presented expert forensic evidence through Dr. Roland Kohr, who had
gonna go meet somebody right now. You wouldn't believe who I'm gonna go meet. I won't say performed Lawson's autopsy—and because his opinion of Lawson's time of death at trial
over the phone in case something happens.” He continued, “I'm f—kin' raged and crazed and differed from two preliminary opinions he had offered, he was cross-examined extensively (as
I'm gonna see this motherf—ker right now and I might beat her f—kin' brains out.” The further discussed below). The jury convicted Defendant of murder, and the case progressed to
message concluded: the penalty phase. The State sought LWOP based on Defendant having been on probation at
the time of Lawson's murder, see Ind.Code § 35–50–2–9(b)(9)(C) (2008); the jury they were taken based on date and time data encoded within the image files by the camera
recommended LWOP; and Defendant was sentenced accordingly. He appealed directly to this that took the photos, as his own camera of the same brand also does. But on the stand, he
Court. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a). Additional details will be supplied where necessary. initially stated that the photos were taken on August 19, and had to review the date and time
data outside the presence of the jury to refresh his recollection. After doing so, he confirmed
Discussion and Decision that the encoded date and time data reflected that the photos were all taken between 4:00 and
6:00 to 7:00 p.m. on the 20th. The accuracy and reliability of that data depends on whether the
II. Standards of Review. camera's time and date were set correctly, but it is consistent with earlier testimony that police
arrived at the cemetery between 3:44 and 4:30 on the 20th in response to Lawson's boyfriend's
Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we address a procedural matter that affects several 911 call, and that photos were being taken around 5:25 p.m. Any remaining uncertainty about
of the issues Defendant raises. As Defendant acknowledges, there was no timely objection the date and time of the photos affects only their weight, not their admissibility. The trial court
raised at trial to Dr. Kohr's reliance on the crime-scene photographs (Part II. A.2 below), the did not abuse its discretion by admitting them into evidence.
penalty-phase preliminary jury instructions (Part II.C), or to the State's alleged reliance on
improper penalty-phase aggravators (Part III.B). Failure to object at trial waives an issue on Defendant also argues that the photos were inadmissible because Dr. Kohr did not testify they
appeal unless the appellant can show fundamental error—that is, “an error that ma[de] a fair were a true and accurate representation of Lawson's body-an issue the State asserts is waived
trial impossible or constitute[d a] clearly blatant violation[ ] of basic and elementary principles of as insufficiently preserved at trial. Potential waiver notwithstanding, this argument fails because
due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Clark v. State, 915 it is based on the wrong type of “foundation.” The foundation required for admitting a
N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind.2009). That exception is “extremely narrow,” Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d photograph depends on its use at trial. In most cases, photos are only demonstrative, “visual
748, 755 (Ind.2002), and reaches only errors that are so blatant that the trial judge should have aids that assist in the presentation and interpretation of testimony”—in which case “testimony ․
taken action sua sponte. Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind.2014); accord Whiting v. that [they] accurately depict the scene or occurrence as it appeared at the time in question” is
State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind.2012) (“A finding of fundamental error essentially means that the an adequate foundation. Smith v. State, 491 N.E.2d 193, 195 (Ind.1986) (citing, inter alia,
trial judge erred ․ by not acting when he or she should have․”). In sum, fundamental error is a Torres v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1021, 102425 (Ind.1982) (approving Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d
daunting standard that applies “only in egregious circumstances.” Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ind.Ct.App.1979), reh'g denied, trans. denied )).
1064, 1068 (Ind.2003).
But other photos-for example, security—camera footage—“are admitted as substantive evi-
By contrast, Defendant's challenges to admission of the crime-scene photos (Part II. A. 1) and dence” as “silent witness[es] as to what activity is being depicted.” Smith, 491 N.E.2d at 196.
denial of his motion for mistrial (Part II.B) were properly preserved and therefore do not face For this “silent witness” purpose, “the foundational requirements ․ are vastly different [than] the
the hurdle of fundamental error. But the standard of review is steep nonetheless, requiring foundational requirements for demonstrative evidence.” Id In such cases, “[t]he witness is not
Defendant to show that the trial court abused its discretion—that its ruling was clearly against required to testify that the photograph is an accurate representation of the scene as it
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Vaughn v. State, 971 N.E.2d 63, appeared”—and indeed, often could not “so testify since he or she was not necessarily there to
67–68 (Ind.2012) (denial of mistrial); Jackson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 53, 54 (Ind.1998) observe the scene on that day.” Id. (citing Torres and Groves v. State, 456 N.E.2d 720, 721
(evidentiary rulings). The standards of review governing his remaining issues (Parts III.A and (Ind.1983)). Instead, the witness “must give identifying testimony of the scene that appears in
III.C.) are more nuanced, and are discussed in greater detail below. the photograph[s],” Smith, 491 N.E.2d at 196, sufficient to persuade “the trial court ․ of their
competency and authenticity to a relative certainty. ” Torres, 442 N.E.2d at 1024–25 (quoting
II. Trial Issues.
Bergner, 397 N.E.2d at 1017) (emphasis original to Bergner). And here, the photos were used
for substantive purposes, as “silent witnesses” of mature maggot activity on Lawson's body at
A. Crime Scene Photographs.1. Sufficient foundation for admission.
the time she was found-which none of the on-scene witnesses ad-dressed, but as discussed
below, was the basis for Dr. Kohr's opinion of Lawson's time of death. For that purpose, Dr.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient foundation to admit six crime-scene photos
Kohr's identification of the photos as the police investigative photos taken between 4:00 and
(Exhibits 92, 93, and 97, plus magnified portions of each marked 92A, 93A, and 97A) into
7:00 p.m. on August 20 was sufficient to show their “competency and authenticity”-and for
evidence through Dr. Kohr's testimony. Because this issue was properly preserved by trial
silent witness purposes, that is all that was required. Defendant's foundation challenge fails.
objection, we review it under the ordinary standard for admission of photographic evidence:
abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 117 (Ind.2005), reh'g denied . Specifically,
2. Expert witness relying on the crime-scene photos.
Defendant asserts that the State failed to sufficiently establish when the photos were taken—
the basic fact from which Dr. Kohr formed his final forensic opinion of Lawson's time of death.
Defendant also argues that because of uncertainty about when the photos were taken, they
We find that their time and date were adequately demonstrated, with any remaining uncertainty
were too unreliable for Dr. Kohr to rely on in forming his opinion-an issue raised for the first
being only a matter of their weight and not their admissibility.
time on appeal, and therefore reviewable only for fundamental error. But it is well settled that
experts may rely on evidence of a type reasonably relied upon in their field of expertise,
Generally, a witness authenticates an exhibit by “produc[ing] evidence sufficient to support a
regardless of its admissibility. Evid. R. 703. Here, it was surely reasonable for Dr. Kohr to rely
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a). Here, Dr.
on the photos' date and time as accurate enough for the assessment he'd been asked to make,
Kohr testified that he received the three original photos on disc from the Indiana State Police
since that detail had been established “to a relative certainty” in demonstrating their
evidence technician who was the photographer at the scene, and created the others by using
his computer to enlarge portions of the originals. He further explained that he verified when
“competency and authenticity” as discussed above. His reliance on those photos was entirely particularly damaging fact to keep concealed. Under other circumstances, failing to disclose
permissible. such a critical fact could readily have been grounds for reversal.

Instead, it appears to us that Defendant's true complaint is with the substance of Dr. Kohr's Nevertheless, Walker acknowledged on direct that he had initially thought Defendant's call
testimony-an understandable matter, but one that lies beyond the standard of review. Dr. Kohr “was a bunch of BS” and did not take it seriously (since again, he had not yet received
rendered three contradictory opinions of Lawson's time of death-two before trial and one during Defendant's voicemails from earlier in the day). Then, during a highly effective cross-
his trial testimony. But the change in his opinions was not because of when the photos were examination, Walker reiterated that he had never known Defendant to be violent and thought
taken (a factor that remained constant in each of his analyses), but rather because of what he he was only making idle threats; and that his impression of the call was that Defendant was
perceived in the photos. Dr. Kohr stated that flies in the Greene County area do not lay eggs in “just messing with” him and that it was Defendant or a TV making the noises. Defense counsel
the dark, and the eggs take about 18 hours to hatch. He had not initially observed maggots in also cast doubt on Walker's veracity, since Walker had never mentioned the choking, let alone
the August 20 crime scene photos, and thus inferred that Lawson died after sundown on the any “moan” or “gasp,” when he spoke with police. And he elicited Walker's admission that at
19th to explain the absence of maggots. But because that finding was inconsistent with the the time, he was experiencing drug-withdrawal symptoms and “needing drugs really bad”-in
other evidence, the State asked him to reconsider that finding. In response, Dr. Kohr amended Walker's own words, “I was so involved in the drugs at that time all I cared about was getting
his findings to suggest that Lawson might have been injured before sundown, even if her death my drugs.”
did not occur until thereafter. But that was inconsistent with his own autopsy finding of the
hinge fracture, which would have caused death almost immediately. At trial, then, Dr. Kohr None of that cross-examination had yet occurred when the trial court denied a mistrial, but it
advanced a third theory after consulting with a forensic entomologist colleague, who suggested bears out the court's concern that the “extreme measure” of mistrial should only be used when
reexamining the crime-scene photos under magnification. Dr. Kohr did so, and for the first time other remedies fail. Here, while avoiding that extreme measure, the trial court offered
noticed large white clusters that appeared to be clumps of mature maggots that he had numerous remedies including “a continuance to conduct [a] deposition or other discovery,” a
previously overlooked-and thus inferred that Lawson's death had occurred before sundown on longer recess “to discuss with the witness a little less formally,” or to “strike the matter from the
the 19th after all. The reliability of his perceptions on that point went to the weight of his record and admonish the jury appropriately”-but defense counsel determined that “perhaps we
opinion, as tested by cross-examination, and not the admissibility of the photos or of his overall have a better opportunity at overcoming any harm through further cross examination” instead
opinion. We find no error, let alone fundamental error. of those other options. The trial court was in the best position to determine what effect Walker's
initial testimony had on the jury, and the likelihood that a less drastic remedy would be
Moreover, any arguable error in that regard would be harmless, and certainly not fundamental. effective-and here, it was. Denying Defendant's motion for mistrial was well within the trial
Even without Dr. Kohr's forensic opinion of Lawson's precise time of death, the remaining court's discretion.
evidence against Defendant was overwhelming: his grudge against Lawson, his incriminating
statements before, during, and after the murder, a car like his backed up to the woods where C. Erroneous Preliminary Penalty–Phase Jury Instructions on Reasonable Doubt.
Lawson's body was found, and his asserted alibi's inconsistency with his own cell-phone
records. Her exact time of death, or the photos' competence to reveal it, had little potential to Next, Defendant asserts fundamental error (again, there was no objection at trial) in the
sway the jury's determination of Defendant's guilt based on the remaining evidence. Again, we preliminary jury instructions on reasonable doubt for the penalty phase, because instead of
find no fundamental error. reciting that the State had to prove the charged aggravating circumstance beyond reasonable
doubt, it repeated the guilt-phase instruction about the “element[s] of the crime” and
B. Denial of Mistrial as a Sanction for Undisclosed Testimony. Defendant's “guilt.” Tr. 1393. We review jury instructions “as a whole and in reference to each
other,” and “error in a particular instruction will not result in reversal unless the entire jury
Defendant next argues that Walker's undisclosed testimony that he possibly heard Lawson charge misleads the jury as to the law in the case.” Whitney v. State, 750 N.E.2d 342, 344
“gasp” or “moan” after Defendant said, “Bitch, say something,” was so prejudicial to require a (Ind.2001) (quoting Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1196 (Ind.1996), reh'g denied ). And
mis-trial. Defendant preserved this issue by timely objection-but still, granting or denying a under fundamental error review, Defendant must further show the charge was so misleading as
mistrial is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 925 N.E.2d 369, 373 to make a fair trial impossible or blatantly violate basic due process. See Clark, 915 N.E.2d at
(Ind.2010). And “[m]istrial is an extreme remedy in a criminal case which should be granted 131. Here, there is no doubt that the challenged instruction was erroneous, but in view of other
only when nothing else can rectify a situation.” Schlomer v. State, 580 N.E.2d 950, 955 correct preliminary instructions on the subject, the overall jury charge was not significantly
(Ind.1991). Our deferential review of decisions to grant or deny a mistrial reflects that “the trial misleading, let alone enough so to establish fundamental error.
court is in the best position to gauge the surrounding circumstances of the event and its impact
on the jury.” Id. First, only one of the preliminary penalty-phase instructions reflected that error, while other
instructions given both before and after the erroneous one framed the issue correctly. One of
In this case, we do not condone the State's failure to supplement its discovery responses to the very first preliminary instructions correctly stated the State's burden of proving “at least one
disclose Walker's additional testimony. The State was aware of that additional testimony a aggravating circumstance as set forth in the Charging Information” and that the jury may not
month before trial, but never disclosed it to the defense-and in response to the motion for consider aggravators “other than those specifically charged.” Only then was the erroneous
mistrial, only argued that the testimony was equivocal and of minimal weight, without offering instruction given, reciting that the State had to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
any justification for failing to disclose it. But the additional detail of Walker perhaps overhearing Defendant is guilty of the crime charged.” The court then gave correct instructions on finding
one of Lawson's dying breaths was likely to be particularly compelling to the jury, and thus a mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, and concluded with another
correct statement about finding the charged aggravator beyond reasonable doubt, closely face value. Even if the instructions might otherwise have been misleading, the State's
mirroring the verdict form the jury would ultimately be given: corrective actions were enough to avoid fundamental error.

You may recommend the sentence of life imprisonment without parole only if you unanimously III. Sentencing Challenges.
find: 1. That the State of Indiana has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the
charged aggravating circumstances exist, and 2. That any mitigating circumstance or Besides the instructional error addressed above, Defendant raises several issues relating to
circumstances that exist are outweighed by the charged and proved aggravating circumstance the substance of his LWOP sentence—that there was insufficient evidence that he was on
or circumstances. probation at the time (the only statutory LWOP aggravator the State charged); that the State
improperly urged the jury to recommend LWOP based on non-statutory aggravators; that
Any potential confusion from the erroneous instruction in the middle was amply mitigated by LWOP is “cruel and unusual” or unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied when it is based
the correct instructions before and after it. solely on probationary status for a prior low-level offense; and that LWOP is inappropriate
under Appellate Rule 7(B). We address each argument in turn.
Furthermore, the penalty-phase witnesses' testimony was quite brief, occupying only eight
pages of the nearly 1,500–page Transcript, see generally id. at 1400–08, followed immediately A. Sufficient Evidence of Defendant's Probation for Methamphetamine Offenses.
by the parties' closing arguments, see id. at 140914. The jury was then briefly dismissed for a
“short break” while the final penalty-phase arguments were settled—which this time, had no Defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence of his probationary status is
oversights in the reasonable-doubt language. The jury therefore had little time outside the unavailing. So far as relevant here, and consistent with our discussion above, seeking LWOP
courtroom to discuss the evidence with each other under any mistaken view of their penalty- required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was “on probation after
phase function before receiving correct instructions. That, too, significantly mitigates the receiving a sentence for the commission of a felony ․ at the time the murder was committed.”
potential for confusion, at least by comparison to an erroneous guilt-phase instruction that I.C. § 35–50–2–9(a), (b)(9)(C). But on appeal, we consider only whether a reasonable
might have misled them for several days before being corrected. factfinder could be satisfied of the matter at issue beyond reasonable doubt, without reweighing
the evidence. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.2007).
Finally, we observe that the verdict form for recommending LWOP reiterated precisely the
correct issue for the jury: “We, the Jury, find that the State of Indiana has proven beyond a Here, the State relied on the testimony of a Bloomington Police Department detective and a
reasonable doubt the charged aggravating circumstance” of probation, and “We, the Jury, find Monroe County probation officer to establish Defendant's June 11, 2009 conviction and
that the charged aggravating circumstance that exists outweigh any mitigating circumstances subsequent sentence for Possession of Methamphetamine and Maintaining a Common
herein.” Accordingly, the very act of signing that verdict form would have a tendency to “re- Nuisance, both as Class D felonies. The detective testified that Defendant was on probation on
instruct” the jury one more time on the correct issue it was charged to address. In each respect, the day of Lawson's murder; and the probation officer testified that Defendant's probation would
we do not believe that the overall jury charge as to reasonable doubt was misleading, despite not be complete until November 28, 2013, thus including the date of the murder. Their
the one incorrect instruction. testimony differed, though, as to the overall length of Defendant's sentence. The detective
testified to a sentence of three years, 353 days on the methamphetamine count and three
The fundamental error standard further cinches that conclusion, in view of the State's efforts to years for the common nuisance count, “all suspended”—not specifying consecutive or
correct that error at the very beginning of its opening argument, immediately after the concurrent, but implying consecutive because of his specific testimony that Defendant was on
instructions were read: probation at the time of the August 19, 2011 murder. By contrast, the probation officer testified,
consistent with a certified copy of the sentencing order she authenticated, that his sentence
I just want to clarify one of those instructions that the Court read because it is a little confusing. was three years with 535 days suspended on the first count and a consecutive three years
The reasonable doubt instruction that he read to you referenced prov[ing] beyond a reasonable suspended on the second count, for a total of four years, 170 days of non-reporting probation.
doubt each element of the crime charged․ [I]t really doesn't apply to this phase because we
have already gone through the first phase and you found the defendant guilty of murder. What Defendant reasons that the discrepancy about the end-date of his probation leaves reasonable
it is referencing and what you need to consider is that I must prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt about his probationary status. Appellant's Br. at 64. We disagree. By the terms of the
doubt the exist[ence] of the aggravating circumstance, so again we are not having to prove the statute, the State was only required to prove that Defendant was on probation for a felony “at
crime over again in this phase, you just have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the the time the murder was committed,” I.C. § 35–50–2–9(a), (b)(9)(C)—not how much longer
Defendant was on probation for a felony offense while he committed the murder of Stacey thereafter his probation would last. Any discrepancy as to the latter point is immaterial, since
Lawson, so I wanted to clear that up. there was no dispute about his probationary status on the relevant date. And in any event, a
reasonable factfinder could readily conclude that the probation officer's testimony, backed by
We acknowledge that the jury was instructed at the beginning of trial that opening and closing the sentencing order, was correct and that the detective's uncorroborated testimony to the
statements “are not evidence,” and that jurors “may accept or reject those arguments [as they] contrary was mistaken. Viewed either way, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable
see fit”—so that counsel's statement, while correct, may not have carried the same force as if factfinder to be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that Defendant was on probation on the
the court had given the instruction correctly. Nevertheless, that clarification was quick, candid, day of Lawson's murder.
and correct, following right on the heels of the erroneous instruction. And since Defendant's
opening statement in no way took issue with it, it is likely the jury would have accepted it at B. Drug Use and Uncaring Attitude as Uncharged, Non-statutory Aggravators.
Defendant next argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by inviting the jury to Methamphetamine and Maintaining a Common Nuisance I think is significant in this case
recommend LWOP based on non-statutory aggravators—a practice we have held violates the based upon the Defendant's actions and evidence that has been provided to you.
proportionality clause of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution and constitutes Methamphetamine was at the heart of this case, he had been convicted of it a couple years
prosecutorial misconduct. On this point as well, he raised no timely trial-level objection and prior, should have sought help for his problem, didn't seek help for his problem, instead he
must therefore establish fundamental error to prevail. We find no error, let alone fundamental viciously murdered Stacey Lawson for no reason. Anybody that is on probation should be
error. walking the line, not committing any offenses, if it is a drug or alcohol offense, seek out help for
your problem, he didn ‘t do any of those things, he wasn't walking the line, he didn't care. The
To ensure that imposition of death or LWOP sentences is “proportioned to the nature of the evidence showed he continued to use [m]ethamphetamine and he murdered an innocent
offense” as Article 1, Section 16 requires, “courts must ․ limit the aggravating circumstances young woman, for that reason I don't believe he should ever be allowed to walk the streets
eligible for consideration to those specified in” Indiana Code 35–50–2–9, which governs those again[. T]hat is why I am asking you[,] make that recommendation [that] he be sentenced to
penalties. Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 95556 (Ind.1994) (death penalty); Ajabu v. State, Life Without Parole.
693 N.E.2d 921, 936 (Ind.1998) (by statute, “life without parole is imposed under the same
standards and is subject to the same requirements” as the death penalty). “[I]t is ․ misconduct (Emphases added.) The State's references to Defendant's continued methamphetamine use on
for a prosecutor to request a jury to return a death penalty or [LWOP] recommendation for probation and prior methamphetamine conviction were limited to the proper context of their
anything other than that the mitigating factors are outweighed by the [statutory] aggravating logical relevance to (and therefore the weight of) the charged statutory aggravator. Similarly,
factor or factors.” Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Ind.2006). Even when reviewing such the “uncaring attitude” the State advocated was not in the sense of callousness towards
claims under the steep fundamental error standard, we have reversed and remanded for a new Lawson's life (which would indeed have been improper under Cooper ), but rather the proper
sentencing hearing when the State's penaltyphase rebuttal both misstated the law and relied context of Defendant's attitude toward his probation—the charged statutory aggravator. We find
on “drumbeat repetition” of non-statutory aggravators. Id. at 840–41. In Cooper, the State no misconduct in this regard, let alone fundamental error.
sought LWOP based on the same statutory aggravator as this case: that the defendant was on
felony probation at the time of the murder-yet in rebuttal, it urged the jury that it “ha[d] to A closer call is a sub-issue Defendant raises: that there was no record evidence that he failed
consider the Defendant's character” and “any aspect of the offense itself” in weighing the to “seek out help for [his] problem” with drugs, so the State's argument in that regard was
charged aggravator against the proffered mitigators of no prior criminal history, acting under speculative and beyond the “analysis of the evidence” that Lambert permits. But that reference
extreme mental and emotional stress at the time of the murder, and undue hardship to the was only fleeting and indirect-asserting that a probationer “should be walking the line, not
defendant's dependent children. Id at 839–41. There, “[t]he unmistakable theme woven committing any offenses, if it is a drug or alcohol offense, seek out help for your problem,” and
through” the rebuttal was that the defendant deserved LWOP because he was “an unsavory that Defendant “didn't do any of those things” (emphasis added). Even assuming arguendo that
character.” Id. at 841. We were “persuaded that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's the State's comment on that point was misconduct, the one-time passing reference did not, in
remarks” in misstating the law and relying on non-statutory aggravators “hampered the jury's context, “place[ ] the defendant in a position of grave peril” as the standard for prosecutorial
ability to decide dispassionately whether [the defendant] should receive a term of years” misconduct requires, Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835–and even less so under fundamental error
instead of LWOP. Id. review. Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed that it was “not permitted to consider any
circumstances as weighing in favor of [LWOP] other than the aggravating circumstances
But we find no such violation here. The State may not urge LWOP based on non-statutory specifically charged by the State in the [c]harging [i]nformation,” and we presume the jury
aggravators, but it is permitted “to state and discuss the evidence and all reasonable heeded that charge, Pruitt v. State, 622 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ind.1993). Even on this closer issue,
inferences to be drawn therefrom” in closing argument, and to “argue both law and facts and Defendant's arguments fail.
propound conclusions based upon [the State's] analysis of the evidence.” Lambert v. State, 743
N.E.2d 719, 734 (Ind.2001) (quoting Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind.1997)) C. Application of LWOP to Defendant's Particular Circumstances .
(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, because “the circumstances of a crime often
provide ‘an appropriate context for consideration of the alleged aggravating and mitigating Last, Defendant challenges his LWOP sentence as unconstitutional, or at least inappropriate
under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Though legally distinct, the basic premise of both
circumstances,’ ․ reference to the nature and circumstances of the crime” is not necessarily
arguments is much like his penalty-phase argument to the jury: that non-reporting probation for
improper. Corcoran v. State, 739 N.E.2d 649, 657 (Ind.2000) (quoting Prowell v. State. 687
the lowest-level felony is insufficient to justify the second-harshest sentence known to Indiana
N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ind.1997)).
law. We address each argument in turn.
Defendant characterizes the State's closing argument as akin to Cooper, “invit[ing] the jury to
1. LWOP as “cruel and unusual” or “disproportionate” as applied to non-reporting probation for
weigh [his] continued use of methamphetamine while on probation, his methamphetamine
low-level offenses.
conviction, his failure to seek treatment, and his uncaring attitude” as non-statutory
aggravators. But in context, we find it clear that the State was properly advocating the
In essence, Defendant argues that his non-reporting probation for two Class D felonies was, as
legitimate inference that Defendant's probation for methamphetamine had a material
a matter of constitutional law, so trivial that using it as the basis for LWOP violates the Eighth
connection to this methamphetamine-fueled murder, even though it was only non-reporting:
Amendment and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution as “grossly disproportionate.”
The Eighth Amendment's bar on “cruel and unusual” punishments has been held to implicitly
I think it is important to note what the Defendant was on probation for. Yes [,] it was
prohibit certain “grossly disproportionate punishments.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 103
unsupervised probation, ․ but the fact that he had committed the crime of Possession of
S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). But our Constitution by its terms expressly requires
proportionality: “Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be works against him. Their relatively minor D-felony classification is offset by involving
proportioned to the nature of the offense.” We have therefore held that this provision “goes methamphetamine—the same drug that fueled Defendant until he was sufficiently “raged and
beyond” Eighth Amendment protections, Conner v. State, 626 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind.1993), and crazed” to take Lawson's life, even while serving a probationary sentence intended to let him
permits us “to review the duration of [a] sentence as it is possible for the statute under which get help with that addiction. Defendant's issue would arguably present a closer call if the prior
[an] appellant is convicted to be constitutional, and yet be unconstitutional as applied ․ in [a] offenses for which he was on probation were wholly unrelated to the circumstances of the
particular instance,” id. (quoting Clark v. State, 561 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ind.1990)). We thus begin murder, perhaps akin to the driving-related offenses in Best and Clark. But especially when, as
our analysis with the more-protective State standard. here, there is a distinct nexus between the prior offenses and the present murder, Defendant's
sentence is not “so severe and so entirely out of proportion to the gravity of the offenses
(a) Article 1, Section 16 disproportionality actually committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of a reasonable
people.” Clark, 561 N.E.2d at 765 (quoting Cox v. State, 203 Ind. 544, 559, 181 N.E. 469, 472
Though Article 1, Section 16 sweeps somewhat more broadly than the Eighth Amendment, its (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It therefore readily survives disproportionality review
protections are still narrow. It is violated “only when the criminal penalty is not graduated and under the Indiana Constitution.
proportioned to the nature of the offense,” Phelps, 969 N.E.2d at 1021 (citing Conner, 626
N.E.2d at 806). Though we “cannot set aside a legislatively sanctioned penalty merely because (b) Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment”
it seems too severe,” Article 1, Section 16 requires us to review whether a sentence is not only
within statutory parameters, but also constitutional as applied to the particular defendant. Having disposed of Defendant's Indiana constitutional claim, his Eighth Amendment claim fails
Conner, 626 N.E.2d at 806. Our standard for an as-applied proportionality challenge depends for similar reasons. The Supreme Court has rarely held the Eighth Amendment to prohibit
on the type of penalty at issue. For habitual-offender enhancements, we assess the “nature LWOP as “disproportional” in any case, and never in any intentional homicide case. “Outside
and gravity” of the present felony, and then the “nature” of the prior felonies on which the the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
enhancement is based, Best v. State, 566 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind.1991); while for penalties sentences have been exceedingly rare,” Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct.
not based on prior offenses, we have undertaken a simpler inquiry into whether the penalty is 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), because in non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment contains
“graduated and proportioned to the nature of [the] offense,” Conner, 626 N.E.2d at 806 (internal only a “narrow proportionality principle.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20–21, 123 S.Ct.
quotation marks omitted). Since the statutory aggravator at issue here relies on Defendant 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the closer capital-
being on probation at the time of the murder, and probation necessarily involves prior criminal case scrutiny, the high Court has held the death penalty disproportionate for vicarious felony
history, we apply the same inquiry as for habitual-offender sentencesassessing the nature and murder—aiding and abetting a robbery in which the accomplices committed murder, but the
gravity of this felony offense along with the nature of the prior felonies underlying Defendant's particular defendant “did not kill or attempt to kill” or otherwise intend to participate in or
probation. facilitate a murder. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140
(1982). And under the “narrow proportionality principle” for non-capital cases like this, LWOP
Turning to the first prong of Best, Defendant does not (and could not) dispute that the “nature has been held unconstitutional for certain broad classes of non-homicide offenses, such as
and gravity” of any intentional murder is the gravest offense known to Indiana law and involves those committed by juvenile offenders. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176
the ultimate harm to its victim—a far cry from the D-felony OWIs in Best and Clark, 561 N.E.2d L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).
at 766, that caused little to no harm to any person. To the contrary, in both cases, we observed
that OWI is generally “classed as a misdemeanor,” and was “raised to the lowest class of But only once has the high Court found LWOP disproportionate as applied to a particular
felony” in those cases only because of a prior OWI conviction. Best, 566 N.E.2d at 1032; see offender—and then, only when imposed as a habitual-offender punishment for “uttering a ‘no
also Clark, 561 N.E.2d at 766. Moreover, we noted in both cases that there was little to no account’ check for $100” after a history of comparably petty and non-violent offenses, Solem,
physical injury or property damage involved. Best, 566 N.E.2d at 1032; Clark, 561 N.E.2d at 463 U.S. at 279–81. And unlike Solem, Defendant is not just a petty recidivist; he committed an
766. In Clark, that factor was so compelling that we reversed the entire enhancement as intentional murder. The Supreme Court has recognized that murderers are “categorically [more]
disproportionate, without even considering the nature of the prior offenses; 561 N.E.2d at 766; deserving of the most serious forms of punishment” than “defendants who do not kill, intend to
and in Best, we reduced the enhancement from 20 years to 10 because even though the kill, or foresee that life will be taken,” Graham, 560 U.S. at 69—and that “a State is justified in
defendant had many prior offenses, they were “non-violent alcohol related offenses, thefts, and punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 296.
burglaries,” 566 N.E.2d at 1032. In both cases, the fact that multi-decade sentences were Here, the gravity of murder-coupled with the recidivism demonstrated by committing such a
issued for the lowest class of felony (and at that, an offense that is often only a misdemeanor) grave offense while still under suspended punishment for a prior felony as Indiana Code
and involving little or no harm to person or property was vital. The “nature and gravity” of section 35–50–2–9(b)(9)(C) contemplatesplaces Defendant's sentence well within Eighth
intentional murder is not remotely comparable. Amendment bounds.

Defendant instead focuses on the second Best prong, arguing that the nature of the offenses 2. LWOP as “inappropriate” under Appellate Rule 7(B).
for which he was on probation are insufficient to justify LWOP. We disagree. First, the very fact
of probation is relevant, regardless of the offense on which it is based. Probation by its nature In the alternative to his constitutional challenges, Defendant seeks relief under Appellate Rule
is a matter of grace, imposed in lieu of imprisonment—granted in exchange for the defendant's 7(B), asserting that his sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
promise to remain law-abiding during his conditional release. Committing a murder while on character of the offender.” The 7(B) “appropriateness” inquiry is a discretionary exercise of the
probation for any felony offense, even a low-level felony, is therefore a particularly flagrant appellate court's judgment, not unlike the trial court's discretionary sentencing determination.
abuse of that grace and leniency. Moreover, the nature of Defendant's particular offenses Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ind.2008). On appeal, though, we conduct that
review with substantial deference and give “due consideration” to the trial court's decision— Chairperson,
since the “principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,” Chambers v. State,
989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind.2013) (citing Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225), and not to achieve a - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
perceived “correct” sentence, Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. This review carries out this Court's
general constitutional authority to review and revise sentences under Article 7, § 4 of the CALLEJO, SR.,
Indiana Constitution. Chambers, 989 N.E.2d at 1259.
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
Applying that standard here, our collective judgment is that LWOP is not inappropriate in light
of the nature of Defendant's offense or his character as an offender. The nature of the offense NACHURA, JJ.
was calculated, premeditated, and brutal. Far from a spur-of-the-moment crime of opportunity,
Defendant had been seeking out Lawson for the two weeks since Sims' suicide. Upon finding
her, he announced that he “might beat her f—kin' brains out,” lured her into the car on false
pretenses, dragged her into the woods behind her own brother's gravesite, and then did just FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA,
what he said he would do, smashing her head with a force normally associated with car
crashes. And he did so at her brother's own gravesite—effectively desecrating that site for represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA,
Lawson's surviving family, who must return to the same spot where their daughter drew her last
CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF
breath in order to pay their respects to their deceased son. Life without parole is not
inappropriate for such an offense.
APPEALS, Promulgated:
Defendant's character as an offender is similarly unavailing. While on probation for a previous
Respondents. March 27, 2007
methamphetamine offense, Defendant made himself “raged and crazed” on methamphetamine
to carry out this murder, hoping to “plead insanity and blame it all on f—kin' meth.” Before,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
during, and after the killing, he displayed a brazen and callous character—announcing his
plans beforehand, crudely taunting her to “say something” during the murder, and afterwards
lying to her boyfriend while he was searching for her, casually telling one friend that “you'll
never hear from her again,” and reenacting the killing with a smile on his face to another friend.
His lengthy criminal history dates back to 1985, and though it consists mostly of drug and
alcohol offenses, it also includes a 1995 conviction for three D-felony counts of intimidation and DECISION
an A-misdemeanor count of battery causing bodily injury. He had been on probation eight
times, and violated it four times. And while we acknowledge Defendant's genuine grief over
Sims' death, we find it minimally mitigating, because it appears to have been based at least in
part on anger at being cut off from Sims' finances. He could have directed his indignation AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
towards methamphetamine and the drug culture that helped bring about Sims' death and
Defendant's own probation, but he directed it instead towards exacting brutal revenge.
Defendant's character, so far as revealed by this record, also does not make the sentence
inappropriate.

Conclusion Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the
Decision[1] dated February 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant's conviction for the murder of Stacey Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Lawson, and his sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.

NENA LAZALITA* TATING, G.R. No. 155208 The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The
Petitioner, subject lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano
Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued
Present: by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.[3]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner
Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.[4] Subsequently, title over the subject WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
property was transferred in the name of Nena.[5] She declared the property in her name for tax and against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14,
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 1969 (Exh. Q) executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as
and 1988.[6] However, the land remained in possession of Daniela. NULL and VOID and further ordering:

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no 1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion of the
transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion; Julio Tating,
mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-
she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants fourth () portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the prescribed fees;
the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her. [7]

2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672 and in
Daniela died on July 29, 1988[8] leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, lieu thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso portion;
Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner. Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso portion; and Nena
Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the house standing thereon be
likewise declared in the names of the persons mentioned in the same proportions as above-
stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered
the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are
demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of
Daniela.[9] Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile. 3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 by way of
moral damages, P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, P5,000.00 by way of attorneys
fees and P3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and to

Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the 4. Pay the costs of suit.
TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the
heirs of Daniela.[10] The complaint also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint with leave of court for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, SO ORDERED.[13]
he having died intestate and without issue in March 1991. [11] He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio,
and Nena as his sole heirs.

Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision
affirming the judgment of the RTC.[14]
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the
subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.
She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court
for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation Nenas Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 22,
expenses.[12] 2002.[15]

Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following dispositive Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA has decided the instant
portion: case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this
Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has
affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence on record. [16]
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the CA finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The Court finds for the petitioner.

The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is
discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely
jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).[19] The primary
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. [20] Such
Court decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as from their
especially considering that it was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same.[17] contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[21]

As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their
on the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is
because Danielas actual intention was not to dispose of her property but simply to help the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said
petitioner by providing her with a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which sworn statement as part of private respondents evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also
persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the accorded great probative weight to this document.
Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said
Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that
Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying
petitioner the right to cross-examine her. There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.[22] The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.[23] Thus, a particular item of
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
Sworn Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.[24] It is settled that affidavits are classified as
only after the death of Daniela in 1994.[18] Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses
simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the petitioner during her lifetime. However, his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or
the fact remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute misunderstood by the one writing them.[25] Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
Sale was executed, she never uttered a word of complaint against petitioner. opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.[26] For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for
being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.[27] The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on
time and again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere Danielas sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and
preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between
argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between them.
Daniela and petitioner created a trust relationship between them because of the settled rule
that where the terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation
that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to
that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence
judgments; that Danielas Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.[28] Aside from Danielas sworn
sale by and between her and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their
agreement between petitioner and Daniela created a trust relationship between them.
claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the
intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner. validity of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the
sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not
able to cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.

In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation
is the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his
rights of ownership over the disputed property.[30] In the present case, however, the evidence However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes preponderance of evidence[37] that the contract of sale between Daniela and petitioner was
due on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contractsand the party who
thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation.[38] Since private respondents
taxation purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they failed to discharge the burden of proving their allegation that the contract of sale between
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.[31] The voluntary petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the presumption of regularity and validity of the October
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government.[32] Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[33] On the other hand, private respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to
or declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she claims be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to
ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private respondents whether or not a trust relationship was created between them.
presented in evidence, refers only to the house standing on the lot in controversy.[34] Even the
said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which
said house was built.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.
really reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she
never told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she Kastigar v. United States No. 70-117 Argued January 11, 1972
simply chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on
December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her Decided May 22, 1972 406 U.S. 441
declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ten years later.
Syllabus
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the
subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in petitioners The United States can compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the Fifth
favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by conferring immunity, as provided
in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that by 18 U.S.C. § 6002, from use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom in
ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts. [35] Just as possession is not subsequent criminal proceedings, as such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive
a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first with the scope of the privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the
paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public privilege. Transactional immunity would afford broader protection than the Fifth Amendment
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the privilege, and is not constitutionally required. In a subsequent criminal prosecution, the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be prosecution has the burden of proving affirmatively that evidence proposed to be used is
inferred. Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Pp. 406 U. S.
notarized deed of conveyance.[36] Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case, it is of 443-462.
no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the
disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she was already 440 F.2d 954, affirmed.
able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the subject property.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART,
WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., post, p. 406 U. S. 462, and MARSHALL,
J., post, p. 406 U. S. 467, filed dissenting opinions. BRENNAN and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no Page 406 U. S. 444
part in the consideration or decision of the case.
requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have
Page 406 U. S. 442 compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The first Congress recognized the
testimonial duty in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided for compulsory attendance of
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. witnesses in the federal courts. [Footnote 6] MR. JUSTICE WHITE noted the importance of this
essential power of government in his concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
This case presents the question whether the United States Government may compel testimony U. S. 52, 378 U. S. 93-94 (1964):
from an unwilling witness, who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, by conferring on the witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony in "Among the necessary and most important of the powers of the States as well as the Federal
subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as immunity from use of evidence derived from the Government to assure the effective functioning of government in an ordered society is the
testimony. broad power to compel residents to testify in court or before grand juries or agencies. See Blair
v. United States, 250 U. S. 273. Such testimony constitutes one of the Government's primary
Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in the Central District sources of information."
of California on February 4, 1971. The Government believed that petitioners were likely to
assert their Fifth Amendment privilege. Prior to the scheduled appearances, the Government But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a number of exemptions from the
applied to the District Court for an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce testimonial duty, [Footnote 7] the most important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege
evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ against compulsory self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental
6002-6003. Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, contending primarily that the scope of values and aspirations, [Footnote 8] and marks an important advance in the development of
the immunity provided by the statute was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege our liberty. [Footnote 9] It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or
against self-incrimination, and therefore was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, [Footnote 10] and it
their testimony. The District Court rejected this contention, and ordered petitioners to appear
before the grand jury and answer its questions under the grant of immunity. Page 406 U. S. 445

Petitioners appeared but refused to answer questions, asserting their privilege against protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a
compulsory self-incrimination. They were brought before the District Court, and each persisted criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. [Footnote 11] This
in his refusal to answer the grand jury's questions, notwithstanding the grant of immunity. The Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege. [Footnote 12]
court found both in contempt, and committed them to the custody of the Attorney General until
either they answered the grand jury's questions or the term of the grand jury expired. [Footnote Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence, [Footnote
1] The Court of 13] are not incompatible

Page 406 U. S. 443 Page 406 U. S. 446

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (CA9 1971). This with these values. Rather, they seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the
Court granted certiorari to resolve the important question whether testimony may be compelled privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify. The existence
by granting immunity from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony and the fact that many offenses are of
("use and derivative use" immunity), or whether it is necessary to grant immunity from such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated
prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates ( "transactional" immunity). 402 in the crime. Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, [Footnote 14]
U.S. 971 (1971).
Page 406 U. S. 447
I
and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses. [Footnote 15] Congress included
The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other immunity statutes in many of the regulatory measures adopted in the first half of this century.
governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence. [Footnote 2] The [Footnote 16] Indeed, prior to the enactment of the statute under consideration in this case,
power with respect to courts was established by statute in England as early as 1562, [Footnote there were in force over 50 federal immunity statutes. [Footnote 17] In addition, every State in
3] and Lord Bacon observed in 1612 that all subjects owed the King their "knowledge and the Union, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one or more such statutes.
discovery." [Footnote 4] While it is not clear when grand juries first resorted to compulsory [Footnote 18] The commentators, [Footnote 19] and this Court on several occasions, [Footnote
process to secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the general common law 20] have characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of various
principle that "the public has a right to every man's evidence" was considered an "indubitable criminal statute. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, speaking for the Court in Ullmann v.
certainty" that "cannot be denied" by 1742. [Footnote 5] The power to compel testimony, and United States, 350 U. S. 422 (1856), such statutes have "become part of our constitutional
the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment fabric." [Footnote 21] Id. at 350 U. S. 438.
Page 406 U. S. 448 Page 406 U. S. 450

II proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him . . . in any court
of the United States. . . . [Footnote 27]"
Petitioners contend, first, that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, which is that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a Notwithstanding a grant of immunity and order to testify under the revised 1868 Act, the
witness against himself," deprives Congress of power to enact laws that compel self- witness, asserting his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, refused to testify before a
incrimination, even if complete immunity from prosecution is granted prior to the compulsion of federal grand jury. He was consequently adjudged in contempt of court. [Footnote 28] On
the incriminatory testimony. In other words, petitioners assert that no immunity statute, however appeal, this Court construed the statute as affording a witness protection only against the use
drawn, can afford a lawful basis for compelling incriminatory testimony. They ask us to of the specific testimony compelled from him under the grant of immunity. This construction
reconsider and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591(1896), and Ullmann v. United States, meant that the statute "could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out
supra, decisions that uphold the constitutionality of immunity statutes. [Footnote 22] We find no other testimony to be used in evidence against him." [Footnote 29] Since the revised 1868 Act,
merit to this contention, and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ullmann. as construed by the Court, would permit the use against the immunized witness of evidence
derived from his compelled testimony, it did not protect the witness to the same extent that a
III claim of the privilege would protect him. Accordingly, under the principle that a grant of
immunity cannot supplant the privilege, and is not sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of
Petitioners' second contention is that the scope of immunity provided by the federal witness the privilege, unless the scope of the grant of immunity is coextensive with the scope of the
immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002, is not coextensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, [Footnote 30] the witness' refusal to testify was held proper. In the course of its
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and therefore is not sufficient to supplant the opinion, the Court made the following statement, on which petitioners heavily rely:
privilege and compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. The statute provides that, when a
witness is compelled by district court order to testify over a claim of the privilege: "We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to
prosecution
"the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any Page 406 U. S. 451
information
after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the
Page 406 U. S. 449 privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. [The immunity statute under
consideration] does not supply a complete protection from all the perils against which the
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibition.
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute
otherwise failing to comply with the order. [Footnote 23]" immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates."

23 18 U.S.C. § 6002. 142 U.S. at 142 U. S. 585-586.

The constitutional inquiry, rooted in logic and history as well as in the decisions of this Court, is Sixteen days after the Counselman decision, a new immunity bill was introduced by Senator
whether the immunity granted under this statute is coextensive with the scope of the privilege. Cullom, [Footnote 31] who urged that enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act would be
[Footnote 24] If so, petitioners' refusals to answer based on the privilege were unjustified, and impossible in the absence of an effective immunity statute. [Footnote 32] The bill, which
the judgments of contempt were proper, for the grant of immunity has removed the dangers became the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, [Footnote 33] was drafted specifically to meet
against which the privilege protects. Brown v. Walker, supra. If, on the other hand, the immunity the broad language in Counselman set forth above. [Footnote 34] The new Act removed the
granted is not as comprehensive as the protection afforded by the privilege, petitioners were privilege against self-incrimination in hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
justified in refusing to answer, and the judgments of contempt must be vacated. McCarthy v. and provided that:
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
"no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
Petitioners draw a distinction between statutes that provide transactional immunity and those transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence,
that provide, as does the statute before us, immunity from use and derivative use. [Footnote documentary or otherwise. . . ."
25] They contend that a statute must, at a minimum, grant full transactional immunity in order to
be coextensive with the scope of the privilege. In support of this contention, they rely Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 444.
on Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), the first case in which this Court
considered a constitutional challenge to an immunity statute. The statute, a reenactment of the Page 406 U. S. 452
Immunity Act of 1868, [Footnote 26] provided that no
This transactional immunity statute became the basic form for the numerous federal immunity
"evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial statutes [Footnote 35] until 1970, when, after reexamining applicable constitutional principles
and the adequacy of existing law, Congress enacted the statute here under consideration. "affords no protection against that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining
[Footnote 36] The new statute, which does not "afford [the] absolute immunity against future therefrom a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may
prosecution" referred to in Counselman, was drafted to meet what Congress judged to be the supply other means of convicting the witness or party."
conceptual basis of Counselman, as elaborated in subsequent decisions of the Court, namely,
that immunity from the 142 U.S. at 142 U. S. 586. The basis of the Court's decision was recognized in Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956), in which the Court reiterated that the Counselman statute
Page 406 U. S. 453 was insufficient:

use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with the scope of "because the immunity granted was incomplete, in that it merely forbade the use of the
the privilege. [Footnote 37] testimony given and failed to protect a witness from future prosecution based on knowledge
and sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony."
The statute's explicit proscription of the use in any criminal case of
Id. at 350 U. S. 437. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71, 254
"testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or U. S. 73 (1920). The broad language in Counselman relied upon by petitioners
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)"
Page 406 U. S. 455
is consonant with Fifth Amendment standards. We hold that such immunity from use and
derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and was unnecessary to the Court's decision, and cannot be considered binding authority.
therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of [Footnote 39]
immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not
be broader. Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), the Court carefully considered immunity
offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader from use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom. The Murphy petitioners were
protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege. The privilege has never been construed to subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York
mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford Harbor. After refusing to answer certain questions on the ground that the answers might tend to
protection against being "forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of penalties affixed to incriminate them, petitioners were granted immunity
. . . criminal acts.'" [Footnote 38] Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as
evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the Page 406 U. S. 456
prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore
insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness. from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. [Footnote 40] They continued to
refuse to testify, however, on the ground that their answers might tend to incriminate them
Our holding is consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman. The Counselman statute, under federal law, to which the immunity did not purport to extend. They were adjudged in civil
as construed by the Court, was plainly deficient in its failure to contempt, and that judgment was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. [Footnote 41]

Page 406 U. S. 454 The issue before the Court in Murphy was whether New Jersey and New York could compel
the witnesses, whom these States had immunized from prosecution under their laws, to give
prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony that might then be used to convict them of a federal crime. Since New Jersey and
testimony. The Court repeatedly emphasized this deficiency, noting that the statute: New York had not purported to confer immunity from federal prosecution, the Court was faced
with the question what limitations the Fifth Amendment privilege imposed on the prosecutorial
"could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be powers of the Federal Government, a nonimmunizing sovereign. After undertaking an
used in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding . . ." examination of the policies and purposes of the privilege, the Court overturned the rule that one
jurisdiction within our federal structure may compel a witness to give testimony which could be
142 U.S. at 142 U. S. 564; used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction. [Footnote 42] The Court held that the
privilege protects state witnesses against incrimination under federal as well as state law, and
that it: federal witnesses against incrimination

"could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be Page 406 U. S. 457
attributable directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be
convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly have been under state, as well as federal, law. Applying this principle to the state immunity legislation
convicted," before it, the Court held the constitutional rule to be that:

ibid.; and that it: "[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under
federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by
federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover, perhaps impossible, the argument goes, to identify, by testimony or cross-examination, the
that, in order to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State subtle ways in which the compelled testimony may disadvantage a witness, especially in the
and Federal Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government jurisdiction granting the immunity.
must be prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits. [Footnote
43]" This argument presupposes that the statute's prohibition

378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 79. The Court emphasized that this rule left the state witness and the Page 406 U. S. 460
Federal Government, against which the witness had immunity only from the use of the
compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom, "in substantially the same position as if will prove impossible to enforce. The statute provides a sweeping proscription of any use,
the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity."Ibid. direct or indirect, of the compelled testimony and any information derived therefrom:

It is true that, in Murphy, the Court was not presented with the precise question presented by "[N]o testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
this case, whether a jurisdiction seeking to compel testimony may do so by granting only use indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in
and derivative use immunity, for New Jersey and New York had granted petitioners any criminal case. . . ."
transactional immunity. The Court heretofore has not
18 U.S.C. § 6002. This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive safeguard, barring
Page 406 U. S. 458 the use of compelled testimony as an "investigatory lead," [Footnote 50] and also barring the
use of any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of his
squarely confronted this question, [Footnote 44] because post-Counselman immunity statutes compelled disclosures.
reaching the Court either have followed the pattern of the 1893 Act in providing transactional
immunity [Footnote 45] or have been found deficient for failure to prohibit the use of all A person accorded this immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002, and subsequently prosecuted, is not
evidence derived from compelled testimony. [Footnote 46] But both the reasoning of the Court dependent for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting
in Murphy and the result reached compel the conclusion that use and derivative use immunity authorities. As stated in Murphy:
is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. Since the privilege
is fully applicable and its scope is the same whether invoked in a state or in a federal "Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to
jurisdiction, [Footnote 47] the Murphy conclusion that a prohibition on use and derivative use matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing
secures a witness' Fifth Amendment privilege against infringement by the Federal Government that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate
demonstrates that immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the source for the disputed evidence."
privilege. As the Murphy Court noted, immunity from use and derivative use "leaves the witness
and the Federal Government in substantially the same position 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 79 n. 18. This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate, is not
limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove
Page 406 U. S. 459 that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of
the compelled testimony.
as if the witness had claimed his privilege" [Footnote 48] in the absence of a grant of immunity.
The Murphy Court was concerned solely with the danger of incrimination under federal law, Page 406 U. S. 461
and held that immunity from use and derivative use was sufficient to displace the danger. This
protection coextensive with the privilege is the degree of protection that the Constitution This is very substantial protection, [Footnote 51] commensurate with that resulting from
requires, and is all that the Constitution requires even against the jurisdiction compelling invoking the privilege itself. The privilege assures that a citizen is not compelled to incriminate
testimony by granting immunity. [Footnote 49] himself by his own testimony. It usually operates to allow a citizen to remain silent when asked
a question requiring an incriminatory answer. This statute, which operates after a witness has
IV given incriminatory testimony, affords the same protection by assuring that the compelled
testimony can in no way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties. The statute, like the Fifth
Although an analysis of prior decisions and the purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege Amendment, grants neither pardon nor amnesty. Both the statute and the Fifth Amendment
indicates that use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with the privilege, we must allow the government to prosecute using evidence from legitimate independent sources.
consider additional arguments advanced by petitioners against the sufficiency of such
immunity. We start from the premise, repeatedly affirmed by this Court, that an appropriately The statutory proscription is analogous to the Fifth Amendment requirement in cases of
broad immunity grant is compatible with the Constitution. coerced confessions. [Footnote 52] A coerced confession, as revealing of leads as testimony
given in exchange for immunity, [Footnote 53] is inadmissible in a criminal trial, but it does not
Petitioners argue that use and derivative use immunity will not adequately protect a witness bar prosecution. [Footnote 54] Moreover, a defendant against whom incriminating evidence
from various possible incriminating uses of the compelled testimony: for example, the has been obtained through a grant of immunity may be in a stronger position at trial than a
prosecutor or other law enforcement officials may obtain leads, names of witnesses, or other defendant who asserts a Fifth Amendment coerced confession claim. One raising a claim
information not otherwise available that might result in a prosecution. It will be difficult, and under this statute need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to
the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
derived from conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions
for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for
Page 406 U. S. 462 withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

legitimate independent sources. [Footnote 55] On the other hand, a defendant raising a (a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to
coerced confession claim under the Fifth Amendment must first prevail in a voluntariness P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit:
hearing before his confession and evidence derived from it become inadmissible. [Footnote 56] (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in
persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the
There can be no justification in reason or policy for holding that the Constitution requires an Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
amnesty grant where, acting pursuant to statute and accompanying safeguards, testimony is
compelled in exchange for immunity from use and derivative use when no such amnesty is (b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical
required where the government, acting without colorable right, coerces a defendant into High School;
incriminating himself.
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
We conclude that the immunity provided by 18 U.S.C. 6002 leaves the witness and the
prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the (d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco
Fifth Amendment privilege. The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilege and Technical High School;
suffices to supplant it. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accordingly is
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against
Affirmed Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance
on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs. (g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).

Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office
among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
using a telephone line. complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not Philippine Constabulary.
disputed by the petitioner.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the
Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be
holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in the word of the caller against the listener's.
nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the
telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users
complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200. often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his
telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly
the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never
and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is intended for such mischievous results.
covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the
petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the
Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner. phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or
arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides: with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or
deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie- arrangement under the law?
talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the
next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964,
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate,
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally popularly known communication device.
or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of
this prohibition. telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph,
detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission
We rule for the petitioner. was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions
of the Act.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of
evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of
and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable
sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main
attempt at extortion. telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place
to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and communication corning from the other party or end.
accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between
one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault
charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or
lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is
a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated extension telephone for the same purpose.
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
113,120). accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension
telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled: construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA
542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind
531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d
xxx xxx xxx 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality
but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be
construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a
'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers
specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement"
other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than
parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly
same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would
conversation. only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this
amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the would have the right to tape record their conversation.
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and
he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and,
shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers
107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138): or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the
peace offices.
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to
ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes (Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to
overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy xxx xxx xxx
of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not
occurred. Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside
listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it falsifying the evidence is not very much.
Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false The resolution, dated November 4, 1996, was presented to this Court. It was adopted at an
testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false assembly led by Rep. Manuel N. Mamba which picketed the municipal trial court on that
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record day.[1] The "resolution" was treated as an administrative complaint and respondent Judge
and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in Dominador L. Garcia was required to answer. The matter was referred to Executive Judge
court. Orlando D. Beltran, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, for investigation, report,
and recommendation.[2]
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).
Thereafter, an investigation was held during which the affidavits and sworn statements of NBI
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons Special Investigator Ablezer Rivera, the joint affidavit of NBI agents, Raul A. Ancheta and Paul
such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices D. Rivera, the sworn statement of the accused in Criminal Case No. 699, Renato Bulatao, and
in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some the testimonies of Abner P. Cardenas, clerk of court, MTC, Tuao, Cagayan and Tomas
unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in Latauan, Jr., interpreter of the same court, were presented. The gist of the evidence for the
order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 complainants is as follows:
or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such
devices or arrangements. On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866 (illegal
possession of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia of the Municipal
Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan.[3] Respondent set the preliminary investigation on September 4,
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti- 1996, but the same was subsequently postponed and reset to October 23, 1996 as respondent
Wiretapping Act. was not present, although the complaining officer, P/Sr. Inspector Danny F. Salvador,
appeared in court. On October 23, 1996, the preliminary investigation was again reset to
CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA, M.D. ATTY, FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., HON. GUILLERMO October 30, 1996. On October 29, 1996, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the NBI
SUMIGAD, HON. CALIXTO GENOVEZA, HON. MARTIN SORIANO, HON. LOURDES that at the scheduled preliminary investigation on September 4, 1996, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador
FAUSTO, HON. LORENZO FERMIN, HON. ADORACION RAQUINIO, HON. LEONIDES demanded P30,000.00 from him in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against
FAUSTO, HON. DIOGENES BALIGOD, HON. LORETO MABBORANG, HON. PETER SY, him. According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and respondent judge on
HON. NICCOLO MAMBA, LORETO MAMBA, JUAN TAGUBA, DOMINGO CAMARAT, October 23, 1996. As Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the amount was reduced to
SEVERINO BUCAYU, CASIANO CHAVENTE, ILLUMINADO BALIGOD, FELICIANO P6,000.00.
SERRANO, TEOFILO URMA, REMIGIO DE LA CRUZ, ABELARDO BAUIT, MARIANO
MIRANDA, JR., ROMULO SERAFICA, CARLOS MANANGUIT, ERNESTO FERMIN, Based on Bulataos report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge. The NBI
ROGELIO FERNANDEZ, ERNESTO CENABRE, TRINIDAD BALUNSAT, MIGUEL PASON, gave Bulatao 12 pieces of P500.00 marked bills amounting to P6,000.00, which the latter
GIL BALORAN, DOMINGO CALLUENG, BERNARDO BENITO, JUAN TURINGAN, would give to Salvador and respondent the next day.[4]
MARCELINO CORPUZ, IGNACIO PASCUA, JR., LEONIDES FAUSTO, TEODORICO
PASTOR, DOMINADOR CORSINO, GENEROSO AGLAUA, ZACARIAS MAGGAY, SIMEON Accordingly, at about 7 o'clock in the morning of the following day, October 30, Bulatao met the
BENZON, PATRICIO TAGUIAM, LUCAS TAGUINOD, MA. GLORIA G. BALIGOD, LAURO NBI operatives in the house of Francisco Mamba, Sr., former representative of the 3rd District
N. FAUSTO, EDGAR AGGABAO, RODOLFO CARDENAS, TERESITA ESPINOSA, of Cagayan, where the entrapment was planned. Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record
PACIFICO C. BINULUAN, ROGELIO SORIANO, ARTURO MAMBA, DR. EXSUPERIOR his conversation with whoever will receive the money. At 9 a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal
YUAGA, VIVIAN DE GUZMAN, EX-CONG. FRANCISCO K. MAMBA, CRISTINA MAMBA, Trial Court and waited for his case to be called. At 10:30 a.m., respondent went out of his
EDWIN LIU, PABLO DANGA, ALICE LOA, VICENTE TOLENTINO, NUMERIANO chambers and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and SPO4 Carlos Poli, representatives of P/Sr.
MACAPULAY, ROLLY SEDANO, complainants, vs. JUDGE DOMINADOR L. GARCIA, Inspector Salvador in the preliminary investigation. Respondent then called Bulatao and led
MTC, TUAO, CAGAYAN, respondent. him and the two police officers to the office of the MTC court personnel. Inside, respondent
asked Bulatao if he had the money with him. When he answered in the affirmative, respondent
DECISION took them to his chambers and left them there as he proceeded to his sala. After handing the
money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's chambers.Upon his signal, the
PER CURIAM: NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's court then rushed to the judge's chambers and
arrested the two police officers after recovering 11 pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their
This is a resolution, which is more accurately a manifesto or a petition of concerned citizens of possession.[5]
Tuao, Cagayan, denouncing certain acts of Judge Dominador L. Garcia, Municipal Trial Court,
Tuao, Cagayan, in connection with his handling of Criminal Case No. 399, entitled People vs. After the matter was referred by this Court to Executive Judge Orlando Beltran for investigation,
Renato Bulatao. The complainants are then Representative of the Third District of Cagayan, the latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of evidence for the respondent. The
the mayor and vicemayor, ten (10) members of the Sangguniang Bayan, thirty-two (32) barrio records show that hearings were set on different dates (December 10, 1997, January 30, 1998,
captains, ten (10) LGU department heads of Tuao, Cagayan, and eight (8) heads of non- February 10, 1998, March 3, 1998, March 10, 1998, September 10, 1998, October 9, 1998,
governmental organizations or NGOs in the municipality of Tuao. November 11, 1998, January 5, 1999, February 9, 1999, March 4, 1999, and April 5, 1999), but
respondent did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was deemed to have waived the "In view of all the foregoing, the undersigned Investigating Judge respectfully recommends that
right to present evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence only his counter- the respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia be found guilty of improper conduct and be
affidavit was considered, in which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who asked punished accordingly.[7]"
permission to talk to the two police officers. He denied that he took the three to his chambers.[6]
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the
On the basis of these facts, the Investigating Judge made the following recommendation: two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the consent of
the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire
"The foregoing facts indisputably show that the respondent Judge allowed the use of his Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.[8] The law
chambers by the two (2) police officers SPOII Jonathan Santos and SPOIV Carlos Poli and covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private communications, as in this
Renato Bulatao, the accused in the criminal case for illegal possession of firearms, so that they case.[9] Thus, the contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to determine the
could talk about the "settlement" of Bulatao's case which was then pending preliminary culpability of respondent judge.
investigation by the respondent Judge.Although the two (2) witnesses, Abner Cardenas and
Tomas Latauan, Jr., claimed that they did not hear the subject of the conversation between In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in accordance with
Bulatao, on one hand, and the two (2) policemen and the respondent Judge Dominador L. the evidence. We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not just of improper conduct
Garcia, on the other, before the three first-named persons went inside the chambers of the but of serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is such conduct which affects a public officer's
respondent Judge, it is not difficult to conclude that they must have talked about the criminal performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which affects his character as a
case of Bulatao and its "settlement." For if the subject-matter of their conversation were other private individual. For serious misconduct to warrant a dismissal from the service, there must
than said "settlement" there appears no reason or purpose to allow the policemen and the be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
accused to go inside the judge's chambers and there to continue their conversation. Simply intention to violate the law. It must (1) be serious, important, weighty, momentary, and not
stated, the respondent judge allowed the two (2) policemen and the accused Renato Bulatao to trifling; (2) imply wrongful intention and not mere error of judgment; and (3) have a direct
use his chambers so that they could consummate the arrangements for the dismissal of the relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties.[10]
case, particularly the payment of the sum of money being demanded as consideration for such
dismissal. In the case at bar, it is clear that the crime of bribery was committed. Although the evidence
may not be sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal case, it is adequate for the purpose of
"In this connection, the undersigned Investigating Judge cannot help but refer to the taped these proceedings. The standards of integrity required of members of the Bench are not
conversation between the two (2) policemen and Renato Bulatao inside the chamber of the satisfied by conduct which merely allows one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. [11] In
respondent Judge. A portion of the translated dialogue between Poli and Bulatao, which was in an administrative proceeding, such as this case, only substantial evidence, or that amount of
Ilocano, tends to show that the P6,000.00 pay-off handed by Bulatao to the policemen was not relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
intended for the respondent Judge but solely for the policemen and their superior, P/Sr. is required.[12]
Inspector Salvador. However, it is not easy to disregard the implication obvious from the said
conversation that the respondent Judge was privy to the entire transaction. SPOIV Poli To constitute bribery, the following must be shown: (1) the offender is a public officer within the
pointedly told Bulatao "to take care of the Judge" which implies that the Judge knew of the pay- scope of Art. 203; (2) the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or present by
off being made and was willing to abide by the "deal" provided he would be "taken care of" by himself or through another; (3) such offer or promise is accepted, or gift received by the public
Bulatao. officer, (a) with a view to committing some crime; (b) in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime, but which is unjust; or (c) to refrain from doing something
"Such acts of the respondent Judge are improper, to say the least. He, therefore, violated the which it is his official duty to do; and (4) the act which he agrees to perform is connected with
duty of every Judge to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the the performance of his official duties.[13] From the records, it is evident that P/Sr. Inspector
appearance of impropriety in all activities. (Mortel vs. Leido, Jr. 44 SCAD 567). It cannot be Salvador, a public officer, solicited money from Bulatao in consideration of the withdrawal of
over-emphasized that a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of the case against the latter. The former categorically told the latter that he would withdraw the
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of criminal case against Bulatao if Bulatao gives him P30,000.00, which was later lowered to
official duties but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach. (Marcos, Sr. vs. P6,000.00. The fact that two of his men came for the preliminary investigation and, without
Arcangel, 72 SCAD 1). Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not hesitation, followed respondent judge to his chambers after hearing that Bulatao had the
just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is true not money, bears out Bulatao's allegations. Although these circumstances do not show
only in the performance of their official duties but in all their activities, including their private conclusively that respondent judge was privy to the crime of bribery, there is substantial
life. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for evidence showing that he was at least an accomplice to the crime who cooperated in the
reproach. (Pedro San Juan vs. Judge Lore V. Bagalsera, RTC, BR. 23, Naga City, A. M. No. execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.[14] The following circumstances, as
RTJ-97-1395, December 22, 1997). In this case, the acts of the respondent judge were clearly corroborated by the report of the NBI and the testimonies of two employees of the MTC, who
improper as he facilitated, if not participated in, the obviously unauthorized/illegal transaction were disinterested witnesses, show that respondent judge knowingly and voluntarily
between the two (2) police officers and the accused Renato Bulatao for the cooperated with P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in consummating the crime:
settlement/dismissal of the latter's criminal case, in consideration of a sum of money,
particularly since the offense charged against Bulatao is a grievous one and that it is one which (1) On the day of the entrapment, respondent judge asked Bulatao if he had the money, and
is not allowed by law to be compromised. when he received an affirmative answer, he took Bulatao and the two police officers to his
chambers, told the police officers to receive whatever Bulatao would give them, [15] and then left; In lieu of the Criminal Case “People v. Estrada” for plunder, the Special Prosecution Panel filed
and before the Sandiganbayan a request for issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum directing the
President of Export and Industry Bank or his/her authorized representative to produce
(2) When Bulatao left respondent's chambers and gave the signal to the NBI operatives waiting documents namely, Trust Account and Savings Account belonging to petitioner and statement
outside, the marked bills were found by the agents in the possession of SPO2 Jonathan of accounts of one named “Jose Velarde” and to testify thereon during the hearings.
Santos, as the latter was leaving the chambers of respondent judge with SPO4 Carlos Poli. As Sandiganbayan granted both requests and subpoenas were accordingly issued.
the Investigating Judge observed, respondent willingly allowed his chambers to be used for the Sandiganbayan also granted and issued subpoenas prayed for by the Prosecution Panel in
consummation of the illegal transaction. The actions of respondent implies a wrongful intention another later date. Petitioner now assisted by his counsel filed two separate motions to quash
to commit an unlawful act while in the performance of his official duties. the two subpoenas issued. Sandiganbayan denied both motions and the consequent motions
for reconsideration of petitioner.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not only impropriety but even
the appearance of impropriety in all their conduct. This includes not taking an undue interest in Issues:
the settlement of criminal cases pending before them as this may compromise the integrity and
impartiality of their office.[16] As the visible representation of the law and of justice, their conduct (1) Whether or not the trust accounts of petitioner are covered by the term “deposits” as used in
must be above reproach and suspicion.[17] By acting as an accomplice to P/Sr. Inspector R.A. No. 1405
Salvador, respondent judge violated not only the law but also the Code of Judicial Conduct.
(2) Whether or not plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty not exempted from
Nor does the fact that respondent committed misconduct during a preliminary investigation, protection of R.A. No. 1405
which is non-judicial in character, exempt him from the disciplinary power of this Court as the
conduct of a preliminary investigation is only an addition to his judicial functions.[18] (3) Whether or not the unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence
obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence.
In Cabrera vs. Pajares,[19] where the payment of the money to respondent judge in his
chambers was witnessed by an NBI agent, this Court ordered his dismissal from the Ruling:
service. Likewise, in Court Administrator vs. Hermoso,[20] where the judge received money from
a party to a case pending before his sala and was entrapped by an NBI agent, this Court (1) YES. An examination of the law shows that the term “deposits” used therein is to be
ordered his dismissal. In addition, the erring judge is liable to the forfeiture of his leave credits understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
and retirement benefits and his dismissal shall be with prejudice to reemployment in any relationship between the depositor and the bank.
branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-
owned and controlled corporations, as provided by Section 9, Rule 14 of the Omnibus Rules The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1. If the money deposited under an account
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and our may be used by banks for authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of
current rulings.[21] whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls
under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of
Respondent judge was previously convicted in two administrative cases filed before this boosting the economic development of the country.
Court. In A.M. No. MTJ-91-616, entitled "Clodualdo Escobar vs. Garcia," the Court, in a
resolution dated September l, 1992, found respondent guilty of palpable ignorance of Rule 114, Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
section 8 resulting in the denial of due process to the prosecution in a criminal petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers “deposit, placement or
case. Respondent was fined an amount equivalent to 15 days salary with warning that a investment of funds” by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under
repetition of the same would be dealt with more severely. In another case, A.M. No. MTJ-95- Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be
1049, entitled Eloisa Bernardo v. Garcia, the Court, in a resolution dated June 28, 1995, found invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would
respondent guilty of deliberately delaying his decision in a civil case and falsifying certificates of encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other
service. He was reprimanded and ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with warning that a ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term “deposits” was
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia guilty of serious intended to be understood broadly. The phrase “of whatever nature” proscribes any restrictive
misconduct and accordingly orders his DISMISSAL from the service and the forfeiture of his interpretation of “deposits.” Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that,
leave credits and retirement benefits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to “deposits” in the
controlled corporations. strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase “or
invested.”
EJERCITO V. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NOS. 157294-95)
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.
Facts:
(2) NO. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly
no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making inspect bank records in camera thus reversed a prevailing doctrine. Hence, it may not be
bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the retroactively applied. The Ombudsman’s inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the
other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who filing of any case before a court of competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at the time it was
enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his conducted. In fine, the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal, hence,
duty, is open to public scrutiny. invocation of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is misplaced.

The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public D. OTHER MATTERS
officers, and in either case the noble idea that “a public office is a public trust and any person
who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to COMPETENCE AND CREDIBILITY
his duty, is open to public scrutiny” applies with equal force.
PAULITA EDITH G.R. No. 193861
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of
SERRA,1
bribery must also apply to cases of plunder. Present:
Petitioner,
(3) NO. Petitioner’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts - versus -
shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 BRION,
only states that “[a]ny violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an NELFA T.
imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or MUMAR, PEREZ,
both, in the discretion of the court.”
Respondent. SERENO, and
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases
involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case. REYES, JJ.
Clearly, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine presupposes a violation of law. If there was no
violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there would be no “poisonous tree” to begin Promulgated:
with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
March 14, 2012
Additional Note: (This case is to be contrasted with Marquez v. Desierto)
DECISION
The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by the Ombudsman of
petitioner’s bank accounts, conducted before a case was filed with a court of competent CARPIO, J.:
jurisdiction, was lawful.
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing
For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of petitioner the 31 July 2009 Decision2 and 27 July 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001. G.R. CV No. 00023-MIN.

When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law in Marquez, that “before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be
a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction”, it was, in fact, reversing an earlier The Facts
doctrine found in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima.
At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular accident along the National
Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, then Highway in Barangay Apopong, General Santos City, which resulted in the death of
known as the Tanodbayan, in the course of its preliminary investigation of a charge of violation Armando Mumar (Mumar), husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar (respondent).
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were
issued during a preliminary investigation, in effect this Court upheld the power of the Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos
Tandobayan under P.D. 1630 to issue subpoenas duces tecum for bank documents prior to the City, one Armando Tenerife (Tenerife) was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the National
filing of a case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Highway heading in the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the van
owned by petitioner Paulita Edith Serra (petitioner) coming from the opposite direction, which
Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco Filipino despite the fact was trying to overtake a passenger jeep, and in the process encroached on his lane. The left
that the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was essentially the same as that side of the sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan to swerve to the left and end up on the
under P.D. 1630. other side of the road. The van collided head on with the motorcycle, which was about 12
meters behind the sedan on the outer lane, causing injuries to Mumar, which eventually led to As to the claim for damages, the RTC said that Nelfa testified that her husband was earning
his death. about P6,000.00 a month without presenting any documentary evidence to prove her claim, but
nonetheless awarded her P300,000.00 for damages due to loss of income.

On the other hand, petitioner denied that her van was overtaking the jeepney at the time of the
incident. She claimed that the left tire of Tenerifes sedan burst, causing it to sideswipe her van. Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.
Consequently, the left front tire of the van also burst and the vans driver, Marciano de Castro
(de Castro), lost control of the vehicle. The van swerved to the left towards Mumars motorcycle.
The impact resulted in the death of Mumar.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Damages by Reason of
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide and Attachment before the General Santos City In its 31 July 2009 Decision, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTCs
RTC. ruling:

FOR REASONS STATED, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. 6764 is
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the appellant is ordered to pay appellee the following:

On 20 November 2003, the General Santos City RTC promulgated a judgment, 4 the dispositive 1. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00;
portion of which reads:
2. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of P1,224,000.00;
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against defendant Paulita Sierra, her co-
defendant not having been served with summons because he could no longer be found, finding 3. Temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00 in lieu of the award for burial expenses;
her liable for damages by reason of reckless imprudence, and she is hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff the sum of: 4. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

1. P65,000.00 for burial damages; 5. The total amount of damages shall bear an interest of 12% per annum from the finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
2. P300,000.00 for loss of income;

3. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

The awards for burial expenses and exemplary damages are deleted.
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.7
SO ORDERED.5

The CA adopted the factual findings of the RTC. It also ruled that the RTC erred in awarding
The RTC found that, based on the evidence presented at the trial, at the time of impact the van burial expenses and actual damages for loss of earning capacity despite lack of proof. Based
was overtaking another vehicle without due regard for the safety of others, bumped the Toyota on the wifes claim that the victim earned not less than P6,000.00 a month and his age at the
Car (sic) and the motorcycle traveling in the right lane going to Polomolok, South Cotabato. time of death, based on his birth certificate (29), the CA applied the formula:
The RTC noted that the damage to the van was located at the bumper, evincing a frontal
collision, while the damage to the sedan was on the left side door and window, evincing that
the van sideswiped the sedan. Likewise, the RTC found that the van encroached on the sedan
and motorcycles lane, in the process hitting the motorcycle, causing the injuries and Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim at time of death) x [Gross Annual
subsequent death of Mumar.6 Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses (50% of gross income)]
Using the foregoing formula, the CA awarded damages due to loss of earning capacity in the
amount of P1,224,000.00.8
As to the CAs award of damages due to loss of earning capacity, petitioner argues that the
same has no basis. She points out that there was no documentary evidence presented or
formally offered at the trial to substantiate the claim for damages due to loss of earning
Likewise, the CA said that the RTC erred in not awarding civil indemnity in the amount capacity. Likewise, petitioner further argues that, based on Nelfas testimony that her husband
of P50,000.00. The CA also awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00 finding that was earning not less than P6,000 a month, the conclusion was that he was earning not less
respondent spent for her husbands burial although the exact amount could not be proven. than the minimum wage at the time of the accident.

Petitioners Arguments Petitioner counters that in 2005 the minimum wage in Region XII, where the accident occurred,
was P200.00 per day plus a cost of living allowance of P13.50, or P5,558.00 per month.
Petitioner raises the following issues: Petitioner posits that it was safe to assume that at the time of the accident on 3 April 2000, the
minimum wage was lower than the rate in 2005.
I. Whether or not the (sic) both the lower court and the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in finding that the incident which killed Armando Mumar was not purely
accidental for which defendants may not be held liable[;]
Petitioner also argues that in Mumars line of work contracting and manufacturing steel grills,
II. Whether or not both the lower court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible fences and gates some form of documentary evidence would be available to support his
error in holding Editha Serra as liable for damages and in not appreciating that she was not widows claim. That these were not presented in evidence would remove the claim from the
negligent in the selection and supervision of the driver of the van, Marciano de Castro[;] exceptions to the requirement that the amount of actual damages must be duly proved. 11

III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding to herein respondent loss of
earning capacity despite complete absence of documentary evidence that the
deceased Mumar was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current Thus, petitioner prays that the assailed CA decision and resolution be reversed and set aside.
labor laws in force at the time of his death, following the ruling in People v. Mallari, G.R. No. In the alternative, petitioner prays that, should the Court sustain the finding of negligence, that
145993, June 17, 2003[.]9 the award of damages for loss of earning capacity in the sum of P1,224,000.00 be completely
deleted for lack of evidentiary basis.12

Petitioner maintains that it was Tenerifes sedan that encroached on the lane of the van after
the sedans left front tire blew out. Petitioner points out that Tenerife himself admitted that what Respondents Argument
happened was merely a sliding collision.10 She points out that the sedan not only cut across
two lanes headed in the opposite direction, it also made a half-circle such that it stopped on the In her Comment, respondent counters that petitioner raises no new matter, and the arguments
shoulder of the left side of the road (opposite its original lane), and then faced towards its are merely a rehash of those raised before the lower courts, which had already ruled on
origin, General Santos City. This could be for no other reason than that Tenerife completely these.13
lost control of his vehicle because the tire burst. Then, the sedan rammed into the van causing
the latters front tire to tear; thus, the vans driver also lost control of the vehicle and headed
towards the opposite lane and hit Mumar. Yet, the van was still facing its destination General
Santos City. The greater damage to the van was from hitting the signboard on the side of the The Courts Ruling
road and not from hitting the sedan.
The petition is partly granted. The Court affirms the decision of the CA, but modifies the award
for damages.

Petitioner argues that the foregoing description of the events proves that it is purely accidental
and without negligence on her drivers part.
Uniform Findings of Fact by the RTC and CA
Petitioner also insists that she was not negligent in the selection and supervision of the driver
of the van. Respondent had the burden to prove that petitioner was negligent but failed to do A petition for review on certiorari should raise only questions of law. In resolving a petition for
so, petitioner claims. review, the Court does not sit as an arbiter of facts for it is not the function of the Supreme
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings Petitioner insists that the traffic investigator SPO3 Haron Abdullatips report should be
below.14 disregarded because he was not at the scene when the accident happened.

When supported by substantial evidence, the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the
trial court15 are final and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal,16 unless
petitioner can show compelling or exceptional reasons 17 for this Court to disregard, overturn or Rarely does it happen that the investigating officer personally witnesses an accident that he
modify such findings. investigates, yet this does not mean that his observations are not valid. A traffic investigators
training and experience allow him to determine how an accident occurred even without
witnessing the accident himself.

In the present case, the Court notes the uniform factual findings by the RTC and CA, and
petitioner has not shown compelling or exceptional reasons warranting deviation from these
findings. In this case, Abdullatip had been a traffic investigator for nine years.21 Even if he arrived at the
scene after the accident, he saw the vehicles in their relative positions as a result of the
accident. His experience, as well as his evaluation of the statements from various witnesses,
guided him in assessing who was at fault. In any case, the presumption of regularity in the
Both the trial court and the CA found that it was petitioners van, then being driven by de exercise of functions is in his favor and therefore his report must be given credence.
Castro, that encroached on the sedans lane, then hit the latter and,
eventually, Mumarsmotorcycle.

Liability for Damages of Petitioner

The Court has previously held that evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. The evidence must be natural, employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employees
reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe. No better test has yet been found to negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the
determine the value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or
common experience of mankind.18 supervision of its employees.22 The liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.23

Petitioners testimony is not credible considering that she admitted that she did not see the
actual bumping of the van with the sedan because it was dark and showering. 19 When she
came out of the van, she said she did not notice the sedan. She then left the scene to ask help Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code,24 if the causative factor was the drivers
from her brother, without even coming to the aid of her driver. 20 negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
Moreover, the traffic investigators findings are more consistent with human experience.

Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence required in supervising her
As found by the investigator, the van ended up on the other side of the road, opposite the lane driver in order to prevent the accident. She admitted that de Castro had only been her driver for
it was originally traversing. The vans forward momentum was going towards the opposite side. one year and she had no knowledge of his driving experience or record of previous accidents.
If indeed the van stayed on its proper lane when the sedans tire blew out and lost control, the She also admitted that it was de Castro who maintained the vehicle and would even remind her
sedan would have bumped into the van on the latters lane and the van would have ended up to pay the installment of the car.25
on the side of the road with the sedan. Likewise, if the van had stayed on its lane, and the
impact of the sedan propelled it forward, the van would have hit the jeepney in front of it,
not Mumars motorcycle, which was on the opposite lane to the right of the sedan. The only
plausible explanation is it was the van, while trying to overtake the jeepney in front of it at a Petitioner also admitted that, at the time of the accident, she did not know what was happening
fast speed, that bumped into the sedan and subsequently, Mumars motorcycle. and only knew they bumped into another vehicle when the driver shouted. She then closed her
eyes and a moment later felt something heavy fall on the roof of the car. When the vehicle
stopped, petitioner left the scene purportedly to ask help from her brother, leaving the other
passengers to come to the aid of her injured driver.
 SECTOR/INDUSTRY Davao City Provinces of:
Damages for Loss of Earning Capacity
General Santos City Davao del Norte
Next, the Court holds that the CA erred in awarding damages for loss of earning capacity in the
Island Garden City Davao del Sur
absence of documentary evidence to support the claim.
of Samal
Davao Oriental
Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages,26 which as a rule
Tagum City
must be duly proven27 by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of Compostela Valley
the widow.
South Cotabato
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in NON-AGRICULTURE 148.00 146.00
the deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws.28
AGRICULTURE
Based solely on Nelfas testimony, the CA determined that the deceased falls within one of
these exceptions. Nelfa testified that her husband was in the business of contracting and - Plantation (i.e. more 138.00 136.00
manufacturing grills, fences and gates,29 and his earnings exceed P6,000.0030 per month prior than 24 Hectares or
to his death. She presented no documentary proof of her claims. employing at least

20 workers)

It was error for the CA to have awarded damages for loss of earning capacity based
on Nelfas testimony alone.
- Non-Plantation

117.00 115.00
First, while it is conceded that the deceased was self-employed, the Court cannot accept that in
his line of work there was no documentary proof available to prove his income from such RETAIL/SERVICE
occupation. There would have been receipts, job orders, or some form of written contract or
agreement between the deceased and his clients when he is contracted for a job.

- Employing more than 10

workers
Second, and more importantly, decedent was not earning less than the minimum wage at the
time of his death. - Employing not more
than 10 workers 148.00 146.00

Wage Order No. RTWPB-XI-07,31 issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
Board-XI of the National Wages and Productivity Commission, under the Department of Labor 117.00 115.00
and Employment, took effect on 1 November 1999 and mandated the minimum wage rate in
Region XI, including General Santos City, at the time of the accident. Section 1 provides: Respondent testified that her husband was earning not less than P6,000.00 per month. On the
other hand, the highest minimum wage rate at the time of the accident, based on Wage Order
SECTION 1. NEW MINIMUM WAGE RATES. Effective November 1, 1999, the new minimum No. RTWPB-XI-07, was P148.00. At that rate, the monthly minimum wage would
wage rates in Region XI shall be as follows: be P3,256.00,32 clearly an amount less than what respondent testified to as her husbands
monthly earnings. The deceased would not fall within the recognized exceptions.
There is therefore no basis for the CAs computation for Mumars supposed net earning capacity
and the subsequent award of damages due to loss of earning capacity.
Antecedents

Both the RTC and the CA agreed on the factual antecedents.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT IN PART the petition. We AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2009 and Resolution dated 27 July 2010 in CA- AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in Makati City,
G.R. CV No. 00023-MIN. We ORDER petitioner to pay respondent the following: proceeding towards MA Montessori to fetch her employers son who was studying there.
Suddenly, a man (later identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to
go with him. She recognized him to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time
she had bought pandesal at 5 oclock am near her employers house in the past two weeks.
1. Civil indemnity of P50,000.00; Alarmed, she refused to do his bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat. Two other
men whom she did not recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the
2. Temperate damages of P25,000.00, in lieu of the award for burial expenses; backseat of a parked car, and one of Sabadlabs cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief.
The car moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still blindfolded, she was
3. Moral damages of P50,000.00; and brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove her clothes. Sabadlab then
undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them tied her hands behind her back.
4. Interest on the total monetary award at the rate of 12% per annum from the finality of this Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck downwards. Although blindfolded, she knew
decision until the award is fully satisfied. that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out his name as he was kissing her
body.Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still tied behind her back.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175924 Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. To
prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers.
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present: The three ravished her again and again, that she could not remember the number of times they
did so.
- versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

ERLAND SABADLAB y LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

At around 3:00 oclock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to
BAYQUEL, BERSAMIN, Dapitan Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she told
anyone about the rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her ward.
Accused-Appellant. VILLARAMA, JR., and She waited there until 5:30 pm.

*
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Upon her arrival at the house, AAAs employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA at first
lied about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated employer
Promulgated: slapped and boxed her on the stomach to force her to disclose.

March 14, 2012

On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to report the
rapes. AAA underwent medico-legal examination later that day at the PNPCrime Laboratory in
Camp Crame Quezon City. The results of the medico-legal examination were embodied in
Medico-Legal Report No. M-797-02 issued by medico-legal officer Dr. Mary Ann P.
Gajardo, viz:
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
PHYSICAL INJURIES:
On October 28, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, in Makati City pronounced
Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel guilty of forcible abduction with rapecommitted against AAA,[1] a 16- 1. Ecchymosis, right mandibular region, measuring 2.5 x 2.5 cm, 8 cms from the anterior
year old domestic helper, and penalized him with reclusion perpetua.[2] On April 26, 2006, midline.
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction and the penalty, but modified the civil
damages.[3] Hence, Sabadlab appeals. 2. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 6 cms right of the anterior midline.
3. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 4.5 cms left of the anterior midline. These antecedents impelled the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati to immediately charge
Sabadlab and two John Does with forcible abduction with rape via the information dated March
4. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 4 cms right of the posterior midline. 13, 2002, alleging:

5. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 4.5 x 3 cms, 4 cms left of the posterior midline. That on or about the 12th day of March of 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) John
6. Ecchymosis, right breast, measuring 4 x 3.5 cms. 10 cms from the anterior midline. Does whose names and whereabouts are still unknown, with lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
7. Ecchymosis, sternal region, measuring 9 x 3 cms, bissecting the anterior midline. carry away AAA, 16 years of age, against her will from Dapitan St., Barangay Guadalupe,
Makati City and brought her to an undisclosed place, where accused by means of force,
8. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 9 cms from the anterior midline. violence and intimidation had carnal knowledge of complainant against her will.

9. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 3 cms, 11 cms from the anterior midline.

10. Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 3.5 x 0.5 cms. 14 cms from the posterior midline CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

GENITAL: In his defense, Sabadlab denied the charge and asserted alibi, claiming that on March 12,
2002, he was at Billiard M where he worked as a spotter; that he stayed there until noon,
PUBIC HAIR: Moderate leaving the place only to have lunch; and that he returned to Billiard M at 12:30 pm and stayed
there until he was arrested at 7:00 pm of March 12, 2002. Frederick Dionisio and Nathaniel
LABIA MAJORA: Full, convex and slightly gaping Salvacion corroborated Sabadlabs alibi.

LABIA MINORA: Pinkish brown slightly hypertrophied labia minora in between. As stated, the RTC convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape as charged based on
AAAs positive identification of him as one of the rapists, observing that her physical injuries and
HYMEN: Presence of shallow fresh lacerations at 7 oclock position and deep fresh lacerations
fresh hymenal lacerations were consistent with her account of the rapes, decreeing:
at 6 and 9 oclock position. Congested.

POSTERIOIR FOURCHETTE: Abraded/Congested

WHEREFORE, finding accused ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL GUILTY BEYOND
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE: Offers strong resistance upon introduction of the examiners REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of forcible abduction with rape charged in this
index finger. case, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
costs.
VAGINAL CANAL: Narrow with prominent rugosities.

CERVIX: Soft and close

On the civil aspect, the accused is ordered to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
PERIURETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS: Negative for spermatozoa and negative for gram (-
(P50,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
) diploxocci.
(P100,000.00) as MORAL DAMAGES.
CONCLUSION: Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. Barring unforeseen
complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will heal within 3-5 days.[4]
SO ORDERED.[6]

Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually
bought pandesal to look for the suspects. She spotted Sabadlab in one of the nearby
On appeal in the CA, Sabadlab assigned the following errors,[7] to wit:
restaurants and pointed to him. The policemen apprehended Sabadlab and brought him to the
station, where he gave his name as Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel. That was her first time to
know the name of Sabadlab.
I. THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO Ruling
THE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT. We affirm the conviction.

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT First of all, Sabadlab continues to assail the credibility of AAAs recollections. We understand
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO why he does so, because the credibility of the victims testimony is aprimordial consideration in
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. rape.[11] Yet, because both the RTC and the CA unanimously regarded AAA as a credible and
spontaneous witness, he has now to present clear and persuasive reasons to convince us to
reverse both lower courts determination of credibility and to resolve the appeal his way.

Nonetheless, the CA sustained his conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua, holding
that the supposed inconsistencies referred to trivial matters or innocent lapses that did not
affect the credibility of AAA as a witness but were instead badges of veracity or manifestations Our review reveals, however, that Sabadlab has not tendered any clear and persuasive
of truthfulness of the material points of her testimony. The CA thus disposed: reasons that may warrant the reversal or modification of the findings of both lower courts on the
credibility of AAA and his criminal liability. The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor
details or collateral matters that the CA precisely held to be badges of veracity and
manifestations of truthfulness due to their tendency of demonstrating that the testimony had not
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the RTC been rehearsed or concocted. It is also basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details or
dated October 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows: collateral matters should not adversely affect the substance of the witness declaration, veracity,
or weight of testimony.[12] The only inconsistencies that might have discredited the victims
1. The award of moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00; credible testimony were those that affected or related to the elements of the crime. Alas, that
was not true herein.
2. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED;

3. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one, the matter of
who of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling, because her
confusion did not alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant did the failure to produce any torn apparel of AAA disprove the crime charged, it being without
may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court. dispute that the tearing of the victims apparel was not necessary in the commission of the
crime charged. In fact, she did not even state that her clothes had been torn when
Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her. Verily, details and matters that did not detract from the
commission of the crime did not diminish her credibility.
SO ORDERED.[8]

We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration on August 2, 2006, Sabadlab is now before of weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he
the Court to seek the final review. derives while the witnesses testify before him.[13] The demeanor on the witness chair of
persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a significant element of judicial
In addition to the arguments and submissions made in his appellants brief in the CA,
adjudication because it can draw the line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or
Sabadlab indicates in his supplemental brief[9] that AAAs version was ambiguous and hesitant pauses, their quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes,
implausible, and conflicted with human experience as borne by the following, namely: (a) the
their modest blushes or guilty blanches - all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the
State did not present any torn apparel; (b) no bodily injuries were shown to prove that AAA had
truth or lying in their teeth.[14] As the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the
resisted the sexual intercourse; (c) AAA did not cry for help; and (d) AAA did not escape
age-old norm to accord the utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on the credibility of
despite several opportunities to do so. He contends, moreover, that the States evidence
witnesses reached by the trial judge on account of his unmatched opportunity to observe
established only simple seduction.[10]
the witnesses and on account of his personal access to the various indicia available but not
reflected in the record.[15]
Secondly, AAAs recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive identification of the The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly prescribed. Article 266-A and Article 266-B of
rapists, particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her trustworthiness in the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,[19]respectively define and
identifying Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her recognition of him as the man who had punish simple rape as follows:
frequently flirted with her at the store where she had usually bought pandesal for her employers
table. As such, the identification of him as one of the rapists became impervious to doubt.

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

Thirdly, AAAs failure to shout for help and her failure to escape were not factors that should 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances:
diminish credibility due to their being plausibly explained, the first by the fact that her mouth
had been stuffed by Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper, preventing her from making any a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
outcry, and the second by the fact that the culprits had blindfolded her and had also tied her
hands behind her back. b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and

And, lastly, Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was actually d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical injuries and the penetration of none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
her female organ.[16] This should debunk without difficulty his submission that she did not offer
any resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered. Her resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to
go with him was immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of
his two cohorts. At any rate, it is notable that among the amendments of the law on rape Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
introduced under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which punished by reclusion perpetua.
adverts to the degree of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist, viz:
Xxx Although the CA deleted the RTCs award of exemplary damages because of the absence
of aggravating circumstance (sic),[20] we reinstate the award in view of the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. The Civil
Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil
rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the circumstances.[21] The Civil Code allows such damages to be awarded by way of example or
prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A. correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.[22] Present here was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have recognized
the entitlement to exemplary damages of AAA on account of the attendance of use of a deadly
weapon. It was of no moment that the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in
We next deal with the characterization of the crime as forcible abduction with rape. The the information. As fittingly explained in People v. Catubig:[23]
principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and
in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from
the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in completely
undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
her body from the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has
order). Although forcible abduction was a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
seemingly committed,[17] we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary
with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.[18] concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature
of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled was an employee of the bank and in charge of the new accounts and time deposits
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. characteristically described as having homosexual inclinations. They were entertained by
Capati and were made to sit at a table occupied by a certain Liza.

Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to
the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and the moral damages of P50,000.00 the CA awarded to Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount
AAA. Sabadlab is further liable for interest of 6% per annum on all the civil damages. of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with
BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 26, cash.
2006, with the MODIFICATION that ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUELis: (a) DECLARED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article 266-A
and as penalized with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353; and (b) ORDERED TO PAY to the victim P50,000.00 Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, withdrawn from her existing savings account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes
plus interest of 6% per annum on each of the amounts reckoned from the finality of this believing in good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the
decision. same unaware of the mistakes in figures.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

BPI G.R. No. 157177 While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was filling up the
signature cards and several other forms.
VS

CONRADO B. REYES, Promulgated:

Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the plaintiff
Respondents. February 11, 2008 was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not
accommodate P200,000.00.

D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying
annul the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 2002 as well as its the change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100
Resolution[2] dated February 12, 2003, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No. 91-3453,[3] requiring Bank Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of plaintiff Jesusa
of Philippine Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's booth.
(respondents) the amount of P100,000.00 plus interest and damages.

The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly summarized by the trial court, to wit:
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to
account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing
December 7, as the date.
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter,
Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested with Plaintiff and daughter then left.
the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00
to a ticket with a car as its prize to be raffled every month.

On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States (Exhs. T, U- U-1) and Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philippine Island admitted that Jesusa
returned to Manila on January 31, 1991 (Exhs. V-V-1). Reyes had effected a fund transfer in the amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary savings
account to the express teller account she opened on December 7, 1990 (Exhs. 3 to 3-C),
however, it was the only amount she deposited and no additional cash deposit of P100,000.00
was made. That plaintiff wanted to effect the transfer of P200,000.00 but the balance in her
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her statement of account sent to account was not sufficient and could not accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to
her by BPI bank that her ATM account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest. reduce the amount to be withdrawn from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with plaintiffs signature
superimposed on said corrections; that the original copy of the deposit slip was also altered
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, however, instead of plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in-
charge of the bank, in this case Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for Jesusa Reyes
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager assured her that they would had already left without signing the deposit slip. The documents were subsequently machine
look into the matter. validated for the amount of P100,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 4).

On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the transactions which
savings account passbook at the BPI with the folded deposit slip forP200,000.00 stapled at the happened on December 7, 1990 as contained in the banks teller tape (Exhs.1 to 1-C).
outer cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the same
was returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and
validated at the back portion thereof.
Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to a lie detector test, the
latter passed the same with flying colors (Exhs. 5 to 5-C), indicative of the fact that he was not
lying when he said that there really was no cash transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter saw the Reyes went to the defendant bank on December 7, 1990; defendant further alleged that they
validation, she got angry. even went to the extent of informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim would not be given credit
(Exh. 6) considering that no such transaction was really made on December 7, 1990. [4]

On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision[5] upholding the versions of respondents, the
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated, whereupon the dispositive portion of which reads:
manager assured her that the matter will be investigated into.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff Jesusa P. Reyes
and Conrado Reyes and against defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the latter to:

When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank, Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) 1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with interest at 14% per annum from December 7,
demand letters thru her lawyer demanding return of the missing P100,000.00 plus interest 1990;
(Exhs. B and C). The same was received by defendant on July 25, 1991 and October 7, 1991,
respectively. 2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

2. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary damages;

The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down and discuss the 3. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and attorney's fees.[6]
problem.
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa deposited only P100,000.00
instead of P200,000.00 was hazy; that what should control was the deposit slip issued by the
bank to respondent, for there was no chance by which respondent could write the amount
The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be submitted to a lie detector test. of P200,000.00 without petitioner's employee noticing it and making the necessary corrections;
that it was deplorable to note that it was when respondent Jesusa's bankbook was submitted to
be updated after the lapse of several months when the alleged error claimed by petitioner was
corrected; that Article 1962 of the New Civil Code provides that a deposit is constituted from
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff filed this instant case.
the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another with the obligation of safely
keeping it and of returning the same; that under Article 1972, the depositary is obliged to keep
the thing safely and to return it when required to the depositor or to his heirs and successors or missing P100,000.00 because it was the author of the loss; that banks are engaged in
to the person who may have been designated in the contract. business imbued with public interest and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in
dealing with its clients, in seeing to it that the funds therein invested or by them received are
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision dated October 29, 2002 affirmed properly accounted for and duly posted in their ledgers.
the RTC decision with modification as follows:
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated February 12, 2003.

Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per annum on the missing P100,000.00 can stand
some modification. The interest thereon should be 12% per annum, reckonedfrom May 12, Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
1991, the last day of the five day-grace period given by plaintiff-appellees' counsel under the
first demand letter dated May 6, 1991 (Exhibit B), or counted from May 7, 1991, the date when A. In affirming the decision of the trial court holding BPI liable for the amount of P100,000.00
defendant-appellant received said letter. Interest is demandable when the obligation consist in representing an alleged additional deposit of respondents, the Honorable Court of Appeals
the payment of money and the debtor incurs in delay. gravely abused its discretion by resolving the issue based on a conjecture and ignoring
physical evidence in favor of testimonial evidence.

B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in holding
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million award of moral damages to a reasonable sum BPI liable to respondents for the payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
of P50,000.00. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a
defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in holding
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the BPI liable for moral damages and attorney's fees at the reduced amounts of P50,000.00
defendant's culpable action. The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the and P30,000.00, respectively. [8]
suffering inflicted.

The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that
In addition, we have to delete the award of P350,000.00 as exemplary damages. The absence respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller
of malice and bad faith, as in this case, renders the award of exemplary damages improper. account on December 7, 1990.

Finally, we have to reduce the award of attorney's fees to a reasonable sum of P30,000.00, as The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited
the prosecution of this case has not been attended with any unusual difficulty. to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[9] As a rule,
the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record or are
based on substantial evidence.[10] Such rule however is not absolute, but is subject to well-
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus indicated, the judgment appealed from is in all other established exceptions, which are: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
respects AFFIRMED. Without costs.[7] or impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and those findings are contrary to the
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA held that the RTC correctly gave admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those
credence to the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
the fund transfer of P100,000.00 from Jesusa's savings account, Jesusa also made a cash evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
deposit of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is unlikely for these two to not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
concoct a story of falsification against a banking institution of the stature of petitioner if their conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
claims were not true; that the duplicate copy of the deposit slip showed a deposit evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[11] We hold that this case falls under
of P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with the fact that it was not machine-validated and the original exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
copy altered by the bank's clerk from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with the altered amount
validated, is indicative of anomaly; that even if it was bank employee Cicero Capati who It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative
prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa stood her ground and categorically denied having any allegations by the degree of evidence required by law.[12] In civil cases, the party having the
knowledge of the alteration therein made; that petitioner must account for the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence,[13] or that evidence
which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount of P200,000.00 from
mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than her savings account to her new Express Teller account was further established by the teller's
that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other. [14] tape presented as petitioner's evidence and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the
teller who had attended to respondent Jesusa's transactions.
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining
preponderance of evidence, thus: The teller's tape,[17] Exhibit 1 unequivocally shows the following data:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In civil cases, the party having the 151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the court may
151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their ***200000.00[18]
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the BIG AMOUNT
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their 151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately 151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the ***200000.00
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. PB BALANCE ERROR
BAL. 229,257.64

For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed 151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who ***200000.00
BIG AMOUNT
penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the 151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of ***200000.00
witnesses on the basis of their demeanor. 151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
TOD

151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145

***2000.00
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses'
151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299
testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on record. ***22917.00
151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we ***100000.00
BIG AMOUNT
find that respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that 151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account. ***100000.00
151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.00[19]
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset, respondent Jesusa told 151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
Capati that she was opening an Express Teller account for P200,000.00; that she was going to 151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
withdraw and transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and that she ***100000.00 ***100000.00[20]

had an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not borne out by the other 151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal 151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
slip[15] for P200,000.00. This is contrary to the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed ***1778.05
152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381
Capati to make a fund transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the Express ***5000.00
Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find it 152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374
strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw ***2000.00
152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
only P100,000.00 from her savings account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her. 152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764
***4000.00 ***4000.00
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
***2000.00
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip without looking at the ***2000.00
amount indicated therein fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in 152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
***3150.00 686448
the regular course of business and taking ordinary care of her concerns,[16] would make sure
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255
that she would check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her ***2800.00 ***2800.00
signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for her signature is very near the 153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264
(Emphasis supplied)
space where the amount of P200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus, she could not
have failed to notice that the amount of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.
The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the second column shows the date the insufficiency of her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the
of the transactions; the third column shows the bank transaction code; the fourth column shows amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account. We give
the teller's code; and the fifth column shows the client's account number. The teller's tape great evidentiary weight to the teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's
reflected various transactions involving different accounts on December 7, 1990 which included computer terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions in the ordinary course of
respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388 and her new Express Teller Account No. business, and there is no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove
235076748. It shows that respondent Jesusa's initial intention to petitioner's claim.
withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her Savings Account No. 233324299 was
begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and 45 seconds as shown in Exhibit 1-c.

Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter, that the former
deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not established
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when she was processing by physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit slip[30] was in the amount
respondent Jesusa's withdrawal in the amount of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show
transaction because there was a discrepancy;[21] thus, the word BIG AMOUNT appeared on the that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip shows that it
tape. Big amount means that the amount was so big for her to approve,[22] so she keyed in the did not contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the cash
amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to process the withdrawal using an deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
officer's override with the latter's approval.[23] The letter J appears after Figure 288 in the fourth
column to show that she overrode the transaction. She then keyed again the amount
of P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her computer rejected the
transaction, because the balance she keyed in based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the deposit slip in the
wrong;[24] thus appeared the phrase balance error on the tape, and the computer produced the amount of P200,000.00 bore the teller's stamp mark is convincing and consistent with logic and
balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed in the withdrawal of P200,000.00.[25] Since it was a the ordinary course of business. She testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with him a
big amount, she again had to override it, so she could process the amount. However, the withdrawal slip for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip
withdrawal was again rejected for the reason TOD, overdraft, [26] which meant that the amount for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new Express Teller account, and the
to be withdrawn was more than the balance, considering that there was a debited amount latter's savings passbook reflecting a balance of P249,657.64[31] as of November 19,
of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook, reducing the available balance to 1990.[32] Thus, at first glance, these appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal
only P198,322.48.[27] of P200,000.00 by fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark, stamped it on the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while the
original copy[33] of the deposit slip was left in her cage.[34] However, as Torneros started
processing the transaction, it turned out that respondent Jesusa's balance was insufficient to
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of respondent accommodate the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Jesusa's balance.[28] Capati then motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when
she was already in front of the teller's cage, Torneros told her that she could not
withdraw P200,000.00 because of overdraft; thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just
withdraw P100,000.00.[29] Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the withdrawal slip and had already left
the teller's counter thereafter and Capati was still inside the teller's cage, Torneros asked
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition of the figure 1 on the Capati about the original deposit slip and the latter told her, Ok naman iyan,[35] and Capati
figure 2 and the change of the word two to one to show that the withdrawn amount from superimposed the figures 1 on 2 on the deposit slip[36] to reflect the initial deposit
respondent Jesusa's savings account was only P100,000.00, and that respondent of P100,000.00 for respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller account and signed the
Jesusa herself signed the alterations. alteration. Torneros then machine-validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of the
deposit slip, which bore Torneross stamp mark and which was given to respondent Jesusa
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00 by fund transfer was prior to the processing of her transaction, was not machine-validated unlike the original copy of
resumed at 3 o'clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big amount, there was a the deposit slip.
need to override it again, and the withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18
minutes and 27 seconds, the amount of P100,000.00 was deposited to respondent Jesusa's While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by Capati and not by
new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. respondent Jesusa herself was a violation of the bank's policy requiring the depositor to sign
the correction,[37] nevertheless, we find that respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by
preponderance of evidence that indeed there was an additional cash of P100,000.00 deposited
to the new Express Teller account.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original intention to
withdraw the amount of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings
account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her new Express Teller account,
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our her way inside the campus, she saw petitioner Ricky Bastian, together with co-accused Albino
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[38] We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon Layasan, Roque Prado and Renato Prado. The trio were seated on the concrete fence of the
physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs school.[4]
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the
physical evidence should prevail.[39]

Lorna did not mind them as she proceeded to the dance hall.[5] Upon reaching the hall, she
learned that the party was still in progress. She decided to while the time and waited for her
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her children. When the affair ended at around 2:00 a.m., Lorna left the school premises with
daughter to concoct a false story against a banking institution is to give weight to conjectures Lorena and Lorsen in tow.
and surmises, which we cannot countenance.

In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.

While on their way out of the campus, Lorna saw her son-in-law John Ronquillo, the victim,
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other issues raised by petitioner. about ten (10) arms-stretch ahead of them. Apparently, he also went to the dance party and
was about to go home.[6] It was at that point when Lorna saw petitioner step ahead of his co-
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October accused. Unexpectedly, petitioner drew a gun and shot Ronquillo on the head. The victim fell
29, 2002 as well as its Resolution dated February 12, 2003 are instantaneously. Petitioner continued shooting while Ronquillo lay sprawled on the ground. [7]
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondents, together with the
counterclaim of petitioner, is DISMISSED.

RICKY BASTIAN, G.R. No. 160811 Lorna heard petitioners co-accused saying, He is dead already, before the group ran
away.[8] She trembled with fear and had to be helped by Lorena and Lorsen in going out of the
Petitioner, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, school campus.[9]

. April 14, 2008 D E C I S I O N REYES, R.T., J.:

COMPARED to appellate magistrates who merely read and rely on the cold and inanimate After receiving a dispatch report regarding the shooting incident at the school grounds, Police
pages of the transcript of stenographic notes and the original records brought before them, the Officers Jose Roo, Elmer Villanueva and Ramie Zomil immediately proceeded to the crime
trial judge is in a better position to calibrate the testimonies of the witnesses at the stand. scene. The investigating team arrived at around 2:50 a.m. They found the dead body of John
Ronquillo on the ground, face up. When they checked the body, they recovered one (1) bullet
The bare claim of responsibility for the killing of the victim by the New Peoples Army (NPA) slug on the ground, near the back of the victim.
does not bind or tie the hands of the Court in determining the real killer as borne by the
evidence.

Di tulad ng mga mahistrado sa apelasyon na tumutunghay at nananalig lamang sa The victims cadaver was later turned over to the Joy Funeral Parlor in Solido, Nabas,
mga record at stenographic notes, ang hukom sa paglilitis ay nasa mas mainam na Aklan. There, Dr. Gloria Boliver of the Municipal Health Office conducted a post-mortem
posisyon upang timbangin ang mga salaysay ng mga testigo. autopsy.

Ang pag-amin ng NPA sa pagpatay ng biktima ay hindi makapagtatali sa hukuman

upang alamin ang tunay na salarin ayon sa ebidensya.
On complaint of the heirs of the victim John Ronquillo, petitioner Ricky Bastian and his co-
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming accused Albino Layasan, Roque Prado and Renato Prado, were all indicted for murder in an
with modification that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, finding Information bearing the following accusation:
petitioner Ricky Bastian guilty of homicide, instead of murder.
That on or about the 25th day of April 1995, in the early morning in Barangay Solido,
Municipality of Nabas, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, confederating together and mutually
The Facts helping one another, with intent to kill one JOHN RONQUILLO, with treachery and evident
premeditation, while armed with a gun, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
On April 24, 1995, at around 11:00 p.m., Lorna Bandiola went to Solido Elementary School in attack, assault and shoot said JOHN RONQUILLO, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
Nabas, Aklan to fetch her children Lorena and Lorsen who were attending a dance party.[3] On and mortal wounds, to wit:
1. Gunshot wound, head, at the fronto-parietal region, 1 inch above the right ear, penetrating RTC and CA Dispositions
the skull and the brain tissue. Wound is round in shape with clean cut edge (wound entrance).
On March 20, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner of homicide instead of murder. In the
2. Gunshot wound, oval in shape, abdomen level of the umbilicus, right side of the lumbar same breath, the RTC acquitted Layasan and Roque and Renato Prado of the charge due to
region (entrance). insufficient evidence. The fallo of the trial court judgment reads:

3. Gunshot wound, abdomen, lumbar region, posterior to wound No. 2 with irregular edge WHEREFORE, premises considered, considering the presence of the aggravating
(wound exit). circumstance of nighttime and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Ricky
Bastian is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) years
4. Gunshot wound, left breast, oval in shape, clean cut edge (entrance). of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum penalty to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR
(4) months and ONE (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum penalty
5. Gunshot wound, right chest, irregular edge (exit). and to indemnify the heirs of John Ronquillo the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim
and another sum of P200,000.00 for loss of earning capacity, and another sum of P10,000.00
6. Wound, left arm posterior, irregular edge. as reimbursement of burial expenses, and another sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages.

For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Albino Layasan, Roque Prado and Renato Prado are
hereby ACQUITTED. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.[12]
As per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Gloria Z. Bolivar, Municipal Health Officer of the Rural
Health Unit of Nabas, Aklan, hereto attached and forming an integral part hereof which wounds
directly caused the death of said JOHN RONQUILLO.
Still dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. The appeal was anchored on the lone
ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On August 29, 2003, the CA
Fifteenth Division affirmed the trial court disposition with modification as to the damages
That as a result of the criminal acts of the above-named accused, the heirs of the deceased awarded. The dispositive part of the CA decision reads:
JOHN RONQUILLO suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount
of P50,000.00.[10] WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of
Kalibo, Aklan, is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and absent any modifying circumstance, the accused-appellant (petitioner) is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as
Petitioner waived the conduct of a pre-trial conference, hence, trial on the merits ensued. minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P1,800 for burial
expenses, P141,320 for lost earnings of the deceased, P50,000 for death indemnity, and
another P50,000 for moral damages (People v. Morano, G.R. No. 129235, Nov. 18, 2002). SO
The prosecution evidence, which was portrayed by the foregoing facts, was principally supplied ORDERED.[13]
by Lorna Bandiola, Dr. Gloria Boliver of the Nabas, Aklan Municipal Health Office, and Jose
Roo of the local Philippine National Police (PNP) office. Their accounts were corroborated in
material points by the victims spouse Analie Ronquillo and Nemelyn Tulio.
In reducing the award of damages, the CA opined:

As to the amount of damages awarded, except for the P1,800 burial fee receipt (Exhibit G, p.
Upon the other hand, the defense version founded on denial, was summarized by the appellate 213, Records) issued by the Nabas Parish Church, no other official receipts were adduced to
court in the following tenor: prove the actual damages incurred for the burial expenses. Offered as proof of the
expenditures were the certifications issued by the alleged owners of the funeral parlor and the
The defense, on the other hand, presented seven (7) witnesses including accused-appellant, band. But a certification, by its nature, is easy to fabricate and as such cannot be admitted in
who denied killing J. RONQUILLO and interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that in the
lieu of official receipts. Hence, the reduction of the burial expense from P10,000 to P1,800. The
evening of April 24, 1995, he was in the house of Barangay Captain VOLTAIRE GARCIA,
well-settled rule is that actual damages cannot be awarded based on the allegation of a
drinking liquor with the latter and ALBINO LAYASAN until 12:30 a.m. They were very drunk
witness without any competent document to support such claim proof is required to be
and were unable to go home. He went to bed ahead of the others, while GARCIA and
adequately supported by receipts (People v. Enguito, 326 SCRA 508 [2000]).
LAYASAN were still conversing (Id. at 9). He woke up at 8 a.m. and learned later at 2 p.m. of
the following day that JOHN was shot. He did not attend the dance party because he was
heavily drunk (TSN, April 4, 2000, pp. 4-6). His testimony was corroborated by VOLTAIRE
GARCIA.[11]
Even if the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support the claim for loss of THE FILING OF FORMAL COMPLAINT BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR,
earning capacity, testimonial evidence may be sufficient to establish a basis for which the court AKLAN, AS THERE ARE NO WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE FAMILY OF THE
can make a fair and reasonable estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity (People v. VICTIM UP TO JUNE 20, 1995, FROM APRIL 25, 1995, THE DATE THE INCIDENT
Perreras, 362 SCRA 202 [2001]). In People v. Muyco (331 SCRA 192 [2000]), the Supreme OCCURRED;
Court held:
III.THE FACT THAT THE NPA HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KILLING OF
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the non-availability of JOHN RONQUILLO, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST THEREFORE, REVERSED
documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed (SIC) AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO AND THAT OF THE HON.
earning less than the minimum wage under the current labor laws and judicial notice was taken COURT OF APPEALS AND INSTEAD ACQUIT THE HEREIN ACCUSED-PETITIONER ON
of the fact that in the victims line of work, no documentary evidence is available; (b) the victim GROUND OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE LOWER COURT
was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.[15] (Underscoring supplied)
laws. x x x

Thus, his heirs are entitled to receive an award for lost earnings in accordance with the
following formula: 2/3 (80 ATD [age at the time of death]) x (GAI [gross annual income]) Our Ruling
80% GAI.
The matter of determining credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial and appellate
courts. The NPA bare claim for the killing does not bind the Court.

In the case at bench, no documentary evidence regarding the net income of the victim was Petitioner scores both the RTC and the CA for accepting hook, line and sinker the prosecution
offered that would serve as the basis for the computation of his net income. But the wife, version of the incident. According to petitioner, the accounts given by the prosecution
however, testified that her husband used to earn 50 cavans of rice every year as a farmer. In witnesses are highly-incredible and unworthy of credence and belief. It is also contended that
their line of employment, no available documentary evidence could be considered to determine the New Peoples Army (NPA) has claimed responsibility for the killing of John Ronquillo. The
their net income. More so, this was not disputed by the defense. Thus, following the above armed guerrilla group allegedly executed Ronquillo after they found him liable for murder and
formula rape.

=2/3 (80-27 years old) x (50 cavans x P400) - 80% (50 cavans x P400)

=2/3 (53) x (P20,000) - 80% (P20,000)

Verily, the thrust of this appeal is to assail the credibility of the witnesses for the People. Upon
=35.33 x (P20,000) - (P16,000)
a review of the entire records, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
conclusions reached by the trial court and the CA. More specifically, this Court puts great
=P141,320 weight on the factual findings of the trial judge who conducted the trial of the case and heard
the testimonies of the witnesses themselves.[16] In People v. Sanchez,[17] the Court had
the heirs of JOHN RONQUILLO are entitled to receive P141,320 as an award for lost occasion to reiterate that:
earnings.[14]
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the
Issues record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and
fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the
Undaunted, petitioner has resorted to the present recourse, imputing to the CA triple flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch these can reveal if the
errors, viz.: witness is telling the truth or lying in his teeth.[18]

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED WITH

MODIFICATION, THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
EVIDENCED (SIC) PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WERE MERELY BASED ON That the New Peoples Army allegedly publicly claimed responsibility for the killing of the victim
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT WERE TAINTED WITH INCONSISTENCIES, ASIDE is beside the point. It is not binding on the Court. It does not preclude the Court from
FROM THE FACT THAT THE NPA PUBLICLY CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KILLING determining the real killer in accordance with the rule of evidence and settled jurisprudence.
OF JOHN RONQUILLO, AFTER FINDING HIM GUILTY OF MURDER AND RAPE;

II.THAT THE POLICE AUTHORITIES OF NABAS, AKLAN, FAILED AS IT FAILED TO

IDENTIFY THE ASSAILANT OF JOHN RONQUILLO, AND, IN FACT, HAS NOT INITIATED
Former Chief Justice Hilario Davides explanation in People v. Quijada[19] is likewise circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards
illuminating: a conviction.[24] Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.[25]
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as
the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the conviction: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are
blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral
the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.[20] crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.[26]

Compared to appellate magistrates who merely deal and contend with the cold and inanimate
pages of the transcript of stenographic notes and the original records brought before them, the
trial judge confronts the victim or his heirs, the accused and their respective witnesses. He The trial court pointed to the following circumstantial evidence that sufficiently identified
personally observes their conduct, demeanor and deportment while responding to the petitioner as the author of the gruesome killing:
questions propounded by both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Moreover, it is also the trial
judge who has the opportunity to pose clarificatory questions to the parties. Tersely put, when a There were a number of proven circumstances from which an inference could be made that
trial judge makes his findings as to the issue of credibility, such findings bear great weight, at Ricky Bastian was the assailant. Circumstance No. 1: The fact that Nemelyn heard gunshots
times even finality, on the appellate court.[21] and saw gun-flashes twenty (20) meters away while she was on her way out of the school
campus approaching the main gate; Circumstance No. 2: The fact that after she heard
gunshots, a short while thereafter, she saw Ricky Bastian holding a gun running past behind
her five (5) meters away coming from the direction where the shots came from; and
The RTC and the CA found the testimonies of the witnesses for the People to have met and Circumstance No. 3: The fact that when she lighted with her flashlights the place where she
passed the tests of credibility and believability. heard gunshots, she saw the victim lying dead on the ground.

Elementary is the rule that when the findings of the trial court have been affirmed by the
appellate court, the said findings are generally binding upon this Court. [22]
These are a combination of unbroken chain of circumstances consistent with the hypothesis
that Ricky Bastian was the assailant and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he was
not.Otherwise stated, these unbroken chain of circumstances taken collectively engendered
Petitioners conviction is based on both positive testimony of an eye-witness and moral certainty for the Court to believe that Ricky Bastian was the assailant. Nemelyns
circumstantial evidence. opportunity, however, of identifying Ricky Bastian as the assailant was put to question by the
accused through their witnesses. We will put to rest this question in the discussion that follow,
Petitioner insists that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting him of the crime but first, let us take a look on the eyewitness account of Lorna Bandiola because her credibility
charged on circumstantial evidence. According to petitioner, the inference upon which the and her presence as an eyewitness are likewise being questioned by the defense.[27]
conviction was premised was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The argument is misleading. It bears stressing that the trial court convicted petitioner of
homicide mainly on the strength of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Lorna Bandiola Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that the testimony of Nemelyn Tulio can be discarded,
and Nemelyn Tulio. Bandiola was an eyewitness to the commission of the crime while Tulio petitioners conviction founded on the positive declarations of eyewitness Lorna Bandiola still
provided circumstantial evidence pointing to petitioner as the author of the gruesome killing of stands on terra firma. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the
the victim Ronquillo. value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The testimony of
only one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. [28] People v.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue Ramos,[29] quoting People v. Toyco,[30] is good authority with the following pronouncement:
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.Resort to it is
essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free.[23] It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their
testimonies. The testimony of a single witness if positive and credible is sufficient to support a
At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not conviction even in a charge of murder.[31]
the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of
 Mamerto Dulay (Dulay) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Murder with the
Use of Unlicensed Firearm and one (1) count of Frustrated Murder.
On the penalty and civil liability
Contrary to what is implied by the title of this case, the instant appeal merely affects Camat and
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes homicide in the following tenor: not Dulay since the subject of this appeal is the October 9, 2002 Joint Decision of the trial court
wherein only Camat was convicted. Moreover, in the Appellants’ Brief, the relief prayed for was
Art. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 (Parricide), the reversal of only the October 9, 2002 Joint Decision and there was no reference to the
shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next December 6, 2000 Decision, containing Dulay’s conviction. This is not surprising considering
preceding article (Murder), shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion that the case involving Dulay was already resolved with finality by this Court in a Resolution
temporal. dated October 11, 2007 in G.R. No. 174775, entitled People of the Philippines v. Mamerto
Dulay.4
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal in any of its periods. It ranges from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. The trial court appreciated the aggravating The present case traces its genesis to the filing of six separate criminal informations charging
circumstance of nighttime. Upon review by the CA, the appellate court opined that while the the appellant Camat alias "Boyet" and his other co-accused, the accused Dulay (referred to in
crime was committed at around 2:00 a.m., the cover of darkness was not relevant to its the title of this case), John Laurean alias "Masong," Rogelio Campos, Ibot Campos, Henry
commission. We sustain the CA conclusion that nighttime does not aggravate the killing of Caoile, Serafin Dulay, and Junior Lopez with the crimes of Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Ronquillo. Thus, the proper penalty or maximum term of the indeterminate sentence could Firearm and Frustrated Murder. The pertinent portions of the aforementioned criminal
be reclusion temporal medium (fourteen [14] years, eight [8] months and one [1] day informations read:
to seventeen [17] years and four [4] months).
Criminal Case No. U-10498

That on or about November 3, 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay Anis, Laoac, Pangasinan
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term must be taken from the penalty next and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
lower in degree, which is prision mayor, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve together, with the use of unlicensed long and short firearms, with deliberate intent to kill,
(12) years, to be imposed in any of its periods. Of course, a better calibration is to likewise set treachery, and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
the minimum term in the medium period (eight [8] years and one [1] day to ten [10] years). attack, assault and shoot ELMER HIDALGO, inflicting upon him the following injuries:

"- Gunshot wound, left wrist, medial aspect.

The CA award of burial expenses in the amount of P1,800.00 and P141,320.00 for lost - Gunshot wounds, left distal third of the thigh, through and through; Point of Entrance, 1 cm. in
earnings is duly covered by receipts and testimony of the victims spouse, respectively. It should diameter, posteriorly, circular in shape; Point of Exit, 1.4 cm. in diameter, medially, circular in
be maintained. The award of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 for moral shape.
damages is likewise in accord with latest jurisprudence. [32]
- Gunshot wounds, right distal third of the thigh, through and through:

1. Point of Entrance, 1 cm. in diameter, laterally, circular in shape; Point of Exit, 1.6 cms. in
In fine, both the penalty and the civil liability imposed on the petitioner by the Court of Appeals diameter, medially, circular in shape.
are in order. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in full.
2. Point of Entrance, 1 cm. in diameter laterally, circular in shape; Point of Exit, 1.7 cms. in
======================================================================== diameter, anteriorly circular in shape.

PEOPLE, Plaintiff -Appellee, vs.DIOSDADO CAMAT & MAMERTO DULAY, Accused- - Gunshot wounds, through and through. Point of entrance, 1 cm. in diameter, circular in shape
Appellants. D E C I S I O N LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: on the right ear anteriorly beside the right pinna trajecting the esophagus and the upper lobe of
the left lung. Point of Exit, 2 cms. in diameter, left mid-axillary line, 5th intercostal space,
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA- circular in shape.
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02429, entitled People of the Philippines v. Diosdado Camat and Mamerto
Dulay, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated October 9, 2002 of the - Comminuted Fracture of the distal third of the femur, right.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Branch 46 in Criminal Case Nos. U-10498, U-
10499, U-10500, U-10501, U-10502 and U-10503. The trial court found herein appellant - Homethorax, 1 liter, left.
Diosdado Camat (Camat) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of
Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder. Prior to CAUSE OF DEATH: Massive hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds." which
this ruling, the same trial court, in a Decision3dated December 6, 2000, found appellant caused the death of said ELMER HIDALGO, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. No. 8294, as amended by That on or about November 3, 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay Anis, Laoac, Pangasinan
R.A. 7659.5 and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, with the use of unlicensed long and short firearms, with deliberate intent to kill,
Criminal Case No. U-10499 treachery, and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot AURELIO HIDALGO, inflicting upon him the following injuries:
That on or about November 3, 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay Anis, Laoac, Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring "Open fracture proximal third fibula right.
together, with the use of unlicensed long and short firearms, with deliberate intent to kill,
treachery, and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Operation Performed: Debridement"
attack, assault and shoot MARCELINA HIDALGO, inflicting upon her the following injuries:
the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
"External Findings: crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce the felony by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the timely and
- Gunshot wound (point of entrance), 1 cm., circular in shape, parasternal line, 4th inter-costal space, left. adequate medical assistance rendered to said AURELIO HIDALGO, which prevented his
death, to his damage and prejudice.
- Gunshot wound (point of exit), 1.5 cm., circular in shape, mid-axillary line, 9th inter-costal space, right.

CONTRARY to Art. 248, in relation to Arts. 6 & 50, Revised Penal Code, and R.A. No. 8294. 8
Internal Findings:

- Gunshot wound, through and through, 1.8 cm., left auricle, heart. Criminal Case No. U-10502

- Gunshot wound, through and through, 2 cm., upper lobe, liver. That on or about November 3, 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay Anis, Laoac, Pangasinan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
- Gunshot wound, through and through, 1.5 cm., upper lobe lung, right. together, with the use of unlicensed long and short firearms, with deliberate intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
- Hemothorax, 1.4 liters, right. attack, assault, and shoot PEDRO HIDALGO, inflicting upon him the following injuries:

CAUSE OF DEATH: Massive hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound." which caused the instantaneous - Gunshot wound at right buttocks through and through
death of said MARCELINA HIDALGO, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.

- Point of entry: Medial aspect of right buttocks

CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. No. 8294, as amended by R.A. 7659.6

- Point of exit: Lacerated aspect of right buttocks

Criminal Case No. U-10500

- Avulsion thena reminence left hand the accused having thus performed all the acts of
That on or about November 3, 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay Anis, Laoac, Pangasinan,
execution which would have produced the crime of MURDER as a consequence but which
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
nevertheless did not produce the felony by reason of causes independent of the will of the
together, with the use of unlicensed long and short firearms, with deliberate intent to kill,
accused and that is due to the timely and adequate medical assistance rendered to said
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
PEDRO HIDALGO, which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.
attack, assault and shoot JUANITO HIDALGO, inflicting upon him the following injuries:

CONTRARY to Art. 248, in relation to Arts. 6 & 50, Revised Penal Code, and R.A. No. 8294. 9
"Gunshot wound with fracture, tibia-fibula right.

Criminal Case No. U-10503

Peration performed: Debridement"

That on or about November 3, 1999, in the afternoon at Barangay Anis, Laoac, Pangasinan,
the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce the felony by
together, with the use of unlicensed long and short firearms, with deliberate intent to kill,
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the timely and
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
adequate medical assistance rendered to said JUANITO HIDALGO, which prevented his
attack, assault, and shoot RICARDO HIDALGO, inflicting upon him the following injuries:
death, to his damage and prejudice.

"Gunshot wound perianal area Fracture superior & inferior ramus pubis Operation performed:
CONTRARY to Art. 248, in relation to Arts. 6 & 50, Revised Penal Code, and R.A. No. 8294.7
Explor-lap, colostomy" the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which
Criminal Case No. U-10501 would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not
produce the felony by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due
to the timely and adequate medical assistance rendered to said RICARDO HIDALGO, which day when he went to the house of accused Camat’s brother, Casimiro Camat, to have some
prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice. snacks. During this time, accused Camat and his brother and two (2) other companions were
working on a cabinet and a book shelf. The following day, Candido again saw accused Camat
CONTRARY to Art. 248, in relation to Arts. 6 & 50, Revised Penal Code, and R.A. No. 8294. 10 with his brother and another passenger on board a red car heading towards the highway.

At their arraignment, all the accused pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges with the exception of On 30 October 1999, CASIMIRO CAMAT went to Sta. Ana, Pampanga to attend the opening of
accused Junior Lopez who eluded arrest and, thus, remained at large. 11 Subsequent to several cursillo class of Sto. Nino Brotherhood Crusade since his brother, accused Diosdado Camat,
pre-trial conferences, trial on the merits commenced. was part of the said graduating class. Casimiro and his brother spent the night in the former’s
house in San Miguel, Tarlac together with Pedro Caseria who was also one of the graduates.
In the Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief,12 the prosecution narrated its version of the factual backdrop of The following day, the three (3) agreed to meet again on 2 November 1999 and proceed to
this case, as follows: Casimiro’s place in Baguio to undertake the construction of his double deck bed, cabinets and
bookshelf.
Between 3:00 o’clock and 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1999, Aurelio, together
with Anastacio, Juanito, Ricardo, Pedro, Marcelina, Abelardo, Elmer, all surnamed Hidalgo, On 2 November 1999, Casimiro, together with his wife and daughter, met his brother and
Lydia Flores, some young ladies, their children, and his nephews and nieces were in front of Pedro Caseria at the crossing in Binalonan and proceeded thereafter to Baguio. Upon reaching
the yard of his brother Anastacio Hidalgo (Anastacio). At that time, they were all seated and the said place, the witness first unloaded his daughter’s baggage at her dormitory before going
talking to each other. The houses of Aurelio and Anastacio were located in the same to Burnham Park for lunch. Afterwards, he left his daughter in her dormitory and then
compound. Aurelio’s house is at the back of Anastacio’s house. accompanied his wife to the bus terminal for her trip back to Tarlac.

While engaged in conversation, Aurelio noticed a motorcycle pass by two times. At the first The Camat brothers and Caseria subsequently proceeded to the Kayang Extension to
pass, he noticed that only Oning Campos was on board. The second time, both Oning Campos purchase some goods for their consumption during their stay in Baguio before going to
and Pilo Cabangas were on board the motorcycle. After a few minutes, gunfire coming from the Casimiro’s house in Asin Road. Upon arriving at the said place, the three began working on the
back of and directed at Aurelio’s group suddenly erupted. The gunfire came from the other side double deck bed. The next day, accused Diosdado Camat left for a while to visit Jaime
of the road in front of a three feet high concrete fence fronting the house of Anastacio. Aurelio Candido. When he returned, the Camat brothers and Caseria went to Benguet Electric
saw both accused-appellants Diosdado Camat and Mamerto Dulay armed with long firearms Cooperative to pay Casimiro’s electric bill and subsequently took their lunch at Burnham Park.
shoot at his group. Although there were six other persons armed with short firearms (Henry Thereafter, they bought some materials from the Benguet Lumber Co. and then continued their
Caoile, Junior Lopez, John Laurean, Ibot Campos, Rogelio Campos, and Serafin Dulay), work in Casimiro’s place. In the afternoon of 4 November 1999, the Camat brothers finally left
standing at the back of accused-appellants, Aurelio, however, only saw accused-appellants Baguio.
firing their guns at his group because he saw them place their long firearms on top of the
concrete fence. The gunmen were approximately six meters away from Aurelio’s group. When Casimiro was asked about the accusation against his brother, he firmly maintained that
his brother was with him in Baguio from November 2 to 4, contrary to the allegation that the
Aurelio said that during the shooting, his aunt Marcelina Hidalgo, and his nephew were hit and accused participated in a shooting incident on 3 November 1999 in Brgy. Anis, Laoac,
Elmer Hidalgo fell down. They died on the spot. Juanito Hidalgo was hit on his right leg. Pangasinan.
Ricardo Hidalgo was hit on the buttocks. The bullet exited near his anus. Pedro Hidalgo was
injured on the buttocks and left arm. Aurelio was himself hit on both legs. PEDRO CASERIA corroborated Casimiro Camat’s testimony that he was with the accused
from November 2 to 4, 1999 to do some carpentries in Baguio.
After shooting their victims, accused-appellants and their companions left the place going
westward. HERMINIGILDA C. JIMENEA was the proprietress of Apple’s Fastfood in Burnham Park where
the accused had lunch with his brother and Pedro Caseria on 3 November 1999 During the
Immediately thereafter, Aurelio and his other injured relatives were brought to the Region I graduation of the cursillo class in Tarlac in October 1999, accused DIOSDADO CAMAT was
Medical Center, Dagupan City. Aurelio was confined in the hospital for five days. After leaving requested by his brother, Casimiro Camat, to do some carpentries at his house in Baguio
the hospital, he was investigated by Investigator Mariano of the Laoac Police Station. together with Pedro Caseria. It was agreed upon that Casimiro would meet both of them at the
crossing in Binalonan on 2 November 1999. On the said date, Casimiro arrived at the meeting
Aurelio recalled that prior to the shooting incident, accused-appellant Mamerto Dulay hacked place with his wife and daughter and let the accused and Caseria board in his car. They then
the house of Juanito Hidalgo, Aurelio’s brother, with a bolo. Juanito Hidalgo had the hacking proceeded to Baguio. Upon reaching the said place, Casimiro first dropped by his daughter’s
incident blottered at the barangay.13(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.) dormitory to unload her baggage before proceeding to Burnham Park where they ate lunch
together. Afterwards, Casimiro left his daughter at her dormitory and his wife at the bus
The defense, in the Accused-Appellants’ Brief,14 offered this summation of events: terminal. The Camat brothers and Caseria went to Casimiro’s place in Asin Road for the
construction of some woodworks.
In the morning of 3 November 1999, JAIME CANDIDO accompanied accused Diosdado Camat
in securing a barangay clearance as the latter was applying for a job as security guard. The On 3 November 1999, the accused left for a while to see Jaime Candido to ask assistance in
next time Candido saw accused Camat was around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same securing a barangay clearance as he was intending to seek employment as a security guard.
When he returned, he went with Casimiro to the city as the latter paid his electric bill. The accused DIOSDADO CAMAT y Sampaga alias "Boyet", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
Afterwards, they had lunch at Apple’s Fastfood in Burnham Park and then proceeded to of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there
Benguet Lumber Co. to purchase some materials before returning to Casimiro’s place for the being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer an
continuation of their work. The next day, the accused left Baguio and went back home to Brgy. imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Caaringayan in Laoac, Pangasinan where a surprising news awaited him. His sister told him Correccional in its medium period as MINIMUM to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
that he was being implicated in a massacre. Consequently, he rushed to the barangay captain Prision Mayor in its medium period, as MAXIMUM and to pay the offended party AURELIO
to clarify the matter. Nonetheless, he was told to go home and just wait for the police to come. HIDALGO the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the cost.

While he was alone in his house at 12:00 midnight, he noticed that a vehicle parked near his The accused JOHN LAUREAN, ROGELIO CAMPOS, IBOT CAMPOS, HENRY CAOILE and
gate and five (5) armed men broke into his house. The accused hid under the stairs. When the SERAFIN DULAY are all ACQUITTED. The accused JUNIOR LOPEZ is still at-large.
strangers were gone, the accused immediately left his house and went to Brgy. Tiblong in San
Fabian, Pangasinan. IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-10500:

ALFREDO TAPO, the barangay captain of Brgy. Caaringayan, testified that in the evening of 4 The accused DIOSDADO CAMAT y Sampaga alias "Boyet", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
November 1999, the accused did go to his house to ask him about the incident in Brgy. of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there
Anis.15 (Citations omitted.) being no aggravating an mitigating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
In a Joint Decision dated October 9, 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. U-10498, U-10499, U-10500, Correccional in its medium period as MINIMUM to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
U-10501, U-10502 and U-10503, the trial court found appellant Camat guilty beyond Prision Mayor in its medium period, as MAXIMUM and to pay the offended party JUANITO
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm and four (4) HIDALGO the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the cost.
counts of Attempted Murder. The dispositive portion of which reads:
The accused JOHN LAUREAN, ROGELIO CAMPOS, IBOT CAMPOS, HENRY CAOILE and
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds: SERAFIN DULAY are all ACQUITTED. The accused JUNIOR LOPEZ is still at-large.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-10503: IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-10499:

The accused DIOSDADO CAMAT y Sampaga alias "Boyet", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt The accused DIOSDADO CAMAT y Sampaga alias "Boyet", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there of the crime of MURDER WITH THE USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARMS penalized under
being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer an Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law and the offense having
imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision been committed with the aggravating circumstance of with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm
Correccional in its medium period as MINIMUM to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of under Republic Act No. 8294, hereby sentences him the ultimum supplicium of DEATH to be
Prision Mayor in its medium period, as MAXIMUM and to pay the offended party RICARDO executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law; to pay the
HIDALGO the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the cost. heirs of the victim MARCELINA HIDALGO in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity;
P200,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the cost.
The accused JOHN LAUREAN, ROGELIO CAMPOS, IBOT CAMPOS, HENRY CAOILE and
SERAFIN DULAY are all ACQUITTED. The accused JUNIOR LOPEZ is still at-large. The accused HENRY CAOILE is ACQUITTED of the charge. The accused JUNIOR LOPEZ is
still unapprehended.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-10502:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-10498:
The accused DIOSDADO CAMAT y Sampaga alias "Boyet", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there The accused DIOSDADO CAMAT y Sampaga alias "Boyet", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer an of the crime of MURDER WITH THE USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARMS penalized under
imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law and the offense having
Correccional in its medium period as MINIMUM to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of been committed with the aggravating circumstance of with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm
Prision Mayor in its medium period, as MAXIMUM and to pay the offended party PEDRO under Republic Act No. 8294, hereby sentences him the ultimum supplicium of DEATH to be
HIDALGO the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the cost. executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law; to pay the
heirs of the victim ELMER HIDALGO in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity; P20,000.00 as
The accused HENRY CAOILE is acquitted of the charge. The accused Junior Lopez is still at- actual damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the cost.
large.
The accused HENRY CAOILE is ACQUITTED of the charge. The accused JUNIOR LOPEZ is
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-10501: still unapprehended.
FINALLY, it is said: "Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est," translated as Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
follows: "The law may be exceedingly hard but the law is written."16 another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
Since appellant Camat was sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH as a consequence of his
conviction for two charges of Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm, among others, the 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
case was originally appealed to this Court but in conformity with our decision in People v. employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
Mateo,17 the matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
After a thorough evaluation, the appellate court merely affirmed with modification the assailed
October 9, 2002 Joint Decision of the trial court in this wise: 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment
or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The joint decision dated 9 other means involving great waste and ruin;
October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Urdaneta City in Criminal Cases Nos. U-
10498 to U-10503 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only on the penalty imposed 4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
for murder with the use of unlicensed firearm. Accused-appellant Diosdado Camat is earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder with the use of
unlicensed firearm instead of death in Criminal Cases Nos. U-10498 and U-10499, and the 5. With evident premeditation;
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium
period as MINIMUM to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
MAXIMUM for each count of attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. U-10500 to U-10503.18 outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

Since the appeal was decided after the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting As encapsulated in jurisprudence, to be liable for Murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1)
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, enacted on June 24, 2006), the appellate a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the
court saw fit to modify the penalty to reclusion perpetua. qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor
infanticide.20
Thus, Camat interposed the present appeal wherein both the prosecution and their defense
merely adopted their briefs filed with the Court of Appeals. Before this Court, appellant Camat We uphold the Court of Appeals’ finding that all the elements of the crime of murder concur in
reiterates the following assignment of errors: this instance. With regard to the first element, the prosecution was able to establish the fact of
death of Marcelina and Elmer Hidalgo as shown by their death certificates21 as well as the
I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED autopsy reports22 which clearly indicate that the common cause of their untimely demise is
NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCONSISTENT AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE massive hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds that they sustained during the shooting
PROSECUTION WITNESSES. incident in question. The fourth element is present as well since both the victims are adults and
not related by consanguinity or affinity to appellant Camat which forecloses any possibility of
II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THE GUILT OF THE classifying their fatal shooting as either parricide or infanticide.
ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH
THEIR IDENTITIES WITH MORAL CERTAINTY.19 As for the second element, there can be no doubt that the prosecution also proved the
participation of appellant Camat in the crimes subject of this case. Appellant Camat’s defenses
Essentially, the issues raised by appellant Camat boil down to whether or not his conviction of alibi and denial as well as his attack on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who
was warranted upon due consideration of the evidence on record. positively identified him simply cannot be given credence.

Appellant Camat argues that his conviction was erroneous because it was based on In the previously mentioned companion case of People v. Dulay,23 appellant Camat’s co-
contradictory and improbable testimonies made by prosecution witnesses who were among the accused Dulay similarly introduced the issue concerning the credibility of the testimonies made
surviving victims of the massacre. He maintains that these witnesses could not have possibly by the witnesses for the prosecution who were among the survivors of the November 3, 1999
identified him with moral certainty as one of the gunmen because it was unlikely that they were massacre, namely, Juanito, Aurelio, Pedro, and Ricardo, all surnamed Hidalgo. Given the
able to see the faces of the assailants firing at them since they were more concerned with identity of the factual circumstances of this case with the Dulay case, we see no reason to
taking cover for their safety. Thus, he posits that his defense of alibi must be upheld over the deviate from the ruling this Court laid down in Dulay, to wit:
supposedly weak testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution.
A few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor
After a careful review, we affirm the guilty verdict against appellant Camat. details do not impair their credibility. Minor inconsistencies even tend to strengthen the
credibility of a witness because they discount the possibility that the testimony was rehearsed.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code states that: As regards the actuations of the witnesses at the time of the incident, it is settled that there is
simply no standard form of behavioral response that can be expected from anyone when A Yes sir.
confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful occurrence. 24
Q How many shots were fired if you remember?
Indeed, minor inconsistencies in the narration of facts by the witnesses do not detract from
A Many sir, I cannot remember how many, sir.
their essential credibility as long as their testimonies on the whole are coherent and intrinsically
believable.25 In fact, this Court had previously held that trivial inconsistencies do not rock the
Q How long was the duration of the gun burst?
pedestal upon which the credibility of the witnesses rests but enhances credibility as they
manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming.26 Jurisprudence even warns against a perfect A Successive sir.
dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were pre-
fabricated and rehearsed.27 Q What particular place Diosdado Camat was standing in relation to the place where you sat?

Since the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were credible, this Court cannot accept A At the eastern direction, sir.31 (Emphases supplied.)
appellant Camat’s defenses of alibi and denial in light of the positive identification of him as one
of the gunmen involved in that dreadful massacre. ATTY. FLORENDO: (cross-examination)

Q So, the first time that you are able to notice the presence of Mamerto Dulay and Diosdado Camat was
It bears repeating that this Court has consistently held that alibi, as a defense, is inherently
when they were already running away, am I correct?
weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. 28 Moreover, positive
identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent, and without any ill motive on the A No sir, at the time when they were at the fence.
part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.29
Q You mentioned a while ago before the actual shooting you did not notice anybody?
To be sure, an examination of the testimonies made by the prosecution witnesses reveals that
their identification of appellant Camat as one of the culprits behind the November 3, 1999 A I was able to notice them at the time when they fired their guns, sir.
massacre was clear and unequivocal. The relevant portions of the transcripts are quoted here:
Q And you are only able to notice Mamerto Dulay and Diosdado Camat aiming their guns to your direction?
[JUANITO HIDALGO]
A Yes sir.32 (Emphases supplied.)
PROS. TOMBOC: (direct examination)
FISCAL DUMLAO: (direct examination)
Q You said a gunfire came from x x x infront of your house, do you know who are firing that gun burst?
Q Mr. Witness, why do you know this Marcelina Hidalgo?
A Yes sir, Mamerto Dulay and Diosdado Camat, and other companions.
A She is my wife, sir.
xxxx
Q Where is she now?
Q You said a burst of gunfire came from Diosdado Camat and Mamerto Dulay and his companion. What kind
of firearm did Diosdado Camat fire when you saw him fired? A She is dead, sir.

A A long firearm, but I do not know the caliber, sir. Q Do you know the cause of death of your wife?

Q When you said a burst of gunfire came from these persons. Who among the group actually make or shoot A Yes, sir.
towards your direction?
Q What was the cause of her death?
A The two (2) which were holding long firearm, sir.
A She was shot, sir.
Q Who are these two (2) persons?
COURT:
A Mamerto Dulay and Diosdado Camat, sir.30 (Emphases supplied.)
Q Who shot her?
ATTY CERA: (cross-examination)
A Camat and companions, sir.
Q So, Mamerto Dulay and Diosdado Camat came into your place, how far were they from where you sat?
FISCAL DUMLAO:
A Not less than six (6) meters, sir.
Q About this Elmer Hidalgo, do you know him?
Q Where was, did the group of Mamerto Dulay come as a group?
A I know him, sir. Q Is this Boyet Camat already inside the courtroom now?

Q What happened to him? A Yes sir, he is here.

A He was also shot, sir. Q Will you please look around the courtroom and scan and point to this Boyet Camat if he is inside the
courtroom?
Q Who shot him?
A He is here sir. (Witness pointing to a person seated inside the courtroom and when asked his name,
A Camat and company, sir. answered, Diosdado Camat, alias Boyet.)

COURT: Q Since when have you known this Boyet Camat before November 3, 1999?

Q Did he die also? A I know him since his childhood, sir.35 (Emphases supplied.)

A He died Ma’am. [PEDRO HIDALGO]

FISCAL DUMLAO: PROS. TOMBOC: (direct examination)

Q When you testified, Mr. Witness, on March 10, 2001, before Hon. Judge Modesto Juanson, you were Q You said that you were shot, where were you hit, in what part of your body?
asked to point to Diosdado Camat but he was not around at that time, now, will you please stand up and look
inside the courtroom if you can see one Diosdado Camat and if he is here please point to him. A (Witness is pointing at the left palm and right buttock, sir.)

A (Witness pointed unto a person inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked, he answered Q While facing east you were hit, how were you able to come to know that the gunshot came from your
Diosdado Camat). back?

xxxx A I turned my face at my back when I heard gunshot, sir.

ATTY. MAPILI: (cross-examination) Q You said you turned your back what did you see?

Q You have no grudge against Diosdado Camat? A I saw John Laurean, Rogelio Campos, Ibot Campos, Mamerto Dulay, Boyet Camat, Henry Caoile, Serafin
Dulay and John Lopez, sir.
A None, sir.
xxxx
Q So there is no reason for him to shoot you because you have no grudge against him?
Q Boyet Camat?
A I do not know x x x but when we were shot he was there.33 (Emphases supplied.)
A A long firearm, sir.
[AURELIO HIDALGO]
COURT:
PROS. TOMBOC: (direct examination)
Q What is the name of Camat?
Q At that time you heard gunfire and directed to you, do you know who are those persons who shot that
gunfire? A Diosdado Camat, sir.36 (Emphases supplied.)

A Yes sir. FISCAL DUMLAO: (direct examination)

Q Will you please name them, if you know? Q Mr. Witness, when you testified before this Honorable Court before Judge Modesto C. Juanson on April 4,
2000, you were made to identify in the court room the person of Diosdado Camat and you said before that he
A Boyet Camat, Henry Caoile, Mamerto Dulay, Junior Lopez, John Laurean, Ibot Campos, Rogelio Campos was not here in that hearing, if this Diosdado Camat is inside the court room now, will you please stand up
and Serafin Dulay, sir. 34 (Emphasis supplied.) and go near him and tap his shoulder?

PROS. DUMLAO: (direct examination) A (Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom, who when his name was asked answered Diosdado
Camat).37(Emphases supplied.)
Q Mr. witness, when you are asked to identify Boyet Camat inside the courtroom during you testimony on
March 13, 2000, your answer was that, he was not here, before, is that correct? ATTY. MAPILI: (cross-examination)

A Yes sir.
Q Mr. Witness, do you remember having testified during the hearing on April 4, 2000, that you do not know apparent aversion to the thought of voluntarily surrendering to the authorities in order to clear
who among the eight alleged assailants fired their gun? his name. The following pertinent portions of the transcript show this:

A Yes, sir, but all of them were holding guns. FISCAL DUMLAO:

Q And you want to impress the Court that you remember the guns that they were carrying even though the Q In other words, at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning of November 5, you immediately proceeded to
shots were only for a few seconds? Tiblong, San Fabian, is that what you mean?

A Boyet Camat was holding long firearms, Mamerto Dulay was holding a long firearm, and the other six were A Yes, sir.
holding short firearms.38 (Emphasis supplied.)
Q You did not even talk to your mother anymore or to your sister Monica before you went to Tiblong?
[RICARDO HIDALGO]
A No more, sir, because I walked at the ricefield.
PROS. DUMLAO: (direct examination)
xxxx
Q Mr. witness, you testified on April 11, 2000 before this Honorable Court regarding these three (3) cases
and you are asked [a] [q]uestion [on] page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes TSN of your testimony
COURT:
that the persons who shot you and your companions were John Laurean, Rogelio Campos, Ibot Campos,
Serafin Dulay, Boyet Camat, Henry Caoile, Mamerto Dulay and Junior Lopez. If this Boyet Camat is in the
Q Why did you not proceed to the police station in that early morning?
courtroom, are you now in a position to point him, Mr. witness?

A I already feared because the relatives of the victims might see me.
A Before he was not here, but now he is here, sir.

Q Why did you not surrender at Manaoag Police Station?

Q Can you point to him?

A I did not think about that anymore, sir.

A Yes sir. (Witness pointing to a person, when asked his name, answered, Diosdado Camat.)

COURT:
COURT:

Continue Fiscal.
Q Do you know the exact name of Boyet Camat?

FISCAL DUMLAO:
A I know they called him in the house, but I do not know the name in the school, sir.

Q You even passed at Mangaldan in going to Tiblong, is it not?

PROS. DUMLAO:

A Yes, sir.
Q Mr. witness, you said that in your testimony on April 11, 2000 particularly on page 10 of the tsn. The
question was asked of you Mr. witness, what caliber or firearm was this Boyet holding at that time and you
Q You did not report to the police of Mangaldan?
answered, long firearm. My question is, will you describe that long firearm?

A I did not think of it anymore, sir.

A (Witness demonstrating a long firearm of about 2 1/2 feet.)

Q You passed also the Poblacion of San Fabian before going to Tiblong?
xxxx

A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know Boyet Camat who answered by the name of Diosdado Camat?

Q You did not think of surrendering to the police of San Fabian?

A He is also our former barangaymate, madam.39 (Emphases supplied.)

A It did not occur to my mind, sir.

Furthermore, appellant Camat’s sudden flight from his residence right after the November 3,
1999 massacre militated against his protestations of innocence. His reaction upon hearing COURT:
reports that he was considered a suspect in the Loac massacre, was to leave his house without
a word to his relatives on the pretext that he was evading armed men who were purportedly Q Casimiro Camat is a member of the army, why did you not go to him to have you surrendered and tell him
looking for him. He settled in his rest house located in San Fabian, Pangasinan where he that you have nothing to do with the incident?
stayed for more than a year before police officers managed to arrest him on December 25,
2000 pursuant to an outstanding warrant of arrest. When he testified in open court, he could A It did not occur to my mind, sir.
not provide any plausible reason for his prolonged absence from his hometown and to his
xxxx
COURT: The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and the attack is swift,
deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
Q In that span of one year that you are hiding, did you not learn that these cases were being tried and one chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the
Mamerto Dulay was already convicted?
aggressor, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
A No, sir.
Treachery may also be appreciated when the victim, although warned of the danger to his life,
COURT: is defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.

Proceed. The testimonial evidence gathered in this case clearly indicates that the victims who were
simply engaged in conversation in a private residence were caught entirely by surprise with the
FISCAL DUMLAO: assailants’ swift, deliberate and unexpected attack using multiple firearms thereby negating the
possibility for the victims to escape or defend themselves.
Q Immediately after you were informed that your name was involved in that massacre when you arrived
coming from Baguio City on November 4, 1999 and when your sister Monica informed you that your name However, contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, this Court finds that the
was involved, so as with your mother, did you not go to the police or some other police station to give your
use of unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution. The evidence indicates that
statement that you have nothing to do in that massacre considering that you were in Baguio City, morning
and afternoon of November 3, 1999. none of the firearms used in the November 3, 1999 massacre were ever recovered and
presented in the trial court. Nevertheless, there is jurisprudence which states that the existence
A No, sir. of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the
firearm.46 The testimony of the prosecution witnesses had established that appellant Camat
Q It is only your first time to narrate your version of this tragedy at Laoac, this is your first time to tell the used a long firearm of unknown make and caliber to shoot his victims but that would still be
Honorable Court that you were in Baguio City in the morning and afternoon of November 3, 1999? insufficient to attribute to his felonious act the qualifying circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm in light of jurisprudence which asserts that in order for the same to be considered,
A Yes, sir.
adequate proof, such as written or testimonial evidence, must be presented showing that the
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder.47 There was no such proof in the case at bar.
Q From the time, Mr. Witness, that you left your house in that early morning of November 5 up to December
25 when you were arrested at Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan City, even once or twice, you did not go or visit
your barangay at Anis, Laoac, Pangasinan, is that correct? Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
for the crime of Murder.1âwphi1 If no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the
A No more, sir.40 commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In this case, the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and use of unlicensed firearms were appreciated by both
In all, the lower courts correctly appreciated appellant Camat’s unexplained departure against the trial court and the Court of Appeals. However, only the presence of the qualifying
him. Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing circumstance of treachery was clearly proven in the trial of appellant Camat for the killing of
oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal Marcelina and Elmer Hidalgo, which nevertheless qualified the felonious act as Murder. There
proceedings.41 In one case, this Court had stated that it is well-established that the flight of an being no other aggravating circumstance, the trial court was incorrect in imposing the death
accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a penalty and should have just imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no
man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.42 In any case, the Court of Appeals imposed the proper penalty of reclusion perpetua after
considering the express mandate of Republic Act No. 9346.
Moreover, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was adequately shown to exist in this case,
thus, satisfying the third element of Murder. This Court also upholds appellant Camat’s conviction of four counts of Attempted Murder since
said charges were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution.
There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially The elements of attempted felony are as follows:
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make.43 For alevosia to qualify the crime to Murder, it must be shown that: (1) the 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her
safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method and 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
manner of execution were deliberately adopted. Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated, it
must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.44 3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

In the recent case of People v. Nugas,45 we expounded on the essence of treachery in this 4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
manner: spontaneous desistance.48
It is well-settled that where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to cause his PEOPLE,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs ROSEMARIE G.R. No. 188132February 29, 2012
death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of MAGUNDAYAO alias ROSE, Accused-
execution that would have brought about the victim’s death.49 Appellant.

In the present case, appellant Camat and his co-accused only committed Attempted Murder D E C I S I O N LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.:
because they were not able to kill Juanito, Aurelio, Pedro, and Ricardo by reason of a cause
independent of their will, specifically timely medical attention, despite the fact that they already For review of the Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2008 in
performed all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Murder. In CA-G.R. CR. No. 02899, which affirmed the Joint Decision[2] dated June 27, 2007 of the
addition, the wounds inflicted upon these victims were not considered fatal as evidenced by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 267, in Criminal Case Nos. 14061-D and
documentary and testimonial evidence presented in the trial court. 14062-D. In the said cases, accused-appellant Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose
was found guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of methamphetamine
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 50 hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
Thus, when death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil 2002.
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) On April 18, 2005, two separate informations were filed against the accused-appellant for
interest, in proper cases.51 violations of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165.

This Court had previously declared that in cases of Murder and Homicide, civil indemnity and In Criminal Case No. 14061-D, the accused-appellant allegedly violated the first paragraph of
moral damages are awarded automatically. Indeed, such awards are mandatory without need Section 5,[3] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in the following manner:
of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of
Murder or Homicide.52 That on or about the 14th day of April, 2005, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to
Pursuant to recent jurisprudence, this Court is increasing the award of civil indemnity from Fifty sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for each count give away to a poseur-buyer PO1 Rey B. Memoracion 0.08 gram of white crystalline substance
of Murder53 as well as decreasing the award of moral damages from Two Hundred Thousand contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent sachet, which substance was found positive to the
Pesos (P200,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for each count of Murder54 and test for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited
from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) for each count law.[4]
of Attempted Murder.55 Furthermore, in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil
Code,56 exemplary damages should be awarded in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) for each count of Murder57 as well as for each count of Attempted Murder. 58
The accusatory portion of the second information pertaining to Criminal Case No. 14062-D for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 27, 2009 of the Court of violation of Section 11,[5] Article II of the same law, states:
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02429 is hereby AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS
that: That on or about the 14th day of April, 2005, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to
(1) Appellant Diosdado Camat is ordered to pay, for each count of MURDER in Criminal Case possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
Nos. U-10498 and U-10499, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, knowingly have in her possession, custody and control 0.10 gram of white crystalline
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent sachet, which substance was found
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; positive to the test for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride or commonly known as shabu, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.[6]
(2) Appellant Diosdado Camat is ordered to pay, for each count of ATTEMPTED MURDER in
Criminal Case Nos. U-10500, U-10501, U-10502 and U-10503, Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary
damages; and Upon her arraignment on May 23, 2005, the accused-appellant entered pleas of not guilty to
each of the charges. [7]
(3) Appellant Diosdado Camat is further ordered to pay the private offended parties or their
heirs interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent ( 6o/o) per annum from Thereafter, joint trial of the cases ensued.[8]
the date of finality of this judgment.

No pronouncement as to costs.
The prosecution called to the witnesses stand: (1) Police Officer III (PO3) Danilo B. Arago and buyer. He was tasked to give the marked money, consisting of two pieces of P100 bills, to the
(2) Police Officer II (PO2) Rey B. Memoracion, both members of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs drug peddler. He stated that he was the one who placed the markings on the money, writing
Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF) of the Taguig City Police Station. On the other thereon his initials RBM at the upper right portion of the serial number. The team submitted a
hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of accused-appellant Rosemarie Magundayao pre-operation report to the PDEA and the latter gave a certification of coordination. The plan
y Alejandro. was for the informant to assist him in buying the illegal drugs from the drug peddler. Should the
sale be consummated, they will immediately arrest the said person. The pre-arranged signal for
PO3 Danilo B. Arago testified that on April 14, 2005, at around 5:30 p.m., he was at the office the arrest was the act of him removing his cap.[15]
of the SAID-SOTF when a reliable informant (pinagkakatiwalaang impormante) came in and
gave information about a certain alias Rose who was peddling illegal drugs, particularly shabu,
along M. L. Quezon Street, at the corner of Paso Street, Bagumbayan,[9] Taguig City.[10] PO3
Arago said that the information was relayed to the leader of his team, Police Chief Inspector PO2 Memoracion narrated that, after the preparations were completed, the team headed to
(P/Chief Insp.) Romeo Paat, who conducted a briefing with the informant. The members of the Bagumbayan corner Paso Street, Taguig City. When they got there, he and the informant took
team present were P/Chief Insp. Paat, PO3 Antonio Reyes, PO2 Memoracion[11] and PO3 a walk, with the other members of the team following them. When the informant saw the
Arago himself. A buy-bust operation was planned whereby PO2 Memoracion was designated accused-appellant, they talked and PO2 Memoracion was introduced as a friend of the
as the poseur-buyer and he was to act as the back-up. He saw P/Chief Insp. Paat give the buy- informant who wanted to buy shabu. They were then facing each other about a foot away. The
bust money to PO2 Memoracion, consisting of two pieces of P100 bills, and the latter signed accused-appellant asked PO2 Memoracion how much he was going to buy and he answered
the initials RBM on the upper right hand of the bills. The team also faxed a pre-coordination that he would buy only P200 worth of shabu. He handed to her the P200 marked money and
report to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).[12] she accepted the same. She then pulled out from her pocket one transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline powder and gave it to him. After he received the plastic sachet, he
made the pre-arranged signal of removing his bull cap.[16]

PO3 Arago related that the team then proceeded to the subject area and arrived there at 8:30 PO2 Memoracion said that he afterwards saw PO3 Arago, followed by PO3 Reyes, coming
p.m. They parked their vehicle along M. L. Quezon Street, around a hundred meters from Paso towards his location. He forthwith informed the accused-appellant that he was a police officer
Street. PO2 Memoracion and the informant alighted and walked to Paso Street. The pre- and showed her his ID. He told her not to run and that he was arresting her for selling illegal
arranged signal was for PO2 Memoracion to remove his bull cap.When he saw PO2 drugs. When he requested her to bring out the contents of her pocket, she brought out another
Memoracion talking to the accused-appellant, PO3 Arago went out of the car and walked plastic sachet with suspected shabu and the buy-bust money, which he both confiscated. He
towards them. He situated himself at about 15 meters away from PO2 Memoracion and the then put markings on the two plastic sachets. He put therein the initials of the accused,
accused-appellant. He saw them talking and, after a while, PO2 Memoracion handed RAM. The shabu subject of the sale was marked as RAM-1 and the other sachet was marked
something to the accused-appellant, who in turn took something from her short pants and as RAM-2. He also appraised the accused-appellant of her constitutional rights. At the scene of
handed it to PO2 Memoracion. The latter then removed his bull cap.[13] the crime, he prepared an inventory of the items seized, which he and the accused-appellant
signed. The accused-appellant was taken to the police station, along with the plastic sachets
and the marked money. Thereafter, the accused-appellant and the seized items were turned
over to the investigator, SPO2 Armando Cay. The police subsequently prepared a request for
PO3 Arago stated that he thereafter ran to the place where PO2 Memoracion was laboratory examination. PO2 Memoracion then delivered the request and the suspected drug
standing. The latter already effected the arrest of the accused-appellant and ordered her to specimen to the crime laboratory. The specimen yielded a positive result
empty the contents of her right front pocket. They saw another plastic sachet, which they for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.[17] Chemistry Report No. D-234-05 stated thus:
believed contained shabu, and the buy-bust money. PO2 Memoracion told him to place the
accused-appellant in handcuffs and the former marked the evidence obtained. PO3 Arago said SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
that he was able to see the object of the buy-bust in the custody of PO2 Memoracion, which
was a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected as shabu. He was Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance having the
following markings and recorded net weight:
beside PO2 Memoracion while the latter was marking the evidence. The marking RAM-1 was
placed at the plastic sachet subject of the buy-bust and the marking RAM-2 was placed at the
A (RAM-1) = 0.08 gram
other plastic sachet that was also confiscated from the accused-appellant. PO3 Arago stated
that he saw PO2 Memoracion take custody of the two plastic sachets and brought the same to B (RAM-2) = 0.10 gram
the police station. They then turned over the plastic sachets to the crime laboratory. After the
accused-appellant was arrested, she was brought to the police station.[14] xxxx

PO2 Memoracion provided a similar picture of the events that allegedly transpired in the PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
afternoon of April 14, 2005. He testified that, at that time, an informant indeed came to their
office and told them about a female individual who was selling illegal drugs at Bagumbayan To determine the presence of dangerous drugs. x x x.
corner Paso Street, Taguig City. The informant talked to P/Chief Insp. Paat and the latter set
FINDINGS:
up a plan to conduct a buy-bust operation. PO2 Memoracion was designated as the poseur-
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the test for The defense formally rested its case without the presentation of any documentary evidence for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x. the accused-appellant.[33]

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A and B contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[18]

On June 27, 2007, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision, finding the accused-appellant guilty of
the offenses charged. The pertinent portions of the judgment states:
The prosecution thereafter adduced the following documentary evidence: (1) Pinagsamang
Salaysay ng Pag-aresto at Paghaharap ng Reklamo o Demanda (Exhibit A);[19] (2) Request for
The substance of the prosecutions evidence is to the effect that accused Rosemarie
Laboratory Examination of the specimen suspected to be shabu (Exhibit B);[20] (3) Initial
Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose was arrested by the police because of the existence
Laboratory Report, stating that the specimen submitted for examination tested positive
of shabu [s]he sold to PO2 Rey B. Memoracion as well as the recovery of the buy-bust money
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit C);[21] (4) Request for Physical Examination of
from [her] possession, and the presence of another plastic sachet containing shabu that was
the accused-appellant;[22] (5) Request for Drug Test of the accused-appellant;[23] (6) Physical
also recovered from her person.
Examination Report;[24] (7) Certificate of Inventory (Exhibit G);[25] (8) Booking and Information
Sheet;[26] (9) Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet (Exhibit I);[27] (10) Certificate of
To emphasize, the prosecution witnesses in the person of PO2 Rey B. Memoracion and PO3
Coordination (Exhibit J);[28] (11) Photocopy of the buy-bust money (Exhibit K);[29] and (12)
Danilo B. Arago positively identified accused Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose
Chemistry Report No. D-234-05, stating that the specimen submitted for examination yielded a
as the person they apprehended on April 14, 2005 at Pazzo Street corner M.L. Quezon
positive result for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit L).[30]
Avenue, Bagumbayan, Taguig, Metro Manila. That they arrested accused Rosemarie A.
Magundayao because their team was able to procure shabu from her during the buy-bust
operation they purposely conducted against the aforementioned accused.
The testimony of Police Inspector Alejandro de Guzman, the forensic chemist who examined
the specimen seized from the accused-appellant, was dispensed with by the parties. The
counsel for the accused-appellant agreed to stipulate that De Guzman indeed examined the
The buy-bust money recovered by the arresting police officers from the possession of accused
specimen upon the request of the police and, after the requisite examination, found it positive
Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose as well as the shabu they were able to
to the test of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The findings were reflected
purchase from the accused sufficiently constitute as the very corpus delicti of the crime of
in Chemistry Report No. D-234-05, which was prepared under oath by De Guzman and
Violation of Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and the other plastic
approved by his immediate supervisor Police Chief Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio. The defense
sachet containing shabu that was recovered from the same accused Magundayao similarly
counsel also stipulated that if De Guzman were to be presented as a witness, the latter would
constitute as the corpus delicti of the crime of Violation of Section 11, 2nd paragraph, No. 3,
testify to the fact that he turned over to the counsel for the prosecution the drug specimen and
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. x x x.
he could identify the same if shown to him. On the other hand, the prosecution stipulated that
the forensic chemist had no personal knowledge from whom the specimen was taken and
under what circumstances the specimen was taken. [31]
The testimony of PO2 Rey B. Memoracion that was corroborated by PO3 Danilo B. Arago, who
Expectedly, the defense presented an entirely different version of the facts. The accused-
have not shown and displayed any ill motive to arrest the accused, is sufficient enough to
appellant claimed that she was framed by the police.
convict the accused of the crimes charged against him. x x x.[34]

The accused-appellant testified that on April 14, 2005, she was at her house at 188 Pazzo
As to the defense put forward by the accused-appellant, the trial court declared that:
Street, Bagong Bayan, Taguig, Metro Manila. At around 6:00 p.m., she was resting when the
door of their house was suddenly opened by five unidentified male persons. They did not Such allegation of the accused that her apprehension was just a result of a frame-up, as she
introduce themselves to her. They told her that they were looking for a certain alias Luga but was not really engaged in peddling shabu when she was arrested, cannot be given credence
she told the men that she did not know this person. They then ransacked her house for about because she was not able to offer and show proof of any previous disagreement between her
ten to fifteen minutes. The men were not able to find any illegal items at her house and they and the arresting law enforcers that may lead the police officers to concoct and hatch baseless
afterwards brought the accused-appellant to the Tuktukan jail. There, the men allegedly asked accusations against her, or the presence of any other circumstances that may have fired up the
money from her before they could allow her to go home. She stated that it was PO2 ire of the police officers against her. x x x.
Memoracion who tried to extort money from her. Since she did not owe them any debt, she
refused to give them any money. Afterwards, she was subjected to inquest proceedings. When xxxx
she was brought to the Tuktukan jail, she was not shown the evidence that were supposedly
taken from her. The accused-appellant further alleged that, on the afternoon of April 14, 2005, Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that when the accused was brought to the Inquest
she did not even go out of her house.[32] Prosecutor for the requisite inquest of the charge against the accused, the latter never
complained to the Inquest Prosecutor of the framing-up brazenly perpetrated by the policemen Costs de oficio.[36]
or by the police investigator. If indeed, the accused complained to the Inquest Prosecutor,
surely, the same could have appropriately acted upon it. On July 17, 2007, the accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal,[37] which the RTC gave due
course to in an Order[38] dated July 27, 2007.
xxxx

To wrap up, the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convict
accused Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose. There can be no other prudent On December 19, 2008, the Court of Appeals found no merit in the appeal of the accused-
conclusion that can be deduced from the circumstances present in the instant cases. The appellant and disposed of the same, thus:
evidence presented by the prosecution leads only to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
accused Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose is guilty of the offenses charged. [35] Wherefore, premises considered, the instant appeal is denied for lack of merit, and accordingly,
the assailed June 27, 2007 Joint Decision of the trial court convicting Rosemarie Magundayao
of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, including the penalties imposed
against her, is hereby affirmed in toto.[39]
The RTC, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused ROSEMARIE
MAGUNDAYAO y Alejandro alias Rose in Criminal Case No. 14061-D for Violation of Section The Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to overturn the verdict of guilt imposed by
5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive the trial court upon the accused-appellant. The appellate court upheld the ruling of the RTC
Drugs Act of 2002, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, accused Rosemarie that the evidence of the prosecution clearly established the concurrence of all the elements of
Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose is hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and the crimes of illegal sale and possession of prohibited drugs. The testimonies of the
ordered to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP500,000.00). prosecution witnesses proved the fact that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the police,
which resulted in the apprehension of the accused-appellant after she was caught in flagrante
delicto in the act of selling shabu and possessing another sachet thereof. The appellate court
likewise rejected the accused-appellants contention that she was a victim of a frame-up since
Moreover, accused ROSEMARIE MAGUNDAYAO y Alejandro alias Rose is also there was no evidence of any ill or improper motive on the part of the police that would have
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 14062-D for Violation of Section impelled the latter to fabricate grave charges against the accused-appellant. Furthermore, the
11, 2ndparagraph, No. 3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Court of Appeals disregarded the allegation of the accused-appellant that the non-compliance
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. And since the quantity of methylamphetamine with the provisions of Section 21(1)[40] of Republic Act No. 9165 on the part of the police was
hydrochloride (shabu) found in the possession of the accused is only 0.10 gram, accused fatal to the prosecutions case. Citing People v. Pringas,[41] the appellate court held that [f]ailure
Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal, nor
ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) will it result to the inadmissibility in evidence against the accused of the illegal drugs seized in
YEARS and TWENTY[-]ONE (21) DAYS as maximum. Accused Rosemarie Magundayao y the course of the entrapment. What is of utmost relevance is the preservation of the integrity
Alejandro alias Rose is further penalized to pay a fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED and evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs, for in the end, the same would be the
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP300,000.00). thrust that shall determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The accused-appellant assailed the above judgment of the Court of Appeals via the instant
appeal before this Court.[42]
Accordingly, the Jail Warden of the Taguig City Jail where accused Rosemarie Magundayao y
Alejandro alias Rose is presently detained is hereby ordered to forthwith commit the person of
convicted Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose to the Correctional Institution for
Women (CIW), Bureau of Corrections in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. In a Resolution[43] dated July 20, 2009, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. The parties filed their
respective manifestations, stating that they will no longer file any supplemental brief.[44]

Upon the other hand, the shabu contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
with a total weight of 0.18 gram which are the subject matter of the above-captioned cases, are
hereby ordered transmitted and/or submitted to the custody of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Asserting her innocence, the accused-appellant avers that:
Agency (PDEA) subject and/or pursuant to existing Rules and Regulations promulgated thereto
for its proper disposition. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [HER] WHOSE GUILT HAS NOT
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[45]
The accused-appellant claims that there exist in the records of the case certain facts and is on this premise that we have laid down the objective test in scrutinizing buy-bust
circumstances that makes doubtful the prosecutions version of events. She pointed to the operations. In People v. Doria, we said:
allegedly contradictory statements in the testimonies of PO3 Arago and PO2 Memoracion as to
how their team leader, P/Chief Insp. Paat, received the information disclosed by the We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details
informant. Specifically, PO2 Memoracion testified that the informant himself talked to P/Chief of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from
Insp. Paat. PO3 Arago, however, stated in his testimony that the information was first given to the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the
the other members of their team and the same was thereafter relayed to P/Chief Insp. Paat. promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was
made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the
buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the
The accused-appellant also argues that the inventory of the items seized from the accused- police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
appellant lacked the requisite signatures of a representative of the media, the Department of are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.[50] (Emphasis ours.)
Justice or any elected public official. This procedural lapse was allegedly not explained
adequately by the witnesses of the prosecution. In like manner, the police did not photograph
the confiscated items in the presence of the above-enumerated individuals. These procedural
lapses, the accused-appellant posits, violated the provisions of Section 21(1) of Republic Act In consonance with the above-stated objective test, the testimony of PO2 Memoracion duly
No. 9165, thus proving that the police failed to perform their duty properly. Accordingly, in established that the members of the SAID-SOTF of the Taguig City Police Station properly
praying for her acquittal, the accused-appellant submits that the presumption of regularity in the performed their duties in the conduct of the buy-bust operation on April 14, 2005. The
performance of official functions cannot be invoked as a basis for her conviction given the testimony of PO2 Memoracion, which was corroborated by the testimony of PO3 Arago, stated
presence of facts and circumstances tending to negate said presumption. She concludes that in great detail how his team carried out the buy-bust as follows:
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there any incident that transpired which has relation to your work as [a] drug
enforcement officer during that particular day April 14, 2005?
doubt.[46]
A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Can you please tell us?

The denial of the appeal is in order.
A: A reliable informant in the afternoon of April 14 came to our office and informed [us] regarding a female
individual who was selling illegal drug at Bagong Bayan corner Paso Street, Taguig City.

In People v. Santos,[47] the Court ruled as follows: PROSEC. SANTOS: To whom did that informant talked (sic) during that time?

Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and A: To our chief, sir, P/Chief Insp. Romeo Paat, sir.
which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be PROSEC. SANTOS: When Insp. Paat learned of the activity of this alias Rose, do you know what your chief
did?
gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to
decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their
A: He has a plan, sir, to conduct possible buy-bust operation, sir during that time.
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. [48] PROSEC. SANTOS: And who were involved in that plan to conduct buy-bust operation?

A: PO3 Antonio Reyes, PO3 Danilo Arago, P/Chief Insp. Romeo Paat, reliable informant and I, sir.

After a thorough review of the records of this case, we hold that the factual findings and PROSEC. SANTOS: And what was your specific assignment in this buy-bust operation?
conclusions of the trial court, which were upheld by the appellate court, are fully supported by
the evidence. A: To act as the poseur-buyer.

PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the others, what were [their] assignment?

A: Back up, sir.

The pronouncement in People v. Padasin[49] quoted below is relevant to the case at bar:
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, you were assigned as the poseur-buyer in this particular case, was there anything
Appellant rightly argues that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by that you had to buy whatever you want from this alias Rose during that time?
law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence. In fact it
A: The marked money, sir consisting of two (2) pieces of one hundred peso bill. A: None, sir, she just ask[ed] me how much will I buy.

PROSEC. SANTOS: You said marked money, how was this money marked? PROSEC. SANTOS: And what was your reaction when you were asked that way by this alias Rose?

A: I was the one who put the markings on the money, sir. A: I uttered, dalawang-daan lang.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What kind of markings did you place on this money? PROSEC. SANTOS: When you said dalawang-daan lang, what was the reaction of [this] alias Rose?

A: My initial, sir, RBM. A: None, sir, after that, I handed to her the two hundred pesos.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Where was your initial placed on the money? PROSEC. SANTOS: And to whom did you hand that money?

A: At the upper right portion of the serial number, sir. A: To the accused, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What else was planned during that time for the purpose of conducting a buy-bust PROSEC. SANTOS: Did this alias Rose accept the money?
operation?
A: Yes, sir.
A: We also prepare[d] the pre-operation report and the blotter as well as the photocopy of the genuine
money and then the scissor, the masking tape and ballpen, sir. PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened?

PROSEC. SANTOS: This pre-operation report is addressed to PDEA, do you know what action did the A: She pulled out from her pocket the one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
PDEA take regarding your pre-operation report? substance, and then she gave it to me, sir.

A: They received our pre-operation report and simultaneously gave the coordination sheet, sir. PROSEC. SANTOS: Did you receive the plastic sachet containing whatsoever from her during that time?

PROSEC. SANTOS: What else was done or plan[ned] regarding this buy-bust operation specially you A: Yes, sir.
designated as the poseur-buyer?
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened? After you have already received or gotten hold [of] the
A: We plan that the reliable informant assisted (sic) me to buy suspected shabu from the accused during that merchandise or the item that you bought from her, what happened then?
time, sir.
A: I made the pre-arranged signal, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And who was assigned as your back up or your perimeter men during that time?
PROSEC. SANTOS: And how did you do that?
A: PO3 Antonio Reyes and PO3 Danilo Arago, sir.
A: I remove[d] my bullcap, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after all this preparations were done and completed, what if any did your team do
then? PROSEC. SANTOS: After giving the pre-arranged signal, what did you do?

A: We proceeded to the area, sir. A: I saw PO3 Arago followed by PO3 Reyes coming, I informed alias Rose that I was a policeman and
showed her my ID, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what area are you referring at this time?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Just like that? You just informed her that you are policeman plus your ID, and thats
A: Bagong Bayan corner Paso Street, Taguig City. it? You did not do anything?

PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened when you were already there? A: I told her not to run, Im a police officer, I am arresting her for selling illegal drug

A: The informant and I walk[ed], the back up members were following us together with the team PROSEC. SANTOS: So, what happened?
leader. When the informant saw the accused alias Rose, they talked and I was introduced as his [friend], that
I wanted to buy shabu. A: I requested her to bring out the contents of her pocket and the buy-bust money.

PROSEC. SANTOS: How were you introduced by your informant to this person alias Rose? PROSEC. SANTOS: Did she comply with your request?

A: The informant uttered, Rose, kaibigan ko, galing probinsya, iiskor ng shabu sayo. A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: And when you were introduced as one needing the shabu and just coming from the PROSEC. SANTOS: And what was brought out or what were the contents of her pocket if there was
province, what was the reaction of this alias Rose? anything?
A: There was another plastic sachet with suspected shabu and the buy-bust money, and I confiscated those accused-appellants contention was without any corroborative evidence whatsoever. Neither did
items. she offer any proof to substantiate her allegation of extortion against the apprehending
officers. The accused-appellant even admitted that, prior to her arrest, she did not know any of
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you confiscated the buy-bust money and another plastic sachet that were come
the police officers who arrested her. Moreover, she stated that she did not know of any reason
from her pocket, what if any did you do with these? To the money and the shabu that was came from her
pocket?
why the police officers would file a case against her if the same were not true.[54] Consequently,
the accused-appellants claim of frame-up cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony and the
A: I put markings on the two (2) plastic sachets, a suspected shabu. positive identification made by the witnesses for the prosecution. Hence, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers in this case
PROSEC. SANTOS: Nothing more that was done in the very place where you bought the shabu, stands.
confiscated another one and arrested the accused, was there anything more that was done?

A: I apprise[d] her of her constitutional rights, sir.

Anent the offenses charged against the accused-appellant, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the shabu that you bought from the accused and confiscated from the
adjudged her guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
accused, did you not make any listing about that?

A: I marked the shabu that I bought at the area, sir.

COURT: What about the shabu that you saw? It was held in People v. Hernandez[55] that [t]o secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the
following essential elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
A: I also marked it, Your Honor. the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment thereof. People v. Naquita[56] further adds that [w]hat is material to the prosecution for
COURT: After you have marked these items, what document did you prepare? illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
A: The request, Your Honor.

COURT: After marking, after apprising her, what else?

The above elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. PO2 Memoracion
A: I placed the recovered items in a plastic containing suspected shabu and I was holding the buy-bust
money and we boarded Rose in our car.[51]
was the poseur-buyer and he identified the accused-appellant as the seller. The object of the
sale was the sachet containing eight centigrams (0.08 grams) of shabu, which bore the
Clearly gleaned from the above testimony are the details relating to the initial contact between marking RAM-1, and the consideration paid by the poseur-buyer therefor consisted of the P200
PO2 Memoracion and the accused-appellant; the said police officers offer to purchase; the marked money. PO2 Memoracion also categorically stated that the object of the sale was in
statement of the amount he was willing to pay; and the consummation of the sale by the fact handed to him by the accused-appellant after he gave her the marked money.
accused-appellants delivery of the shabu to PO2 Memoracion. On this matter, our ruling
in People v. Agulay[52] dictates that [a]bsent any proof of motive to falsely accuse [the accused-
appellant] of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail As to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, People v. Lazaro, Jr.[57] provides
over that of the accused-appellant. that the elements thereof are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. That the accused-appellant
knowingly carried the illegal drug shabu without authority was likewise proven in this case. PO3
In seeking exculpation from the above charges, the accused-appellant invoked the defense Arago and PO2 Memoracion both testified to the fact that after the latter effected the arrest of
that she was framed by the police. The Court, however, is not convinced. We reiterated the accused-appellant, she was ordered to empty her pocket. When she did so, she produced
in People v. Hernandez[53] that [i]n order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must another plastic sachet, which PO2 Memoracion marked as RAM-2. The chemistry report of the
be proved with strong and convincing evidence. forensic chemist P/Insp. De Guzman confirmed that the said sachet contained ten decigrams
(0.10 grams) of shabu.

In the instant case, the accused-appellant impugned the prosecutions assertion that she was
arrested after a buy-bust operation was undertaken by the SAID-SOTF operatives. Instead, As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO2 Memoracion and PO3 Arago,
she claimed that the police merely barged into her house, forcibly took her to the Tuktukan jail the Court finds the same unpersuasive. People v. Lazaro[58] states that [f]or a discrepancy or
and tried to extort money from her. Her refusal to give in to the police officers demand allegedly inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to the
brought about the filing of the drugs charges against her. The Court notes, however, that the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime charged. An
inconsistency which has nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
the acquittal of the accused. copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
We quote with approval the following discussion of the Court of Appeals on the matter: custody over said items. (Emphasis ours.)

Whether the information regarding the identity and illegal drugs activities of Rosemarie was
relayed directly to P/Chief Inspector Romeo Paat, or the tip was otherwise given initially to
some inferior police personnel at the station who thereafter informed their station chief is a In People v. Padua,[60] the Court stated that [c]learly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in
trivial and inconsequential matter. What is of utmost importance was the undisputed fact that a the implementing rules is centered on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
trusted civilian informant volunteered a tip to the police authorities, and finding the information the seized items. Furthermore, we reiterated in People v. Naquita[61] that [n]either would non-
reliable, the tip became the basis for the police to plan an entrapment operation which, true compliance with Section 21 render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
enough, paved the way to the eventual apprehension of Rosemarie who was caught in from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
flagrante delicto in the act of selling a sachet of shabu, and subsequently, after further search, evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
for possession of another sachet of the same prohibited drug. [59] guilt or innocence of the accused.

The Court likewise finds untenable the contention of the accused-appellant that since the In the case before us, the chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case, along with
provisions of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 were not strictly complied with, the marked money used in the buy-bust, was shown to have been preserved.The relevant
the police officers failed to properly perform their duties. portions of the testimony of PO2 Memoracion are as follows:

COURT: At the scene of the crime? May dokumento ba kayong ginagawa?

Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 reads: A: Yes, Your Honor.

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous COURT: Anong papel yun?
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
A: Yung inventory po, Your Honor.
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors PROSEC. SANTOS: You were talking of an inventory, who inventoried the items that you bought and seized
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so from alias Rose?
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
A: I, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: At the bottom portion of this document, is the name of the suspect, representative and
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately a purported signature above the name Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro, do you know whose signature is
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of that?
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
A: Its the signature of Rosemarie, the accused.
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what else happened?
and be given a copy thereof[.]
A: We went back to our office, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: And when you went there, where was the accused?
On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, stipulates: A: She was with us, sir.

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the specimen that you or the item that you bought and confiscated from the
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in accused, where are they?
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
A: Its with me, sir.
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the money, where is it? The above statements of PO2 Memoracion were corroborated by the testimony of PO3 Arago,
who testified that he saw the former take custody of the two plastic sachets seized during the
A: Its with me, sir. buy-bust operation and the said items were turned over to the crime laboratory. [63] Moreover,
the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit B)[64] issued by the office of SAID-SOTF of the
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what happened in your office?
Taguig City Police Station on April 14, 2005 reflected that the fact that the same was delivered
A: She was turn[ed] over to the investigator on case, sir.
to the crime laboratory by PO2 Memoracion on even date at 10:00 p.m.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What items did you turn over to your investigator? In fine, the evidence for the prosecution established that during a buy-bust operation, the
accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of selling a plastic sachet
A: The two (2) plastic sachets containing suspected shabu and the buy-bust money. of shabu to a police officer, who acted as a poseur-buyer, and was thereafter caught in
possession of another sachet of shabu. Thus, the guilt of the accused-appellant of the crimes
PROSEC. SANTOS: And who was your investigator during that time? charged had been proven in the instant case beyond reasonable doubt.

A: SPO2 Armando Cay, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you know what your investigator Cay did when you turn[ed] over the items to him
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the crime of unauthorized sale of shabu,
during that time?
regardless of the quantity and purity thereof, is punishable with life imprisonment to death and
A: We prepare[d] the request for laboratory examination. a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00).
PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the articles or the items that you turn over to Cay during that time, where
were they when Cay was preparing the request? Hence, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 was correctly imposed by
the RTC and the Court of Appeals on the accused-appellant Rosemarie
A: [In front] of us, sir. Magundayao y Alejandro for illegal sale of shabu.

PROSEC. SANTOS: And who delivered or transported the request and the specimen to the crime
laboratory?
On the other hand, in accordance with Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the crime
A: I, sir.
of illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu is penalized with imprisonment of
PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you know what happened to the specimen when you delivered that to the crime
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred
laboratory? thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00). Thus, the RTC
and the Court of Appeals properly penalized the accused-appellant Rosemarie
A: Yes, sir. Magundayao y Alejandro with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years and twenty-one (21) days, as maximum, as well as a fine
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened? of P300,000.00, since the said penalties are within the range of penalties prescribed by the
above provision.
A: It gave positive result to the test of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December
PROSEC. SANTOS: Can you again tell us what marking did you put on the plastic sachet containing the
19, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 02899, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated June 27, 2007 of
shabu that you bought from the accused?
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267, in Criminal Case Nos. 14061-D and 14062-
A: The initial of the accused RAM, sir. D, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What else?

A: RAM-1 and RAM-2, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: RAM-1 is the shabu?

A: Subject of sale, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, how about the money Officer that you said you used in buying and which later on
you found from the possession of the accused and confiscated, where are they now?

A: It was turn[ed] over, sir, during the inquest it was submitted.[62]