LECTURE ON ARTICLE VII: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

By: Atty. Edwin E. Torres

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the

Philippines.

It would not be accurate to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the
President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. Although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains
intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive.1

The first section of Article VII of the Constitution means that the President of the Philippines is
the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President’s bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford
ed., 498), and in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are
subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.
Stated otherwise, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority." 2

DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY:

The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various
executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such
heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the
President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in
our presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief
Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are
performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of
practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected to personally perform the
multifarious functions of the executive office.3

The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in
the landmark case of Villena vs. The Secretary of Interior (1939). In said case, the Department of
Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena
and found him guilty of bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then
recommended to the President the suspension from office of Mayor Villena. Upon approval by
the President of the recommendation, the Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena.
Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his suspension, asserting that the Secretary of Interior had
no authority to suspend him from office because there was no specific law granting such power
to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who was empowered to suspend
local government officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his suspension,
holding that the doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the suspension by the Secretary
of Interior. Justice Laurel, writing for the Court, opined:

1
Marcos, et al. vs. Manglapus, et al. (G.R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989).
2
Manalang-Demigillo vs. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) (G.R. No.
168613, 5 March 2013).
3
Ibid.
 2

“After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the

government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that
under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
(Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U. S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 1141; see also U. S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968;
Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., 80;
Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox vs.
Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)”

But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the
President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of PD 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of RA
8494, the five ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National
Economic and Development Authority, and the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas
Construction Board, while the four other members of the Board were the three from the private
sector (at least one of whom should come from the export community), who were elected by the
ex officio members of the Board for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and the
President of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet
members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or
function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it
was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. 4

RESIDUAL POWERS:

The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of
the general grant of executive power. Residual powers of the president under the US constitution
were we pattered the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches. In
Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal executive, unlike the
Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the
constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific
terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where
limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the
constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the
concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted
by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power,
authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. 5

The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual
powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad
organization powers to implement reorganization measures, viz.:

SEC. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President
shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which

4
Op cit., Manalang-Demigillo.
5
Marcos, et al. vs. Maglapus, et al. (G.R. No. 88211, 27 October 1989).
 3

are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated
above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.

This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then
gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and
to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is] unquestionable. The
1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or
repealing said decrees.6

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same

qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same
manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same
manner as the President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such

appointment requires no confirmation.

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct

vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be
eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election
to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly

certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates
in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected,
but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes,
one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.

6
Ibid.
 4

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

A president-elect does not assume office until noon of June 30 next following a presidential
election. An outgoing President does not cease to perform the duties and responsibilities of a
President merely because the people had chosen his/her new successor. Until her term expires,
an outgoing President has the constitutional duty to discharge the powers and functions of a
President unless restricted by the Constitution.7

Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President,
the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or
affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously
fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation.
So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)

Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of

the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not
be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall
take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during
which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their
tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.

Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume

office at the beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as

President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act
as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall

have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-
elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall

have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently
disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a
President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to
act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall
have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the
officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

The Constitution provides for two classes of Presidential succession: (a) before assumption of
office by the President-elect at the beginning of his term (noon of June 30 following the
elections); and (b) after assumption of office by the President-elect at or subsequent to the time
fixed for the beginning of his term. The Constitution distinguishes between the situation when
the Vice-President shall ACT as President and that when he BECOMES President. The Vice-
President shall ACT as President (a) if the President-elect fails to qualify until the President-elect
shall have qualified (Sec. 7, Art. VII); (b) if a President shall not have been chosen until a
President shall have been chosen and qualified (Sec. 7, Art. VII); and (c) in case of temporary
inability or incapacity of the President to discharge his powers and duties until the disability
shall have been terminated (Sec. 11, Art. VII). The Vice-President shall BECOME the President

7
Separate opinion of Justice Reyes, R.T., Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, et al. (G.R. No. 180643, 4 September 2003).
 5

(a) if President-elect shall have died (Sec. 7, Art. VII); and (b) if President shall have become
permanently disabled (Sec. 7, Art. VII).

Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or

resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President
to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until
the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of
death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He
shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected
and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.

Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Estrada did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after
the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not he resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, the Supreme Court held that Estrada
resigned as President. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead
in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying
the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell.8

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President

during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a
Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

This section recognizes the bicameral nature of Congress by its requirement that the
nominee to replace the Vice-President is to be confirmed "by a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."

Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third
day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President
occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a
President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days
nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such
special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall
be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from
the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the

8
Estrada vs. Desierto, et al. (G.R. No. 146710-5, 2 March 2001).
 6

special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the

vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election.

Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President
as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the

President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate

and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with
its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to
assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be
informed of the state of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge
of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the
President during such illness.

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth

civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.

The disqualification in the above provision is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the
Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-
embracing. In contrast, under Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . . .” Under
Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any
time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2),
 7

Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government."9

Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or
be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing
prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress,
members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. 10

Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain

effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from
his assumption or reassumption of office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

The prohibition Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution applies only to presidential
appointments. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of their tenure.11

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.

The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word “shall” - an imperative, operating to impose a
duty that may be enforced - should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the
President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear
disobedience to the Constitution.12

Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying
votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The second type of appointments
prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments which are
mere partisan efforts to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments." The Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition in Section 15, Article
VII, to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the
prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their
subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried
and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight

9
Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 83896, 22 February 1991).
10
Ibid.
11
De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 131136, 28 February 2001).
12
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council and Macapagal-Aroyo (G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010).
 8

appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments were made in haste and with
irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out
of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the
appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering
from such defects because of the JBC's prior processing of candidates. Also, the intervention of
the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose
of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The
experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial
positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be
assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to
undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was
precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the
Commission on Appointments.13

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Under Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination
is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. An express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. Hence, it follows that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments. It further follows that the President was correct in appointing
a person as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. 14

The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group
of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments. The first group
of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials
who have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The second group of officials the
President can appoint are "all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." The
second sentence acts as the "catch-all provision" for the President’s appointment power, in
recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. The wide

13
Ibid.
14
Sarmiento, et al. vs. Mison, et al. (G.R. No. 79974, 17 December 1987).
 9

latitude given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the
President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In
other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the
process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by
appointment.15

Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives of the House of Representatives in
paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express
provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, these representatives are among the "other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the
first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.16 Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in
the Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as
appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and
the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI).17

May Congress, by law, require CA confirmation of appointments extended by the president to

government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII of the Constitution whose appointments require CA confirmation? RULING: No. In a
case,18 the requirement of CA confirmation of the commissioners of the NLRC as provided by the
RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law) was challenged. The provision is unconstitutional because:

1) it amends by legislation the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution
by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President.

The first group includes “officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain.”
The inclusion of officers of the AFP does not cover the PNP. The police force is different from and
independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the
Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under
the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.19 Likewise, officers of the Philippine Coast Guard from the rank of captain and
higher do not require CA confirmation because EO 475 transferred it from being a part of the
Philippine Navy to the Department of Transportation and Communication. The PCG, not
anymore part of the Philippine Navy or the AFP, the promotions and appointments of its officers
do not require CA confirmation.20

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. Such appointment in an acting capacity does not need CA
confirmation.21

Acting vis-à-vis Ad-interim appointment. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-
interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments
are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. 22

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

15
Kida, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. (G.R. No. 196271, 28 February 2012).
16
Quintos-Deles, et al. vs. Commission on Appointments, et al. (G.R. No. 83216, 4 September 1989).
17
Ibid.
18
Calderon vs. Carale, et al. (G.R. No. 91636, 23 April 1992).
19
Manalo vs. Sistoza, et al. (G.R. No. 107369, 11 August 1999).
20
Soriano III vs. Lista, et al. (G.R. No. 153881, 24 March 2003).
21
Pimentel, et al. vs. Ermita, et al. (G.R. No. 164978, 13 October 2005).
22
Ibid.
 10

Reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition

thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It alters the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged with the legislature, the
authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may include such abolition,
is permissible under our present laws. The general rule has always been that the power to
abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the
power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the
Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a
particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures.23

If an office is legally not under the control of the President, then such office is not part of the
Executive branch. The President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers
in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the
power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion. In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises
"control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under
the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President.
The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power
exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is
not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or
constitutional basis.24

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed

forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following

such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any

citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,
nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

23
Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Sulla, et al. (G.R. No. 160093, 31 July
2007).
24
Liban, et al. vs. Gordon (G.R. No. 175352, 15 July 2009).
 11

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.

Section 18 covers three powers of the President: (a) calling out power, (b) power to suspend the
privilege of habeas corpus, and (c) power to proclaim martial law. These are part of the
graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. When the President feels that there
is imminent danger of, or actual, violence, he may call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress it. This does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial
review. In comparison, the exercise of the powers to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to
proclaim martial law is subject to legislative concurrence and judicial review. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. The intent is to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.25

The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated

power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions,
namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such
power. However, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The
only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'" 26

The Court has only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. The President is required to report his actions to Congress, in person or
in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is
required to convene without need of a call within 24 hours following the President’s proclamation
or suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the Congress.
Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its own
mandate to review the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its
issuance. If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the
proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear
the petitions challenging the President’s action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the
Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension. But what if the 30 days
given it by the Constitution proves inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his
dissent: that 30-day period does not operate to divest the Court of its jurisdiction over the case.
The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been
terminated.27

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in

this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.

The qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" does not only apply to criminal cases.
It also applies to administrative cases. If the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. If executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be

25
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al. (G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000).
26
Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. Reyes, et al. (G.R. No. 1590085, 3 February 2004).
27
Fortun and Angeles vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 190293, 20 March 2012).
 12

unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII,
Section 19 of the Constitution considering that cases of impeachment are automatically
excluded because they do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.28

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not
forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to
him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring
back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his
eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence
and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense
charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the
pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to
him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
Hence, in a case where a government employee was found administratively liable for dishonesty
and consequently dismissed from the service but acquitted in the criminal charge of qualified
theft on the same acts for which he was dismissed, his executive clemency is based on his
innocence. His reinstatement from the service on account of the executive clemency bestowed
on him entitles him to backwages.29

The condition “after conviction by final judgment” means that pardon cannot be extended while
the case is under appeal. A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is
seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right
to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial
court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained
finality, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the accused. The reason for the rule is to
prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power. 30

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on

behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter
of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.

Loans are transactions wherein the owner of a property allows another party to use the property
and where customarily, the latter promises to return the property after a specified period with
payment for its use, called interest. On the other hand, bonds are interest-bearing or
discounted government or corporate securities that obligate the issuer to pay the bondholder a
specified sum of money, usually at specific intervals, and to repay the principal amount of the
loan at maturity. The word "bond" means contract, agreement, or guarantee. All of these terms
are applicable to the securities known as bonds. An investor who purchases a bond is lending
money to the issuer, and the bond represents the issuer’s contractual promise to pay interest
and repay principal according to specific terms. A short-term bond is often called a note. The
language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to
contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds
of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others.
This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly
burden the powers of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the
Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power
provided therein. It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to
misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic act. The only restriction that the
Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans
must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this regard, RA 245 as amended by Pres.
Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to

28
Llamas vs. Orbos and Ocampo III (G.R. No. 99031, 15 October 1991).
29
Garcia vs. Chairman of Commission on Audit, et al. (G.R. No. 75025, 14 September 1993).
30
People vs. Salle Jr., et al. (G.R. No. 103567, 4 December 1995).
 13

Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be
contracted in the form of, inter alia, bonds.31

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece
with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. The participation of the
legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the
executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the
treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and
balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth.32

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and
exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration
and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the
agreement as between the parties. Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state
but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives
are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators
at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a
draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the
subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues
involved, and may even "collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the
points under consideration. If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the
treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties;
but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of
the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that
is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to
his own state. Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms
and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of
ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give
them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It
is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a
department of the government other than that which negotiated them. The last step in the
treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also
signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties.
Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the
instrument is deemed effective upon its signature. 33

The signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-
making process. The signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the
instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the
state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is
the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or
of the government. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It
is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. Ratification is the act by which
the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty
signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such
treaty. Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its

31
Constantino Jr., et al. vs. Cuisia, et al. (G.R. No. 106064, 13 October 2005).
32
Pimentel Jr., et al. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 158088, 6 July 2005).
33
Ibid.
 14

ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been
signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
mandamus. The Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus to
compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to
the Senate.34

While Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements, Section 25, Article
XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that
"foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the
other contracting state. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies
to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII provides:

“Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic
of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”

The "concurrence requirement" under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the
Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty - the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). The charter provides that the Senate shall be composed of twenty-four (24) Senators.
Two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on the
proposal is compliance with the requisite number of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article
VII.35

Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an international
agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation." International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require
legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to
treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and
deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. The right of the Executive to enter
into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation
rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements
and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.36

There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or
an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration
in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an international
agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of
form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a
treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor
under the pacta sunt servanda principle.37

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days
from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

34
Ibid.
35
Bayan, et al. vs. Zamora, et al. (G.R. No. 138570, 10 October 2000).
36
Bayan Muna vs. Romulo and Ople (G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011).
37
Ibid.
 15

RA 6670, passed in 1988, amended PD 1177 with the following salient provisions:

"Sec. 13. Submission of the Budget. — The President shall, in accordance with
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, submit to the Congress within thirty
(30) days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the General
Appropriations Bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including
receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. Additional
appropriations proposals may be submitted which correspond to part of the
expenditure estimates submitted as part of the budget proposal: Provided, That
continuing appropriations may be enacted for public works, highways and other
infrastructure projects which require more than one year for construction. In
such cases, revenue estimates for the future years shall be used in the
evaluation of funding availability.

"The President may transmit to Congress, from time to time, such proposed
supplemental or deficiency appropriations as are, in his judgment, (a) necessary
on account of laws enacted after the transmission of the Budget, or (b) otherwise
needed in the public interest."

"Sec. 24. Appropriations for Personal Services. — Appropriations for personal

services shall be considered as included in the amount specified for each
budgetary program and project of each department, bureau, office or agency,
and shall be itemized. The itemization of personal services shall be prepared by
the Secretary for consideration and approval of the President as provided in
Section 30 hereof: Provided, that the itemization of personal services shall be
prepared for all agencies of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches and
the Constitutional bodies down to the division chief level and in the case of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police down to the
rank of second lieutenant, except as may be otherwise approved by the President
for positions concerned with national security matters: Provided, further, That
appropriations for casual and/ or temporary employees shall be in lump-sum
based on the number of man-hours to be rendered."

"Sec. 27. Infrastructure and Other Bills. — The public works, highways and other
bills requiring appropriations may be filed at any time during the sessions of the
Congress and shall be considered by the Congress upon their being reported out
by the corresponding Committees."

"Sec. 30. Content of the General Appropriations Act. — The General

Appropriations Act shall be presented in the form of budgetary programs and
projects for each agency of the government, with the corresponding
appropriations for each program and project, including statutory provisions of
specific agency or general applicability. The General Appropriations Act shall
contain an itemization of personal services which shall be prepared by the
Secretary before enactment of the General Appropriations Act."

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its
regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.

______________________

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him
to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and
judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
 16

usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. 38

38
Boac, et al. vs. Cadapan and Empeño (G.R. No. 184461-62, 31 May 2011).