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39 - Juan V Juan

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JUAN v JUAN

Aug 23, 2017 | Peralta


Judicial Notice
SSP

Doctrine: Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
Summary: Respondent brought a suit against his brother, the petitioner, to settle who between them has
the better right to use "Lavandera Ko" as a service name. RTC dismissed the complaint and held that neither
of the parties had a right to the exclusive use or appropriation of the mark "Lavandera Ko" because the same
was the original mark and work of a certain Santiago S. Suarez. According to the RTC, the mark in question
was created by Suarez in 1942 in his musical composition called, "Lavandera Ko". The basis of RTC’s decision
was an article appearing in a website. SC held that the article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks
a requisite for it to be of judicial notice to the court because such article is not well and authoritatively settled
and is doubtful or uncertain. SC also found that the lower court confused trade or business name with
copyright. SC remanded the case to RTC.

Facts:
 Respondent (Roberto U. Juan) claimed that he began using the name and mark "Lavandera Ko" in his
laundry business on July 4, 1994. Thereafter, on March 17, 1997, the National Library issued to him a
certificate of copyright over said name and mark.
 Respondent then formed a corporation to handle the said business, hence, Laundromatic Corporation
(Laundromatic) was incorporated in 1997, while "Lavandera Ko" was registered as a business name
on November 13, 1998 with the DTI. Thereafter, respondent discovered that his brother, petitioner
(Fernando) was able to register the name and mark "Lavandera Ko" with the Intellectual Property
Office (IPO) on October 18, 2001, the registration of which was filed on June 5, 1995.
 Respondent also alleged that a certain Juliano had been writing the franchisees of the former
threatening them with criminal and civil cases if they did not stop using the mark and name "Lavandera
Ko." It was found out by respondent that petitioner Fernando had been selling his own franchises.
 Respondent filed a petition for injunction, unfair competition, infringement of copyright, cancellation
of trademark and name.
 RTC dismissed the petition and ruled that neither of the parties had a right to the exclusive use or
appropriation of the mark "Lavandera Ko" because the same was the original mark and work of a
certain Santiago S. Suarez (Santiago). According to the RTC, the mark in question was created by Suarez
in 1942 in his musical composition called, "Lavandera Ko" and both parties of the present case failed
to prove that they were the originators of the same mark.
 Petitioner contended that a mark is different from a copyright and not interchangeable. Petitioner
insisted that he is the owner of the service mark in question as he was able to register the same with
the IPO pursuant to Section 122 of R.A. No. 8293.
 Furthermore, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in giving credence to the article of information it
obtained from the internet stating that the Filipino folk song "Lavandera Ko" was a composition of
Suarez in 1942 rather than the actual pieces of evidence presented by the parties. As such, the
information acquired by the RTC is hearsay because no one was presented to testify on the veracity of
such article.

Issues:
WoN the RTC erred in using an article appearing in a website as the basis of its decision - YES
 The RTC's basis or source, an article appearing in a website, in ruling that the song entitled "Lavandera
Ko" is protected by a copyright, cannot be considered a subject of judicial notice that does not need
further authentication or verification.
 The article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks a requisite for it to be of judicial notice to the
court because such article is not well and authoritatively settled and is doubtful or uncertain. It must
be remembered that some articles appearing in the internet or on websites are easily edited and their
sources are unverifiable, thus, sole reliance on those articles is greatly discouraged.
 Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact
without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and
expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of
dispute and are not bona fide disputed.
 Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the ROC declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or
discretionary on the courts.
 The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
 Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be
one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful
or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety.
 To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form
of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because
the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the
court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are "commonly" known.
 Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety
and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts
have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
court has no constructive knowledge.
 Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

WoN the lower court confused trade or business name with copyright – YES
 RTC erred in denying the parties the proper determination as to who has the ultimate right to use the
said trade name by ruling that neither of them has the right or a cause of action since "Lavandera Ko"
is protected by a copyright.
 "Lavandera Ko," the mark in question in this case is being used as a trade name or specifically, a service
name since the business in which it pertains involves the rendering of laundry services. Under Section
121.1 of R.A. No. 8293, "mark" is defined as any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods
(trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked
container of goods.
 As such, the basic contention of the parties is, who has the better right to use "Lavandera Ko" as a
service name because Section 165.i3 of the said law, guarantees the protection of trade names and
business names even prior to or without registration, against any unlawful act committed by third
parties.
 A cause of action arises when the subsequent use of any third party of such trade name or business
name would likely mislead the public as such act is considered unlawful.
 "Lavandera Ko," being a musical composition with words is protected under the copyright law (Part
IV, R.A. No. 8293) and not under the trademarks, service marks and trade names law (Part III, R.A. No.
8293).

Disposition: Petition for Review on Certiorari GRANTED. This Court, however, ORDERS the REMAND of this
case to the RTC for its prompt disposition.

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