ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, petitioner, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. ESTATE
OF RAMON U. COJUANGCO AND IMELDA O.
COJUANGCO, respondents. batas

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review to set aside the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated October 9, 1996 dismissing petitioners Amended-complaint-in-
[1]

intervention and the subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1997 denying

[2]

petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The issue in this petition is whether or not, under the undisputed

circumstances at bar, the Sandiganbayan may dismiss the complaint-in-
intervention for alleged failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees on
time.

On July 16, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter, the Republic)
filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for Rescission, Reconveyance,
Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
Marcos and Prime Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter, PHI), docketed as Civil Case
No. 0002. Alleging ownership of the properties of the Marcoses sought to be
forfeited by the Republic, petitioner Yuchengco filed a motion for intervention
and complaint-in-intervention on August 11, 1988, impleading the Republic,
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda Marcos and PHI as defendants-in-intervention. Petitioner
[3]

paid a docket fee of P400.00.

On February 17, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the

motion for intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention. The
[4]

Republic filed a motion for reconsideration on March 14, 1989, which

petitioner opposed.

On February 9, 1990, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republics motion for

reconsideration. Hence, the Republic and the PCGG, on behalf of PHI, filed
[5]

an answer to the complaint-in-intervention dated June 19, 1990 and

November 2, 1990, respectively.
Meanwhile, PHI filed a Manifestation and Motion, stating that Imelda
Cojuangco and the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco claim ownership of PHI.
Thus, on May 31, 1993, petitioner moved for leave to admit amended
complaint-in-intervention to implead the said claimants. hustisya [6]

On June 11, 1993, the Sandiganbayan, in open court, admitted the amended
complaint-in-intervention. Consequently, amended answers-in-intervention
[7]

were filed by the Republic and the PHI on July 2, 1993.

On the other hand, the Estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco
(hereinafter, the Cojuangcos) filed a motion to dismiss the amended
[8]

complaint-in-intervention, dated August 25, 1993, on the ground of failure to

state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the
case, inasmuch as petitioner did not pay the correct docket fees. They argued
that the amended-complaint-in-intervention failed to state the amount of the
claim or the value of the property subject of the complaint, in violation of the
doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of
Appeals. [9]

On September 6, 1993, petitioner filed a second amended complaint-in-

intervention with motion for leave. Later, on September 28, 1993, he also
opposed the motion to dismiss filed by PHI and the Cojuangcos on September
28, 1993. [10]

PHI and the Cojuangcos filed a reply alleging that since the amended
[11]

complaint-in-intervention is substantially an action for the recovery of

ownership and possession of shareholdings in the Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC), Section 7 (a) of Rule
141 of the Rules of Court applies, to wit:

Sec. 7..... Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. ---

(a)....For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or money

claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with
leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a
complaint in intervention xxx if xxx the stated value of the property
in litigation is:

1.....Not more than P20,000.00 -------------------------------

---------- P120.00
 2.....More than P20,000.00 but less than P40,000.00 ---
------------- 150.00

3.....P40,000.00 or more but less than P60,000.00 ------

------------- 200.00

4.....P60,000.00 or more but less than P80,000.00 ------

------------- 250.00

5.....P80,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00 ----

--------------- 400.00 Esmmis

6.....P100,000.00 or more but less than P150,000.00 --

--------------- 600.00

7.....For each P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00 -----

---------------- 5.00

Further, respondents PHI and the Cojuangcos contend that as the action
seeks to litigate the ownership and disposition of properties consisting of
subject shares, the amount of docket fees must be based on the total value of
the same.

Petitioner filed a rejoinder dated November 29, 1993, maintaining that no

[12]

docket fees are payable to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section 11 of

Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, which provides:

Proceedings free of charge. --- All proceedings in the

Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant
and/or his witnesses.

In their sur-rejoinder filed on January 28, 1994, respondents PHI and the
[13]

Cojuangcos countered that the reason for the above-quoted Section 11 of

P.D. 1606 is that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan at the time of its
enactment was limited to criminal actions. With the expansion of the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include civil cases, the payment of docket fees
has become a jurisdictional requirement.

On February 8, 1994 , petitioner replied that the Sandiganbayan has no

[14]

power or discretion to ignore or amend the provision in Section 11 of P.D.

1606 simply on the basis of public policy. Petitioner points out that Executive
Order No. 14 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino did not amend the said
provision, hence, payment of docket fees in the Sandiganbayan is legally
without basis.

On September 21, 1994, petitioner re-filed his second amended complaint-in-

intervention with motion to admit, wherein he sought to include Y Realty
[15]

Corporation as co-plaintiff-in-intervention and to join Imelda R. Marcos as the

representative of the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos.

On October 11, 1994, PHI and the Cojuangcos opposed the motion to admit
second amended complaint-in-intervention, contending that jurisdictional
[16]

issues should first be resolved before the most recent motion is

considered. Percuriam

A motion for early resolution was filed by petitioner on October 27, 1994. He
[17]

averred that since the main issues in the motion to dismiss filed by PHI and
the Cojuangcos dwell on payment of docket fees and the amount thereof,
which may possibly involve the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and it is
unclear whether the filing of the complaint-in-intervention tolled the running of
the 10-year prescriptive period, there is a need for the Sandiganbayan to
resolve the motion to dismiss as soon as possible.

On March 31, 1995, petitioner moved that he be allowed to post a bond, to [18]

answer for whatever docket fees he may be held to pay, with the prayer that
the running of the prescriptive period be deemed tolled pending the resolution
by the Sandiganbayan of the motion to dismiss.

In a Resolution dated April 17, 1995, the Sandiganbayan deferred the

[19]

resolution of the motion to dismiss until trial, as the grounds raised therein do
not appear to be indubitable.

Meanwhile, PHI and the Cojuangcos opposed petitioners motion to post bond
on the ground that the same should not be construed as a substitute for the
actual payment of the proper docket fees, because payment of docket fees
should not be subject to any contingency. [20]

On the other hand, petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration of the
Resolution dated April 17, 1995 insofar as the deferment of the issue on
payment of docket fees and the amount thereof. In the alternative, petitioner
prayed that his motion to post bond be granted. PHI and the Cojuangcos
[21]

also moved for the reconsideration of the April 17, 1995 Resolution. [22]
Meanwhile, petitioner prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss in view of
the passage of Republic Act No. 7975 which, like Executive Order 14, did
[23]

not amend Section 11 of P.D. 1606. [24]

In the meantime, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 123264, assailing public respondents decision to defer
[25]

adjudication on the issues raised in PHIs and the Cojuangcos motion to

dismiss. The petition for certiorari was dismissed by this Court for being
premature. [26]

On March 29, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying

petitioners motion to post bond and ordering petitioner (plaintiff-in-intervention
therein) to pay the balance of the docket fee in the amount of
P14,425.00. Petitioner paid with reservation. Esmsc
[27] [28]

PHI and the Cojuangcos filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the [29]

Sandiganbayan erred in the computation of the docket fees and in allowing

petitioner to pay additional docket fees beyond the prescriptive period. They
again invoked Rule 141, Section 7 (a) of the Rules of Court and averred that
the PTIC, registered in the name of PHI, has a stated value of P1.6 billion.
Accordingly, as petitioner claims to own 31% of PTIC, which has a more
recent value of P1,078,260,896.56, he should be made to pay at least the
sum of P5,391,154.35.

On May 7, 1996, the Sandiganbayan denied PHI's and the Cojuancos'

[30]

motion for reconsideration of its April 17, 1995 Resolution.

Thereafter, respondents PHI and the Cojuangcos filed their answer to the
amended complaint-in-intervention. [31]

On June 11, 1996, petitioner moved that the amount of P14,425.00 be

refunded to him, insisting that proceedings in the Sandiganbayan should be
[32]

free of charge.

The Sandiganbayan, on October 9, 1996, issued the assailed resolution

granting the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners motion to admit second
amended complaint-in-intervention. [33]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated October 30, 1996, and PHI
[34]

and the Cojuangcos filed their opposition. The Republic filed a

[35]

manifestation dated December 24, 1996 adopting the arguments raised by

[36]

PHI and the Cojuangcos.

On October 6, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence this petition.
[37]

As earlier stated, the main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether
or not petitioner is barred from asserting his alleged causes of action against
respondents by reason of non-payment of the proper docket fees.

The Sandiganbayan cited several cases spanning from 1932 to 1987 to the
effect that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests the trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Kylex
[38]

The ruling that the timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional is all too
familiar. It should be noted, however, that the pronouncements of this Court
on the matter have always been influenced by the peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances surrounding each case. For instance, the Lazaro v.
Eudencia ruling was in accordance with the then applicable law, i.e., Section
[39]

76 of Act No. 190 as amended by Act No. 3615. In Malimit v. Degamo , this [40]

Court ruled that the date of payment of docket fees and not the date of mailing
is considered the date of filing of a petition for quo warranto. In Garcia v.
Vasquez , this Court initially stated that a docket fee must be paid for a
[41]

second will executed by the same decedent. Subsequently, on a motion for

reconsideration, this Court reversed itself and held that the initial payment for
the first will presented for probate was sufficient compliance. This Court was
even more liberal in Magaspi v. Ramolete, where the docket fee was paid
[42]

upon the filing of the complaint. It turned out later, after the complaint was
amended, that the payment was insufficient. This Court ruled that under the
circumstances, the case was docketed upon the first payment and the trial
court already acquired jurisdiction. However, the correct fee based on the
amended complaint was required to be paid.

In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan adhered strictly to the rule enunciated
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, to wit: [43]

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. Any amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in
the Magaspi case, insofar as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
In Manchester, this Court stated that the allegation in the body of the
complaint of damages suffered in the amount of P78,000,000.00, and the
omission of a specific prayer for that amount, was intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of correct filing fees if not to mislead the
docket clerk in the assessment of the correct fee. The ruling was intended to
put a stop to such an irregularity. In the case at bar, however, we note that
there is no such irregularity or attempt to mislead in the instant petition before
us.

We also note that the Manchester ruling did not become the final statement on
the matter. In Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Asuncion, the Court ruled:
[44]

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is

called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.

In the said case, the payment of the correct fee within "a reasonable time" but
in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period was
allowed. In another case decided after Manchester, this Court made some
[45]

more distinctions: Mesm

Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar

pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there
is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this
event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In
other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed or the
claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be
expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion,
permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees
provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred.
The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every
claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule
now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment
of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such
payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take
cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has
set in and consequently barred the right of action.

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of
 both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of
related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the
payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the
time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of
the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant,
unless, of course, prescription has set in in the meantime. But
where x x x the fees prescribed for an action involving real
property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court
undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real
property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested
of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because
of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is imply to
expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, which is what the respondent Court did, or allow, on
motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaint so
as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and
accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period. Exsm

The rule is not as simple and uncomplicated as Manchester makes it appear.

There are other determining circumstances, equally important. The timely
filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional, but as shown by our decisions,
considerations of law and equity come into the picture. This situation likewise
obtains in the case at bar.

The Sandiganbayan Law itself, Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides:

Sec. 11. Proceedings free of charge. - All proceedings in the

Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant
and/or his witnesses.

Petitioner points out that when former President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 14 in 1986 which expanded the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to include civil cases, she did not repeal or amend Section 11 of
P.D. 1606 on filing fees.
Similarly, when Congress in 1994 enacted Republic Act No. 7975 further
strengthening the functional and structural organization of the Sandiganbayan,
it did not amend the provision on non-payment of fees even as it amended or
repealed several sections of the original law. When Congress in 1997 passed
Republic Act No. 8429 further amending P.D. 1606, it did not touch the
section on non-payment of court fees. If Congress in repealing various parts
of P.D. 1606 did not touch Section 11, what is the basis of the
Sandiganbayans ruling on repeal or amendment?

In the resolution submitted to us for review, the Sandiganbayan emphasized

that when P.D. No. 1606 was issued, the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court was
limited to criminal actions. The Sandiganbayan now tries civil cases. While we
are inclined to sustain the ruling that correct filing fees in civil cases must be
paid in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan, this does not preclude a ruling
that, in this case, the petitioner acted in justifiable good faith. There was
ample reason for uncertainty and doubt on the intervenors part not merely as
to the correctness of the amount to be paid but whether or not docket fees
should be paid at all. Esm

Equitable considerations are equally significant. Unlike the basis of

the Manchester ruling, there is no evidence in the present case that the
petitioner tried to evade the payment of correct fees or in any way tried to
mislead that court and its employees. On the contrary, petitioner paid dues
and asked the Sandiganbayan what are the correct docket fees, if the dues
paid are not accurate. When Sandiganbayan came out with its own
computation, petitioner paid the corrected amount.

Correctly, petitioner asserted that the Sandiganbayans resolution, assuming it

was correct, was not something that could have been reasonably anticipated
by the ordinary litigant.

Indeed, the actions of the Sandiganbayan clearly call for the application of
equitable considerations. On February 17, 1989, it admitted the complaint-in-
intervention. Answers thereto were filed by PHI and the Cojuangcos. On June
11, 1993, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended complaint-in-
intervention. More important, the lower court denied the motions to dismiss
filed by respondents questioning the incorrect payment of docket fees in its
resolutions dated April 17, 1995, March 29, 1996 and May 7, 1996. Petitioner
was thus led into believing, long before the ten year prescriptive period
expired, that its complaint-in-intervention would stay admitted.
However, the Sandiganbayan on October 9, 1996 and October 6, 1997 issued
the Resolutions now before us in this petition for review. Petitioners complaint
was dismissed for non-payment of the prescribed docket fees, without obvious
regard to the implications of the reversal of its earlier rulings.

Moreover, on October 27, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the resolution of
the issue on correct docket fees. When no decision was forthcoming,
petitioner on March 31, 1995 filed a motion to post bond to answer for
whatever additional fees that may be assessed later. On April 17, 1995, the
Sandiganbayan decided to defer the resolution of respondents motions
to dismiss until trial. Petitioner even elevated the inaction of the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari but this was
dismissed for being premature. It can thus be seen that, far from committing
the irregularity illustrated in Manchester, petitioner did the opposite in this
case. Msesm

More specifically, petitioners alleged causes of action before the

Sandiganbayan constitute the following:

1.....Claims on the 6% stockholdings in PTIC which he alleged to

have bought from Gregorio Romulo and Leonides Virata but were
purportedly transferred to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group by
coercion, duress and force majeure (Martial Law);

2.....Claims on the 25% shares of General Telephone & Electronics

Corporation (GTE) in Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC) which petitioner was prevented from acquiring
by virtue of a "put and call" agreement with GTE;

3.....(Alternative Third Cause of Action) Claims on the 4.6% shares

in PTIC.

Considering that petitioner seeks to recover properties, the ownership and

possession of which he was allegedly deprived through fraud, duress and/or
coercion, we hold that, assuming hypothetically these averments to be true,
the legal relationship of constructive trust was present among the parties
concerned in the said transactions. Constructive trust is that created by
reason of equity to answer the demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment. It arises against one, who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, hold. [46]
Correspondingly, actions thereon prescribe after ten (10) years as provided by
Article 1144 of the Civil Code:

The following actions must be brought within ten (10) years from
the time the right of action accrues:

1.....Upon a written contract;

2.....Upon an obligation created by law;

3.....Upon a judgment.

(Emphasis provided).

Under normal circumstances, petitioners cause of action should have

prescribed on February 26, 1996, a month before petitioner was ordered by
the Sandiganbayan to pay docket fees or two months before the docket fees
were actually paid in the corrected amount of P14,825.00. However, we hold
that said payment could not be construed as belatedly made such as to
foreclose the prosecution of his claims. Esmso

It should be noted that when the issue on docket fees was raised, petitioner
submitted the determination of the same to the sound discretion of the
Sandiganbayan. As earlier stated, he sought for the immediate resolution of
this issue as early as October 27, 1994. In the alternative, petitioner proposed
to post a bond to answer for the docket fees, if such are payable. He even
filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 123264, to seek an early
resolution of this issue.

Clearly, petitioner did not sleep on his rights, and prescription has not set in to
bar his right to seek judicial relief. The essence of the statute of limitations is
to prevent fraudulent claims arising from unwarranted length of time and not to
defeat actions asserted on the honest belief that they were sufficiently
submitted for judicial determination.

To punish petitioner for public respondents failure to timely decide an issue

pivotal to the success of his case would be setting a bad precedent. It would
give trial courts unbridled power and an unfair weapon to frustrate the filing of
actions. We hold that public respondents belated action after prolonged
inaction on the issue of petitioners payment of docket fees is a supervening
event beyond the independent will and control of petitioner that tolled the
running of the prescriptive period. Article 1154 of the Civil Code is applicable
by parallelism, to wit:

The period during which the obligee was prevented by fortuitous

event from enforcing his right is not reckoned against him.

As earlier stated, equity and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the

present case necessitate this ruling. For among the parties in the case at bar,
the Sandiganbayan is the most equipped to afford petitioner the opportunity to
present his claims. Not only that, but going back to the pronouncements of
this Court in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, where we
[47]

recognized that the sufficiency of the docket fees is a matter for the
determination of the clerk of court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or
clerk in-charge, the Sandiganbayan could have immediately drawn petitioners
attention if its clerk of court found difficulty in determining the amount of
chargeable docket fees from a reading of the complaint. Even in the
celebrated case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the trial court directed the plaintiff therein to rectify the flaws in its
[48]

amended complaint. That way, not only could the Sandiganbayan have
seasonably resolved the issues on docket fees but it could very well have
timely settled petitioners dilemma on what to do and what was required to
preserve his rights. Chiefx

Courts are mandated to promptly administer justice. Having the inherent

power to amend and control the processes and orders, to make them
conformable to law and justice we have the avowed duty to uphold the right
[49]

of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases and avert the precipitate
loss of rights.

While it may be argued that petitioner could have very well amended his
complaint and alleged the monetary values of the properties he seeks to
recover to comply with Rule 141, Section 7(a) of the Rules of Court, we
find, pro hac vice, that petitioner acted in good faith when he contended that
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are free of charge. The present rule
must, however, be stressed: parties filing civil actions before the
Sandiganbayan are liable to pay the required docket fees. The situation only
differs in the case at bar because of petitioners honest conviction manifested
in his filing of a reservation for the payments he made, after having been
ordered by the Sandiganbayan on March 29, 1996 to pay the balance of
P14,425.00 and after the court denied his motion to post bond pending final
resolution of the motion to dismiss.
Be that as it may, petitioners position that subsequent amendments to PD
[50]

1606 did not expressly repeal Section 11 thereof is untenable. Petitioner failed
to appreciate that the expansion of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include
civil cases impliedly amended the same and Section 1, Rule IV, Part I of the
Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the Supreme Court enjoys
exclusive power to promulgate the rules on pleading, practice, and procedure.

In addition, Republic Act No. 7975 amended Section 9 of P.D. 1606 to read
[51]

as follows:

Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the

Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with
the Sandiganbayan. x x x

Hence, Rule 141 Section 7(a) of the Rules of Court applies to petitioners
complaint and/or amended complaints-in-intervention.

Petitioner argues that R.A. 7975, having been promulgated on March 30,
1995 should not be retroactively applied. This is not so, as statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, thus, retrospective in such sense
and to that extent. haideem
[52]

As a final note, petitioners manifestation that he is withdrawing some of the

causes of action alleged in his complaints-in-intervention and the subsequent
amendments thereto should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan for proper
determination and action. This should be taken into consideration by the
Sandiganbayan in determining anew the docket fees payable by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partially GRANTED. The

questioned Resolutions are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered to submit to
public respondent Sandiganbayan the value of the properties he seeks to
recover and to pay the proper docket fees therefor within thirty (30) days upon
determination thereof either by the Sandiganbayan or its clerk of court, which
in turn is directed to act with dispatch on the matter.

SO ORDERED.