No.

19-10011

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE

OF ARIZONA; STATE OF FLORIDA; STATE OF GEORGIA; STATE OF
INDIANA; STATE OF KANSAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA; PAUL LePAGE,
Governor of Maine; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, by and through Governor Phil
Bryant; STATE OF MISSOURI; STATE OF NEBRASKA; STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA;
STATE OF TENNESSEE; STATE OF UTAH; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
STATE OF ARKANSAS; NEILL HURLEY; JOHN NANTZ,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES; ALEX AZAR, II, SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE; CHARLES P. RETTIG, in his
Official Capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Defendants-Appellants,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA; STATE OF DELAWARE; STATE OF HAWAII; STATE OF
ILLINOIS; STATE OF KENTUCKY; STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE
OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA;
STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT;
STATE OF VIRGINIA; STATE OF WASHINGTON; STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Intervenor Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Texas
(No. 4:18-cv-00167-O)

MOTION OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES TO INTERVENE
DOUGLAS N. LETTER Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.
General Counsel Elaine J. Goldenberg
TODD B. TATELMAN Ginger D. Anders
Deputy General Counsel Jonathan S. Meltzer
KRISTIN A. SHAPIRO Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler
Assistant General Counsel MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
BROOKS M. HANNER 1155 F. Street N.W., 7th Floor
Assistant General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20004-1361
Tel: (202) 220-1100
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL Fax: (202) 220-2300
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Donald.Verrilli@mto.com
219 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515 Elizabeth B. Wydra
(202) 225-9700 (telephone) Brianne J. Gorod
Douglas.Letter@mail.house.gov Brian R. Frazelle
Ashwin P. Phatak
CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER
1200 18th Street N.W., Suite 501
Washington, D.C. 20036-2513
Tel: (202) 296-6889
elizabeth@theusconstitution.org
brianne@theusconstitution.org

Counsel for the U.S. House of

Representatives
 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Because Movant is a government entity, a certificate of interested persons is

not required. 5th Cir. R. 28.2.1.

Dated: January 7, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

s/ Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS .........................................................i

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................5
I. UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24(a), THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE ENTITLED TO
INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT. ........................................................................ 6
A. Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(1). ........................................ 9
B. Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). ......................................11
C. Timeliness of intervention motion. .....................................................15
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 24(b), THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WOULD BE ENTITLED TO PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. ............... 19
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................22
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................23
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
FEDERAL CASES
Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady,
944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991) ............................................................................ 8
Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs,
607 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J. 1985), aff’d as modified on reh’g, 809
F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) ........................................................................................8
Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986) .................................................................................7
Aranas v. Napolitano,
No. 12-1137, 2013 WL 12251153 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2013).............................. 8
Aransas Project v. Shaw,
404 F. App’x 937 (5th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................15
Automobile Workers, Local 283 v. Scofield,
382 U.S. 205 (1965) ..............................................................................................5
In re Balas,
449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) ................................................................. 8
Barnes v. Carmen,
582 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1984), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Kline,
759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984), rev’d on mootness grounds sub nom.
Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) .................................................................. 8

In re Benny,
44 B.R. 581 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d in part & dismissed in
part, 791 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1986)........................................................................ 9
Bishop v. Smith,
760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................8

Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U.S. 142 (1927) ............................................................................................18

i
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)

Page
Cardona v. Shinseki,
26 Vet. App. 472 (2014) .......................................................................................8

Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS,

392 U.S. 206 (1968) ..............................................................................................7

Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers,

542 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................17

Cooper-Harris v. United States,

No. 12-cv-00887, 2013 WL 12125527 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013) ......................... 8
Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Tobits,
No. 11-0045, 2013 WL 3878688 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2013) .................................. 8
Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
872 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Cal. 2012), vacated in part (Oct. 28,
2013) .....................................................................................................................8
Edwards v. City of Houston,
78 F.3d 983 (5th Cir. 1996) ..........................................................................12, 15
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) .................................................................. 8
INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) .....................................................................................passim

John Doe No. 1 v. Glickman,

256 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2001) ........................................................................16, 17

King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) ..........................................................................................1

King v. Marion Circuit Court,

868 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2017) ..............................................................................10

ii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)

Page
In Re Koerner,
800 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1986) ......................................................................4, 7, 8

In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig.,

570 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................ 7

Lui v. Holder,
No. 11-CV-01267, 2011 WL 10653943 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011) .................... 8

Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States,

118 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ..............................................................................5
Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) ...............................................................................8, 11
McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co.,
430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970) ............................................................................16

McKenna v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,

303 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1962) ............................................................................3, 5

McLaughlin v. Hagel,
767 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2014) ................................................................................. 8

In re Moody,
46 B.R. 231 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1985)................................................................... 9

Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc.,

221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000) ..............................................................................10

Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,

881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012)................................................................... 8
In re Production Steel, Inc.,
48 B.R. 841 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) ................................................................ 9

Revelis v. Napolitano,
844 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2012) .................................................................... 8

iii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)

Page
Ross v. Marshall,
426 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2005) ..............................................................7, 13, 16, 18

Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57 (1981) ..............................................................................................13

Sierra Club v. Espy,

18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994) ............................................................15, 16, 17, 18

Stallworth v. Monsanto Co.,

558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977) ........................................................................18, 19
Synar v. United States,
626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) ..................................................................................8
Texas v. United States,
805 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015) ..................................................................11, 14, 20
Texas v. United States,
No. 4:18-cv-00167-O (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2018) ..................................1, 2, 3, 14
In re Tom Carter Enterprises, Inc.,
44 B.R. 605 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) ................................................................... 9
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am.,
404 U.S. 528 (1972) ......................................................................................12, 15

United States v. AT&T Co.,

551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ............................................................................17

United States v. Bursey,

515 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1975) ....................................................................4, 5, 15

United States v. Harris,

106 U.S. 629 (1883) ............................................................................................13

iv
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)

Page
United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946) ..............................................................................................7

United States v. Windsor,

570 U.S. 744 (2013) ..................................................................................8, 10, 11

United States v. Windsor,

No. 1:10-cv-08435-BSJ-JCF (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2011) ........................................ 8

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n,

834 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................12, 15, 18

FEDERAL STATUTES
26 U.S.C. § 5000A ...................................................................................................14
28 U.S.C. § 530D ..............................................................................................passim
28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii)..................................................................................10

28 U.S.C. § 530D(b)(2)........................................................................................4, 12
28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) ...................................................................................4, 9, 10, 13

42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D)............................................................................................1

RULES
Fed. R. App. P. 27 ......................................................................................................1
Fed. R. App. P. 44 ....................................................................................................10

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 .............................................................................................4, 5, 15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).........................................................................................6, 9, 15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) ....................................................................................6, 9, 11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) ..................................................................................7, 11, 12

v
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)

Page
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) ............................................................................................6, 19

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A) ................................................................................19, 20

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B) ................................................................................19, 20
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ..................................................................................................2

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
H. Res. 6 (January 3, 2019)........................................................................................2

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, 15A Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3902.1 (2d ed.) ...............................................................................18

Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General, to Paul Ryan,

Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (June 7, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1069806/download.................................................. 3

vi
 Pursuant to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the U.S.

House of Representatives (“House”) respectfully moves to exercise its right to

intervene in order to prosecute the appeal of the district court’s ruling invalidating

the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. 111-148, as

amended. See Mem. Op. and Order, Texas v. United States, No. 4:18-cv-00167-O

(N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2018) (Dkt. No. 211).1

The Plaintiffs and the Federal Defendants oppose this motion; the Intervenor

States take no position with respect to this motion.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Congress enacted the ACA, a landmark law intended to achieve

“near-universal coverage” affordable for all Americans. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D);

King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015). In this litigation, the Plaintiffs asked

the district court to invalidate the ACA because, in their view, recent statutory

amendments rendered the individual mandate unconstitutional and the rest of the law

is inseverable from that provision. The district court agreed, declaring the ACA’s

individual mandate unconstitutional and inseverable from the rest of the statute.

1
Attorneys for the Office of General Counsel for the U.S. House of
Representatives, including “any counsel specially retained by the Office of General
Counsel,” are “entitled, for the purpose of performing the counsel’s functions, to
enter an appearance in any proceeding before any court of the United States or of
any State or political subdivision thereof without compliance with any requirements
for admission to practice before such court.” 2 U.S.C. § 5571(a).
1
Mem. Op. and Order, Texas v. United States, No. 4:18-cv-00167-O (N.D. Tex. Dec.

14, 2018) (Dkt. No. 211).

On December 30, 2018, the district court entered partial final judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) on Count I. Order Granting Stay

and Partial Final Judgment, Texas v. United States, No. 4:18-cv-00167-O (N.D. Tex.

Dec. 30, 2018) (Dkt. No. 220). On January 3, 2019, the Intervenor States filed a

notice of appeal, docketed in this Court as the instant appeal, No. 19-10011. Notice

of Appeal, Texas v. United States, No. 4:18-cv-00167-O (N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2019)

(Dkt. No. 224). On January 4, 2019, the Department of Justice filed a notice of

appeal, which was docketed with the Intervenor States’ appeal. Pursuant to House

Resolution, H. Res. 6 (January 3, 2019), the House now moves to exercise its right

to intervene in these proceedings to defend the ACA. 2

2
The House has also moved to intervene in the district court as to the
remaining counts in this case pending before that court. The district court held that
those counts present “distinct” challenges to the ACA’s validity from the challenge
raised in Count I, and therefore the district court retains jurisdiction to conduct
further proceedings concerning those counts. Order Granting Stay and Partial Final
Judgment at 5-6, Texas v. United States, No. 4:18-cv-00167-O (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30,
2018) (Dkt. No. 220). The district court has issued a temporary administrative stay
of its proceedings, but has stated that “[s]hould further proceedings . . . become
necessary or desirable, any party may initiate it by filing an appropriate pleading.”
Stay Order and Administrative Closure at 1, Texas v. United States, supra (Dkt. No.
223).
2
 While the Department of Justice normally defends the validity of Acts of

Congress when they are challenged in court, here it has joined the plaintiffs in

attacking the validity of the individual mandate. It also has argued that the law’s

“guaranteed-issue” and “community-rating” provisions are inseverable from its

individual mandate and thus should be invalidated. Fed. Defs.’ Mem. In Response

To Pls.’ Appl. For Prelim. Inj. at 2, Texas v. United States, No. 4:18-cv-00167-O

(N.D. Tex. June 7, 2018) (Dkt. No. 92); see Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III,

Attorney General, to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (June 7,

2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1069806/download.

By any measure, the exceptional circumstances presented here require

recognition of the right of the House to intervene in this Court in order to defend the

constitutionality of the federal statute at issue. See McKenna v. Pan Am. Petroleum

Corp., 303 F.2d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court has long recognized

that “Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a [federal] statute when

an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees

with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.” INS v. Chadha,

462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983).

Indeed, federal law provides that the Attorney General has a right to intervene

in litigation to defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, and it empowers

the House and/or the Senate to intervene to defend a statute on the rare occasions in

3
which the Attorney General fails to do so. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2403(a), 530D(b)(2);

In Re Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358, 1360 (5th Cir. 1986) (House Bipartisan Leadership

Group intervened to defend statute’s constitutionality). These statutes recognize that

the House, as a coordinate Branch of the Federal Government, has a unique

institutional interest and prerogative—one not shared by any non-federal party—in

defending an Act of Congress against judicial invalidation. Chadha, 462 U.S. at

940; 28 U.S.C. § 530D. In light of that unique federal interest, the House’s

participation will materially aid this Court’s consideration of the issues of overriding

national importance presented by this appeal.

The considerations that this Court examines in granting intervention on

appeal—which parallel the factors set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24,

governing intervention in the district court—compel granting intervention here.

United States v. Bursey, 515 F.2d 1228, 1239 n.24 (5th Cir. 1975). The House has

a unique institutional interest in this proceeding that cannot be adequately

represented by existing parties, it has sought to intervene as soon as it was able to do

so, and no prejudice or delay will result.

Accordingly, the House moves to exercise its right to intervene in this case,

so that it can defend the constitutionality of the ACA before this Court and contend

that any unconstitutional provision is severable from the remainder of the statute.

4
 ARGUMENT

This Court should grant the House’s exercise of its right to intervene in this

litigation. Because the Executive Branch has taken the position that the ACA is

invalid in significant part, the House seeks to exercise its right, recognized by federal

statute and the Supreme Court in Chadha, to intervene to defend the ACA’s validity.

Although no federal rule governs intervention on appeal, the Supreme Court,

this Court, and other courts of appeals have confirmed that the principles governing

intervention in the district courts should guide the analysis of intervention on appeal.

See, e.g., Automobile Workers, Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 217 n.10 (1965)

(“[T]he policies underlying intervention [in the district courts] may be applicable in

appellate courts.”); Bursey, 515 F.2d at 1238 n.24 (quoting same); Massachusetts

Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, while this Court has indicated that intervention on appeal

requires “exceptional” circumstances, McKenna, 303 F.2d at 779, it has concluded

that those circumstances are present when the Rule 24 factors are satisfied: namely,

when the intervenor has a significant stake in the proceeding that cannot be

adequately represented by the existing parties; intervention is timely under the

circumstances or the intervenor’s failure to intervene earlier is justified; and no party

will be prejudiced as a result. Bursey, 515 F.2d at 1238 n.24. As explained below,

the House is entitled to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

5
24(a), and at a minimum is entitled to permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), for

the following reasons: federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 530D, recognizes the right of the

House to intervene where the Attorney General declines to defend the Act of

Congress at issue; the House has timely moved to intervene, four days after it came

into existence as the House of the 116th Congress and the first day this appeal was

docketed—that is, the day the 116th House could first participate in this appeal; the

House’s unique interests in defending the validity of an Act of Congress cannot be

adequately protected by the existing parties, because the only federal party in the

case is not defending the validity of the Act and the House’s interests likely will

diverge in important respects from those of the Intervenor States; and intervention

will cause no prejudice or delay. Moreover, the gravity of the House’s institutional

interest, as a coequal Branch of the Federal Government, in defending an Act of

Congress, leaves no doubt that this case presents exceptional circumstances

justifying intervention. Accordingly, intervention by the U.S. House of

Representatives must be recognized here.

I. UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24(a), THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE ENTITLED TO
INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), “[o]n timely motion, the court

must permit anyone to intervene who . . . is given an unconditional right to intervene

by a federal statute,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1), or who “claims an interest relating to

6
the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that

disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s

ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that

interest,” id. 24(a)(2). The rule “is to be construed liberally,” with “doubts resolved

in favor of the proposed intervenor.” In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d 244,

248 (5th Cir. 2009). “[I]ntervention of right must be measured by a practical rather

than technical yardstick” and “should generally be allowed where no one would be

hurt and greater justice could be attained.” Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 753 (5th

Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Intervention is particularly appropriate here given that “Congress is the proper

party to defend the validity of a [federal] statute when an agency of government, as

a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute

is inapplicable or unconstitutional.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940 (citing Cheng Fan

Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 210 n.9 (1968), and United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.

303 (1946)); see Koerner, 800 F.2d at 1360, 1364, 1367; Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 888 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Congress has standing to

intervene whenever the executive declines to defend a statute or, as in this case,

actually argues that it is unconstitutional”).

Most recently, when the Department of Justice declined to defend the

constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the House of the 112th

7
Congress intervened in more than a dozen cases to defend the law—and some of

those cases were on appeal when the House intervened. See, e.g., Massachusetts v.

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2012). Although the

Department of Justice contended that the House should be permitted to intervene

only to “present[] arguments in support of the constitutionality of Section 3,” see,

e.g., Def.’s Response to Mot. to Intervene at 2, United States v. Windsor, No. 1:10-

cv-08435-BSJ-JCF (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2011) (Dkt. No. 20), no court denied the

House full party status. 3 And in other contexts, various courts, including this Court,

have routinely granted motions to intervene filed by the House of Representatives.

See Koerner, 800 F.2d at 1360. 4

3
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); McLaughlin v. Hagel, 767
F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014); Cardona
v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 472 (2014); Cooper-Harris v. United States, No. 12-cv-
00887, 2013 WL 12125527 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Lui v. Holder, No. 11-CV-01267,
2011 WL 10653943 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011); Aranas v. Napolitano, No. 12-1137,
2013 WL 12251153 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2013); Revelis v. Napolitano, 844 F. Supp.
2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, No. 11-0045, 2013 WL
3878688 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2013); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 872 F. Supp.
2d 944 (N.D. Cal. 2012), vacated in part (Oct. 28, 2013); Pedersen v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012); In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2011).
4
See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930 n.5; Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d
1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991); Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1378-79
(D.D.C. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Ameron, Inc.
v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 607 F. Supp. 962, 963 (D.N.J. 1985), aff’d as modified
on reh’g, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986); Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163, 164

8
 In this case, too, intervention as of right by the House is proper. Both of the

independent grounds for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) are satisfied. And

the House of Representatives of the 116th Congress “timely” filed this motion, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 24(a), the first day the 116th House could participate in this appeal.

A. Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(1). First, as would be

required by Rule 24(a)(1), the House of Representatives has an unconditional right

to intervene pursuant to federal law. As described above, federal law recognizes the

uniquely important role of the United States Government in defending the

constitutionality of Acts of Congress. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), “[i]n any action,

suit or proceeding . . . wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting

the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the

Attorney General, and shall permit the United States to intervene . . . for argument

on the question of constitutionality.” When the Attorney General decides not to

defend the validity of an Act of Congress, the House and/or Senate are empowered

by statute to intervene in order to exercise that power. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 530D

requires the Attorney General to “submit to the Congress a report of any instance”

(D.D.C. 1984), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
rev’d on mootness grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 362 (1987); In
re Production Steel, Inc., 48 B.R. 841, 842 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Moody,
46 B.R. 231, 233 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1985); In re Tom Carter Enterprises, Inc., 44
B.R. 605, 606 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984); In re Benny, 44 B.R. 581, 583 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1984), aff’d in part & dismissed in part, 791 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1986).
9
in which the Executive Branch declines to defend the constitutionality of an Act of

Congress “within such time as will reasonably enable the House of Representatives

and the Senate to take action, separately or jointly, to intervene in timely fashion in

the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(2). Indeed, as the Supreme

Court has observed, “when Congress has passed a statute and a President has signed

it, it poses grave challenges to the separation of powers for the Executive at a

particular moment to be able to nullify Congress’ enactment solely on its own

initiative.” United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 762 (2013).

Notably, both Section 2403(a) and Section 530D permit the United States to

intervene at any stage in a proceeding, including on appeal, and the Executive

Branch routinely does so. See, e.g., Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 167 (5th

Cir. 2000) (citing Section 2403(a)); King v. Marion Circuit Court, 868 F.3d 589,

593 (7th Cir. 2017). Indeed, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 44, which

implements Section 2403(a), expressly contemplates that the United States may

intervene on appeal, as it provides that a party challenging the constitutionality of a

federal statute must “give written notice to the circuit clerk” as soon as the issue is

raised, and requires the clerk to notify the Attorney General so that he can intervene.

Fed. R. App. P. 44. And in the rare circumstances in which the Executive Branch

has declined to defend (or attacked) a federal statute, courts of appeals have treated

the House as having a right, materially similar to that of the Executive, to intervene

10
on appeal. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 7 (appeal held in abeyance to permit

House to intervene); accord Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930 n.5, 939 (approving of court

of appeals’ permission for House and Senate to intervene at rehearing stage).

B. Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). If there were any doubt

about the House’s right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1), there can be no reasonable

question that it has a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). That provision permits

a party with an interest in the litigation to intervene as of right if “disposing of the

action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its

interest” and “existing parties [do not] adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015).

The requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) are fully satisfied here. As Section 530D

reflects, the House has a powerful and unique institutional interest in defending an

Act of Congress. That interest is fundamental to “the legislative power” in our

Federal system, which the Executive Branch’s decision that it will not fully defend

the constitutionality of an existing statute undermines. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 762;

see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940. The House’s institutional interest encompasses

not only defending the constitutionality of the statute’s provisions, but also ensuring

the proper application of severability principles, which determine whether other

provisions of the statute must fall when one provision is deemed unconstitutional.

11
Numerous courts have accepted those fundamental interests in recognizing House

intervention. See pp. 8-9, supra.

Here too, no existing party “adequately represent[s]” the House’s interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Under Rule 24(a)(2), the House’s burden to establish

inadequate representation is “minimal,” requiring only a showing that representation

by existing parties “may be” inadequate. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am.,

404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic

Beverage Comm’n, 834 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting with respect to

adequacy of representation “the broad policy favoring intervention”). Although a

presumption of adequate representation arises when a governmental entity “charged

by law with representing the interests of the [proposed intervenor]” is already a

party, or when the proposed “intervenor has the same ultimate objective as a party

to the lawsuit,” Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996),

neither presumption defeats intervention here.

First, the U.S. Attorney General plainly does not adequately represent the

House’s interest in this case. Section 530D establishes that the Justice Department

can no longer be regarded as “charged by law with representing the interests” of the

House, Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1005, when the Department has decided not to defend a

statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 530D(b)(2). In addition, the Attorney General plainly has

a different ultimate objective in this case than the House does, because he (like the

12
Plaintiffs) has affirmatively argued that the individual mandate is unconstitutional

and inseverable from other provisions. The House disagrees with, and will argue

against, that position, which (if enforced) would erase in significant part the statute

that Congress enacted. See Ross, 426 F.3d at 761.

Second, the Intervenor States do not adequately represent the House’s

interests. They are not charged with representing the institutional interests of any

part of the Federal Government. Indeed, federal law specifically recognizes the

value of having a federal party defending the constitutionality of a federal statute.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2403(a), 530D. These provisions reflect the unique interest, not shared

by any non-federal party, that Branches of the Federal Government have in

defending the constitutionality of a federal statute. The House, unlike the Intervenor

States, is part of a “coequal branch of government.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.

57, 64 (1981). Its “Members take the same oath [members of the judiciary] do to

uphold the Constitution of the United States.” Id. The House thus has an

institutional interest not only in defending an Act of Congress against constitutional

challenge, but also in defending its prerogative, as a coordinate Branch of

government, to interpret the Constitution and to pass laws based on that

interpretation. Cf. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883) (“Proper

respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government requires the courts of the United

13
States to give effect to the presumption that congress will pass no act not within its

constitutional power.”).

Moreover, the interest of the Intervenor States is potentially adverse to the

interest of the House in important respects. See Texas, 805 F.3d at 662. For instance,

the Intervenor States did not argue in their briefs before the district court that the

Plaintiffs lack standing, see Mem. Op. and Order at 15 & n.6, Texas v. United States,

No. 4:18-cv-00167-O (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2018) (Dkt. No. 211)—and such an

argument may well run counter to the States’ long-term interest in arguing for broad

and permissive state standing. The House, however, wishes to ensure that the

Plaintiffs demonstrate truly concrete and particularized harm before they may

challenge a federal law. The Intervenor States therefore cannot adequately represent

the House’s interest in that respect.

That adversity of interests may well extend to the merits of the arguments

about the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, because both the standing issue

and the issue of Section 5000A’s constitutionality turn on the question whether

Section 5000A (as amended) actually mandates that covered individuals obtain

minimum essential health-care coverage. See Mem. Op. and Order at 27-34, Texas

v. United States, supra (Dkt. No. 211). The Intervenor States may be unable to make

a full-throated defense on the merits because doing so would undermine their claim

to standing.

14
 The divergence of interests between the House and the Intervenor States thus

meets the House’s “minimal” burden to show that existing representation “may be”

inadequate and to entitle the House to participate as a party on appeal. Trbovich,

404 U.S. at 538 n.10; see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 834 F.3d at 569; Edwards, 78 F.3d

at 1005-06; Aransas Project v. Shaw, 404 F. App’x 937, 941 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting

that a federal defendant “could not advocate for . . . a state”).

In short, whether this Court construes Section 530D as vesting the House with

an unconditional right to intervene, or as making explicit the House’s interest in

litigation in which the Justice Department refuses to defend a federal law,

intervention as of right would be warranted in the district court, triggering Rule 24’s

requirement that a district court permit the House to intervene so long as the

intervention motion is “timely.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Because the same interests

underlie intervention in the court of appeals—the House unquestionably has a

“significant stake” in the litigation, see Bursey, 515 F.2d at 1238 n.24—this Court

should permit the House to intervene.

C. Timeliness of intervention motion. This motion is timely. As this

Court has recognized, determining whether a motion to intervene is timely requires

a “contextual” analysis, and “absolute measures of timeliness should be ignored.”

Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994). The key question is whether

the timing of the intervenor’s motion prejudices the original parties to the

15
proceeding. Id. Thus, “[f]ederal courts should allow intervention ‘where no one

would be hurt and greater justice could be attained.’” Id. (quoting McDonald v. E.J.

Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970)); Ross, 426 F.3d at 754 (permitting

intervention subsequent to district-court judgment “provided that the rights of

existing parties were not prejudiced and intervention did not interfere with the

orderly processes of the court”).

That permissive standard has led this Court to adopt a contextual four-factor

test for timeliness of intervention in the district court. Under that test, a court should

consider (1) “[t]he length of time during which the would-be intervenor actually

knew or reasonably should have known of its interest” before it sought to intervene;

(2) “the extent of the prejudice that the existing parties” may suffer due to the

“intervenor’s failure to apply for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should

have known of its interest”; (3) “the extent of the prejudice that the would-be

intervenor may suffer if intervention is denied”; and (4) “the existence of unusual

circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is

timely.” Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1205. “A motion to intervene may still be timely

even if all the factors do not weigh in favor of a finding of timeliness.” John Doe

No. 1 v. Glickman, 256 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2001).

In this case, all four factors do strongly militate in favor of permitting

intervention. First, the House moved to intervene on the first day the 116th House

16
could participate in this appeal. See U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 2 (“The Congress

shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on

the 3d day of January . . . .”). The House of Representatives is not a “continuing

body,” and there is a different House with the start of each new Congress. United

States v. AT&T Co., 551 F.2d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see Comm. on the Judiciary

of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(noting that “the 110th Congress ends on January 3, 2009” and “[a]t that time, the

110th House of Representatives will cease to exist as a legal entity”). Thus, before

January 3, 2019, the 116th House did not exist and had no interests to assert. It

moved to intervene in the district court not only as soon as it “knew . . . of its interest

in the case” but also as soon as those interests came into being. Sierra Club, 18 F.3d

at 1205; cf. Glickman, 256 F.3d at 376-77. The House then immediately moved to

intervene in this appeal once a notice of appeal was filed—depriving the district

court of the ability to grant intervention as to Count I—and the appeal was docketed

in this Court.

Second, no prejudice to the Court or the existing parties will result from the

House intervening now. The House will coordinate with the other parties to ensure

that intervention does not affect scheduling, and will submit briefs consistent with

any scheduling order issued by this Court. This Court has found an absence of

prejudice when district courts allowed intervention even after judgment was entered,

17
where, as here, the only “inconveniences . . . [were] those commonly associated with

defending a ruling or judgment on appeal, and would have arisen regardless of

whether [the intervenor] sought to intervene before the district court entered its

amended judgment.” Ross, 426 F.3d at 756; see, e.g., Stallworth v. Monsanto Co.,

558 F.2d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 1977); Wal-Mart Stores, 834 F.3d at 565-66. This Court

has likewise considered the prejudice to other parties and potential delay of

proceedings when considering intervention on appeal. See Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at

1206 (no prejudice where party intervened to appeal injunction); see also 15A

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, 15A Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3902.1 (2d ed.).

Third, both the House of Representatives and the public at large will suffer if

intervention is denied. The federal statutes contemplating intervention by the U.S.

government reflect the fact that “declar[ing] an Act of Congress unconstitutional . . .

is the gravest and most delicate duty” that a court “is called on to perform,” Blodgett

v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927) (Holmes, J.), and that a court should

endeavor not to do so without the participation of a federal entity defending such an

Act. If permitted to intervene, the House would be the only organ of the Federal

Government defending the constitutionality of the ACA, and it would assert

arguments likely distinct from those of the Intervenor States. It is therefore

important to the interests of the United States, the fair administration of justice, and

18
the public’s perception that the Judiciary has impartially considered all arguments

in support of a law’s constitutionality that the House be permitted to intervene.

Finally, this Court has explained that, even if a court determines that an

intervenor failed to promptly seek intervention, that entity may nevertheless

demonstrate timeliness by providing “convincing justification[s] . . . that for reasons

other than lack of knowledge he was unable to intervene sooner.” Stallworth, 558

F.2d at 266. For the reasons explained above, the House of Representatives did

promptly intervene here. But to the extent this Court disagrees, the change of House

leadership, and the House’s status as a distinct legal entity when it is reconstituted

following an election, provide the requisite “convincing justification” and render the

motion timely.

II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 24(b), THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD
BE ENTITLED TO PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION.
The House would also satisfy the standard for permissive intervention under

Rule 24(b). Under that Rule, “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to

intervene who . . . is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute,” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A), or who “has a claim or defense that shares with the main

action a common question of law or fact,” id. 24(b)(1)(B). Because the House

satisfies both independent grounds of Rule 24(b)(1) and its participation would not

19
cause any delay or prejudice, permissive intervention before a district court would

be warranted.

First, to the extent this Court concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 530D does not

provide an unconditional right to intervene, that statute, at a minimum, provides “a

conditional right to intervene” in proceedings where the Attorney General declines

to defend a federal law, thus satisfying Rule 24(b)(1)(A). Congress’s determination

that either chamber can do so at a minimum demonstrates that the House has a

conditional right to intervene.

Second, the House seeks to address the same questions of law that the original

parties to this suit are addressing, and therefore “has a . . . defense that shares with

the main action . . . common question[s] of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).

Finally, intervention would not “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of

the original parties’ rights,” id. 24(b)(3), because the House seeks only to adjudicate

the rights of the original parties, so as to ensure that this Court and, potentially, the

Supreme Court have the benefit of full briefing on all sides of this case. The House

will file papers on the same schedule as the other parties. “[N]o one would be hurt

and the greater justice could be attained” by permitting the House to intervene, so

this Court “should allow intervention.” Texas, 805 F.3d at 657.

20
 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion by the House of Representatives to

intervene should be granted.

Dated: January 7, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

s/ Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

DOUGLAS N. LETTER Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.
General Counsel Elaine J. Goldenberg
TODD B. TATELMAN Ginger D. Anders
Deputy General Counsel Jonathan S. Meltzer
KRISTIN A. SHAPIRO Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler
Assistant General Counsel MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
BROOKS M. HANNER 1155 F. Street N.W., 7th Floor
Assistant General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20004-1361
Tel: (202) 220-1100
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL Fax: (202) 220-2300
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Donald.Verrilli@mto.com
219 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515 Elizabeth B. Wydra
(202) 225-9700 (telephone) Brianne J. Gorod
Douglas.Letter@mail.house.gov Brian R. Frazelle
Ashwin P. Phatak
CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER
1200 18th Street N.W., Suite 501
Washington, D.C. 20036-2513
Tel: (202) 296-6889
elizabeth@theusconstitution.org
brianne@theusconstitution.org

Counsel for the U.S. House of

Representatives

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 7, 2019, the foregoing document was filed

with the Clerk of the Court, using the CM/ECF system, causing it to be served on all

counsel of record.

Dated: January 7, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

s/ Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

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 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. P.

27(d)(2)(A), because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App.

P. 32(f), this document contains 5,173 words.

2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App.

P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this

document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft

Word 2010 in 14 point, Times New Roman.

Dated: January 7, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

s/ Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

23