Moral Disengagement (See moral exclusion; genocide and mass

killing: origins and prevention.)

ALBERT BANDURA Figure 1 shows the point in the process
of moral control at which the disengage-
The moral standards people adopt serve as ment can occur (Bandura, 1999). There are
guides for conduct and deterrents for detri- eight such mechanisms of moral evasion.
mental activities. They do things that bring Three of them change harmful conduct
them satisfaction and a sense of self-worth, into benign or worthy conduct. This is
and refrain from violating their moral stand- achieved by sanctifying harmful means with
ards because such conduct begets self- worthy ends; enlisting exonerative compari-
condemnation. Self-sanctions keep conduct sons that make harmful practices appear
in line with internal standards. However, benign or even righteous; using sanitizing
moral standards do not function as an unwa- and convoluted language that disguises the
vering regulator of moral conduct. There harm being done. Two of the mechanisms
are many psychosocial maneuvers by which reduce accountability for detrimental prac-
people selectively disengage moral self- tices by displacement and diffusion of
sanctions from inhumane conduct. This responsibility. Another form of moral
enables them to do cruel things with freedom evasion is to ignore, minimize, distort, or
from the restraints of self-censure. Indeed, even dispute that one’s activities cause
large-scale inhumanities are often perpe- any harm. The disengagement may also
trated by people who are compassionate in include dehumanizing and blaming the
other aspects of their lives. They can even victims for bringing the harm on them-
behave compassionately and cruelly at the selves. The following sections review the
same time depending on whom they include eight mechanisms of moral disengage-
and exclude in their category of humanity. ment in greater detail. These psychosocial

Moral Justification Minimizing, Ignoring, or

Dehumanization
Exonerative Comparison Misconstruing the
Attribution of Blame
Euphemistic Labeling Consequences

Detrimental
Injurious Effects Victim
Practices

Displacement of Responsibility
Diffusion of Responsibility

Figure 1 Psychosocial mechanisms through which moral self-sanctions are selectively

disengaged from detrimental conduct at different points in the moral control process.

The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Daniel J. Christie.

© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
2 moral disengagement

mechanisms operate at both the individual one’s destructive conduct appears benevo-
and social system levels. lent. Exonerating comparison relies heavily
on moral justification by the utilitarian
standard. Violence is made morally accept-
SOCIAL AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION
able by claiming that one’s injurious actions
will prevent more human suffering than they
The prime mode of moral disengagement
cause.
operates by cognitive reconstrual of the det-
rimental behavior itself. In this process of
moral justification, such conduct is made
EUPHEMISTIC LANGUAGE
personally and socially commendable by
portraying it as serving socially worthy or
Language is widely used to make detrimen-
moral purposes. People then act on a moral
tal conduct socially and personally accepta-
imperative. Through moral justification
ble. Gambino (1973) identifies three
of violent means, they see themselves as
linguistic forms that serve a neutralizing
protecting cherished values, fighting ruth-
function. The first is sanitizing language.
less oppressors, preserving peace, saving
Consider, by way of example, aerial bom-
humanity from subjugation, or honoring
bardment. Bombers drop “vertically
righteous commitments. Voltaire put it well
deployed anti-personnel devices.” We call
when he said, “Those who can make you
them bombs. Bombing missions are
believe absurdities can make you commit
described as “servicing the target,” in the
atrocities.”
likeness of a public utility, or as “visiting a
Over the centuries, much inhumane
sight,” in the likeness of a social call. The
conduct has been perpetrated by ordinary
airplanes are “force packages,” as though
decent people in the name of righteous
propelled non-agentically. The attacks
ideologies, religious principles, and nation-
become “clean, surgical strikes,” arousing
alistic imperatives (Reich, 1990). The poli-
imagery of curative activities. Bombing
ticization of religion, for example, has
errors that kill civilians are characterized as
produced a long bloody history of holy
“outside current accuracy requirements.”
terror. Among the set of mechanisms, moral
The civilians the bombs kill are linguistically
justification is uniquely powerful. This is
converted to “collateral damage.” Collateral
because it serves dual functions. It enlists
damage takes on a different appearance if
ardent moral engagement in the worthy
one puts a human face on it. Sanitizing lan-
cause, but moral disengagement in its injuri-
guage pervades most organizational prac-
ous and destructive execution.
tices that have adverse effects. The Quarterly
Journal of Doublespeak records the linguistic
ADVANTAGEOUS COMPARISON cleansing practiced by diverse occupations.
People behave more cruelly when detrimen-
How behavior is viewed is colored by what tal practices are sanitized than when they
it is compared against. By exploiting the con- are called aggression.
trast principle, reprehensible acts can be The agentless passive voice serves as
made righteous. For example, terrorists see another self-exonerative linguistic tool. It
their behavior as acts of selfless martyrdom creates the appearance that detrimental acts
by comparing them with widespread cruel- are the work of nameless forces rather than
ties inflicted on the people with whom they people. The specialized jargon of a legiti-
identify (Bandura, 2004). The more flagrant mate enterprise can also be exploited to lend
the contrasting inhumanities, the more an aura of respectability to an illegitimate
 moral disengagement 3

one. The detrimental schemes concocted by Surreptitious authorization of human

ill-doers are “game plans,” and the dutiful cruelty spares them loss of self-regard.
functionaries are “team players” conjuring When harmful practices are publicized
up admirable qualities befitting the best of they are dismissed as isolated incidents
champions. resulting from misunderstanding of what
was authorized. The blame usually gets
shifted to subordinates who are portrayed
DISPLACEMENT AND DIFFUSION OF as mistaken, overzealous, or irresponsible
RESPONSIBILITY freelancers.
Displacement of responsibility requires
Moral control operates most strongly when obliging functionaries. If they cast off all
people acknowledge that their actions cause responsibility they would be quite unrelia-
harm. The second set of disengagement ble, obeying only when the authority is
practices obscures or minimizes the agentic present. One must distinguish between two
role in the harm one causes. People will levels of responsibility. The best functionar-
behave in ways they normally repudiate if a ies have a strong sense of duty to honor their
legitimate authority accepts responsibility obligations to authorities, but no personal
for the effects of their injurious activities. responsibility for the harm caused by carry-
Under displaced responsibility they view ing out the orders.
their actions as stemming from the dictates Moral control is also weakened through
of authorities rather than being person- diffusion of responsibility for detrimental
ally responsible. This spares them self- behavior. (See diffusion of responsibiity.)
condemning reactions. They are merely Kelman and Hamilton (1989) identify three
carrying out orders, as Adolf Eichmann ways in which responsibility is dispersed.
claimed in his 1961 Nazi War Crimes trial in Tasks are subdivided so the parts seem
Jerusalem. harmless in detached isolation. Group
As shown in Milgram’s (1974) research, decision-making is also self-exonerative
the more legitimate the authority giving because the faceless collectivity becomes
the injurious orders, the higher the obedi- the agent. Where everyone is responsible,
ent aggression. However, in real life the no one feels personally responsible. Col-
authorization of cruelty differs in two lective action further weakens moral control
important ways from Milgram’s authoriza- by providing anonymity and making it
tion practice. The authority was present, easy to discount the significance of one’s
pressured participants when they resisted contribution in the aggregate mix of activi-
the orders, and publicly accepted responsi- ties. People behave more cruelly under
bility for any harm done when they group responsibility than when they hold
refused to escalate their punitiveness. In themselves accountable for their actions.
real life, authorities usually sanction harm-
ful practices surreptitiously. This enables
them to remain intentionally uninformed DISREGARDING AND DENIAL OF
about what is going on. They create INJURIOUS EFFECTS
schemes of deniability that leave the
higher echelons blameless. Surreptitious Other ways of weakening moral control
sanctioning provides self-protection from operate by minimizing, disregarding, or dis-
social criticism for failed policies. However, puting the harmful effects of one’s actions.
authorizers have to live with themselves. As long as the harmful effects are out of
They do not want blood on their hands. sight and out of mind, there is little reason
4 moral disengagement

for self-censure to be activated. When people qualities to them. They become “satanic
see and hear the suffering they cause they friends,” “degenerates,” “vermin,” and other
find it difficult to behave destructively. bestial creatures. It is easier to brutalize
We are now in the era of satellite and people when they are viewed as low animal
laser-guided hardware wars. These technol- forms. (See dehumanization, infrahumani-
ogies have become highly lethal and deper- zation, and naturalization.)
sonalized, with mass destruction delivered Psychological analyses tend to emphasize
remotely via satellite-guided systems with how easy it is to bring out the worst in
no restraining human contact. For example, people through dehumanization. However,
officers operate pilotless drones from a the power of humanization to counteract
control center in Nevada. The cameras cruelty is equally striking but receives rela-
aboard the drones identify possible suspects tively little attention. The affirmation of
in Iraq or Afghanistan.The operator fires common humanity can foster peaceable
rockets that blow them up. This remotely relationships among people (Bandura,
implemented faceless warfare underscores 1999).
the extraordinary flexibility of moral regula- Given the easily enlisted psychosocial
tion of conduct. The operators switch their mechanisms for disengaging moral self-
moral control off and on daily between their sanctions, societies cannot rely solely on
military working hours and their off-duty individuals, however righteous their stand-
life. ards, to ensure a civil society. Humane life
requires, in addition to ethical personal
standards, effective safeguards built into
DEHUMANIZATION AND social systems that uphold compassionate
ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME behavior and curb human cruelty. Regardless
of whether inhumane practices are executed
The final set of disengagement practices individually, organizationally, or institution-
operates on the recipients of detrimental ally, it should be made difficult for people to
activities (Bandura, 1999; Zimbardo, 2007). remove humanity from their conduct.
Blaming one’s foes for bringing the suffering
on themselves by their provocative behavior SEE ALSO: Dehumanization, Infrahumani-
is another form of self-exoneration. Injurious zation, and Naturalization; Diffusion of
actions toward provocateurs or compelling Responsibility; Genocide and Mass Killing:
circumstances are not only excusable, but Origins and Prevention; Moral Exclusion.
one can even feel self-righteous in inflicting
harm.
The strength of moral self-censure also
depends on how the perpetrators regard REFERENCES
their foes. To perceive another as human
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condemnation. Hence, self-censure for disengagement in terrorism and
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ness does not weaken self-censure, it can be interventions (pp. 121–150). Washington, DC:
eliminated by attributing demonic or bestial American Psychological Association Press.
 moral disengagement 5

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