I.

The Life of Aristotle

Aristotle (picture) was born at Stagira, a Greek colony of Thrace, in the year 384 B.C.
His father, a Macedonian named Nicomachus, was a physician in the court of Amyntas
II, King of Macedonia.

After the death of his parents, Aristotle's education was directed by Proxenus of
Atarneus. In his eighteenth year, Aristotle went to Athens and entered the Academy of
Plato, remaining there about twenty years, until the death of the master.

During Plato's last years, Aristotle collaborated with the master in the revision of his
works. After Plato's death, Aristotle went to Assus, a city of the Troad, where he lived for
three years. His friendship with Hermias, ruler of the city, led to his marriage to Pythias,
the ruler's niece and adopted daughter.

About 343 B.C. Aristotle withdrew to Mitylene; during the same year he was summoned
by King Philip to the court of Macedonia to educate Prince Alexander, then a youth of
thirteen years. Aristotle remained there for three years, until the beginning of the famous
Asiatic expedition.

Alexander was grateful for the education received, and supplied his master with the
financial means to form a library and to assemble a museum of natural history with which
Aristotle enriched his school. Aristotle had returned to Athens in the year 335. B.C., and
there had opened a school in the gardens dedicated to Apollo Lyceios.

The school was hence called the Lyceum, and also the Peripatetic School, probably from
Aristotle's custom of teacher, discussing and conversing with his pupils while walking
along the shady lanes of the garden. He taught in the Lyceum for twelve or thirteen years,
and composed the greater part of his books during that time.

In 323 B.C., upon the death of Alexander, there was reawakened in Athens conflict
between the followers of the Macedonian party and the enemies of Alexander. The
national reactionaries were led by the great Greek orator Demosthenes.

Aristotle, as a Macedonian sympathizer, was accused of impiety, which meant that he

would be called to judgment to hear the sentence of death passed upon himself. He
anticipated the condemnation and voluntarily retired to Chalcis, where he possessed a
villa inherited from his mother.

It is said that while departing for exile he uttered these words, referring to the
condemnation of Socrates: "I do not wish that Athens should sin twice against
philosophy."

His school, including the library and the museum of natural history, went to his disciple
Theophrastus. Aristotle died in 322. B.C., at Chalcis in Euboea.
II. The Works of Aristotle
Aristotle, whom Plato is said to have surnamed "The Intellect," certainly had the loftiest
mind ever known in Greece, and perhaps in the entire human race. He is the type of true
philosopher who, not allowing himself to be distracted by practical and political motives,
lives entirely engrossed in his speculations.

The books edited by him and comprising all the knowledge of his day number about a
thousand. Of these works, some were destined for the public, and some for Aristotle's
school. The greater part of his works has been lost, but some important parts have been
preserved, that is, those works destined for his school and representing the philosophic
thought of this greatest of philosophers.

The complete edition was published for the first time by Andronicus of Rhodes about the
middle of the last century before Christ. Following the classification of Andronicus of
Rhodes and passing over the scientific books which have no direct connection with
philosophy, the works of Aristotle comprise the following groups:

1. Logic

The works on logic were called the Organon, that is, an instrument of learning. The
Organon includes the following:

• The Categories
• On Interpretation
• Prior Analytics (on the syllogism)
• Posterior Analytics (on Demonstration)
• Topics
• Sophistic Refutations

2. Physics

The works on physics comprise the body of doctrine which is today embraced by
cosmology and anthropology:

• Physics (in eight books)

• Concerning the Heavens (in four books)
• Concerning Birth and Corruption (in two books)
• Meteorology (in four books)
• On the Soul (in three books)

3. Metaphysics
Aristotle's Metaphysics is usually divided into fourteen books. These are a compilation
made after the death of Aristotle and are based on manuscript notes referring to general
metaphysics and theology. The name "metaphysics" is due to the position of these works
in the collection edited by Andronicus; they appeared "after the works on physics."

4. Ethics and Politics

• Nichomachean Ethics (in ten books, dedicated to Aristotle's con, Nicomachus,

named after Aristotle's father)
• Eudemian Ethics
• The Great Ethics
• Politics (in eight books, unfinished)

5. Rhetoric and Poetry

• Rhetoric (in three books)

• Poetics (in two books)

These books, of course, are only a part of the works of Aristotle.

III. Introduction to Aristotle's Doctrine

Plato had split reality into two worlds:

• The World of Ideas (eternal, immutable, unchangeable, like the "being" of

Parmenides, but fashioned according to the Socratic concept); and
• The World of Sensible Things (mutable, changeable, like the "being" of
Heraclitus).

Plato had been induced to divide the world of reality because he believed that only by
such a separation could he give metaphysical foundation to the concept of Socrates
without denying Heraclitus' doctrine of "fluent reality" -- the object of immediate
experience.

Aristotle found that the weakest point of his master's doctrine lies in this separation
of the world of Ideas from the world of sensible things. "It would seem impossible
for the substance and that which is the substance to exist in separation." (1)

How can Ideas be causes of the motion and change in the visible world if Ideas are
separate from things? Plato had held that Ideas are patterns or models of things. Aristotle
holds that to say this "is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that
fashions things on the model of Ideas?" (2) Since Ideas are separated from reality and are
themselves immutable, unchangeable, they cannot be the cause of the motion and of
change in sensible things.
Nor does the teaching of separate Ideas help toward the knowledge of other things, for
Ideas are not the substance of particulars, but are separated from them. Hence, how
would it be possible to have any knowledge of sensible substances if what constitutes
these substances (Ideas) is really separated from them?

The cause of motion and change, according to Aristotle, must be sought in the thing itself
as an immanent element of the reality. Only when an understanding of the factor or
factors of motion is had can we have a true knowledge of things; for these factors of
motion are the key to understanding the concept of Socrates.

Thus any investigation must start from things which begin to be, develop, and then pass
away. Although sensible reality is in continuous "becoming," the "factors" of this
becoming are unchangeable, immutable. Only when the causes of motion are grasped as
intrinsic factors of motion itself will we have a true understanding of reality, i.e.,
knowledge by causes.

In other words, the intelligibility of sensible things must be sought in the things
themselves, and not in a separate world of Ideas, as Plato believed.

References:

IV. Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology)

Comprehension and Extension

Logic, of which Aristotle was the first systematizer, essays to state the relationships
existing between one concept and another, with the purpose of forming an intrinsically
organized entity which will enable the intellect to pass from one truth to another by
showing the reasons for such passage.

To achieve this purpose, logic starts by analyzing each concept. Thus logic may
determine:

• what are the logical elements of each concept -- in other words, its
comprehension;
• what is the field of application of each concept -- in other words, its extension
or the number of beings mentally represented by that concept.

(For example, the concept "animal" comprehends the following characteristics or logical
elements: an animal has a body, it is organic, it requires nourishment, it is sensitive, etc.;
the concept "animal extends to both non-human animals and man.)

It is easy to see that comprehension and extension are in inverse relation; the greater the
comprehension, the less the extension of the concept, and vice versa. Thus if we increase
the comprehension of the concept "animal" by adding another element, for instance
"rationality," the extension of the concept will decrease, because it is now no longer
applicable to non-human animals but only to men. With non-human animals excluded,
the extension is proportionately decreased.

Again, concepts may be classified according to their extension and comprehension. If we

were to arrange them on the rungs of a ladder, as it were, top place would be occupied by
the concept with the greatest extension (but with the minimum of comprehension);
inversely, the bottom would be taken by the concept with the least extension (but with the
maximum of comprehension).

In such an arrangement, each intermediary concept is a species in relation to the concept

above it, and a genus in relation to the concept below it. In this method of classification
(by descending from genus to species), the last place will be taken by concepts having an
individual extension ("this individual is John and no one else"); and the individual is
neither species nor genus.

The Categories

By ascending the ladder (from species to genus), top place will be taken by a genus
which is not a relative species, since there is no concept above it; hence it is called
supreme genus. These supreme genera are also called categories (or predicaments), and
according to Aristotle they are ten in number:

• substance (who or what is this thing?)

• quantity (how much or how big?)
• quality (what sort of thing is it?)
• relation (to what or whom does it refer?)
• activity (what does it do to another?)
• passivity (what is done to it?)
• when (at what point of time?)
• where (where is it?)
• site or posture (in what attitude?)
• habit (how surrounded, equipped; how conditioned?)

Such analysis and classification make it possible for us to know the general predicament
or class under which a concept is located, and also the difference which distinguishes it
from other species of the same genus.

Definition

Now, to know the genus and the specific (or specifying) difference of a concept is the
same as knowing its definition or essence. For example, the definition (or essence) of
man is rational animal: that is, proximate genus -- animal; and specific difference --
rational.
According to Aristotle, the differentia is not something diverse and distinct from the
genus, but is rather the actuation (or form) of the same essence which existed virtually in
the genus. Thus "animal" may be rational: that animal in which this potentiality to
rationality is actuated is man.

Here we must observe that in giving the definition of a concept ("man is a rational
animal") the intellect makes a judgment, which consists in affirming (or denying) that
something (the predicate) belongs (or does not belong) to something else (the subject).

Characteristic of the judgment is truth or falsity. Such a possibility was not present in
the simple concept, in which nothing was affirmed or denied. On the contrary, the
presence of error is possible in a judgment, in which the logical affirmation of the
relationship of the predicate to the subject may not correspond with reality.

The possibility of error forces the mind to demonstrate that a given judgment is true. This
means that the intellect must find the reasons which ensure that the proposed judgment is
in conformity with reality. Such reasons, giving the mind certainty that a judgment is
true, are the foundation for perfect knowledge, since perfect knowledge is knowledge
through causes.

The Syllogism

According to Aristotle, the best method of leading the mind to perfect knowledge is the
syllogism. The syllogism is an argumentation formed from three judgments so connected
with one another that from the truth of the first two (the premises) the mind draws out a
third truth (the conclusion) necessarily connected with the premises.

The syllogism shows that the cause (or reason) for connecting the predicate (P) of the
conclusion to the subject (S) of the same conclusion is that both predicate and subject are
connected necessarily with a third concept (M), called the middle term, in the premises.
According to the principle of identity, therefore, such a connection must be affirmed
necessarily in the conclusion also.

Aristotle stated three figures of the syllogism; the first is the best and may be presented as
follows:

• All men (M) are mortal (P);

• Socrates (S) is a man (M);
• Therefore, Socrates (S) is mortal (P).

This syllogism shows that the reason (or cause) which makes Socrates mortal is that
mortality is an element necessarily connected with his being a man.

It is clear that the truth of the conclusion is conditioned on the truth of the premises. In
other words, supposing that the premises express a necessary truth, the conclusion will
also express a necessary truth. The truth of the premises, it is supposed, has been proved
by another syllogism, and so on.

First Principles

But, according to Aristotle, this process cannot be extended ad infinitum; it is necessary

that the mind reach some judgments which do not need any demonstration because they
are evident from within. Such are the logical fundamental principles, the most
important of which is the principle of contradiction, which was formulated by Aristotle
in the following manner:

"A thing can not be and not-be at the same time in the same manner." (1)

The first principles of reason are universal, that is, valid for the whole of human
knowledge, both philosophical and scientific. This means that philosophy and the
sciences must start from these principles, and must deduce from them the particular
principles which are the foundation of each kind of knowledge.

Aristotle spoke also of induction, which means the passage from particular to universal
knowledge. According to Aristotle, concepts are the result of induction; the form, which
is always particular in individuals, is a universal concept as soon as it is considered as
abstracted from the individuating characteristics; this passing from the particular to the
universal Aristotle calls induction. Since the concepts are the matter of the propositions
and these latter the matter of the syllogism, we can say that induction prepares the
material for perfect reasoning.

References:

(1) Metaphysics, IV, 3, 1005b.

V. General Metaphysics
A. Analysis of Being in Becoming: Matter and Form, Potency and Act.

Aristotle starts from the solid ground of experience.

Experience shows us that only individual substances exist, and all exist in the
substance and are predicated of the substance. Moreover, experience shows us that
individuals are not produced by some Idea or model, but are produced by other
individuals of the same species.

The fact of generation tells us that first of all there must be an individual, who by the act
of generation is able to produce a new reality as germ or seed. In virtue of this act of
generation, the germ or seed receives the power of reproducing another individual
specifically the same as the generator; for man generates man, and oak generates oak.

The power of reproducing a new individual is the very form of the seed; because, for
Aristotle, every form is a force or a potency for developing what is virtually contained
within the subject. Thus the immanent form of the seed or germ is a potency for
developing a perfect being (it has the power of becoming man or oak). The development
from the state of potency to the state of perfect being is called becoming.

To make this development possible, it is necessary to suppose some substratum or

matter on which the successive forms of development can be realized until the last form
is reached (the perfect or completed individual). This substratum is called matter, by
which is meant all those conditions which make possible the passage of successive forms.
To function thus, this substratum or matter must remain unchangeable.

Moreover, experience shows us that the forms in the development of a living being
proceed from an inferior to a higher form, not by change but by a predetermined form,
which specifically is the same as that of the individual that produced the germ or seed.

This predetermined form (entelechy) is always immanently present, coordinating and

distributing the matter not arbitrarily but according to that specific from within -- in this
instance, man or oak. The idea of the entire individual is present within the seed from the
first moment as an immanent potency and does not cease its activity until the perfect
(completed) individual is attained.

Now, as a first result of this analysis of becoming, we are able to determine and
understand Aristotelian terminology.

Only individuals are beings in the full sense of the term. Every individual is a compound
of matter and form. Matter is an indeterminate element: the form is the determining
element; it is the force, power -- or better, the potency -- developing the whole which is
virtually contained within the individual. Thus it is called active potency. Matter,
considered as the complex of those conditions which make possible the activity of the
form, is called passive potency.

Every form, since it designates some actual determination of matter, is also called act.
Thus the analysis of the development of a living being has given us the concept of matter
(substratum), form (determining element), potency (both active and passive), and act.

Aristotle extends the results of the analysis of the development of a living being to a work
of art, that is, to artificial becoming. Let us take the classic example of the piece of
marble which becomes a statue.

Here, too, first of all, there must be an artist who conceives the "idea" of the statue which
he wants to bring forth in the marble.
Secondly, the marble, which already possesses its own shape -- for instance, that of a
cube -- is supposed to be capable of losing this shape and assuming that conceived by the
artist. In other words, the marble must be in passive potency in order to assume the form
of a statue.

Thirdly, the marble, under the action of the tools used by the artist, loses its former shape
and becomes a statue. The action of the artist ceases when the marble has passed into the
new form, that of a statue.

This process is analogous to that of the development of the living organism. There are,
however, some interesting differences.

In the development of a living organism, the seed is predetermined by nature to all the
successive forms which are intermediary means of reaching that specific form which is
the last.

The marble, on the contrary, is not determined by its form of marble to be this rather than
that statue or something else. Here the determination comes extrinsically, from the idea
of the artist -- as does also the origin of the active potency to produce such a statue;
whereas in the living organism this active potency is immanent in the seed.

However -- the artificial becoming also consists in a union of matter and form.

B. The Four Causes of Becoming

The preceding analysis showed that four causes are acting upon the being in the process
of becoming:

• There is an efficient cause, and it is that which gives the impulse to movement or
development (the generator as becoming takes place in nature, and the artist as
becoming takes place in art);
• There is a material cause, the permanent and indeterminate substratum of the
successive transformations (organic matter in the case of the living organism, and
the marble in the case of the statue);
• There is a formal cause, established by the forces within the idea (the form of
species in the living organism, and the idea conceived by the artist in works of
art);
• There is a final cause, that which directs the entire series of transformations on a
pre-established plane, giving unity to the entire course of the development (which
results in the complete organism in natural becoming, and the complete statue in
artificial becoming). (1)

It is interesting to note that, according to Aristotle, three of the above-mentioned causes --

namely the efficient cause, the formal cause, and the final cause -- logically are reducible
to the idea of "form." In the development of a natural organism -- for instance, that of
man --
 • The efficient cause or generative act is possible in so far as the acting individual
(generator) possesses, already realized, the "form" of man;
• The formal cause, immanent in the germ, organizes the matter step by step and
gives it exactly the "form" required by the species to which the germ belongs
(thus the efficient cause is the same as the formal cause, if we consider the latter
in its actual development);
• The final cause, considered as the model toward which the steps of development
tend, is the same as the formal cause.

Thus the efficient cause, the formal cause, and the final cause coincide in the concept of
"form." Hence form is the propelling, organizing and final principle of becoming.

C. Priority of Act

For Aristotle, only individuals exist as true realities, and individuals are in continuous
development. Every development, however, is conditioned in the sense that it
presupposes a reality already possessing the complete form, which is the origin of
movement.

"The seed comes from other individuals who are prior and complete, and the first
thing is not seed but the complete being; for example, we must say that before the
seed there is a man; the man is not produced by the seed but by another from whom
the seed comes." (2)

Likewise the statue presupposes the idea of the artist.

The priority of act over potency, the determinate over the indeterminate, the perfect over
the imperfect, is one of the most outstanding principles of Aristotle's philosophy.

Every becoming is a movement, a passage from potency to act; and every movement
depends upon the existence of a mover, which is in act; that is, which already possesses
the form toward which the movement tends. The mover is in act what the moved is in
potency; and because it is act, it can impart movement; that is, it can start the process of
movement.

D. The Limits of Becoming: Prime Matter and Immovable Mover

From the above-mentioned principle Aristotle draws the most important conclusion of his
speculative thought; development or movement, related not to this or that particular
individual but to the whole universe, must have two limits, one deriving from matter and
the other from form. In other words, becoming presupposes a lowest point (Prime Matter)
and a highest point (the immovable Mover).

Prime Matter
The lowest point is Prime Matter, which must be conceived of as without any force of
movement; it must be absolutely indeterminate, pure potency. But is a being without any
form thinkable?

Let us try to explain this important point of Aristotelian philosophy.

Seed is matter in respect to a plant, as marble is matter in respect to a statue. Truly here
by "matter" we mean the "indeterminate"; but evidently, in the aforementioned instances,
such an indetermination is not absolute but relative.

Seed and marble are determined as such; at the same time they are determinable by the
higher forms of plant and statue. In other words, seed and marble as such are compounds
of matter and form, and, of course, are determinate beings.

However, they are called "matter" in relation to the higher form (plant or statue in our
instance) which can be attained by the seed or the marble.

Thus our concept of "matter" is relative to the higher form, and seed and marble are
called "matter" in so far as they are "in potency" as regards the completed plant or statue.

In other words, our concept of matter is obtained by a regressive process of mind from
the higher to the inferior condition which was the substratum of the production of the
new individual form. Going back along this regressive process, we must finally arrive at
matter deprived of any form whatever.

For instance, we can deprive the marble not only of the form of the statue but also of the
form of marble and reduce it to the elementary substances which concurred in the
formation of marble; and these elementary substances can be deprived of their own
forms, and so on, until we reach "matter" absolutely without form -- pure potency. This
is what Aristotle called Prime Matter.

"For when everything else is removed, clearly nothing but matter remains...By
matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor quantity nor
designated by any of the categories which define being." (3)

Prime Matter does not exist as such independently of any form. According to Aristotle,
only individuals exist that are composed of matter and form.

However, Prime Matter is not a mental abstraction, but a metaphysical reality. How it
would be possible to have a metaphysical entity, which on the one hand is pure potency,
absolutely indeterminate, and, on the other hand, is naturally disposed to receive any
form whatever, is not made clear by Aristotle; and, of course, it is one of the obscure
points of his metaphysics.

God, the Immovable Mover

The highest point is the immovable Mover, God. Aristotle proves the existence of God by
force of the above-mentioned principle: "priority of act over potency."

This proof may be summed up as follows: Becoming is the passage from potency to
act. This transition cannot be effected without appealing to a mover which would
activate the potency.

But again, this mover, if it be in the series of becoming, would derive its motion from a
second, and so on. Such tracing of the object moved and the mover cannot go on into an
infinite series, for, if so, the problem of becoming would remain unsolved.

It is necessary to stop at a prime mover which would be outside this series of becoming,
and which moves but is itself unmoved, the immovable Mover, God.

The necessity of admitting the first and immovable Mover does not depend on the fact of
whether becoming has a beginning. Even if the world is without a beginning (as Aristotle
supposed it to be, because of his lack of a concept of creation), its becoming would
remain ever inexplicable without a prime, immovable Mover, the absolute cause of all
becoming.

Having thus formulated his proof for the existence of God, Aristotle gives himself to the
task of determining God's nature. God is Pure Act, intermingled with no potency.

Since, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, knowledge of the world would imply duality
between knower and known, he denies to God any knowledge of earthly becoming.
Consequently, God is thought, which revolves upon itself, Thought of Thought, as
Aristotle expresses it.

Cosmic reality has a pronounced aspiration toward God, and in this sense God moves the
world. But He is not the Creator of this cosmic reality, and does not have any direct
relationship to it. He is the exemplary (final) cause and the efficient cause of becoming,
but He is ignorant of this reality and hence does not govern it.

If we compare the God of Plato (Highest Good) with that of Aristotle, we can say that in
both there remains dualism: God is distinct from uncreated and co-eternal reality.
Aristotle's proof for the existence of God through the notion of becoming is superior to
that of Plato, whose proof consists in the intelligible substratum of all intelligible things
(Ideas). Aristotle's explanation is frankly metaphysical, while Plato's is logical.

With reference to the nature of God, while Plato recognized in God the attribute of
modeler or fashioner of the material universe (Demiurge), and hence also recognized the
attribute of providence, these endowments are absent from the God of Aristotle.

Thus, though a development in metaphysics is achieved through Aristotle's proof for the
existence of God, in matters of religion Aristotle's contribution involves a step in reverse.
RefVI. Cosmology
Cosmology as a science of nature (it was called physics by Aristotle) is connected with
chemistry, physics and astronomy, sciences which were in a rudimentary state during the
time of Aristotle. As a consequence Aristotle's cosmology is the weakest part of his
philosophical system. We shall limit ourselves to giving a brief summary of this branch
of his teaching.

Aristotelian cosmology is based on the principle of the mover and the thing moved. It is
dualistic: God, Pure Act, immovable Mover, who transcends cosmic reality; and cosmic
reality, consisting of the heavens which rotate around the earth.

Every sphere of the heavens is formed of incorruptible matter. God moves the highest
sphere. The form of the sphere is round, and the spheres' movement is circular (the sphere
is considered as the most perfect body).

The earth, which is at the center of the universe (geocentric system), receives its
movement from the heavenly spheres, but it has characteristics opposed to them. It is
formed of the four essences of Empedocles, and its motion is from higher to lower or vice
versa. Movement, which comes from the heavenly bodies, is the proximate cause of all
the becoming in the world.

In the cosmology of Aristotle there are some theoretical points that are worthy of
consideration. Precisely because these points are theoretical they do not have essential
dependence upon his physics.

Change is the passage from potency to act and is of four kinds:

• Substantial (change of the substantial form, birth and death);

• Qualitative (change of some quality);
• Quantitative (increase or diminution); and
• Spacial (change of place and of any of the other species of motion).

Space is defined as the immovable limit of the surrounding body with respect to the body
surrounded.

Time is the measure of movement, the aspect of "before" and "after."

The so-called teleology (finality) of nature merits special consideration: nature does, as
far as is possible, always that which is more beautiful. The end of nature is the realization
of the form in matter, the development of potency into act; but this tendency will never
be completely realized because, with the exception of Pure Act (God), the act must exist
in potency.
VII. Psychology
Life is called soul by Aristotle, and is the form of organized matter, and the principle of
immanent action. Consequently, living beings are distinguished from minerals, whose
form is the principle of transient action.

Corresponding to the three hierarchical grades of living beings there are three forms of
psychic life:

• Vegetative life, proper to plants, whose operations are for the nourishment and
growth of the plants themselves;
• Sensitive life, proper to animals, which, besides nutrition and growth, have also
the faculty of locomotion and of sense; and
• Intellective life, proper to man, who, besides assuming the two inferior souls
(vegetative and sensitive), has also the faculty of knowing through universal
concepts.

Contrary to Plato, who affirmed that there are in man two distinct souls (one having two
aspects) and that the union of the rational soul with the body is accidental, Aristotle
vindicates the oneness of the soul, which is the form (entelechy) of the body and hence is
immanent in it.

The various functions proper to the vegetative and sensitive life are performed by the one
soul, which also has the capability of performing superior operations, of gaining
knowledge through concepts (intellectual cognition).

Cognitive Activities

There are two cognitive activities of the soul, and these give origin to two distinct types
of knowledge: sensible and intellective.

Sensible cognition, sensation, is objective and presupposes a physical fact, a contact of

the object with an organ or sense of the subject, who then transforms the physical contact
into a psychic act, or cognition of the object.

There are five senses, each of which perceives its proper sensible; the eye, for example,
apprehends light; the taste, sapidity.

Aristotle calls common sensibles those qualities of the object that can be perceived by
more than one sense organ -- size and shape, for instance, which can be perceived by the
senses of sight and touch.

To the sensitive faculties belong also the memory (the faculty which preserves images
already perceived) and the phantasy or imagination (the faculty which revives such
images and represents them in the absence of the object itself).
The proper object of sensitive knowledge is the individual, the particular, the
contingent and material thing.

The intellect, on the other hand, has as its object the universal, the necessary, the
immutable, the essences, the forms of things abstracted from their individuation.

But for Aristotle the intellect does not possess innate ideas. Contrary to the innatism
of Plato, Aristotle defends the theory of the tabula rasa (blank slate).

In its first awakening the intellect possesses no beautiful and formed ideas; it has only the
capacity for receiving ideas, and acquires them by abstraction from the data of the senses.
Sensation contains the universal concept "in potentia"; the intellect has the power of
enucleating the universal.

We are now confronted with two potencies which of themselves cannot be the cause of
the passage into act. Aristotle solves the difficulty by having recourse to an intellect
which he calls poieticos, the agent intellect, in which the intelligible species is in act.
This acts upon the so-called passive intellect (pateticos) and gives actuality to the concept
contained in potency in the sensation.

Analogous to cognitive activity, there are also two practical activities of the soul: the
appetite and the will. The appetite is a tendency toward a good presented by way of
sensitive cognition and is proper to the animal soul. The will is the impulse toward a
good guided by reason, and is proper to the rational soul.

The Immortality of the Soul

The question of the immortality of the human soul is one of the most obscure in the
doctrine of Aristotle. It appears in fact that he affirms the immortality of the active
intellect, which is one for all human beings; and denies it for the passive intellect, which
is individual and the immanent form of the body.

On the other hand, Aristotle admits that the proper object of the soul is the knowledge of
the universal, of the immaterial, of essences, and hence it is impossible to understand
how the individual soul can perish with the body.

The steps in Aristotle's reasoning on this point are not clear, and thus his interpreters have
divided them into opposing

: VIII. Ethics

Ethics, for Aristotle, has the purpose of establishing what is the end that man,
according to his nature, must attain, and also from what source his happiness
comes.
The end of man, as for every being, according to the doctrine established in
metaphysics, is the realization of the form, the attainment of the perfection due to
his nature.

Now man is a rational animal, and hence his end will be the attainment of wisdom.
The actions which bring one to the realization of this perfection of living according
to reason are called virtues. Virtue, for Aristotle, is not the end, but the means to
attain perfection, and consists in a conscious action fulfilled according to reason.

Aristotle distinguishes two types of virtue:

• Dianoetical, and
• Ethical.

Dianoetical (dia-noetics) concerns the perfection of reason in itself and therefore pertains
to such virtues as prudence and wisdom, which give us the absolute, metaphysical
knowledge of nature and of the universe in which we must act.

In the determination of ethical virtues, Aristotle is in conformity with the whole of Greek
Socratic-Platonic thought in which science or knowledge is virtue.

But Aristotle recognizes the fact that man is not pure reason, that he also has passions;
that he is a rational animal. In this, Aristotle goes far beyond the simple Greek
intellectualism of other philosophers.

The passions imply a sentimental, affective element, an organic tendency of our body. At
variance with Plato, Aristotle says that these tendencies should not be considered an evil,
and hence should not be annulled. If they are regulated by reason they concur in the
realization of the form and perfection which are due to man because of his nature.

The ethical virtues concern the activity of the passions controlled by reason.

The ethical virtues, according to Aristotle, consist in a just mean between two
extremes.

This just mean is not a sole and abstract rule, but is relative to circumstances. Thus
between prodigality and avarice there is the just mean of generosity; between abstinence
from and abuse of pleasures there is the mean of temperance. The rule of virtue is relative
in so far as what for a poor man is generosity may for a rich man be avarice.

The ethical virtues include another element, constancy. One swallow, says Aristotle,
does not make spring. (One performance of an action does not make a habit.) Thus it is
not enough to perform one act of generosity in order to be generous; it is necessary to act
constantly according to the dictates of reason.
Constancy induces what Aristotle calls habit, a constant right moral disposition. Habit is
acquired by the repetition of acts. The ethical virtues are based on natural dispositions,
and with assiduous repetition they become mechanical, so to speak; they become second
nature.

In this way a habit of virtue or vice may be contracted through repeated acts of virtue or
vice. It is thus clear that Aristotelian morality is essentially rational, a system which tends
to organize all human activity according to reason.

Happiness consists in this rational activity. It can be lacking, and this absence can make a
man poor, but not miserable.

IX. Politics

Aristotle's politics is the coronation of his moral teaching. If the end of man is his moral
perfection, he needs the aid of his fellow creatures in order to attain conservation and
perfection. Hence the definition of man as a political animal, who is ordained by nature
to the polis, the state.

This natural tendency to live with his fellow men first brings about the organization of an
imperfect society, the family, which chronologically and historically precedes the state as
the parts precede the whole.

According to Aristotle, and contrary to Plato, the family is natural to man, and private
property is necessary for the family. The family is composed of four elements:

• children
• wife
• goods
• slaves

The head of the family, naturally, takes care of the direction of all. He must guide the
children and women by reason of their imperfection. He must bring forth profit from his
goods, and in order to make his property productive he needs inanimate and animate
instruments. The latter would be his slaves.

The low opinion in which Grecians held manual labor induced Aristotle to admit slavery.
Thus Aristotle divides man into two classes: free and slave. The first are given to the
liberal arts; and the second, to whom all liberal education is closed, take charge of
manual labor.

Aristotle, as well as Plato, considers the state an ethico-spiritual institution.

The duty of the state is to provide citizens with such material goods as the individual
and collective defense and security, the possibility of self-development, which would
not be otherwise available. But above all it is to direct men to the attainment of
happiness through virtue.

The state must above all educate; Aristotle criticizes the Spartan state and the "Republic"
of Plato which, instead of being concerned with the bettering of citizens through their
peaceful and scientific education, were preoccupied with wars of conquest.

Education, for Aristotle, is the harmonious development of all the activities of man
-- first, his spiritual activities, and subordinately to them, the material and physical
ones; first, knowledge, in which virtue consists, and then gymnastic exercises.

With a greater historical sense than Plato, Aristotle does not describe an ideal form of the
state in his "Politics." He distinguishes three principal types of state:

• monarchical government, which is government by one person -- the character and

power of monarchical government consist in its unity, and its degeneracy results
in tyranny;
• aristocratic government, which is government by a few -- its character and power
consist in the qualities of the persons who govern, and these should be the best,
and their degeneracy results in oligarchy; and
• polyarchical government, which is government by many -- its character and
power lie in liberty, and its degeneracy results in demagogy.

All these forms of government are good according to the ages, conditions, and needs of
the people, provided the end of the state be attained, happiness through virtue.

Aristotle's preference seems to be for a form of intellectual democratic government,

which would be what in his moral teaching he calls the just mean.

X. Religion and Art

Aristotle presents us with the religious cult of Pure Act and astral intelligences, which
animate the celestial bodies. Pure Act, which is not a creator and which ignores terrestrial
becoming and hence is not divine providence, can be the object only of a rational cult.

Astral intelligences, which have a true influence upon cosmic becoming, would give
place to a physical religion. Religious teaching in Aristotle is inferior to Plato.

Popular religion is not justified by Aristotle's metaphysics and, with Plato, Aristotle
opposes mythical polytheism. He is nevertheless induced to admit the traditional Grecian
religion which, even though not justified metaphysically, is a means of educating the
people.

Art for Aristotle is imitation. But he proposes a different basis for this imitation than does
Plato. Art does not tend to imitate the contingent element of nature, but the
intelligible, that which in nature is rational and universal.

The artist must look not at nature as it is presented, because this model is always
imperfect, but he must look at what it ought to be. He must imitate this ideal type of
reality. This concept established, art, for the Stagirite, contrary to Plato, has a high
educative value.

Even when the clash of violent contrast is presented in tragedy, art awakens in the soul
the ideal type of reality, and hence, rather than stir up the passions, frees the soul from
disturbances (catharsis) which have their origin in the passions.

XI. Deficiencies of the System of Aristotle

The metaphysics of Aristotle has as its historical and logical precedent the system of
Plato, whom Aristotle tries to surpass. The problem which troubled Plato most was the
reconciliation of the "being" of Parmenides with the "becoming" of Heraclitus, and that
Plato solved this problem with a metaphysical dualism (Ideas -- non-being) and
interposed between these two points the work of Demiurge, which effect the becoming.

For the world of Ideas Aristotle substitutes the concept of Pure Act; he replaces Platonic
non-being, an irrational reality, with the concept of potentiality, or tendency toward new
perfection (act). The great merit of Aristotle consists in this surpassing of Plato's
system; this is his finest contribution to metaphysics.

But metaphysical dualism is present in Aristotle no less than in Plato. Aristotle's Pure Act
is completely separate from potency; Pure Act is not the creator of potency; it ignores the
existence of potency and the tendency of potency toward act or perfection. This tendency
of potency is directed toward Pure Act, since the latter is the efficient and final cause of
the former.

Yet Pure Act knows nothing of its own causality. What is the origin of this potency,
which is no mere nothing, from the moment it possesses the potency to be something?

This is the great question which remains unanswered in Aristotle because he did not have
a concept of creation in which potency and act arise from nothingness through the
volitional act of Pure Act.

It is useful to point out another deficiency in Aristotle regarding the concept of form, or
entelechy, as he calls it. For Aristotle entelechy is the form immanent in matter, in which
it develops itself according to its own nature. There is no doubt that the concept of
entelechy -- as a principle which limits and determines the possibilities of matter -- is the
most outstanding and original contribution which Aristotle gave to philosophy.

However, the historian of philosophy has to note that it is exactly this fundamental
Aristotelian concept that has caused one of the most profound crises of thought in regard
to the human soul.

According to Aristotle's famous definition the human soul is "the entelechy of a natural
body having life potentially within it." (1) Now Aristotle himself acknowledges that the
nature of the human soul is not such that the soul is limited to the organic operations of
the vegetative and sensitive life; the soul also possesses understanding, which is an
operation "unmixed" with matter and is "divine."

Thus it would be expected that Aristotle, who gave the concept of a form acting in
dependence on matter, would expound also the nature of a form independent of matter; in
other words, Aristotle should have made clear what is the nature of the intellective soul in
itself and in its relations with the human body.

Unfortunately this was not done, and such a lack was to give origin to the question of the
separated intellect.

XII. Aristotelianism
The literary activity of Aristotle was a complexus of philosophy and of the sciences. The
ages immediately following him placed greater stress on scientific development by given
an empirical bent to the Peripatetic School. This was in keeping with the times. The first
to direct the Lyceum after Aristotle was Theophrastus, who wrote a book on plants.

Philosophically, Theophrastus' system did not have developments of significance. The

Peripatetics can be considered as commentators on Aristotle, with the intent of giving
development to this or that part of his system, but without departing from the ensemble of
his metaphysics.

Thus we record as commentators on Aristotle Alexander of Aphrodisias (second century

A.D.), who interpreted the doctrine of the Stagirite in a naturalistic manner, denying the
immortality of the soul and the finality of the world. This is an interpretation which was
to pass into Arabian philosophy and beyond Greek thought.

Aristotelianism was to have its greatest success and its ultimate development outside
Greek thought, in Christian thinking. Thomistic Scholasticism drew from the depths of
the Peripatetic system its logical theistic conclusions, which are the rational basis of
Christianity.
Aristotle's View of Politics
Political science studies the tasks of the politician or statesman (politikos), in much the
way that medical science concerns the work of the physician (see Politics IV.1). It is, in
fact, the body of knowledge that such practitioners, if truly expert, will also wield in
pursuing their tasks. The most important task for the politician is, in the role of lawgiver
(nomothetês), to frame the appropriate constitution for the city-state. This involves
enduring laws, customs, and institutions (including a system of moral education) for the
citizens. Once the constitution is in place, the politician needs to take the appropriate
measures to maintain it, to introduce reforms when he finds them necessary, and to
prevent developments which might subvert the political system. This is the province of
legislative science, which Aristotle regards as more important than politics as exercised
in everyday political activity such as the passing of decrees (see EN VI.8).

Aristotle frequently compares the politician to a craftsman. The analogy is imprecise

because politics, in the strict sense of legislative science, is a form of practical
knowledge, while a craft like architecture or medicine is a form of productive knowledge.
However, the comparison is valid to the extent that the politician produces, operates,
maintains a legal system according to universal principles (EN VI.8 and X.9). In order to
appreciate this analogy it is helpful to observe that Aristotle explains production of an
artifact in terms of four causes: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes (Phys. II.3
and Met. A.2). For example, clay (material cause) is molded into a vase shape (formal
cause) by a potter (efficient or moving cause) so that it can contain liquid (final cause).
(For discussion of the four causes see the entry on Aristotle's physics.)

One can also explain the existence of the city-state in terms of the four causes. It is a kind
of community (koinônia), that is, a collection of parts having some functions and interests
in common (Pol. II.1.1261a18, III.1.1275b20). Hence, it is made up of parts, which
Aristotle describes in various ways in different contexts: as households, or economic
classes (e.g., the rich and the poor), or demes (i.e., local political units). But, ultimately,
the city-state is composed of individual citizens (see III.1.1274a38-41), who, along with
natural resources, are the "material" or "equipment" out of which the city-state is
fashioned (see VII.14.1325b38-41).

The formal cause of the city-state is its constitution (politeia). Aristotle defines the
constitution as "a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state" (III.1.1274b32-41).
He also speaks of the constitution of a community as "the form of the compound" and
argues that whether the community is the same over time depends on whether it has the
same constitution (III.3.1276b1-11). The constitution is not a written document, but an
immanent organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an organism. Hence, the
constitution is also "the way of life" of the citizens (IV.11.1295a40-b1, VII.8.1328b1-2).
Here the citizens are that minority of the resident population who are adults with full
political rights.

The existence of the city-state also requires an efficient cause, namely, its ruler. On
Aristotle's view, a community of any sort can possess order only if it has a ruling element
or authority. This ruling principle is defined by the constitution, which sets criteria for
political offices, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8-10; cf. IV.1.1289a15-18).
However, on a deeper level, there must be an efficient cause to explain why a city-state
acquires its constitution in the first place. Aristotle states that "the person who first
established [the city-state] is the cause of very great benefits" (I.2.1253a30-1). This
person was evidently the lawgiver (nomothetês), someone like Solon of Athens or
Lycurgus of Sparta, who founded the constitution. Aristotle compares the lawgiver, or the
politician more generally, to a craftsman (dêmiourgos) like a weaver or shipbuilder, who
fashions material into a finished product (II.12.1273b32-3, VII.4.1325b40-1365a5).

The notion of final cause dominates Aristotle's Politics from the opening lines:

Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that every community is
established for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what
they believe to be good), it is clear that every community aims at some good, and the
community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims highest,
that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is called the city-state or political
community. [I.1.1252a1-7]

Soon after, he states that the city-state comes into being for the sake of life but exists for
the sake of the good life (2.1252b29-30). The theme that the good life or happiness is the
proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the Politics (III.6.1278b17-24, 9.1280b39;
VII.2.1325a7-10).

To sum up, the city-state is a hylomorphic (i.e., matter-form) compound of a particular

population (i.e., citizen-body) in a given territory (material cause) and a constitution
(formal cause). The constitution itself is fashioned by the lawgiver and is governed by
politicians, who are like craftsmen (efficient cause), and the constitution defines the aim
of the city-state (final cause, IV.1.1289a17-18). For a further discussion of this topic, see
the following supplementary document:

Supplement: Presuppositions of Aristotle's Politics

It is in these terms that Aristotle understands the fundamental normative problem of

politics: What constitutional form should the lawgiver and politician establish and
preserve in what material for the sake of what end?

3. General Theory of Constitutions and Citizenship

Aristotle states that "the politician and lawgiver is wholly occupied with the city-state,
and the constitution is a certain way of organizing those who inhabit the city-state"
(III.1.1274b36-8). His general theory of constitutions is set forth in Politics III. He begins
with a definition of the citizen (politês), since the city-state is by nature a collective
entity, a multitude of citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants, such as
resident aliens and slaves; and even children and seniors are not unqualified citizens (nor
are most ordinary workers). After further analysis he defines the citizen as a person who
has the right (exousia) to participate in deliberative or judicial office (1275b18-21). In
Athens, for example, citizens had the right to attend the assembly, the council, and other
bodies, or to sit on juries. The Athenian system differed from a modern representative
democracy in that the citizens were more directly involved in governing. Although full
citizenship tended to be restricted in the Greek city-states (with women, slaves,
foreigners, and some others excluded), the citizens were more deeply enfranchised than
in modern representative democracies because they were more directly involved in
governing. This is reflected in Aristotle's definition of the citizen (without qualification).
Further, he defines the city-state (in the unqualified sense) as a multitude of such citizens
which is adequate for a self-sufficient life (1275b20-21).

Aristotle defines the constitution as a way of organizing the offices of the city-state,
particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8-10; cf. IV.1.1289a15-18). The constitution
thus defines the governing body, which takes different forms: for example, in a
democracy it is the people, and in an oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well
born). Before attempting to distinguish and evaluate various constitutions Aristotle
considers two questions. First, why does a city-state come into being? He recalls the
thesis, defended in Politics I.2, that human beings are by nature political animals, who
naturally want to live together. For a further discussion of this topic, see the following
supplementary document:

Supplement: Political Naturalism

He then adds that "the common advantage also brings them together insofar as they each
attain the noble life. This is above all the end for all both in common and separately."
(III.6.1278b19-24) Second, what are the different forms of rule by which one individual
or group can rule over another? Aristotle distinguishes several types. He first considers
despotic rule, which is exemplified in the master-slave relationship. Aristotle thinks that
this form of rule is justified in the case of natural slaves who (he asserts without
evidence) lack a deliberative faculty and thus need a natural master to direct them
(I.13.1260a12; slavery is defended at length in Politics I.4-8). Although a natural slave
allegedly benefits from having a master, despotic rule is still primarily for the sake of the
master and only incidentally for the slave (III.6.1278b32-7). (Aristotle provides no
argument for this: if some persons are congenitally incapable of self-governance, why
should they not be ruled primarily for their own sakes?) He next considers paternal and
marital rule, which he also views as defensible: "the male is by nature more capable of
leadership than the female, unless he is constituted in some way contrary to nature, and
the elder and perfect [is by nature more capable of leadership] than the younger and
imperfect." (I.12.1259a39-b4) Aristotle is persuasive when he argues that children need
adult supervision because their rationality is "imperfect" (ateles) or immature. But he also
alleges (without substantiation) that, although women have a deliberative faculty, it is
"without authority" (akuron), so that females require male leadership (I.13.1260a13-14).
(Aristotle's arguments about slaves and women appear so weak that some commentators
take them to be ironic. However, what is obvious to a modern reader need not have been
so to an ancient Greek, so that it is not necessary to suppose that Aristotle's discussion is
ironic.) It is noteworthy, however, that paternal and marital rule are properly practiced for
the sake of the ruled (for the sake of the child and of the wife respectively), just as arts
like medicine or gymnastics are practiced for the sake of the patient (III.6.1278b37-
1279a1). In this respect they resemble political rule, which involves equal and similar
citizens taking turns in ruling for one another's advantage (1279a8-13). This sets the stage
for the fundamental claim of Aristotle's constitutional theory: "constitutions which aim at
the common advantage are correct and just without qualification, whereas those which
aim only at the advantage of the rulers are deviant and unjust, because they involve
despotic rule which is inappropriate for a community of free persons" (1279a17-21).

The distinction between correct and deviant constitutions is combined with the
observation that the government may consist of one person, a few, or a multitude. Hence,
there are six possible constitutional forms (Politics I.7):

Correct Deviant
One Ruler Kingship Tyranny
Few Rulers Aristocracy Oligarchy
Many Rulers Polity Democracy

This six-fold classification (which is adapted from Plato's Statesman) sets the stage for
Aristotle's inquiry into the best constitution, although it is modified in various ways
throughout the Politics. For example, he observes that the dominant class in oligarchy
(literally rule of the oligoi, i.e., few) is typically the wealthy, whereas in democracy
(literally rule of the dêmos, i.e., people) it is the poor, so that these economic classes
should be included in the definition of these forms (see Politics III.8, IV.4, and VI.2 for
alternative accounts). Also, polity is later characterized as a kind of "mixed" constitution
typified by rule of the "middle" group of citizens, a moderately wealthy class between the
rich and poor (Politics IV.11).

Aristotle turns to arguments for and against the different constitutions, which he views as
different applications of the principle of distributive justice (III.9.1280a7-22). Everyone
agrees, he says, that justice involves treating equal persons equally, and treating unequal
persons unequally, but they do not agree on the standard by which individuals are
deemed to be equally (or unequally) meritorious or deserving. He assumes his own
analysis of distributive justice set forth in Nicomachean Ethics V.3: Justice requires that
benefits be distributed to individuals in proportion to their merit or desert. The oligarchs
mistakenly think that those who are superior in wealth should also have superior political
rights, whereas the democrats hold that those who are equal in free birth should also have
equal political rights. Both of these conceptions of political justice are mistaken in
Aristotle's view, because they assume a false conception of the ultimate end of the city-
state. The city-state is neither a business association to maximize wealth (as the oligarchs
suppose) nor an agency to promote liberty and equality (as the democrats maintain).
Instead, Aristotle argues, "the good life is the end of the city-state," that is, a life
consisting of noble actions (1280b39-1281a4). Hence, the correct conception of justice is
aristocratic, assigning political rights to those who make a full contribution to the
political community, that is, to those with virtue as well as property and freedom
(1281a4-8). This is what Aristotle understands by an "aristocratic" constitution: literally,
the rule of the aristoi, i.e., best persons. Aristotle explores the implications of this
argument in the remainder of Politics III, considering the rival claims of the rule of law
and the rule of a supremely virtuous individual. Here absolute kingship is a limiting case
of aristocracy. Again, in books VII-VIII, Aristotle describes the ideal constitution in
which the citizens are fully virtuous.

4. Study of Specific Constitutions

The purpose of political science is to guide "the good lawgiver and the true politician"
(IV.1.1288b27). Like any complete science or craft, it must study a range of issues
concerning its subject matter. For example, gymnastics (physical training) studies what
sort of training is advantageous for what sort of body, what sort of training is best or
adapted to the body that is naturally the best, what sort of training is best for most bodies,
and what capacity is appropriate for someone who does not want the condition or
knowledge appropriate for athletic contests. Political science studies a comparable range
of constitutions (1288b21-35): first, the constitution which is best without qualification,
i.e., "most according to our prayers with no external impediment"; second, the
constitution that is best under the circumstances "for it is probably impossible for many
persons to attain the best constitution"; third, the constitution which serves the aim a
given city-state population happens to have, i.e., the one that is best "based on a
hypothesis": "for [the political scientist] ought to be able to study a given constitution,
both how it might originally come to be, and, when it has come to be, in what manner it
might be preserved for the longest time; I mean, for example, if a particular city happens
neither to be governed by the best constitution, nor to be equipped even with necessary
things, nor to be the [best] possible under existing circumstances, but to be a baser sort."

Hence, Aristotelian political science is not confined to the ideal system, but also
investigates the second-best constitution, the one which is the best that most city-states
are capable of supporting. For it is the closest approximation to full political justice
which the lawgiver can attain under the circumstances. Although Aristotle's political
views were influenced by his teacher Plato, he is very critical of the ideal city-state set
forth in Plato's Republic on the grounds that it overvalues political unity, it embraces a
system of communism that is impractical and inimical to human nature, and it neglects
the happiness of the individual citizens (Politics II.1-5). In contrast, in Aristotle's own
"best constitution" (described in Politics VII-VIII) each and every citizen will possess
moral virtue and the equipment to carry it out in practice, and thereby attain a life of
excellence and complete happiness (see VII.13.1332a32-8). All of the citizens will hold
political office and possess private property because "one should call the city-state happy
not by looking at a part of it but at all the citizens." (VII.9.1329a22-3). Moreover, there
will be a common system of education for all the citizens, because they share the same
end (Pol. VIII.1). But if (as is the case with most city-states) the population lacks the
capacities and resources for complete happiness, the lawgiver must be content with
fashioning a suitable constitution (Politics IV.11). The second-best system typically takes
the form of a polity (in which citizens possess an inferior, more common grade of virtue)
or mixed constitution (combining features of democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy, so
that no group of citizens is in a position to abuse its rights).

In addition, the political scientist must understand existing constitutions even when they
are bad. Aristotle adds that "to reform a constitution is no less a task [of politics] than it is
to establish one from the beginning," and in this way "the politician should also help
existing constitutions." (IV.1.1289a1-7) The political scientist should also be cognizant of
forces of political change which can undermine an existing regime. Aristotle criticizes his
predecessors for excessive utopianism and neglect of the practical duties of a political
theorist. However, he is no Machiavellian. The best constitution still serves as a
regulative ideal by which to evaluate existing systems.

These topics occupy the remainder of the Politics. Books IV-VI are concerned with the
existing constitutions: that is, the three deviant constitutions, as well as polity or the
mixed constitution, the best attainable under most circumstances (IV.2.1289a26-38). The
whole of book V investigates political change and revolution. Books VII-VIII are
devoted to the ideal constitution. As might be expected, Aristotle's attempt to carry out
this program involves many difficulties, and scholars disagree about how the two series
of books (IV-VI and VII-VIII) are related to each other: for example, which were written
first, which were intended to be read first, and whether they are ultimately consistent with
each other. For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary
document:

Supplement: Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle's Politics

Aristotle's Politics did not have an immediate impact because it defended the Greek city-
state, which was already becoming obsolete in his own lifetime. (As mentioned above,
the Greek city-states permanently lost their independence due to the conquest by the
kings of Macedon.) For similar reasons much of his discussion of particular political
institutions is not directly applicable to modern nation-states (apart from his
objectionable defenses of slavery, female subservience, and disenfranchisement of the
working classes). Even so, Aristotle's Politics has had a deep influence on political
philosophy until the present day, because it contains deep and thought-provoking
discussions of perennial concerns of political philosophy: the role of human nature in
politics, the relation of the individual to the state, the place of morality in politics, the
theory of political justice, the rule of law, the analysis and evaluation of constitutions, the
relevance of ideals to practical politics, the causes and cures of political change and
revolution, and the importance of a morally educated citizenry.

Definition and Structure of the State

by Aristotle
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a
view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good.
But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the
highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any
other, and at the highest good.

Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master
are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects.
For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a
household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference
between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the
king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a
king; when, according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled
in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who
considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other
departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the
simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of
which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule
differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one
of them.

He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything
else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those
who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may
continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in
common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave
behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be
preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be
lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a
subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature
has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the
smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single
use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But
among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no
natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore
the poets say, --

It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing
to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says, --
 First house and wife and an ox for the plough,

for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for
the supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas
'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the
manger.' But when several families are united, and the association aims at something
more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the
most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed
of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And
this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the
Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are.
Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly
form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says: --

Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that
the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under
the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life
to be like their own.

When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be
nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs
of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier
forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a
thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether
we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing
is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a
political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is
either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the

Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,

whom Homer denounces -- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be
compared to an isolated piece at draughts.

Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is
evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal
whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an
indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature
attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another,
and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and
inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of
man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the
association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the
whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there
will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand;
for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their
working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer
have their proper quality, but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state
is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is
not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is
unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be
either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by
nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man,
when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the
worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with
arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends.
Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals,
and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for the
administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of
order in political society.

Justice is Essential to the State

by Aristotle

Let us now turn to ... the conceptions of justice held by advocates of oligarchy and of
democracy. Oligarchs and democrats all cling to some idea of justice or other, but their
thinking does not go far enough to grasp the true concept of justice in its entirety. The
democrats believe that justice implies equality -- and so it does, but only for those who
are equal, not for everybody. The oligarchs, on the other hand, believe that justice implies
inequality -- and so it does, but only for those who are unequal, not for everybody. Both
sides judge erroneously because they do not specify the class of persons to which their
principles apply. that is because such judgments affect their own interests, and most men
are rather bad judges where their own interests are involved. For justice involves persons
-- a just distribution being one in which [the value of] the things distributed corresponds
to [the worth of] the persons receiving them, as has already been said in the Ethics; and
although the two parties agree on what constitutes equality in things, they are at odds on
what constitutes equality in persons. The main reason for such disagreement is the one
here stated, namely that both parties judge badly of what most nearly concerns them; but
there is also another reason, that because each party is espousing some limited conception
of justice, each thinks of itself as espousing some limited conception of justice, each
thinks of itself as espousing judtice absolutely. The oligarchs think that because they are
superior in one respect -- say wealth -- they are superior in all; while the democrats think
tht because they are equal with others in one respect -- say in being [born] free -- they are
equal in all. Both sides ignore, however, the really cardinal qustion [of the end for which
the state exists].

Now if men came together and formed a [political] association for the sake of wealth
alone, then their shares in the state would be proportionate to the amounts they possessed,
and the oligarchical argument would be valid -- viz. that it is not right for a person who
contributes the hundredth of an investment to receive the same returns, either in principal
or in profits, as he who has contributed the other ninety-nine one-hundredths. The state
exists, however, not merely that men may live but that they may live well; were it not so,
then slaves and the lower animals might form a state -- in impossibility, since they share
neither in 'true felicity' (eudaimonia) nor in life guided by 'moral purpose' (proairesis).

Nor again does a state exist merely as a defensive alliance to secure its members against
all injury, nor yet for the sake of exchange and economic intercourse; otherwise the
Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians and all other nations having such relations with one
another could be regarded as citizens of one inclusive state. It is true that they have
customs agreements, compacts against mutual injury, and written articles of defensive
alliance. But there are no common law-enforcing bodies to uphold such agreements; the
power of enforcement being limited to the internal affairs of each state. Moreover, neither
of the contracting states cares about the moral character of the citizens of the other --
about ridding them of all unjust and evil tendencies -- but cares only about preventing
violations of the compact. Those who really think in terms of good government, on the
other hand, have a concern for [the more fundamental issue of] virtue and vice in
individuals. Whence it is plain that a state which is truly and not superficailly so called
must be concerned with virtue; for where this concern is lacking, a political community
degenerates into a mere alliance, differing only in spatial extent from those alliances
whose members [are states an] live apart; while law degenerates into a mere compact --
"a guarantor of mutual rights," in Lycophron the Sophist's phrase -- without any power to
produce goodness and justice in its citizens.