Sy-Quia v.

Sheriff of Ilocos Sur

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff of Ilocos Sur to proceed with a chattel
mortgage foreclosure sale. On 3 Feb 1915, Cheng-Laco and ChengKiangco executed a chattel mortgage in
favor of the petitioner, Sy-Quia on their mercantile establishment, including the merchandise therein, as
security for a 6k debt. The mortgage was recorded on the date of its execution and fell due on 3 Feb 1917. An
agreement was made that the mortgagors were allowed to sell the merchandise replenishing their stock and
that the new stock brought in should also be subject to the mortgage. On 5 May 1924, Cheng-Laco executed
another chattel mortgage on the same establishment and all its contents in favor of the respondent De Leon
(De Leon) as security for the sum of P4,900, which mortgage was recorded on 4 May 1924. The petitioner, in
writing, requested the sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged property and to sell it at public auction under
Sec. 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508). The sheriff seized the establishment and fixed the date of
the sale on 2 June 1924. Afterwards, De Leon presented an adverse claim to the property by virtue of his
chattel mortgage, alleging that all the goods on which the chattel mortgage of Sy-Quia was given had been
sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon was executed and that the earlier chattel mortgage
was of no effect. The sheriff, in doubt as to the conflicting claims, suspended the foreclosure proceedings and
brought an action

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint for interpleader was proper?

YES. Ruling: Plaintiffs entirely missed the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 62, section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the subject
matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants." While PHHC and GSIS may
have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and ownership of
Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No
allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy
to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or
amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability, and
recognition or non-enforceability and nonrecognition of the turnover agreement of December 27, 1961 between
the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely
socalled, are between the two corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in
conformity and had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court that the SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo,
1st Sem, 2010-2011)
under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the two claimants to interplead.

Issue: W/N the sheriff was correct in suspending the sale and bringing an action requiring the 2 claimants to
interplead

Held: YES. Court held that it would’ve been better practice for the sheriff to sell the property and hold the
proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, the court would still not justify
interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he sold the goods
without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not appear that the petitioner offered to give
bond to hold him harmless in such an event. His action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the
action of interpleader seems justified. In cases like this, the petition for mandamus should be addressed to the
Courts of First Instance rather than to this court. The petition is denied with the costs against the petitioner.

Ocampo v. Tirona

Facts: Ocampo bought the subject parcel of land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the registered owner Alipio
Breton Cruz. Tirona, tenant of Breton, was informed of this arrangement and started paying Ocampo rent.
Some months thereafter, Ocampo received a letter from Callejo Law Office stating that Tirona will stop paying
rent because the area has been declared under area for priority development. Ocampo then wrote a demand
letter for payment of rental. Despite receipt of said letter, Tirona failed and refused and still fails and refuses to
heed Ocampo’s demands. Ocampo then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona
before the MTC. Tirona answered by asserting that Dona Yaneza was the owner, not Ocampo. Tirona
subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend her answer because a lawyer did not assist her in her initial
answer. In her amended answer, Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. Tirona
also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale of the land. MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo
because of non-payment of rent and because of the termination of Tirona’s right to possess and occupy the
subject land. Tirona changed theory in the RTC and raised that it was Rosauro’s sister Ma. Lourdes who could
validly sell the land to Ocampo. The court did not believe her and still ruled in favor of Ocampo. CA considered
partition of the estate of Alipio as a prerequisite to Ocampo’s action so it reversed the decision of the MTC and
RTC.

Issue: Who has the right of possession of the subject land? What should have been filed by Tirona to show
good faith of Tirona in not paying rent?

Decision: Ocampo has a better right. All the elements of unlawful detainer are present. Tirona obviously is in
bad faith. The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola when
Ocampo informed her earlier that the land has already been sold to him. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have
used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual
institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper
when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property
Note: The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in
his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the
persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the
other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a
double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves,
there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading
which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
G.R. No. 70145 November 13, 1986

MARCELO A. MESINA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity
as Judge of Regional Trial Court — Manila (Branch VIII), JOSE GO, and ALBERT UY, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC for short), now
the Court of Appeals (CA) in AC-G.R. S.P. 04710, dated Jan. 22, 1985, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by Marcelo A. Mesina against the trial court in Civil Case No. 84-22515. Said
case (an Interpleader) was filed by Associated Bank against Jose Go and Marcelo A. Mesina regarding their
conflicting claims over Associated Bank Cashier's Check No. 011302 for P800,000.00, dated December 29,
1983.

Briefly, the facts and statement of the case are as follows:

Respondent Jose Go, on December 29, 1983, purchased from Associated Bank Cashier's Check No. 011302
for P800,000.00. Unfortunately, Jose Go left said check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he
left the bank. The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain Albert Uy,
who had then a visitor in the person of Alexander Lim. Uy had to answer a phone call on a nearby telephone
after which he proceeded to the men's room. When he returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone.
When Jose Go inquired for his cashier's check from Albert Uy, the check was not in his folder and nowhere to
be found. The latter advised Jose Go to go to the bank to accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order, which
suggestion Jose Go immediately followed. He also executed an affidavit of loss. Albert Uy went to the police to
report the loss of the check, pointing to the person of Alexander Lim as the one who could shed light on it.

The records of the police show that Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing on December 31,
1983, coming from Prudential Bank, Escolta Branch. The check was immediately dishonored by Associated
Bank by sending it back to Prudential Bank, with the words "Payment Stopped" stamped on it. However, the
same was again returned to Associated Bank on January 4, 1984 and for the second time it was dishonored.
Several days later, respondent Associated Bank received a letter, dated January 9, 1984, from a certain Atty.
Lorenzo Navarro demanding payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being held by his client.
He however refused to reveal the name of his client and threatened to sue, if payment is not made.
Respondent bank, in its letter, dated January 20, 1984, replied saying the check belonged to Jose Go who lost
it in the bank and is laying claim to it.

On February 1, 1984, police sent a letter to the Manager of the Prudential Bank, Escolta Branch, requesting
assistance in Identifying the person who tried to encash the check but said bank refused saying that it had to
protect its client's interest and the Identity could only be revealed with the client's conformity. Unsure of what to
do on the matter, respondent Associated Bank on February 2, 1984 filed an action for Interpleader naming as
respondent, Jose Go and one John Doe, Atty. Navarro's then unnamed client. On even date, respondent bank
received summons and copy of the complaint for damages of a certain Marcelo A. Mesina from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City filed on January 23, 1984 bearing the number C-11139. Respondent bank
moved to amend its complaint, having been notified for the first time of the name of Atty. Navarro's client and
substituted Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe. Simultaneously, respondent bank, thru representative Albert Uy,
informed Cpl. Gimao of the Western Police District that the lost check of Jose Go is in the possession of
Marcelo Mesina, herein petitioner. When Cpl. Gimao went to Marcelo Mesina to ask how he came to possess
the check, he said it was paid to him by Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate
further. An information for theft (Annex J) was instituted against Alexander Lim and the corresponding warrant
for his arrest was issued (Annex 6-A) which up to the date of the filing of this instant petition remains unserved
because of Alexander Lim's successful evation thereof.
Meanwhile, Jose Go filed his answer on February 24, 1984 in the Interpleader Case and moved to participate
as intervenor in the complain for damages. Albert Uy filed a motion of intervention and answer in the complaint
for Interpleader. On the Scheduled date of pretrial conference inthe interpleader case, it was disclosed that the
"John Doe" impleaded as one of the defendants is actually petitioner Marcelo A. Mesina. Petitioner instead of
filing his answer to the complaint in the interpleader filed on May 17, 1984 an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abudante Cautela alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the absence of an order to litigate, failure to state a
cause of action and lack of personality to sue. Respondent bank in the other civil case (CC-11139) for
damages moved to dismiss suit in view of the existence already of the Interpleader case.

The trial court in the interpleader case issued an order dated July 13, 1984, denying the motion to dismiss of
petitioner Mesina and ruling that respondent bank's complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for
itnerpleader. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on September
26, 1984. Upon motion for respondent Jose Go dated October 31, 1984, respondent judge issued an order on
November 6, 1984, declaring petitioner in default since his period to answer has already expirecd and set
the ex-parte presentation of respondent bank's evidence on November 7, 1984.

Petitioner Mesina filed a petition for certioari with preliminary injunction with IAC to set aside 1) order of
respondent court denying his omnibus Motion to Dismiss 2) order of 3) the order of default against him.

On January 22, 1985, IAC rendered its decision dimissing the petition for certiorari. Petitioner Mesina filed his
Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the same court in its resolution dated February 18, 1985.

Meanwhile, on same date (February 18, 1985), the trial court in Civil Case #84-22515 (Interpleader) rendered
a decisio, the dispositive portion reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff

Associate Bank to replace Cashier's Check No. 011302 in favor of Jose Go or its cas equivalent
with legal rate of itnerest from date of complaint, and with costs of suit against the latter.

SO ORDERED.

On March 29, 1985, the trial court in Civil Case No. C-11139, for damages, issued an order, the
pertinent portion of which states:

The records of this case show that on August 20, 1984 proceedings in this case was (were)
ordered suspended because the main issue in Civil Case No. 84-22515 and in this instant case
are the same which is: who between Marcelo Mesina and Jose Go is entitled to payment of
Associated Bank's Cashier's Check No. CC-011302? Said issue having been resolved already
in Civil casde No. 84-22515, really this instant case has become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion sholud be as it is hereby granted and this
case is ordered dismissed.

In view of the foregoing ruling no more action should be taken on the "Motion For
Reconsideration (of the order admitting the Intervention)" dated June 21, 1984 as well as the
Motion For Reconsideration dated September 10, 1984.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner now comes to Us, alleging that:

1. IAC erred in ruling that a cashier's check can be countermanded even in the hands of a holder in due
course.
2. IAC erred in countenancing the filing and maintenance of an interpleader suit by a party who had earlier
been sued on the same claim.

3. IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner as in default when there was no proper
order for him to plead in the interpleader complaint.

4. IAC went beyond the scope of its certiorari jurisdiction by making findings of facts in advance of trial.

Petitioner now interposes the following prayer:

1. Reverse the decision of the IAC, dated January 22, 1985 and set aside the February 18, 1985 resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

2. Annul the orders of respondent Judge of RTC Manila giving due course to the interpleader suit and declaring
petitioner in default.

Petitioner's allegations hold no water. Theories and examples advanced by petitioner on causes and effects of
a cashier's check such as 1) it cannot be countermanded in the hands of a holder in due course and 2) a
cashier's check is a bill of exchange drawn by the bank against itself-are general principles which cannot be
aptly applied to the case at bar, without considering other things. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that
he is a holder in due course and for consideration or value as shown by the established facts of the case.
Admittedly, petitioner became the holder of the cashier's check as endorsed by Alexander Lim who stole the
check. He refused to say how and why it was passed to him. He had therefore notice of the defect of his title
over the check from the start. The holder of a cashier's check who is not a holder in due course cannot enforce
such check against the issuing bank which dishonors the same. If a payee of a cashier's check obtained it from
the issuing bank by fraud, or if there is some other reason why the payee is not entitled to collect the check,
the respondent bank would, of course, have the right to refuse payment of the check when presented by the
payee, since respondent bank was aware of the facts surrounding the loss of the check in question. Moreover,
there is no similarity in the cases cited by petitioner since respondent bank did not issue the cashier's check in
payment of its obligation. Jose Go bought it from respondent bank for purposes of transferring his funds from
respondent bank to another bank near his establishment realizing that carrying money in this form is safer than
if it were in cash. The check was Jose Go's property when it was misplaced or stolen, hence he stopped its
payment. At the outset, respondent bank knew it was Jose Go's check and no one else since Go had not paid
or indorsed it to anyone. The bank was therefore liable to nobody on the check but Jose Go. The bank had no
intention to issue it to petitioner but only to buyer Jose Go. When payment on it was therefore stopped,
respondent bank was not the one who did it but Jose Go, the owner of the check. Respondent bank could not
be drawer and drawee for clearly, Jose Go owns the money it represents and he is therefore the drawer and
the drawee in the same manner as if he has a current account and he issued a check against it; and from the
moment said cashier's check was lost and/or stolen no one outside of Jose Go can be termed a holder in due
course because Jose Go had not indorsed it in due course. The check in question suffers from the infirmity of
not having been properly negotiated and for value by respondent Jose Go who as already been said is the real
owner of said instrument.

In his second assignment of error, petitioner stubbornly insists that there is no showing of conflicting claims
and interpleader is out of the question. There is enough evidence to establish the contrary. Considering the
aforementioned facts and circumstances, respondent bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make
a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. It has been shown that the
interpleader suit was filed by respondent bank because petitioner and Jose Go were both laying their claims on
the check, petitioner asking payment thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser or owner. The allegation of
petitioner that respondent bank had effectively relieved itself of its primary liability under the check by simply
filing a complaint for interpleader is belied by the willingness of respondent bank to issue a certificate of time
deposit in the amount of P800,000 representing the cashier's check in question in the name of the Clerk of
Court of Manila to be awarded to whoever wig be found by the court as validly entitled to it. Said validity will
depend on the strength of the parties' respective rights and titles thereto. Bank filed the interpleader suit not
because petitioner sued it but because petitioner is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming. On the
very day that the bank instituted the case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages filed by
petitioner against it as supported by the fact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs.
Jose Go and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe when his name became
known to respondent bank.

In his third assignment of error, petitioner assails the then respondent IAC in upholding the trial court's order
declaring petitioner in default when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader case. Again,
such contention is untenable. The trial court issued an order, compelling petitioner and respondent Jose Go to
file their Answers setting forth their respective claims. Subsequently, a Pre-Trial Conference was set with
notice to parties to submit position papers. Petitioner argues in his memorandum that this order requiring
petitioner to file his answer was issued without jurisdiction alleging that since he is presumably a holder in due
course and for value, how can he be compelled to litigate against Jose Go who is not even a party to the
check? Such argument is trite and ridiculous if we have to consider that neither his name or Jose Go's name
appears on the check. Following such line of argument, petitioner is not a party to the check either and
therefore has no valid claim to the Check. Furthermore, the Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file
their answers is to all intents and purposes an order to interplead, substantially and essentially and therefore in
compliance with the provisions of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. What else is the purpose of a law suit but to
litigate?

The records of the case show that respondent bank had to resort to details in support of its action for
Interpleader. Before it resorted to Interpleader, respondent bank took an precautionary and necessary
measures to bring out the truth. On the other hand, petitioner concealed the circumstances known to him and
now that private respondent bank brought these circumstances out in court (which eventually rendered its
decision in the light of these facts), petitioner charges it with "gratuitous excursions into these non-issues."
Respondent IAC cannot rule on whether respondent RTC committed an abuse of discretion or not, without
being apprised of the facts and reasons why respondent Associated Bank instituted the Interpleader case.
Both parties were given an opportunity to present their sides. Petitioner chose to withhold substantial facts.
Respondents were not forbidden to present their side-this is the purpose of the Comment of respondent to the
petition. IAC decided the question by considering both the facts submitted by petitioner and those given by
respondents. IAC did not act therefore beyond the scope of the remedy sought in the petition.

WHEREFORE, finding that the instant petition is merely dilatory, the same is hereby denied and the assailed
orders of the respondent court are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-15653 September 29, 1961

PETRA CARPIO VDA. DE CAMILO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,

vs.
THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SAMUEL A. ARCAMO, ONG PENG KEE and ADELIA
ONG, respondents-appellants.

Flavio Macaso for petitioners-appellees.

Dionisio M. Labuga for respondents-appellants.

PAREDES, J.:

This appeal stemmed from a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by Petra Carpio Vda. de Camilo and
others, against Samuel A. Arcamo, Justice of the Peace of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur, Ong Peng Kee and
Adelia Ong.
Petitioner Petra Carpio Vda. de Camilo, had been by herself and predecessor in interest in peaceful, open and
adverse possession of a parcel of public foreshore land, situated in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur, containing
an area of about 400 square meters. A commercial building was erected on the property which was declared
under Tax Dec. No. 5286 and assessed at P7,400.00. Respondent Ong Peng Kee was a lessee of one of the
apartments of said commercial building since June 1, 1957.

On August 1, 1957, Arthur Evert Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case against both De Camilo and Ong
Peng Kee (Civ. Case No. 64) with the JP of Malangas. For failure of Bannister and/or counsel to appear at the
trial, they were declared in default and P100.00 was awarded to De Camilo on her counterclaim. The motion
for reconsideration presented by Bannister was denied.

The other petitioners, Severino Estrada, Felisa, Susana, Antonio and the minors Isabelo, Rene and Ruben, all
surnamed Francisco, the said minors represented by their mother Susana, had also been in possession (in
common), peaceful, open and adverse, since 1937, of a parcel of public foreshore land, about 185 square
meters which is adjoining that land occupied by De Camilo. On this parcel, a commercial building assessed at
P1,000.00 was erected by the Franciscos, and had the same declared under Tax Dec. No. 4911.

On September 1, 1957, the two commercial buildings were burned down. Two weeks thereafter, respondents
Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong, constructed a building of their own, occupying about 120 square meters. The
building, however, was so built that portions of the lands previously occupied by petitioner (De Camilo and the
Franciscos) were encroached upon.

Under date of December 3, 1957, De Camilo filed Civil Case No. 78 for Forcible Entry against Ong Peng Kee
and Adelia Ong with the JP of Malangas, with respect to portion belonging to her wherein the building of Ong
Peng Kee was erected. On August 8, 1958, Severino Estrada and the Franciscos filed a similar case (No.
105). In answer to the complaints, the defendants (Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong), claimed that the land
where they constructed their building was leased to them by the Municipality of Malangas.

Pending trial of the two cases, the respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong filed a complaint for
Interpleader against De Camilo, Severino Estrada, the Franciscos, Arthur Evert Bannister, the Mayor and
Treasurer of Malangas (Civ. Case No. 108), alleging that the filing of the three cases of forcible entry (Civ.
Cases Nos. 64, 78 an 105), indicated that the defendants (in the Interpleader) had conflicting interests, since
they all claimed to be entitled to the possession of the lot in question and they (Peng Kee and Adelia) could not
determine without hazard to themselves who of defendants was entitled to the possession. Interpleader
plaintiffs further alleged that they had no interest in the property other than as mere lessees.

A motion to dismiss the complaint for Interpleader was presented by the defendants therein (now petitioners),
contending that (1) the JP had no jurisdiction to try and to hear the case; (2) There were pending other actions
between the parties for the same cause; and (3) The complaint for Interpleader did not state a cause of action.
Peng Kee and Adelia registered their opposition to the motion and on September 30, 1957, respondent Justice
of the Peace denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the defendants therein to interplead (Annex D). The
two forcible entry cases were dismissed.

The defendants (now petitioners) instituted the present proceedings, for certiorari and mandamus before the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, claiming that respondent JP in denying the motion to dismiss acted
without jurisdiction, and for having given due course to the complaint for Interpleader, the respondent JP
gravely abused his discretion, and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which was specifically
enjoined by law, and for which there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The Answer of respondents which contained the usual admissions and denials, sustained the contrary view.
The CFI rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: —

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the Justice of the Peace Court of Malangas
to be without jurisdiction to try the case for interpleader and hereby sets aside its Order dated
September 30, 1958, denying the motion to dismiss the interpleader case; and considering that Civil
Cases 78 and 105 have long been pending, the respondent Justice of the Peace of Malangas is hereby
ordered to proceed to try the same, without pronouncement as to costs.
The only issue raised in the present appeal is whether or not the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Interpleader case.

The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective portion of the lands belonging to them on which the
respondents had erected their house after the fire which destroyed petitioners' buildings. This being the case,
the contention of petitioners-appellants that the complaint to interplead lacked cause of action, is correct.

Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides —

Interpleader when proper. — Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be
made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject-matter, or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents. Their respective claim was separate
and distinct from the other. De Camilo only wanted the respondents to vacate that portion of her property which
was encroached upon by them when they erected their building. The same is true with Estrada and the
Franciscos. They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of different areas, adjoining each other.
Furthermore, it is not true that respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong did not have any interest in the
subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions
encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not
exist.

Even in the supposition that the complaint presented a cause of action for Interpleader, still We hold that the
JP had no jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof. The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead, practically
took the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP court, because the action would then necessarily "involve the title
to or possession of real property or any interest therein" over which the CFI has original jurisdiction (par. [b],
sec. 44, Judiciary Act, as amended). Then also, the subject matter of the complaint (interpleader) would come
under the original jurisdiction of the CFI, because it would not be capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, par.
[a], Judiciary Act), there having been no showing that rentals were asked by the petitioners from respondents.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find that the decision appealed from is in conformity with the law, and
the same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against respondents-appellants Ong Peng Kee and
Adelia Ong.

Wack Wack Golf v. Won

FACTS: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club (“Corporation”), a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines, filed a complaint of interpleader. It alleged, for its first cause of action, that
defendants Lee Won and Bienvenido Tan were both claiming ownership over the Corporation’s membership
fee certificate (“MFC”) 201: Won, by virtue of the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 and by MFC
201-serial no. 1478 issued on Oct. 17, 1963 by the deputy clerk of court for and in behalf of the president and
secretary of the corporation and of the People’s Bank & Trust Company; Tan, on the other hand, by virtue of
MFC 201serial no. 1199 issued on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment in his favor by Swan, Culbertson
and Fritz, the original owner of MFC 201. For its second cause of action, the Corporation alleged that MFC
201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court in behalf of the Corporation is null and void because it
was issued in violation of the Corporation’s by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the
outstanding MFC 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its
president and secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is not
binding upon defendant Tan. The Corporation prayed for the issuance of an order requiring Lee and Tan to
interplead and litigate their conflicting claims, declaring who the lawful owner of MFC 201 is, and ordering the
surrender and cancellation of MFC 201serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee. The trial court dismissed the
complaint upon motion of the defendants on the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action, and bar by prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of interpleader was proper and timely filed.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The action of interpleader, under §120
of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or
an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the
persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with
the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or
the one thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double
vexation in respect of one liability. A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending
claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of
interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without
waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue
delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is
not barred. If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed
to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.
In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it offered no
satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011) situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper
because it was filed much too late. A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in
an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in
effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. In fine, the interpleader suit cannot prosper because the
Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its application for
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; Lee had already
established his rights to MFC 201 in the civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to
establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of
an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might
eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in
the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or
unreasonable delay.