Prepared by: Ana Fe G.

Diwas
Master in Public Administration
University of Baguio

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ROLANDO S. MIEDES, SR.

G.R. No. 176409, February 27, 2008

FACTS:

A complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman was filed against

members of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Municipal Government of
Carmen, Davao del Norte, namely: Municipal Accountant Rolando S. Miedes,
Sr. (respondent), Municipal Treasurer Cristeta M. Oducayen (Oducayen) and
Municipal Budget Officer Sarah Jane L. Alcuzar5 (Alcuzar) for violations of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, Presidential Decree No. 1445; Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, Abuse of
Authority and Acts Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

The Complaint was founded on the acquisition of 19 cellular phone units

amounting to P104,500.00 allegedly made without a public bidding; that the
purchase was made through an authorized distributor and not directly through a
manufacturer or an exclusive distributor.

Respondents Oducayen and Alcuzar assert the regularity and propriety of

the transactions. Nonetheless, Petitioner found substantial evidence on record
proving that the offense of Simple Misconduct was committed by the BAC
members and imposed upon them the penalty of three-month suspension
without pay.

Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for review.
The CA affirmed the findings of the Petitioner but reduced the imposable
penalty from three-month to one-month suspension, holding that respondent's
act was not motivated by any corrupt or wrongful motive. Petitioner moved to
reconsider the decision asserting that it correctly imposed the medium-term
penalty of suspension for three months for Simple Misconduct as the
circumstance of lack of showing of corrupt or wrongful motive had been taken
into consideration in the downgrading of the offense from Grave Misconduct to
Simple Misconduct.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the acts of the Respondent constitute Simple Misconduct.

2. Whether or not the penalty imposed by the CA is correct.

RULING:

1. Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer."

In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct,

the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rules, must be manifest and established by
substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser
offense of Simple Misconduct. Thus, a person charged with Grave
Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if the misconduct
does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.

The respondent and his companions are guilty of Simple

Misconduct. The elements particular to Grave Misconduct. Corruption,
as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others. There is no clear and
convincing evidence in the present case to show that the purchase and
acquisition of the 19 cellular phone units had been made for personal or
selfish ends. Nor is there evidence that respondent and his companions
acted in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice to others.

Nonetheless, as aptly found by the CA, respondent and his

companions should have exercised all the necessary prudence to ensure
that the proper procedure was complied with in the purchase of the 19
cellular phone units because the Municipal Government of Carmen,
Davao del Norte was deprived of means of securing the most
advantageous price by the purchase of the 19 cellular phone units through
an authorized distributor and not directly through a manufacturer or an
exclusive distributor. Thus, respondent is liable for Simple Misconduct.
2. The CA erred in considering once again the absence of corrupt or
wrongful motive as a mitigating circumstance in the imposition of the
proper penalty for Simple Misconduct on respondent. The absence of
corrupt or wrongful motive was already considered in downgrading the
offense from grave misconduct to simple misconduct.

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases classifies simple

misconduct as a less grave offense punishable with a corresponding
penalty of suspension for one month and one day to six months for the
first offense. Considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
can be appreciated in favor of the respondent, the medium penalty of
three months as imposed by petitioner is the appropriate penalty.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. JOSE J. LUCAS
GR. No. 127838, January 21, 1999

FACTS:

On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at

the Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture filed with
the office of the Secretary, DA a complaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a
photographer of the same agency, for misconduct for allegedly touching her and
throwing her out of the office after she admonished him not to do it again.

The board found the respondent guilty of simple misconduct and a

penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day was approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture.

The CSC, on appeal by the respondent, found the respondent guilty of

grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the
service.

Respondent raised the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA set aside the
decision of the CSC and reinstated the judgment of the Board.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC
found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple
misconduct.

2. Whether the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.

RULING:

1. There is an existing guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and

grave misconduct. “In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest, which is
obviously lacking in respondent's case. Respondent maintains that as he
was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right
to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct.
 The Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must
be duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person cannot
be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and

fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due
process is applicable in administrative proceedings.

2. The Supreme Court ruled that, even in jest, Respondent had no right to
touch complainant's leg. However, under the circumstances, such act is
not constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that
respondent was maliciously motivated. We note that respondent has been
in the service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MINERVA M.P. PACHEO
G.R. No. 178021. January 25, 2012

FACTS:

Pacheo was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal

Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)in Revenue Region No.
7 (RR7), Quezon City.

On May 7, 2002, the BIR issued Revenue Travel Assignment

Order (RTAO) No. 25-2002, ordering the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant
Chief, Legal Division from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando,
Pampanga. The BIR cited exigencies of the revenue service as basis for the
issuance of the said RTAO.

Pacheo questioned the reassignment as the transfer would mean

economic dislocation since she would have to spend P 200.00 on daily travel
expenses or approximately P 4,000.00 a month. It would also mean physical
burden on her part as she would be compelled to wake up early in the morning
for her daily travel from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga, and to
return home late at night from San Fernando, Pampanga to Quezon City. She
was of the view that that her reassignment was merely intended to harass and
force her out of the BIR in the guise of exigencies of the revenue service. In
sum, she considered her transfer from Quezon City to Pampanga as amounting
to a constructive dismissal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Pacheo’s assignment constitutes constructive dismissal
and, thus, entitling her to reinstatement and backwages.

RULING:

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible

even without the employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer
is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service,
or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the
provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil
Service.
 Significantly, Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee
quits his work because of the agency head’s unreasonable, humiliating, or
demeaning actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the
employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur although
there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a
transfer from one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job.

In the case at bench, the lateral movement of Pacheo as Assistant Chief,

Legal Division from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga within the same
agency is undeniably a reassignment.

Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an

employee’s security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without
cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are
tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.

As to her claim for back wages, it is a settled jurisprudence that an

illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but limited
only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his
illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. DR. AGNES OUIDA P. YU
G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012

FACTS:

In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program

pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the ―The Local
Government Code of 1991,” which affected the Department of Health (DOH)
along with other government agencies.

Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo held the position of

Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of the Department of Health (DOH)
regional office in Zamboanga City and was the head of both the Basilan
Provincial Health Hospital and Public Health Services. Respondent Dr. Agnes
Ouida P. Yu, on the other hand, held the position of Provincial Health Officer I
(PHO I). She was assigned, however, at the Integrated Provincial Health
Office in Isabela, Basilan.

Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan

Governor Gerry Salapuddin refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of
the PHO II position that was to be devolved to the local government unit of
Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the Regional Office No.
IX in Zamboanga City where she would serve the remaining four years of her
public service. She retired in 1996.

Meanwhile, in 1994, or two years after the implementation of the

devolution program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II
position.

On February 23, 1998, Republic Act No. 8543 was passed converting the
Basilan Provincial Hospital into a Tertiary Hospital under the full
administrative and technical supervision of the Department of Health, whereby
the hospital positions previously devolved to the local government unit of
Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH.

While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the
re-nationalization of the Basilan General Hospital, she was made to retain her
original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of
Chief of Hospital II. Subsequently, then DOH Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit
appointed Dr. Domingo Remus A. Dayrit to the position of Chief of Hospital
II.

Aggrieved, Dr. Yu filed a letter of protest before the CSC claiming that
she has a vested right to the position of Chief of Hospital II.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Dr. Yu has a vested right to the position of
Chief of Hospital II.

RULING:

Devolution includes absorption of personnel of national agencies or

offices by the local government units to which they belong or in whose areas
they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable.

In line with the foregoing, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 503 was issued by
President Corazon Aquino which state, among others, that the absorption of
the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which case, the LGUs
shall create the equivalent positions of the affected personnel except when it is
not administratively viable.

On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin

to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Fortunata
Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the word ―shall‖
both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503,
which connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The only instance that
the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when
absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result to
duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by
the national government. However, in the absence of the recognized exception,
devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local
chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go
beyond June 30, 1992.

However, Governor Salapuddin refused to reappoint Dr. Castillo to her

devolved position in the LGU for no other reason than that he ―wanted to
accept only the item position of PHO II.” It was not shown, and no attempt
was ever made on the part of the LGU to show, that the absorption of Dr.
Castillo was not administratively viable. There being no valid and legal basis
therefor, Governor Salapuddin's refusal to accept Dr. Castillo was, plainly and
simply, whimsical.

With Dr. Castillo's re-absorption by the DOH which appears to bear the
former's approval, her devolved position with the LGU of Basilan was left
vacant. Thus, Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II and,
consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classified designation – Chief of
Hospital II. As such, Dr. Yu should have been automatically re-appointed by
Secretary Dayrit in accordance with the Guidelines for the Re-Nationalization
of Personnel, Assets and Appropriations of Basilan Provincial Hospital.

Considering, however, that Dr. Yu had already retired on August 24,

2004, petitioner should at least recover her salaries for the services she had
rendered. However, petitioner admitted that she received her salary as PHO II
converted to Chief of Hospital for the period August to November 2001.
Therefore, she should receive her salary and benefits as Chief of Hospital from
December 2001 up to her retirement in August 24, 2004.