Romulo Macalintal vs Commission on Elections

Political Law – Election Laws – Absentee Voters Act – Proclamation of Winners in a

National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to
participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to
the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a
resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for
at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates
for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it
is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in
the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in
election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of
his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one
has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent
to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the
affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by
virtue of RA 9189.
Tobias vs Abalos

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Facts:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into
a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged
to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they
approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.

Issue:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and
26(1)

Held:

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality
pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It
should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of
the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning
the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
Political Law – Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the
said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues among others that the
People’s Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or
the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is
therefore beyond the power of people’s initiative.

ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does it
constitute a revision.

HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might
appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and
on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the
President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the
philosophy of governance, “to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to
handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the
hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-
making for the common good”; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision
of the 1987 Constitution.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or
limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either
to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people”
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
Lansang vs. Court of Appeals (Consti1)
Amado J. Lansang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, General Assembly of the Blind, Inc., and Jose Iglesias,
respondents.

February 23, 2000

Quisumbing, J:

Facts:
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of
lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract
accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument involved.
With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to
clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate
the area.
The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his
conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against
the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the state
which could not be sued without its consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government
official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done
without or in excess of his authority.
Issues:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in
effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.
Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private
respondents from Rizal Park.
Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.
No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.
Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done
in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to
perform a positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It is evident from
the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of
GABI from Rizal Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.
CASE DIGEST : Estrada Vs Escritor
A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA,
Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

FACTS : Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her
husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related
either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that
she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor
testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died
in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in
good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE : Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and
immoral conduct."

HELD : The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a

different reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to
formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct
or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the
programs placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the Court,
showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society Accommodationist -
Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the
United States as shown by many traditional government practices which An accommodationist holds
that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious
and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict
neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise First, the
accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment. Second,
the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the
accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions
from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and overt
hostility to the minority Fourth, the accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way
to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different
effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed
and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil,
whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand,
and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a
burden on her free exercise of religion The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely
using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure
the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much
less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of
the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection.
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima
undue delegation of power; separation of power

Facts:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A.
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless
of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There
is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or
BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

Discussions:

The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.

The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on
the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may
in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.
Rulings:

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is
the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees
and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.

R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335
was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
Belgica vs Executive Secretary 10 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government –
Invalid Delegation

Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects”
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which
would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a
part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation
of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled
that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as
the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress
can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the
GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of
the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a
mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to
wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003

Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory
for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses,
among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial
candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.

Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of
additional qualification on candidates for Senator?

Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL.
Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5
qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has
no effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.