ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), vs.

DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS

G.R. No. L-48931 July 16, 1979
91 SCRA 482 [1979]

TOPIC: Agency (Conducting Agency)

FACTS:
This is a certification election case. The Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a duly registered labor
union, filed with the Ministry of Labor a petition for certification election which the med-arbiter granted the
petition
Instead of deciding the appeal promptly, the Director turned over the record of the case to the Trade
Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), a federation of labor unions, allegedly by virtue of an
arrangement between the Ministry of Labor and the said federation that cases involving its member-unions
must first be referred to it for possible settlement in accordance with its Code of Ethics.
The TUCP has not decided the controversy. Thus, IBM filed in this Court the instant petition for
mandamus to compel the Director of Labor Relations to decide the case, or, in the alternative, to require
the TUCP to return to the Director the record of the case.

ISSUE: Whether it was legal and proper for the Director of Labor Relations to refer to the TUCP the appeal
of the Associated Labor Unions in a certification election case.

Held. No. The Labor Code never intended that the Director of Labor Relations should abdicate delegate
and relinquish his arbitrational prerogatives in favor of a private person or entity or to a federation of trade
unions. Such a surrender of official functions is an anomalous, deplorable and censurable renunciation of
the Director's adjudicatory jurisdiction in representation cases.
Article 226 of the Labor Code provides in peremptory terms that the Bureau of Labor Relations and
the labor relations divisions in the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor "shall have original and exclusive
authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-
union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management
relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the
implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance
procedure and/or voluntary arbitration."
Article 259 of the Labor Code provides that "all certification cases shall be decided within twenty
(20) working days." Article 260 of the same Code provides that the Bureau of Labor Relations should
decide appeals in representation cases, within fifteen (15) working days", or twenty working days,
according to section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
Section 10 further provides that "the decision of the Bureau in all cases shall be final and unappealable."
The president, secretary, or any responsible officer of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
is ordered to return to the Director of Labor Relations within forty-eight hours from notice the original record
The Director is directed to decide the appeal within ten days from the receipt of the record. Costs
against respondent TUCP.

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA

G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989
180 SCRA 740 [1992]

TOPIC: Test (Validity of Election)

Facts:
Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (BWLU- ADLO) filed a
petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) alleging:
 that BENECO has in its employ 214 rank and file employees; that 198 or92.5% of these employees
have supported the filing of the petition;
 that no certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months;
 that there is no existing collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to
represented by BWLU- ADLO; and,
 that there is no collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative.
An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees Labor Union (BELU) contending that it
was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the subject workers pursuant to
an order issued by the med-arbiter; that pending resolution by the NLRC are two cases it filed against
BENECO involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases
bars any representation question.

BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming that it is a non-profit electric
cooperative engaged in providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers; and, that the
employees sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing because they are members and joint owners of the cooperative.

The med-arbiter issued an order giving due course to the petition for certification election. However, the
med-arbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of BENECO who are non-members
thereof and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative because it found that there
are 37 employees who are not members and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the
cooperative.

BELU and BENECO appealed but the same was dismissed for lack of merit. So BENECO filed with the SC
a petition for Certiorari which the SC dismissed for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated April 1986.The
ordered certification election was held in October 1986. Prior to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel
verbally manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that employees who are members-consumers are
being allowed to vote when they are not eligible to be members of any labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification election." BENECO submitted a certification showing that
only 4 employees are not members of BENECO and insisted that only these employees are eligible to
vote in the certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU garnered 49 of the 83 "valid
“votes cast. Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a Protest.

The med-arbiter dismissed the protest. B

LR director Calleja affirmed the med-arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.

Issue: Whether employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes
of collective bargaining.

Held: NO. Under Article 256 of the Labor Code, to have a valid certification election, "at least a majority of
all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid
votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit."BENECO asserts
that the certification election held was null and void since members-employees who are not eligible to form
and join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein.

The issue has already been resolved and clarified in the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer
Calleja, et al. and reiterated in the cases of Batangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. And San Jose
City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, et al. wherein the Court had stated
that the right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a co-owner thereof. With respect,
however, to employees who are neither members nor co-owners of the cooperative they are entitled to exercise
the rights to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and
applicable statutes.

The fact that the members-employees of petitioner do not participate in the actual management of the cooperative
does not make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining with
petitioner. The Court's ruling in the Davao City case that members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for
purposes of collective bargaining was based on the fact that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners
thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for "certainly an owner cannot bargain with
himself or his co-owners." [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra]. It is the fact of
ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from
joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their participation in the
actual management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining.
PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILS (PWUP) vs. DOLE
G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992

Facts:
The collective bargaining agreement between petitioner International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI)
and private respondents Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due
to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next
CBA and were already plotting their moves.

The first challenge to APCWU was the filing of certification election by Sandigang Manggagawa sa Daungan
(SAMADA) which has consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit and submitted
eleven days after the petition.

Another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union
(PEALU). The consent signatures were submitted thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.

The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint decision.

APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in
Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as follows:
In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of
the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a
legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election
by secret ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining
agreement and supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period
shall be dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be satisfied
upon the filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be dismissed.

Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent
signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5, 1990,
dismissing the consolidated petitions.

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the
written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification election. The principal
petitioners did not appeal. DOLE Undersecretary BienvenidoLaguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter
and dismissed PWUP's appeal.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Under this article, the Med-Arbiter should automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition is
supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied
with the law when they submitted the required consent signatures several days after filing the petition. The
petitioner complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including its own petition for
intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of the ICTSI employees.

Private respondent’s Contention:

ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as implemented by Section 6,
Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules, decisions of the Secretary in certification election cases shall be final and unappealable.

Solicitor General’s View:

I agree with the petitioner that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Article
256 should be liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code, stating as follows:

Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor.
Topic: Nature of the Proceeding (Nature)
Issue: Whether the petitioners had no right to represent the principal petitioners which had not appealed the
dismissal order.

Held. No. We repeat that the certification election is not litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary
character where the rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Technical rules and objections should not
hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union that has the support of confidence of the majority of the
workers and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with management. The petition for
intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal petitions had complied with the
requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its intervention should not be
disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.

It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be deemed
automatically dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be allowed
to prevent a correct determination of the real representative of the workers in line with their constitutional
rights to self-organization and collective bargaining.

Topic: Bars to Certification Election

Sub-Topic: Exception

Issue: The petitioner assails the decision of the respondent Director on the ground that "the ratification of the
collective bargaining agreement renders the certification election moot and academic."

Held: This contention finds no basis in law. The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule
where the law prohibits the holding of certification elections during the lifetime of the collective bargaining
agreement. Said agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid the
holding of a certification election.

Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown to
be imperative. Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the authorized representative
of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the workers. As
we stated in Philippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, any stability that does not establish the
type of industrial peace contemplated by the law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose
their real representative.

The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an affirmation of their
membership in the bargaining agent, rendering the representation issue moot and academic and conclusively
barring the holding of a certification election thereon.

That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say that the mere ratification of the CBA by the majority of
the workers signified their affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. That case required, first,
ratification of the CBA, the second, affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. The second
requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the record does not show that the majority of the
workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with APCWU.

Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the representation
case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during the last 60 days of a
subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case. As the new CBA was entered into at
the time when the representation case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the final
agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.