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(Fujiki V Marinay GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013) : Petition Is Bigamy

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[Fujiki v Marinay; GR No.

196049, June 26, 2013]

On January 23, 2004 Fujiki married Marinay, but his parents did not like their union and
he could not bring her home in Japan. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met Maekara. The two got married without the first marriage being
dissolve on May15, 2008. Sadly Marinay suffered physical abuse from Maekara, so she
left him.

After leaving Maekara, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and proceeded to dissolve the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara before the family court of Japan, which voided
the marriage on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki then filed a petition before the RTC for the
recognition of Foreign Judgment praying thee following: 1) to recognize the judgment of
the Family Court of Japan; 2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

RTC ruled denied the petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (AM No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable

WON a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.

WON the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

On the first issue, the court ruled that the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v Republic, this Court
held that the rule in AM No. 02-11-10-SC, that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy.”

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.

[Villanueva v Cheridan Lending Investors Corp; GR No. 177881, October 13, 2010]

FACTS:

+ Spouses Fortunato and Rachel Penaredondo obtained a loan from Cheridan


amounting to Php 2.2 Million, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land.
However they ware not able to pay, so respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage. At the auction sale, Cheridan was declared as the highest bidder and after the
redemption period the title over the property was issued to Cheridan’s name.

+Petitioner Villianueva found out that the property was now in Cheridan’s name and filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order and the setting aside of writ of possession on
the ground that he is the owner and is in actual possession of the subject property. He
had notified the court that he had filed criminal and civil cases relative to the fraudulent
transfer of ownership of the said property from him to the spouses Penaredondo.

+While the case was pending, respondent instituted a special civil action for certiorari
before the CA praying that the RTC order denying a motion for alias writ of possession
be reversed and set aside. CA granted the said petition

ISSUE:

HELD:

Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made to


apply suppletorily to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by
Section 6, Act 3135, as amended, the possession of the mortgaged property
may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third
party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
debtor. Section 33 provides:

Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of


redemption period; by whom executed or given.

If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date


of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so
redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other
redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time
for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the
conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor
shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be
executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in
office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though
the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed
it.

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the


purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all
the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property
shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same
officer unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.

The same issue had been raised in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
[26]
Icot, Development Bank of the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood
Association,[27] Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company (Phils.),
[28] [29]
Inc., and Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, and we
uniformly held that the obligation of the court to issue an ex parte writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor.

The purchaser’s right of possession is recognized only as against the


judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose
right of possession is adverse to the latter.[30] In this case, petitioner opposed
the issuance of the writ of possession on the ground that he is in actual
possession of the mortgaged property under a claim of ownership. He
explained that his title to the property was cancelled by virtue of a falsified
deed of donation executed in favor of spouses Peñaredondo. Because of this
falsification, he filed civil and criminal cases against spouses Peñaredondo
to nullify the deed of donation and to punish the party responsible for the
falsified document. Petitioner’s claim that he is in actual possession of the
property is not challenged, and he has come to court asserting an ownership
right adverse to that of the mortgagors, the spouses Peñaredondo.

The third party’s possession of the property is legally presumed to be


based on a just title, a presumption which may be overcome by the purchaser
in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property. Through such a
judicial proceeding, the nature of the adverse possession by the third party
may be determined, after such third party is accorded due process and the
opportunity to be heard. The third party may be ejected from the property
only after he has been given an opportunity to be heard, conformably with
the time-honored principle of due process.[31] The Civil Code protects the
actual possessor of a property, as Article 433 thereof provides:

Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership


raises disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.

One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another


must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The
“judicial process” could mean no less than an ejectment suit or a
reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending
parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.[32]

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