G.R. No.

L-409 January 30, 1947 may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
vs.
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner. "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944,
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent. p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague
Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is
RESOLUTION
not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
petition for habeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice,
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a
Philippine Republic:
government de factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an
obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the
resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be
which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof;
(Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the
President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526); suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not case;
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the
have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which
from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign;
and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit

1
treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a conscience (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated
factoacquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who
the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not
on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict
obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not
while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own; in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of
sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does
military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance
into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance
cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control
against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to
against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force,
penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist
are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would
that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate
lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be
government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above
repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it
stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted
would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter
order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was
incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are
applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by
to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of
their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to
nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, commit a political suicide;
either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines
military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to
defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended

2
to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from
representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with
upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of
the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution
the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth
laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to
this constitution;
deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring
government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.
was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United
Separate Opinions
States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of
the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the PERFECTO, J., concurring:
people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II),
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace
but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President
time. While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on
peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now
are no traitors until war has started.
the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes
of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-
page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It
States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is
202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be
question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should
of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their
citizens and subjects of the country. country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be
the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which
provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy
United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is
States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the
retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was
the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United also suspended.
States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same individual owes to his government or his sovereign in return for the protection
way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the which he receives.

3
"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians
government of which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208. of a state, for they receive protection from the government and are subject to
its laws. They are born in allegiance to the government of the state.
"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or
Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed.,
duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is."
226-227.)
United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either
Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political
a citizen or subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a
duty binding on him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to
political duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth,
render service and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is
to render service and fealty to the federal government; the obligation of
reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between
fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government or to the
the government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492,
sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives; that
501.
duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he receives; that duty which is
By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between
individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in the government and the citizen.
return for the protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and
Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance —
permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or
that which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance — that arising
subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or
through some circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by denization or
sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and
naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that arising from residence simply within
becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien
the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance — that arising
while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is
from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by the common law, the oath
continuous during his residence. Carlisle vs.United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.),
of allegiance might be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve
147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.
years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)
"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the
Allegiance. — the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual
subject to the King, in return for that protection which the King affords the
owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for
subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one
the protection he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).
natural, the other local, the former being perpetual, the latter temporary.
Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King's "Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the
dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they citizen to his state — the obligation of obedience and support which he owes
are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its
reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The machinery
due from the subject upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as through which it operates is its government. The persons who operate this
the one affords protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural- machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state utters
born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally
within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in
misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being Constitutional and International Law, 1 American Journal of International Law,
acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could p. 915.).
acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally
The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are
permanent to the King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which
reciprocal in character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme
he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time,
Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:

4
 Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic
on the part of the member and a duty protection on the part of the society. philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the
These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. (3 enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such
Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.) thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation between life and
death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of our
Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for
people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or
the protection which the government affords him. The duty which the subject
"suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the
owes to the sovereign, correlative with the protection received.
Filipino people ceased to be what they are.
It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our
from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege
Constitution.
fealty, i. e., absolute and qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a
xxx xxx xxx
wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force
Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties
qualified and temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife
government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the
the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local allegiance assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing
continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the
154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.). wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July
pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and
fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as
authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above that of the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of changing
quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the United States of her power
sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not change the
themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the people sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional
and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized
shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been exercised by by the United States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt
princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the
whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of American people, accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in
France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.
government, as an entity different and in opposition to the people themselves.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the
Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern
proclamation of independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific
democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the
war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign people in
pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people.
the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part —
To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and adoption of the
people, there may be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future
suspended during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that allegiance democratic federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those
must also have been suspended, because our government stopped to function in who adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is
the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If

5
anxiously desired by all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and disaster of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of
of another war. their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is
immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is
same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the
lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the
life of an individual should continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his
power granted by the Election Code to the President to suspend the election in
mind to choose the most effective measures of personal protection.
certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a
public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and
has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by
has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we
law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included among the have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil.,
laws of the Commonwealth which, by his theory of suspended allegiance and 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases
suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the Japanese where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept
occupation. petitioner's theory.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void,
Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one
of Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese constituted by the Filipino people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the
imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones that could claim obedience
treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. from our citizens.
Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting
that duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate
service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight,
defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the country is invaded because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity,
by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration,
sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the
Constitution surely did not entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of
the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings
of the survival of the state, the same should be suspended, and that upon such — hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt,
suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or civil service spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies
may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in between our people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any
distress. feeling of attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese
invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of
Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance.
haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in
He argues that the Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during
their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.
enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their
allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the
sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is other to be further slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them
dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is a reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules and
the result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should
that organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology remains as it is,

6
the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems
hatred? that there is no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect
of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing
political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted
principles of international law, could not have established in our country any
reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under
government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and
petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent.
ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of
allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people. Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a
moment?
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the
citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of
Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of government, even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated
small nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on that it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy
imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when
smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium of Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by
the invaders. Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the
Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected
which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we
petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act
started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect during the
No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all
emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President
cases of crime against national security "committed between December 8, 1941
"to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive departments
become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and
have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2),
Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including
that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect
and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President
and should be enforced.
with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.)
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations
one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
Representatives, ever dared to expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as
to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the
laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available the necessary
Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.
of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of
theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate
suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent,
effort to help quash the pending treason cases at any cost.
are now under indictment for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on country, because their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to
generally accepted principles of international law, although this argument becomes revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which
futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against
by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future
petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generations with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their own people. They
generally accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of law

7
that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as international law are brought about by the action of governments designed to
such during the critical period of test. meet a change circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through
decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled principles to new
situations.
HILADO, J., concurring:
xxx xxx xxx
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the
After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked
so-called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the
reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place.
occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which
By the time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that
constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this
launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was illegal
country to their legitimate government and to the United States was not
and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to those
suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change
who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical
of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:
principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.
The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more steps. One of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which
than a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and practically all
principles which came to be known as International Law, governing their conduct the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy,
with each other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means,
forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.
preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the
Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no
potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to
meaning at all and comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry
that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently
L. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American
justified, and the nations had not on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as
concept of its effect. He said, "war between nations was renounced by the
an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It
signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has
is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact.
become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the
Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.
source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By
was, employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the
compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been legal profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.
so materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well
This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and
defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death
has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of
and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not
mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime.
only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61
civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva
solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by
by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the the representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared that "a war of
United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President aggression constitutes .. an International crime. . . .
Truman of June 7, 1945:
The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution
International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no of the representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany,
continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in declared that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime. At the

8
 Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to
unanimously adopted a resolution stating that "war of aggression constitutes military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.
an international crime against the human species."
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the
xxx xxx xxx aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from
the last month of 1941 of the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to
We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and
outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound
that modern international law has abolished the defense that those who incite
herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific
or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law
means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then
be mobilized on the side of peace. ("U.S.A. — An American Review," published
existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter. With the
by the United States Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis
modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound
supplied.).
themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the outlawing, prescription
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the course
doctrines of international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saving
justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the that the rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of
father of international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the military occupation were automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all
unjust war — the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in future cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact.
an earlier paragraph of the same report.
If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above crime; if such a war is an international crime against the human species: a nation
mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly,
early part of the 20th century generally declared that war-making was not illegal under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or posses any legitimate
and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted power or right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in
from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the view-point criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory
that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the during the Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense — and only
common sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as this sense should we speak here — with respect to this country and its citizens, any
other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific more than could a burglar breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to
Settlement of International Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either to the
an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal
that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan- power or right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right
American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that on the part of the burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the course
war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species: of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would be
which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue. the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and
hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the
same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be
United States, and later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war
forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have
of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable,
instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose
as admitted on all sides, was its attack against the Philippines and its consequent
sight of the further fact that this government has a representative in the
invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.
international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo.
Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with
petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime.
evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war Not only this, but this country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war

9
already renounced war as an instrument of national policy (Constitution, Article II, cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory
section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he
may compel them to take an oath — sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' — . . .
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for
willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate
this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines
commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the
during that war the rules and principles of international law which might be
rule is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of
applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How
obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from
can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own
the inhabitants an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same
government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo
rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that
trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and
obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them, does not constitute
peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but
allegiance.
part and parcel? In such circumstances how could such occupation produce no less
an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and (c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that
government? when the one's country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be
bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that
(b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere hypothesis — that
precisely when his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty,
when Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines
he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent
she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would
and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring. The outward
not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a notion by its citizens is
manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the
one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to the
irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor
occupant the power to interfere with.
obliterate the invisible feelings, and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the
. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible
He is thus forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people should never allow them to act,
and that irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the
theory designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of some highly Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because
important privileges. These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence
family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, was disabled from affording them protection, they were released from their sacred
and connection with or residence in the occupied territory. obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy,
giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only
The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the
tend to aggravate their crime.
inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International
Law, 2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.) II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY
. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the
allegiance. Since the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the people and all government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are
inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, the self-same people before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July
International Law, pp. 341-344.) 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under
the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty
The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the
remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said
inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their
Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as
allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in
the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete
obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of
loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work above
Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth

10
be known as the Republic of the Philippines." Under this provision the Government considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim
of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws
identical government thereafter — only the name of that government was to be of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in
changed. abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75,
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the
Phil., 875, 881.)
Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case
being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the
This was already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the occupant will naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which
law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in article 114 of said affect the welfare and safety of his command, such action to be made known to the
Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued, inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance
along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution which to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article
constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to
Constitution" — of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, the exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be
and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention,
governments sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases.
Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people — they are the same
Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the
people who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change in its respect.
proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a
If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, "result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of
he continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby
following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the district occupied
Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February
the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts
(Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and
independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that customs until further orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the
can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute present circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in
after independence — that they became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the
But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the
fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason application of "laws and regulations which are not proper act under the present
committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically situation of the Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with
independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party some political purposes."
continues to be the same — only his status has changed.
The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and
PARAS, J., dissenting: humane. The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more
or less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the
occupant. It thus consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the
Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted
crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they
principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3)
were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over
as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion
progressive needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations
already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection

11
and the rule of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages legislative enactments and institutions — on the one hand bound to continue
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government,
the public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan.
in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent
The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political complexion and
occupant "takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to
taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against
acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to
the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of
himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit
the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), — must be the
the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor
preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet
successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are
the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is
permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde,
suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the
International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)
latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were to be the only effect,
authority of the invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious
conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically
occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant,
necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the
for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to believe the opponents of the
1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all
involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind
their own country" (Hague Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or
by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The
government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane.
chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant `is totally Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a mere manifestation of
independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of
aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial
war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply
circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), with what the occupant has ordained obedience to such command within the
citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from the prosecution by the
International Law, Vol. II. Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.) occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)
He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute
people in an occupied territory were required to obey two antagonistic and and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the
opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in a state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory and the
reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, protection of the army of the occupant, against which prosecution and punishment
358), contained in the following passage: such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard
to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted
To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who
and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out
never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations,
of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the
processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only
belligerent occupant.
have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them in
the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution
mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the

12
Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with close of the war the place by treaty restored to the United States, and after that
the United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly was done Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so
expressed in the following passage (page 298): introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which
by the laws of the United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the
United States was that its laws were properly in force there, although the place was
precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the
at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the United States, and the laws,
accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the
therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of the United
period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may
States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound
said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of
so to decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the
the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a
court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the
constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed
American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The
show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's
single question is whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the
Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and
enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported
cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases
into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be
already terminated completely.
sustained. . . . The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of
In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully
during the Japanese military occupation against the United States or the enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted
Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary
not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only,
time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws
of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far
facto law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported
shall have a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties only as the British
refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into
the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if, as the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if
alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant? the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States,
and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this case they say
The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports
there would be no pretense to say that American duties could be demanded; and
our position. As analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas.,
upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They
773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States — the
add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there
court of highest human authority on that subject — and as the decision was against
were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any
the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the
aid from authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held
war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew;
as this was in armed belligerents occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it,
and while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of
and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is
Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity, the great
of bias in the mind of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no
and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story
doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision.
delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this
That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great
case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that
Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port
such country, so held, is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former
of Castine, in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it
government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported there (and by
was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had
been introduced into that port without paying duties to the United States. At the

13
parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the an occupied territory can expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that
territory of its former sovereign, the United States." States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over
such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States,
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the
should insist that States should provide system of law and of courts, and in actual
United States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty,
practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien
and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after
residents. This does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its
the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that
borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it grants
sovereignty can have any important significance only when it may be exercised;
to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate
and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is
opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law
the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or
impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected."
otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)
States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and
theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law, convicted of treason committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article
hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under
right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied belligerent occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense,
area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in
compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the doctrine in the United whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the
States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal
prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the military occupant to Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under
suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and occupation can no longer be "delivered."
inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940,
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance
article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that
will enable the military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against
mere conquest or military occupation of a territory of another State does not
their own government, without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This
operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the
argument is not correct, because the suspension does not exempt the occupant
occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the
from complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows it to demand all
time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of
kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation
the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The
of taking part military operations against their own country." Neither does the
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)
suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not from dying and becoming heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their
immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos own country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law should be
during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organizations.
a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that
It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the
"temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the temporary
collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by
allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the territory
the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion
wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The
that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation,
comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not
there would not be any Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming
hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he is in the territory of a power
that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight
which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of political
as guerrillas — after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting
nature of his own government; and the protections received by him from that
forces, — they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering
friendly or neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of
that the latter's military strength at the time and the long period during which they

14
were left military unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and
reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction. totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-
Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The
If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the
regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected
liberation of the Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their
themselves to the perils of military operations, likely received summary liquidation
countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance
or punishments from the guerrillas and the parties injured by their acts, and may be
movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage
prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the returning sovereign; those
themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to
who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may
argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life
be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group even the spies and
or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of
informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable
thought is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any
for any act offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the
such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned
war profits tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact
with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the
that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any
hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with
Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by
each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from
personal motives than by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere
taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the
to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation
occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause to take
the royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent
vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the
amnesty granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the
occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may, under
furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions
plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions,
imposed by them upon the real traitors.
proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military
achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by
1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected
months; it extended over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the Philippines,
in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in when their mere physical presence implied force and pressure — and not after the
towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government — that we
by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations accepts to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated
belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and
occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, obedience. If there were those who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can
p. 1879.) be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine history.
Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-
the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of
production of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and
himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place,
and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of
other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and
real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he
during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of
motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in
law. The Filipino people as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . .
of fear of a treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth

15
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey
occupation and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez ideas worthy of some reflection.
Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience
MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and
during the Japanese military occupation, they were at most — borrowing the
the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the
famous and significant words of President Roxas — errors of the mind and not of
United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations
the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its
theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the
existence, applied by the President of the United States, and later embodied in the
Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling
Hague Conventions of 1907."
and conscience to their country.
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the
population to take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral
Japanese military occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to
protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the
prosecute treason committed against the former sovereignty existing during the
implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the
Commonwealth Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the
displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions,
United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the
has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all
provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion
the laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to
and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that,
take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and
as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the
as already stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law that the
Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make
inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the time
the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said
being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the
declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was
victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is
subervient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under
prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from which it is fair to
which, in addition to its many provisions essentially destructive of the concept of
deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the
sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over
population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the authors
the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had
of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as
to make said declaration of principle because the document was ultimately
are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should
intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have
be in a better position to know what will save them during the military occupation
announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino
than any exile government.
people and their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose,
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent country under the
warned against the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics Commonwealth Government.
who "see no reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy
The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that
weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such,
existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained
said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a
unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty over the
man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for
Philippines continued to be complete.
courts that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just
desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been seen that
go about punishing criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict guilty the exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the
Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some various organs which, collectively, constitute the Government. For practical
guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea political reasons which can be easily appreciated, it is desirable that the public
of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were policies of a State should be formulated and executed by governmental

16
 agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the control of other It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own,
States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life and that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by
which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty.
governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even when selecting
State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the members for the national legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying
governmental agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents
becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose of the National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law
sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be [1931], p.250.)
Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they were
This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and
originally created.
the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested.
By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)
delegating State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this
competence again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its own
Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the
creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to colonies
final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines
control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the
and improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to
deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and
exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a
under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth
grant and the continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of
Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty
those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as
delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the
possessing only administrative autonomy and not political independence.
latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the
Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the so-called
Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or
Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the
sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or
central Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government
against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but
and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may,
did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the
without parting with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield
sovereign and independent Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in
to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to
order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the Republic.
create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of
independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any considerable size, Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws
efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local of the Philippines Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until
self-government be granted to particular districts. (Willoughby, The amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75.). section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried,
and determined under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these
The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and
constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce article
the States of the American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own
114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain
sovereignty although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been
operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution.
authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own,
The fact remains, however, that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible
that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the
with the Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe
express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and
allegiance to the United States or the government of the Philippines, the latter
that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the
being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former,
individual States is no longer contested.
whereas under the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the

17
Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the United States. To G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947
contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been modified in the sense that
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied
vs.
to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.
facto law.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United
J. Antonio Araneta for appellant.
States has held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38),
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for
that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient
appellee.
to state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the
same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S., 308), rendered in HILADO, J.:
May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged
the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only
with the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The
be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as
Floreses not having been apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the
delegated by the mother country, the United States.
offense charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of the
August 12, 1943, that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000
having now the status as a government of other independent nations--in fact all the to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the decision,
attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was not and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of, the
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio
Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it
Pulong Tindahan, Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese
appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States had to issue
soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the
the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States
instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of Barrio
and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not
Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this plan, said
President Osmeña who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the
Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets,
restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given
gathered the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945.
official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States
Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled included men,
Congress, and not the Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office
women and children — mostly women (Exhibits A, C, amd C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65,
of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
102, t.s.n.).
The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as
The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women — the
against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed
prosecution star witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the
against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ). Presently, the Japanese and their Filipino comrades set
Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained,
the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103, t.s.n.), and proceeded to
treason against either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different
butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus killing, among
sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.
others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang,
Mina, Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang,
Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).
Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom
he bayoneted to death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita
Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi

18
pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but he gave the callous made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the
answer that no mercy would be given them because they were wives of guerrillas Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made on
(pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.). September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
(Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).
Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria
Paulino if he had been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant
been butchered, he proposed to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not
saying that the children knew nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the
Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children would be wives of theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not
guerrillas later when they grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We
t.s.n.). are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render
military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a
The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses
part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to
— Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas — to the ruthless massacre of
loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable.
Banaban. There is a complete absence of evidence tending to show motive on the
He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act
part of these witnesses for falsely testifying against appellant — such a motive is
No. 63, providing:
not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel frankly states (p.
3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the People's Court." . . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the People's events:
Court, who heard, observed and saw them testify, had the following to say:
xxx xxx xxx
The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
are simple barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been
a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
tainted by feelings of hatred or revenge or by any desire to be spectacular or to
exaggerate. They were straight-forward and frank in their testimony and did (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign
not show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They could country;
not have been mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for they
xxx xxx xxx
know him so well that they referred to him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor"
or Pedro, the painter. They could not have erred in the narration of the salient (6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the
phases of the tragic events of January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a
forced eye-witnesses to and were involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.
the houses and the massacre committed by the accused and his Japanese There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to
masters took place in broad daylight and were not consummated in a fleeting support the constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in
moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain a Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before he was admitted into
trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event they could not help but the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against the
witness. Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath was in
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, fact one of allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot
positive and convincing that it would be sufficient for conviction without any uphold such a far-fetched deduction. The members of the Makapili could have
further corroboration. Yet, there is ample corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily swearing to support her
Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the massacred residents of Banaban constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely aided
shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.). And appellant China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese
himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements — one constitution and laws, even if they had to help China fight Japan. During the first

19
World War the "National Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to their coercion. They would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal
go to Europe and fight on the side of the Allies, particularly of the United States. In modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for
order to carry out that mission — although the war ended before this could be instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of the
done — they surely did not have to take an oath to support the constitution or laws criminal to his country. (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)
of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for they
696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his
illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.
nationality, shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's
military, naval, or air service" of Japan. International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian Edition by Borchard.)
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it
deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps — nor even that he was a is improper to separately take into account against appellant he aggravating
member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps. circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment of a band in
appraising the gravity of the crime. We likewise are of the same opinion,
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and
considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
elementary principles governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our
providing that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted
Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said constitution ordains:
together in the commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have been
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the committed by a band," the employment of more than three armed men is an
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of
military or civil service." (Emphasis supplied.). a band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included,
there being only the aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is
brought more immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable
in war. During such a period of stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, that appellant acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore
the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward exempt from criminal liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty
the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the patriotism and incidental to his service for Japan as a member of the Makapili. It is obvious that
intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code compliance with duties
under the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal order.
of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could The construction contended for by appellant could entail in its potentialities even
be effectively cast off by him even when his country is at war, by the simple the destruction of this Republic.
expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his
of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in
Japanese masters under pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should
the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine
be considered as committed under the impulse of an irresistible force or
Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less repulsive.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose
by the very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of rendering military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected — if
of which under the circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought
his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the matter
law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the appellant actually acted with
from punishment. gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more
cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese masters — so fate willed it — were the very
But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself
to a divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from

20
ones who saved the little girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined Q. Do you know how to pray? — A. I forgot how to pray."(Pages 44 and 45,
to become the star witnesses against him on the day of reckoning. t.s.n.)
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant From the testimony of Clarita Perez, we quote:
guilty of the crime of treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance
Q. Please state your name and your personal circumstances. — A. Clarita Perez,
of one aggravating circumstance, that of "armed band," thus discarding the first
10 years of age, and resident of the Sitio of Banaban.
aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court. A majority of the Court
voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty, Q. What town? — A. I do not know.
convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000
JUDGE NEPOMUCENO:
to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's
decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the Q. Is Banaban a sitio in the town of Malolos, or Quiñgua, or Bigaa? — A. I do
imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the applicable legal provisions not know, sir.
we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be inflicted, Q. You do not know? — A. I do not know, sir.
and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine JUDGE ABAD SANTOS:
of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the Q. What province? — A. I do not know, sir. (Page 4, t.s.n.)
third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. So ordered.
Witness Policarpio Tigas, municipal policeman, testified that about sixty persons,
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, including his sister Eufemia, were killed in Banaban, but he was not killed "because I
JJ., concur. was with my guerrilla outfit then." He saw the killing "because on the 29th day of
January, I came down from the mountains and went to the barrio to see my family
to take them away from the place, but upon arriving there I saw that the people
PARAS, J.: were being gathered and placed behind the chapel. After placing the people behind
I concur in the result because I am convinced that the appellant is guilty of multiple the chapel I saw the massacre of the group begun. In my interest to ascertain the
murder and he even deserves the maximum penalty. fate of my sister and so that I would not be seen, I crept to a creek and stayed there
to find out what would be the end of it all. While I was thus hiding in that creek I
Separate Opinions
saw my sister killed by Pedro Manayao, the painter. After that, convinced of the
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting: fate of my sister and knowing the one who killed her was Pedro Manayao, and
because I was afraid that if I stayed there longer I might be caught by the people
The main facts in this case upon which the prosecution relies are based on the
and knowing that if I would be caught I would also be killed, I left the place." (Page
testimonies of three witnesses, two ten-year-old girls, Clarita Perez and Maria
102, t.s.n.) He was fifty meters away from the place of the massacre. "The dead
Paulino, and Policarpio Tigas.
bodies were burned. I left to go to the mountains. I first put my mother in a safe
From the testimony of Maria Paulino we quote: place, and after that I joined my companions and together we returned to the
town." Eufemia "was buried by my father" on the "second day after the killing". (P.
Q. You said that you are ten years old, do you know what is the meaning of
103, t.s.n.)
telling a lie? — A. I do not know.
The above are the facts testified in the direct testimony of the witness. That he
Q. Do you know the difference between falsity and truth? — A. I do not know.
should come from the mountains and arrive at the place at the very instant when
xxx xxx xxx the massacre was about to be executed; that he should have remained hidden in a
creek, fifty meters away, to find out the final fate of his sister; that, instead of
Q. Do you know how to read? — What, Sir?
remaining to witness the gory scene, he did not depart to call his co-guerrilleros
Q. How to read. — A. No, Sir. who, according to him, were well armed, in order to attack the mass killers and try

21
to save those who were gathered to be killed; that he left precisely after he saw his against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to
sister decapitated, notwithstanding which he testified that the corpses were burned satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such
but that the body of his sister was buried by his father the day after the killing, — unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo,
these, besides other details, are things that lead us to doubt the veracity of the Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.
testimony of this witness, thus leaving to be considered only the testimonies of the
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the
two girls.
accused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta
Although we are inclined to believe that the appellant must have been seen by the Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to
two girls at the place of the massacre in the company of the Japanese, we cannot get her and told her that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead,
reconcile ourselves in believing all the details as narrated by them, so as to justify she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas;
the inflicting of the supreme penalty upon appellant. Although we are constrained that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that the accused
to believe in the substantial truthfulness of the two grills, considering their tender came again and told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information
Clerk; that she did not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to
age which makes them highly susceptible to suggestions, and the additional
Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet Governor
significant fact that Maria Paulino does not know "the meaning of telling a lie" nor
Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini
"the difference between falsity and truth," and history and experience have time wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the
and again shown that human fallibility is more pronounced in children of tender latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her
age, we vote for the modification of the appealed decision in the sense that with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in having carnal
appellant be sentenced to reclusion perpetua. knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she was brought to
Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was able to escape and
stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when
G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949 Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, "As regards count No. 2 —

vs. Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant. with some Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant. Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order
appellee. that said Japanese Colonel might select those first who would later be taken to
satisfy his carnal appetite and that by means of threat, force and intimidation,
TUASON, J.: the above mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of the
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where Eriberta
Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2
electrocution. were testified to by said witnesses Eriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de
Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite once more their testimony in support of
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence
the allegations in court No. 2; this Court is fully convinced that the allegation in
only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were
said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the evidence adduced.
substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 4 —
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos,
Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in
recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women
Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and

22
 delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, later, upon the pretext of conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said
but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, accused brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in
before delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first their lust; the Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and violence had
accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get
while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused though force and intimidation,
her on the pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case affecting certain
raped her in an uninhabited house; that she resisted with all her force against
Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were
the desire of the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she
brought in a car driven by the accused; they were brought to the house of
was delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas who also raped her.
Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and after
Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion,
remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out with her hair and her
Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then
dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her immediately that she was raped against
out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a revolved if she
her will by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said
refuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that
Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat
while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and
and intimidation, the accused succeeded in raping her; that when she returned
their companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that when
to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that the following day while
the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered her
conducting the two girls back to their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped
face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house;
by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
that on arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the
Governor exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but the accused replied Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as
saying: "These girls talked bad against the Japanese , and that is why we following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the
arrested them"; that the said Governor Hontañosas then, said: "Take them to Japanese needed her daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, he
the Japanese "; that the accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the daughters, under that understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she
Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese went to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the office
Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters wept and told her
room by another Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap that they were turned over to the Japanese and raped them; that her daughter
while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail. Flaviana told her (the witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the
accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that the accused did
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and
not permit her two daughter to return home on the pretext that the Puppet
Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven beyond
Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they stayed in the house of
reasonable doubt.
the accused Perez; that when her daughter returned to her house ultimately,
"As regards count No. 5 — they related to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters told her they
would have preferred death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran; that
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused
Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had raped her.
commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the
pretext that they were to bee taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a
the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and part of the res gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between the
uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two girls occurrence and the time of the information. In the manner these two witnesses
to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces in testified in court, there could be no doubt that they were telling the absolute
Bohol and by means of violence threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would assume and admit the
abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The Court is fully
subsequently of Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and intimidation, convinced that all the allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been proven by
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her against her will; that two days, the testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.

23
"As regards count No. 6 — common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy and attachment
are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion
apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business
nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country
organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a country by the
high ranking officers, which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the
that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were severely natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature
reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable
to attend another banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and assistance is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is
Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit best their fancy; that comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United
the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was to lure them to the States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She declared: enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
That on June 29, 1942, she and companion nurses, saw the accused coming to individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile
the hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the office of the Puppet designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a
Governor where they were severely reprimanded by the latter for not friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is
attending the dance held on June and receptions was to select from among to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to
them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for immoral lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging
purposes that she and her companions were always afraid of the accused Perez war against the giver's country enhance his strength and by same count injures the
whenever he came to said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on interest of the government of the giver. That is treason. (See United
perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her room, laid down on States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused, not satisfied, went up into the
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is
room of that particular nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered her and
correct. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or
telling her that it was only her pretext that she was sick.
men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for
Ralameda. Said testimony need not be reproduced here. the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women
themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned, but it
bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the
is contended that the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason.
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to
The Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and
weaken the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair
preserve the morale of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a
implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple
fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests not only on its
the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the
physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual
defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the
report of the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30,
war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital
1933).
ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.
women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog,
them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason.
Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without
For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general result. yet by

24
his cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been PABLO, M., disidente:
committed.
I disagree. In my opinion, the proven facts constitute a crime of treason.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in
The defendant of good reputation in Bohol to make them available to the officers of
section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:
the enemy army, has helped them in the work of destruction. In war, destruction is
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to used for triumph, and destruction is done in things and in people. To disable for
support the offense (treason) charged, the People's Court may, nevertheless, work or for war the inhabitants of the invaded country is to destroy them to a
convict and sentence the accused for any crime included in the acts alleged in greater or lesser degree and to violate or dishonor women, also to destroy them
the information and established by the evidence. materially and morally and it is even worse than to kill and annihilate. In the present
case, the defendant helped Colonel Mini and Dr. Takibayas in dishonoring several
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by
senoritas, putting them in a worse situation than that of the slaves. If the
the evidence.
recruitment of men or women to be forced to build trenches for the invading army
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1, constitutes a crime of treason; if seizing the citizens' rice in their homes to give it to
paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the the hungry soldiers of the Japanese army is treason; Why should not recruiting
right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The senoritas be used by enemies in their bestial desires, as a means of entertainment
contention is not well taken. The provision in requires that the private crimes of or relief of their jobs? Flaviana and Feliciana Bonalos, illegally arrested and then
which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the information handed over to the two beast officers, in their statement, have said that they would
and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the defendant was have preferred to die than to be raped.
warned of the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of
The argument of the Attorney General, which deserves serious consideration, is the
treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no
following tenor:
element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of criminal
procedure convicted for crime different from that designated in the complaint or In the United States Army, and we believe this is also true in the Imperial Japanese
information is allowed and practiced, provided only that such crime "is included or Forces, a unit known as the United Services Organization (U.S.O.) functions with the
described in the body of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof primordial aim and view to keep at peak of the morale of the soldiers. To achieve
presented during the trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.) this, varied forms of entertainment like movies, dancer, stage show and the like are
provided for at an enormous expense. In fine, the soldiers are surrounded with all
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these
the comfort and opportunities that they ordinarily enjoy in their civilian life. The
assaults are not charged against him and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion
reason for this is to their nerves and minimized as much as possible, they heavy
alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of
strain on them incident to the nature of their mission in time of war. Such
the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.
entertainment because the more imperative when it comes to soldiers who are
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for assigned overseas, in a foreign soil, in a no man's land, a devour of the inspiring
each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 association of their families, girl friends and those dearest to them.
year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify
. . . Clearly, therefore, appellant provident them with what should have been the
each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being
burden of the Imperial Japanese Forces, relieving the latter of the trouble, expense,
understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed forty years.
and difficulty of sending over to these Islands Japanese women to entertain their
Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur. soldiers to bolster up their morale. In other words, the services of the Japanese
Paras, J., reserves his vote. women who were replaced by ours, through the efforts of the appellant could be
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result. diverted to other important phases of military activities either in the homeland or in
this sector. Hence, the aid and comfort to the enemy is evident.

Separate Opinions

25
If Colonel Mini and Dr. Takibayas of the Japanese army did not find another G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
consolation or solace to forget their worries and cruelties more than satiate their
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
lust, then to provide them women against their will is to help them recover lost vs.
enthusiasms and give them new vigor to continue the war of conquest. Well known EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
is that the soldiers are not steel machines that can be fighting every day every day;
they need time to rest to recover lost strengths, to entertain themselves to forget Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
lugubrious thoughts and frank recreation to invigorate their spirit. If for Colonel First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo
Mini and Dr. Takibayas, raping the ladies recruited by the accused was good for appellee.
compensation for their military efforts, then it is worthwhile for them to expose life TUASON, J.:
in the luncha because after all they are well compensated. What greater
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After
satisfaction for them as to freely enjoy the senoritas of the province with the help
pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and
of the accused? Poresa satisfaction, they would redouble their conquest efforts to
maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor
have other opportunities to satiate their bestial appetites. Under such morbid introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that
inclinations, to give them entertainment, solace and recreation is to help them in he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty
war. on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay
It is no exaggeration to suppose that these Japanese officers have left children, the fine of P20,000.
wives and mothers in their country whom they love dearly, and in their moments of Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on
loneliness, sadness and nostalgia it is not impossible for them to remember them any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the
and to say for themselves : "What do we get out of this war of invasion, leaving our accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American
children, our children, our families and our abandoned homes just to satisfy the aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a
emperor's ambitions of conquest? Every time we realize that we are nothing more carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the
than simple instruments to sacrifice So many lives and haciendas for the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the
boastfulness of Japan, conscience revolts, we believe that war is wicked, unjust: we Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier.
must abandon it, we must not continue to invade territories. " If these thoughts Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the
persisted in the minds of said officers, they would undoubtedly lose accused following an American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness
stated that the American was walking as well as his captors. And there was no sled,
he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a
drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to
corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it.
(People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating
circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders
and physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from
treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the
decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense
committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:

26
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province 7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the
of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture
Police and acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with the of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead,
infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason.
guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending
treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said accused and his
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make
companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him
treason.
and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the
accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
and from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical
Mandaue and detained for 7 days; activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute
or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province
becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article
Japanese Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully,
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from their house; that said
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
accused and his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of
Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the face and
course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the
in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai
government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes
Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while
instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where murder or physical
his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him
injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded
nor his whereabouts known;
separately under their general denomination.
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with
may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other
the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces,
atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less painful method of execution
said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully,
will be taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14,
unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a
paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented the
patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an,
sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal
municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
objective.
guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as guerrilla
suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of
rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but
Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home count 4 has not be substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
and the accused did bayonet them to death;
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of
the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in

27
spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947
the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality vs.
and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil.,
82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his TUASON, J.:
defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present
counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court
sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the The information charged:
interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes
that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of
worker." We do not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija
not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as a and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the
sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is
sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and
rights of the appellant. the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then
and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States
charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as
to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be follows:
modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be
affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant. That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and
designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the
Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations against the United
States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and assisted
the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and
engagements against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the
Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan,
Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime
between January and April, 1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts
alleged except that of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What
the People's Court found is that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in
certain raids and in confiscation of personal property. The court below, however,
said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so
regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did
find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and
other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva
Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with
rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that

28
during the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, people. The principal effect of it was no difference from that of enlisting in the
performed duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in invader's army.
Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the
American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with
deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this
the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the
statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness
Americans."
who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the another day, and so forth?
proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look
one of the various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who
for guidance from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial
gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property,
interpretation has been placed on the two-witness principle by American courts,
and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly
and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull from American
committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one
materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the
defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to
another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at
be to the same overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to
least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
an overt act and another witness to another overt act of the same species of
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that the same construction
both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: "The
one against his will, membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering the two
intent, considering the purposes for which the organization was created, which, witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by
according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country
assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to by all the constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires
shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule
influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the in England.
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section
enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two
2038, p. 271:
witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one
witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is
the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.) separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685),
necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to
actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if
countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in
enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even Wigmore on Evidence,ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65
though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays
gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in
knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting,
war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the
augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."

29
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla,
the trial court. To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have JJ., concur.
reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only to say that the authors of Paras, J., concurs in the result.
the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy purposely made
conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so
exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where Separate Opinions
two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed HILADO, J., dissenting:
by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to
discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and Being unable to bring myself agree with the majority upon the application of the
tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding two-witness rule herein, I am constrained to dissent.
the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other As I see it, being a member of the Makapili during the Japanese occupation of those
testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a areas of the Philippines referred to in the information, was one single, continuous,
substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another and indivisible overt act of the present accused whereby he gave aid and comfort to
eyewitness to the same overt act. the Japanese invaders. That membership was one and the same from the moment
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the he entered the organization till he was captured. The fact that he was seen on a
prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the certain day by one of the state witnesses being a member of the Makapili, and was
founders of the American government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead seen by another state witness but on a different day being a member of the same
not merely in spite but because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) organization, does not mean that his membership on the first day was different or
More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional Convention independent from his membership on the other day — it was the selfsame
"as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against membership all the way through. A contrary construction would entail the
legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing consequence that the instant defendant, if we are to believe the allegations and
Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice proofs of the prosecution, became or was a member of the Makapili as many
Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It times as there were days from the first to the last.
is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional T.E. Holland defined "acts" in jurisprudence as follows:
provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony
than modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such Jurisprudence is concerned only with outward acts. An "act" may therefore be
a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a defined . . . as "a determination of will, producing an effect in the sensible
crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant world". The effect may be negative, in which case the act is properly described
so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely as a "forbearance". The essential elements of such an act are there, viz., an
or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the exercise of the will, an accompanying state of consciousness, a manifestation of
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may the will. (Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., unabridged, p. 25.)
sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — There can, therefore, be no question that being a member of the Makapili was an
as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not overt act of the accused. And the fact that no two witnesses saw him being such a
merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of member on any single day or on the selfsame occasion does not, in my humble
them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most opinion, work against the singleness of the act, nor does the fact that no two
venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were witnesses have testified to that same overt act being done on the same day or
generally virulent.'" occasion argue against holding the two-witness rule having been complied with.
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American My view is that, the act being single, continuous and indivisible, at least two
Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the
witnesses have testified thereto notwithstanding the fact that one saw it on one
Philippine statute books must be understood to have intended that the law should
operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers meant. day and the other on another day.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

30
 G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922 the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the
amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants. officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly
disposed of.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee. The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
MALCOLM, J.:
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain hostility.
Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and
grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history
as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without
and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century
jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime
piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so
not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the
and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for
Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong
second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for
all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for
the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of
crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as
the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the
follows:
Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it
and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging
violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at
Maruro the two women were able to escape.
war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First
the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death,
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de
and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the
officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within
same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in 1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the
force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, same.
trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of
sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together
the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties,

31
 four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan.
hundred and sixteen. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with
specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book. piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in
relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of
the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
saving themselves.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the
code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal
the national territory. Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person,
who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the
Spaniard shall be considered as such. power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress,
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States
in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that
relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United
whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev.
laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of
were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the
transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
law of nations.
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines
McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.) relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in
the United States.
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines
by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A
Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the
when he said: crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be
substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned,
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the
citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of
case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority"
person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered
as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend
as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of
all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of
things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent;
the Philippine Islands.
and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force,
and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read
before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be as follows:

32
 The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924
of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal
to cadena perpetua.
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio vs.
mayor. JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines. G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation vs.
to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused- appellant.
cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us vs.
to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellant.
imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating PER CURIAM:
circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal
Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter Ponce y
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were charged of the crime of piracy in an information
filed before the then Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed
which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the vicinity of
consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the Municipality of Cagayan
importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, and within the jurisdiction of this
cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the honorable Court, the above-named accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias
horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y
punishment. Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power being crew
members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine registry,
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another and
imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, to wit: three (3)
accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle,
court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation upon persons,
provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court did then and there willfully and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and
as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the carry away against the consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and
defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is other persona) properties belonging to the crew members and passengers of
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of cash money amounting to Three Million
by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two Five Hundred Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00),
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, personal belongings of passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational charts and
instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to the damage

33
 and prejudice of the aforementioned owners in the total amount of THREE The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic review.
MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the vessel
(P3,687,300.00) Philippine Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of
M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo
the said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the abovenamed accused to
wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the
take, steal and carry away the properties abovementioned, the herein accused
following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the evening of
in pursuance to their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the vessel were several traders
feloniously with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treacherously
and crew members. Two or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25
attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage of superior strength, use
miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the
personal violence upon the persons of Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America,
vessel.
Perhan Tan, Marcos Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk
Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra, Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile, he heard
Segovia Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad
shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch to hide and on his way through
Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar
the engine room, he saw appellant Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez,
Tahil Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin,
Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards Que's
Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam
companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's house to handle the
Sahiddan, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused
steering wheel. He was substituted by Usman, another passenger, while Que and
their instantaneous death and likewise causing physical injuries upon the
the other crew members were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the
persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad and Hadji
dead bodies of Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the
Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which could have
time, appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason or cause independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the motor launch,
and able medical assistance rendered to said victims which prevented death. followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down among the sacks of copra. He saw
appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit,
premeditation, night time and the use of superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of
their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he realized that he was also
L-61069)
hit on the right side of his stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted daytime.
by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on March 5, 1982 and
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from one of the
sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it could not be opened. After
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty. However, awhile, the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid
he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of guilty. On March 10, 1982 he behind the bags of copra until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him.
was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they took cover in the
of death." bodega of copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and
Peter Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
come out otherwise something worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the extreme ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies
penalty of death." overboard.
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the four About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an island
defendants because "there was a separate civil action for breach of contract and where the four appellants were able to secure pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered
damages filed with the same trial court in Civil Case No. N-85 against the several to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases which were full of money.
defendants, including the four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069) Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and

34
Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—In all cases in
durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles. which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it
attended the commission of the deed.
arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf ten
dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid of merit.
Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares, Masihul Bandahala, Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian
Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul Salialam. authorities and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National
Bureau of Investigation of Manila. When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece claim that the
offered in evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by the
trial court erred (1) in imposing the death penalty to the accused-appellants Jaime
defense, aside from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the
Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias
truthfulness of said declarations, thus:
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight to
the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C" Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in A Yes. sir.
holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat and Kota
piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay was merely a Kinabalo, is that right?
denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
which was his personal money to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you have signed that
Investigation. statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely: Jaime
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in Kudat?
Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No. 532,
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which We
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal
likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that his participation in the
Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides:
commission of the offense was positively testified to by the master of the vessel,
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or highway Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another witness,
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an
court be punished by: M-14 rifle.
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who actually saw
periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon indiscriminately at the passengers and crew
result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be members in wanton disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting and
imposed. If rape, murder or no homocide is committed as a result or on the killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat, there
occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without can be no question that he was in conspiracy with the three other defendants. After
means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing his arrest, Ponce gave a statement to the authorities stating therein his
upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. participation as well as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
(Emphasis supplied)
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian authorities.
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of Investigation authorities fetched and
where rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, brought them to Manila where they executed their respective statements after Rico
the lower court committed no error in not considering the plea of the three (3) Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00, respectively,
defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch which the Malaysian authorities
that: also turned over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.

35
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers pertinent I take exception, however, to the statement therein that accused Peter Ponce "was
to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit: fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel." The
monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No" have been stricken down by the Court as
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you are under
utterly unacceptable as a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the constitutional right
investigation here in connection with the robbery committed on the M/V
to silence and to counsel in People vs. Caguioa (95 SCRA 2). in line with my separate
Noria last August 31, 1981, where you are an Assistant Engineer. You have a
concurring and dissenting opinion in the recent case of People vs. Itlanas (G.R. No.
right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any of our questions here. You
60118, prom. February 28, 1985). As therein stated, I subscribe to the Court's
have the right to be represented by counsel of your choice in this
requirement in Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile (121 SCRA 538) that "the right to
investigation. Should you decide to be represented by a lawyer but cannot
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
afford one we will provide a lawyer for you free. Should you decide to give a
assistance of counsel" in order to assure that it is knowingly, voluntarily and
sworn statement, the same shall be voluntary and free from force or
intelligently given.
intimidation or promise of reward or leniency and anything that you saw here
maybe used for or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do you
understand an these rights of yours?
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer? THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
A: No, sir. vs.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to signify that you so JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW
understand all your rights as above stated and that you do not need the JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo) ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional right to This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of
remain silent and his right to counsel. Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.

Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H", In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM
"J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each other as each admits his KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy
participation and those of the other co-accused, there is no room for doubt that with triple murder and frustrated murder said to have been committed according to
conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of appellant the information as follows:
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this
showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of
consequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed. Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of their superior
strength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with
SO ORDERED. the other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur. feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo
de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were
Fernando, C.J., took no part,
riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas,
Separate Opinions boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings
amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the
I concur with the judgment of conviction, there being sufficient direct evidence and said accused, on the occasion of the crime herein above-described, taking
positive Identification by eyewitnesses.

36
 advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did then and there returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump by Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and
into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of
caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by
and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of his companions.
with Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends
of causes in dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able
who were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island,
to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely medical assistance
Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The
rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death.
goods they brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn).
(Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas
Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.) Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and
portion. Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P
3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh,
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the
went to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods
accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt
worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock
of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as
in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram
defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and
did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de
hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao
and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-
members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so called compassionate Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth
society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.) P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram
did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of
APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED
Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place
The People's version of the facts is as follows: Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters
away from the place where the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn).
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan
Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two persons whose faces
Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on
the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their
July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and
goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to
Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his store consisting of mosquito
return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself
nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000
at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island,
more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received under an agreement that
Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200
they would be sold by the above-named persons and thereafter they would pay
meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off
the value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits for themselves.
the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other
However these people neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor

37
 pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons 1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the
on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice
recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family
house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods
rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after
Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61,
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does
tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to
not support this assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important
undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on.
consequence to mention that the witness presented by the defense are all from
With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that
Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving
remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro.
team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this fact.
Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from
The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso
the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp.
Police Daily Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the
62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall.
attention of the PC or Police but to an army detachment. The Army is known to
When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman,
have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom
Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and
the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be
treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela,
true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by
Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
the accused testified against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason
wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such
two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The
the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC
the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn). to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the
commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial
agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or believing in the
Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular
version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted
area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M.
consistently with the latter's report and placed the accused under detention for
Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo
investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates
(Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.) 3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de
Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of
Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands
witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone
were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants'
prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that
claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not
they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity
the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among
of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned
the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
credibility to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact
or circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the significance It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved
of which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's in this case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show
determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants are not clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness
convincing: Tony de Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both

38
 accused were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.
Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness
Separate Opinions
Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed
strangers to whom the two accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the CUEVAS, J., dissenting:
dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from the two armed
considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was
strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de
committed, I vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.
Guzman and companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and
undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not molested. These
concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA
130). The convergence of the will of the conspirators in the scheming and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them the act of vs.
any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.) ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE,
CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo
MELO, J.:
de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no
reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the
manner different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to
and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the
material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene,
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value
punishable by death regardless of the number of victims. of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on,
the victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded,
stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio
wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including
the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45
appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete
with armalites. control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the
and the law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San
votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending
appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the
SO ORDERED. vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air
Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela Fuente, Alampay
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and
and Patajo, JJ., concur. cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed
Aquino, C.J., took no part.

39
to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of
1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-
appellants, as follows:
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to
18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG,
transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532),
San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, committed as follows:
after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both
30, 1991.
dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor
transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride." launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in
waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with
three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government
the complement and crew members, employing violence against or
authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be
intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed
killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger
to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the
jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who
Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of
the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional
accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon
different places in Metro Manila. arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon
ensued.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew,
called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some
The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer
officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having
incident. their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March
2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel.
present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid
surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that
headquarters in Manila. period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they
cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo
denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas.
Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to
Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00
evade arrest.
each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment
lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City. signed by the parties.

40
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi
home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report
Emilio Changco, Jr. which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then
handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence
morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to
that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and
the company.
later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years
on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by
Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first
shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and
owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride." drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The
transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco
in full for the transfer.
and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile
Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels
telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma." and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker
or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean
discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new
broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00
transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the
Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to
vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being
Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the
billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name
firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the
"SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to
contact vessel.
be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was
upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship- thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the
designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of
crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase.
Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals,
the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of
procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice,
Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals
pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987
vessel carried 11,900 tons. Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers
meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of
then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer
the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of
of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong
relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC
latter's personal card.
Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can
no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit,

41
 jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the
P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is
per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge
accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao"
Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or
longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him
interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore. outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the
making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and
National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the
which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court
pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and
erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the
532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree,
National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
SO ORDERED. accusation against him.
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not
may be summarized as follows: prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified
piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information
they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby
with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have
appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.
or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and
examined seven witnesses for the accused. The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal
effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly
appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the
contend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in
violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to
finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not
accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act
informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.
No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5)
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February
Cheong San Hiong 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were

42
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the
similar practices, and their families.
subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the
same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave
(tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any
questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend
right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against
himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds
technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be
the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
presence of counsel.
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article
6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions
"[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the
assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree
by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused- doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case
appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the
Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible.
sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State
knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fidelawyer, should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA
where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of
[1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]). accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible
and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial
inadmissible in evidence against them.
investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang
Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and
the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse,

43
 about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses
the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and
"M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
(American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . . convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically
impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to
xxx xxx xxx
do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were dates aforestated.
on board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is
to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of
accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to
doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a
and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately
certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when
and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and identified the said Accused as some of the pirates. and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one
need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in
xxx xxx xxx
every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when
Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated
evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore. common criminal design.
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin,
denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the
weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was
witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan,
the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio
Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T
conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other
Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off- accused-appellants.
shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another.
for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families,
Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka
without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the
Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia
personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and
Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences
clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is
are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are
incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to
close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their
leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely
parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-
unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides,
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding
and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989.
in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and

44
Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
time remained at large. considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
(effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement
order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] or not, any person is covered by the law.
of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence,
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
excluding him from the coverage of the law.
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide: crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the
reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas,
Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
harmoniously as separate laws.
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers. (Italics As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
supplied.) person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And
who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the
whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
of its complement or passengers. (Italics ours) pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the
same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood,
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
as follows:
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v.
by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the

45
law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of
(People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]). the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right
Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground
verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine
that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure
532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section
that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities,
2 of said law?
and supplied, the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing: maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure)
"M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi
the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said
Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal
indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution
the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to
which provides: "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail
highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who knowingly and in any manner accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized
aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the
information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T
government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record)
or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration"
indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits
shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart
in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and
the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this
unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from
Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
"M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH,
of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic
principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH",
favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the
Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]). amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite
"General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential
in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear
Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided
that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said
in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the
voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel
case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption
oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above.
that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property
It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio
taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
Changco supervised the transfer from his end.

46
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his SO ORDERED.
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source
G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN)
Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Petitioners,
any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances vs.
under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF
never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo POLICE, Respondents.
whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178554
that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson Elmer Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President Joselito V.
Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any Ustarez and Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN
receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean RIGHTS, represented by its Executive Director Daisy Arago, Petitioners,
vs.
national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity
cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at as Acting Secretary of National Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, GEN.
than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, in his capacity as PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents.
irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
time and money for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were G.R. No. 178581
legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS,
shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS
(KMP), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR
acquiring was purloined. UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), KALIPUNAN
NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the
STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA
orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR
to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, RENATO
the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA
LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN (ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-
Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior
ARAULLO, RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO
Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vs.
vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, DEPARTMENT
unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL
the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have
DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-
refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE
to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its
consequences of his actions. intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence G.R. No. 178890
on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.

47
 KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, represented herein by Dr. DECISION
Edelina de la Paz, and representing the following organizations: HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline
Hernandez and also on her own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary Guy Portajada and also CARPIO MORALES, J.:
on her own behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA AMNESTIYA
(SELDA), represented by Donato Continente and also on his own behalf, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), represented by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
CHURCH PEOPLE'S RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado, OCARM, Petitioners,
Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, 1signed into law on
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE March 6, 2007.
SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern
DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty.
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-
THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights
ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers3 who are also bringing the action
THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
as G.R. No. 178554.
G.R. No. 179157 The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS
FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and FORMER (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality,
SENATORS SERGIO OSMEÑA III and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, Petitioners, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
vs. Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE),
(ATC), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW),
G.R. No. 179461 League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante,
MGA SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective
CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr.
(COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB,
NG MGA MAMAMAYAN SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos
MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos,
LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSÑOS RURAL Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for
POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS & EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIÑO LAJARA, TEODORO REYES, certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY
P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE BELTRAN, Petitioners, On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
vs. Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
Promotion of Church People’s Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY respective officers5who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI- Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its
intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents. docketed as G.R. No. 179157.

48
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region, 7 and earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
individuals8 followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari the case.10
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Petitioners lack locus standi
Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All difficult constitutional questions.11
the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12 summarized the rule
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National
on locus standi, thus:
Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
intelligence and investigative elements.
constitutional questions.
The petitions fail.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionshas acted without or in excess of some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
"communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity
petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their
how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with
status as citizens and taxpayers.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State

49
and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far
elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi. and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being
matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
court has no constructive knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No.
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice.
178890, allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by
Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific
state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and
charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after
"vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military
its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating
build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the
from the so-called tagging.
[S]tate."14
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to
correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result
purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
in direct injury to their organization and members.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R.
United States of America17 (US) and the European Union18 (EU) have both classified
No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged
the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court
action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of
takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice
the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The
Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU
tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.19 Such statement
without following the procedure under the law. 15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare
G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners. under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July
2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
proscription under RA 9372.
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to
be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano and
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the
records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations.
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration 21 of resuming peace
ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the
questionable. judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or specific interests in the questions being raised.22 Of recent development is the filing
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are of the first case for proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety Sayyaf Group.
and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the

50
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi.
under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as
a result of the law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in
doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of
public.
Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino
Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and
petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front taxing power of Congress,28 whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and
organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, personal interest in the proceeding.29
BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.26
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of
Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the
a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a
interest is key.
person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to
prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged. controversy.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA lower courts as may be established by law.
9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. 27 The IBP failed to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not Government.30(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
"political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the Court finds that she has to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly actualities.
lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator Sergio
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.32
concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC 33 cannot be
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr.
more emphatic:
in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of
transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-reaching [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable—
they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal

51
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that
of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or
must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much
be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a less a real and existing one.
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on opinion, which is not its function.43
uncertain, contingent events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely
declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity
wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.35
the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.44
Elections36 for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such
on Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law
based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the
may be abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before
Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy
courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
between real litigants.
demandable and enforceable.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein
grounds goes on ad infinitum.
certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for
definition of the crime of terrorism46under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread
mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government
that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the
to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies
issues.38
with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness
Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply
vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and
only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
"should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole
means of seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to
court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
§2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material support to organizations doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting
that they intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of
the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly
two such organizations.
cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an
The Court clarifies.
anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the
conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in
controversy.42 Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and

52
impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
vague.51 entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court
held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to
stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the
exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said
therein subject election offense53 under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.54
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion 55 of Justice Vicente cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
V. Mendoza in the Estradacase, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
(Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of
tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they
the crime of plunder.
are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will
basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
decision, reads: Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face
is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
and in its entirety.
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S.
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
overly broad statutes.
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
chances as in the area of free speech. wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"

53
and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.63
charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth may be challenged" and "underscored that an ‘on-its-face’ invalidation of penal
and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a statutes x x x may not be allowed."64
penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case
rights).
may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of
operate on the same plane. crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism
against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime.
of the Government muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 58
to him.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.59
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
affecting real litigants, a facialinvalidation is an examination of the entire law, always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or applied to the litigants.
activities.60
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle 61 in his concurring opinion that the exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
all times be abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes

54
it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the analysis of its validity
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA
assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause others not before the
9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate
those third parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
two cases,67 observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an government to give in to an unlawful demand.
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 68and that
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it
terrorism77 must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
protected by the free speech clause.
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct.
Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
society of constitutionally protected expression."71 speech.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent chargeagainst them phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component
operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein
of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face
speech.
and in its entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."73 Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it
unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender
the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at
like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity."
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants’ claims analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on
that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a
"among the most important guarantees of liberty under law."75 sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed
as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
least three cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor
ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in
illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the making the element of coercion perceptible.
petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed
instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed
penal statute, unlike in the present case.
an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by

55
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive vs.
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY
interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it
DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO
practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents
as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to x-----------------------x
society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied) G.R. No. 231774
NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they MAPANDI, Petitioners,
merely evidence a prohibited conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND)
Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1 SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG)
SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of
OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL
the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.
they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness
grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed DECISION
penal statute on its face and in its entirety. DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."
The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September
the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court 2016 declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in
reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling Mindanao;
on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In case
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President)
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law
SO ORDERED. x x x';
WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968,
G.R. No. 231658 provides that 'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
vs. Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO
forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, any of their powers or prerogatives';
Respondents
x-----------------------x WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the
G.R. No. 231771 series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO, CARL attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing
ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTIN A E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H.
and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August
ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY
REPRESENTATIVE i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM, VENCER
MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over
a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within

56
 the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. As narrated in the
casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag of the President's Report:
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting
On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior
to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of
leader of the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and
Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to
Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with armed resistance which escalated
enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in
into open hostility against the government. Through these groups' armed siege
Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and
and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities,
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of major social,
other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not economic, and political foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis.
only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao. This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the groundwork for the
eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016,
law, do hereby proclaim as follows: consisted of around two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully armed and
prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly operates
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao
in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks and linkages with
group of islands for a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date
foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahidin
hereof.
Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its publication of a video footage
suspended in the aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law. declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that foreign-based
terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in particular, as well as
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord,
illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical support to the Maute Group.
Two Thousand and Seventeen.
The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and
Proclamation No. 216.
prerogatives.2
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with
In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on
rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing
May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law
of time.
and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit:
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion
• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their
for decades. In more recent years, we have witnessed the perpetration of
sympathizers, commenced their attack on various facilities - government and
numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the duly constituted
privately owned - in the City of Marawi.
authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano
• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being
carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan,
manage by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).
among others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these,
• The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate,
namely, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute Group.1
and assaulted on-duty personnel. BJMP personnel were disarmed, tied, and/or
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to locked inside the cells.
capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute • The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two
Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in [2] prisoner vans and private vehicles).
Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their • By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted, and
efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government authorities and sporadic gunfights were heard and felt everywhere. By evening, the power

57
outage had spread citywide. (As of 24 May 2017, Marawi City's electric supply Maranaos from leaving their homes and forcing young male Muslims to join
was still cut off, plunging the city into total black-out.) their groups.
• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed • Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP,
and burned the Marawi Police Station. A patrol car of the Police Station was there exists a strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City,
also taken. seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government
• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the personnel, and committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the
takeover of the Marawi City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escape of at government.3
least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail.
The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the
• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected
President to conclude that -
areas to evacuate.
• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to
namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, fell under the control of these groups. establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned
They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-empt military reinforcement. establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.
• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied several
The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of
areas in Marawi City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street, Mapandi, and
young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the
Camp Keithly, as well as the following barangays: Basak Malutlot, Mapandi,
armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation
Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao, Caloocan, Banggolo,
of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH
Barionaga, and Abubakar.
flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove
• These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the
checkpoints at the Iligan City-Marawi City junction.
Government.
• Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College Foundation,
Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, and the Shia There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the
Masjid Moncado Colony. Hostages were taken from the church. President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a
• About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt
reportedly killed by the lawless groups. to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in
• Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed;
Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School. and remove his supervisory powers over local govemments.4
• The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other
flag there, among other several locations. As of 0600H of 24May 2017,
criminals, brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and
members of the Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates of Amai
government personnel, particularly in the performance of their duties and
Pakpak Hospital. They held hostage the employees of the Hospital and took
functions, and untold hardships to the civilians, viz.:
over the PhilHealth office located thereat.
• The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced
Hospital, which they later set ablaze. difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide
• Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from
commandeered one of its armored vehicles. performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
• Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of Marawi hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The
City has been infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of members of the bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the
Maute Group and the ASG. As of the time of this Report, eleven (11) members government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop
of the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police have been killed in reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from
action, while thirty-five (35) others have been seriously wounded. restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
• There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for Christian government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered.
communities in Marawi City to execute Christians. They are also preventing

58
 The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The
provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant House of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 105010 "EXPRESSING
acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO
resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216,
have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao. 5 ENTITLED 'DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE
OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'.
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the The Petitions
Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under
A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)
the control of the lawless groups.
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C.
The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of
Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed
its terrain and the easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless
a Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987
armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape
Constitution.
routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.
First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups,
sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in
local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in
any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not
attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of
constitute rebellion12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove
Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure
Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its
the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national
territory.13 It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and
integrity.6
other outlying areas as mere propaganda114 and not an open attempt to remove
The President ended his Report in this wise: such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the Chief
Executive of the assertion and exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein. It
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address
contends that the Maute Group is a mere private army, citing as basis the alleged
the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates
interview of Vera Files with Joseph Franco wherein the latter allegedly mentioned
the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the
that the Maute Group is more of a "clan's private militia latching into the IS brand
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time
theatrically to inflate perceived capability".15 The Lagman Petition insists that during
that the rebellion is completely quelled.7
the briefing, representatives of the military and defense authorities did not
In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the categorically admit nor deny the presence of an ISIS threat in the country but that
military and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House they merely gave an evasive answer16 that "there is ISIS in the Philippines".17 The
of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law. Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that
the current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S.
government in its bid to capture Hapilon.18Based on said statement, it concludes
Resolution No. 3888 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and
that the objective of the Maute Group's armed resistance was merely to shield
finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance
Hapilon and the Maute brothers from the government forces, and not to lay siege
with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no
on Marawi City and remove its allegiance to the Philippine Republic. 19 It then posits
compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate thus resolved as follows:
that if at all, there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by way of the "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the
sense of the Senate, that the Senate finds the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 declaration of martial law.20
to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. The Senate
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
hereby supports fully Proclamation No. 216 and finds no compelling reason to
sufficient factual basis because the President's Report containef "false, inaccurate,
revoke the sarne.9
contrived and hyperbolic accounts".21

59
It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment
Amai Pakpak Medical Center. Citing online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer on the Lagman Petition and set the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15,
Saber (Dr. Saber), the hospital's Chief, the Lagman Petition insists that the Maute 2017.
Group merely brought an injured member to the hospital for treatment but did not
On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and
overrun the hospital or harass the hospital personnel. 22 The Lagman Petition also
231774 were filed and eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 231658. 32
refutes the claim in the President's Report that a branch of the Landbank of the
Philippines was ransacked and its armored vehicle commandeered. It alleges that B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)
the bank employees themselves clarified that the bank was not ransacked while the
The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII"33 of the Constitution,
armored vehicle was owned by a third party and was empty at the time it was
likewise seeks the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional
commandeered.23 It also labels as false the report on the burning of the Senator
because it lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that
Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School.
public safety warrants its declaration. 34
It avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation is intact as of May 24,
2017 and that according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi Central In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216
Elementary Pilot School was not burned by the terrorists. 24 Lastly, it points out as relates to events happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire region of
false the report on the beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis
and the occupation of the Marawi City Hall and part of the Mindanao State for the imposition of martial law in the entire Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any act
University.25 of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x allege that public safety requires
the imposition o martial law in the whole of Mindanao".36
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
sufficient factual basis since the President's Report mistakenly included the attack The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and
on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to property" 37 does
in Marawi City in August 2016, the Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of
the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Mindanao.38 It also posits that there is no lawless violence in other parts of
and Basilan, as additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial law. It Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City.39
contends that these events either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel
began, had long been resolved, or with the culprits having already been arrested. 26
groups" in the last Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no failed to identify these rebel groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they were
sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not supposedly waging.40
consult the military establishment or any ranking official 27 before making the
In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and
proclamation.
falsities in the Report of the President to Congress, particularly the attack at the
Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, the
lacks sufficient factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before killing of five teachers of Dansalan College Foundation, and the attacks on various
the Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that the government facilities.41
military was even successful in pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to
In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as
take over Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao; there was absence of any
unconstitutional or in the alternative, should the Court find justification for the
hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
fighters allied with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a
corpus in Marawi City, to declare the same as unconstitutional insofar as its
meager number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group.29
inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao.42
Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to:
C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)
(1)"exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of
nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient factual basis. 30 [the] Factual Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the

60
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself as "a special proceeding"44 or corpus in Mindanao"57 and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for
an "appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen"45 authorized under Section 18, lack of sufficient factual basis.
Article VII of the Constitution.
The Consolidated Comment
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort 46 and
The respondents' Consolidated Comment 58 was filed on June 12, 2017, as required
should be invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less severe
by the Court. Noting that the same coincided with the celebration of the 119th
remedies.47 It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be
anniversary of the independence of this Republic, the Office of the Solicitor General
dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second,
(OSG) felt that "defending the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216" should
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the
serve as "a rallying call for every Filipino to unite behind one true flag and defend it
power to declare martial law.48 It maintains that the President has no discretion to
against all threats from within and outside our shores". 59
choose which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated
only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation.49 The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the
Court with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave
the declaration of martial law.60 The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18,
as to require the imposition of martial law.50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents
Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such authority or power, the same
"do not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought about by an actual
constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through
rebellion, which would compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of
which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted to. The
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus".51 It proposes that "[m]artial law can only
OSG suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII
be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its] imposition
may be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either
x x x is compelled by the needs of public safety"52 which, it believes, is not yet
under Section 1 or 5, of Article VIII.61Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review
present in Mindanao.
power is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court. 62 The
Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the Court has the discretion not to give due course to the petition. 63
Congress, to wit: that the Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual
they have the capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities of their powers
basis of Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of
and prerogatives; and that the Marawi armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a
grave abuse of discretion"64 and not the yardstick of correctness of the
grander plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are conclusions bereft of
facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be the standard in reviewing the
substantiation.53
sufficiency of factual basis.
The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law,
The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the
and without waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought
petitioners to prove that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis.1âwphi1 It
before the Court to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No.
thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to shift the burden of proof when they
216.
asked the Court "to compel [the] respondents to present proof on the factual
Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual basis basis"66 of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he who alleges must prove"67 and
for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ that governmental actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional. 68
of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the
Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed
wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of
from the trajectory or point of view of the President and base on the facts available
arbitrariness".54 Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative assertion, then
to him at the time the decision was made.69 It argues that the sufficiency of the
the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on the
factual basis should be examined not based on the facts discovered after the
respondents.55 It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to divulge
President had made his decision to declare martial law because to do so would
relevant information"56in order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual basis.
subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an impossible standard. 70 It
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to reiterates that the President's decision should be guided only by the information
review, "compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the and data available to him at the time he made the determination. 71 The OSG thus
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas asserts that facts that were established after the declaration of martial law

61
should not be considered in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary
proclamation of martial law. The OSG suggests that the assessment of after- of National Defense;
proclamation facts lies with the President and Congress for the purpose of
c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
determining the propriety of revoking or extending the martial law. The OSG fears
proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been
that if the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of
accurately reported;
the factual basis for the proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the
Congress to determine whether martial law should be revoked or extended. 72 3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on
writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by
intelligence reports coming from the Armed Forces of the Philippines; 73 and that he
Congress jointly or separately;
could not be expected to personally determine the veracity of thecontents of the
reports.74 Also, since the power to impose martial law is vested solely on the 4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of
President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation from the Defense martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration, or
a. What are the parameters for review?
affect its validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.
b. Who has the burden of proof?
Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the
facts cited by the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the c. What is the threshold of evidence?
Congress by merely citing news reports that supposedly contradict the facts
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the happenings in Marawi. For the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief,
OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay evidence, twice removed," 75 and thus
namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the "legal
corpus, and declaration of martial law;
presumption bestowed on governmental acts".76
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague
Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation
and thus null and void:
No. 216 has sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the
petitioners. However, the OSG still endeavors to lay out the factual basis relied a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or
upon by the President "if only to remove any doubt as to the constitutionality of
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within
Proclamation No. 216".77
the entire Mindanao region;
The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in
detail in the Court's Ruling.
the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
ISSUES
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
The issues as contained in the revised Advisory78 are as follows:
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao 1 region;
are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of
8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to
the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this Court
actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial
when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
of habeas corpus is promulgated;
9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell
facts; lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

62
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and II. Whether or not the petitions are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by
supplemental memoranda. paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode
of review required by the Court.
OUR RULING
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third
I. Locus standi of petitioners.
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional which provides:
question is brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
challenge it."79 As a general rule, the challenger must have "a personal and
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
injury as a result of its enforcement."80 Over the years, there has been a trend
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found
in Section 18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this
proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.87 It is a
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those
requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. 88
challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer."81
The Court agrees.
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens
a) Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law.
of the Republic;"82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be
"Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City". 83 In It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
the Lagman Petition, however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention Constitution or by the law.89 Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by
that they are suing's citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly elected the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act
Representatives.84 That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in
Congress couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the
House of Representatives of House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to language of the Constitution or a statute.90 It must appear clearly from the law or it
President Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such will not be held to exist.91
resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is in
grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
direct contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules
corpus.
on legal standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved in the present
Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not venture into b) "In an appropriate proceeding" does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed
this matter. After all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion to accept a suit under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII
which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the
Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing] could compel
phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition
assumption of jurisdiction."86 In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of
for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of
the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines
review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any
since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf as
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the
citizens of this country. Besides, respondents did not question petitioners' legal
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be
standing.
emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put
differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition

63
for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the
Article VII. declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and
c) Purpose/significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-
reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
Marcos martial law ruling in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Lansang. d) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to provide additional safeguard against
possible abuse by the President on the exercise of the extraordinary powers.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the
1987 Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible
Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, 92 to wit: that abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or
the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of
of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the
of judicial review. now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.99 This is clear from the records of
the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the
"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional
President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
provision, the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be
Thus:
rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be
remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry." 93 Fr. MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional Commission
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this
that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:
means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine
The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension
President Ferdinand Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in
from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that period upholding the seeking to delete this particular, phrase. May we be informed of his good and
actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part of Philippine substantial reasons?
constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the Constitutional Commission,
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in
very much aware of these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-
previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on
Chief powers with a view to dismantling what had been constructed during the
the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual
authoritarian years. The new formula included revised grounds for the
invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly.
activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of
Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60
the powers, and review of presidential action.94 (Emphasis supplied)
days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of always exists, even during those first 60 days.
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his
MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past administration, if
decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in
we give exclusive right to the President to determine these factors, especially
the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of the declaration
the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second factor of determining
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not
whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call the attention of the
a political question and is within the ambit of judicial review.96 However, in 1983, or
Gentleman to what happened to us during the past administration.
after the declaration of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as
Court, in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted
President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon him
to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the
purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the Constitution, wherein he
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to
made this predicate under the "Whereas" provision:
judicial inquiry.98
Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless
elements of the Communists and other armed aggrupations organized to

64
 overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the
have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as
and the Republic of the Philippines. the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of
the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30
And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also
days from date of filing.
promulgated by Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of
all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 e) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of the
dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among other things: President.
Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment
of lives and properties, widespread lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason
disorder now prevailing throughout the country, which condition has been why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but
brought about by groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines in order to
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations,
take over the government by force and violence, the extent of which has
President Cecilia Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution.
now assumed the proportion of an actual war against our people and the
She said:
legitimate government ...
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
people for a six-year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life.
corpus and declare martial law in our country without justifiable reason. Would
While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted,
the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase 'and, with the
nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the
concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress'?
extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr.Marcos, he is suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given
The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos
the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has
caused the imposition of martial law for more than eight years and the
sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has
suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in
mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis
1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be exercised
because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme
only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for
Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
such suspension or proclamation of martial law which congressional action may
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must
not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the President
promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to render[s] the executive action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction
balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the of the courts to adjudicate.
public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens.
For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not
And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr.
suspend the operation of the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative
Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned. 100
assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over civilians, or suspend
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state that this
Constitution not only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written during
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial my tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law cases. 101
review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question
f) To interpret "appropriate proceeding" as filed under Section 1 of Article VIII would
before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or
be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably

65
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to the
for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, actions of the two co-equal branches of the Government: on' the part of the
contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to President as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary powers to
place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216 and not
Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard revoking the same.
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court.
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said
g) Jurisdiction of the Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections I and 5 presidential action. In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of
of Article VIII suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are
subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and
5 of Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests a) The judicial power to review versus the congressional power to revoke.
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII. 102 The power
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On
of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the Commission
the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A). 103
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
h) Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension,
generis.
the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent
that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On the other hand, Congress may take into
enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the absolute correctness of
citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a
likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress'
considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its
review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress
decision.
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are
brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the
not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although
mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of executing." 104In fine, the
concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be
18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a b) The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the judicial power to review to be
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court. exercised independently from the congressional power to revoke.
III. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas the Court and Congress with veto powers independently from each other, we quote
corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the the following exchange:
actions taken by Congress.

66
 MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the
safeguards that Congress will be able to revoke such proclamation. Court of its power to review.
MR. RAMA. Yes. IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet because they have been arrested
extend to the calibration of the President's decision of which among his graduated
or that the Congress has been padlocked, then who is going to declare that
powers he will avail of in a given situation.
such a proclamation was not warranted?
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a)
xxxx
calling out the armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
MR. REGALADO. May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is corpus; and c) declaring martial law.112 These powers may be resorted to only under
not exactly just standing by. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the specified conditions.
Members are detained, can immediately be applied for, and the Supreme Court
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-
shall also review the factual basis. x x x107
in-Chief by revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the
c) Re-examination of the Court's pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal- manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential
Arroyo action."113
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine, a) Extraordinary powers of the President distinguished.
reconsider, and set aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign
Arroyo108 to the effect that:
and involves ordinary police action.114 The President may resort to this
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to President;"115 the only limitations being that he acts within permissible
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of
when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is
such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The x x x not subject to judicial review."117
constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands
corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual
of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. 109
invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed
xxxx the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days;
(2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the
nullification by the Supreme Court."118
proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court
can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase
if it has a factual basis. x x x110 "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.119 They perceived the phrase
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own
"imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;" 120 besides, the calling
power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its
out power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent danger."121
bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-by,
waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ
aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this of habeas corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual
proceeding.111 freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that
the Executive Department has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review
of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain
with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any

67
of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the civil
restore order and enforce the law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent courts, in fact, are unable to function.
safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court. 123
MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in
b) What really happens during martial law? that specified critical area.
During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens FR. BERNAS. That is correct.
during the imposition of martial law? What powers could the President exercise
MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the
during martial law that he could not exercise if there is no martial law?
Commander-in-Chief.
Interestingly, these questions were also discussed by the framers of the 1987
Constitution, viz.: FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-
Chief. The understanding here is that the phrase 'nor authorize the conferment
FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the
of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians' has reference to
Committee: What precisely does martial law add to the power of the President
the practice under the Marcos regime where military courts were given
to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state:
jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will never allow that except in
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies... necessary for some kind of court to function.125
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises
Court. I think it is the case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the Supreme Court police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the
said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative President exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public
power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial law does not safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to
suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the
principle of separation of powers. State.126
The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V.
answer we gave to that question in the Committee was: During martial law, the Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on
President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war. In March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President
actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial
general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies
strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had during the period of and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x".128
martial law. In other words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform
concept of martial law as it was developed especially in American
do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during
jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater of war.124
martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the
xxxx Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative
assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place
FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the
during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas
meaning of martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in
corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged
the jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In
with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.129
a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual theater of
war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander is Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil
authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely liberties,130 the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to
because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where declare a state of martial law.
the civil courts are open then in no case can the military courts be given

68
c) "Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does not Congress may revoke, amend, or shorten or even increase the period of such
refer to a sequence, order, or arrangement by which the Commander-in-Chief must suspension.134
adhere to.
xxxx
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a
MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis
'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are:
that in the first imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of
the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
the Members of Congress because the provision says 'in case of actual invasion
corpus, and the power to declare martial law."131 It must be stressed, however, that
or rebellion.' If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino
the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any
de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response because there is an
manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief
attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because
must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the
the roads might be blocked or barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial
manner by which the President decides which power to choose.
concurrence of the majority of all Members of the Congress in case of an
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can see it.
Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and
Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift
prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the
the suspension.
calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question
lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which and no longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point
among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence as a
judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ
broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that of habeas corpus. x x x135
endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.132
xxxx
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail
given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete
into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the Members
that solely, at least initially, lies with the President. of the Congress...'
d) The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the Congress not to interfere a MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege
priori in the decision-making process of the President. of the writ of habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial law.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this
concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of would be an exclusive prerogative of the President?
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that
MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of
judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which
60 days may be shortened by the Congress or the Senate because the next
of his graduated powers will be availed of in a given situation. Voting 28 to 12, the
sentence says that the Congress or the Senate may even revoke the
framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the requirement of congressional
proclamation.136
concurrence in the first imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege. 133
xxxx
MR. PADILLA.x x x
MR. SUAREZ. x x x
We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial law
should not require beforehand the concurrence of the majority of the The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this
Members of the Congress. However, as provided by the Committee, the means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine
the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension

69
of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot
seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be informed of his good and act under those conditions.
substantial reasons?
MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in authority?
previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on
MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the
the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual
concurrence of Congress would be available; and, secondly, the President will
invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly.
be able to act quickly in order to deal with the circumstances.
Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60
days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to
judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation expediency?
always exists, even during those first 60 days.
MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect
xxxx the country in the event of an invasion or a rebellion. 137
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow
undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given Congress to interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary powers.
the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has
e) The Court must similarly and necessarily refrain from calibrating the President's
sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman
decision of which among his extraordinary powers to avail given a certain situation
mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis
or condition.
because the paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme court
may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional
on the same within 30 days from its filing. Commission to eliminate the requirement of 1 concurrence of the Congress in the
initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to
the writ of habeas corpus.
balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the
public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. x Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
xx the writ of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when
public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos
thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect
had done?
the country.138The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the
another Marcos. What we are looking for are safeguards that arereasonable Constitution to the Executive Department.
and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion or
j) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the
rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention here is to protect
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that there should
corpus.
be a concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is automatically
terminated at the end of such 60 days. Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National
Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President
xxxx
to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any
for a legislative check on this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public
Commander-in-Chief? safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of

70
the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."141
the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is
b) Vagueness doctrine applies only in free speech cases.
bestowed.
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces"
g) In any event, the President initially employed the most benign action - the calling
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
out power - before he declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ
Amendment cases.142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
of habeas corpus.
and also to one which is overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who
declaration of martial law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague
Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence."143
Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing presidential
It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-
actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his
speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the
statutes.144 Justice Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
President made the conscious anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign
from among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
suppressing and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The
decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not theory is that ' [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes
prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law and suspend the privilege in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in Mindanao protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires it. statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may be considered vague and thus void
specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
because of (a) its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the absence of any
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
guideline specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
Mindanao region.
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups" 139 in its Whereas Clause and for
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
lack of available guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
entire Mindanao region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
This argument lacks legal basis.
xxxx
a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of analytical tools developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
application."140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess respect to such statute, the established rule is that'one to whom application of
at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been

71
 pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.' Clearly, the
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes ordinance imposed no standard at all 'because one may never know in advance
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as what annoys some people but does not annoy others.'
applied' to a particular defendant.' x x x145
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act whose
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
striking down statutes entirely on the ground that they might beapplied to parties legislation couched in imprecise language - but which nonetheless specifies a
not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 146 "Such standard though defectively phrased - in which case, it may be 'saved' by
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of 'actual proper construction.151
case and controversy' and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when
having no factual concreteness."147
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of
c) Proclamation No. 216cannot be facially challenged using the vagueness doctrine. Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55,
which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is
unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, e) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216
and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged. 148 What it seeks to vague.
penalize is conduct, not speech.
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial review of ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within
Proclamation No. 1017, issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere
a state of national emergency, on ground o vagueness is uncalled for since a plain tools for the implementation of the proclamation. In Part III, we declared that
reading of Proclamation No. 10171 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information or data available to or
or even speech-related1 conduct. It is actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension.
Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Like And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the
Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, proclamation itself and the Report submitted to Congress.
not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality
d) Inclusion of "other rebel groups " does not make Proclamation No.216 vague. of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders
and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review.
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216
Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and
open to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be
the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a
sustained.
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas,
In People v. Nazario,150 the Court enunciated that: it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for
Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men 'of common intelligence must necessarily VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 will (a) have the effect of
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is repugnant to the recalling Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts of the President in calling
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the
persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to Mindanao region.
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
a) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of
The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's
Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it
declaration of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in
illegal for 'three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there

72
Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the
upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National 1 Police (PNP) to undertake declaration of martial law in this case, such ruling could not affect the President's
such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.
region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating
b) The operative fact doctrine.
elsewhere in the Philippines.
Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of
In Kulayan v. Tan,152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in
the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact
a different category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it
corpus and the power to declare martial law:
is declared unconstitutional.158
x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it:
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's
'When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power
former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive
in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the laws or the Constitution.' The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. 153
not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. This
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American Supreme Court
independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas stated: 'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of
corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case. cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to the invalidity may have to be considered in various
Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his
aspects, - with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and
calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for
particular conduct, private and official.
that particular purpose.
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the
As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 154 the President's
Constitution is supreme and provides the measure for the validity of legislative
exercise of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the executive branch,
violence, invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as to whether
and for that matter much less, this Court, has power under the Constitution to
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner
act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its
constituting grave abuse of discretion.155
provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.
In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the ' Philippines
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ
had failed to sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
able to show any specific injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of
valid leads to a more appreciative attitude of theemerging concept that a
President Joseph Estrada's order deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in
declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which the more orthodox
visibility patrols around the metropolis.156
view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive
This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the order, or ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be indisputable. What
Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's is more appropriate and logical then than to consider it as 'an operative fact?'
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ of habeas (Emphasis supplied)159
corpus is concerned. In fact, by constitutional design, such review may be instituted
However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-
by any citizen before the Court,157 without the need to prove that he or she stands
proof shield that would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the
to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned
effectivity of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
Presidential act/s.

73
corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling rebellion or invasion, and promotion is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had
of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise. sufficient factual bases.
VII. The Scope of the Power to Review. We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial
review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
a) The scope of the power of review under the 1987 Constitutionrefers only to the
determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law
and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these
To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to
Lansang,160 which was decided under the 1935 Constitution,161 held that it can
whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only
inquire into, within proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or
on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made
compliance with the constitutionally-imposed limitations on the Presidential power
the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.162 "Lansang limited the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These
review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of
may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
arbitrariness."163 Fr. Bernas described the "proper bounds" in Lansang as follows:
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the
What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts? The President.
Court first gave the general answer that its power was 'merely to check - not to
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or
supplant - the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
existing at the time of the declaration.
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the
Court said that its power was not 'even comparable with its power over civil or As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to
criminal cases elevated thereto by appeal...in which cases the appellate court the President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what
has all the powers of the courtof origin,' nor to its power of quasi-judicial to include and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report
administrative decisions where the Court is limited to asking whether 'there is taking into account the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He
some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding. Instead, the Court cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and confidential information that
accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to satisfy may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.
[itself] not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are
endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in
included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency
suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.'164
of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had
Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on the determination of already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or
the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the test of reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as
arbitrariness as provided in Lansang. part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
b) The "sufficiency of factual basis test". In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the
basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute
1987 Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis"
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts
in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test
reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the
for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the
President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the
the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate
Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision
the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports

74
submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion
able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.
peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the
upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to
President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
"immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency". 166 Possibly, by the
corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an
time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it
examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the
would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already
Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the
escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend
Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
military officers as credible evidence that the President ca appraise and to which he
VIII. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the
can anchor his judgment,167 as appears to be the case here.
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of habeas corpus.
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. in Fortun:
a) Actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requirement.
President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of
her by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police,
the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
considering that the matter of the supposed armed uprising was within their
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and
realm of competence, and that a state of emergency has also been declared in
(2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence
Central Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar to the 'Maguindanao
of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension
massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to the public safety
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.
warranting a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ.
As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is
Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before
construed to have the same technical or legal meaning.171 Since the Constitution did
declaring martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The
not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning
Constitution, as couched, does not require precision in establishing the fact of
as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 172
rebellion. The President is called to act as public safety requires. 168
During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986,
Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need
then Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as one defined
to proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant,
under Article 134 of the RPC:
for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation
had not been accurately reported to him. MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion
and no longer imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should
After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the
be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for
information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do
example? Let us take for example a contemporary event - this Manila Hotel
not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any event,
incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee consider
safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover
that an actual act of rebellion?
such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may
choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134
Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration. 169 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of
men in an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case.
by the means employed under Article 135. x x x173
Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and
the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as
declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation defined under Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only

75
create confusion but would also give the President wide latitude of discretion, Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to the
which may be abused - a situation that the Constitution see k s to prevent. 174 core of the controversy - whether Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial
Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of
Article 134 of the RPC states:
Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis.
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or
IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
prerogatives. of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the
President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be
Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l)
reiterated that martial law is a matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility
there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2)
should be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to completely
the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance
validate all the information he received before declaring martial law or suspending
to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the
Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:
prerogatives."175
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the
b) Probable cause is the allowable standard of proof for the President. Government; and
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince 2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from
himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a the allegiance to said Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or
rebellion was committed or is being committed.176 To require him to satisfy a higher any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces or (b) to
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President Macapagal- powers or prerogatives.178
Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the
Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi
standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for
City.179 However, they insist that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in
purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable,
the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal from the
most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully
allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the
ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of
Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed
martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of
forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any
proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and
of their powers and prerogatives.
therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of
probable cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man [to weigh] The contention lacks merit.
the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of
a) Facts, events and information upon which the President anchored his decision to
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not,
a crime has been committed x x x by the accused."177 Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at
10:00 PM,180 the Court will consider only those facts and/or events which were
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as
known to or have transpired on or before that time, consistent with the scope of
follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two
judicial review. Thus, the following facts and/or events were deemed to have been
requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from and
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:

76
1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;181 and ASG attacked various government and privately-owned
2. Series of violent acts182 committed by the Maute terrorist group including: facilities;202
a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur m February 2016, b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered
killing and wounding several soldiers; the Marawi City Jail; facilitated the escape of inmates; killed a
b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested comrades member of PDEA; assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel
of the Maute Group and other detainees; and/or locked them inside the cells; confiscated cellphones,
3. On May 23, 2017:183 personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles;203
a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi; c) by 4:30 PM, intem1ption of power supply; sporadic gunfights;
b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi; city-wide power outage by evening;204
c) Burning of certain government and private facilities; d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned
d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government; the Marawi Police Station; commandeered a police car;205
e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other
f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and affected areas;206
cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod,
other parts of Mindanao; and the Report184 submitted to Congress: Bangulo, and Sauiaran, was taken by the rebels; 207
1. Zamboanga siege;185 g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups
2. Davao bombing;186 at the Iligan-Marawi junction;208
3. Mamasapano carnage;187 h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria
4. Cotabato bombings;188 Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid
5. Sultan Kudarat bombings;189 Moncado Colony;209
6. Sulu bombings;190 i) taking of hostages from the church;210
7. Basilan bombings;191 j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College
8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance foundation;211
by combined forces of ASG and the Maute Group;192 k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and
9. Escalation of armed hostility against the government troops;193 Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School;212
10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities l) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;213
and establishments but civilians as well;194 m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;214
11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship
which paralyzed Marawi City;195 Hospital;215
12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the groundwork for o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and
the establishment of a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province;196 commandeering an armored vehicle;216
13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and combat- p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians;217
ready;197 q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes;218
14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;219 and
and local armed groups;198 s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass
15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS;199 action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and
16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration of private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel1 ,
allegiance to ISIS;200 and committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the
17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and logistical Government.220
support to the Maute Group;201
b) The President's Conclusion
18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly:

77
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop
the following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report: reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from
restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to
government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered."227
the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief
Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to 8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support
maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their
rebellion."221 blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao,
have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City;
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising
they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of
against the duly constituted government and against the people of Mindanao,
Mindanao."228
for the purpose of removing Mindanao - starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao
del Sur - from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and depriving the 9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist
Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City is a
and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety
prejudice, and detriment of the people therein and the nation as a whole." 222 of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure
the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national
3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to
integrity."229
establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted
authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives. "223 Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt
allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the
to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned
Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to
establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire
believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being
Mindanao."224
committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and
5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH
show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an
flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the
allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
Government."225
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause
to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in
for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed;
of habeas corpus. As Justice Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun:
and remove his supervisory powers over local governments."226
x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such amount
7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced
of proof as to unduly burden and effectively incapacitate her from exercising
difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide
such powers.
power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from
performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several Definitely, the President need not gather proof beyond reasonable doubt,
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The which is the standard of proof required for convicting an accused charged with
bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the a criminal offense.x x x

78
xxxx Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most reasonable,
most practical, and most expedient standard by which the President can fully
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest quantum of evidence, and to
ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion, necessary for a
require the President to establish the existence of rebellion or invasion with
declaration of martial law x x x230
such amount of proof before declaring martial law or suspending the writ
amounts to an excessive restriction on 'the President's power to act as to c) Inaccuracies, simulations, falsities, and hyperboles.
practically tie her hands and disable her from effectively protecting the nation
The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216
against threats to public safety.'
and the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not
Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either criminal or persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute correctness,
civil cases, is indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial law or suspension accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of
of the writ. This amount of proof likewise unduly restrains the President in the President in responding to an urgent situation.
exercising her emergency powers, as it requires proof greater than
Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its counter-
preponderance of evidence although not beyond reasonable doubt.
evidence.231
Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof necessary in
civil cases, is demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law. FACTUAL STATEMENTS COUNTER-EVIDENCE
xxxx (1) that the Maute group attacked Amai Statements made by:
Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two opposing Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH (a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the Hospital
flag there, among several locations. As of (b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial;
sides, before she can act and impose martial law or suspend the writ
unreasonably curtails the President's emergency powers. 0600H of 24 May 2017, members of the (c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt.
Maute Group were seen guarding the Dionardo Carlos;
Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the entry gates of the Amai Pakpak Hospital (d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co.
President's use of her emergency powers. Substantial evidence is the amount and that they held hostage the Edgard Arevalo; and
of proof required in administrative or quasi-judicial cases, or that amount of employees of the Hospital and took over (e) Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the PhilHealth office located thereat denying that the hospital was attacked
a conclusion. (Proclamation No. 216 and Report); by the Maute Group citing online news
I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or articles of Philstar, Sunstar, Inquirer,
rebellion suffices and satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of and Bombo Radyo.232
martial law and suspension of the writ. 2. that the Maute Group ambushed and Statements made by PNP Director
Probable cause is the same amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal burned the Marawi Police Station General Ronald dela Rosa and Marawi
information by the prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report); City Mayor Majul Gandamra in the
judge. Probable cause has been defined as a 'set of facts and circumstances as online news reports of ABS-CBN News
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense and CNN Philippines233denying that the
charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been Maute group occupied the Marawi
committed by the person sought to be arrested.' Police Station.

In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and 3. that lawless armed groups likewise Statement made by the bank officials in
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of ransacked the Landbank of the the on-line news article of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of Philippines and commandeered one of its Philstar234 that the Marawi City branch
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than armored vehicles (Report); was not ransacked but sustained
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. damages from the attacks.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence
that would justify conviction. 4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Statements in the on-line news article

79
Pilot School was burned (Proclamation of Philstar235 made by the Marawi City Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and
No. 216 and the Report); Schools Division Assistant parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
Superintendent Ana Alonto denying independent facts showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and
that the school was burned and public safety requires the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege
Department of Education Assistant of the writ of habeas corpus. To be precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate
Secretary Tonisito Umali stating that statements are only five out of the severa1 statements bulleted in the President's
they have not received any report of Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the
damage. second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not
aware or that he had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited. 241 As it
5. that the Maute Group attacked various Statement in the on-line news article of thus stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the
government facilities (Proclamation No. Inquirer236 made by Marawi City Mayor other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the
216 and the Report). Majul Gandamra stating that the ASG President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without
and the Maute Terror Groups have not sufficient factual basis.
taken over any government facility in Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's
Marawi City. imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly
However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.
articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have
X. Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
affirmed the contents thereof It was not even shown that efforts were made to
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has
consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely
without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
truth of the matter asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal force to the of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online news articles238 as basis for their the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual
claim of insufficiency of factual basis. rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President
noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were
Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no
directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against
application in these cases. As long as there are other facts in the proclamation and
civilians and their properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities,
the written Report indubitably showing the presence of an actual invasion or
bomb threats were issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set
rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension, the
up;244 schools and churches were burned; 245 civilian hostages were taken and
finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands.
killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were
d) Ruling in Bedol v. Commission on Elections not Applicable. forced to join their group;248 medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered;249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were
Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news
hindered;250 and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.251
reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity.
Petitioners' reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already
the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which is an ·exception to the escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare
hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that such statements were made martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last
is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial." 240 Here, the question is paragraph of his Report, the President declared:
not whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address
they said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the exception
the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates
in Bedol finds no application here.
the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the
e) There are other independent facts which support the finding that, more likely privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time
than not, rebellion exists and that public safety requires it. that the rebellion is completely quelled.252

80
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly being exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state
and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and
being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires information classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in
the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security. These documents may
corpus. contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock
of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects
XI. Whole of Mindanao
and sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court,
a) The overriding and paramount concern of martial law is the protection of the some information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or
security of the nation and the good and safety of the public. Report. But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the
Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners
Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law under
concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the
the Marcos regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop
assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President."255
at nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that the
constitutional writers entertained no doubt about the necessity and practicality of It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified
such specie of extraordinary power and thus, once again, bestowed on the documents. "It is for the President as [C]ommander-in[C]hief of the Armed Forces
Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law albeit in its diluted form. to appraise these [classified evidence or documents/]reports and be satisfied that
the public safety demands the suspension of the writ." 256 Significantly, respect to
Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
these so-called classified documents is accorded even "when [the] authors of or
corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of
witnesses to these documents may not be revealed." 257
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary , and although it might
[curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending and In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he
protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our sovereign also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and
people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-Chief of the
writ of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing Armed Forces.
potential internal enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao."254
c) The Court has no machinery or tool equal to that of the Commander-in-Chief to
Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and ably and properly assess the ground conditions.
promotes public safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify
In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President.
the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
However, this should not be considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary,
corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be present.
this is in line with the function of the Court, particularly in this instance, to
b) As Commander-in-Chief, the President receives vital, relevant, classified, and live determine the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly
information which equip and assist him in making decisions. discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual
basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report
In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed
and Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-
the basis for Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of facts and
Arroyo,258 cautioned not to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
events, more likely than not, shows that actual rebellion exists and that public
pleadings." In this regard, "the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities
safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment;"259 in turn, the Executive Department will have to
writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated, the President believes that there is
open its findings to the Court,260 which it did during the closed door session last
probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance
June 15, 2017.
of Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at
such a conclusion, relied on the facts and events included in the Report, which we d) The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the
find sufficient. discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

81
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or from a new perspective by elaborating on the sufficiency of the proposed
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the safeguards:
privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
MR. MONSOD. x x x
under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion
to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a declaration of martial law for a fixed period not exceeding 60 days, which is
part thereof under martial law. subject to judicial review, is going to result in numerous violations of human
rights, the predominance of the military forever and in untold sufferings.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive
Madam President, we are talking about invasion and rebellion. We may not
Department, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the
have any freedom to speak of after 60 days, if we put as a precondition the
repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in
concurrence of Congress. That might prevent the President from acting at that
calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the
time in order to meet the problem. So I would like to suggest that, perhaps, we
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has
should look at this in its proper perspective. We are only looking at a very
the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of
specific case. We are only looking at a case of the first 60 days at its maximum.
what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on
And we are looking at actual invasion and rebellion, and there are other
the period of application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or
safeguards in those cases.262
extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the
Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment of the President. Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough
safeguards against presidential abuses and commission of human rights violations.
e) The Constitution has provided sufficient safeguards against possible abuses of
In voting yes for the elimination of the requirement of prior concurrence of
Commander-in-Chief's powers; further curtailment of Presidential powers should not
Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.:
only be discouraged but also avoided.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote II yes is that despite
Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of
my concern for human rights, I believe that a good President can also safeguard
martial law would engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as
human rights and human lives as well. And I do not want to unduly emasculate
an institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of
the powers of the President. Xxx263
martial law in the context of our society should outweigh one's prejudices and
apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law should not be undermined Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:
by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.
to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and
ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very
not only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from high and delicate nature. A free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of
beyond our shores. As such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and military power, and the power to impose martial law is certainly felt to be one
potency limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated assumptions. of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the Committee, there are many
safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2) Congress can revoke it; 3) the Supreme
Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several
Court can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it does not
safeguards which effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The
suspend the operation of the Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when
1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of
I interpellated Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the power to impose
[the] experience with the previous regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to
martial law is dangerous to liberty and may be abused. All powers may be
actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless
abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point
sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto
out any other hands in which this power will be more safe and at the same
powers of the Court and Congress.
time equally effectual. When citizens of the State are in arms against each
Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition, other and the constituted authorities are unable to execute the laws, the action
even exhorted his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to look at martial law of the President must be prompt or it is of little value. x x x 264 (Emphasis
supplied)

82
At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the framers case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms against the government for
of the 1987 Constitution that sufficient safeguards against possible misuse and the attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of the contingent
abuse by the Commander-in-Chief of his extraordinary powers are already in place gathered and formed a mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising
and that no further emasculation of the presidential powers is called for in the guise against the government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds
of additional safeguards. The Constitution recognizes that any further curtailment, on which the armed public uprising actually to6k place should be the measure of
encumbrance, or emasculation of the presidential powers would not generate any the extent, scope or range, of the actual I rebellion. This is logical since the other
good among the three co-equal branches, and to the country and its citizens as a rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or elsewhere, whose participation did not involve
whole. Thus: the publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be considered as engaging in the crime of
rebellion.
MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put
all of these encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after
actual invasion or rebellion, given an intractable Congress that may be finding probable cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public safety
dominated by opposition parties, we may be actually impelling the President to requires it, declares martial law and suspends the writ of habeas corpus in the
use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a whole of Metro Manila, could we then say that the territorial coverage of the
revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the proclamation is too expansive?
insurrection. x x x265 (Emphasis supplied)
To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to
f) Rebellion and public safety; nature, scope, and range. determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The
Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines
It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public
or any part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial
uprising against the government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime
law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising
of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a
actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent
priori, within predetermined bounds."267 We understand this to mean that the
measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such,
precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured by exact metes and
the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound,
bounds.
he need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he
To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in could impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President would have
Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he
overpowered the guards, entered the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag. could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario
Their motive was political, i.e., they want to remove from the allegiance to the envisioned by the Constitution.
Philippine government a part of the territory of the Philippines, particularly the
Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to
Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.
impose martial law only within the Court's compound because it is where the
Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same
rebellion, could we validly say that the rebellion is confined only within the Court's time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law
compound? Definitely not. The possibility that there are other rebels positioned in beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within
the nearby buildings or compound of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the predetermined bounds.
Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be discounted. There is no way of
Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial
knowing that all participants in the rebellion went and stayed inside the Court's
law, "involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger
compound.
the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage,
Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or such as crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any
MSHS is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured
fact, they were merely lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it by metes and bounds.
must be pointed out that for the crime of rebellion to be consummated, it
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not
is not required that all armed participants should congregate in one place, in this
necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising

83
actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The Court cannot
"The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers,
complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion[,] and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system."281
though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical
rebellion."269 Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance".270 Direct
machinery to determine the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts
assault,271murder,272 homicide,273 arson,274 robbery,275 and kidnapping,276 just to
to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of
name a few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of
adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes
rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate charge." 277Jurisprudence also
and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the proclamation of
teaches that not only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also
martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that more than
"offenses under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No. 1829]278 which are
ten thousand souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense". 279 "All crimes, whether
that the military would have to secure those places also; none of us could have
punishable under a special law or general law, which are me e components or
predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife
ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
Ominta Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none
rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. 280
of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would
Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if launch an attack in Cotabato City. The Court has no military background and
committed in furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in technical expertise to predict that. In the same manner, the Court lacks the
Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed technical capability to determine which part of Mindanao would best serve as
in the crime of rebellion. This all the more makes it difficult to confine the forward operating base of the military in their present endeavor in Mindanao. Until
application of martial law only to the place where the armed public uprising is now the Court is in a quandary and can only speculate whether the 60-day lifespan
actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao. It is on
center of the rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening in Makati this score that the Court should give the President sufficient leeway to address the
City. peace and order problem in Mindanao.
In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President
in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply is goaded into using "the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot" 282 by
because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their attempting to impose another encumbrance; after all "the declaration of martial
transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially an
determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from executive act."283
arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these
Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein
limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining
in, or give the President a nudge, so to speak, as some sort of reminder of the
the territorial scope of martial law.
nation's experience under the Marcos-styled martial law. However, it is not fair to
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited judge President Duterte based on the ills some of us may have experienced during
only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the Marcos-martial law era. At this point, the Court quotes the insightful discourse
the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to of Commissioner Ople:
prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy
MR. OPLE. x x x
reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of
Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where xxxx
there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law,
Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the
it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
executive branch of the government impotent, as though by reducing
g) The Court must stay withinthe confines of its power. drastically the powers of the executive, we are rendering a service to human
welfare. I think it is also important to understand that the extraordinary
The Court can only act within the confines of its power.1âwphi1 For the Court to
measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive pertain to a practical
overreach is to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine

84
 state of war existing in this country when national security will become a a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in
common bond of patriotism of all Filipinos, especially if it is an actual invasion Barangay Campo Uno, Lamita City, Basilan. A civilian was killed while another
or an actual rebellion, and the President may have to be given a minimum was wounded.290
flexibility to cope with such unprecedented threats to the survival of a nation. I
b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near Bakungan
think the Commission has done so but at the same time has not, in any
Island, Taganak, Tawi-Tawi.291
manner, shunned the task of putting these powers under a whole system of
checks and balances, including the possible revocation at any time of a c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah,
proclamation of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite Albarka, Basilan resulting in the death of two children and the wounding of
determination of these extraordinary powers, subject only to another three others.292
extension to be determined by Congress in the event that it is necessary to do
d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED
so because the emergency persists.
explosions by the BIFF in Mindanao. These resulted in the death and wounding
So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is completely of several personalities.293
responsible; it is attuned to the freedom and the rights of the citizenry. It does
e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner
not render the presidency impotent and, at the same time, it allows for a
in Sulu.294
vigorous representation of the people through their Congress when an
emergency measure is in force and effect.284 f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights
between rebels and government troops.295
h) Several local armed groups have formed linkages aimed at committing rebellion
and acts in furtherance thereof in the whole of Mindanao. g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel
Besconde.296
With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of
the South."285 On April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him
Marawi."286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal', three days later.297
meaning a destination point or rendezvous. Literally, it also means arrival or
There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed
coming."287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero
by the ASG and other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in
marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point
Marawi has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of
established among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in
the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the
Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not
target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed
simply disregard the events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the
groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes,
Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless bombings in
supply lines, and backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to establish
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others.298 The Court cannot
a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May
simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined
23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places
bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of
in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations,
martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel, 289 must also be
the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the
considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the contention that
circumstances.
Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
i) Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion.
Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City.
Consider these: It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for
decades. While some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have
resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the
crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate

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crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be espouse, advocate or champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the
committed.299 However, while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its Filipino people, are confronted with a crisis of such magnitude and proportion that
purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and we all need to summon the spirit of unity and act as one undivided nation, if we are
create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.
government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is
Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second
traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading,
month and only God or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take notice of the
among others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is
fact that the casualties of the war are mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that
political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its
were 303 Maute rebels as against 71 government troops and 44 civilians.
laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land,
naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives. our differences and prejudices?
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the
of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a
SO ORDERED.
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is
terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err
in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the
crime of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be
characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No.
216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be
interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized
powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President
complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of
terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of
proclaiming martial ' law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. After all, the extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by
the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers.
Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that
rebellion and terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they cannot
co-exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the
RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot
absorb the other as they have different elements.300
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
region.
At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the
validity or correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles that we

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