170. Re: Letter of Tony Q.

Valenciano Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City
March 7, 2017

Facts:This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been converted into a Roman
Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument for religious activities. He believe that
such practice violated the constitutional provisions on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination,
or any other system of religion. He further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice
showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities caused great
disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00
to 1:15 in the afternoon.

Issue: Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the
constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition against
appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or
system of religion.

Ruling:The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church and State. The
1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be inviolable; if further provides that
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In
fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The Roman Catholic express their worship through
the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion.
It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall
of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation wherein the government recognize the reality
that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the
public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional
encroachment.

No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of any Church. The constitution provides that “No
public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or any priest,
preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a
particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of public property for religious
purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a
public property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental
consequence of its primary purpose.

171. Victoria Segovia, et al. Vs. The Climate Change Commission,

March 7, 2017

FACTS:To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007.
This body was reorganized through EO 774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries
as members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing
Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:

Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The new
paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must
have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation
system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train). In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as
lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable
Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned, thus:

SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF - In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate and pursue
the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines. Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following
functions:

(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the movement of
men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this
purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling,
and the man--powered mini-train).

Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change Commission which
absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the government which shall be
tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate
change.[7] Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing
Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the said letter-foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and
government fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%).Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this
petition. The Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in tum
represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation
were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the
extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by
environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.

[9] These identified violations include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust" as provided under
Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance in the midst of acute public want under Article
25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent
(50%); (b) DOTC and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's failure to devote
public open spaces along sidewalks, roads and parking lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section
12(b)[11] of EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to guide them on the Road
Sharing Principle under Section 9(g)[12] of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant emissions; and lastly, (f)
DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for purposes stated in Section 9(e)[13] of EO 774.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances
resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners'
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of
life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due process of law.[15] They also decry the
"unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety--eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are
discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and
while large budgets are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for
sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.

[16] Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the outright dismissal of
the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The respondents denied
the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that they have taken and continue to take measures to improve
the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve the environment condition - through projects and programs
such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport
System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum,
Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually and jointly
implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of motorized
vehicles on the environment.Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact
of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on
Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions, greenhouse
gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the transport sector. In response, petitioner
filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the Petition.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;
2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; and
3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED. Procedural

Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), respondents argue that the
petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather
amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury.Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as
citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Oposa
v. Factoran;and that, in any event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its
discretion.

The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the
filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws.This has been
confinned by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift, and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines).However, it bears noting that there is a difference
between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the
inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ;and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.

Requisites for issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus The petitioners failed to establish the
requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must
concur: there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; the
actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ of
continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing mandamus as follows: RULES
8 : WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation
of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is
fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the
duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping. First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to
the respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental
cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated a principle. It cannot be considered an absolute
imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is
applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary,and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but
not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided
in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion,
the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.

This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the respondents to act one way
to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and
bicycling, and the other to Filipino - made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances
that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good intentions notwithstanding,
the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion with their own through this petition for the
issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that
specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the
respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to
improve air quality. .

172. Agapito J. Cardino Vs. Commission on Elections En Banc and Roslina G. Jalosjos
March 7, 2017

FACTS:Jalosjos and Cardino both run for mayoral position in Dapitan City, Zamboanga in May 2010 election. Jalosjos
was running for his 3rd term while Cardino tried his luck. Way before the election, Cardino filed a case against
Jalosjos of denial of due course and cancellation of certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material
representation, thus making his contender ineligible to run for the Office of Mayor. COMELEC decided in favor of the
petition for disqualification. Jalosjos, even though won the election, was ousted from mayoralship. The COMELEC
then intended to implement the LGC provisions on rules of succession.

Cardino, dissatisfied, argued that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, And so, the present case file befor the SC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC erred in considering Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code rather than Secs 74
and 78 of the same Code.

RULLING:The Supreme Court ruled that the perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his
criminal conviction by final judgement is a material fact involving eligibility-a proper ground for a petition under Sec
78 of OEC. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void ab initio and all votes casted in favor of him were strayed. As a
result, Cardino being the sole qualified candidate actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor. Cardino should be proclaimed as the winning candidate to the said position

173. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR. RETIRED JUDGE PABLO R. CHAVEZ Et. AL.
RE: UNDATED ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PRESIDING JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT AND COURT
STENOGRAPHER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 87, ROSARIO, BATANGAS.
March 07, 2017

Facts: The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas on March 2 to 4, 2009 in view of the then pending
compulsory retirement of Judge Pablo R. Chavez (Judge Chavez) conducted a judicial audit. It was found out that
here were 17 criminal cases without further action or setting for a considerable length of time, four criminal cases
where the accused had not been arraigned despite the lapse of a considerable length of time from the date the
cases were filed, 11 criminal cases with pending incidents submitted for resolution and 27 criminal cases submitted
for decision.3 Meanwhile, there were two civil cases where the court failed to take action from the time of their
filing, 21 civil cases without further action or setting for a considerable length of time, 10 civil cases with unresolved
motion or incident submitted for resolution and 24 civil cases submitted for decision. On the court's active cases,
Judge Chavez was found to have failed to: (1) take any action on Civil Cases Nos. LRC 09-006, CC 09-013 from the
time of their filing; (2) take further action on identified criminal and civil cases; (3) resolve the pending incidents and
motions submitted for resolution on identified criminal and civil cases; (4) decide identified criminal and civil cases
which were submitted for decision as early as 2007 and 2008; (5) resolve on time identified criminal cases; and (6)
present to the audit team the records of a criminal case. He was also reported to have irregularly issued an order of
inhibition dated August 28, 2008 after the case had been submitted for decision on September 12, 2007. The audit
team noted that except for three cases, in all the cases it identified, Judge Chavez failed to seek an extension to
resolve or decide them. Even in the three cases where Judge Chavez sought an extension, he still incurred delay in
deciding them.
Issue: Whether Judge Pablo R. Chavez be held gross neglect of duty and undue delay of rendering decisions?
Held: Yes. He was inefficient in managing his caseload and grossly negligent in running the affairs of his court. Judges
are charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in their
custody are intact. They must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets to bolster the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business. Further, as administrative officers of the court, judges should organize and
supervise court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity at all times.

174. CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD REPRESENTED BY CHAIRPERSON BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Et. AL. v. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III Et. Al.

Facts: On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the CES Occupancy of the Department
of Justice (DOJ).6 This document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled positions in the PAO, 33 were occupied
by persons without the required CES eligibility.

In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing (Deputy Chief Mosing) sent a letter7
to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V. Allones. He informed her that the positions of Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional Public Attorneys (subject positions) were already permanent in nature
pursuant to Section 68 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9406, which accorded security of tenure to the occupants thereof.

A second letter dated 9 November 20109 was sent to the CESB by Deputy Chief Mosing to reiterate its earlier
communication. The letter also contained supplementary arguments in support of the assertion that the subject
positions were permanent posts; hence, their occupants may only be removed for cause provided by law. Based on
the foregoing premises, the PAO requested the deletion of its office from the Data on CES Occupancy for the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to Deputy Chief Mosing by the CESB, through Deputy
Executive Director Arturo M. Lachica.10 The latter informed Deputy Chief Mosing that the CESB would conduct a
position classification study on the specified PAO positions to determine whether they may still be considered CES
positions in the DOJ. CESB noted that the positions in question "require leadership and managerial competence"23
and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these posts
cannot be considered permanent. However, this was reversed by the CSC upon appeal by PAO prompting CESB to
file the instant Petition40 imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent CSC.
Issue: Whether CESB has avail proper remedy?

Held: No. It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition is proper only in cases
where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the second
requirement is plainly absent. As respondents correctly observed, there was an appeal available to the CESB in the
form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

175. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs HEIRS OF JOSE TAPULADO, Respondents
March 8, 2017

FACTS:Jose Tapulado, now deceased, was the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. (P-17535) P-2788 with an area of 17 .8393 hectares located in Kiblagon, Sulop, Davao del Sur, and OCT No.
(P-4518) P-1277 with an area of 11.1359 hectares situated in Kisulan, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.

In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject lands under the coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27; and in 1978, awarded them to the
farmer-beneficiaries. Tapulado, however, did not receive any compensation from the government.

It was just on March 24, 1980, that the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) computed the value of the
subject lands, placing them at P38,002.47 or P1,315 .00 per hectare.

The respondents, the Heirs of Tapulado (Tapulados), rejected the valuation of the subject lands after the DAR and
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) computed the value of the subject lands. They filed a petition to the RTC,
sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination and payment of just compensation.

ISSUE:Can the Tapulados demand for the computation of just compensation with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) and Landbank of the Philippines (LBP)?

HELD:Yes. Though the Court is fully aware that the subject properties have been taken by the government since
1972, it has no option but to affirm the CA order of remand to the RTC for the computation of the just compensation
in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 because the basis for the RTC determination of just compensation
was not clear.

In the determination of just compensation, the R TC should be guided by the following: (1) Just compensation must
be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, that
is, the date when the title or the emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer beneficiaries.

(2) Just compensation must be determined pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as
amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. Nevertheless, while it should take into account the different
formulas created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations
before it do not warrant their application. In which case, the RTC must clearly explain the reasons for deviating
therefrom, and for using other factors or formulas in arriving at a reasonable just compensation.

(3) Interest may be awarded as warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. In
previous cases, the Court had allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the
payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part
of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be fixed at the rate of 12% per annum from the time of taking
and 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid
176. WILLIAM & IRENE LOUH VS. BPI
March 8, 2017

FACTS:Respondents BPI issued a credit card in William’s name with Irene as the extension card holder. Based on the
terms and conditions, a 3.5% finance charge and 6% late payment charge shall be imposed monthly upon unpaid
credit card availments.

Spouses Louh made purchases through the credit card and was able to pay regularly. However, they were remiss in
their obligations starting Oct. 14, 2009. As of August 15, 2010, their account was unsettled prompting BPI to send
demand letters dated Aug 7, 2010, January 25, 2011 and May 19, 2011. By September 14, 2010, the owed BPI the
total amount of P533,836..27. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, the spouses Louh failed to pay BPI.

On August 4, 2011, BPI filed before the RTC of Makaty City a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. William,
then, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file an Answer od Responsive Pleading. The RTC granted an extension of
15 days but spouses Louh failed to comply with in the prescribed period.

On July 24, 2012, the RTC issued an Order declaring the spouses Louh in default and setting BPI’s ex parte
presentation of evidence. On Novemeber 29, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of BPI. The spouses Louh
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied. The appeal they filed was likewise denied by the CA in the
assailed decision and resolution. Aggrieved, the spouses Louh filed an instant petition for review on certiorari to
assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining BPI’s complaint.

HELD:The Court affirms the herein assailed decision and resolution, but modifies the principal amount and attorney's
fees awarded by the RTC and the CA.

The Spouses Louh reiterate that the RTC wrongly declared them in default since by reason of William's sickness, they
were entitled to a relaxation of the rules. Moreover, BPI had failed to offer preponderant evidence relative to the
actual amount of the Spouses Louh's indebtedness.
The foregoing claims are untenable.

In the case at bar, the CA aptly pointed out that the Spouses Louh filed their Answer with the RTC only on July 20,
2012 or more than three months after the prescribed period, which expired on March 4, 2012. When they were
thereafter declared in default, they filed no motion to set aside the RTC's order, a remedy which is allowed under
Rule 9, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Spouses Louh failed to show that they exerted due diligence in
timely pursuing their cause so as to entitle them to a liberal construction of the rules, which can only be made in
exceptional cases.
The Spouses Louh claim as well that BPI's evidence are insufficient to prove the amounts of the former's obligation.

BPI had offered as evidence the (1) testimony of Account Specialist Carlito M. Igos, who executed a Judicial Affidavit
in connection with the case, and (2) documentary exhibits, which included the (a) delivery receipts pertaining to the
credit cards and the terms and conditions governing the use thereof signed by the Spouses Louh, (b) computer-
generated authentic copies of the SOAs and (c) demand letters sent by BPI, which the Spouses Louh received. The
Clerk of Court subsequently prepared a Commissioner's Report, from which the RTC based its judgment.

The Spouses Louh slept on their rights to refute BPI's evidence, including the receipt of the SOA’s and demand
letters. BPI cannot be made to pay for the Spouses Louh's negligence, omission or belated actions.
Be that as it may, the Court finds excessive the principal amount and attorney’s fees awarded by the RTC and CA. A
modification of the reckoning date relative to the computation of the charges is in order too.

In the case at bench, BPI imposed a cumulative annual interest of 114%, plus 25% of the amount due as attorney's
fees. Inevitably, the RTC and the CA aptly reduced the charges imposed by BPI upon the Spouses Louh. Note that
incorporated in the amount of ₱533,836.27 demanded by BPI as the Spouses Louh's obligation as of August 7, 2010
were the higher rates of finance and late payment charges, which the comis a quo had properly directed to be
reduced.

In the SOA dated October 14, 2009, the principal amount indicated was ₱l13,756.83. In accordance with Macalinao,
the finance and late payment charges to be imposed on the principal amount of ₱l13,756.83 are reduced to 12%
each per annum, reckoned from October 14, 2009, the date when the Spouses Louh became initially remiss in the
payment of their obligation to BPI, until full payment.
Anent BPI's litigation expenses, the Court retains the RTC and CA' s disquisition awarding ₱5,064.00 as filing or
docket fees, and costs of suit.

However, the Court reduces the attorney's fees to five percent (5%) of the total amount due from the Spouses Louh
pursuant to MCMP and Article 2227 of the New Civil Code.

177. MANUEL L. BAUTISTA, SPOUSES ANGEL SAHAGUN and CARMELITA BAUTISTA, and ANIANO L. BAUTISTAvs
MARGARITO L. BAUTISTA

Facts: The Bautista siblings – Margarito, Manuel L. Bautista, Carmelita Bautista Sahagun (Carmelita), Aniano L.
Bautista (Aniano), Florencia Bautista de Villa (Florencia), and Ester Bautista Cabrera (Ester) – established a lending
business through a common fund from the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of coconut land they inherited from their
mother Consorcia Lantin Bautista.
Amelia V. Mendoza obtained a loans from Florencia, and secured the same with a real estate mortgage over a parcel
of land she owned. SubsequentlyAmelia and Florencia executed another Kasulatan ng Pagdaragdag ng Sanla.
Florencia, thereafter, received the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2371, which she, in turn, entrusted to
Carmelita when she went overseas.
On November 28, 2002, Amelia allegedly sold the subject property to Margarito through a Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan. On the same date, Florencia filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Second Owner’s Duplicate of TCT No. T-
2371 before the RTC of San Pablo City. She alleged that she was the mortgagee of the subject property, and that she
could not locate, despite diligent search, the owner’s duplicate title in her possession, which she misplaced
sometime in September 2002. Florencia also executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Margarito to represent
her in the proceedings.
Petitioners tried to oppose the issuance, but on January 30, 2003, the RTC granted the petition and TCT No. T-59882
was later issued in the name of Margarito.
Petitioners averred that Margarito and the others refused to heed their oral and written demands for the partition
of the properties they co-owned, which included the Sta. Monica property. For his part, Margarito asseverated that
he exclusively owns the property in controversy since he used his personal funds in purchasing the land. On February
16, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared, among other things, that the Sta. Monica property
was commonly owned by the siblings. Aggrieved, Margarito elevated the case before the CA. In a Decision dated
March 6, 2012, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
The CA concluded that petitioners failed to establish that they are -owners of the Sta. Monica property. It held that
the TCT under Margarito’s name was an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property and has more
probative weight than the blank Kasulatan adduced by the petitioners. Consequently, petitioners’ action for partition
and accounting cannot be acted upon because they failed to prove that they are co-owners of the Sta. Monica
property.

Issue: Whether or not Implied Trust resulted from the act of petitioners when he conveyed the subject land by his
Transfer Certificate of Title.
Rulings: Yes. Their transaction resulted into an Implied Trust. Despite all these, Margarito failed to prove that Amelia
conveyed the Sta. Monica property exclusively in his name. It is also quite intriguing why he did not even bother to
present the testimony of Amelia or of Florencia, who could have enlightened the court about their transactions. In
addition, We find it incredible that a property, which secured a loan roughly over a million pesos, would be sold for
considerably less than that amount or for only ₱550,000.00.
As for the TCT No. T-59882 in the name of Margarito, like in the case at bar, although a certificate of title is the best
proof of ownership of a piece of land, the mere issuance of the same in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that
the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of
the certificate of title. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate
the trust by relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title.
There is an implied trust when a property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by
another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. This is sometimes referred to as a purchase
money resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an
equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged
beneficiary of a resulting trust.
A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between families, does not
lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document. From the foregoing, this Court finds that an
implied resulting trust existed among the parties. The pieces of evidence presented demonstrate their intention to
acquire the Sta. Monica property in the course of their business, just like the other properties that were also the
subjects of the partition case and the compromise agreement they entered into. Although the Sta. Monica property
was titled under the name of Margarito, the surrounding circumstances as to its acquisition speak of the intent that
the equitable or beneficial ownership of the property should belong to the Bautista siblings.
Inevitably, the RTC’s Order of partition of the Sta. Monica property was erroneously set aside by the CA and this
Court is convinced that petitioners satisfactorily established that they are co-owners of the property and are entitled
to the reliefs prayed for

178. KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES vs. ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF MAKATI

March 08, 2017

FACTS:On 22 July 2013, petitioner Kim S. Jacinto-Henares, acting in her capacity as then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR), issued RMO No. 20-2013, "Prescribing the Policies and Guidelines in the Issuance of Tax Exemption
Rulings to Qualified Non-Stock, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations under Section 30 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, as Amended.”

On 29 November 2013, respondent St. Paul College of Makati (SPCM), a non-stock, non-profit educational institution
organized and existing under Philippine laws, filed a Civil Action to Declare Unconstitutional [Bureau of Internal
Revenue] RMO No. 20-2013 with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC. SPCM alleged that "RMO No. 20-2013 imposes as a prerequisite to the enjoyment by non-
stock, non-profit educational institutions of the privilege of tax exemption under Sec. 4(3) of Article XIV of the
Constitution both a registration and approval requirement, i.e., that they submit an application for tax exemption to
the BIR subject to approval by CIR in the form of a Tax Exemption Ruling (TER) which is valid for a period of [three]
years and subject to renewal."
In a Resolution dated 22 January 2014,[9] the RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction after finding that RMO
No. 20-2013 appears to divest non-stock, non-profit educational institutions of their tax exemption privilege.
Thereafter, the RTC denied the CIR's motion for reconsideration. On 29 April 2014, SPCM filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court.
In a Decision dated 25 July 2014, the RTC ruled in favor of SPCM and declared RMO No. 20-2013 unconstitutional. It
held that "by imposing the x x x [prerequisites alleged by SPCM,] and if not complied with by non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions, [RMO No. 20-2013 serves] as diminution of the constitutional privilege, which even
Congress cannot diminish by legislation, and thus more so by the CIR who merely exercises quasi-legislative function.
On 18 September 2014, the CIR issued RMO No. 34-2014,[12] which clarified certain provisions of RMO No. 20-2013,
as amended by RMO No. 28-2013.
Meanwhile, this Court clarifies that the phrase "Revenue Memorandum Order" referred to in the second sentence of
its decision dated July 25, 2014 refers to "issuance/s" of the respondent which tends to implement RMO 20-2013 for
if it is otherwise, said decision would be useless and would be rendered nugatory.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT the petition to review by the CIR be given merit.

2. WHETHER OR NOT the Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-2013 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

1. NO. Petition is denied on the ground of mootness. On 25 July 2016, the present CIR Caesar R. Dulay issued RMO
No. 44-2016, which provides that: Amending Revenue Memorandum Order No. 20-2013, as amended (Prescribing
the Policies and Guidelines in the Issuance of Tax Exemption Rulings to Qualified Non-Stock, Non-Profit Corporations
and Associations under Section 30 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as Amended.
In line with the Bureau's commitment to put in proper context the nature and tax status of non-profit, non-stock
educational institutions, this Order is being issued to exclude non-stock, non-profit educational institutions from the
coverage of Revenue Memorandum Order No. 20-2013, as amended.

SECTION 1. Nature of Tax Exemption. --- The tax exemption of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions is
directly conferred by paragraph 3, Section 4, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:
"All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties."

2. YES. It was Amended. It is clear and unmistakable from the aforequoted constitutional provision that non-stock,
non-profit educational institutions are constitutionally exempt from tax on all revenues derived in pursuance of its
purpose as an educational institution and used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. This
constitutional exemption gives the non-stock, non-profit educational institutions a distinct character. And for the
constitutional exemption to be enjoyed, jurisprudence and tax rulings affirm the doctrinal rule that there are only
two requisites: (1) The school must be non-stock and non-profit; and (2) The income is actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes. There are no other conditions and limitations as provided by law and is
therefore constitutional.

In this light, the constitutional conferral of tax exemption upon non-stock and non-profit educational institutions
should not be implemented or interpreted in such a manner that will defeat or diminish the intent and language of
the Constitution.

179. Malvar vs. Baleros

08 March 2017

Facts: Dr. Malvar claimed that Atty. Baleros, by notarizing an assailed “Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land”, made it appear that he executed the same when in truth, he never went to the office of the latter
since he was in Manila at the time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties as a doctor.
Accordingly, Dr. Malvar filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Baleros for acts amounting to grave misconduct
consisting of falsification of public documents. On the other hand, Atty. Baleros argued that the charges filed against
her were all part of Dr. Malvar’s scheme to avoid his obligations to the buyer of his lot.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Baleros should be held administratively liable.

Held: Yes. Atty. Baleros shall be made liable not only as a notary public who failed to discharge her duties but also as
a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard to the integrity and dignity he owed to the legal profession.
180. MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.,respondent.
March 08, 2017

Facts:On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong City after being
in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two children.

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to
jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so severe that he even
poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the latter feel
maltreated and molested. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa
was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left and never saw
Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr.
Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The
trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.

Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General
to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General was also
directed to submit its certification. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's
orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the Office of the
Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision granting the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor
General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts
of stenographic notes. It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases
it was handling On September 13 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration..

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued that the trial court erred a)
in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving
credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based
on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not file any
responsive pleading.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a Comment 70 stating
that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in
adjudging him and petitioner as married."

Issue:Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

Held:Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant
the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that
respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court
for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study
and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as
hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very
definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation
and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but
the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected
of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He
vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would

refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by
petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest,
and a doctor, and suggested couples counseling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at
seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the marriage be annulled.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her
family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that
petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their
family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that
respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this
Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable

181. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESALVA alias "ROBERT SANTOS"
June 19, 2017

FACTS:On September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m., Ortigosa, his cousin Renato B. Flores (Flores) and Manny Boy
Ditche were drinking in Dupax Street, Old Balara, Quezon City. Later, they decided to go to a store to buy cigarettes.
On their way to the store, Flores noticed accused-appellant standing in a comer near the store and staring at them.
Then, accused-appellant walked away and disappeared. Later, accused-appellant reappeared, accompanied by
Menieva and Ilaw, and followed Ortigosa and his group to the store. When accused-appellant and his companions
were already in front of Ortigosa, Menieva uttered, "Ne!, ano ba yan?" and proceeded to stab Ortigosa twice with an
icepick. Menieva stabbed Ortigosa first on the right portion of his chest, then on his left armpit. As Menieva stabbed
Ortigosa, Ilaw pointed a sumpak at Ortigosa while accused-appellant pointed at Ortigosa' s group and left.

After the stabbing, Ortigosa and his group tried to run back to where they were drinking. Before they reached the
place, Ortigosa fell on the ground. His companions rushed him to East Avenue Medical Center where he died.
A case was filed before the RTC and the accused-appellant denied any participation in Ortigosa's stabbing. He
claimed that on the night of the incident, he was waiting for his sister on the corner of Dupax Street. While waiting,
he saw and heard people running and shouting which caused him to leave the place.

The RTC found the accused appellant guilty of murder. The CA affirmed with modification the trial court's Decision
and held that conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the three accused.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the other accused

HELD:No. The prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw in committing the
crime of murder.

Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical
acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant's act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act which shows that accused-
appellant acted in concert with his co-accused to cause the death of Ortigosa. It is stressed that mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of the
crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in the furtherance of
the common design or purpose. Likewise, where the only act attributable to the other accused is an apparent
readiness to provide assistance, but with no certainty as to its ripening into an overt act, there is no conspiracy. In
this case, while accused-appellant's presence and act of pointing at the victim and his group may mean he approved
of the crime or that he was ready to assist his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is no
conspiracy.

182.ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROLANDO V. ZUBIRI

June 19, 2017

Facts: In manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's January 15, 2014 Order on January
18, 2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on February 12, 2014.14 Since the COMELEC
only issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the
TRO was addressed only to the RTC Judge, and not to the Clerk of Court; therefore, the Clerk of Court is not bound by
the TRO. For these reasons, respondent insisted that the Clerk of Court could legally issue the writ of execution
pending appeal.
The Clerk of Court eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the sheriff. However,
complainant only found out about respondent's manifestations when the sheriff attempted to serve the writ on him.
Soon thereafter, complainant filed the disbarment complaint.

In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled and induced the
Clerk of Courtto defy lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order.17 As a
result, respondent allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.

In his answer,19 respondent claimed that, first, since the case records had been transmitted to the COMELEC on
January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case; therefore, it had no more power to issue the
February 25, 2014 Order.20 Respondent put forward the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the COC
instead of the RTC Judge.21Second, the manifestations contained no misleading statements or factual deviations. He
merely stated in his manifestations his honest belief that the twenty-day period had already lapsed when the
COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no longer had any binding effect. He explained that the filing of manifestations to
highlight his position did not violate any rule.22Third, he allegedly filed those manifestations pursuant to his duty
under Canon 18 of the CPR to represent his client with competence and diligence.
Issue: Whether respondent is guilty?
Held: Yes. In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations before the COC praying for affirmative reliefs.
The Court agrees with the IBP that these "manifestations" were in fact motions, since reliefs were prayed for from
the court - particularly, the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling them as manifestations,
respondent craftily sidestepped the requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived the other party of an
opportunity to oppose his arguments. Moreover, the fact that he submitted these manifestations directly to COC,
instead of properly filing them before the RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards the other party by
keeping the latter completely unaware of his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his professional
obligations under the CPR.
He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely represented his client with competence and diligence.
However, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically bound not only to serve his client but also the
court, his colleagues, and society. His obligation to represent his client is not without limits, but must be "within the
bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair and
honest means to attain their clients' objectives.

183. SEAPOWER SHIPPING ENT., INC vs.HEIRS OF WARREN M. SABANAL, represented by ELVIRA ONG-SABANAL,
June 19, 2017

Facts: Sometime in September 1995, during voyage, Sabanal started exhibiting unusual behavior. When the ship
captain checked on him on September 22, 1995, he responded incoherently, though it appeared that he had
problems with his brother in the Philippines. This prompted the captain to set double guards on Sabanal. The sailors
watching over Sabanal reported that he wanted to board a life boat, citing danger in the ship's prow. Because of
Sabanal 's condition, the captain relieved him of his shift and allowed him to sleep in the cabin guarded. 3 The
following day, the captain wanted to supervise Sabanal better, so he took him on deck and assigned to him simple
tasks, such as correcting maps and collecting and typing the crew's declarations. The captain observed that Sabanal's
condition was "rather better" and he "did not appear to have any problems."4 Later that day, Sabanal requested the
sailor-on-guard that he be allowed to return to the deck for some fresh air. Once on deck, Sabanal suddenly ran to
the stem and jumped to the sea. The ship's rescue attempts proved futile, and Sabanal's body was never recovered.
Issue: Whether the family can recover compensation?
Held: No. Since it is undisputed that Sabanal' s death happened during the term of the employment contract, the
burden rests on the employer to prove by substantial evidence that Sabanal' s death was directly attributable to his
deliberate or willful act. For its part, Seapower submitted the ship log entries and master's report to prove that
Sabanal suddenly jumped overboard the MT Montana. The Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and Court of Appeals all agree that
the evidence presented sufficiently establish that Sabanal indeed jumped into the sea. The Court of Appeals,
however, ruled that Sabanal's act was not a willful one because he was not in his right mental state when he
committed the act. Evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of
willfulness as a matter of counter-defense. 22 But the burden of evidence is then shifted to the claimant to prove
that the seafarer was of unsound mind. 23 The question, therefore, is whether Elvira was able to prove by
substantial evidence that Sabanal has lost full· control of his faculties when he jumped overboard. Or, more
precisely, whether his unusual behavior prior to the incident is such substantial evidence.
Elvira did not present any evidence to support her claim that Sabanal was already insane when he jumped
overboard. Similar to the claimant in Agile, she only relied on the strange behavior of Sabanal as detailed by the ship
captain in the ship log and master's report. However, as we already held, while such behavior may be indicative of a
possible mental disorder, it is insufficient to prove that Sabanal had lost full control of his faculties. In order for
insanity to prosper as a counter-defense, the claimant must substantially prove that the seafarer suffered from
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act or complete absence of the power to discern the
consequences of his action. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties does not foreclose willfulness. 29 In fact, the
ship log shows Sabanal was still able to correct maps and type the declarations of the crew hours before he jumped
overboard. The captain observed that Sabanal did not appear to have any problems while performing these simple
tasks, while the sailor-on-guard reported that Sabanal did not show any signs of unrest immediately before the
incident. 30 These circumstances, coupled with the legal presumption of sanity,31 tend to belie Elvira's claim that
Sabanal no longer exercised any control over his own senses and mental faculties.
184. OSCAR C. RIZALADO,, Complainant vs. PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 21,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,, Respondent
x-----------------------x
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT DATED JUNE 27, 2011 OF OSCAR C. RIZALADO AGAINST JUDGE GIL BOLLOZOS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, RELATIVE TO G.R. NO. 188427 (CYNTHIA G. ESP ANO, ET AL. v.
DR. OTHELLO C. GUZMAN, ET AL.).
x-----------------------x
OTHELLO C. GUZMAN, RICARDO GUZMAN, MARIO C. GUZMAN, SR., AND ROSARIO GUZMAN RIZALADO,
Complainants,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
OSCAR C. RIZALADO, Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, Respondent.
June 19, 2017

Facts: Four (4) administrative cases filed against respondent Presiding Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent), namely: (a)
OCA IPI Nos. 11-3800-RTJ, 1 12-3867-RTJ, 2 and 13-4070-RTJ, 3 all initiated by complainant Oscar C. Rizalado
(Rizalado) alleging undue delay in the disposition of the case, partiality, and gross ignorance of the rules, and (b) OCA
IPI No. 12-3897-RTJ 4 filed by complainants Othello C. Guzman 5 (Othello), Ricardo Guzman, Mario C. Guzman, Sr.,
and Rosario Guzman Rizalado (Guzman, et al.) for gross ignorance of the law, undue delay in the administration of
justice, and bias.

The complaints alleged that respondent failed to act on the motion for execution within a considerable amount of
time. He also averred that respondent's July 14, 2011 Joint Order was inconsistent with the CA Decision and was
intended to delay the execution of the judgment to favor Reuben. Likewise, Rizalado questioned the January 31,
2011 Order issued by respondent, which held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to withdraw deposits
previously filed by Atty. Demecillo. Rizalado claimed that the issuance thereof was "anomalous," considering that the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409 has been put on hold for five (5) months. Hence, he
ascribes ignorance of the Rules of Court, specifically Section 1, Rule 39 thereof, upon respondent.They also alleged,
among others, that respondent has been delaying the execution of the judgment in their favor and "protecting" the
opposing party's counsel, Atty. Andrew Barba (Atty. Barba) by refusing to hold the latter in contempt despite the
various motions filed by him opposing their motion for execution. Moreover, their request for respondent to update
the rental payments of all tenants as well as to release the same from the OCC-RTC in their favor remained
unresolved. Furthermore, they claimed that respondent's order for them to pay estate tax was premature, as most
of the tenants have not updated their rental payments; that despite the finality of the decision in Civil Case Nos. 92-
368 and 92- 409, respondent still failed to implement the same. Rizalado insinuated that Reuben bribed Atty. Laya
and respondent to delay the execution of the judgment. He claimed that Atty. Laya intentionally altered the date in
the motion for execution and made it appear as "July 24, 1990" instead of "July 2, 1980" to deceive Guzman, et al.
He also reiterated his allegations in a previous complaint that despite Reuben's failure to comply with respondent's
order to submit an accounting, respondent has never cited him in contempt. 48

Rizalado also asserted that respondent allowed Atty. Barba to file pleadings despite the finality of the
judgment.1âwphi1 He maintained that the motion to withdraw deposits previously filed by Atty. Demecillo had been
denied by respondent, in contravention of the Court's final order. Questioning the appointment of a commissioner,
he averred that it was intended to conceal anomalies committed by respondent

Issue: Whether the respondent should be held liable?

Held; No. It is well-settled that "in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents committed the
acts complained of rests on the complainant. x x x. Bare allegations of bias and partiality are not enough in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role
to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice
or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself.In this
case, the charges of bias and partiality against respondent have not been substantiated. Complainants failed to
present substantial evidence to prove that respondent was motivated by bias, bad faith, or partiality

As regards the charge of undue delay in the resolution of the motions for execution, the Court finds respondent's
explanation meritorious, considering the multiple motions filed by Guzman, et al.' s two counsels. In any case,
respondent had already granted the motion for execution filed by Atty. Laya in his December 5, 2011 Order.

185 Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. represented by Rafael A. Poblador Vs. Rosario L. Manzano
June 19, 2017

FACTS:On May 1996 Elsa A. Poblador was authorized by the Probate court as the administratrix of certain properties
of petitioner including his shares in Wack-Wack golf course. Elsa instructed Rafael, heir of Honorio Poblador to look
for potential buyers. Rafael engaged the services of Rosario Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated.
The property was sold to Metroland Holdings for the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 which it paid ₱15,200,000.00
through a check and the balance of ₱2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to Manzano for the payment of the taxes.

On October 1996 the sale of the shares were annulled by the Probate Court. Thus, Elsa returned to Moreland the
₱15,200,000.00 and asked the BIR for a refund of the paid taxes. Meanwhile, Rafael, through an accountant allegedly
requested Manzano for an accounting of the ₱2,800,000.00 she received on behalf of petitioner. In response,
Manzano faxed documents requested by petitioner but when examined, there was a discrepancy in said documents
as it was found that the amount paid was only ₱80,000.00 instead of ₱1,480,000.00. This led to the filing, on
December 8, 1999, of an Information for the crime of estafa against Manzano;

ISSUE:Whether or not Manzano is guilty of Estafa.

HELD:No, Manzano is not guilty of Estafa.

Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary estimation through estafa under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by
abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person.

In the case at hand, prosecution failed to establish that fraud or bad faith was present. Petitioner failed to show that
Manzano personally received the ₱2,800,000.00 from petitioner with the duty to hold it in trust for or to make
delivery to the latter. In fact, Rafael admitted that he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and
that Manzano's name did not appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.

186.Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs

June 19, 2017

FACTS:The omnibus motion is anchored primarily on the alleged applicability of Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs.
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs to the case at bar. However, the court desisted from applying the doctrine
laid down in Chevron considering that the facts and circumstances therein are not in all fours with those obtaining in
the instant case. Thus, Chevron is not a precedent to the case at bar. The facts and circumstances between the
jurisprudence relied upon and the pending controversy should not diverge on material points. But as clearly
explained in the assailed December 5, 2016 decision, the main difference between Chevron and the case at bar lies
in the attendance of fraud. In Chevron, evidence on record established that Chevron committed fraud in its dealings.
On the other hand, proof that petitioner Pilipinas Shell was just as guilty was clearly wanting. Simply there was no
finding of fraud on the part of petitioner in the case at bar. In his dissent, Associate Justice Peralta claims that fraud
was committed by the petitioner when it allegedly deliberately incurred delay in filing its Import Entry and Internal
Revenue Declaration in order to avail of the reduced tariff duty on oil importations, but as exhaustively discussed in
December 5, 2016 decision. The document was never formally offered as evidence before the Court of Tax Appeals,
therefore, bereft of evidentiary value. Resultantly, no scintilla of proof was ever offered in evidence by respondent
Commissioner of Customs to substantiate the claim that Pilipinas Shell acted in fraudulent manner. The allegations
of fraud on the part of Pilipinas Shell is mere conjecture and purely speculative. In the case at bar, petitioner filed its
Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration and paid the import duty of its shipments on May 23, 1996. However,
it only received a demand letter from public respondent on July 27, 2000, or more than 4 years later. By this time,
the one-year prescriptive period had already elapsed. Justice Peralta and the respondent claim that the government
is no longer collecting tariff duties. Rather, it is exercising its ownership right over the shipments, which were
allegedly deemed abandoned by petitioner because of the latter’s failure to timely file the IEIRD.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner acted in fraudulent manner for ipso facto abandonment doctrine be applied?

HELD:No. Public respondent cannot harp on the Chevron ruling to excuse compliance from the due notice
requirement before the imported articles can be deemed abandoned, for to do so would only downplay the Court’s
finding anent the non-attendance of fraud. It becomes abundantly clear that the notice requirement as mandated in
CMO 15-94 cannot be excused unless fraud is established. Fraud being absent on the part of petitioner Pilipinas
Shell, the ipso facto abandonment doctrine cannot operate within the factual milieu of the instant case.

187. JUDGE CELSO O. BAGUIO vs. JOCELYN P. LACUNA,

June 19, 2017

Facts: Judge Baguio alleged that on January 25, 2013, the RTC had to reset the scheduled initial trial of Criminal Case
No. 14405-10, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jason Ondrade, for failure of respondent to transcribe and submit
the stenographic notes of the pre-trial proceedings held on November 16, 2012. As a result, she was directed to
immediately transcribe the same in an Order 2 dated January 25, 2013, and ordered to submit a written explanation
why she should not be held administratively liable for her failure to perform her job in accordance with the rules.
While respondent apologized for her incompetence in a letter dated January 28, 2013, she nonetheless claimed that
the resetting of the case was not solely due to her failure to perform her task but also in view of the absence of the
witness for the prosecution. Judge Baguio further claimed that despite having been previously suspended for a
similar offense in A.M. No. P-11-2933 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2674-P), 5 respondent did not improve, and that her
proficiency as stenographer was doubtful given that she relied solely on tape recordings for the past fifteen (15)
years. He pointed out that the incident complained of was just one of the many similar incidents involving
respondent's dismal failure to perform her tasks, which resulted in the cancellation of hearings and caused
embarrassment to the court. Nevertheless, Judge Baguio remarked that respondent has an almost perfect
attendance and that she behaved well in court although she mostly tended to keep to herself and was always very
quiet.

Issue: Whether respondent is liable for gross incompetence?

Held: Only simple neglect of duty. It is undisputed that respondent failed to comply with the twenty (20) day period
in the transcription of the stenographic notes for the Pre-Trial in Criminal Case No. 14405-10, and hence, guilty of
violating Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 24-90. 15 The heavy work load proffered by respondent in her
attempt to be exonerated from liability is not an adequate excuse for her to be remiss in the performance of her
duties. To allow otherwise would permit every government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of
duty to resort to the same convenient excuse to evade punishment. While respondent admitted to incurring delay in
the performance of her duties, records show that she nonetheless completed the same in time for the calendar of
cases. Under the circumstances, her failure to timely transcribe the stenographic notes was correctly found by the
Executive Judge to constitute simple neglect of duty, which is defined as a disregard of, or a failure to give proper
attention to a task expected of an employee, simple neglect of duty signifies carelessness or indifference. 2

188. MANG INASAL PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner Vs. IFP MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent
June 19, 2017

FACTS:The Trademark Application and the Opposition Respondent IFP Manufacturing Corporation is a local
manufacturer of snacks and beverages.

On May 26, 2011, respondent filed with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) an application for the registration of
the mark "OK Hotdog Inasal Cheese Hotdog Flavor Mark"in connection with goods under Class 30 of the Nice
Classification. The said mark, which respondent intends to use on one of its curl snack products. The application of
respondent was opposed by petitioner Mang Inasal Philippines, Inc. Petitioner is a domestic fast food company and
the owner of the mark "Mang Inasal, Home of Real Pinoy Style Barbeque and Device" (Mang Inasal mark) for services
under Class 43 of the Nice Classification. The said mark, which was registered with the IPO in 2006 and had been
used by petitioner for its chain of restaurants since 2003.

Petitioner, in its opposition, contended that the registration of respondent's OK Hotdog Inasal mark is prohibited
under Section 123.l (d)(iii) of Republic Act No. (RA) 8293. Petitioner averred that the OK Hotdog Inasal mark and the
Mang Inasal mark share similarities-both as to their appearance and as to the goods or services that they epresent
which tend to suggest a false connection or association between the said marks and, in that regard, would likely
cause confusion on the part of the public. As petitioner explained:

1. The OK Hotdog Inasal mark is similar to the Mang Inasal mark. Both marks feature the same dominant element-
i.e., the word "INASAL"-printed and stylized in the exact same manner, viz:
a. In both marks, the word "INASAL" is spelled using the same font style and red color;
b. In both marks, the word "INASAL" is placed inside the same black outline and yellow background; and
c. In both marks, the word "INASAL" is arranged in the same staggered format.
2. The goods that the OK Hotdog Inasal mark is intended to identify (i.e., curl snack products) are also closely related
to the services represented by the Mang Inasal mark (i.e., fast food restaurants). Both marks cover inasal or inasal-
flavored food products. Petitioner's opposition was referred to the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the IPO for
hearing and disposition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the registration of respondent's OK Hotdog Inasal mark is prohibited under Section 123.l (d)
(iii) of Republic Act No. (RA) 8293

HELD:Yes. The OK Hotdog Inasal mark meets the two conditions of the proscription under Sec. 123.l(d)(iii) of RA
8293. First, it is similar to the Mang Inasal mark, an earlier mark. Second, it pertains to goods that are related to the
services represented by such earlier mark.
The Proscription: Sec. 123.l(d)(iii) of RA 8293 A mark that is similar to a registered mark or a mark with an earlier
filing or priority date (earlier mark) and which is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public cannot be
registered with the IPO. Such is the import of Sec. 123.l(d)(iii) of RA 8293: SECTION 123. Registrability. – 123. 1. A
mark cannot be registered if it:
Verily, to fall under the ambit of Sec. 123. l(d)(iii) and be regarded as likely to deceive or cause confusion upon the
purchasing public, a prospective mark must be shown to meet two (2) minimum conditions:
1. The prospective mark must nearly resemble or be similar to an earlier mark; and
2. The prospective mark must pertain to goods or services that are either identical, similar or related to the goods or
services represented by the earlier mark.

189. ANONYMOUS, complainant vs. GLENN L. NAMOL Et. Al.

June 20, 2017

FACTS:Before the Court is an anonymous Letter-Complaint, dated April 14, 2014, from the Concerned Lawyers of the
Third District of Negros Oriental against Edselbert Garabato , Process Server; Erla Joie L. Roco ,Legal Researcher; and
Glenn Namol , Court Interpreter, all of the Regional Trial Court Branch 63, Bayawan City, Negros Oriental, for grave
misconduct due to case fixing, marriage solemnization fixing, improper solicitation, gross ignorance of the law, and
conduct unbecoming of a court employee.

Respondents Garabato and Namol confederated and conspired in money making activities by asking money from
litigants whose cases have just been dismissed or terminated in court by making it appear that these persons are
obligated to the court personnel. Even though it is not necessary, they helped each other in making false pretenses
thereby besmirching the integrity of the Supreme Court.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) after its investigation, made a report and recommendation and found
Garabato guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for asking accused
Bucad Pl0, 000.00 for the processing of his application for probation, out of which amount he accepted P3, 000.00 as
initial payment. The OCA also found Namol and Garabato guilty of loafing in view of their admission that they had
left the court's premises without the authority of their superior for the purpose of confronting Lasconia and
Aragones regarding the allegations in the complaint. As to the liability of Roco, the OCA found her liable for simple
neglect of duty for her failure to report the extortion incident involving Garabato and Bucad.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the OCA erred in finding the respondents guilty of the crime charged.

HELD:No. The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

The act of Garabato in demanding and receiving money from Bucad who had a pending case before the courts
constituted serious misconduct in office. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel specifically
prohibits all court employees from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.

With respect to Namol, the Court agrees with the findings of the OCA except on the penalty. As court employees,
Namol and Garabato are reminded to observe the prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment
thereof for public service if only to recompense the government and ultimately the people who shoulder the cost of
maintaining the Judiciary. As such, they must, at all times, strictly observe official time to inspire public respect for
the justice system.

Under Section 52 (A)(l7), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules or Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 991936, loafing or
frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours is a grave offense punishable by suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Under
the circumstances, the penalty of one (1) month suspension is proper.

In the case of Roco, the finding of the OCA is well taken. She should be held liable for simple neglect of duty, which is
defined as "the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference." Roco simply failed to exercise reasonable diligence and prudence when she failed to
report the illegal activity of Garabato to her superior, the Branch Clerk of Court, or directly to the Judge.

As regards the inaction of Judge Jayme, Section 3, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides: Judges
should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may have become aware. Pursuant to said section, Judge Jayme should have caused the
investigation of the unprofessional conduct committed by the court personnel under his supervision. He was well
aware of the extortion activity being committed within the court and yet he failed to initiate any investigation for
appropriate disciplinary action against the erring employee. Hence, Judge Jayme should be required to explain why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his failure to take the appropriate disciplinary measure against
the erring court personnel.

Wherefore, the SC finds Edselbert Anthony Garabato, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, and the Court orders his
DISMISSAL from the service with FORFEITURE of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled
corporation. Respondent Glenn Namol, is found GUILTY of Loafing and is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty. Respondent Erla Joie L.
Roco, is found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

The counter complaint against Judge Ananson Jayme is hereby ordered re-docketed as a separate administrative
matter. Judge Ananson Jayme, is DIRECTED to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his
inaction despite his knowledge of the illegal activity of respondent Edselbert Anthony Garabato

190. ARLENE VILLAFLORES-PUZA, Complainant vs.ATTY. ROLANDO B. ARELLANO

Facts: Complainant was the defendant in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by her husband, Ernesto
Puza (Puza), who was represented by respondent as his counsel. On July 21, 2005, Puza, through respondent, filed
his formal offer of evidence, which included some affidavits of witnesses notarized by him.

In the aforesaid affidavits, it was indicated that respondent was issued a notarial commission in Mandaluyong City.
Upon inquiry, however, complainant discovered that he was never issued a notarial commission in Mandaluyong
City. In support thereof, she attached a Certification, 4 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, attesting that he was not a commissioned notary public in said city.

Issue: Whether respondent liable should be suspended?

Held: Yes. Any transgression of the notarial rules should not be treated trivially but must be punished accordingly to
preserve the integrity of notarization.1âwphi1 Under the rules, only persons who are commissioned as notary public
may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. 10

In the present case, it was sufficiently established that respondent was without a notarial commission when he
notarized the affidavits he offered in evidence. This was supported by the certification issued by the RTC of
Mandaluyong City that from January 1998 until August 2005, respondent was never commissioned as a notary
public. A lawyer who notarizes documents without a valid notarial commission is remiss in his professional duties
and responsibilities. 11

Further, it is noteworthy that respondent did not even attempt to answer the accusations against him. He failed to
comply with the orders of the investigating commissioner and he did not attend the scheduled hearings. On this
ground alone, respondent could have been penalized more heavily because he was bound to comply with all the
lawful directives of the IBP, not only because he is a member, but more importantly because the IBP is the Court-
designated investigator of his case.

191. RHODELIA L. SAMBO and LORYL J. AVILA, Petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
June 20, 2017

Facts: On September 12, 2008, the Audit Team Leader (ATL)/Residcnt Auditor in QUEDANCOR of COA Naga City
issued ND No. REG. 08-01- 101 dated September 12, 2008 disallowing disbursement and payments.O n February 18,
2010, petitioners and the concerned employees payees elevated the matter to the COA Regional Director in Region
V by filing a Memorandum for the appellants. Petitioner ruled in favor of the concerned employees. Upon automatic
review, 14 the COA Commission Proper rendered a Decision dated January 29, 2015 partly approving the said
Decision holding that the RD might have overlooked the name of Mr. Reinhard Arceo and included instead Ms.
Meriam A. Borromeo in lifting the above disallowance and the officers who authorized/certified/approved the
payment of the disallowed benefits shall be solidarily liable for the total disallowance, but the rank-and file
employees who received the benefits in good faith need not refund the amount they each received.

Issue: Whether petitioners should be held liable?

Held: Yes. Petitioners failed to faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence
which resulted in the irregular disbursements paid to the employees whose appointments have not been approved
by the CSC. Being a GOCC, QUEDANCOR is bound by civil service laws. Under the Constitution, the CSC is the central
personnel agency of the government, including GOCCs. It primarily deals with matters affecting the career
development, rights and welfare of government employees.3 In this light, the ruling of the COA Commission Proper
in not appreciating good faith on the part of the petitioners must perforce be upheld.

192. CORAZON M. LACAP, Petitioner Vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [Fourth Division] and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
June 21, 2017

FACTS:Corazon was indicted for violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019, for having allegedly neglected or refused, after
due demand, and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time, on the application of complainant
Fermina Santos for a business permit in Masantol, Pampanga for the years 1999 and 2000 for the purpose of
discriminating against Fermina, who previously filed a criminal complaint against the accused's husband.

Fermina Santos owns the Fersan Variety Store located in Masantol, Pampanga and engaged in the sale of school
supplies, furniture and accessories since 1975. She applies for a Mayor's Permit every year and has been submitting
the required documents. If everything is complete, she will present these documents to the Office of the Treasurer
for assessment and evaluation and then it will be submitted to the Office of the Mayor for approval. From 1975 to
1998, the Mayor of Masantol has been issuing her a Mayor's Permit.
For the year 1999, she filed an Application for Mayor's Permit and submitted to the Mayor's Office the required
documents, however, accused Mayor Corazon Lacap was angry at her and denied her application.

The misunderstanding started when Fermina filed a complaint against Abelardo Dizon, a compadre of Mayor
Corazon Lacap. Epifanio Lacap, the husband of the accused, called her up and asked her to withdraw the complaint
against his compadre. She told Epifanio to be fair but Epifanio shouted invectives at her.

In 1998, former Mayor Epifanio Lacap ordered the closure of her store because she filed a complaint against him on
March 17, 1998. It was Epifanio Lacap who asked her to get a permit from the DTI which is one of the requirements
for the approval of the application for Mayor's Permit. On April 1, 1998 she was issued a Mayor's Permit but she was
told to get a DTI Certificate of Registration. She claimed that her documents were complete when she applied for
Mayor's Permit in 1998. At first her store was ordered closed by Epifanio Lacap and the second time it was ordered
closed by Mayor Corazon Lacap on July 3, 1998.
Fermina said that she has a permit in 1998 and yet they closed her store. There were two policemen and a
bodyguard carrying firearms who went to her store and forcibly padlocked her store. She was not able to get her
merchandise until 2001 so none were sold or could be sold because they were damaged.

Atty. Calderon wrote to Mayor Corazon Lacap, to ask her the reasons for the closure and padlocking of Santos' store.
Accused responded but since it was already late in the year, Santos said that she is no longer interested in the
closure and padlocking of her store.
Atty. Calderon with the Municipal Treasurer of Masantol wrote Santos to bring the application for them to make a
letter forwarding all the documents to the Municipal Mayor. In a letter dated April 26, 1999, she wrote again the
Municipal Mayor forwarding to her all the documents which were brought by Santos to her Office. At the time she
wrote the letter she had in mind that everything was complete and it is the duty of the Mayor to issue a permit.
Mayor Lacap did not reply but her counsel requested for time to answer the letter dated April 26, 1999. In May,
1999, accused Lacap's counsel made a response that it was Santos who withdrew her application and thus, there is
nothing, no application in the Office of the Mayor which they could act on.

Andres T. Onofre, Jr. testified that he is a businessman engaged in the selling of school supplies also in Sto. Nino,
Masantol, Pampanga. From 1990 to 1999, he was not able to secure license/permit from the Municipality. What he
just did was to fill up an application form to operate a store and submit the same to the Municipality of Masantol
and then he was already issued an official receipt. He already considered that as an authority to operate his business
and all those years, he was never questioned by the Mayor for operating a business without a permit.

Corazon claimed that she did not order the closure of the store because when she assumed her post as a Mayor,
Santos' store was already closed by her husband, the former Mayor, her husband, way back June 23, 1997 because it
was operating without a Mayor's permit, DTI, SSS and that she was not issuing official receipt to their customers.

The Sandiganbayan found the prosecution's evidence sufficient for conviction and holding Corazon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019.
Corazon filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit and because
there were no new matters raised therein.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed serious misapprehension of facts in having found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of official inaction under Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft Law.

2. Whether the accused's act of referring the letter of Atty. Calderon to her lawyer for appropriate response
constitutes a felony.

3. Whether the Sandiganbayan wrongly assumed that the accused acted with criminal intent
to discriminate against the private complainant absent any categorical evidence therefor.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that there is no merit in Corazon's petition.

The issues raised by Corazon in her petition essentially show that she disputes the existence of the elements of the
offense penalized under Section 3(f) of RA 3019, to wit:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request
has been made on him;
3. Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter
pending before him; and
4. Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against
another.
The resolution of the three issues, therefore, rests upon the existence of sufficient proof to establish the four
elements enumerated above.
The first element is not disputed. As the then Municipal Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, who assumed office on June
30, 1998, Corazon was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged, a public officer.

The second issue raised by Corazon disputes the presence of the second and third elements, while the third issue
puts in doubt the fourth element.
193. NORMAN PANALIGAN ET AL. VS. PHYVITA ENTERPRISES CORP.
G.R. No. 202086
June 21, 2017

Facts: Panaligan et al (petitioner) were employees of Phyvita Enterprises corp. (respondent)

Panaligan was employed as a room boy at Phyvita Enterprises corp.
Sometime in Jan 2005, respondent discovered that the amount of 180,000 including some receipts and payroll were
missing .

While the police investigation was pending, the petitioner together with some employees filed a complaint before
the DOLE against respondent for 1.underpayment of wages, 2.non payment of special and legal holidays, 3.5 days
service incentive leave, 4.night shift differential pay, 5.no pay slip, 6.signing of blank payroll.

In the interim, the respondent accused the petitioner of theft and stated that the latter is responsible for the loss of
the money and properties.

Later, respondent terminated the employer-employee relationship between them and the petitioner based on loss
of trust and confidence.

On June 2005, respondent filed a criminal complaint of theft against the petitioner, but the same was dismissed by
the city prosecutor, there being no sufficient evidence.
On Nov 2006 petitioner filed a complaint with the LA alleging that they were illegally dismissed.

Respondent, on their defense, stated that the dismissal was legal because the allege criminal complaint was enough
evidence to produce a substantial evidence.
LA ruled in favor of the respondent.

NLRC reversed the decision of LA and decided in favor of petitioner.

CA reversed the decision of NLRC.

Issue: WON a dismissed criminal complaint is enough ground to terminate an employee based on loss of trust and
confidence.

Held: No, In order to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, the employee must be
guilty of an actual and willful breach of trust duly supported by substantial evidence. In the case at hand, respondent
failed to adduce evidence that would clearly demonstrate that Panaligan have committed serious misconduct.
Hence a dismissed criminal complaint does not tantamount to a ground for termination of employment. Art 282 of
Labor code.