Coso vs. Fernandez Deza
Coso vs. Fernandez Deza
Coso vs. Fernandez Deza
Judgments modified.
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OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila setting aside a will on the ground of undue influence alleged
to have been exerted over the mind of a testator by one Rosario
Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an
illegitimate son had by the testator with said. Rosario Lopez, and
also provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish
duros by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
taking care of the testator in Barcelona during the years
597
VOL. 42, DECEMBER 22, 1921 597
Coso vs. Fernandez Deza
598
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that
undue influence, in the sense above expressed, existed at the time of
its execution and we do not think that this burden has been carried in
the present case. While it is shown that the testator entertained
strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her
influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his
free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his
own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to
have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only by
a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his
illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying
Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not
invalidate a will. No imposition or fraud has been shown in the
present case.
It may be further observed that under the Civil Law the right of a
person with legal heirs to dispose of his property by will is limited to
only a portion of his estate, and that under the law in force in these
Islands before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
only outside influences affecting the validity of a will were duress,
deceit, and fraud. The present doctrine of undue influence originated
in a legal system where the right of the testator to dispose of his
property by will was nearly unlimited. Manifestly, greater
safeguards in. regard to execution of wills may be warranted when
the right to so dispose of property is unlimited than when it is
restricted to the extent it is in this