CALABIG VS.

VILLANUEVA

Gr.NO. 56598, MARCH 15, 1985

FACTS:

Petitioner was declared mayor of Paete, Laguna having garnered two votes more than private
respondent Baldemor. Baldemor filed an election protest with TRO in the CFI of Laguna. Calabig filed
his answer denying the material allegations of Baldemor and By way of counter protest, he alleged
that Baldemor, his leaders and sympathizers, committed coercion, intimidation, vote buying and other
electoral frauds and anomalies. He also claimed that private respondent Baldemor has no cause of
action or legal capacity to file said protest since he was a disqualified candidate, his certificate of
candidacy having been denied due course by the Comelec and prayed for the enforcement of the
COMELEC resolution. However,The restraining order prayed for by Baldemor was granted and the
CFI continued to hear the case instead of remanding it to the COMELEC for further hearing.
Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration of this reolution but to no avail.

Petitioner, then, sought to amend his "Answer, with Counter Protest" in the said Election Case
No. II by filing a motion for the admission of his amended answer wherein he pleads by way of
affirmative and special defenses the disqualification of private respondent, a matter which is however
already alleged in his original answer but amplified and elaborated in the amended answer sought to
be admitted. Petitioner then prayed that before any revision of ballots may proceed, a preliminary
hearing must first be conducted on the issue of respondent Baldemor's disqualification since the
result thereof would be determinative of the outcome of private respondent's election
protest.Respondent Judge, however, denied petitioners motion without conducting a hearing
prompting him to file this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Villanueva committed grave abuse of discreation in prejudging the issue
without conducting a hearing?

Ruling:

No. The petition is devoid of merit. It cannot be denied that petitioner does not controvert, that
nothing new is sought to be introduced in his Amended Answer. He admits that the amendments
incorporated consist merely of allegations of ultimate facts in amplification or elaboration of the
ground already previously alleged in his original Answer, not new grounds; that some of the
amendments merely consist of a change in phraseology; and insofar as the counter-protest is
concerned, the amendment consists merely in the introduction of a new statement of facts which do
not change essentially the grounds of the protest but merely an elaboration of those already alleged.

The court fully subscribe to the observation aptly made by the Honorable respondent Judge
that to allow and entertain petitioner's amended answer will only delay disposition of the pending
election protest filed by petitioner against private respondent and vice versa it appearing that the
issue of private respondent's disqualification and those allegations in relation to petitioner's counter-
protest are essentially mere elaboration of the previous grounds already set forth in the original
Answer

DANIEL C. VALENZUELA et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS

An Accion Reinvidicatoria was filed against petitioners by private respondents,

the Heirs of Federico Salazar. Petitioners were alleged to be occupying 300
square meters of private respondents property. An Answer was filed by
petitioners and in it they claimed by way of affirmative defense "that the
portion wherein defendants' house stands is outside the area covered by
petitioners title. In view of this allegation, both parties, through their counsels,
agreed at the pre-trial conference to a re-survey of the property by a court-
appointed surveyor to determine if the house is actually within the boundaries
of the title. Said agreement was confirmed in the order of the trial court which
directed the Bureau of Lands to conduct a survey of the property and to
submit a report to the court. This is the first assailed ruling.

In compliance with the order, the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources, Land Management Bureau, sent a survey team to the disputed
property. Unfortunately, they were refused entry by petitioner Daniel
Valenzuela. In response, private respondents filed a Motion to Issue Show
Cause Order against Daniel Valenzuela. Commenting on the motion,
petitioners' counsel stated that "upon serious scrutiny of the records it appears
that said title should not be the subject of the resurvey but the whole subject
property or mother title to reflect all portions of the respective heirs of the
deceased owner. Private respondents replied stating that OCT No. 4097 is
immaterial as it had long been cancelled and the property partitioned.

On July 7, 2000, Atty. Fernando B. Zuniga entered his appearance as new

counsel for petitioners. Immediately, he filed a rejoinder to the show cause
motion stating that conducting a re-survey on either TCT No. 111366(16930)
or even OCT No. 4097 will not lay to rest any issue in the case so that the
previous counsel not only erred in agreeing to the re-survey of TCT No.
111366(16930) but also committed a palpable mistake in proposing a re-
survey on the mother title. He then accused previous counsel of failing to
"exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause [sic]
and his reckless and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind"
petitioners. The rejoinder consequently asked that the December 9, 1999
order to conduct a survey be entirely set aside.

Following the rejoinder, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion for

Extension on August 18, 2000 alleging that the original Answer was insufficient
and prayed that petitioners be given 20 days to file a Motion for Leave to File
Amended Answer. The motion was followed by a second motion for extension
of 15 days on September 8, 2000. The trial court, in an order dated
September 11, 2000, denied the motion for extension and gave petitioners
one last opportunity to comply with the December 9, 1999 order. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed praying that the September 11, 2000 Order be
reconsidered. On October 4, 2000, petitioners filed their Motion for Leave to
File Amended Answer. In their Amended Answer, the allegation that
petitioners' house stands outside TCT No. 111366(16930) was removed in
favor of the defenses of acquisition in good faith of the 300-square meter
property, prescription, laches and estoppel. On December 11, 2000, the trial
court issued an order denying the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion
for Leave to File Amended Answer. This is the second assailed ruling.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the orders of the trial
court through a petition for certiorari . The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court. Moreover, the appellate court declared that it is all too obvious that
petitioners are resorting to dilatory tactics to prevent the case from being
decided against them. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari .

ISSUE:
 WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM DATED 2
OCTOBER 2000 WHEN THE PRESENT CASE IS ONLY IN ITS PRE-TRIAL STAGE.

RULING:

The denial of the Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer, again the Court
finds nothing that could be interpreted to show grave abuse of discretion or a
whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the trial court. Having filed an
Answer way back on September 18, 1999, with pre-trial on-going,
amendments to the Answer were no longer a matter of right but at the
discretion of the trial court. The pertinent provision would be Section 3 of Rule
10, which reads:

SEC. 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the next

preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of
court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion
was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided
in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

The Court is aware that amendments to pleadings are allowed at any stage
before the rendition of final judgment.16 This is most especially permitted
during pre-trial as one of its goals is to consider the "necessity or desirability
of amendments to the pleadings."17Nevertheless, whether an amendment will
be allowed is still discretionary upon the trial court, taking into account the
circumstances of each case with particular attention to the possibility that the
motion was made with intent to delay.

[G.R. No. 128061. September 3, 1998]

JESUS G. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL, TRIAL COURT OF
BULACAN, BRANCH 9 and OMAR H. YAPCHIONGCO, respondents.

DECISI0N
BELLOSILLO, J.:

JESUS G. SANTOS, petitioner, together with four (4) other Santoses, was sued for damages on 23 May
1979 by Omar H. Yapchiongco before the then Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan, alleging petitioner
unlawfully took possession of five (5) parcels of land a piggery farm which were the subject of an agreement to
buy and sell between respondent Yapchiongco on one hand and the Santoses on the other, namely, petitioner
Jesus G. Santos, Ciriaco C. Santos, Belen G. Santos, Apolonio G. Santos and Alfredo G. Santos.
On 20 June 1991 the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.[1]
On 6 June 1995 respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared petitioner liable for
actual damages of P192,260.00, moral damages of P40,000.00, and attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
P25,000.00.[2] On 15 June 1995 the decision of the appellate court was sent by registered mail to petitioner's
counsel, Atty. Anacleto S, Magno. On the same day, the corresponding notice of registered mail was sent to
him. Two (2) other notices were sent to the same addressee on 19 and 21 June 1995. But these circumstances
notwithstanding, the mail remained unclaimed and consequently returned to the sender.[3]
On 27 July 1995 respondent court again sent its decision to the same addressee by the same mode but after
three (3) notices the decision was returned to the sender for the same reason.[4]
On 27 September 1995 a notice of change of name and address of law firm was sent by petitioner's counsel
to respondent court.[5]
On 28 March 1996 the same decision of respondent court was sent anew by registered mail to petitioner's
counsel at his present address[6] which he finally received on 3 April 1996.[7] On 17 April 1996 he withdrew his
appearance as counsel for petitioners.[8]
On 18 April 1996 petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Lemuel M. Santos, entered his appearance[9] and moved
for reconsideration of respondent court's decision of 6 June 1995. Respondent Yapchiongco opposed the motion
on the ground that the period for its filing had already expired. He insisted that on the basis of the dates of the
notices and the notation "Unclaimed: Return to Sender" stamped on the envelope containing the decision of
respondent court,[10] service by registered mail was complete five (5) days from 15 June 1995, and thus
commenced the running of the period for reconsideration, the last day being 5 July 1995. Respondent court
sustained the opposition and denied the motion on 29 November 1996[11] holding that -

x x x x Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that service by registered mail is
deemed complete if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days
from the date of first notice of the postmaster x x x x appellees (were) considered to have received
a copy of (its) decision on June 20, 1995 (and) had (only) until July 5, 1995 within which to file a
motion for reconsideration x x x x[12]

On 21 December 1996 petitioner moved for leave to admit his motion for reconsideration raising the
argument that it was filed on the fifteenth (15th) day from actual receipt of the decision. On 30 January 1997
respondent court likewise denied reconsideration based on the finding that the motion was in reality a second
motion for reconsideration which was prohibited under Sec. 6, Rule 9, of its Revised Internal Rules.[13]
Did respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying both motions?
Petitioner asseverates that there is no proof that his former counsel was ever notified of the registered
mails. Since a copy of respondent court's decision was actually received by his former counsel only on 3 April
1996 the filing of the motion for reconsideration on 18 April 1996 was certainly within the fifteen (15)-day
reglementary period. What is applicable, petitioner advances, is the general rule in Sec. 8, Rule 13, that "service
by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee." Furthermore, he points out that his first
motion for reconsideration deals with the merits of the appeal while his second motion for reconsideration
concerns the technical issue of timeliness of seeking reconsideration and therefore the latter is not strictly a
prohibited pleading.
Aside from maintaining his opposition to the motion for reconsideration, respondent disputes petitioner's
claim of lack of notice by relying on the certification issued by Postmaster Renato N. Endaya of the Manila
Central Post Office declaring that notices of the registered letter were duly issued to petitioner's former counsel
on 15, 19 and 21 June 1995.[14]
Respondent Court-'of Appeals, indeed, committed grave abuse of discretion. Section 8, Rule 13, of the
Rules of Court provides -

Sec. 8. Completeness of service. - Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by
ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after rnailing, unless the court
otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but
if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from-the date of first notice of
the postmaster, service shall take effect-at the expiration of such time (underscoring supplied).

It may, be observed that the rule on service by registered mail contemplates two (2) situations: first, actual
service the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail and,
second, constructive service the completeness of which is determined, upon the expiration of five (5) days.from
the date of first notice of the postmaster without the addressee having claimed the registered mail. The second
circumstance was appreciated by respondent court to obtain in the present case. Yet for completeness of
constructive service there must be conclusive proof that petitioner's former counsel or somebody acting on his
behalf was duly notified or had actually received the notice, referring to the postmaster's certification to that
effect[15] Here, private respondent failed to present such proof before respondent court but only did so in the
present proceedings. Let us analyze the postmaster's certification -

This is to certify that according to the record(s) of this Office Registered Letter No. 71154 (with
Delivery No. 30175) sent by (the) Court of Appeals, Manila on June 15, 1995 addressed to
Atty. Anacieto S. Magno of 208 Associated Bank Bldg., Ermita, Manila was returned to sender as
unclaimed mail on July 4, 1995 after the lapse of reglementary period provided for under postal
regulations following the issuance of notices on the dates hereunder indicated (underscoring
supplied):

First Notice - June 15, 1995

Second Notice - June 19, 1995
Third Notice - June 21, 1995[16]

Obviously, the certification was procured only during the pendency of this petition or specifically on 29
January 1998. This act amounts to piece-meal introduction of evidence which is not allowed.[17] Even if we
tolerate the procedural misstep, the certification accomplishes nothing because as early as 24 November 1972,
in Hernandez v. Navarro,[18] we already considered this kind of certification as insufficient. Thus -

x x x x it is but proper to take judicial notice of the fact that the Postal Manual of the Philippines
sets out in unmistakable terms the procedure that the post office is supposed to observe not only in
the delivery of notices of registered mail but also in providing proof of such delivery x x x x

Clearly then, proof should always be available to the post office not only of whether or not the
notices of registered mail have been reported delivered by the letter carrier but also of how or to
whom and when such delivery has been made. Consequently, it cannot be too much to expect that
when the post office makes a certification regarding delivery of registered mail, such certification
such certification should include the data not only as to whether or not the corresponding notices
were issued or sent but also as to how, when and whom the delivery thereof was
made. Accordingly, the certification in the case at bar that the first and second notices addressed to
Atty. Narvasa had been "issued" can hardly suffice the requirements of equity and justice. It was
incumbent upon the post office to further certify that said notices were reportedly received. When
there are several related acts supposed to be performed by a public officer or employee in regard to
a particular matter, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions arise and
be considered as comprehending all the required acts, if the certification issued by the proper office
refers only to some of such acts, particularly in instances wherein proof of whether or not all
of them performed is available under the or office regulations to the officer making the
certification. In other words, the omission of some of the acts in-the certification may justify the
inference that from the proof available to the officer there is no showing that they have also been
performed x x x x[19] (underscoring supplied).

As between the claim of non-receipt of notices of registered mail by a party and the assertion of an official
whose duty is to send notices, which assertion is fortified by the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed,[20] the choice is not difficult to make. But then the contents of the official's certification
may spell the difference. For, it was not enough for Postmaster Endaya to have certified that the notices
were issued because this is just a prelude to service by registered mail. And definitely, it would not be in
consonance with the demands of due process and equity for us to automatically conclude that from the word
"issued" alone, the notice was in fact received by the addressee or somebody acting on his behalf and on the
same date of the notice, The postmaster should have included in his certification the manner, date and the
recipient of the delivery. Hernandez need not overemphasize the point.
The finding of respondent court that petitioner and his coappellees were considered to have received a copy
of the decision on 20 June 1995 or five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, in the absence of
conclusive proof as it merely relied on the dates of the notices and the notation "Unclaimed: Return to Sender"
stamped on the envelope containing its decision, was clearly arrived at arbitrarily. Consequently, certiorari lies.
With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the other issue raised.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 29
November 1996 denying petitioner Jesus G. Santos' motion for reconsideration and 30 January 1997 also
denying his motion for leave to admit motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. Respondent court is
directed to act accordingly on petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the meritsand to proceed in the
disposition thereof with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.