1

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 12779. September 10, 1917.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIONISIO SANTOS, defendant-appellant.

Juan Medina Cue for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PEACE OFFICERS; POWERS. — The powers for peace officers in the Philippines, generally stated, are the same as those conferred
upon constables under the Anglo-American Common Law. The extent of their authority to make arrests without warrant and the
limitations thereon are as stated in the language of the Legislature in the charter of the city of Manila.
2. ID.; JUSTIFICATION FOR ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT. — A peace officer can justify an arrest without warrant if there is reasonable
ground of suspicion tending to show that a person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace, and if he
acts in good faith. Under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, he peace officer is not liable.
The courts should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. So a policeman, acting under the order of his chief who desires to
put a stop to pilfering in a certain locality, patrolled this district and about midnight seeing two persons in front of an uninhabited
house and then entering an uninhabited camarin, arrested them without warrant, although no crime had been committed, is not
guilty of coercion or arbitrary detention.

DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:

The sole facts of controlling force in the present case are these:
Dionisio Santos, a policeman of Pateros, Province of Rizal, acting under the orders of his chief who desired to put a stop to pilfering
in a certain locality, patrolled this district, and about midnight, seeing two persons in front of an uninhabited house and then entering
an uninhabited camarin, arrested them without warrant, although no crime had been committed, and took them to the municipal
presidencia where they were detained in the jail for six or seven hours when they were released. Was the accused guilty of coercion
as found by the trial court? Or was he guilty of coercion as found by the trial court? Or was he guilty of the lesser offense of arbitrary
detention as suggested by the Attorney-General? Or was he innocent as argued by his counsel?
The powers of peace officers in the Philippines, generally stated, are the same as those conferred upon constables under the Anglo-
American Common Law. The extent of their authority to make arrests without warrant and the limitations thereon, as held by the
Supreme Court, are as stated in the language of the Legislature in the Charter of the city of Manila. (U. S. vs. Fortaleza [1909], 12 Phil.
Rep., 472.) The Administrative code (sec. 2204, edition of 1916; sec. 2258, edition of 1917) enjoins municipal policemen to "exercise
vigilance in the prevention of public offenses."

The accused herein cannot justify the arrest by reason of acting in obedience to legal process which it was his duty to obey. He must
justify, if at all, under the rule that peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or
under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or
breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty. Besides
reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if the
suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable.

One should however not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning o a judicial
officer. Often he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of
the criminal. To err is human. Even the most conscientious officer must at times be mislead. If, therefore, under trying circumstances
and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good
faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of
themselves violating the law. (See generally Voorhees on Arrest; 5 Corpur Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R. C. L., p. 450.)

The Common Law rule as to the arrest without warrant of suspicious night-walkers is of particular interest. Blackstone says,
"Watchmen, either those appointed by the statute of Winchester (13 Edw. I, c. 4) to keep watch and ward in all towns from sun-
setting to sun-rising, or such as are mere assistants to the constable, may virtute officii (by virtue of their office) arrest all offenders,
 2

and the particularly night-walkers, and commit them to custody till the morning." (II Cooley's Blackstone, p. 1445.) The cases hold
that a peace officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable
ground to suspect of felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the
person so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. (Miles vs. Weston [1871],
60 Ill., 361, citing English decisions.) The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about streets and
uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is just as
commendatory as the capture of criminals. surely the officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony.
The rule is supported by the necessities of life.
The foregoing are the applicable principles of the American and English Common Law as to the powers of peace officers. The
principles of the Spanish law are not essentially different. (See U. S. vs. Sanchez [1914], 27 Phil. Rep., 442.) Both rest upon the same
foundation of reason and common sense.
Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with the costs de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.

||| (United States v. Santos, G.R. No. 12779, [September 10, 1917], 36 PHIL 853-856)
 3

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 46250. July 26, 1939.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE P. ANCHETA, defendant-appellant.

Claro M. Recto for appellant.

Solicitor-General Ozaeta for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; ARBITRARY DETENTION. — In crimes of arbitrary detention (article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code, which is equivalent to article 200 of the old Penal Code), the legality of the detention made by a person in authority or an agent
thereof does not depend upon the juridical and much less judicial fact of a crime which, at the time of its commission, is not and
cannot definitively be determined for lack of the necessary data and of jurisdiction, but upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom
such characterization May reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision
for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.
2. ID.; ID. — The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary
requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, It is sufficient that
the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detainer participated therein.
3. ID.; ID.; THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN UNITED STATES vs. SANTOS (36 PHIL., 863), REITERATED. — This ruling was upheld not only
by the Supreme Court of Spain but also by this court in several cases, among them being that of United States vs. Santos (36 Phil.,
853), where it was stated that the reasonable or probable cause which must exist to justify an arrest without warrant consists in a
ground sufficient in itself to convince a reasonable man to believe that the person arrested by him is guilty; and that, besides
reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the peace officer making the arrest. It was
likewise stated therein that under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer who
arrested him is not liable, adding that one should not expect too much of a policeman, and the same is true with a constabulary
officer as the appellant, because both are not presumed to have the training and preparation of a judicial officer, not having as they
do not often have the opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on their own belief to prevent the escape of
the criminal.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN ARRESTS MAY BE MADE WITHOUT WARRANT; CASE AT BAR. — It should likewise be borne in mind that the law
(section 848 of the Administrative Code and article 124 of the Revised Penal Code) allows members of the Constabulary or policemen
to make arrests without warrant, not only when a crime is being committed or is about to be committed in their own presence, but
also when they reasonably believe or have ground to suspect that a crime has been committed and that it has been committed
precisely by the person arrested (U. S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472 U. S. vs. Samonte 16 Phil., 516; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U.
S. vs. Santos, supra; People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil., 221). The detention of B. S. ordered by the appellant took place exactly
under these same circumstances.

DECISION
PER CURIAM, p:
Again this case occupied the attention of this court by reason of the petition filed by the accused and appellant Vicente P. Ancheta
for reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him, which affirms that formerly entered by the Court of First Instance of
Palawan sentencing him to the indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to four years of prision correccional, with
the costs of the proceedings. His petition is based on the following grounds:
"I. That it is an error to hold that the detention of Bibiana Sanson ordered by the appellant was not justified on the ground that it has
not been proven that she had conspired with her brothers to assault said appellant.
"II. That the conviction of the appellant in this case, after this Supreme Court has found in its decision that 'there are circumstances
in support of the theory of the defense' that the appellant ordered the arrest of Bibiana Sanson for having conspired with her brothers
and with the deceased Salazar to assault said appellant, is a deviation from the uniform ruling that peace officers are empowered to
make arrests without warrant when they have reasonable cause to believe that an offense or violation of law has been committed
and that the accused is guilty thereof, and is likewise contrary to the express provision of section 848 of the Administrative Code
pertinent thereto."
We have reviewed the record and firmly adhere to the finding that it was the accused-appellant who really ordered the arrest of
Bibiana Sanson upon the belief that she had taken part in the assault committed upon him by the Sanson brothers, Rufo and Cirilo
and by justice of the peace Guillermo Salazar. The only question now to be determined anew is: "Was the detention of said woman
arbitrary under said circumstances?"
Without making a tedious repetition of the facts pertinent to the case, which already appear in the decision rendered in case G. R.
No. 45344 (37 Off. Gaz., 620), and in the one under reconsideration, it should be stated, however, that the assault committed by the
Sanson brothers and justice of the peace Salazar upon the accused-appellant took place immediately after the latter had been
approached by Bibiana Sanson in the middle of the street, while he was passing in front of the store situated under the house owned
 4

by the Sansons. Under said circumstances, the appellant undoubtedly had well founded reasons to believe that Bibiana Sanson was
not innocent of said aggression: first, because it was strange for her, an unmarried woman, after the appellant had broken with her,
to approach him in the middle of the street feigning friendship, a thing she had never done before, and for her brothers Rufo and
Cirilo and justice of the peace Salazar, immediately afterwards and knowing him to be a peace officer, to fall upon him and assault
him, punching and kicking him until he fell to the ground, and at the same time wresting from him the revolver which he carried in
his belt; second, because the four of them harbored a grudge against him, and he knew it, by reason of his break with Bibiana and of
the slander of which she had allegedly been informed and which had reached the ears of the Sansons thereby naturally offending
them, that he had been spreading the news that she had in his possession some of Bibiana's innermost garments, and by reason of
having complained of the behaviour and investigated the conduct of justice of the peace Salazar in various cases in which the latter
had intervened as such justice of the peace; third, because Bibiana made no efforts to prevent her brothers and said justice of the
peace from maltreating as they in fact maltreated him; and lastly, because after the assault, all the four went up the house of the
Sansons, locking up themselves therein until they were compelled to surrender by the Constabulary.
There is no doubt that the above-stated facts constitute in themselves strong circumstantial evidence that the aggression was
premeditated and was the result of a previous conspiracy in which Bibiana Sanson could not but have a part. Anybody who found
himself in the same circumstances as the appellant, would have believed 80 himself and would have made the same decision, all the
more so because the person involved was not merely a peace officer but a commanding officer of a detachment of constabulary
soldiers, called upon, by reason of his position, to act promptly in order to preserve order and to bring to the authorities those whom
he believes in good faith to be violators of the law. It should be borne in mind that on the same day on which the appellant ordered
the detention of Bibiana Sanson, he caused the presentation of a complaint for frustrated homicide, which was so done in fact not
only against her but also against her two brothers, because he was then of the opinion that such was the crime committed by them
against him. The complaint was filed with the acting vice-president Emilio Castro, on the belief that said official could act upon it, in
the absence of the justice of the peace and of the municipal president of Balabac. It seems clear that the appellant ceased to have
any responsibility from the time the complaint was filed with the authorities, because it was not then incumbent upon him to take
the steps subsequent to said act, such as that of effecting the provisional release of Bibiana Sanson on bail, or that of dismissing the
complaint against her for the reason that she does not appear to be liable for any crime, after the corresponding preliminary
investigation.
In crimes of arbitrary detention (article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, which is equivalent to article 200 of the old Penal Code), the
legality of the detention made by a person in authority or an agent thereof, as stated by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision
of January 27, 1885, does not depend upon the juridical and much less judicial fact of a crime which, at the time of its commission, is
not and cannot definitively be determined for lack of the necessary data and of jurisdiction, but upon the nature of the deed,
wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves
the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person
in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a
crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of November 5, 1892).

This same ruling was upheld by this court in several cases, among them being that of United States vs. Santos (36 Phil., 853), where
it was stated that the reasonable or probable cause which must exist to justify an arrest without warrant consists in a ground sufficient
in itself to convince a reasonable man to believe that the person arrested by him is guilty; and that, besides reasonable ground of
suspicion, action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the peace officer making the arrest. It was likewise stated therein
that under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer who arrested him is not
liable, adding that one should not expect too much of a policeman, and the same is true with a constabulary officer as the appellant,
because both are not presumed to have the training and preparation of a judicial officer, not having as they do not often have the
opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on their own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. It should
likewise be borne in mind that the law (section 848 of the Administrative Code and article 124 of the Revised Penal Code) allows
members of the Constabulary or policemen, and in general every public officer or employee, to make arrests without warrant, not
only when a crime is being committed or is about to be committed in their own presence, but also when they reasonably believe or
have ground to suspect that a crime has been committed and that it has been committed precisely by the person arrested (U. S. vs.
Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472; U. S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U. S. vs. Santos, supra; People vs. Kagui
Malasugui, 63 Phil., 221). Bibiana Sanson's detention ordered by the appellant took place exactly under these same circumstances.
Wherefore, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Vicente P. Ancheta, lieutenant of the Constabulary, of the crime of
arbitrary detention with which he was charged, the detention of Bibiana Sanson ordered by him being as it is now declared sufficiently
justified, in view of the circumstances surrounding the same, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 46250, [July 26, 1939], 68 PHIL 415-421)
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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 7284. August 23, 1912.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE BATALLONES ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Luciano de la Rosa for appellants.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. POLICE; ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT. — Municipal police officers, like all other officials in these Islands, who "by direct provisions
of law or by appointment of competent authority are charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security
of life and property" have authority to make arrests without warrant, substantially similar to the authority generally conferred upon
"peace officers" in the United States, and more especially that class of "peace officers" known to American and English Law as
"constables." And "the provisions of section 37 of Act No. 183 (the Charter of Manila), quite clearly set forth the powers usually
conferred by American and English Law upon 'peace officers' including 'constables' in making arrests without warrant." (U.S. vs.
Fortaleza, 12 Phil. Rep., 472, 479.)
2. ID. ID. — Municipal police officers in these Islands have substantially the same powers as the police officers of the city of Manila
"in making arrests without warrant" and they "may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of
the peace, may arrest or cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender when the offense is committed in the presence of a
peace officer or within his view." (Sec. 37, Charter of Manila.)
3. ID.; ID. — Two strangers were seen slipping about the market place in one of the municipalities of these Islands and behaving
generally in suspicious manner. A short time prior thereto a number of thefts and robberies had been committed in the municipality.
A woman who observed the suspicious conduct of the strangers denounced them to two policemen on duty at the market place. The
policemen found the strangers and demanded that they give an account of themselves and produce their cedulas. This they were
unable to do, but undertook to support their claim that they were innocent persons, secret service agents of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, acting in the performance of their duty, by the production of certain documents in English, which the policemen were
unable to read. The policeman arrested the strangers and brought them before the justice of the peace of the municipality, who
directed that they be detained in the municipal jail until further orders. Held, That although it afterwards developed that the strangers
were what they claimed, secret service agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, acting in the performance of their duties,
nevertheless, under all the circumstances as set out in the opinion, the policemen are not criminally liable for their action in making
the arrests.
4. ID.; ID. — The mere fact that a citizen is unable to produce his cedula upon demand does not itself justify his arrest or detention
without a warrant.
5. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL DETENTION. — Under all the circumstances of this case, as set out in the opinion, the justice of the peace, who
arbitrarily and without investigation directed the detention of these internal revenue agents, held to have been guilty of the crime
of "detencion arbitraria."

DECISION
CARSON, J p:
The defendants in this case were charged with the crime of detencion illegal by the fiscal of the Province of Laguna. The information
charging the offense is as follows:
"The undersigned charges Jose Batallones, Maximo Cuadro and Isaac Demo with the crime of illegal detention, committed as follows:
"On or about December 5, 1909, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, the accused Jose Batallones, justice of the peace,
and the accused Maximo Cuadro and Isaac Demo, policemen of the said municipality, all of them acting in such capacities, did willfully,
maliciously and Isaac Demo, policemen of the said municipality, all of them acting in such capacities, did willfully, maliciously and
criminally arrest Apolonio Gumarang and Inocencio Reyes and detain them from that night to be morning of the 6th of the said month
and year, although they had not committed any crime or misdemeanor to warrant such detention and although the accused were
not authorized by any law or ordinance to detain said persons—in violation of law."
The trial judge found all and each of the defendants guilty of the crime of detencion arbitraria, as defined and penalized in article 200
of the Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to a fine of 3,250 pesetas, that being the maximum penalty prescribed by law.
It appears that on the 5th of December, 1909, Apolonio Gumarang and Inocencio Reyes, two secret service agents connected with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, were in the municipality of Cabuyao on official business; that while there they were arrested by the
appellants Maximo Cuadro and Isaac Demo, members of the local police, and were taken by them before the appellant Jose
Batallones, a justice of the peace, who directed that they be detained in the municipal jail until further orders; and that in compliance
with that order they were detained in the municipal jail until the next morning, when they were released upon information as to
their identity furnished by the municipal treasurer.
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We think that the evidence of record sufficiently establishes the following additional facts in connection with the incident. Some time
prior to the arrest several thefts and robberies had been committed in the municipality of Cabuyao. The two secret service agents,
strangers in the municipality, were seen spying about in the neighborhood of the market place, and acting generally in a manner
calculated to arouse the suspicions of anyone not advised as to the duty in which they were engaged. A woman named Restituta
Catindig, having had her attention attracted by the peculiar conduct of the men, approached them between 6 and 7 o'clock in the
evening in a dark corner where they were apparently attempting to secrete themselves. When she approached they slipped away,
apparently desiring to avoid observation. She complained to the two accused policemen on duty in the neighborhood, and charged
the strangers with being suspicious characters. The policemen called upon the secret service agents to give an account of themselves,
and to explain their suspicious conduct, and at the same time demanded that they produce their cedulas. This the secret service
agents were unable to do, claiming that they had forgotten them in the neighboring town of Calamba. They undertook to identify
themselves by producing certain documents in English to show just what was their business. The police officers, who did not know
English, were unable to read these documents, and believing that their conduct and their inability satisfactorily to account for
themselves justified the suspicion that they were in some way connected with the recent robberies, or that they were about to
commit theft or robbery, placed the two men under arrest and took them forthwith to the house of the justice of the peace informing
them that the justice of the peace would be able to understand the documents produced by them and to decide what was proper to
do under all the circumstances. The justice of the peace came down from his house, glanced over the papers, and without further
attempt to verify the truth of the claims of the secret service agents, ordered them to be taken to the municipal jail and there to be
searched and detained until further orders. The justice of the peace, at the trial, denied that he had given any order directing their
detention, but we think the evidence conclusively establishes not only that he did so, but that the order was issued by him without
making any effort to verify the truth of the claims of the secret service agents, and without giving them any reasonable opportunity
to explain their suspicious conduct or to produce evidence to relieve themselves of the suspicions aroused by their peculiar conduct
in and about the market place. Indeed, the proof shows that he apparently wholly failed to appreciate the obligation which rested
upon him to make a reasonable attempt to satisfy himself as to the grounds upon which the suspicions of the policemen were based,
before issuing a judicial order for the detention of the men arrested by the policemen.
So far as the conduct of the two policemen is concerned, we are wholly unable to agree with the trial judge that there was anything
reprehensible in their action in making the arrest, and certain it is that in view of the facts above set out a criminal charge of detencion
arbitraria cannot be maintained against them.
In a former case we held that officials in these Islands, who, "by direct provisions of law or by appointment of competent authority
are charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property," have authority to make
arrests without warrant substantially similar to the authority generally conferred upon "peace officers" in the United States, and
more especially that class of "peace officers" known to American and English law as constables; and that "the provisions of section
37 of Act No. 183" (the Charter of Manila) "quite clearly set forth the powers usually conferred by American and English law upon
'peace officers' including 'constables' in making arrests without warrants," and provide that they "may pursue and arrest without
warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has
committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender,
when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view." (U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. Rep., 472, 479.)

In the light of after events it is of course very clear that the suspicion directed against the secret service agents was not well founded;
but viewing the facts as they must have presented themselves to the woman who complained to the policemen, and to the policemen
themselves, at the time of the arrest, we think that they must be held to have had reasonable grounds upon which to base their
suspicions as to the arrested men. One readily sees that the conduct of these secret service agents, engaged, as presumably they
were, in an attempt to surprise violators of the Internal Revenue Law, might well give rise to suspicions as to their real object and
intentions in the mind of one who was not advised as to the real object which they had in view; and their inability satisfactorily to
account for themselves and to produce their cedulas undoubtedly tended to confirm the suspicions already aroused.
We must not be understood, however, as holding that under the law as it now exists the mere fact that a citizen is unable to produce
his cedula upon demand would in itself justify his arrest and detention without a warrant. There is no authority in law for the making
of such arrests upon such grounds. But the conduct of these strangers in a provincial town in these Islands having already aroused
the suspicion that they may have been guilty of a grave offense or were about to commit one, their failure or inability to produce
their cedulas, or to satisfactorily account for their failure so to do, naturally impressed the local policemen as in some sort
confirmatory of the suspicion already aroused. The failure to produce their cedulas on demand was not in itself offense, but in the
minds of the two policemen in the case at bar it was undoubtedly calculated to confirm their suspicions already aroused.
Under all the circumstances we think that the action of the police officers in promptly bringing the suspected persons before the
local judicial officer clearly indicated that, on their part, their acts were wholly inspired by a genuine desire to faithfully perform their
duties as guardians of the law and of the good order of the community. And we conclude, therefore, that though the suspicions on
which they based the arrest were not well founded, they are in no wise criminally responsible for their action in making the arrest;
the facts, as they appeared to them at the time, having furnished reasonable grounds for their suspicions under all the circumstances.
But the facts as developed by the evidence of record to not in our opinion sustain the defense offered by Jose Batallones, the justice
of the peace, and wholly fail to justify his conduct in arbitrarily issuing the order for the confinement of the suspected secret service
agents. He himself denied that he had directed that they be detained, but we think that the evidence of records shows conclusively
that he did in fact issue a verbal order to that effect. Indeed, the suspected persons having been brought before him by the police
officers, it would seem that it was his duty as the local judicial officer, either to order their discharge or to direct that they be detained.
 7

The suspected persons were brought before him about 6 or 7 o'clock in the evening at his own house. There was plenty of opportunity
for the verification of their claim that they were not suspicious characters, and that such suspicion as might have arisen in the minds
of the policemen and of the woman who complained against them was founded upon acts the meaning of which was satisfactorily
explained by the fact that they were engaged in the performance of their duties as secret service agents. The papers in their
possession, had they been examined carefully by the justice of the peace, who is presumable a man of some intelligence and
education, were entirely sufficient to dispel any doubt as to the true character of these men. The testimony of the justice of the
peace himself would seem to indicate that he was able to understand the contents of these documents; and even if the fact that they
were prepared in English rendered them unintelligible to him, he could easily have verified the nature of their contents with the aid
of one or other of the local officials or of some other person in the municipality who could read English. As a matter of fact, the
municipal treasurer on the following morning secured the prompt discharge of the prisoners by furnishing information as to their
status and employment. The justice of the peace made no effort whatever to verify the grounds upon which the police officers based
their arrest, but arbitrarily and without investigation, without taking any evidence or making any effort to verify the claims of the
arrested persons, issued his judicial order for their detention, and we are satisfied that in doing so he acted without reasonable
grounds upon which to base his action. If the police officers were to make the arrests at all, it was necessary for them to act promptly
upon such information as they had in hand; but there was no such urgent necessity upon the part of the justice of the peace to order
the continued detention of the arrested persons without making some investigation. Indeed, he seems to have acted without the
slightest regard to his obligations as a judicial officer or to the rights of the arrested persons to be set at liberty in the absence of
reasonable grounds for their detention. No reason suggests itself why, at the hour at which they were brought before him, he could
not have at least made some effort to verify the truth of their claims.
There is no ground for the belief that in acting as he did, the justice of the peace was actuated by any special malice or illwill toward
the prisoners, and the only explanation of his conduct is that he was willfully negligent of their rights, and willing arbitrarily to detain
them rather than to take any trouble to verify their claims.
We think the judgment of conviction of the trial court should be affirmed, but we think that the fine, imposed by the trial court in its
maximum degree, should be reduced from the sum of 3,250 pesetas to 325 pesetas.
The judgment of conviction, together with the sentences imposed by the trial court in the cases of the appellants Maximo Cuadro
and Isaac Demo, is hereby reversed, and these appellants are hereby acquitted of the crime with which they are charged, and, if in
detention, will be set at liberty forthwith; if at liberty under bail, their bond is hereby exonerated.
The judgment of conviction of the appellant Jose Batallones is affirmed, but the sentence imposed upon him should be, and is hereby
modified by substituting for the fine imposed by the trial court, a fine of 325 pesetas, with imprisonment in accordance with law, in
the event of insolvency and failure to pay the fine. One-third of the costs of these proceedings in the trial court will be taxed to this
defendant. All other costs are hereby declared de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
||| (U.S. v. Batallones, G.R. No. 7284, [August 23, 1912], 23 PHIL 46-54)
 8

[G.R. No. 6909. February 20, 1912.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HACHAW, defendant-appellant.

Ellsworth E. Zook, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. POLICE; INSUFFICIENT REASON FOR MAKING ARREST. — The arrest in this case was made for the reason that, as the officer put it:
"I wanted to see if he had committed a crime." This is not a legal reason for making an arrest.
2. OPIUM LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF OPIUM; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. — Facts examined and held not sufficient to sustain
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of opium.

DECISION
MORELAND, J p:
The defendant in this case was convicted of the crime of having opium in his possession without authority of law His appeal is based
solely upon the proposition that the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction.
The conviction is based upon the evidence of three witnesses of the prosecution, namely, Jose Mendoza, Alejo Hilario, and Antonio
Aquino. They assert in substance that while they were on a certain street in the town of Cavite they noticed the accused, a Chinaman,
who was passing along the street, acting very suspiciously. They called to him to stop, but, instead of doing so, he started to run.
They thereupon pursued and overtook him and compelled him to go with them to the presidencia. Arriving there they compelled
him to take everything out of his pockets. Among the things brought forth was, they claim, a small quantity of opium done up in
paper.
The accused denies absolutely the story told by these witnesses. He asserts that he never used opium in any way; that he did not
deal in the drug; that at the time of his arrest he had no opium in his possession; that the opium, if any, found on him in the presidencia
was placed in his pocket by the witnesses above named and then taken therefrom on the search. In support of this story he presented
the testimony of three persons, members of the Constabulary, one a sergeant, another a corporal, and the third a private. They were
at the time dressed in civilian clothes and were engaged under the orders of their officers in making a quiet search for criminals in
that locality. They assert that while standing upon the street on which the accused was arrested Jose Mendoza came to them and
asked them if they did not want to make some money; that they asked him in what way he. proposed that the money should be
made; that he replied that he had some opium and that they should take it and put it in the pocket of some Chinaman, where upon
he would arrest the Chinaman; that in all probability the Chinaman would thereupon try to bribe them and then would come their
opportunity to make the money; that he showed them the opium and the paper in which it was wrapped. These witnesses further
assert that after they had rejected the proposition Mendoza took the opium and put it in his pocket. They stood there together for a
short time afterwards, when they saw a policeman, Alejo Hilario, coming down the street. Mendoza ordered Hilario to arrest the
accused, alleging as a reason therefor that he might show some "forbidden thing" in his possession. When the accused came along
Mendoza ordered Hilario to stop him, which he did. Thereupon Mendoza approached the accused, took from his pocket the opium
he had previously shown the witnesses and surreptitiously inserted it in the pocket of the accused. These witnesses testified that
they followed Mendoza and his companions when they took the accused to the presidencia. They saw the accused when he was
searched and saw the opium when it was produced at that time. They declared unhesitatingly that the opium was the same that had
been shown them by Mendoza and was wrapped in the Identical paper in which it was then inclosed. While the witnesses for the
prosecution assert that the Chinaman thereupon offered them three 20-peso bills if they would let him go and say nothing about his
possession of the opium, the Constabulary soldiers testified that no such thing happened.
Mendoza does not deny that he was on the street at the place and time alleged by the Constabulary soldiers and admits that they
were also present at the presidencia when the Chinaman was searched. He does not directly deny the story told by the Constabulary
soldiers. The denial results by inference from the contradictory stories told by the two sets of witnesses.
The trial court based its rejection of the testimony of the Constabulary soldiers upon the ground that it was unreasonable that
Mendoza should have tried to induce them to enter into a conspiracy to defraud the Chinaman, asserting that if Mendoza had thought
of doing any such thing he would have kept it to himself instead of inviting others to participate with him. This is correct without
doubt to a certain extent, but we do not regard it as controlling. If Mendoza had carried out the scheme according to the theory of
the trial court, while he would not have exposed himself to the mercy of the Constabulary soldiers, he would, nevertheless, have
been met with the proposition on the trial that he had placed the opium in the pocket of the accused, and he would have had his
testimony alone against the testimony of the Chinaman; whereas, if he had succeeded in inducing the Constabulary soldiers to enter
the conspiracy with him, his testimony against the Chinaman would have been supported by that of three other persons. From the
record, we regard the story told by the Constabulary soldiers fully as reasonable as that told by Mendoza.
Mendoza presents as the only reason why he ordered the arrest of the Chinaman that he was acting suspiciously. He did not say in
what way he was acting suspiciously or what was the particular act or circumstance which aroused his curiosity. He said in that
connection:
 9

"I told Alejo Hilario I had suspicions of the Chinaman. I had suspicions that he had some prohibited thing which he carried on his
person."
When asked to tell what prohibited thing he suspected, he said:
"There are many things which are prohibited which might be used to assault a person with, or a pointed instrument which might be
used to strike with or with which a crime might be done against the government or robbery in some house, or opium on his person."
In another place he said:
"I just said to Alejo Hilario that I had suspicions of this Chinaman, without saying what my suspicions were."
Further on he said:
"Yes, I followed along behind Hilario and the accused to the police station. I wanted to see if he had committed a crime . . ."
This testimony of the witness does not present any clear reason why he arrested the Chinaman. He arrested him because, as he said,
"I wanted to see if he had committed a crime." Among free men and under constitutional and statutory guaranties of personal liberty,
this furnishes no reason whatever why a person should be arrested.
We believe that the testimony of these three witnesses for the defendant, given as it is by persons whose reputation is apparently
good and whose allegations have not been discredited in any way, is strong evidence in the case and sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused. The trial court itself in no way impeached the credibility of those witnesses except to say that their
story was unreasonable. We do not believe it to be so unreasonable that it ought to be rejected entirely. We regard it as reasonable
as the story told by Mendoza and as likely to have been the true history of the occurrence as that given by the witnesses for the
prosecution.
For these reasons the judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant acquitted.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

||| (U.S. v. Hachaw, G.R. No. 6909, [February 20, 1912], 21 PHIL 514-517)
 10

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 9294. March 30, 1914.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EULOGIO SANCHEZ, defendant-appellant.

Leodegario Azarraga for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. POLICE; DUTY TO ARREST LAWBREAKERS. — One of the duties of the police is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the
disposal of the judicial or executive authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act constituting the violation or to
prosecute and secure the punishment thereof. One of the means conducing to these ends being the identification of the person of
the alleged criminal or lawbreaker, the duty that directly devolves upon the police to make the arrest or detentions for the purposes
of such investigation cannot be questioned.
2. ID.; ID.; ARBITRARY DETENTION. — The policeman who in compliance with the orders of his chief and, for the purpose of identifying
him arrests a person suspected of being the perpetrator of a crime which it is reasonable to believe has been committed, is not guilty
of the crime of arbitrary detention, because he has acted solely in the performance of his duty.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — It is not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact in order to regard such detention as legal.
"The legality of the detention does not depend upon the actual commission of the crime, but . . . upon the nature of the deed,
wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves
the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen." (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, January 27,
1885.)

DECISION
ARAULLO, J p:
Eulogio Sanchez was accused of the crime of illegal detention, provided for and punished in article 200 of the Penal Code, for having
detained one Benigno Aranzanso by keeping him in the municipal jail of the pueblo of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, for a period of less
than three days.
The Court of First Instance of said province sentenced the defendant as guilty of said crime to a fine of 1,000 pesetas and to the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, such imprisonment not to exceed six months. From this judgment the
defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant, being a municipal policeman of the town of Caloocan, did, at about 9 o'clock in the
morning of August 13, 1912, arrest Benigno Aranzanso in the cockpit of Maypajo of that town and take him to the town hall, where
he was detained until just before nightfall of the same day, when he was set at liberty by order of the president. But it also appears
from the same evidence: (1) That both the municipal president and the sergeant of police, who was acting as chief of police of the
town, had information that two nights previous a robbery had occurred in a boat on the Maypajo River in that jurisdiction, for the
boatman had presented himself to the said sergeant and indicated as one of the assailants of the boat an individual who was the son
of one Eto and who had been in a billiard room the same night; (2) that on the said night of the 12th of August the Constabulary had
been in Caloocan to investigate, in company with the policemen of the pueblo, a robbery that had occurred in a billiard room, and
the said sergeant had acquired the information that Benigno Aranzanso had been in that billiard room that night and that about five
minutes before he had left on the run; (3) that in view of this the sergeant of police directed not only the defendant Eulogio Sanchez
but also all the patrolmen under his orders to look for the said Benigno Aranzanso in order that he might be identified by the boatmen;
and (4) that by virtue of said order and because the description they had given him of the person who had been in the billiard room
fitted Aranzanso, the defendant Eulogio Sanchez proceeded to arrest him in the cockpit on the next morning, the 13th, and took him
to the town hall, as has already been stated, where he remained in confinement until before nightfall of the same day. He was not
identified because when the sergeant of police arrived at the station he had already been set at liberty. No warrant was previously
issued for his detention because the fact had not been reported to the justice of the peace and the 13th of August was a legal holiday.
The defendant, therefore, acted in compliance with orders of his chief, the sergeant of police, in asserting Benigno Aranzanso and
his detention was justified for the purpose of identifying his person, since, according to the sergeant himself, reasonable grounds
existed for believing in the existence of a crime and suspicion pointed to that individual.
It was not necessary that the fact of the robbery committed in the boat should have been established in order to regard such
detention as legal:
"The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but . . . upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such
characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for
the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen." (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, January 27, 1885.)
One of the duties of the police is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of the judicial or executive authorities
upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act constituting the violation or to prosecute and secure the punishment thereof.
 11

One of the means conducing to these ends being the identification of the person of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker, the duty that
directly devolves upon the police to make the arrests or detentions for the purposes of such investigation cannot be questioned.
The same supreme court has so declared in a decision of April 21, 1884, in a case wherein the person who had threatened another
was unknown and suspicion pointed to a man whom an officer of the law proceeded to arrest. The court said:
"The mere fact that an officer of the law compelled a person to appear before the chief of the department to establish or prove his
identity does not justify the classification of illegal detention. It was merely in the nature of an administrative measure, justified by
the suspicion that he may have made certain threats against another person."
It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the defendant Eulogio Sanchez did not commit the crime charged against him in the complaint,
and we therefore reverse the judgment appealed from and freely acquit him; with the costs of both instances de officio.
Arellano, C. J., Carson Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
||| (United States v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 9294, [March 30, 1914], 27 PHIL 442-445)
 12

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-2128. May 12, 1948.]
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN
CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile, for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro, for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; "JUDICIAL AUTHORITY"; MEANING AS USED IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE. — In view of the history of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing any 'public officer or employee who
shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the
period of six hours," the precept of the Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of the Rules of Court
regarding arrest and habeas corpus, the words "judicial authorities," as used in said article 125, mean the courts of justice or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with
having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law."
(Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CITY FISCAL NOT JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND CANNOT ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST OR OF
COMMITMENT. — The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include
the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATION BY CITY FISCAL NOT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PROPER. — The investigation
which the city fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in section 11 of Rule 108 to which
all persons charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere
investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the
proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or
secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the
preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendants charged with offenses
triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PROPER. — The only
executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence of both the
justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who
are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the accused.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINTS IN MANILA TO BE FILED WITH CITY FISCAL. — Under the law, a complaint charging a
person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of
First Instance of Manila, because the latter do not make or conduct preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be
made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigations, not for
the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the
accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest of the accused.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF OFFICER ARRESTING WITHOUT WARRANT. — When a person is arrested without
warrant in cases permitted by law, the officer or person making the arrest should without unnecessary delay take or surrender
the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction
to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the
case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the
peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with
the provisions of section 13, Rule 108. In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or
the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested
to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the corresponding investigation and file, if proper, the necessary information within
the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the
temporary detention of the accused.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING LIABILITY OF OFFICER DETAINING A
PERSON BEYOND LEGAL PERIOD. — For the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for
more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and
other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file
in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
8. ID.; ARREST; PEACE OFFICER WITHOUT POWER TO ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT EXCEPT IN AUTHORIZED CASES.
— A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any
other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a
complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. If the city fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest of a person charged with having committed
a public offense even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the
accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon
 13

complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged.
9. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; PROVISIONAL LAW FOR APPLICATION OF SPANISH PENAL CODE, STATUS OF. —
The provisions of the Provisional Law for the application of the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code in the Philippines by Royal
Decree of September 4, 1884, are in force in these Islands in so far as they have not been repealed or amended by implication
by the enactment of the body of laws put in force in these Islands since the change from Spanish to American sovereignty.
10. ID.; ID.; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWS IN FORCE ON. — According to the ruling in United States vs.
Fortaleza (12 Phil., 472), a person may be arrested without warrant in the cases specified in Rules 27 and 28 of said Provisional
Law and section 37 of Act No. 183 (Charter of Manila). The provisions of said Rules 27 and 28 are substantially the same as
those contained in section 6 Rule 109 of the Rules of Court which superseded them; and the provisions of section 37 of Act No.
183 above referred to have been incorporated in section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code. Both section 6 of Rule 109,
and the pertinent provisions of said section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code are now the laws in force on the subject.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; CITY OF MANILA AND PROVINCES. — Persons arrested or accused in
the City of Manila are not entitled to preliminary investigation. In provinces the justice of the peace or judge shall, according to
section 2 of Act No. 194, "Make the preliminary investigation of the charge as speedily as may be consistent with the right and
justice but in any event he must make the investigation within three days of the time the accused was brought before him,
unless the accused or complainant shall ask for delay in order that witnesses may be obtained, or for other good and sufficient
reason, in which event a continuance for a reasonable time may be allowed." This provision of section 2 of Act No. 194 is still
in force, because no law has been enacted amending or repealing it. (Marcos vs. Cruz [May 13, 1939], 1st Supp., 40 Off. Gaz.,
174, 182.) The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure do not undertake to dispose of all subjects of preliminary investigation,
and repeal all laws on the subject not incorporated therein; specially those that, like the said provisions of section 2, Act No.
194, confer substantive rights upon defendants which can not be diminished, increased or modified by the Rules of Court
(section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution).
12. ID.; JUDICIAL AUTHORITY; MEANING AS USED IN ARTICLE 125 OF REVISED PENAL CODE. — In view of the
provisions of section 17, Rule 109, Rule 31 of the Provisional Law, article 204 of the old Penal Code, from which article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code was taken, and section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution, there can be no doubt that the judicial
authority within the meaning of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code must be a judge who has authority to issue a written
warrant of commitment or release containing the ground on which it is based (auto motivado).
13. ID.; ID.; DELIVERY TO JUDICIAL AUTHORITY OF PERSON ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT. — The surrender or
delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without warrant by a peace officer, does not consist in a physical
delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding
court or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner, because
the arresting officer can not transfer to the judge and the latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF CITY FISCAL TO FILE INFORMATION WITHIN PRESCRIBED PERIOD; CONTINUED
DETENTION OF ARRESTED PERSON. — If the city fiscal does not file the information within the period of six hours prescribed
by law and the arresting officer continues holding the prisoner beyond the six-hour period, the fiscal will not be responsible for
violation of said article 125, because he is not the one who has arrested and illegally detained the person arrested, unless he
has ordered or induced the arresting officer to hold and not release the prisoner after the expiration of said period.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CITY FISCAL WITHOUT POWER TO ORDER DETENTION OF ARRESTED PERSON UNDER SECTION
2460 OF REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. — Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code which specifies the powers and
duties of the chief of police of Manila and authorizes the latter "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the
city court of any person arrested for violation of any city ordinance: Provided, however, That he shall not exercise this power in
cases of violation of any penal law except when the fiscal of the city shall so recommend and fix the bail to be required of the
person arrested," do not authorize, either expressly or by implication, the city fiscal to order the detention of the prisoner if
bond is not given, not only because they refer to the powers of the chief of police of Manila and not of the city fiscal, but
because the only incidental authority granted to the latter is to recommend the granting of the bail by the chief of police and
to fix the amount of bail to be required of the person arrested for violation of any penal law in order that the chief of police
may release the latter on bail.
16. ID.; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWS IN FORCE. — Section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code and
section 6 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court are the only provisions of law in force in these Islands which enumerate the cases in
which a peace officer may arrest a person without warrant, and the so called common law relating to other cases of arrest
without warrant has no application in this jurisdiction. "The right to make arrests without a warrant is usually regulated by
express statute, and except as authorized by such statutes, an arrest without a warrant is illegal." (5 C. J., pp. 395, 396.) And
statutory construction extending the right to make arrest without a warrant beyond the cases provided by law is derogatory of
the right of the people to personal liberty (4 Am. Jur., p. 17).
DECISION
FERIA, J p:
Upon complaint of one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery,
Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint
against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was
 14

heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts of justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a
quorum in Manila, and it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation and
decision. We have not until now an official information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint
filed by Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever might have been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we
have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and guidance in the
future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the petitioners are
being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of Manila ajudicial authority within the meaning of
the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our Constitution
guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion
that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with
judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense,
that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.).
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in
force in these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person
upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest."
There was no doubt that the judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after
a proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any
other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which complements said section 202, of the same
Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following
persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force,
shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of
the grounds upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by the mere
omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1(3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of
arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his witness. And the
judicial authority to whom a person arrested by a public officer must be surrendered can not be any other but a court or judge
who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of
the case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for more than six
hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, which, referring to the duty of an officer
after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and
within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action as
they may deem proper to take ;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his
delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be informed of the
substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or
evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of
the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him."
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of sections 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the
provisions of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed."
Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal
of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108;
Hashin vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Suppl., p. 13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz.,
1214). The investigation which the city fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in
section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all persons charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in
 15

provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding
information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the
investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by
law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious
prosecution, since defendants charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper
preliminary investigation.

The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary
absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the
municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the accused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in
connection with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct
under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila
is not filed with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make
or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who,
personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused,
but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants,
and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted by law, the officer or person making the arrest
should, as above stated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the
offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction, and
then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance,
the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the
latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time
prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary
detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially
impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such
cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person arrested or file the
corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense
charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and
not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or
continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain or
secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person
for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and
other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file
in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to
authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any
process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for
filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days
or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party
or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to
file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other
political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest of a person charged with having
committed a public offense even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged
with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes
convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who
intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a
clear cut ruling on the matter, in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners
within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being
actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are
being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a
process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.
Paras, Actg. C. J., Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
 16

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
In my dissent from the decision of this Court I contented myself with citing my dissenting opinion in Lino vs. Fugoso,
L-1197, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214, 1246, as grounds for my disagreement. As the present decision has gone farther than that decision
and contains new statements and conclusions, I deem it convenient to enlarge on my dissent.
The term "judicial officers" has been defined to be, in its popular sense, officers of a court (Hitt vs. State, Miss. 181,
So. 331) and in its strict sense, "judges and justices of all courts and all persons exercising judicial powers by virtue of their
office." (Settle vs. Van Evrea, 49 N. Y., 280.) The city fiscal is a judicial officer in both senses. In the popular or larger sense, he
is a judicial officer because he is a part of the legal machinery created for the administration of justice. A prosecuting attorney,
charged with the administration of justice and invested with important discretionary power in a motion for a nolle prosequi, is
a judicial officer. (State ex rel. Freed vs. Circuit Court of Martin County, Ind., 14 N. E. 2d 910; State vs. Ellis, 112 N. E., 98, 100;
184 Ind., 307.)
In the strict legal sense, the city fiscal is a judicial officer when making preliminary examination because he performs
the function of a justice of the peace — assuming, as the majority seem to assume, that the conduct of preliminary
examination is a judicial function. By express provision of section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, the city fiscal "shall
cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the necessary
information or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused." In addition, section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of
Court states that "every justice of the peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation of all offenses alleged to have been committed within his municipality or city, cognizable by the Court of First
Instance."
The city fiscal is not any the less a judicial officer simply because he can not issue warrant of arrest. The power to
issue warrant of arrest is not an essential ingredient of a judicial office. This is specially so when, as in cases like the present,
the accused is already under arrest when the city fiscal intervenes and there is no need of issuing an order of arrest. As to
power to commit a detained person to prison, if that be necessary, the majority are not exactly right when they affirm that the
city fiscal is not clothed with it. I shall come to this later.
However that may be, the city fiscal is a "judicial authority" within the contemplation of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is the inevitable result from the fact that in the City of Manila, the city fiscal under the existing scheme of
government is the only officer to whom the person arrested without warrant may be presented. The majority opinion admits
that the municipal court and the Court of First Instance of Manila "do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper,"
and criminal complaints are not filed with them but with the city fiscal. Reasoning from another angle, we reach the same
conclusion. We are to presume that in using the generic term "judicial authorities" — and in plural — instead of the more
specific word "justice," "judge," or "court", the lawmaker intended to include in the operation of the article under
consideration all officers who are named to receive the prisoner from the arresting officer. We have to adopt this construction
if we are to give effect to the law and the rule of court I have cited, and if we are to avoid what I might call, without meaning
offense, an absurdity.
Under no canon of statutory construction is there justification for this Court's opinion that the police and the city
fiscal have to share the six hours fixed in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The language, the nature and the object of this
provision unerringly point to the theory that the six hours mentioned in the Revised Penal Code are meant exclusively for the
police officer who made the arrest. I can discern absolutely no indication of any intention to have the city fiscal squeeze in his
action within this brief period, a period which, in many cases, is not even sufficient for the police. Read separately or in
conjunction with the entire criminal procedure, article 125 does not furnish the slightest indication of legislative intent to
place the city fiscal and the police under the same category. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was devised for one
purpose; section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court for another. Article
125 is a penal provision designed to prevent and punish police abuses for which the police are noted. The investigation by the
city fiscal is strictly and essentially procedural. It is an integral part of the procedure for bringing the case to trial.
Little reflection will disclose the disastrous consequences which this Court's interpretation of article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will bring to law enforcement. It nullifies the role of the fiscal in the administration of criminal law. For
sheer lack of time, the release of the prisoner arrested without warrant will, in a great number of cases, be inevitable, unless
the city fiscal files charges without sufficient and adequate investigation. The alternative will be for the city fiscal to be on a
24-hour watch lest in his sleep the time for him to act might slip by.

But this is only a poor alternative. Regardless of any vigilance on his part the opportunity for the city fiscal to make
the required investigation cannot always be assured. The law gives the police absolute power to detain a prisoner for six hours
without incurring penal liability. There is no law which obliges the police to take the prisoner to the city fiscal before the
expiration of six hours from the time of arrest. There can be cases where the entire six hours might be consumed by the police
in their investigation alone, or just in the chasing, collection and transportation to the police station of law breakers. This can
happen in tumultuous and other mob offenses in which many people are involved and there is necessity of screening the
guilty ones.
Supposing then that the police should deliver the prisoner or prisoners to the city fiscal at the last minute of the six
hours through negligence or by force of circumstances, what time is there for this functionary to comply with his duty? And
even if the city fiscal be given the chance to start his assigned task at the beginning of the six hour period, can this time insure
 17

proper and just investigation in complicated cases and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous and witnesses are
not on hand to testify? It is well to remember that the police are not authorized to round up witnesses and take them along
with the prisoners to the city fiscal.
In the light of these consequences I can not imagine that the meaning which this Court attaches to article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code so much as entered the thought of the legislature. No sound-minded legislature could have intended to
create such a situation, which is easy to perceive unless we assume that the legislative purpose was to tie up the hands of the
law and give lawlessness full sway; unless the legislature wanted to coddle and pamper lawless elements to a calamitous
extreme. When the Court says that the prisoner, after being released at the end of six hours from the time of his arrest may be
rearrested should the city fiscal find sufficient evidence and prefer charges against him, it takes for granted that underworld
characters and hardened criminals are honorable men who would keep themselves ready and handy for a second arrest.
The Court says:
"To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that
permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal may not,
after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and
release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a
court or judge."
What is that "proper process" referred to in the above-quoted portion of the decision? Whatever is meant by
"proper process," we should note that there is no fundamental difference between the proceeding before a justice of the
peace and the procedure followed by the city fiscal. There is nothing important the justice of the peace may do in the interest
of the accused in the cases triable before the Court of First Instance which the city fiscal may not do. If the city fiscal can not
issue an order of arrest, the justice of the peace himself does not do so to give the detention the stamp of legality. At least, I
am aware of no law which tells him to take this step, and I can see no material advantage which an accused could derive from
this ceremony. All the justice of the peace does which matters to the accused is admit him to bail, if the crime be bailable, and
proceed to an investigation.
But the city fiscal does just that; and if it be necessary to order the commitment of the prisoner pending
ascertainment of his guilt, the city fiscal no less than the justice of the peace or judge of first instance has that authority also,
as I propose to show later. In actual practice, a person arrested without warrant in a regular municipality frequently suffers
greater injustice and is subject to, and frequently goes through, greater hardships than his counterpart in the City of Manila.
We are witness to the common spectacle of cases being dismissed on motion of the provincial fiscal for want of sufficient
evidence after the prisoner had been bound by the justice of the peace over to the Court of First Instance for trial and after he
had languished in jail for months or years. Prisoner's detention in that case is not considered illegal.
This anomaly seldom takes place in cities where the preliminary investigation is entrusted to the city fiscal. Rarely in
the City of Manila is a case dropped for insufficiency of evidence after it has been determined in a preliminary investigation
that the prisoner should be held for trial. On the whole, the method by which the preliminary investigation is conducted by the
prosecuting attorney is more conducive to efficiency, minimizes or eliminates conflicts of opinion in the existence of probable
cause, and better insures prompt dispatch of criminal cases to the lasting benefit of the prisoner. Only physical impossibility,
as I understand it, is in the way for the adoption of this method throughout the country.
It is a mistake, in my humble judgment, to confuse a prisoner's detention during the six-hour period fixed in article
125 of the Revised Penal Code and his continued detention after he is turned over to the city fiscal. As I have said, article 125
regulates the time within which a police officer may hold the prisoner under his responsibility, and it applies to the police
alone. It will hardly be contended that this article, or any other law, or the constitution limits the period within which a
prisoner may be detained after he is delivered to the justice of the peace. If that is so, and since the city fiscal acts in lieu of a
justice of the peace, there is no sound basis, legal or practical, for denying to the former the same time and the same freedom
of action that is enjoyed by the latter.
By the same token, there is no sound reason for denying to the proceeding by the city fiscal the same attributes
which adhere to the proceeding before the justice of the peace. After the arresting officer produced the prisoner before the
city fiscal, the law takes its course in the same manner that it does when the examining officer is the justice of the peace or
judge of first instance. From that time the arresting officer ceases to have any control over the prisoner save to keep him in
custody subject to the orders of the city fiscal. The police step out and the law steps in and extends to the prisoner the mantle
of protection against inquisitory examination by the police. From that time on he enjoys the rights granted by law to all
accused persons — the right to give bail and the right to testify freely uninfluenced by any fear of violence or other forms of
maltreatment. The danger envisioned by article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is past.
The proceeding before the city fiscal does not lose its character of due process of law by its being conducted by the
city fiscal instead of a judge. For one thing, preliminary investigation is not a trial. It is not a constitutional right. It is purely a
matter of statutory regulation. (Potenciana Dequito vs. Hugo O. Arellano et al., G. R. No. L-1336; 32 C. J. S., 456.) A judicial
proceeding which lies within the power of the legislature to provide or withhold without infringing the fundamental law may
be placed in the hands of any officer other than a judge.
The jurisdiction to make a preliminary examination or investigation is not even considered judicial. Judges who
perform this function do not do so as judicial officers. Municipal executives here and in the United States are conferred this
power. "The power to examine and to commit persons charged with crime is not judicial, but is one of the duties of the
 18

conservators of the peace, and it may be, and usually is, vested in persons other than courts, as, for instance, justices of the
peace or police magistrates, or persons exercising jurisdiction analogous to that exercised by justices of the peace, or who are
ex officio justices of the peace, such as mayors, notaries public, or court commissioners, Power to hold preliminary
examinations may be exercised by United States commissioners, and United States district judges who, while making the
preliminary examination, exercise the powers of commissioners only." (16 C. J., 319-320.)
There is no basis for the fear that "the city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks
without any process issued by a court or judge." This statement overlooks the consistent and general practice heretofore
followed with clear, express statutory sanction. Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes the chief of police
of the City of Manila "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of any person arrested for
violation of any city ordinance," while in cases of violation of any penal law, according to the same article, the fiscal of the city
may, and does, recommend and fix the bail to be required of the person arrested. Power to fix bail necessarily implies power
to recommend or order the detention of the prisoner if bond is not given. This in its working is no more nor less than the
power to commit an accused to prison pending investigation of this case, power which the majority erroneously say is not
possessed by the city fiscal.
The constitutional and statutory provisions and rules cited by the majority are of general application which are good
only in the absence of specific enactments. The controlling provisions in the case at bar are sections 2460 and 2465 of the
Revised Administrative Code and section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court.

The decision further says:

"A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of
the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the
complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the city fiscal has no authority,
and he has not, to order the arrest of a person charged with having committed a public offense even he finds,
after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty
thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes
convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged."
I do not think the foregoing paragraph is relevant to the instant case. We are not dealing with the authority of a
police officer to make arrest without warrant. There is no question raised against the legality of the petitioners' arrest. Our
problem concerns the time in which the city fiscal may make his investigation and the scope of his power.
Assuming the above-quoted statement to be pertinent to the issues, the same can not, in my humble view, pass
unchallenged. Under certain, well-defined circumstances, an officer may and constantly does make arrests without a court
order, with or without complaint. An officer in good faith may arrest without warrant when he believes that a person is guilty
of a crime, and his belief rests on such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, under the
circumstances, to believe likewise. (6 C. J. S., 596.) This practice is not derived from any express authority but on the necessity
of catching law violators before they disappear and hide. I have not come across any law naming specific offenses for
committing which the offenders shall be arrested without court orders.
It is also a general principle of law that an officer need not necessarily have personal knowledge of the facts
constituting the offense, in the sense of having seen or witnessed the offense himself, but he may, if there are no
circumstances known to him which materially impeach his information, acquire his knowledge from information imparted to
him by reliable and credible third persons, or by information together with other suspicious circumstances. (Id., pp. 599, 600.)
This principle ought to serve as a qualification to the ruling laid down by this Court, that "a peace officer has no power to
arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person." Under the rule I have quoted, a
police officer certainly may arrest a person pointed to him as having committed a crime provided that the information or
complaint comes from a reliable source and under circumstances as to make an ordinarily reasonable man to believe it to be
well-founded. When the victim of a robbery or aggression, for example, should subsequently spot the criminal and request an
officer to arrest him, the officer would not have to seek or wait for a warrant of arrest before detaining the man, provided
again that there was good ground to believe the truth of the accusation.
This is a common law rule implanted in the Philippines along with its present form of government, a rule which has
been cited and applied by this Court in a number of cases. (U. S. vs. Santos, 35 Phil., 853; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U.
S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516.)
SUPPLEMENTARY
TUASON, J., dissenting:
When I filed my dissent from the decision of the Court on the occasion of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, it was my understanding that there was going to be only a minute resolution. I make this remark not as a
complaint but as my explanation for writing my dissent in advance of the reasoned resolution. Even then I would contend
myself with resting my dissent on what I have already stated did not the resolution contain new propositions to be answered
and disclose misunderstanding of some of my statements to be cleared. As this is in the nature of reply, topics will be treated
without regard to continuity of thought.
 19

The resolution says that article 30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code in the Philippines has
been repealed by section 17 of Rule 109, but that section 31 is still in force except the last sentence. And so, according to the
resolution, is section 2 of Act No. 194.
Without discussing the materiality of those laws, I disagree that they are still in effect. Like article 30, article 31 of
the Provisional Law and section 2 of Act No. 194 deal with procedure in justice of the peace courts in general covered by the
new Rules of Court. The Rules of Court, in the words of their introductory section, concern "pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts of the Philippines, and the admission to practice law therein." These Rules are a complete revision and a complete
re-enactment of the entire field of procedure, and there is every reason to believe that they were intended to replace, with
some exceptions, all previous laws on the subject, especially Spanish laws which had long been out of harmony with the new
mode of pleading and practice. If the last sentence of article 31 is repealed, as the resolution says, I see no valid ground for not
holding the other parts of that article repealed also. "Where a later act covers the whole subject of earlier acts, embraces new
provisions, and plainly shows that it was intended, not only a substitute for the earlier acts, but to cover the whole subject
then considered by the legislature, and to prescribe the only rules in respect thereto, it operates as a repeal of all former
statutes relating to such subject matter. The rule applies not only where the former acts are inconsistent or in conflict with the
new act, but also even where the former acts are not necessarily repugnant in express terms, or in all respects, to the new
act." (59 C. J., 919-920.) "While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later act is not favored, yet 'if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier act and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of
the earlier'." Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U. S., 497; 80 Law ed., 351.)
As the Rules of Court took effect on July 1, 1940, the case of Marcos vs. Cruz, decided on May 30, 1939, and cited in
the resolution, is no authority for the opinion that no law has been enacted amending or repealing section 2 of Act No. 192.
But this rule of implied repeal holds good only as regards laws of general application. Another well known rule of
statutory construction tells us that preliminary investigations in Manila and other chartered cities are to be excluded from the
operation of the Rules of Court. Such investigations are provided for by special enactments which, because of their special
nature and limited application, must be excepted from and prevail over the general provisions. "When the provisions of a
general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of a previously enacted special law, applicable in a
particular locality only, the passage of such general law does not operate to repeal the special law, either in whole or in part,
unless such repeal is provided for by express words, or arises by necessary implication. An intention to repeal local acts
generally is not inferable from the fact that the general act specifically excludes one locality from its operation." (59 C. J., 934.)
There is no apparent intention in the Rules of Court to repeal the laws under which preliminary investigations in Manila have
to be conducted by the city fiscal. The contrary intention is evidenced by section 2 of Rule 108, which provides that "Every
justice of the peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses
alleged to have been committed within his municipality or city, cognizable by the Court of First Instance," (Espiritu vs. De la
Rosa [July 31, 1947], L-1156, 45 Off. Gaz., 196; Hashim vs. Boncan [Nov. 22, 1941], 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp., p. 13.) In the first
of these cases, Mr. Justice Padilla, speaking for the Court, categorically held that the "Rules of Court had not repealed and
supplanted the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code regarding the power and authority of the City Fiscal to conduct
preliminary investigation." And in Hashim vs. Boncan, the Court, through Mr. Justice Laurel, said:
"The framers of the Rules could not have intended to brush aside these lessons of experience and
to tear down an institution recognized by law and decision and sanctioned by years of settled practice. They
could not have failed to keep intact an effective machinery in the administration of criminal justice, as
expeditious and simple as any reform they have infused into the new Rules."
The term "proper court or judge" in section 17, Rule 109, of the Rules of Court 1 should be interpreted to mean, in
the case of Manila, city fiscal, under the last mentioned canon of interpretation. In Manila, the city fiscal performs the duties
devolving on justices of the peace in regular municipalities in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and all criminal
charges by the police and offended parties are filed with him. And it is admitted that prisoners arrested without warrant in
Manila may be taken only to the city fiscal by the arresting officer. Let it be noted also in this connection that section 17 of
Rule 109 regulates the taking of persons arrested to the court or judge, not the filing of complaint.
In view of these circumstances; in view of the fact that neither the judges of first instance nor the municipal judges
of Manila are authorized to conduct preliminary hearings other than for the purpose of determining the amount of bail
(section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code), the result of applying section 17 of Rule 109 to Manila would be virtually to
eliminate preliminary investigation in this city of persons arrested without a warrant. The decision creates a vacuum, a
situation which this Court on another occasion refused to countenance in the forceful language above quoted in Hashim vs.
Boncan et. al. There, the Court continued:

"To sustain the theory of repeal is to wipe out these advantages. Not only this. If neither section 11
nor section 13 of Rule 108 is applicable to the preliminary investigation conducted by the City Fiscal, as we
have above shown, and if existing legislation thereon is to be deemed repealed, then the matter would be
left uncovered by rule or law. There would thus be a void crying for urgent reform. There would be no such
void if the old and tried procedure is kept in being, untouched by the new Rules. Withal, our own knowledge
of the history of this portion of the Rules here involved does not warrant an interpretation not contemplated
when we drafted and deliberated upon these Rules. And while, perhaps, the language could have been
clearer and the arrangement made more logical, consideration of expediency and the avowed purpose of
preliminary investigation point to the already trodden path hereinabove indicated."
 20

The resolution has interpreted article 125 of the Revised Penal Code with meticulous adherence, at best, to its letter,
and in open disregard, at worst, of its spirit and of the pernicious results that follow from such interpretation. The construction
which the majority give to the term "judicial authority" makes it impossible for the city fiscal to perform his assigned duties
with the consequence that, for lack of time, malefactors will have to be turned loose before proper investigation is conducted,
or prosecution filed on insufficient evidence, in many cases.
Nevertheless, I am not pleading, in this case, for a departure from the letter of the law. I merely submit that the city
fiscal, as was emphasized in my dissent from the decision, is a judicial officer or judicial authority both in the popular and the
legal sense of the term, and that it is unjust, unwarranted by any rule of interpretation, absolutely disastrous to the
administration of criminal law, to identify the city fiscal with the police, forcing him to file an information or release the
prisoner within the six hours intended for the arresting officer alone. I do not contend that the term "judicial authority" be
expanded beyond its literal and legal meaning, although if necessary this might be done to carry out the obvious purpose of
the law, but I take exception to the unjustified restriction and limitation placed on the meaning of "judicial authority" which
not only does violence to the letter and spirit of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code but leads to an extremely anomalous,
not to say impossible, situation. We do not have to look outside for the meaning of "judicial authority," as a simple reading of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code yields the clear intent of the
legislature. This intent, as manifested in laws that have been amended by section 2465 and section 2474 of the Revised
Administrative Code, crystallized in a system and a practice that have received "the imprint of judicial approval" in various
decisions of this Court. (U. S. vs. McGoven, 6 Phil. 261; U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 122; U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122;
U. S. vs. Carlos, 21 Phil. 553; Hashim vs. Boncan, ante; Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, ante.)
The resolution, as a solution to the quandary in which it places the city fiscal, would have him go to Congress. But, as
I trust I have shown, the laws on the subject need no supplementation and implementation. They have no gaps to be filled or
ambiguities to be cleared. The loopholes exist only as a direct result of this Court's new ruling. Section 2474 of the Revised
Administrative Code and its predecessors have operated smoothly, without a hitch for nearly half a century. Not even when
the arresting officer had 24 hours to take arrested persons to a judicial authority was it ever imagined, much less asserted,
that the city fiscal had to borrow his time from the police.
The resolution in laying down the rule that the city fiscal has no power to issue warrant of arrest or "an order or
commitment of release by a written warrant containing the ground on which it is based," thinks it is necessary to advert, "in
justice to the city fiscal," that this official does not pretend to possess such authority, since it is only in the dissenting opinion,
it says, where the claim is made.
At the outset I deny that I attributed to the city fiscal power to issue warrant of arrest; and I did not say in an
unqualified manner that he has power to issue commitment. On the first point, what I said was an implicit acknowledgment of
the opposite. Let me quote from the second paragraph of page 2 of my dissenting opinion what I did say:
"The city fiscal is not any the less a judicial officer simply because he can not issue warrant of
arrest. The power to issue warrant of arrest is not an essential ingredient of a judicial office."
On the power to commit prisoners, the same paragraph of my opinion shows what I said.
"As to the power to commit a detained person to prison, if that be necessary, the majority are not
exactly right when they affirm that the city fiscal is not clothed with it. I shall come to this later."
And taking the matter up again on page 11, I said:
"Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes the chief of police of the City of
Manila 'to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of any person arrested for
violation of any city ordinance,' while in cases of violation of any penal law, according to the same article, the
fiscal of the city may, and does, recommend and fix the bail to be required of the person arrested. Power to
fix bail necessarily implies power to recommend or order the detention of the prisoner if bond is not given.
This in its working is no more nor less than the power to commit an accused to prison pending investigation
of his case, power which the majority erroneously say is not possessed by the city fiscal."
There is nothing in this statement any outright affirmation that the city fiscal has power to issue commitment
papers. There is, on the contrary, an implied admission that the power, as it is ordinarily exercised by a judge or court, does
not exist. I merely submitted as my personal opinion and interpretation of section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code,
regardless of what the city fiscal thinks, that it confers upon the latter official a power which, performed in conjunction with
the power of the chief of police, amounts in its practical operation to a power to commit a man to prison. And I said this in
answer to the sweeping assertion (which apparently was made in the decision in complete oblivion of section 2460, supra),
that to give the city fiscal unlimited time might result in injustice, since, the decision says,
"The city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or
prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or
weeks without any process issued by a court or judge."
I intended to emphasize by citing section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, that a prisoner could secure his
release, pending investigation of his case, in the same manner and with the same facilities that he could if the complaint or
information had been filed with a court. In citing and stating my interpretation of section 2460 of the Revised Administrative
Code, I wished to show what I considered an erroneous ruling that
 21

"If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense
charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he
should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code.
The majority come back with the assertion that the provisions of section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code 1
"do not authorize, either expressly or by implication, the city fiscal to order the detention of the
prisoner if bond is not given, not only because they refer to the powers of the chief of police of Manila and
not of the city fiscal, but because the only incidental authority granted to the latter is to recommend the
granting of the bail by the chief of police and to fix the amount of bail to be required of the person arrested
for violation of any penal law in order that the chief of police may release the latter on bail."
I disagree again. I do not believe that a provision is rendered nugatory by the mere fact that it is foreign to the
subject of the main provision or to the title or caption of the section, if otherwise the language is clear. The title or caption is
important only in determining the meaning of laws which are ambiguous and uncertain. The provision of section 2460 of the
Revised Administrative Code quoted in the resolution does not suffer from such infirmity.
In truth, the proviso in section 2460 is not alien to the enacting clause. The proviso relates to the chief of police,
conferring on him power of the same nature as does the enacting clause, with the only difference that, in cases of violations of
a municipal ordinance the chief of police acts independently, on his own responsibility, while in cases of violations of a penal
law, he acts with the advice of the city fiscal and the latter fixes the amount of bail. The intervention of the city fiscal was only
inserted, in my opinion, in view of the gravity of the latter class of cases.
As to the other reason given in the resolution why, it says, continued detention of a prisoner beyond six hours is not
authorized — namely, that the authority granted to the city fiscal to recommend the granting of bail by the chief of police and
to fix the amount of bail to be required of the person arrested, is only incidental — my comment is that, whether the power to
take bail or release prisoners belongs to the city fiscal or the chief of police, is inconsequential. To my mind, the important
point is that the accused, as the resolution admits, may be released on bond. From this power, irrespective of who possess it,
is implied the power to keep the prisoner under detention he does not file a bond.

When the resolution concludes that if no bond is given by the person arrested, "neither the chief of police, who is
only authorized to release on bail, has power to detain the person arrested for more than six hours; nor the city fiscal, who is
empowered to fix and recommend the bail to the chief of police has authority to release person arrested in violation of penal
law," I can not follow. In a nutshell, the majority's reasoning, as I understand it, is that the law authorizes the city fiscal to
recommend and fix the bail "in order that the chief of police may release the latter (prisoner) on bail," but that if the prisoner
does not put up a bond he has to be set at large just the same. The filing of bail is not a meaningless gesture which may be
taken advantage of by an accused at pleasure with the same effect. The privilege to put up a bond extended to an accused
must be the price or condition of his temporary release. The law does not have to say in so many words that if he does not put
a bond he would be kept in confinement in order that we may be warranted in reaching this result.
The resolution says that "the purpose of the law in empowering the chief of police of Manila to release the prisoner
if he puts up a bail, is to relieve the officer making the arrest from the necessity of taking the prisoner to the city fiscal, and the
latter from filing an information with the proper courts within the period of time prescribed by law."
I have reflected closely on the meaning of this statement to be sure that I did not misunderstand it. Unless I still fail
to grasp the idea, I think the statement is self-annulling and self-contradictory. The filing of bail can not relieve the arresting
officer from the necessity of taking the prisoner to the city fiscal for the simple reason that such bail, in cases of violations of
penal laws, can be filed only on recommendation of, and its amount can be fixed by, the city fiscal. In other words, the
prisoners necessarily has to be taken to the city fiscal before any bond can be executed. And it would be underestimating the
intelligence of an accused to expect him to file a bond within six hours from the time of his arrest if he is aware that, if at the
end of those hours the city fiscal had not preferred any charges against him and no order of commitment had been issued by
the proper judge, he (accused) had to be released. In the face of the latter theory, no prisoner would, even if he could, perfect
a bond within six hours knowing that if he did not, he would be a free man, at least temporarily, within what remains of six
hours, while if he did, the bond would enable the city fiscal to take his time to file a case against him in court.
The gravamen of the court's argument seems to be that a commitment by a court or judge is essential to validate
detention beyond the time specified in the Revised Penal Code. I do not share this opinion. Neither such commitment by a
judge nor a formal complaint is required by the constitution in order that a person may lawfully be kept in jail pending
investigation of his case. An opportunity to file a bond in a reasonable amount satisfies the constitutional demands. Nor does
the bail have to be fixed or granted by a court. Sheriffs and police officers have been authorized by statutory enactments in
other jurisdictions to take bail. At least one court has gone so far as to uphold, "independently of statute, a practice of long
standing on the part of the sheriff to take bail in criminal cases of prisoners committed for not filing bail, and release them
from confinement." (Dickinson vs. Kingsbury, 2 Day [Com., 1.] Now then, under section 2460 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the chief of police of Manila, as already shown, is allowed to take bail by himself in cases of violations of a municipal
ordinance and with the intervention of the city fiscal in other cases. Under this provision and this practice, a detention
prisoner arrested without warrant is not deprived of any privilege or benefit guaranteed by the constitution. The lack of a
formal complaint does not in the least prejudice him or deprive him of any benefit enjoyed by his counterparts in the
provinces. On its legal aspect, let it be observed that all the proceeding conducted by the city fiscal is a preliminary and
summary inquiry which is purely a matter of statutory regulation. Preliminary investigation by the prosecuting attorney when
 22

authorized by law is due process no less than one conducted by a judge. It may be suppressed entirely, and if it may be
suppressed, it may be entrusted to any officer, provided only the constitutional right to give bail is carefully safeguarded. As
this Court has said in Hashim vs. Boncan, supra, and U. S. vs. Ocampo, supra:
"The prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila is presumed to be as competent to conduct a
preliminary investigation as the average person designated by law to conduct a 'preliminary examination'
under the provisions of General Orders No. 58. He is a sworn officer of the court, and the law imposes upon
him the duty of making such investigations. For such purpose the legislature may designate whom it pleases
within the judicial department."
The resolution has taken pain to cite and explain in detail what it says are the laws on arrests in the Philippines, and
takes me to task for quoting from 6 Corpus Juris Secundum, 599-600 and citing the decisions of this Court. We are told in
effect that the excerpts from my dissenting opinion, quoted on page 16 of the resolution, are without any foundation because,
it is said,
"they are premised on the wrong assumption that, under the laws in force in our jurisdiction, a peace officer
need not have personal knowledge but may arrest a person without a warrant upon mere information from
other person."
The resolution assumes that those excerpts are predicated on what I call the common law rule, on Corpus Juris
Secundum, and on decisions of the Supreme Court.
I commend a reading of my dissenting opinion. It will be seen that I did not base on those laws, rules or decisions my
statements, "The entire six hours might be consumed by the police in their investigation alone;" "Even if the city fiscal be given
the chance to start his assigned task at the beginning of the six hour period, this time can not insure proper and just
investigation in complicated cases and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous and witnesses are not on hand to
testify," and "The police is not authorized to round up witnesses and take them along with the prisoner to the city fiscal." It
will be seen that far from using as my premise those laws, rules and decisions, which I said contain in brief outlines the powers
of police officers to make arrests, I said clearly on page 12 of my dissenting opinion:
"I do not think the foregoing paragraph is relevant to the instant case. We are not dealing with the
authority of the police officer to make arrest without warrant. There is no question raised against the legality
of the prisoner's arrest. Our problem concerns the time and period within which the city fiscal may make his
investigation, and the scope of his power."
It was the majority decision which brought the question of the authority of the police to make arrests into the
discussion. I only met the decision on its own territory though I regarded that territory as outside the legitimate circle of the
present dispute. I cited Corpus Juris Secundum and decisions of this Court, which I said are derived from common law, to
refute the statement,
"a fortiori, a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes
convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged."
I especially wanted to express my disagreement with the thesis in the decision that
"A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of
the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law."
It was my humble opinion that the rules I cited and the rules on which the decisions of this Court are predicated,
were general provisions of law applicable to varying and changed circumstances, and I wanted to deny the insinuation that
there were, or there might be, arrests without warrant "expressly authorized by law"; so I countered that "I have not come
across any law naming specific offenses for committing which the offenders shall be arrested without court orders." This is my
concept of express provisions authorizing arrests without a warrant.
Section 6 of Rule 109, section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the Provisional Law on the subject of
arrest, cited in the resolution in an attempt to show the error of my citations, can not be a source of comfort to the majority.
Rather, I should think, they reenforce my position, for I believe that the rules and decisions I cited and the rules and laws
called to our attention as the real thing, are in substantial agreement. My mistake was in not citing, myself, Rule 109, section
6, of the Rules of Court, section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the Provisional Law. I might have found and
cited them had I thought the matter worthy of more than a passing notice.
Now that the resolution has gone into this subject at length, I shall devote a few more lines to it at the peril of tiring
the reader on what I believe an impertinent topic.
My citation from Corpus Juris and my comment that "this is a common law rule implanted in the Philippines along
with its present form of government, a rule which has been cited and applied by this Court in a number of cases," has met with
derision. I am informed that my quotation is "not a general principle of law or common law rule implanted in the Philippines";
that "it is a summary of the ruling of several states courts based on statutory exceptions of the general rule."

I do not think I was wide off the mark when I said that the common law rule has been transplanted to this country
along with the present form of government and that the rules and decisions I have quoted spring from the common law. And
 23

the majority are not closer to the mark when they affirm that my quotation from Corpus Juris Secundum, and section 2463 of
the Revised Administrative Code are purely statutory creation.
There was common law before there were statutes. Common law in England and in the U. S. preceded statutes and
constitutions. Statutes and constitutions in matters of arrest came afterward, restating, affirming, clarifying, restricting or
modifying the common law.
"The English common law has been adopted as the basis of jurisprudence in all the states of the
Union with the exception of Louisiana 'where the civil law prevails in civil matters.' (11 Am. Jur., 157.) And
"in England, under the common law, sheriffs, justices of the peace, coroners, constables and
watchmen were entrusted with special powers as conservators of the peace, with authority to arrest felons
and persons reasonably suspected of being felons. Whenever a charge of felony was brought to their notice,
supported by reasonable grounds of suspicion, they were required to apprehend the offenders, or at least to
raise hue and cry, under penalty of being indicted for neglect of duty."
See the footnote on pp. 2512-2513, Vol. 2, of Jones Blackstone and the numerous cases therein cited. It is a footnote
appended to the statement of a common law principle which is of the same tenor as that just noted. Treatises on arrest not
infrequently start with a statement of the common law rule and speak of statutes and constitutions in the sense I have
mentioned. Moran's Commentaries on the Rules of Court mention the common law (Vol. 2, p. 577) in connection with the
power to make arrest without a warrant.
The doctrine taken from 5 C. J., 395-396-that "the right to make arrest without a warrant is usually regulated by
express statute, and, except as authorized by such statutes, an arrest without a warrant is illegal" — is not at war with the
proposition that the authority of peace officers to make arrest originated at common law and that constitutions and statutes
merely re-stated and defined that authority with greater precision, naming the officers who may make arrest, the grades of
offenses for, and the circumstances under, which arrest may be effected, etc. Arrests made by officers not designated or
under circumstances not coming within the terms of the statute or constitution are illegal.
Even then, broad constitutional or statutory inhibition against search and seizure of property or persons without a
warrant has exceptions, as can be inferred from the two sentences preceding the above sentence quoted in the resolution.
These exceptions are cases where the public security has demanded the search and seizure.
"Well established exceptions to this rule have been long recognized in cases of felony, and of
breaches of the peace committed in the presence of the party making the arrest." (5 C. J., 395.)
Arrests under such circumstances are authorized in spite of statutes and constitutions. The power to make such
arrest is deeply rooted in the unwritten or common law, which "includes those principles, usages and rules of action applicable
to the government and security of person and property which do not rest for their authority on any express or positive
declaration of the will of the legislature." Although acting at his peril, the powers to arrest on "probable cause of suspicion"
even by a private person are "principles of the common law, essential to the welfare of society, and not intended to be altered
or impaired by the Constitution." (Wakely vs. Hart, 6 Binn. [Pa.,], 316,)
I have remarked that there is no fundamental difference between my citations, on the one hand, and section 6 of
Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, cited by the majority of the Court, on the other hand. There is
only a difference in phraseology. The very case of U. S. vs. Fortaleza relied upon in the resolution speaks of barrio lieutenants'
power to make arrest as not inferior to that usually conferred on peace officers known to American and English law as
constables.
The resolution quotes this from 5 C. J., 404:
"It is a general rule, although there are statutory exceptions and variations, that a peace officer has
no right to make an arrest without a warrant upon mere information of a third person."
This is only a part of the sentence. The omitted portion is more important from my point of view and contradicts the
point stressed by the majority. The complete sentence is
"It is a general rule, although there are exceptions and variations, that a peace officer has no right
to make an arrest without a warrant, upon mere information of a third person or mere information of a third
person or mere suspicion that a misdemeanor has been committed, that right being limited to arrests for
offenses of the grade of felony, as elsewhere shown."
It will be noticed that the quoted portion relates to arrest for misdemeanor. For further proof, I invite attention to
the title of the Section on page 401, paragraph (a), which reads: "For Misdeameanor — aa. In General." Let it be noted that
the power to arrest for misdemeanor is different from, and more restricted than, the power to arrest for felony, as is further
demonstrated by the last clause of the full sentence above quoted. This clause refers us back to section 30, p. 399, which says:
"At common law, (here again common law is mentioned), and subject to the provisions of any applicatory statute, a
peace officer may arrest, without a warrant, one whom he has reasonable or probable grounds to suspect of having
committed a felony, even though the person suspected is innocent, and, generally, although no felony has in fact been
committed by any one, although, under some statutes, a felony must have been actually committed, in which case an officer
may arrest, without a warrant, any person he has reasonable cause for believing to be the person who committed it."
As is elsewhere stated, section 6 of Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, like the
authorities I have cited, do not limit the power of a police officer to make arrest to those cases where he saw with his own
 24

eyes or heard with his own ears the commission of an offense. Section 6 of Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised
Administrative Code are transcribed in full in the resolution, and I just suggest a careful reading thereof. Section 2463 of the
Revised Administrative Code empowers police officers
"to pursue and arrest, without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any crime
or breach of the peace,"
and section 6 of Rule 109 authorizes a peace officer or a private person to make arrest when
"an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed it"
Rule 28 of the Provisional Law itself empowers judicial and administrative authorities "to detain, or cause to be
detained person whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense" or "when the authority or agent
has reason to believe that unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed."
To make arrest on suspicion or on information is not new; it is an everyday practice absolutely necessary in the
interest of public security and firmly enshrined in the jurisprudence of all civilized societies. The power to arrest on suspicion
or on reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed is authority to arrest on information. Information coming
from reliable sources may be, and it often is, the basis of reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed or of
reasonable ground of suspicion that a person is guilty thereof. Suspicion, reasonable ground and information are intertwined
within the same concept.
"The necessary elements of the grounds of suspicion are that the officer acts upon the belief of the
person's guilt, based either upon facts or circumstances within the officers own knowledge, or upon
information imparted by a reliable and credible third person provided there are no circumstances known to
the officer sufficient to materially impeach the information received. It is not every idle and unreasonable
charge which will justify an arrest. An arrest without a warrant is illegal when it is made upon mere suspicion
or belief, unsupported by facts, circumstances, or credible information calculated to produce such suspicion
or belief."
Failure to take these principles into account has led to the belief that:
"The investigation which the city fiscal has to make before filing the corresponding information in
cases of persons arrested without a warrant, does not require so much time as that made upon a complaint
of the offended parties for the purpose of securing a warrant of arrest of the accused. In all cases above
enumerated in which the law authorizes a peace officer to arrest without warrant, the officer making the
arrest must have personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
about to commit an offense in his presence or within his view, or of the time, place or circumstances which
reasonably tend to show that such person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the
peace. And the testimony of such officer on the commission of the offense in his presence or within his view
by the person arrested, or on the facts and circumstances that tend reasonably to show that said person has
committed or is about to commit an offense, would be sufficient evidence or basis for the city fiscal to file an
information without prejudice to his presenting of other evidence or witnesses, if any, during the trial to
insure the conviction of the defendant." (Pp. 16-17 of the Resolution.)

Section 6 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, as well as the
authorities I have quoted, show the fallacy of the idea that the arresting officer knows, or should know, all the facts about the
offense for the perpetration, or supposed perpetration, of which he has made the arrest. The resolution fails to realize that in
the great majority of cases an officer makes arrest on information or suspicion; that "suspicion implies a belief or opinion as to
the guilt based upon facts or circumstances which DO NOT AMOUNT TO PROOF;" and that information and suspicion by their
nature require verification and examination of the informers and other persons and circumstances. While an officer may not
act on unsubstantial appearances and unreasonable stories to justify an arrest without a warrant, obviously in the interest of
security, an officer, who has to act on the spot and cannot afford to lose time, has to make arrest without satisfying himself
beyond question that a crime has been committed or that the person suspected is guilty of such crime. A police officer can
seldom make arrest with personal knowledge of the offense and of the identity of the person arrested sufficient in itself to
convict. To require him to make an arrest only when the evidence he himself can furnish proves beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the accused, would "endanger the safety of society." It would cripple the forces of the law to the point of enabling
criminals, against whom there is only moral conviction or prima facie proof of guilt, to escape. Yet persons arrested on
suspicion, on insufficient evidence or information are not necessarily innocent so that the prosecuting attorney should release
them. Further and closer investigation not infrequently confirm the suspicion or information.
The majority of arrests are not as simple as a police officer catching a thief slipping his hand into another's pocket or
snatching someone else's bag, or surprising a merchant selling above the ceiling price, or seizing a person carrying concealed
weapons. Cases of frequent occurrence which confront the police and the prosecution in a populous and crime-ridden city are
a great deal more complicated. They are cases in which the needed evidence can only be supplied by witnesses, witnesses
whom the arresting officer or private persons has not the authority or the time to round up and take to the city fiscal for
examination within what remains, if any, of six hours.
Let me give two examples.
 25

1. A murder with robbery is reported to the police. An alarm is broadcasted giving a description of the murderer.
Later a police officer is told that the wanted man is in a store. He proceeds to the store and, besides believing in the good faith
of his informant, detects in the man's physical appearance some resemblance to the description given in the alarm. All this
occurs at the holy hours of night.
Should the officer refrain from making an arrest because he is not certain beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of
the suspected murderer? Should the city fiscal order the release of the prisoner because of insufficiency of evidence and
because the six hours are expiring or should he prefer formal charges (if that can be done at midnight) on the strength of
evidence which, as likely as not, may be due to a mistaken identity? Should not the prosecuting attorney be given, as the law
clearly intends, adequate time to summon those who witnessed the crime and who can tell whether the prisoner was the
fugitive?, allowing the prisoner to give bail, if he can.
2. A police officer is attracted by screams from a house where a robbery has been committed. The officer rushes to
the place, finds a man slain, is told that the murderers have fled. The officer runs in the direction indicated and finds men with
arms who, from appearances, seem to be the perpetrators of the crime. The people who saw the criminals run off are not sure
those are the men they saw. The night was dark, for criminals like to ply their trade under cover of darkness.
The officer does not, under these circumstances, have to seek an arrest warrant or wait for one before detaining the
suspected persons. To prevent their escape he brings them to the police station. On the other hand, would the fiscal be
justified in filing an information against such persons on the sole testimony of the police officer? Is it not his duty to wait for
more proofs on their probable connection with the crime? Should the city fiscal file an information on insufficient evidence, or
should he, as the only alternative, order the release of the prisoners? Does either course subserve the interest of justice and
the interest of the public? If the arrested persons are innocent, as they may be, is their interest best served by hasty filing of
information against them, or would they rather have a more thorough investigation of the case?
Cases like these with varying details can be multiplied ad infinitum. They form the bulk of underworld activities with
which the forces of law have to cope and with which the general public is vitally concerned. The public would not be secure in
their homes and in the pursuit of their occupations if this Court, through unreasoning worship of formalism, throws down a
method, practice and procedure that have been used here and elsewhere from time immemorial to the end of service and in
the interest of public security. The public is not much interested in such minor offenses as pick-pocketing, fist fights and
misdemeanors or violations of municipal ordinances for which arrests can be made by police officers only when committed in
their presence or within their hearing.
The decision of this Court leaves the city fiscal no alternative between releasing prisoners for insufficiency of
evidence due to lack of time to secure more, and filing information against persons who may be innocent of the crime
charged. The latter course, to which the city fiscal is driven to play safe, defeats directly the very aims of preliminary
investigation. The oft-repeated purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense, anxiety
of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. (Hashim vs. Boncan, No. 47777,
January 13, 1941; 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp. p. 13; U. S. vs. Mendez, 4 Phil.; 124; U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 11 Phil. 122; U.
S. vs. Marfori, 35 Phil. 666; People vs. Colon, 47 Phil. 443.) Even more deplorable would be the acquittal of guilty accused due
to lack of proofs which the prosecution, if it had been afforded sufficient time, could have gathered.
The foregoing goes, too, for the concurring opinion. There is only one more point to which we wish to address
ourselves briefly. The concurring opinion contains this passage:
"Dentro de las 6 horas hay tiempo mas que suficiente para meter en cuenta a toda canalla . . . Pero;
por Dios que no se violen ni pisoteen las garantias constitucionales por miedo a los gangsters!"
No one can disagree with this thought — as an abstract proposition. The only trouble is that the opinion does not
cite any concrete constitutional provision or guaranty that is infringed by our dissent. I take the suggestion in the resolution —
that "it would be proper for the interested parties to take the case to Congress, since it can not be done by judicial legislation"
— to be a tacit recognition that the matter is purely one of statute and that no constitutional impediment is in the way of
changing the law and enlarging the power of the city fiscal in the premises. And let it be said that the objection in the
concurring opinion to this suggestion is rested, not on constitutional grounds but on the supposition that the law is good
enough to be left alone. All of which tempts us to paraphrase the famous apostrophe of that equally famous woman in French
history, and exclaim, "Oh Constitution! what grievous mistakes are committed in thy name!"
The concurring opinion is in error when it sees shadows of fear of gangster in our dissent. Society no less than a
natural person has the right to protect itself, and the arrest and punishment of transgressors of its laws is one of its legitimate
means of self- protection and self-preservation. As far as the insinuation of fear may reflect on those who are duty bound to
have a part in such arrest and punishment, the application of criminal laws without quarters to the end which they are
intended to serve, is not in strict logic a sign of apprehension. Such course, rather than tolerance, leniency or indifference
towards crimes and appeasement of lawless and other elements and groups who wield the power of physical and verbal
retaliations, calls for exactly the opposite quality of fright.
||| (Sayo v. Chief of Police, G.R. No. L-2128, [May 12, 1948], 80 PHIL 859-921)
 26

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-1159. January 30, 1947.]
CECILIO M. LINO, petitioner, vs. VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, and JOHN DOE, in their
capacity as Mayor, Chief of Police and Officer in charge of municipal jail, all of the City of Manila,
respectively, respondents.
Emanuel Peldez, Francisco A. Rodrigo, Enrique M. Fernando, Manuel M. Crudo, Claudio Teehankee and Jose W. Diokno Fiscal Jose
P. Bengzon, for respondent.
City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon, for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. HABEAS CORPUS; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; DETENTION AFTER SIX HOURS WITHOUT DELIVERY TO JUDICIAL
AUTHORITIES; ILLEGALITY OF, NOT CURED BY FILING OF INFORMATION; CASE AT BAR. — Assuming that P. D. and P. M. were
legally arrested without warrant, their continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours without their
having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. The illegality of their detention was not cured by the filing of
informations against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment have been issued by the municipal court up
to the hearing of this case before this Court.
2. ID.; ARREST WHEN INFORMATION IS FOR LIGHT OFFENSE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; DETENTION
THEREUNDER. — The general rule is that when the offense charged is light the accused should not be arrested except in
particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the exercise of its discretion. While an arrest may be made without
warrant when there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule 109 section 6 Rules of Court), the prisoner cannot be retained
beyond the period provided by law unless a warrant is procured from a competent court.
3. ID.; ARREST; CITY FISCAL AUTHORITY OF, TO ISSUE WARRANT OF. — The City Fiscal has no authority to issue
warrants of arrest, and is powerless to validate an illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own
either express or implied.
4. ID.; CITY FISCAL; POWER OF, TO ORDER COMMITMENT OR RELEASE ON BAIL OF ACCUSED. — The City Fiscal has
no power to order either the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses.
Per PERFECTO, J., concurring:
5. EXPEDITING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING. — Cases of habeas corpus, by their very nature if the remedy is to be
effective and there is an earnest desire to avoid a failure of justice should be disposed of without any delay, as was done in
Tañada vs. Quirino (42 Off. Gaz., 934).
6. RESPONDENTS' ACTIONS NEED BE COUNTERACTED. — Speedy action is necessary to squelch the tactics of
respondents who are bent on exerting all the power and ability that they command to mock at the action of the courts as
exemplified by the case of Villavicencio vs. Lukban (39 Phil. 778-812).
7. OFFICIAL DISREGARD FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. — Twelve humble peaceful and law-abiding citizens
while in the peaceful exercise of their constitutional rights of freedom of expression and to peaceably assemble, the right to
enlist public support in the pursuit of their right to a decent living wage, and the right to petition their own government for the
redress of their grievances are abruptly interrupted in the exercise of their rights and violently hauled into prison as dangerous
criminals.
8. IGNORANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS. — Ignorance of the constitutional Bill of Rights by the
erring officials is no justification. It only aggravates the situation. It shows unpardonable dereliction of duty and recklessness of
responsible high authorities.
9. PEACE OFFICERS. — Peace officers are duty bound to know the law. They are also known as law officers, because
it is their essential function to enforce the laws. At least, they ought to know the Constitution and learn by heart the Bill of
Rights.
10. OFFER OF PROVISIONAL RELEASE OF BAIL. — That the twelve detainees were offered provisional release if they
should post a bail of P12,000 each, does not make legal their illegal detention. The required bail only tends to show
respondents stubbornness in the exercise of an illegal power, and the fact that the amount of P12,000 was required of persons
who were not receiving even the miserable pittance, to secure the increase of which they went into strike, appears to be an
unbearable sarcasm.
11. SEDITION. — The allegation that the arresting officers believe that the detainees, are guilty of sedition holds no
water when respondents themselves confess that no such crime was committed. Sedition is the crime usually resorted to by
tyrants as a pretext to silence or suppress those persons who have the firmness of character to oppose them and expose their
abuses.
12. ONE-FOURTH OF A CENTURY PRONOUNCEMENTS. — The pronouncements made by the Supreme Court one-
fourth of a century ago on fundamental civil rights are quoted in the opinion.
13. VIRUS OF THE JAPANESE FEUDALISTIC IDEOLOGY. — The wanton disregard by those responsible for the arrest of
the twelve detainees of their fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Constitution, shows that the Japanese feudalistic
ideology, as propagated during enemy occupation, has left its pernicious virus in our soil.
 27

14. ARBITRARINESS AND ILLEGAL DETENTION. — These Government officers who are responsible for the detention
and confinement of the twelve detainees are liable for prosecution under articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
15. POOR FACE-SAVING DEVICE. — The filing of information for insignificant misdemeanors against P. M. and P. D.
appears to us as a poor face-saving device to justify, in some way, their further detention and should not be countenanced as
a means to defeat the release of said two detainees.
16. PERILOUS PATH. — Those who under the pretext of subduing allegedly seditious persons, committed the
arbitrariness complained of in the petition, trod a perilous path that, as shown by the experience of other countries, usually
leads to the implantation of a dictatorship, whose whole philosophy is built upon the hateful slogan that everything, including
the most cherished possessions and the most blessed ideals of the people, should be sacrificed for the sake of state
supremacy.
17. PRICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. — Eternal vigilance and constant willingness and readiness to fight for them are the
price of human rights. The existence of liberal elements, always watchful and ready to defend victims of violations of the Bill of
Rights, is necessary to vitalize democracy and to give tangible reality to the guarantees of the Constitution.
18. CONDITIONS AND QUALITIES REQUIRED. — The attainment of great ideals needs faith, passionate adherence to
them, the militant attitude manifested in the inflicting readiness to fight and face hardships and sacrifices, unconquerable
steadfastness and unbreakable perseverance in the face of obstacles and setbacks. These are the conditions and qualities
needed by all liberal and progressive spirits to keep lighted the torch of liberty, to squelch the hydra of reaction, to conserve
the moral heritage of advancement and conquests in the emporium of human rights bequeathed by the champions and
martyrs who waged the heroic battles for real spiritual values and for the dignity if man as the image of God.
DECISION
MORAN, C.J p:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be unlawfully detained by
respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John Doe in their capacity as mayor, chief of police and officer in
charge of the municipal jail of the City of Manila, respectively. It is alleged in respondents' return that ten of the petitioners
had already been released, no sufficient evidence having been found to warrant their prosecution for inciting to sedition, but
that the remaining two, Pascual Montaniel and Facifico Deoduco, are being held in custody because of charges filed against
them in the municipal court unjust vexation and disobedience to police orders, respectively.
After hearing, by minute resolution we dismissed the case with respect to the petitioners already released and we
ordered the release of the remaining two, Montaniel and Deoduco, without prejudice to a reasoned decision which we now
proceed to render.
The case of the ten petitioners has become academic by their release. The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is only
to set them free. After they are freed, the writ is purposeless. If they have been the victims of illegal arrest or detention, they
can have recourse to criminal actions in the proper courts.
As regards the remaining two petitioners, the pertinent facts as admitted at the hearing by respondents, are as
follows: Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the police officers of Manila on November 8, 1946, for inciting to
sedition, and Pacifico Deoduco, on November 7, 1946, for resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders. On November 11
when this petition for habeas corpus was filed, these two petitioners were still under arrest. They were thus held in
confinement for three and four days, respectively, without warrants and without charges formally filed in court. The papers of
their cases were not transmitted to the City Fiscal's office until late in the afternoon of November 11. Upon investigation by
that office, no sufficient evidence was found to warrant the prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to sedition and of
Pacifico Deoduco for resisting arrest, but both remained under custody because of informations filed with minuet charging
Montaniel with unjust vexation and Deoduco with disobedience to an agent of a person in authority under the second
paragraph of article 151 of Revised Penal Code. These informations were filed on the same day when this case was heard
before this Court, that is, on November 12, 1946. And so far, no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment are shown to
have been issued by the municipal court pursuant to the informations thus filed.
Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is illegal. Even assuming that they were
legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively, their continued detention became illegal upon the
exploration of six hours without their having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125, Rev. Pen
Code, as amended by Act No. 3940.) Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946,
that is, four and three days, respectively, after they were arrested. The illegally of their detention was not cured by the filing of
information against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment have been issued by the municipal court to the
hearing of this case before this Court.

It must be observed, in this connection, that in said informatons, the two petitioners are charged with light offenses
punishable by law with arresto mayor or an fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both, according to the second paragraphs of
articles 151 and 287, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code. Under Rule 108, section 10, when the offense charged is of that
character, "the judge with whom the complaint or information is filled, shall not issue any warrant for order for the arrest of
the defendant, but shall order the letter to appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer to the complaint of
information," although in particular instances he may also "order that a defendant charged with such offense be arrested and
not released except upon furnishing bail." The general rule, therefore, is that when the offense charged is light the accused
 28

should not be arrested, except in particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the experience of its discretion. In
the instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the informations nor exercised its discretion the arrest of the two
petitioners and, therefore, they are still detained not because of the informations filed against them but as a continuance of
their illegal detention by the police officers, While an arrest may be made without warrant there are reasonable grounds
therefor (Rule 109, section 6 Rules of Court), the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law, unless a
warrant is procured from a competent court. (4 Am. Jur., p. 49; Diers vs. Mallon, 46 Neb., 121; 50 Am. St. Rep., 598; Burk vs.
Howley, 179 Penn., 539; 57 Am. St. Rep., 607; Karner vs. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App., 460; 34 S. W., 656; Johnson vs. Americus, 46
Ga., 80; Leger vs. Warren, L. R. A., 216-281 [Bk. 51.] It is obvious in the instant case that the City Fiscal had no authority to
issue warrants of arrest (vide authorities cited above, and Hashim vs. Boncan and City of Manila, 71 Phil., 216) and was
powerless to validate such illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own, either express or implied
It is not necessary now to determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial authority within the purview of article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940, for even if he were, the petitioners' case was referred to him long after
the expiration of the six hours provided by law. And since the City Fiscal, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order
either the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses (Adm. Code, section 2460), the
petitioners' further their confinement after their case had been referred to the City Fiscal was but a mere continuation of their
illegal detention by the police officers. In the eyes of the law, therefore, these prisoners should have been out of prison long
before the informations were filed with the municipal court, and they should not be retained therein merely because of the
filing of such informations it appearing particularly that the offenses charged are light and are not, as a general rule, grounds
for arrest, under Rule 108, section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order of commitment could legalize the prisoner's
continued confinement, and no such order has ever been issued. Indeed, the municipal court could acquire jurisdiction over
said prisoners only by the issuance of a warrant of arrest, an order of commitment or a writ of summons as provided in the
aforementioned rule.
We reiterate the minute-resolution above mentioned.
Paras, Feria, Pablo and Hilado, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla concurred in this decision.
||| (Lino v. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1159, [January 30, 1947], 77 PHIL 933-983)
 29

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154130. August 20, 2004.]
BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming petitioner’s conviction by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner now seeks a reconsideration of our Decision.
The facts are briefly restated as follows:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members
of the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On
September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police
Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal
logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth
being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be
the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements
and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought
to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m. IaEACT
On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986. On petition for review, we rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality on January 12, 2004. 1 Petitioner then filed an “Urgent
Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration” 2 with attached “Motion for Reconsideration,” 3 wherein he makes
the following submissions:
1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETAINING THE PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTIES;
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS INSISTED ON LEAVING THE PLACE WHERE THEY
WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER;
4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY WANTING IN THE INSTANT CASE. 4
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration. 5
The prosecution was required to comment on petitioner’s second Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.
We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-taken. 6
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court
to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby. ESIcaC
The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived
and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots
of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to
be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
operation. 7
The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds. 8
The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the
evidence on record, we find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties.
 30

Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the
DENR Team during their mission. On the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended
his hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus:
ATTY. JUMAMIL:
q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram?
a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we saw a boat being constructed there
so we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod (sic).
q And you arrived at 5:00 o’clock?
a Yes sir.
q And you left at 2:00 o’clock in the morning of September 2?
a Yes sir.
q And you ate dinner between 5:00 o’clock to 2:00 o’clock in the morning of September 2, is that correct?
a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner.
q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had dinner?
a Yes sir. cTSDAH
q And of course you also partook of wine?
a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ NARIO:
q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 o’clock Mayor Astorga was with you having dinner?
a Yes Your Honor.
q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters, the complainants here?
a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ PALATTAO:
q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this laughter?
a Probably they were talking of something humorous. 9
The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1
Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it
was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for
them to travel by boat.
ATTY. JUMAMIL:
q It was raining at that time, is that correct?
a Yes sir it was raining.
q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time that you were in Lucoblucob,
Daram?
a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.
q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in Lucoblucob?
a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at that time. EcSCHD
q But it was raining the whole day?
a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.
q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 o’clock in the morning is that correct?
a A little bit hard I don’t know when the rain stopped, sir.
q It is possible that it rain . . . the rain stopped at 1:00 o’clock in the morning of September 2?
a I don’t remember sir.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ PALATTAO:
q Were you told not to go away from the place?
 31

a No Your Honor.
q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go somewhere?
a They did not say anything sir.
q Where did you go after that?
a Just down until it rained.
q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part, was there somebody prevented you
to go to another place?
a I don’t know Your Honor.
q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent you to go somewhere else?
a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to leave the barangay.
q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not supposed to leave that barangay, is this
Barangay Daram?
a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.
q On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in your impression you cannot leave
the barangay. How about the other companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave
the place?
a No Your Honor. CSHEca
q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case of those I have enumerated they
cannot, why?
a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor. 10
Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness stand on August 16, 2000 but did not complete his
testimony-in-chief due to lack of material time. His testimony only covered preliminary matters and did not touch on the
circumstances of the alleged detention. 11
On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias
and Wenefredo Maniscan, executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance stating, in pertinent part:
xxx xxx xxx;
6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation aggravated by the exhaustion of the
team in scouring the shores of the small islands of Samar for several days. Mayor Benito Astorga
may have also been confronted with the same predicament, hence our confrontation resulted to a
heated argument and the eventual misunderstanding;
7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of Daram, Samar our respect for him
prevailed when he ordered us to take dinner with him and other local residents thereat, so we
capitulated whose invitation was misinterpreted by us;
8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team and the group of Mayor
Astorga during the dinner and we were eventually allowed to leave Daram, Samar;

9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the incident to our supervisors who
required us to submit our affidavit;
10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both parties had already express
apologies and are personally no longer interested to pursue the case against the Mayor, hence, this
affidavit of desistance;
xxx xxx xxx. 12
Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to testify. This notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan
convicted petitioner of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the
police escorts of the DENR Team. AHDacC
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian’s testimony negate the element of detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and
is necessarily subjective. 13 Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must
instead be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime. 14 As such, SPO1 Capoquian
and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in the minds of the private
offended parties herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their testimonies in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR
Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two interpretations. While it may support the
proposition that the private offended parties were taken to petitioner’s house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next
morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at
 32

his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate
together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent
with a hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all
unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 15 He is entitled to an acquittal
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 16
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of
the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the prosecution’s evidence must stand or
fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 17 Furthermore,
where the evidence for the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be
duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When the
circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence
while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit
a guilty man than to convict an innocent man. 18
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1, 2003 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The appealed
judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
||| (Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, [August 20, 2004], 480 PHIL 585-596)
 33

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 189093. April 23, 2010.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y GARCIA, BRYAN BRINGAS y
GARCIA, JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y CRUZ, ERICKSON PAJARILLO y BASER (deceased), and EDEN SY
CHUNG, accused-appellants.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
In the instant appeal, 1 accused-appellants John Robert Navarro y Cruz, Christopher Bringas y Garcia, Bryan Bringas y
Garcia, and Eden Sy Chung seek their acquittal by a reversal of the January 3, 2006 Decision 2 and June 6, 2007 Resolution 3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911, which affirmed their earlier conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 258 in Parañaque City for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 6539 (Carnapping) and for violation of Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Kidnapping for Ransom) in Criminal Case Nos. 95-136 and 95-137, respectively.
The Facts
On April 28, 1995, accused-appellants Christopher Bringas y Garcia alias "Jimboy," John Robert Navarro y Cruz alias
"Jun," Dennis Ticsay y Peña alias "Peng," Aruel Ross y Picardo, Bryan Bringas y Garcia alias "Bobby," Roger Calaguas y Jimenez
alias "Bronson," Ericson Pajarillo 4 y Baser alias "Erick," Edgardo Sulayao y Petilla alias "Eddie," Eden Sy Chung alias "Kim," Glen
Sangalang, and Ricky Castillo were indicted for Carnapping or violation of RA 6539. The Information 5 in Criminal Case No. 95-
136 reads:
That at about 1:30 in the afternoon of December 14, 1994 at Marina Subdivision, Municipality of Parañaque
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, while in the process of executing their criminal design to kidnap for ransom a
minor child named PATRICK TENG, with intent to gain and with violence and intimidation, did then and there,
take a motor vehicle, Toyota Corolla, with Plate No. TNK-782, owned by Erick Teng.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same accused were likewise indicted for Kidnapping for Ransom or violation of Art. 267 of the RPC. The
Information 6 in Criminal Case No. 95-137 reads: TAECSD
That at about 1:30 in the afternoon of December 14, 1994 at Marina Subdivision, Municipality of Parañaque
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there take, carry away and kidnap a minor, PATRICK TENG, against
his will and detained him for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release which was effected after payment
by his parents of the amount of TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2.5 Million) to the damage
and prejudice of aforementioned victim and his parents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Jason Rosales, a member of the group, was not included in both indictments as he was utilized as state witness and
placed under the Witness Protection Program of the Government.
Except for Glen Sangalang and Ricky Castillo who remain at large, the rest of the accused were apprehended. When
arraigned on September 28, 1995, the apprehended accused, assisted by their respective counsels, uniformly entered a plea of
"not guilty."
To substantiate the accusations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of: (1) Rosales (state witness); (2) Maricel
Hipos, house-helper of Eric Teng; (3) Police Chief Inspector Gilbert C. Cruz of the Philippine Anti-Crime Commission (PACC); (4)
Police Chief Inspector Michael Ray Aquino of Task Force Habagat; (5) Police Chief Inspector Paul Tucay of Task Force Habagat;
(6) Eric, the father of the minor kidnap victim Patrick Teng; and (7) Antonio Nebrida (Tony) of PTV 4.
Version of the Prosecution
Culled from the records, the People's version of the incident is synthesized as follows:
That sometime around 11:30 a.m. on December 14, 1994, Eric's house helper Maricel received a phone call
purportedly from Eric's brother-in-law, Johnson, informing that a gift will be delivered for Patrick, and she was instructed to wait
for the driver who will be arriving soon. 7 At around 1:30 p.m., the doorbell rang and Maricel went to check the gate. 8 When
she asked who it was, the men outside answered that they were delivering the gift for Patrick from Johnson. 9 Peering through
the gate she saw two men, 10 whom she came to know later on to be Rosales and Calaguas with the latter holding a large gift
in Christmas wrapper. 11 Since the gift could not fit the aperture in the gate, Maricel opened the gate. 12
Calaguas then poked a gun at Maricel and pulled her towards Eric's house. 13 She was made to knock at the front door
which was opened by Sweeney, the sister of Eric. 14 Maricel, Sweeney, and the other house helpers, Dina and Melanie, were
herded by Calaguas to the children's room at the second floor together with Eric's children, Patrick and Mikee. 15 While on the
stairway, Rosales asked for the key to Eric's car. 16 Maricel was then gagged with packing tape by Pajarillo, 17 and the three of
them went down. 18 Maricel pointed to the car key in the kitchen. 19 Thereafter, Maricel was brought upstairs to the children's
room by Pajarillo. 20 Already inside the children's room were Sulayao and Calaguas. 21 Pajarillo then tied the hands and feet of
 34

Maricel, 22 while the others did the same to Sweeney, Dina and Melanie. 23 However, Dina's feet were not tied. 24 One of the
men said "kunin na ninyo ang bata." 25 Maricel identified Ross as among those who took Patrick. 26 The kidnappers also took
Eric's red Toyota Corolla (Model GLI 1994). 27 IaSCTE
After the kidnappers left, Dina looked for a pair of scissors. 28 After the girls extricated themselves from their bindings,
they immediately called Kim Teng (Kimbol), the brother of Eric, who rushed to Eric's house. 29 Shortly thereafter, at around 2:30
p.m., Kimbol called Eric to tell him about the kidnapping of his son, Patrick. 30 Eric rushed home. 31 At around 3:10 p.m., Eric
received the first call from one of the kidnappers (negotiator) demanding a ransom of PhP10 million for his son and ordered him
not to report the matter to the police else n Patrick will be harmed. 32 A friend of the grandparents of Patrick, however, reported
the kidnapping to the PACC Special Operations Task Force Habagat. 33
While Eric was trying to pool resources from friends and relatives, he continued receiving calls from the same
negotiator urging him to cooperate. 34 At about 4:00 p.m., Eric received a call from Gen. Panfilo Lacson, then head of the PACC
Special Operations Task Force Habagat. 35 Eric was only able to raise PhP200,000 that afternoon. 36
Through another call, the negotiator instructed Eric to produce six individuals for them to interview and choose from
to deliver the money, the qualifications given was "kailangang matalik ninyong kaibigan na mapapagkatiwalan ng pera, hindi
ninyo kamag-anak, mukhang instik at marunung managalog." 37 The negotiator gave his name as Eric. 38 They then called
Racquel Chung, the wife of Eden Sy Chung (Chung), asking if Chung could help. 39 Imelda, Eric's wife, was able to talk to Chung
who was willing to help deliver the money if selected. 40 At around 10:00 p.m., Eric again received a call from the negotiator
which was followed by another call, this time by a different person. 41
The next day, December 15, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Chung arrived. 42 Chung encouraged Eric to pay the ransom as soon
as possible. 43 Thereafter, Eric received so many calls but was able to identify the negotiator's voice. Upon query on the six
individuals, he informed the negotiator that they could only come up with two: Chung and John Tuang. 44 The negotiator
interviewed both Chung and John Tuang on the phone. 45 By lunchtime, the ransom was reduced to PhP8 million, 46 which was
further reduced to PhP5 million at 4:00 p.m. 47 But Eric still could not raise the amount. After dinner, the negotiator instructed
Chung and John Tuang to go home. 48 Chung borrowed Eric's car. 49 Thereafter, they received another call
threatening, "puputulin ko ang daliri ng anak mo, puputulin ko ang bayag ng anak mo papatayin ko kayo." 50
After a while, the negotiator called again demanding for Chung to come back, and Chung came back to the Teng's
residence at around 8:00 p.m. 51 Eric was then instructed to have the ransom money delivered, which at that time was
significantly reduced to PhP2.5 million and which he was able to raise that day. 52 It was to be placed in a box and gift
wrapped. 53 Chung was instructed by the negotiator to deliver the ransom money at the Quezon Memorial Circle near
GSIS. 54 Chung then took Eric's two-door Honda Civic with Plate No. TGH 439. 55
On the way, Chung called Eric telling him that he was intercepted by two cars which he had to follow. 56 The PACC
operatives tailing Chung who were on radio contact with the PACC, however, belied Chung's allegation of interception. 57 The
PACC then suspected Chung to be in cahoots with the kidnappers. 58 Gen. Lacson thereafter instructed Eric to delay Chung upon
his return. 59 Eventually, Chung, bringing Patrick, arrived at Eric's place past midnight. 60 Chung reported to Eric that "hinarang
ako inipit ako sa dalawang kotse at nakita ko si Johnson sa isa sa mga sasakyan." 61 Five minutes after Chung's arrival, Gen.
Lacson and his men arrived and arrested Chung. 62 cEISAD
A few hours thereafter, at around 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1994, Eric received a call from Gen. Lacson informing
him that the ransom money was recovered except for PhP100,000 which was given by Chung to Navarro. 63 At around noon of
December 16, 1994, Eric again received a call from the PACC informing him that Chung wanted to talk to him. 64 Chung
apologized to Eric saying, "Sorry, ginawa ko sa inyo ito, napipilitan lang ako" and "[T]utulong naman ako sa PACC ibinigay ko na
yung dalawang pangalan." 65 Chung named Navarro and Jimboy Bringas. 66 At 4:00 p.m. of December 16, 1994, Eric again
received a call from the PACC confirming the arrest of both Navarro and Jimboy Bringas. 67 And, later, at 9:00 p.m., the PACC
further informed Eric that they have arrested the other kidnappers who were pointed out by Jimboy Bringas. 68 Moreover, Eric's
red Toyota Corolla was likewise recovered. 69
During the December 17, 1994 press conference at the PACC Headquarters in Camp Crame, Eric recognized the voice
of the negotiator among the kidnappers whom he identified later on to be that of Navarro. 70 In the same press conference,
Navarro admitted to the media that he made three calls to the Teng family regarding the ransom and that Pajarillo likewise
admitted to the media that Chung supplied them with handguns except the ammunition. 71 Eric Teng was able to tape segments
of the news aired over Channels 2 and 4 covering the admissions of Navarro and Pajarillo. 72
Tony of PTV 4 testified 73 that he was the newscaster of PTV 4 of the December 17, 1994 evening news edition that
what was taped by Eric Teng.
Police Chief Inspector Aquino was the Operations Chief of the PACC Task Force Habagat who coordinated the
operation, monitoring and response to the kidnapping of Patrick Teng; he assigned Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza to
secure the house of Eric Teng and monitor the communications with the negotiator of the kidnappers. 74 Police Chief Inspector
Cruz was the one who led a team in arresting Navarro and Jimboy Bringas at around half past 1:00 p.m. on December 16, 1994
in the vicinity of Malate. 75 And Police Chief Inspector Tucay was the team leader who led the team which tailed Chung in the
evening of December 15, 1994 to the house of Chung's mother, the Bowling Inn and Philippine Westin Plaza; and also led the
team in the afternoon and evening of December 16, 1994 in arresting Calaguas, Sulayao, Ross, Pajarillo, Bobby Bringas and
Dennis Ticsay in Pampanga and in recovering Eric Teng's red Toyota Corolla. 76
 35

Version of the Defense

The fractious defense offered in evidence the testimonies of: (1) John Robert Navarro; (2) Sr. Police Inspector Michael
Ray Aquino; (3) Eden Sy Chung (Chung); (4) Christopher Bringas (Jimboy Bringas); (5) Roger Calaguas (Calaguas); (6) Lourdes
Bringas, mother of Christopher and Bryan; (7) Bryan Bringas (Bobby Bringas); (8) Edgardo Sulayao (Sulayao), also known as Kosa;
(9) Ericson Pajarillo (Pajarillo); and (10) Aruel Ross (Ross).
The accused' divergent defenses uniformly assailed the credibility of Maricel Hipos and state witness Rosales, and in
assiduously declaring their innocence they pointed to each other as the perpetrator or mastermind of the kidnapping for
ransom. IHCDAS
From their testimonies, Navarro 77 and Chung 78 similarly asserted being implicated by the other in the crime and
pointed at each other as the mastermind thereof. Calaguas, 79 Sulayao, 80 Pajarillo 81and Ross 82 uniformly point to Chung and
Navarro as the brains behind the kidnapping who were assisted by Rosales and Jimboy Bringas, and that they were merely
implicated for they were merely hired as factory workers [Calaguas and Sulayao], for a driving job [Ross] or was only doing a
favor for Rosales [Pajarillo]. They admitted the taking of Patrick Teng but denied doing any violence and the use of handguns.
Calaguas and Sulayao repudiated their joint August 21, 1995 Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng Pagpapabulaan 83 sworn to before the
state prosecutor for allegedly not being true as their former counsel, Atty. Gasmen, did not put therein what they actually
narrated to him.
Jimboy Bringas maintained that he was only implicated by Chung and Navarro for he was neither involved with the
crime nor participated in its commission as he was only tasked to look for factory workers by Chung and for tourist guides by
Navarro. 84
It must be noted that, while all the accused pinpointed and identified Navarro as one of the masterminds, only Pajarillo
testified otherwise that John Robert Navarro is not the same person as John or Jun Navarro who was with him and Rosales in
the evening of December 13, 1994 in Tradewinds Hotel, and on December 14, 1994 when they delivered gifts and the kidnapping
of Patrick was committed.
Bobby Bringas strongly protested his innocence as he was in Pampanga on the days material and was never involved
in the crime but was merely implicated by Rosales. His testimony 85 and that of his mother, Lourdes Bringas, 86 were dispensed
with upon the prosecution's stipulation that he was in Pampanga from December 14, 1994 until his arrest by PACC operatives
on December 16, 1994.
Acquittal of Dennis Ticsay
On July 30, 1997, accused Dennis Ticsay (Ticsay) filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to
Evidence 87 which was unopposed and granted by the trial court. 88 Accordingly, on August 22, 1997, Ticsay filed his Demurrer
to Evidence. 89 On December 3, 1997, the trial court granted the demurrer and acquitted Ticsay. 90
Subsequently, on June 10, 1998, the motions to grant bail filed by the other accused were denied by the trial court. 91
The Ruling of the RTC and CA
The RTC, finding the testimonies of prosecution witnesses more credible, rendered, on March 26, 1999, its Joint
Decision 92 finding accused-appellants and the other accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The fallo reads: 2005jurcd
WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
In Criminal Case No. 95-136 for CARNAPPING, defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 6539, finding
accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia; JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER
CALAGUAS y Jimenez; ERICKSON PAHARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla and EDEN SY CHUNG GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
nineteen (19) years as minimum to twenty-seven (27) years, as maximum.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA, he is hereby ACQUITTED.
In Criminal Case No. 95-137, for KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, finding accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia;
JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; BRYAN BRINGAS y Garcia; ROGER CALAGUAS y Jimenez;
ERICKSON PAHARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla; and EDEN SY CHUNG guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Likewise, accused JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz is hereby directed to pay Eric Teng the sum of PhP100,000.00
as actual damages with interest thereon at the legal rate from December 15, 1994 until fully paid and all the
accused are directed to pay Eric Teng jointly and severally the amount of PhP5,000,000.00 as moral damages;
PhP2,000,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Let Alias Warrants of Arrest issued against GLEN SANGALANG and RICKY CASTILLO for their immediate
apprehension which need not be returned until after they have been arrested.
SO ORDERED. 93
Thru its Order of Commitment (Mittimus), 94 the RTC sent the accused to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City. 95 The RTC also elevated the records of the case to this Court for automatic review, docketed under G.R. Nos. 139115-16.
 36

In accordance, however, with People v. Mateo, 96 the Court, per its September 7, 2004 Resolution, 97 transferred the
case to the CA for intermediate review, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911.
Eventually, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dated January 3, 2006, affirming the trial court, the dispositive
portion reads: ASHaDT
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 26, 1999 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court or Parañaque
City, Branch 258, is hereby AFFIRMED. However, considering that the death penalty was imposed, instead of
entering judgment, We hereby CERTIFY the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review
and final disposition, pursuant to Section 13 (a & b), Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED. 98
Navarro, Pajarillo and Chung filed their respective motions for reconsideration 99 of the assailed decision. As stated
at the threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein equally assailed Resolution 100 dated June 6, 2007, denied the motions, but, noting
the passage of RA 9346 101 lifting the death penalty, accordingly reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. In the same assailed
Resolution, however, the CA further noted that the accused failed to file their motions for reconsideration or notices of appeal
as regards Criminal Case No. 95-136 for Carnapping, the lesser offense, and, citing Sec. 13 (b) of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, it pronounced finality of the affirmed RTC decision as regards Criminal Case No. 95-136.
Subsequently, on July 16, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution 102 for the issuance of a Partial Entry of Judgment 103 in
Criminal Case No. 95-136 as to Ross, Jimboy Bringas, Calaguas and Sulayao. Undaunted, accused-appellants Navarro, Jimboy
Bringas, Bobby Bringas and Chung filed their respective notices of appeal 104 pursuant to Sec. 13 (b), Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In the meantime, on April 8, 2006, Pajarillo died from aspiration pneumonia secondary to PTB, 105 while Sulayao died
on March 10, 2007. 106
On June 23, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution 107 giving due course to the notices of appeal filed by accused-appellants
and ordered the issuance of a (Partial) Entry of Judgment 108 against Ross who opted not to take any further appeal to this
Court, and dismissed the instant criminal case as to Sulayao on account of his death on March 10, 2007 without prejudice to his
civil liability.
We take notice, however, that the CA failed to note the May 4, 2009 letter 109 from the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City belatedly informing it, on May 6, 2009, of the death of Pajarillo way back on April 8, 2006. Consequently, the
appeal 110 of Pajarillo filed by his counsel on July 4, 2007 is rendered moot and academic. Moreover, we further note that the
CA failed to pronounce an entry of judgment as regards Calaguas who failed to file either a motion for reconsideration or to take
a further appeal of the January 3, 2006 CA Decision. Consequently, for his failure to file an appeal as required by the rules, the
instant case has become final as to Calaguas.
Thus, the instant appeals before us from accused-appellants Navarro, Jimboy Bringas, Bobby Bringas and Chung who
prayed for their respective acquittal from the crime of kidnapping for ransom. ITSaHC
The Issues/Assignment of Errors
The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, and accused-appellants Navarro and Chung chose not to file
any supplemental briefs, maintaining their respective positions, assignment of errors and arguments in their respective briefs
earlier filed in G.R. Nos. 139115-16.
In his appellant's brief, 111 Chung raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT CHUNG HAD CONSPIRED WITH THE OTHER
APPELLANTS CONSIDERING THAT:
A. There is no clear and sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant Chung participated in the
planning of the crime;
B. The evidence of conspiracy against Appellant fails to establish his participation in the planning of
the offense beyond reasonable doubt;
C. There are no overt acts attributable to Appellant Chung which would establish that he intended
to, or did actually carry out the alleged conspiracy;
D. There is no evidence which would establish Appellant Chung's presence at the scene of the
crime, or his alleged participation in aiding his co-appellants in the commission thereof.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE ALLEGED WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE'S EVIDENCE RATHER
THAN ON THE DOUBTFUL STRENGHT n OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING, WITHOUT ANY BASIS WHATSOEVER, THAT APPELLANT
CHUNG IS THE MASTERMIND OF THE CONSPIRACY.
IV
 37

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JASON ROSALES, AN ADMITTED
CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE PLANNING AND COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. TIDaCE
V
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO PERFORM ITS DUTY OF RESOLVING ALL DOUBTS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT CHUNG. 112
Navarro, on the other hand, raises in his Appellant's Brief 113 the sole assignment of error that: The Court a
quo committed serious error when it convicted him on the basis of what may at best be considered circumstantial evidence
despite clear and direct testimonies of law enforcers and the other accused that proved his absence of involvement in the crimes
charged. 114
In their Accused-Appellants' Brief, 115 Jimboy and Bobby Bringas raise the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY AS PRINCIPALS OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED. 116
Moreover, in their supplemental brief, 117 Jimboy and Bobby Bringas additionally raise the assignment of errors that:
(a) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding them guilty despite the prosecution's failure to prove it beyond reasonable
doubt; and, (b) that they conspired with the other perpetrators. 118
The foregoing issues or assignment of errors can actually be reduced and summarized as follows:first, on the credibility
of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in general and, in particular, of Maricel Hipos and of the state witness Rosales;
and, second, on the finding of conspiracy.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Core Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Accused-appellants strongly assert that Maricel Hipos and state witness Rosales only made up their respective
testimonies relative to how the kidnapping transpired.
There is no dispute that Patrick Teng was kidnapped. It is admitted by the accused that Patrick Teng was brought to
Pampanga on the day he was abducted and was released shortly before midnight the next day or on December 15, 1994. There
is likewise no dispute that a PhP2.5 Million ransom was raised by the Teng family on December 15, 1994 and was handed to
Chung in the evening of the same day for the payment and release of Patrick Teng as instructed by the negotiator. The
undisputed facts also show that Chung was apprehended by the PACC shortly after midnight or very early on December 16,
1994; while Jimboy Bringas and Navarro were apprehended at past 1:00 p.m. on December 16, 1994; and the other accused
were apprehended in Pampanga late afternoon and early evening on December 16, 1994.AEDcIH
Both courts a quo found all accused guilty beyond reasonable for the crime of carnapping and kidnapping. With the
instant appeal, what remains to be resolved is the respective criminal liability or lack thereof of accused-appellants Navarro,
Chung, Jimboy and Bobby Bringas. An assiduous review of the records at hand, particularly the testimonies of both prosecution
and defense witnesses, however, constrains this Court to affirm the appellate court's decision and resolution affirming their
conviction except that of Bobby Bringas.
Prosecution Witnesses More Credible
First. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maricel Hipos and Eric Teng were straightforward, cohesive, positive
and credible. More so when they are corroborated on material points by the testimonies of both prosecution and defense
witnesses. Besides, there is no showing that Maricel Hipos and Eric Teng had any motive to falsely testify against the accused.
As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that
no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit. 119
The testimony of Maricel was initially assailed by accused-appellant Sulayao who testified that when the kidnapping
was carried out they did not use any weapon or handgun, that they were let into the house voluntarily by Maricel and that it
was Rosales who took Patrick Teng without a struggle. This assertion was uniformly shared by Pajarillo, Calaguas and Ross.
However, aside from their mere assertion, they did not present any evidence supporting such contention.
The testimony of Maricel on what occurred is corroborated by the testimony of the accused that the gift Calaguas was
holding did not fit the aperture in the gate. Maricel never intended them to enter the Teng's premises but was merely
constrained to open the gate due to the ruse adopted by the accused.
Very telling are the testimonies of Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross asserting that they did not see Maricel. This is incredulous
for Maricel positively identified them as among the companions of Rosales during the extra-judicial line-up conducted by the
PACC in Camp Crame. Aside from Calaguas, Maricel picked out Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross from a line-up of about 15 men. During
her testimony in open court, she again positively identified them. If indeed they did not meet her, Maricel could not have
identified them as among the companions of Rosales and Calaguas.
 38

Moreover, the mere denials of Calaguas, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross cannot prevail over the positive assertion of
Maricel that she was with Sweeney, the sister of Eric Teng, and two other helpers, Dina and Melanie, who were the "yayas" of
Patrick and Mikee. Pajarillo, Sulayao, Calaguas and Ross want the Court to believe that it was only Maricel who was in the house
of Eric Teng or that aside from her there was nobody in the first floor of Eric Teng's house when Rosales supposedly brought
down Patrick Teng.
Further, the testimony of Maricel is not only credible but cohesive as well considering the events that transpired from
the phone call received at around 11:30 a.m. to the arrival of the kidnappers at 1:30 p.m., the time Dina was able to find scissors
to cut their bindings and being freed therefrom and calling Kimbol, who rushed to Eric's place; then Kimbol calling Eric at around
2:30 p.m. with the latter rushing home. The testimony of Eric would show how he received the call from his brother, his rushing
home and receiving the first call from the negotiator [kidnappers] at around 3:10 p.m.
As to the use of violence and intimidation, it is abundantly clear from Maricel's testimony that the accused indeed
used guns to threaten and intimidate them. At the very least, Maricel positively identified Calaguas as the one holding the gift
and poking her with a gun when she opened the gate, and her being herded together with Sweeney and the other house helpers
to the children's room at the second floor. The use of guns to threaten and intimidate is not only plausible but well nigh credible
considering the crime involved. Besides, it must be noted that during the press conference on December 17, 1994, caught on
camera and shown during the evening news on the same day was Pajarillo uttering words to the effect that Chung provided
them with a .45 caliber and a .38 caliber handguns.
It must be noted that there is no showing that Maricel simply made up the details of her testimony or that she was
coached. Both courts a quo found her testimony credible, cohesive and straightforward. We find no cogent reason to substitute
the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. Besides, the trial court is in the best position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand, and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination — significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. 120 STECDc
Furthermore, the testimony of Eric supplies what transpired after he received the call from his brother Kimbol on
December 14, 1994 until the morning of December 17, 1994 when the PACC held a press conference presenting the alleged
kidnappers and his being able to tape segments of the evening news showing footages of the press conference. His testimony
is likewise straightforward, cohesive and credible, which was not at all rebutted by the defense.
Second. The testimony of state witness Rosales was likewise straightforward, cohesive and credible. And it was
likewise corroborated on some material points by the officers of the PACC Task Force Habagat.
Rosales was among the six arrested on December 16, 1994 in Pampanga. Jimboy Bringas pinpointed them to PACC
operatives led by Police Chief Inspector Tucay. He was not included in the two Informations since he was utilized as a state
witness and placed under the witness protection program of the government. It must be noted that prosecutorial powers include
the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for testimony against another. 121 And the fact that an individual
had not been previously charged or included in an Information does not prevent the prosecution from utilizing said person as a
witness. 122
In People v. Bohol, the Court held that the fact that an accused has been "discharged as a state witness and was no
longer prosecuted for the crime charged does not render his testimony incredible or lessen its probative weight." 123
The testimony of Rosales was not rebutted by the accused. His narration of the events transpiring from December 7
to 13, 1994 leading up to the actual kidnapping on December 14, 1994 cohesively showed the specific roles of the other accused
relative to the instant crime. Although the Court believes that he had a greater role than what he testified to as being merely
coerced. Be that as it may, it would not change the fact that in his participation of the crime, he knew and clearly pointed out
the specific roles of the accused in the conspiracy and actual execution of the kidnapping and the carnapping.
The testimonies of police officers from the PACC corroborated the transfer of the Patrick to Chung at around or shortly
before midnight of December 15, 1994 in the parking lot of Philippine Westin Plaza.
It bears stressing that prosecution witnesses Maricel Hipos, Eric Teng and state witness Jason Rosales never wavered
in their testimonies under rigorous cross-examination by the various counsels representing the accused during trial. The same
holds true with the testimonies of the PACC police officers. IcTCHD
In fine, when the credibility of witnesses is in issue, the trial court's assessment is accorded great weight unless it is
shown that it has overlooked a certain fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case. 124 In the instant case,
we find no fact or circumstance of substance overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated by the courts a quo, except as to
that of Bobby Bringas.
Third. The prosecution witnesses PACC police officers gave clear, credible and straightforward testimonies on what
transpired on their end regarding the kidnapping: their monitoring of the negotiation, the surveillance of Chung and the arrest
of the accused. Their testimonies were not at all rebutted. In fact, as aptly narrated by Police Chief Inspector Tucay, accused-
appellants Chung and Navarro could not deny seeing each other in the evening of December 15, 1994 in the vicinity of their
houses in Paco, their subsequent meeting at the Bowling Inn and at the Philippine Westin Plaza. After his arrest in the house of
Eric Teng, Chung supplied to the PACC the names and identities of Jimboy Bringas and Navarro which led to their arrest at past
1 p.m. on December 16, 1994 in Malate. And, after his arrest, Jimboy Bringas in turn pinpointed to the PACC operatives led by
Police Chief Inspector Tucay the other accused who were arrested in Pampanga late in the afternoon and early evening of
December 16, 1994.
 39

Fourth. From the defense testimonies of Jimboy Bringas, Ross, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguas — upon the backdrop
of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses — they collectively point to Chung and Navarro as the brains of the kidnapping.
Pajarillo, however, asserted that his co-accused Navarro is not the same person as the mastermind Navarro. This assertion,
however, fails vis-Ã -vis the testimony of Rosales and other accused who testified that Navarro worked closely with Chung.
Second Core Issue: Presence of Conspiracy
Kidnapping for ransom proven
beyond reasonable doubt
The crime of Kidnapping and serious illegal detention, under Art. 267 125 of the RPC, has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim or a public officer who has a
duty under the law to detain a person;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and aSTECI
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority;
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official. 126
It must be noted that when the victim is a minor and the accused is any of the parents, the crime is Inducing a minor
to abandon his home defined and penalized under the second paragraph of Art. 271 of the RPC. While if it is a public officer who
has a duty under the law to detain a person but detains said person without any legal ground is liable for Arbitrary
detention defined and penalized under Art. 124 of the RPC.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof
of intent of the accused to effect the same. 127 Moreover, if the victim is a minor, or the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. 128 Ransom means
money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from
captivity. 129
In the instant case, all the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused are all private individuals. The kidnapping of Patrick Teng, then three years old, a minor is undisputed. That ransom
was demanded and paid is established. The only issue to be resolved is whether the accused are equally guilty of kidnapping for
ransom having conspired with each other.
Duly-Proven Conspiracy
Accused-appellants uniformly assail the court a quo's findings of conspiracy in the commission of the kidnapping for
ransom of Patrick Teng. Our assiduous review of the records of the case shows the presence of conspiracy. However, we fail to
appreciate the direct participation of Bobby Bringas in the conspiracy. Thus, accused-appellants Jimboy Bringas, Chung and
Navarro together with the other accused Pajarillo, Sulayao, Ross and Calaguas are equally guilty and liable for the crime charged
for having conspired to commit and did commit kidnapping for ransom of Patrick.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide
to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. 130 AHTICD
Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary
to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. 131
To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt
act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity — mere presence when the transaction was made does not necessarily lead
to an inference of concurrence with the criminal design to commit the crime. 132 Moreover, the same degree of proof necessary
to prove the crime is required to support a finding of criminal conspiracy. 133
The testimony of state witness Rosales is the lynchpin by which the conspiracy is proven. Jimboy Bringas brought
together Rosales, Calaguas and Sulayao from Pampanga, while Rosales brought in Ross and Pajarillo from Laguna. They thus
formed the team, although Jimboy Bringas did not join the team but was in on the sharing of the ransom. Together with Chung,
Navarro and two others (Glenn Sangalang and Ricky Castillo), they proceeded to Eric's house on December 14, 1994 and
kidnapped Patrick. Verily, a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. 134
Together with Ricky Castillo and Rosales, accused Ross, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguas actively participated in the
kidnapping. Ross drove one of the cars. Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguas entered the house with Rosales. Calaguas poked a gun
at Maricel. Pajarillo gagged and bound Maricel. The others herded the house helpers, the kids and Sweeney to the second floor.
They took Patrick after binding everyone except Mikee Teng. Then they brought Patrick to Pampanga. In all, they carried out a
 40

concerted plan of kidnapping and detaining Patrick until they were given word to bring back the child to Manila which they did
the very next day shortly before midnight at the Philippine Westin Plaza.
Then they went back to Pampanga, apparently to await their share of the ransom money. Clearly, Ross' testimony that
he is employed as a driver who can earn so much as PhP5,000 in a day and can ill afford to be absent is belied by his accompanying
the others to Pampanga after they delivered Patrick Teng to Chung on December 15, 1994 shortly before midnight. And he
continued to stay in Pampanga with the others until his arrest on December 16, 1994 while on a drinking spree. In all, he was
absent from work from the 14th until the 16th of December 1994.
Jimboy Bringas evidently participated in the planning and the subsequent execution of the conspiracy by bringing in
Calaguas and Sulayao from Pampanga. Together with them, he met with Chung and Navarro. And together with Rosales he went
to Laguna to fetch Pajarillo and Ross. In effect, he recruited or brought in the team that would carry out the kidnapping. He
knows the other accused and was the one who went with the PACC team led by Police Chief Inspector Tucay to Pampanga in
the late afternoon of December 16, 1994 and identified them to be arrested. cEATSI
Rosales' actuations, first in ringing the doorbell at the gate and urging Maricel to open it and in asking for the car key
and taking the Toyota Corolla of Eric do not tend to show that he was merely coerced. This is, however, academic considering
his turning state witness.
Accused-appellant Navarro's assertion that he was only implicated fails to persuade. His direct involvement in the
conspiracy is clearly shown in that: (1) the testimony of Rosales shows Navarro's involvement with Chung; (2) the unanimous
testimonies of Calaguas, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross to the effect that Navarro was together with Chung in their meetings before
the kidnapping and Navarro was with them when they went to Eric Teng's place on December 14, 1994; (3) Navarro's admission
caught on camera during the December 17, 1994 press conference that he made calls to negotiate the ransom which bolsters
Eric's testimony that he recognized the voice of Navarro as the negotiator calling his residence; (4) Navarro received PhP100,000
from Chung in the evening of December 15, 1994 at the Bowling Inn; (5) Navarro was with Chung when Patrick Teng was
delivered by the other accused in the parking lot of Philippine Westin Plaza.
Similarly, accused-appellant Chung's assertion that he was only implicated flies from logic given that not only Rosales
pinned him as the mastermind but that the other accused testified to the effect that together with Navarro he orchestrated the
kidnapping. The foregoing clearly shows his involvement: (1) per Pajarillo's admission during the December 17, 1994 press
conference, Chung provided the guns; (2) Chung's admission to Eric through a phone call he made at noon on December 16,
1994 asking pardon and forgiveness; (3) Chung gave misleading information to Eric about his being intercepted when he was
supposed to deliver the ransom money; (4) Chung proceeded to his parents' place in Paco and gave PhP50,000 from the ransom
money to his mother; (5) Chung left the remaining PhP2.35 million in his parents' place without telling Eric about it; (6) Chung
took Patrick from the other accused at the parking lot of Philippine Westin Plaza shortly before midnight of December 15, 1994
without paying the ransom; (7) Chung brought Patrick back home without telling Eric upon their arrival about the ransom money.
Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. 135
Bobby Bringas' participation either
as accomplice or as co-conspirator
not established
As to Bobby Bringas, it is undisputed that he did not participate in the actual kidnapping. He was in Pampanga from
December 10, 1994 until he was arrested together with the others on December 16, 1994. It may be true that the other accused
brought Patrick to Bobby Bringas' place but it was not shown that Bobby Bringas took care of Patrick as the group moved to
different places. It was neither clearly shown that Bobby Bringas recruited the other accused to carry out the kidnapping. It was
only Rosales' testimony that Bobby Bringas asked him to drive. Aside from that, the fact alone that the other accused went to
his place does not point to his direct involvement in the conspiracy considering that he knows them. He worked as driver for the
mother of Rosales and Pajarillo is his kumpare. There is therefore no clear and convincing evidence of Bobby Bringas' direct
involvement either in the kidnapping of Patrick or in the conspiracy to its commission.
In the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the accused in the commission of the crime, conspiracy
must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. 136 Given our observation that the
involvement of Rosales was not merely of a person under coercion, there is reasonable doubt as to Bobby Bringas' involvement
for it was Jimboy Bringas who brought or recruited Sulayao and Calaguas from Pampanga. There is therefore a palpable
reasonable doubt of the existence of conspiracy on the part of Bobby Bringas. The presence of reasonable doubt as to the
existence of conspiracy suffices to negate not only the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense as principal
but also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as accessory or accomplice, the criminal liability of the
accused. 137 Consequently, Bobby Bringas must be acquitted from the crime of kidnapping for ransom. CSTcEI
The penalty for kidnapping for ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC, as amended, would have been the supreme penalty
of death. However, the passage of RA 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty has banned the death penalty
and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. 138
Award of damages modified
Anent the award of damages, we find proper the award of actual damages against Navarro in the amount of
PhP100,000 with legal interest of 12% from December 15, 1994 until fully paid. We, however, find the award of PhP5 million as
moral damages and PhP2 million as exemplary damages to be exorbitant and not in accord with jurisprudence.
 41

In line with current jurisprudence, 139 an award of PhP50,000 as civil indemnity is proper. An award of PhP200,000 as
moral damages is likewise proper considering the minority of Patrick. 140 Moreover, when the crime of kidnapping is attended
by a demand for ransom, by way of example or correction, PhP100,000 exemplary damages is also proper. 141
With the affirmance of the conviction of accused appellants Jimboy Bringas, Navarro and Chung, they are jointly and
severally liable together with Ross, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguas for the payment of the damages awarded.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeals of accused-appellants Christopher Bringas, John Robert Navarro and Eden Sy Chung
are DENIED; while the appeal of accused-appellant Bryan Bringas is GRANTED. Accordingly, the January 3, 2006 Decision and
June 6, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar
as the amount of the damages awarded and the acquittal of Bryan Bringas. As modified, the dispositive portion of the March
26, 1999 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 258 in Parañaque City, pertaining to Criminal Case No. 95-137,
for Kidnapping for Ransom, shall read:
In Criminal Case No. 95-137, for KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, finding accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia;
JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER CALAGUAS y Jimenez; and EDEN SY CHUNG
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
The instant criminal charge is DISMISSED as to accused ERICSON PAJARILLO y Baser and EDGARDO SULAYAO y
Petilla on account of their death pursuant to Article 89, 1 of the Revised Penal Code. IHCESD
The accused JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz is hereby directed to pay Eric Teng the sum of PhP100,000.00 as
actual damages with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from December 15, 1994 until fully paid.
The accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia; JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER
CALAGUAS y Jimenez; ERICSON PAJARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla and EDEN SY CHUNG are
directed to pay Eric Teng jointly and severally the amount of PhP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP200,000.00
as moral damages; and PhP100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accused BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA is hereby ACQUITTED for reasonable doubt as to his involvement.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Nachura, Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Bringas y Garcia, G.R. No. 189093, [April 23, 2010], 633 PHIL 486-523)
 42

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162808. April 22, 2008.]
FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner, vs. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
and Other Law Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1 VALENTINO
RUFANO, and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the October 30, 2003
Resolution 1 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices — Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B,
filed by Feliciano Galvante 2 (petitioner) against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1 Valentino
Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary detention, illegal search and grave threats; and the January
20, 2004 Ombudsman Order 3 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur, private respondents confiscated from
petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live
ammunitions. 4 The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999. 5
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an Information 6 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5047, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case, docketed as
Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG); 7 and a criminal case, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search
and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman. 8
In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner narrated how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents
aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon after having lunch
for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy. Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and
inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen;
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin
Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a ride from the highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I
immediately went down of the jeep but before I could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform
blocked my way;
3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP
both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1
Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l. Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan,
Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the sound of
the release of the safety lock;
4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG"
which means "Give me your firearm", to which I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as
"I have no firearm", showing my waistline when I raised my T-shirt;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and showed their waistline
when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their
firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his house told them not to
harass me as I am also a former police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;
6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner
type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant;
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and asked me of the MR of
the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to us, I searched my wallet and
gave the asked [sic] document;
8 That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without saying anything bringing with them
the firearm;
9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento Police Station where I saw a person
in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, to which I asked the police officers including
those who searched my jeep to apprehend him also;
 43

10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the armed civilian person
so I went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who immediately called the armed civilian to his
office and when already inside his office, the disarming was done;
11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said person by Police Chief Rocacorba and
was released only at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;
12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing cases of Illegal Search, Grave
Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1
Ramil Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran. 9
Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit 10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo Sanoria and Percival Plaza.
Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002, where he interposed the following defenses:
First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of Police/Officer-in-Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro
Mehos Rocacorba who ordered the detention. Petitioner himself admitted this fact in his own Complaint-Affidavit; 11 and
Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle, 12 but admits that even though he was not armed with a warrant, he searched the
person of petitioner as the latter, in plain view, was committing a violation of COMELEC Resolutions No. 3258 and No. 3328 by
carrying a firearm in his person.
Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-Affidavit dated March 25, 2002, which contradicts the
statements of private respondent Conde, viz.:
1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where we stated among other things,
that "we saw Feleciano "Nani" Galvante armed with a handgun/pistol tucked on his waist";
2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that the said handgun was taken by
SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who was acting as our team leader during the May 14, 2001 Elections,
from the jeep of Mr. Galvante after searching the same; and
3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated August 28, 2001 after we have
already affixed our signatures thereon. 13
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with both the IAS and Ombudsman, absolving
private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in
both administrative and criminal cases. 14
On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, finding all private respondents guilty of grave
misconduct but penalized them with suspension only. The IAS noted however that private respondents were merely being
"[enthusiastic] in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty." 15
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance
the Issuance of or Recall the Warrant of Arrest. 16 The RTC granted the same in an Order 17 dated August 17, 2001. Upon
reinvestigation, Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss" dated November 22, 2001,
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5047 on the ground that "the action of the policemen who conducted the
warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the
security of his property." 18 Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano Pag-ong approved said recommendation. 19
The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order 20 dated January 16, 2003.
Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047, Ombudsman Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L.
Garcia issued in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, the October 30, 2003 Resolution, to wit:
After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable cause for any of the offenses
charged against above-named respondents.
The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the complaint, it appearing from
the records that the incident stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an
affidavit of desistance by the complainant rendered the complaint even more uncertain and subject to doubt,
especially so since it merely exculpated some but not all of the respondents. These circumstances, coupled
with the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, negates any criminal liability on the part of
the respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the above-captioned case be dismissed
for lack of probable cause. 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military Orlando C. Casimiro
(Deputy Ombudsman) approved the October 30, 2003 Resolution. 22

In his Motion for Reconsideration, 23 petitioner called the attention of the Ombudsman to the earlier IAS Decision, the
Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC Order, all of which declared the warrantless
search conducted by private respondents illegal, 24 which are contradicted by the October 30, 2003 Ombudsman Resolution
declaring the warrantless search legal.
 44

The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the latter offered "no new evidence or errors
of law which would warrant the reversal or modification" 25 of its October 30, 2003 Resolution.
Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro, Director Blancaflor and Prosecutor Garcia (public
respondents) the following acts of grave abuse of discretion:
I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Resolution dated October 30, 2003, public
respondents found that the incident upon which petitioner's criminal complaint was based stemmed from a
valid warrantless arrest and dismissed petitioner's complaint despite the fact that:
A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the private respondents was made
without a valid warrant, nor does it fall under any of the instances of valid warrantless searches.
B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was arrested and detained by the
private respondents.
II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Order dated January 20, 2004, public respondents
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a capricious, whimsical, despotic and arbitrary
manner. 26
In its Memorandum, 27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public respondents acted within the bounds of their
discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-0109-B given that private respondents committed no crime in searching petitioner and
confiscating his firearm as the former were merely performing their duty of enforcing the law against illegal possession of firearms
and the COMELEC ban against the carrying of firearms outside of one's residence.
Private respondent Conde filed a Comment 28 and a Memorandum for himself. 29 Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano
and Balolot filed their separate Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004. 30
The petition lacks merit.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. 31 The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains
from interfering when the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman, 32 except when the
same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 33
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. 34 This
does not obtain in the present case.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman charges private respondents with warrantless
search, arbitrary detention, and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is
not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. — In
addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty
ofarresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding
P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant
without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary
severity in executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall
search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of
his family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused private
respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not
covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, 35 under Article 32, in relation to Article
2219 36 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
xxx xxx xxx
 45

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975. 37
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint for damages with the regular courts 38 or an
administrative case with the PNP/DILG, 39 as petitioner did in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, and not a criminal action
with the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private
respondents was therefore proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the
mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the
Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint. 40 Public respondents completely
overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense.
Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an
offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their finding on
the validity of the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge
for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the
complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds. 41 The second element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-
Complaint. As pointed out by private respondent Conde in his Comment 42 and Memorandum, 43 petitioner himself identified in
his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege
that private respondents effected his detention, or were in any other way involved in it. 44 There was, therefore, no factual or legal
basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly pointed out that the same is based merely on
petitioner's bare allegation that private respondents aimed their firearms at him. 45Such bare allegation stands no chance against
the well-entrenched rule applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official function. 46 The IAS itself observed that private respondents may have been carried away by their "enthusiasm in the
conduct of the arrest in line of duty". 47 Petitioner expressed the same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that
private respondents may have been merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at him.
All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against private
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Galvante v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 162808, [April 22, 2008], 575 PHIL 324-338)
 46

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198694. February 13, 2013.]
RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the June 30, 2011 Decision 2 and September
20, 2011 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32544 which affirmed the April 30, 2009 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08-258669, convicting petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon
Goco y Martinez (Ramon) of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs punished under Section 11 (3), Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (RA 9165), otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Factual Antecedents
At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2 Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe (PO2 Cepe) and PO3
Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta), who were all assigned to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate Police Station 9 (Police
Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting "Putang
ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (Manila City
Ordinance) which punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later identified as Ramon, was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon to Police Station 9 where the
former marked the item with the latter's initials, "RMG." There, Police Superintendent Ferdinand Ricafrente Quirante (PSupt
Quirante) prepared a request for laboratory examination which, together with the specimen, was brought by PO2 Soque to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. HCDaAS
Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Erickson Calabocal (PSInsp Calabocal) examined the specimen which contained 0.173 gram
of white crystalline substance and found the same positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu).
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11 (3), Article II of RA 9165 through an
Information dated January 3, 2008 which states:
That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
ZERO POINT ONE SEVEN THREE (0.173) gram of white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride known as SHABU, a dangerous drug. 5
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the incident. He narrated that on December 29, 2007, at around 4:00
in the afternoon, while walking along Balingkit Street to borrow a welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing
approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man who
eventually introduced himself as a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) where the said officer asked him if he
was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque propositioned
Ramon and asked for P20,000.00 in exchange for his release. When Ramon's wife, Amalia Goco, was unable to produce the
P20,000.00 which PO2 Soque had asked for, Ramon was brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest proceedings. TIEHDC
The RTC Ruling
In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs as charged, finding all its
elements to have been established through the testimonies of the prosecution's disinterested witnesses. In this relation, it also
upheld the legality of Ramon's warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City
Ordinance during the time of his apprehension. Consequently, Ramon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
Aggrieved, Ramon elevated his conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its June 30, 2011 Decision, the CA denied Ramon's appeal and thereby affirmed his conviction. It upheld the factual findings of the
RTC which found that the elements of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs were extant, to wit: (1) that the accused is in
possession of a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. 6
Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body search made on Ramon as an incident of a lawful warrantless arrest for breach of
the peace which he committed in the presence of the police officers, notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the peace)
subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Moreover, the CA observed that every link in the chain of custody of the prohibited drug was sufficiently established from the time
PO2 Soque took the same up to its actual presentation in court.
Finally, it did not give credence to Ramon's claim of extortion as his asseverations failed to overcome the presumption of regularity
in the performance of the police officers' official duties. EDISTc
The Issue
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The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon of the crime
of possession of dangerous drugs.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person's right against unwarranted intrusions by the government. Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states that:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by government authorities in
contravention of the foregoing are rendered inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section 3
(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that:
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to Section 2] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. SDHITE
Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription is not, however, an absolute and rigid one. 7 As found in
jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs searches, 8 searches of moving vehicles, 9 seizure of evidence in plain
view, 10 consented searches, 11 "stop and frisk" measures 12 and searches incidental to a lawful arrest. 13 This last-mentioned
exception is of particular significance to this case and thus, necessitates further disquisition.
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the parameters of Section 5 (a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court 14 which requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a
person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 15 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 16 In
this light, the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.
Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance which provides as
follows:
Sec. 844. Breaches of the Peace. — No person shall make, and, countenance, or assist in making any riot, affray,
disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; or assault, beat or use personal violence upon another without
just cause in any public place; or utter any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibit
or display any emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device, instrument, or thing; or do any
act, in any public place, meeting or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturbance or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly.
PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6) months and/or fine not more than Two Hundred pesos
(PHP200.00)
As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing ordinance penalizes the following acts: (1) making, countenancing, or assisting in making
any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; (2) assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another without
just cause in any public place; (3) uttering any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibiting or displaying
any emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device, instrument, or thing; and (4) doing any act, in any public place,
meeting or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful
purpose, or disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly. Evidently, the gravamen of these offenses is
the disruption of communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be established that the
apprehension was effected after a reasonable assessment by the police officer that a public disturbance is being committed. TAESDH
In this regard, PO2 Soque's testimony detailed the surrounding circumstances leading to Ramon's warrantless warrant, viz.:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
ASST. CITY PROS. YAP:
Q: Tell the Court, what happened when you were there on patrol?
A: While we were on routinary patrol we heard a man shouting on top of his voice telling "Putang ina mo!
Limang daan na ba ito?" pointing to his right front pocket, sir.
Q: There was a shouting, where was this man shouting, where was the shouting came from?
A: Along the street of Balingkit, sir.
Q: How far were you from this shouting, as you said?
A: About ten (10) meters, sir.
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Q: Tell the Court what happened, what next follows?

A: We proceeded to the voice where it came from, then, we saw a man, sir.
Q: Who was that man?
A: Goco, sir.
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: Ramon Martinez Goco, sir. HCEcAa
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: He is the one that we apprehended, sir.
Q: What was he doing then when you said you responded immediately, when you saw a man?
A: We saw him shouting on top of his voice, sir.
Q: That is why you came near him, the one who shouted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, what did you do, Mr. Witness, together with your other co-operatives?
A: We apprehended him for bringing [sic] the silence of the serenity of the place, sir.
Q: What time was that already at that time, the incident of shouting?
A: Past 9:00, sir.
Q: Who actually accosted Goco, the one who shouted?
A: Me, sir.
Q: Tell the Court, how many were there at that time present with Goco?
A: They scampered away when they saw the police were coming near the place, sir, they scampered in different
directions.
Q: Tell the Court what were Cepe and Zeta doing also when you approached the accused?
A: They followed me, sir. ACcaET
Q: So, tell the Court what happened when you approached accused therein Goco?
A: We apprehended Goco for violation for alarm scandal, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 17
CROSS EXAMINATION:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. AMURAO:
Q: So, just like Leveriza, Balingkit is also thickly populated?
PO2 Soque:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there are many people outside their houses?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And I can imagine everybody there outside was talking also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I was very noisy, everybody talking, altogether?
A: They were talking casually.
xxx xxx xxx 18
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of probable cause when the police officers conducted their
warrantless arrest of Ramon. SacTCA
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place, with many people conversing with each other on
the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon was
not making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using
personal violence upon another; and, the words he allegedly shouted — "Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" — are not
slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time
of the incident, Balingkit Street was still teeming with people and alive with activity.
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Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest ever complained that Ramon's shouting disturbed the public. On
the contrary, a disinterested member of the community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely standing
in front of the store of a certain Mang Romy when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon,
immediately handcuffed and took him away. 19
In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and circumstances could not have engendered a well-founded belief that any breach
of the peace had been committed by Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected. All told, no probable cause existed
to justify Ramon's warrantless arrest.
Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the
law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of
suspending his liberty, 20 this should not be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a person's liberty be subjected to ubiquitous abuse.
As law enforcers, it is largely expected of them to conduct a more circumspect assessment of the situation at hand. The determination
of probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates the line
between legitimate human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible criminal activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be
performed wisely and cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as
constitutionally guaranteed rights lie at the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be clothed with utmost
conscientiousness, as well as impelled by a higher sense of public accountability. IHTaCE
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested, the warrantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus,
the subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as
mandated by the above-discussed constitutional provisions. In this regard, considering that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, Ramon's acquittal should therefore come as a matter of course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and September 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32544 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ramon Martinezy Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

||| (Martinez y Goco v. People, G.R. No. 198694, [February 13, 2013], 703 PHIL 609-623)