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Beena Marriage, Where The Husband Visited The Wife But Did Not Bring Her Ho M E, T He W I Fe

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CHAPTER-IINTRODUCTION

One of the essential parts of Muslim marriage is “dower” paid or promised to be paid byt he h us b an d
to t he w if e. Wi tho ut m a h r a n ik a h c an no t b e sa i d to h av e bee n p ro pe rly solemnised.
Dower money must be paid or fixed before the solemnisation of a marriage.Dower must not, however
be confused with “dowry” which consists of presents made byfather and other relations of the
bride and Muslim Law does not make any provision for p aym e nt o f do w ry. D o we r i s the
s um o f m o ney o r o t her pro p e rty w h ic h t he w ife i sentitled to receive from the husband in
consideration of marriage.
1
The amount of dower may be fixed either before or at the time of marriage of after marriage. The law
does notsay anything about the quantum of dower. The amount of dower is generally split into
two p a r t s -
“prompt dower” which is payable immediately on demand by the wife and“
deferred dower” which is payable only on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce. Inthis present
endeavour the author would try to explain in detail the types of dower and theeffect of non-payment of
dower. Some of the important cases with respect to dower wouldalso be analysed.
1
D.F. Mulla, Principles of Mohammedan Law, 17th Ed.P.277
5

CHAPTER-IIDEFINITION
PRIOR to Islam, two kinds of material gifts were prevalent. In a certain type of marriage,the so-called
Beena marriage, where the husband visited the wife but did not bring her ho m e, t he w i fe
w as ca ll ed sadiqa o r f e m a l e f r i e n d , a n d a g i f t g i v e n t o t h e w i f e o n marriage was
called sadaq.‘In Islam sadaq simply means a dowry and is synonymouswith mahr.
But originally the two words were quite distinct: sadaqis a gift to the wife and
mahr

to the parents of the wife.’


2
The latter term belongs to the marriage of dominion,which is known as the
baal
marriage, where the wife’s people part with her and have to be compensated. Now
mahr
i n t he
baal
fo rm o f m a rr ia ge wa s u se d by t he P ro p he t to am el io r ate t he po s it io n o f t he w i fe in
I s lam , a n d it w as co m b i ne d w it h
sadaq
, s o t h a t i t b e c a m e a settlement or a provision for the wife. In Islamic law,
mahr
belongs absolutely to thewife.
3
Thus, historically speaking, the idea of sale is latent in the law of
mahr
(dower).Justice Mahmood defines dower as follows:‘
D ower , u nd er t he M uh a mma d a n l aw , is a su m of mo ne y or ot her pr op er t y promised
by the husband to be paid or delivered to the wife in consideration of
them a r r i a g e , a n d e v e n w h e r e n o d o w e r i s e x p r e s s l y f i x e d o r m e n t i o n e d a t t h
e marriage ceremony, the law confers the right of dower upon the wife
.’
4
2
Robert Smith,
Kinship
, 93
as cited from
Asaf.A.A.Fyzee,
Outlines of Muhammadan Law
, (OxfordUniversity Press, 4
th
Edition, 2002) p.132
3
Kor. iv, 4; Ameer Ali, II, 461-2;
Fat. Law
δ 70
as cited from
Asaf.A.A.Fyzee,
Outlines of Muhammadan Law
, (Oxford University Press, 4
th
Edition, 2002) p.132
4

Abdul Kadir
v.
Salima
(1886) 8 All. 149
6

It is not ‘consideration’ in the modern sense of the term; but an obligation imposed by thelaw upon the
husband as a mark of respect to the wife.
5
This is made abundantly clear bythe author of the
Hedaya
when he says:‘
The payment of dower is enjoined by the law merely as
a token of respect
for itsobject (the women), wherefore the mention of it is not absolutely essential to
thev a l i d i t y o f a m a r r i a g e ; a n d , f o r t h e s a m e r e a s o n , a m a r r i a g e i s a l s o
v a l i d , although the man were to engage in the contract on the special condition that there
should be no dower.

6
There is no doubt that
mahr
was originally analogous to sale-price, but since the inceptionof Islam it is hardly correct to regard it as
the price of connubial intercourse. If the authorsof the Arabic text-books on Muhammadan law
have compared it to price in the law of sale, it is simply because marriage is regarded as a civil
contract in the system.In pre-Islamic Arabia,
sadaq
was a gift to the wife; but
mahr
was paid to the wife’s father,and could therefore be regarded as tantamount to sale -price. But
when Islam insisted onit s pay m e nt to the w ife , it co u l d no lo n ge r b e re ga r ded st r ict ly
a s a s a le
7
. T h us I sl am sought to make
mahr
into a real settlement in favour of the wife, a provision for a rainyday and, socially, it
became a check on the capricious exercise by the husband o f hisalmost unlimited power of
divorce. A husband thinks twice before divorcing a wife whenhe knows that upon divorce the whole of
the dower would be payable immediately.The Muslim concept of dower has no reference to the
price that under some systems of law was paid to the father of the bride when she was
given in marriage. On the other hand, it is considered a debt with consideration (for
submission of her person by thewife). The result is that dower is purely in the nature of a
marriage settlement and is for co ns id er at io n . I t is a cl a im a ri si n g o u t o f co nt ra ct by
t he h us b an d a n d a s su c h ha s
5
Abdur Rahim, 334.
as cited from
Asaf.A.A.Fyzee,
Outlines of Muhammadan Law
, (Oxford UniversityPress, 4
th
Edition, 2002) p.133
6
Hamilton’s
Hedava
,2
nd
ed. By Grady, 44, cited by Mahmood J. in
Abdul Kadir
v.
Salima
(1886) 8 All. 149at 157-8.
7
Robert Smith,
Kinship
, 92-3, 111; Ameer Ali shows how the change was effected, II, 432-4, 461-3
as cited from
Asaf.A.A.Fyzee,
Outlines of Muhammadan Law
, (Oxford University Press, 4
th
Edition, 2002) p.133
7

preference to (
sic
) bequests and inheritance, but on no principle of Muhammadan law it can have priority over
the contractual debts
8
T he be st ge ne ra l o bs er v at io ns o n do we r are tho se o f L o rd P a rke r o f Wa d d in gto n i n
Hamira Bibi
v.
Zubaida Bibi
9

:‘
Dower is an essential incident under the Mussulman law to the status of m
arriage; to such an extent this is so that when it is unspecified at the time the mar r i a ge is
c o ntr a cte d th e l aw dec l ar e s t h at it mu st be a dj u dg ed o n d ef in it e principles. Regarded as
a consideration for the marriage, it is, in theory, payablebefore consummation; but the law allows its
division into two parts, one of whichis c a ll ed ‘ pr omp t’ , p ay a bl e be for e t he wi fe c a n be
c a l le d u po n t o en ter th e conjugal domicil; the other ‘deferred’, payable on the dissolution of the
contract by the death of either of the parties or by divorce…..But the dower ranks as a debt,
and the wife is entitled, along with the other creditors, to have it satisfied onthe death of the husband
out of his estate. Her right, however, is no greater than that of any other unsecured creditor,
except that if she lawfully obtains possessionof the whole or part of his estate, to satisfy her claim
with the rents and issuesaccruing therefrom, she is entitled to retain such possession until it
is satisfies.This is called the widow’s lien for dower, and this is the only creditor’s lien of
theMussulman law which has received recognition in the British Indian Courts and at this
Board.

AMOUNT OF DOWER
8
Per Khaliluzzaman J. in
Kapore Chand
v.
Kadar Unnissa
, [1950] S.C.R. 747 at 751
9
(1916) 43 I.A. 294 at 300-1; also cited in
Syed Sabir Husain
v.
Farzand Hasan
(1937) 65 I.A. 119 at 127.
8

The amount of
mahr
may either be fixed or not; if it is fixed, it cannot be a sum less thanthe minimum laid down by the law.
Minimum Dower
1)Hanafi law - 10
dirhams
2)
Maliki
law - 3
dirhams
3)
Shafii
law – No fixed minimum4 )S h i ite l aw – No m i nim u m f ix ed . A
dirham
(Persian,
diram
, a word derived from the Greek) is the name of a silver coin 2.97 gram in weight
10
, and is usually valued at 3-4 annnas or 20-25 paise. In India, it has been held that the value of ten
dirhams
is something between Rs.3 and 4
11
. Thus it will beseen that the minimum doer fixed by the law can hardly be deemed to be an
adequate provision for the wife. In fact, it would be a mistake to lay too great a stress upon
themonetary value of the minimum dower. It is said that in the case of an extremely
poor man, the Prophet requested him to teach the Koran to his wife, and this was considered bythe
Lawgiver to be an adequate requital of the husband’s obligation.Among the Muslims of India two
distinct tendencies are to be found in society. In somecases, as in the
Sulaymani
Bohoras, the dower is Rs. 40, it being considered a point of honour not to stipulate for a
sum higher than the minimum fixed by the Prophet for his favourite daughter
Fatima
, t he w i fe o f Al i, n am e ly 5 0 0
dirhams
. Among certain other communities, there are dowers of anything between a hundred and a
thousand rupees;Am eer
A l i m e nt io ns am o u nt s be twee n fo u r to fo rty tho u sa n d r u pee s. An alto ge th er differen
t tendency is to be found in Uttar Pradesh, and also to some extent in Hyderabad,Deccan, where the
absurd rule appears to be that the nobler the family, the higher the
mahr
, regardless of the husband’s ability to pay or capacity to earn.
CHAPTER- III
10
According to Wilson’s
Glossary
, ‘a silver coin 45-50 grains in weight, rather heavier than six pence’.
11

Asma Bibi
v.
Abdul Samad
(1909) 32 All. 167.
9

TYPES OF DOWER
We have seen that dower is payable whether the sum has been fixed or not, Ali said:‘ Th ere
c a n be no m a r ri ag e wi t ho u t
mahr
’ . Th u s, do we r m ay , f ir st o f al l , be e it he r specified or not specified. In the latter case, it is
called
mahr al-mithl
, Proper Dower, or to b e st ri ct ly li ter al , ‘t he do we r o f t he l ike ’. I f the do we r h as bee n
s pe ci f ied , the n t he question may be whether it is prompt (
mu‘ajjal
) or deferred (
muwajjal
, strictly
mu’ajjal
).Thus we have two kinds of dower in Islam:A . S p e c i f i e d D o w e r (
al-mahr

al-musamma
); andB. U ns pec i fie d D o we r o r P ro pe r D o we r (
mahr al mithl
).Specified Dower may be again be divided into-

Prompt -
mu‘ajjal
, and

Deferred -
mu’ajjal
.In (A) and (B) the question before the court is the amount payable: in (I) and (II) the question
is the time when payment has to be made.
A.
Specified Dower
(al-mahru al-musamma)
12

Usually the
mahr
is fixed at the time of marriage and the
kazi
performing the
ceremonye n t e r s t h e a m o u n t i n t h e r e g i s t e r ; o r e l s e t h e r e m a y b e a r e g u l a r c o
ntract called
kabinnama
, w it h num e ro us co n di t io n s. T he sum m ay be f ixe d e it he r at the tim e o f marriage or
later, and a father’s contract on behalf of a minor son is binding on the minor.Where a father stipulates
on behalf of his son, in Hanafi law, the father is not personallyliable for the
mahr
; b ut
aliter
in
Ithna ‘Ashari law.
In
Syed Sabir Husain
v.
Farzand Hasan,
a Shiite father had made himself surety for the payment of the
mahr
of his minor son. Thereafter he died, and it was held that the estate of the deceased was
liable for the
12
Also called
mahr al-‘aqd
.
10

payment of his son’s


mahr.
Accordingly each heir was made responsible for a portion of the wife’s claim in proportion to the share
received by the particular heir on distributionfrom the estate of the deceased. The heirs were, however,
liable only to the extend of theassets received by them from the deceased, and not personally
13
.Where the amount has been specified, the husband will be compelled to pay the whole of it, however
excessive it may seem to the court, having regard to the husband’s means; butin Oudh, only a
reasonable amount will be decreed, if the court deems the amoun t to beexcessive or fictitous
14
.
B.
Unspecified Dower (
mahr al-mithl

15

The obligation to pay dower is a legal responsibility on the part of the husband and is
notde pe n de nt u po n an y co nt ra ct be twee n
t he p ar tie s; i n o t he r wo rd s, i f m a rr i age , the n dower
16
.Where the dower is specified, any amount, however excessive, may be stipulatedfor. But what are
the principles upon which the amount of dower is to be determined where no agreement
exits?The customary or proper dower of a woman is to be fixed with reference to the
social position of her father’s family and her own personal qualifications. The social position of the
husband and his means are of little account. The
Hedaya
lays down the important rulethat her ‘age, beauty, fortune, understanding and virtue’ must be taken
into consideration.Islamic marriage, therefore, safeguards the rights of a wife and attempts to ensure
her aneconomic status consonant with her own social standing. Historically speaking, and
onthe analogy of sale, it is permissible to ask: ‘What have the circumstances of a purchaser to do with
the intrinsic value of the thing he buys?’ The answer is that the Indian courts no
13
(1937) 65 I.A. 119.
14
This is called ‘fictitious dower’. Sometimes for the purpose of ‘glorification’ a larger
mahr
is announced, but the real
mahr
is smaller. Such a
mahr
for the purposes of ‘show’ is know as
sum‘a
.
15
Ameer Ali calls it the ‘customary’ dower.
16
This has been emphasized by the Privy Council in
Syed Sabir Husain’s Case,
(1937) 65 I.A. 119
11
longer consider marriage as a form of sale or barter, and do not proceed upon the analogythat dower is
the price of consortium.In fixing the amount of the proper dower, regard is to be had to the
amount fixed in thecase of the other female members of the wife’s family. ‘
Mahr
is an essential incidentunder the Mussalman law to the status of marriage; to such an extend that is
so that whenit is unspecified at the time the marriage is contracted the law declares that it
must beadjudged on definite principles’.
17
The main consideration is the social position of the bride’s father’s family, and the court
will consider the dowers fixed upon her female paternal relation such as sisters or paternal aunts
who are considered to be her equals.The Prophet once allowed the marriage of an indigent
person for a silver ring; and onanother occasion, merely on the condition that the husband should
teach the Koran to hiswife. In Hanafi law, where the specified dower is less than 10
dirhams
, the wife is entitledonly to the minimum, namely 10
dirhams
, a n d in
Ithna ‘Ashari law
, the proper dower can never exceed 500
dirhams
, the dower fixed for the Prophet’s daughter
Fatima.
Thus,among the Shiites there are three kinds of
mahr
:i.
Mahr-e sunat
, the dower supported by tradition, i.e. 500
dirhams
;ii.
Mahr-e mithl
, ‘ the do wer o f th e like ’, o r t he do wer o f a n eq ua l , w hi ch i s t he technical name for
proper or unspecified dower; andiii.
Mahr-e musamma
,
the specified dower.
Prompt
(mu‘ajjal)
and Deferred
(mu’ajjal)
dower
When the dower is specified, the question arises: At what times and in what proportions isthe amount
payable? Here two somewhat puzzling terms are used and it is necessary to
17

Syed Sabir Husain’s Case,


(1937) 65 I.A. 119
12
distinguish carefully between them. The technical term for ‘prompt’ dower is
mu‘ajjal
. Itis derived from a root meaning ‘to hasten, to preced’. The term
mu‘ajjal
, therefore, means‘that which has been hastened or given a priority in point of time’. The
term
mu’ajjal
,however, means ‘delayed, deferred’, and comes from a root which means ‘to delay
or postpone’. Written in the original Arabic there would be no cause for confusion, but in theusual
English forms of spelling the words often puzzle those who are not familiar with theArabic
tongue.Prompt dower is payable immediately after the marriage, if demanded by the wife;
whiledeferred dower is payable on the dissolution of the marriage or on the happening of
aspecified event. When dower is fixed, it is usual to split it into two equal parts and
tostipulate that one shall be paid at once or on demand, and the other on the death of
thehusband or divorce or the happening of some specified event. But a difficulty arises whenit is not
settled whether the dower is prompt or deferred.In
Ithna ‘Ashari law
the presumption is that the whole of the dower is prompt; but in Hanafi law the position is
different. The whole of the dower may be promptly awarded
18
; but a recent Full Bench decision lays down first, that where the
kabin-nama

is silent onthe question, the usage of the wife’s family is the main consideration; and secondly, thatin
the absence of proof of custom, the presumption is that one -half is prompt, and theother
half deferred, and the proportion may be changed to suit particular cases.
INCREASE OR DECREASE OF DOWER
The husband may at any time after marriage increase the dower. Likewise, the wife mayrem it t he
d o we r, w ho lly o r p ar ti a lly ; a n d a M us lim g ir l who h as at ta i ned pu b er ty is competent
to relinquish her
mahr
, although she may not have attained majority (18 years)
18
Per J. Mahmood in A
bdul Kadir
v.
Salima
, (1886) 8 All. 149;
Husseinkhan
v.
Gulab Khatum
(sic) (1911)35 Bom 386.
13
within the meaning of the Indian Majority Act
19
. The remission of the
mahr
by a wife iscalled
hibat al-mahr
or
hiba-e mahr
.It has, however, been held in Karachi that in certain cases remission of dower cannot
beupheld. For instance, if a wife feels that the husband is increasingly showing indifferenceto her and
the only possible way to retain the affection of her husband is to give up her claim for
mahr
and forgoes her claim by executing a document, she is not a free agent andit may be against justice and
equity to hold that she is bound by the terms of the deed
20
.
CHAPTER- IVNON-PAYMENTOFDOWER
The claim of the wife or widow for the unpaid portion of the
mahr
is an unsecured debtdue to her from her husband or his estate, respectively. It ranks
rateably with unsecured
19

Qasim Husain
v.
Bibi Kaniz
, (1932) 54 All. 806
20

Shah Bano
v.
Iftekar Muhammed
PLD 1956 (W.P.) Kar. 363.
14

debts, and is an actionable claim. During her lifetime the wife can recover the debt herself from the
estate of the deceased husband. If she predeceases the husband, the heirs of thewife,
including the husband, become entitled to her dower. A lady, whose
mahr
was Rs.50,000, received from her husband during his lifetime sums of money in the
aggregateexceeding the
mahr
settled on her. The largest of such payments was Rs. 3,000. Therewas no evidence that
these payments were intended by the husband to satisfy the doer debt. The question arose
whether these payments satisfied the husband’s obligation. TheJudicial Committee held that such
payments were not to be treated as having been madein satisfaction of the dower debt.
21
Non-payment of Prompt Dower
If the husband refuses the pay prompt dower, the guardian of a minor wife has the right torefuse to
allow her to be sent to the husband’s house; and similarly, the wife may refusethe husband his
conjugal rights, provided no consummation has taken place. The wife isunder Muhammadan
Law entitled to refuse herself to her husband until the prompt dower is paid; and if in such
circumstances she happens to reside apart from him, the husband is bound to maintain her.
22
This right of refusing her is, however, lost on consummation.
23
Thus if the husband files asuit for restitution of conjugal rights before cohabitation, non-payment of
prompt dower is a complete defence; but after cohabitation, the proper course is to pass a
decree for restitution conditional on the payment of prompt dower. This was laid down in the
leadingcase of
Anis Begam
v.
Muhammad Istafa Wali Khan
.
24
21

Mohammad Sadiq
v.
Fakr Jahan
(1931) 59 I.A. 19.
22

Nur-ud-din Ahmad
v.
Masuda Khanam
PLD 1957 Dacca 242;
Muhammadi
v.
Jamiluddin
PLD 1960Karachi 663.
23
In Lahore it has been held that consummation does not deprive the wife of her right to refuse
conjugalrelations if the prompt dower is not paid,
Rahim Jan
v.
Muhammad
, PLD 1955 Lahore 122;
per contra
,
Rabia Khatoon
v.
Mukhtar Ahmad
AIR (1966) All. 548, which, it is submitted is the correct view.
24
(1933) 55 All. 548. This case is of great importance as Sulaiman C.J. has carefully considered
andcriticized certain dicta of Mahmood J. in the leading case of
Abdul Kadir
v.
Salima
(1886) 8 All. 149
15

Non-payment of Deferred Dower


The non-payment of deferred dower by its very nature cannot confer any such right
of refusal on the wife. The right to enforce payment arises only on death, divorce or
thehappening of a specified event.The dower ranks as a debt and the widow is entitled, along with the
other creditors of her deceased husband to have it satisfied out of his estate. Her right, however, is the
right of an unsecured creditor; she is not entitled to a charge on the husb and’s property,
unlessthere be an agreement. The Supreme Court of India has laid down

i . Th at t he w i do w ha s n o pr i or i ty o ver t h e cr e d it or s, b ut
ii.
That mahr as a debt has priority over the other heirs’ claims.
25
And the heirs of the deceased are not personally liable to pay the dower; they are
liablerateably to the extent of the share of the inheritance which comes to their hands.
The Widow’s Right of Retention
Muhammadan law gives to the widow, whose dower has remained unpaid a very specialright to
enforce her demand. This is known as

‘the widow’s right of retention’. A


widowl awf u lly i n po sse ss io n o f he r de cea sed h us ba n d’ s e sta te is e nt it le d to re ta in s
u c h possession until her dower debt is satisfied.
26
Her right is not in the nature of a regular charge, mortgage or a lien
27
; it is in essence a
personal
right as against heirs and creditorsto enforce her rights; and it is a right to
retain
,
not to obtain
, possession of her husband’s
25
Kapore Chand
v.
Kadar Unnissa
[1950] S.C.R. 747.
26

Mirvahedalli
v.
Rashidbeg
, AIR (1951) Bom. 22
27

Zaibunnissa
v.
Nazim Hasan
, AIR (1962) All. 197
16

estate. Once she loses possession of her husband’s estate, she loses her special right and isin no better
position than an unsecured creditor.
28
The nature of this right was discussed by their lordships of the Privy Council in
Maina Bibi
v.
Chaudhri Vakil Ahmad
29
. One Muinuddin died in 1890 possessed of immovable property leaving him surviving his
widow Maina Bibi, who entered into possession. In1902 some of the heirs filed a suit to recover
possession of their share of the property. Thewidow pleaded that the estate was a gift to her, or
alternatively that she was entitled to possession until her dower was paid. In 1903 the trial judge
made a decree for possessionin favour of the plaintiffs on condition that the plaintiffs paid a
certain sum by way of dower and interest to the widow within six months. This sum was not paid,
however, andthe widow remained in possession, in 1907 Maina Bibi purported to make a gift
of thewhole of her property to certain persons. The original plaintiffs challenged this
gift andthe Privy Council held that the widow had no power to make a gift of the properties, andcould
not convey the share of the heirs to the donees. Their lordships, in discussing the nature of a
widow’s right of retention, said that‘
the possession of the property being once peaceably and lawfully acquired, theright of the
widow to retain it till her dower-debt is paid is conferred upon her byMahomedan Law
’.
30
They further said that it is not exactly an lien, nor a mortgage, usufructuary or other.‘
The widow who holds possession of her husband’s property until she has been paid her dower
has no estate or interest in the property as a mortgagee under anordinary mortgage
’.
31
28

Ibid
29
(1924) 52 I.A. 145.
30

Id
at p. 150.
31

Id
at p. 151.
17

T h us , in es se nce , it is a pe rso na l ri g ht g iv en by M u ham m a d an kaw to s af eg u ar d


t he position of the widow.
32
The Supreme Court has laid down that a Muslim widow in possession of her
deceasedhusband’s estate in lieu of her claims for dower, whether with the consent of the heirs
or otherwise, is not entitled to priority as against his unsecured creditors.
33
There is a conflict of opinion whether in order to retain possession the consent, express or implied, of
the husband or his heirs is necessary. Some judges are of opinion that such consent is
necessary; others, that it is not. It is submitted with great respect, that on first principles, having regard
to the nature of the right, the consent of the husband or his heirsis immaterial. Muhammadan law
casts a special obligation on every debtor to pay hisdebt, and the right of the widow for her
dower is a debt for which the widow has a goodsafeguard. Thus, the question of consent appears
to be immaterial.The right to retention does not confer on the widow any title to the
property. Her rightsare twofold: one, as heir of the deceased and two, as widow entitled
to her dower and, if necessary, to retain possession of the estate until her
mahr
has been paid. The right tohold possession must, therefore, be sharply distinguished from
her right as an heir. Thewidow, in these circumstances, has the right to have the property
administered, her justdebts satisfied and her share of the inheritance ascertained and pa id.
She has no right toalienate the property by sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, and if she attempts to
do so, sheloses her right of
mahr
.There are two other major questions on which the law is still unsettled. Can the widow
transfer
her right of retention? And is this right of retention
heritable
? In
Maina Bibi
v.
Chaudhri Vakil Ahmad
34
their lordships expressed a doubt whether a widow could transfer the dower debt or the right to
retain the estate until the
mahr
was paid. Following thatcase there has been much conflict of judicial opinion on the questions as to
the heritability
32
The Patna High Court has adopted this view,
Abdul Samad
v.
Alimuddin
(1943) 22 Pat. 750.
33

Supra
Note 25
34

Supra
Note 29
18

and transferability of this right. The Mysore and Allahabad High Coutrs have decided thatthe right is
both heritable and transferable
35
; but the Patna High Court has held that thewidow’s is a personal right, and not a lien, and as such,
it is not transferable.
36
Althoughthere is a conflict of opinion, in view of
Kapore Chand’s case
, the balance of authorityseems to be in favour of the Patna view.
CHAPTER- VANALYSIS OF SOME CASES
1)
Mohd. Ahmed Khan

.
Shah Bano Begum and Ors.

37

CITATIONREFERED
MANU/SC/0194/1985
DECIDED ON

23.04.1985
HON’BLE JUDGES

Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., D.A. Desai, E.S. Venkataramiah, O.Chinnappa Reddy and Ranganath Misra, JJ.
35

Hussain
v.
Rahim Khan
AIR (1954) Mysore 24;
Zaibunnissa
v.
Nazim Hasan
AIR (1962) All. 197.
36

Zobair Ahmad
v.
Jainandan Prasad
AIR (1960) Pat. 147.
37
AIR 1985 SC 945
19

FACTS

The appellant, who is an advocate by profession, was married to the respondent in1932. Three sons and
two daughters wire born of that marriage.

In 1975 the appellant drove the respondent out of the matrimonial home.

In April 1978, the respondent filed a petition against the appellant under Section1 2 5 o f th e
Co de i n th e co ur t o f th e le ar ne d J ud ic i al M a g is tr ate ( Fi rst C la ss ), Indore asking for
maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500 per month.

On November 6, 1978 the appellant divorced the respondent by an irrevocabletalaq. His


defence to the respondent’s petition for maintenance was that she hadceased to be his wife
by reason of the divorce granted by him, to provide that hewas therefore under no
obligation maintenance for her, that he had already paidmaintenance to her at the rate of
Rs. 200 per month for about two years and that,h e ha d de po s it ed a su m o f Rs . 3 0 0 0 in
t he co urt b y wa y o f do we r d ur i ng t he period the of
iddat
.

In August, 1979 the learned Magistrate directed appellant to pay a princely sum of Rs. 25 per month to
the respondent by way of maintenance. It may be mentionedthat the respondent had alleged that
the appellant earns a professional income of about Rs. 60,000 per year.

In July, 1980 in a revisional application filed by the respondent, the High court of Madhya Pradesh
enhanced the amount of maintenance to Rs. 179.20 per month.

The husband thus came before the Supreme Court by Special leave.
RELEVANTISSUE

1)Would the payment of


mahr
indemnify the husband from his obligation under the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C?
DECISION

The Court decided that


mahr
is different from a sum payable ‘on divorce’ whichoccurs in Section 127(3)(b) of Cr.P.C and hence does
not indemnify the husbandfrom his obligation under the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C.20

REASONING

I n M u l la ’s p ri nc i pl es o f M a ho m e da n L aw (1 8 t h Ed it io n, p ag e 3 0 8 ) ,
mahr
or Dower is defined in paragraph 285 as “a sum of money or other property which the wife is
entitled to receive from the husband in consideration of the marriage.”

Dr. Paras Diwan in his book, “Muslim Law in Modern India” (1982 Edition,
page6 0 ) , c r i t i c i s e s t h i s d e f i n i t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t
mahr
i s n o t p a y a b l e “ i n consideration of marriage” but is an obligation imposed by law on the
husband asa mark of respect for the wife, as is evident from the fact that non-specification of
mahr
at the time of marriage does not affect the validity of the marriage.

Under the Muslim Personal Law, the amount of


mahr
is usually split into two parts, one of which is called “prompt”, which is payable on demand, and the
other is called “deferred” which is payable on the dissolution of the marriage by death or by
divorce.

B ut , the f act t ha t defe rre d


mahr
i s p aya b le at t he t im e o f t he d is so l ut io n
o f m a rr ia ge , c a nno t ju st i fy t he co nc lu sio n t h at it is p ay ab le ‘o n d iv o rce ’ . Ev e n assumi
ng that, in a given case, the entire amount of
mahr
is of the deferred variety payable on the dissolution of marriage by divorce, it cannot be said
that it is anamount which is payable on divorce.

Divorce maybe a convenient or identifiable point of time at which the deferredamount has to
be paid by the husband to the wife. But, the payment of the amountis not occasioned by the
divorce, which is what is meant by the expression ‘on divorce’, which occurs in Section 127(3)(b)
of the Code.

If
mahr
is an amount which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in co ns i de rat io n o f
t he m ar r ia ge, t ha t is t he v ery o p po s it e o f th e am o u nt b ei n g payable in consideration of
divorce. Divorce dissolves the Marriage. Therefore
noa m o u n t w h i c h i s p a y a b l e i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e m a r r i a g e c a n p o s s i b l y b e
described as an amount payable in consideration of divorce.

The alternative premise that


mahr
is an obligation imposed upon the husband as am a rk o f r es pec t fo r t he wi fe , is w ho lly
d et rim e nt a l to th e s ta n ce t h at it i s a n am ou n t pay a ble to th e w if e o n div o rce . A
m a n m ay m a rr y a wo m a n fo r lo v e , 21

looks, learning or nothing at all. And he may settle a sum upon her as a mark of respect for
her. But he does not divorce her as a mark of respect.

Therefore, a sum payable to the wife out of respect cannot be a sum payable ‘ondivorce’.
2)
Md. Nayeem Khan
v

.
Union Law Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi and others
38

CITATIONREFERED
MANU/AP/0516/2001
DECIDED ON

10.07.2001
HON’BLE JUDGES

Satya Brata Sinha, C.J. and V.V.S. Rao, J


FACTS

This case is based on a very complex factual matrix. However, the relevant issueto be discussed does
not require much elaboration of facts. Hence, the author is not mentioning the facts.
RELEVANTISSUE

38
2001 (5) ALD 145
22

1)Whether Muslim women entitled to retain possession of husband’s immov


a b l e property even after divorce, until her dower debt is satisfied?
DECISION

T he Co urt dec id ed t ha t a M us lim wi do w is co n fer re d w it h t he r ig h t to re ta i n property


in lieu of payment of ‘
mahr
’ till it is paid off, whether she is divorced or her husband is deceased.
REASONING

A principle of Muslim law confers a right on the widow to retain the immovable property of her late
husband in her possession in lieu of payment of
Mahr
till thesame is paid off.

Possibly the same principle may be extended having regard to the rationale behindthe said principle
to cases where the divorced wife is in possession of a house of the husband or in regard to the
matrimonial home where she is residing. She may be entitled to retain possession of the house
of the husband who divorced her tillthe
mahr
amount is paid off.23

3)
Kapore Chand
v

.
Kadar Unnisa Begum and Ors.

39

CITATIONREFERED

MANU/SC/0043/1950
DECIDED ON

12.10.1950
HON’BLE JUDGES

Mehr Chand Mahajan, R.C. Patnaik and Khaliluzzaman, JJ.


FACTS

The appellant, Kapurchand, had a money decree, amongst others; against one Mir Hamid Ali Khan,
husband of the respondent Kaderunnisa.

In execution of the decree the house in dispute belonging to the deceased j


udgment-debtor was attached.

To the attachment the widow of the deceased raised an objection on the ground that she was
in possession of it in lieu of her outstanding dower and could not bedispossessed her claim was satisfied.
39
AIR 1953 SC 413,
24

T he o b jec tio n w as a llo we d by th e ex ec ut ing co u rt an d it wa s o rde re d t h at t he house


be sold subject to the respondent’s claim, the decree-holder being entitled tothe surplus, if any, out of
the sale proceeds. There was not much possibility of theho u se fet ch i ng m o re i n t he exe c utio n
s a le t h an t he am o u nt d u e o n a cco u nt o f dower. The court took the view that the widow’s
claim for dower had priority over debts due to other unsecured creditors and her position was
analogous to that of asecured creditor.

The decree-holder made an application in revision to the High Court but withoutany
success. He then preferred an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the State and it is now
before the Supreme Court of India.
ISSUE

1)Whether widow possessing husband’s estate in lieu of dower entitled to priority


over other creditors?
DECISION

The Court decided that a widow possessing husband’s estate in lieu of dower is not entitled to
priority over creditors; however it is entitled priority against heirsof the deceased husband.
REASONING

The dower of a Muslim woman is a settlement in her favour made prior to the marriage
contract and is similar to the donatio proper nuptias of the Romans but isof such an obligatory nature
that if it is not mentioned before or at the time of themarriage, it is presumed to exist to the extent of a
proper dower amount

T he M u sl im co nc ep t o f do wer h as no re fe ren ce to t he p r ice th at u n de r so m e systems


of law was paid to the father of the bride when she was given in marriage.On the other hand, it is
considered a debt with consideration (for the submissionof her person by the wife).

T he re fo re do we r is pu re ly i n t he n at u re o f a m a r ri ag e s ett lem e nt a n d is
fo r consideration. It is a claim arising out of contract by the husband and as such has25

preference to bequests and inheritance, but on no principle of Muhammadan Lawit can have priority
over other contractual debts.

In our view, therefore, a dower debt cannot be given any priority over other debtson any equitable
consideration or on the ground that there is something inherent inits very nature which entitles it to
priority.
4)
Zobair Ahmad and Anr
.
v

.
Jainandan Prasad Singh
40
CITATIONREFERED

MANU/BH/0045/1960
DECIDED ON

05.08.1959
HON’BLE JUDGES

V. Ramaswami, C.J. and Kanhaiya Singh, J.


FACTS

SALAMAT______________|__________________ | | | |Sakram Saliman Marian Tetu| |Bashiruddin


Naffisa (defnt. 2)_____________ | |Zobair Ahmed Zaibunnisa(plaintiff 1) (plaintiff 2)
40
AIR 1960 Pat 147
26

Bashiruddin, who was admittedly the owner of the 16 annas of the property, diedin the year 1937.

It appears that on 7-5-1945, Naffisa and Bibi Saliman executed a sale-deed (Ext.B) in favour
of defendant No. 1 in respect of the 16 annas share in the properties in dispute. This sale-deed
was executed by Bibi Naffisa on her own behalf as wellas the guardian of her two children, namely, the
two plaintiffs.

After attaining majority the two plaintiffs filed the present suit for recovery
of possession of their 14 annas share in the properties. The allegation was that their mother
had no right to convey the property to defendant No. 1.

The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 on the ground that defendant No. 2 came in
possession of the properties in lieu of her dower debt, that defendant No.2 was a p po in te d t he
ex ec uto r o f t he pro per ti es o f Ba sh ir u d di a n a n d th e l eg a lg ua r di a n o f t he p l ai nt if fs
a n d th at th e t ra ns ac tio n w as fo r t he be ne fit o f th e plaintiffs and it could not, therefore, be
impeached.

The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs but that decree has beenset aside by the lower
appellate court in appeal.

And hence this present appeal.


ISSUE
1)Whether a widow has a right to transfer her right to dower debt or any possession inlieu
it?
DECISION

The Court decided that a widow cannot transfer her right to dower debt or any possession
in lieu it. However, she may transfer the share of the property which has inherited as the wife
of the deceased husband and not the one received in lieuof the payment of
mahr.
REASONING

27

Precedence must be given to the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1925 PC 63and the view
expressed by the Madras High Court in AIR 1920 Mad 666 cannot be held to be authoritative
in view of the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1925 PC 63.

Privy Council in
Maina Bibi
v.
Chaudhri Vakil Ahmad
41
. One Muinuddin died in1890 possessed of immovable property leaving him surviving his
widow MainaBibi, who entered into possession. In 1902 some of the heirs filed a suit to
recover possession of their share of the property. The widow pleaded that the estate was agift to her,
or alternatively that she was entitled to possession until her dower was paid.

In 1903 the trial judge made a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiffs oncondition that the
plaintiffs paid a certain sum by way of dower and interest to thewidow within six months.

T h i s s u m w a s n o t p a i d , h o w e v e r , a n d t h e w i d o w r e m a i n e d i n p o s s e s s i o n , mea
nwhile Maina Bibi purported to make a gift of the whole of he r property tocertain persons.

The original plaintiffs challenged this gift and the Privy Council held that thewidow had no
power to make a gift of the properties, and could not convey the share of the heirs to the
donees.
41
AIR 1925 PC 63
28

5) Daniel Latifi
v.
Union of India
15

Facts in Brief
In this case, the constitutional validity of the Muslim Wom en (Protection of Rights
onDivorce) Act, 1986 was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Act was passed
toappease a particular section of the society and with the intention of making the decision incase of
Mohd. Ahmed Khan
v.
Shah Bano Begum
ineffective.In the
Shahbano’s case
, the husband had appealed against the judgment of the MadhyaPradesh High Court which
had directed him to pay to his divorced wife Rs. 179/ -
per m o n t h , e n h a n c i n g t h e p a l t r y s u m o f R s . 2 5 p e r m o n t h o r i g i n a l l y g r a n t e d
b y t h e Magistrate. The parties had been married for 43 years before the ill and elderly wife
had be en t hro w n o ut o f her h u sb a nd ' s r es id e nce . Fo r a bo ut two ye ar s
t he h us b an d p ai dmaintenance to his wife at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. When these
payments ceaseds he pet it i o n ed u n de r Sec tio n 1 2 5 o f th e Co de o f C r im i na l P ro ce d ure
( Cr .P .C .) . Th e husband immediately dissolved the marriage by pronouncing a triple
talaq
. H e p a i d Rs.3000/- as deferred
mahr
a n d a fu rt he r s um to co v e r ar re ar s o f m a inte n an ce a nd maintenance for the
iddat
period and he sought thereafter to have the petition dismissedon the ground that she had received
the amount due to her on divorce under the Musilm law applicable to the parties. The important
feature of the case was that wife had managed29

the matrimonial home for more than 40 years and had borne and reared five children andwas incapable
of taking up any career or independently supporting herself at that late stateof her life - remarriage was
impossibility in that case. The husband, a successful Advocatewith an approximate income of Rs. 5,000/-
per month provided Rs. 200/- per month to thedivorced wife, who had shared his life for half a
century and mothered his five childrenand was in desperate need of money to survive.
Contentions
The petitioner argued, (a) that the rationale of Section 125 Cr.P.C. was to offset or meet asituation
wherein a divorced wife was likely to be led into destitution or vagrancy. It wasurged that Section
125 Cr.P.C. was enacted to prevent such a situation in furtherance of the concept of social
justice embodied in Article 21 of the Constitution. (b) That the object of Section 125 Cr.P.C.
being to avoid vagrancy, the remedy thereunder could not bedenied to a Muslim woman otherwise
it would amount to violation of not only equality before law but also equal protection of
laws (Article 14) and inherent infringement
of A r t i c l e 2 1 a s w e l l a s b a s i c h u m a n v a l u e s . ( c ) T h a t t h e A c t w a s
u n - I s l a m i c , u n c o ns ti tu tio na l a nd h a d t he po t en ti al o f s uf fo c at i ng t he M us l im
wo m e n w h ile a lso undermining the secular character, which was the basic feature of
the Constitution. Andthus there was no rhyme or reason to deprive the Muslim women from the
applicability of the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C.Defending the validity of the enactment, it wa s
argued on behalf of the respondents that( a) i f th e le gi sl at u re, as a ma tte r o f po l icy ,
w an te d to a pp ly Se ct io n 1 2 5 Cr .P .C .
to M us l im s, i t a lso m ea n t t ha t t he sam e l egi s lat u re co u l d, by ne ce ss ary im pl ic at io n ,
withdraw such an application of the Act and make some other provision in that regard. (b)Parliament
could amend Section 125 Cr.P.C. so as to exclude it application and apply 30

personal law instead. (c) That the policy of Section 125 Cr.P.C. was not to create a right of maintenance
dehors
the personal law and therefore could not stand in the way of the Act.
Judgement
Upholding the validity of the Act, the Supreme Court held as follows;

A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of t he d iv o rc ed wi fe
w hi c h o bv io us ly i nc lud es h er m ai nt en a nce a s w el l . Su ch a reasonable and fair provision
extending beyond the
iddat
period must be made bythe husband within the
iddat
period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act,

Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay
maintenance is not confined to
iddat
period,

A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintainherself after
iddat
p er io d c a n pro cee d as p ro v id ed u n de r Secti o n 4 o f t he Ac t against her relatives who are
liable to maintain her in proportion to the propertiesw hi c h t hey i n her it o n he r de at h
a cco rd i n g to M us l im la w f ro m su ch d iv o r ced woman including her children and parents. If any
of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf
Board establishedunder the Act to pay such maintenance.

The provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitutionof India.
Analysis
I t is u nfo rt u nat e to no te t ha t t he Co urt d i d no t st ri ke do w n t he A ct wh ic h p u rpo rts
to exclude Muslim women in particular from the beneficial treatment of Section 125.
Thel e g i s l a t u r e t o a p p e a s e t h e M u s l i m g e n t r y m a y h a v e p a s s e d t h e A c t o n p o
l i t i c a l consideration but that same has rendered an indirect classification of people of the
basisof religion, which is against the fundamental rights.Other than the above cases, following
are some case, which are there just to supplementthe effort of judiciary towards them.In
Shamim Ara

v.
State of U.P
16
the Supreme Court streamlined the position regarding therequirements for a valid Talaq under the
Muslim law. The Court held that the correct law31

of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by
attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters-one from the wife's family
and the other from the husband's; if the attempts fail, talaq may be effected.In
Savitri Pandey
v.
Prem Chand Pandey
17
t he S u prem e Co ur t hel d t ha t t he seco n d marriage by a spouse during the subsistence of an
appeal by the other spouse against thedecree of divorce would be subject to the end result of the
proceedings. The court further observed: “There is no denial of the fact that right of at least
one appeal is a recognisedright under all systems of civilised legal jurisprudence. If despite
the pendency of theappeal, the appellant chose to solemnise the second marriage, the adventure is
deemed tohav e bee n un d er take n at h er o w n ri sk a nd t he u lt im ate co n se qu en ces
a r is in g o f th e judgment in the appeal pending in the High Court. No person can be permitted to flout
theco urs e o f j us ti ce by h is o r he r o v e rt a nd co v er t a cts . At t hi s st a ge we wo u l d li ke
to observe that the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal under Section 28(4)
isa p p a r e n t l y i n a d e q u a t e w h i c h f a c i l i t a t e s t h e f r u s t r a t i o n o f t h e m a r r i a g e s b
y t h e unscrupulous litigant spouses. We are of the opinion that a minimum period of 90
daysmay be prescribed for filing the appeal against any judgment and decree under the
Acta n d a n y m a r r i a g e s o l e m n i s e d d u r i n g t h e a f o r e s a i d p e r i o d b e d e e m e d t o
b e v o i d . Appropriate legislation is required to be made in this regard. We direct the Registry thatthe
copy of this judgment may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law & Justice for suchac tion as it
may deem fit to take in this behalf”. The legislature accepted this request of the apex Court of
India and enhanced the period of appeal from 30 days to 90 days, whichis an appropriate step in the
right direction.In
Amina
v.
Hassn Koya
18
the Supreme Court while adjudicating upon the validity of a m ar r ia ge en te re d in to by a
p re g na n t M us lim fem a le o b serv ed : It is v ery d if fi c ul t to believe that a woman who is five
months pregnant will be able to conceal the pregnancyf ro m t he h us ba n d . Su c h an a dv a n ced
s ta ge o f p reg n an cy can no t be co n cea le d as t he pregnancy starts showing by that time.
In any case the pregnancy cannot be concealedfro m t he h us ba n d . A hu s ba n d w i ll at
l ea st kno w fo r s u re tha t t he wi fe is pre g na nt 32

especially when the pregnancy is five months old. Therefore, we cannot accept that that t he
r es po nd en t di d no t kn o w at t he t im e o f m a r ri ag e t ha t t he a p pell a nt wa s
a l rea dy pregnant. If this fact was known to the respondent, the marriage cannot be said to
bei l l e g a l o r v o i d .
A l s o , t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t a t t h e r e l e v a n t t i m e i s t o b e considered.
He went through the marriage. He did not raise any objection even after the marriage. He was
present at the time of delivery of the child. Presumably he gave his ownname as the name of the
father of the child for the official record. Even thereafter, for nearly four years he went along
with the marriage and brought up the child while treatingthe appellant as his wife. Any person,
who learns that his newly married wife is already pregnant for five months and who does
not accept that marriage or pregnancy, will not behave in the manner in which the respondent
did. In the present case, the facts on recordshow that the husband was aware of the pregnancy of the
wife at the time of the marriage.Therefore, such a marriage cannot be said to be invalid”.In
B.S. Joshi & Ors
v.
State of Haryana & Anr
19
the Supreme Court held that the HighCo ur t in ex er ci se o f its i n her en t po we rs ca n
q u as h cr im i n al p ro cee d in gs o r F IR o r complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or
affect the powers under Section482 of the Code. The Court observed: “The special features in such
matrimonial mattersar e ev id en t. I t beco m e s t he d uty o f t he Co u rt to en co u ra ge
g e nu i ne set tlem e nt s o f matrimonial disputes. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes
in recent times.Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young
coupleto settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly eruptwhich
often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes inwhich elders
of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and
brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being
arrayeda s a c c u s e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e . T h e r e a r e m a n y o t h e r r e a s o n s w h i c h
n e e d n o t b e mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may
ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead
of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in
that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different
courts.33

There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings tomeet the ends
of justice would prevent women from settling earlier”.In
K.A. Abdul Jaleel
v.
T.A. Shahida
20
,
the Supreme Court held that the Family Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any question relating
to the properties of divorced
parties.T h e C o u r t o b s e r v e d : “ T h e F a m i l y C o u r t s A c t w a s e n a c t e d t o p r o v
i d e f o r t h e establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure
speedysettlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters
connectedtherewith. From a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it appears that
thesaid Act, inter alia, seeks to exclusively provide within the jurisdiction of the
FamilyCourts the matters relating to the property of the spouses or either of them. The Statementof
Objects and Reasons would clearly go to show that the jurisdiction of the Family Courtextends, inter
alia, in relation to properties of spouses or of either of them which would c l e a r l y m e a n
t h at t he p ro per tie s cla im e d by th e pa rt ies t he reto as a s po u se o f o t he r; irrespective of
the claim whether property is claimed during the subsistence of a marriageor otherwise”.34

CHAPTER – VICONCLUSION
In conclusion, all that can be said is that Mahr is a mandatory gift given by the groom tothe bride.
Unlike a bride price, however, it is given directly to the bride and not to her father. Although
the gift is often money, it can be anything agreed upon by bride andg ro o m s u ch a s a
h o u se o r v ia b le b us ine ss th at i s pu t in h er n am e a n d c an be ru n a n d owned entirely by
her if she chooses.I n to d ay ’s term s, it h as ta ken a v e ry w id e s co p e an d m a ny im po rt an t
co ns ti tu tio na l questions have also cropped up. However, in my opinion, even though
Dower serves assecurity for the girl, it should entirely be scrapped. Infact, all personal laws
should besc ra p pe d a nd a un i fo rm c iv il co de sho u l d be bro u g ht i n. T h is s ha ll m ake
t he I n di a n Society live in a state of perfect harmony.35

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