Name Bisharat Hussain Bozdar

Cms 890-2017

Batch 38

Assignment Constitutional law (US)

Topic Landmark Cases

Submitted to Ma`am Aamra Tariq

 MARBURY VS MADISON
In the presidential election of 1800 Democratic-Republican Thomas
Jefferson defeated Federalist John Adams, becoming the third President of
the United States. Although the election was decided on February 17,
1801, Jefferson did not take office until March 4, 1801. Until that time,
outgoing President Adams and the Federalist-controlled 6th Congress were
still in power. During this lame-duck session, Congress passed
the Judiciary Act of 1801. This Act modified the Judiciary Act of 1789 in
establishing ten new district courts, expanding the number of circuit
courts from three to six, and adding additional judges to each circuit, giving
the President the authority to appoint Federal judges and justices of the
peace. The act also reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from
six to five, effective upon the next vacancy in the Court.
On March 3, just before his term was to end, Adams, in an attempt to
stymie the incoming Democratic-Republican Congress and administration,
appointed 16 Federalist circuit judges and 42 Federalist justices of the
peace to offices created by the Judiciary Act of 1801. These appointees,
the infamous "Midnight Judges", included William Marbury, a prosperous
financier in Maryland. An ardent Federalist, Marbury was active in Maryland
politics and a vigorous supporter of the Adams presidency. He had been
appointed to the position of justice of the peace in the District of Columbia.
The term for a justice of the peace was five years, and they were
"authorized to hold courts and cognizance of personal demands of the
value of 20 dollars".

Facts
The case resulted from a petition to the Supreme Court by William
Marbury, who had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of
Columbia by President John Adams but whose commission was not
subsequently delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to force the
new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. The
Court, with John Marshall as Chief Justice, found firstly that Madison's
refusal to deliver the commission was both illegal and correctible.
Nonetheless, the Court stopped short of ordering Madison (by writ
of mandamus) to hand over Marbury's commission, instead holding that the
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that enabled Marbury to bring his
claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to
extend the Court's original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III
established. The petition was therefore denied.
The Marbury v. Madison decision expanded the power of the Supreme
Court in general, by announcing that the 1789 law which gave the Court
jurisdiction in this case was unconstitutional. Marbury thus lost his case,
which the Court said he should have won, but, in explaining its inability to
provide Marbury the remedy it said he deserved, the Court established the
principle of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare a law unconstitutional.

Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams

attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new
judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in these
efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of
the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the
District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President
Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s,
were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the
commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring
James Madison to deliver his commission.
Issues
Inscription on the wall of the Supreme Court Building from Marbury v.
Madison, in which Chief Justice John Marshall outlined the concept of
judicial review.
There are three ways a case can be heard in the Supreme Court:
(1) Filing directly in the Supreme Court.
(2) Filing in a lower federal court, such as a district court, and appealing all
the way up to the Supreme Court.
(3) Filing in a state court, appealing all the way up through the state's
highest courts, and then appealing to the Supreme Court on an issue of
federal law. The first is an exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction; the
second and third are exercises of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction.
Because Marbury filed his petition for the writ of mandamus directly in the
Supreme Court, the Court needed to be able to exercise original jurisdiction
over the case in order to have the power to hear it.
Marbury's argument is that in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress granted
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of
mandamus. This raises several issues that the Supreme Court had to
address:

 Does Article III of the Constitution create a floor for original jurisdiction,
which Congress can add to, or does it create an exhaustive list that
Congress can't modify at all?
 If Article III's original jurisdiction is an exhaustive list, but Congress tries
to modify it anyway, who wins that conflict, Congress or the
Constitution?
 And, more importantly, who is supposed to decide who wins?
In its answer to this last question, the Supreme Court formalizes the notion
of judicial review. In short, the constitutional issue on which Marbury v.
Madison was decided was whether Congress could expand the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Question

(1) Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions?

(2) Can they sue for their commissions in court?

(3) Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their
commissions?
Decision

On February 24, 1803, the Court rendered a unanimous (4–0)

decision, that Marbury had the right to his commission but the court did not
have the power to force Madison to deliver the commission. Chief Justice
Marshall wrote the opinion of the court. Marshall presented the case as
raising three distinct questions:

 Did Marbury have a right to the commission?

 Do the laws of the country give Marbury a legal remedy?
 Is asking the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus the correct legal
remedy? Marshall quickly answered the first two questions affirmatively.
He found that the failure to deliver the commission was "violate of a
vested legal right".
In deciding whether Marbury had a remedy, Marshall stated: "The
Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right." One of the key legal principles on which Marbury relies is the
notion that for every violation of a vested legal right, there must be a legal
remedy. Marshall next described two distinct types of Executive actions:
political actions, where the official can exercise discretion, and
purely ministerial functions, where the official is legally required to do
something. Marshall found that delivering the appointment to Marbury was
a purely ministerial function required by law, and therefore the law provided
him a remedy.
A federal court has a "special obligation to 'satisfy itself not only of its own
jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review." If a
court does not have the power to hear a case, it will not issue dicta.
Consequently, with exceptions not applicable here, a federal court must
decide whether it has jurisdiction before discussing the merits of the
case.] Chief Justice Marshall, however, did not address jurisdictional issues
until addressing the first two questions presented above. Because of the
canon of constitutional avoidance (i.e., where a statute can fairly be
interpreted so as to avoid a constitutional issue, it should be so
interpreted), courts generally deal with the constitutional issues only if
necessary. In this case, the jurisdictional issue was a constitutional one.
In analyzing the third question, Marshall divided the question further, asking
if a writ of mandamus was the correct means by which to restore Marbury
to his right, and if so, whether the writ Marbury sought could issue from the
Supreme Court. Concluding quickly that since a writ of mandamus, by
definition, was the correct judicial means to order an official of the United
States (in this case, the Secretary of State) to do something required of him
(in this case, deliver a commission), Marshall devotes the remainder of his
inquiry at the second part of the question: "Whether it [the writ] can issue
from this court".
Jurisdiction; the second and third are exercises of the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Because Marbury filed his petition for the writ of mandamus directly in the
Supreme Court, the Court needed to be able to exercise original jurisdiction
over the case in order to have the power to hear it.
Marbury's argument is that in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress granted
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of
mandamus. This raises several issues that the Supreme Court had to
address:

 Does Article III of the Constitution create a floor for original jurisdiction,
which Congress can add to, or does it create an exhaustive list that
Congress can't modify at all?
 If Article III's original jurisdiction is an exhaustive list, but Congress tries
to modify it anyway, who wins that conflict, Congress or the
Constitution?
 And, more importantly, who is supposed to decide who wins?
In its answer to this last question, the Supreme Court formalizes the notion
of
Judicial review. In short, the constitutional issue on which Marbury v.
Madison was decided was whether Congress could expand the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Marshall first examined the Judiciary Act of 1789 and determined that the
Act purported to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over writs of
mandamus. Marshall then looked to Article III of the Constitution, which
defines the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdictions
(see Relevant Law above). Marbury had argued that the Constitution was
only intended to set a floor for original jurisdiction that Congress could add
to. Marshall disagreed and held that Congress does not have the power to
modify the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Consequently, Marshall
found that the Constitution and the Judiciary Act conflict.
This conflict raised the important question of what happens when an Act of
Congress conflicts with the Constitution. Marshall answered that Acts of
Congress that conflict with the Constitution are not law and the Courts are
bound instead to follow the Constitution, affirming the principle of judicial
review. In support of this position Marshall looked to the nature of the
written Constitution—there would be no point of having a written
Constitution if the courts could just ignore it. "To what purpose are powers
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these
limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?.
" Marshall also argued that the very nature of the judicial function requires
courts to make this determination. Since it is a court's duty to decide cases,
courts have to be able to decide what law applies to each case. Therefore,
if two laws conflict with each other, a court must decide which law
applies. Finally, Marshall pointed to the judge's oath requiring them to
uphold the Constitution, and to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
which lists the "Constitution" before the "laws of the United States". Part of
the core of this reasoning is found in the following statements from the
decision:
The Supreme Court noted that the Constitution did not have any provisions
that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue the writ
of Mandamus though Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted it to
do so. With Article VI of the United States Constitution providing that the
Constitution was the Supreme law of the land, Section 13 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 was found inconsistent with the Constitution, and therefore,
invalid.
In the case of Marbury v. Madison, the Court held that an Act of Congress
that was inconsistent with the United States Constitution could not stand.
With this decision, the Supreme Court established the doctrine of Judicial
Review, establishing its authority to review the acts of the Legislature and
the Executive and declare them invalid if found to be in violation of the
provisions of the United States Constitution.

It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department [the

judicial branch] to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of
each.
So, if a law [e.g., a statute or treaty] be in opposition to the Constitution, if
both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the
Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the Courts are to regard
the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the
case to which they both apply.
 MCCULLAH VS MARYLAND
On April 10, 1816, the Congress of the United States passed an act titled
"An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States",
which provided for the incorporation of the Second Bank of the United
States. The Bank first went into full operation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
In 1817, the Bank opened a branch in Baltimore, Maryland, and transacted
and carried on business as a branch of the Bank of the United States by
issuing bank notes, discounting promissory notes, and performing other
operations usual and customary for banks to do and perform. Both sides of
the litigation admitted that the President, directors, and company of the
Bank had no authority to establish the Baltimore branch, or office of
discount and deposit, other than the fact that Maryland had adopted the
Constitution of the United States.
On February 11, 1818, the General Assembly of Maryland passed an act
titled, "an act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in
the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature":

FACTS
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), was a decision by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The state of Maryland had
attempted to impede operation of a branch of the Second Bank of the
United States by imposing a tax on all notes of banks not chartered in
Maryland. Though the law, by its language, was generally applicable to all
banks not chartered in Maryland, the Second Bank of the United States
was the only out-of-state bank then existing in Maryland, and the law was
recognized in the court's opinion as having specifically targeted the Bank of
the United States. The Court invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause of
the Constitution, which allowed the Federal government to pass laws not
expressly provided for in the Constitution's list of express powers, provided
those laws are in useful furtherance of the express powers of Congress
under the Constitution.
.
In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In
1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank.
James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank,
refused to pay the tax. The state appeals court held that the Second Bank
was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not provide a textual
commitment for the federal government to charter a bank.
ISSUES
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland that if any bank has
established or shall, without authority from the State first had and obtained
establish any branch, office of discount and deposit, or office of pay and
receipt in any part of this State, it shall not be lawful for the said branch,
office of discount and deposit, or office of pay and receipt to issue notes, in
any manner, of any other denomination than five, ten, twenty, fifty, one
hundred, five hundred and one thousand dollars, and no note shall be
issued except upon stamped paper of the following denominations; that is
to say, every five dollar note shall be upon a stamp of ten cents; every ten
dollar note, upon a stamp of twenty cents; every twenty dollar note, upon a
stamp of thirty cents; every fifty dollar note, upon a stamp of fifty cents;
every one hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of one dollar; every five
hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of ten dollars; and every thousand dollar
note, upon a stamp of twenty dollars; which paper shall be furnished by the
Treasurer of the Western Shore, under the direction of the Governor and
Council, to be paid for upon delivery; provided always that any institution of
the above description may relieve itself from the operation of the provisions
aforesaid by paying annually, in advance, to the Treasurer of the Western
Shore, for the use of State, the sum of $15,000.

Question

1. Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank?

2. Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional
powers?
3. Read Article I, Section 8 (link above) and underline the
express powers of Congress that might be dependent on the
operation of a bank. Can Congress effectively carry out its
powers without establishing a national bank?
 Decision

The Court determined that Congress did have the power to create the
Bank. Chief Justice Marshall supported this conclusion with four main
arguments.
First, he argued that historical practice established Congress' power
to create the Bank. Marshall invoked the first Bank of the United
States history as authority for the constitutionality of the second
bank. The first Congress enacted the bank after great debate and
that it was approved by an executive "with as much persevering
talent as any measure has ever experienced, and being supported by
arguments which convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this
country can boast."
Second, Chief Justice Marshall refuted the argument that states
retain ultimate sovereignty because they ratified the constitution. "The
powers of the general government, it has been said, are delegated by
the states, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in
subordination to the states, who alone possess supreme dominion"
Marshall contended that it was the people who ratified the
Constitution and thus the people are sovereign, not the states.
Third, Marshall addressed the scope of congressional powers under Article
I. The Court broadly described Congress' authority before addressing the
necessary and proper clause. Marshall admitted that the Constitution does
not enumerate a power to create a central Bank but said that this is not
dispositive as to Congress's power to establish such an institution. Chief
Justice Marshall wrote, "In considering this question, then, we must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.
Fourth, Marshall supported the Court's opinion textually by invoking
the Necessary and Proper Clause, which permits Congress to seek an
objective while exercising its enumerated powers so long as the objective is
not forbidden by the Constitution. In liberally interpreting the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the Court rejected Maryland's narrow interpretation of the
clause, which purported that the word "necessary" in the Necessary and
Proper Clause meant that Congress could only pass those laws that were
absolutely essential in the execution of its enumerated powers. The Court
rejected this argument, on the grounds that many of the enumerated
powers of Congress under the Constitution would be useless if only those
laws deemed essential to a power's execution could be passed. Marshall
also noted that the Necessary and Proper Clause is listed within the
powers of Congress, not the limitations.
The Court held that for these reasons, the word "necessary" in the
Necessary and Proper Clause (elastic clause) does not refer to the only
way of doing something, but rather applies to various procedures for
implementing all constitutionally-established powers. "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional."
This principle had been established many years earlier by Alexander
Hamilton.
Criterion of what is constitutional, and of what is not so ... is the end, to
which the measure relates as a mean. If the end be clearly comprehended
within any of the specified powers, and if the measure have an obvious
relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the
Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of the
national authority. There is also this further criterion which may materially
assist the decision: Does the proposed measure abridge a pre-existing
right of any State, or of any individual? If it does not, there is a strong
presumption in favor of its constitutionality....
Chief Justice Marshall also determined that Maryland may not tax the bank
without violating the Constitution. The Court voided the tax on the grounds
that it was unconstitutional. The opinion stated that Congress has implied
powers that need to be related to the text of the Constitution, but need not
be enumerated within the text. This case was a seminal moment in the
formation of a balance between federalism, federal power, and states'
powers. Chief Justice Marshall also explained in this case that the
Necessary and Proper Clause does not require that all federal laws be
necessary and proper and that federal laws that are enacted directly
pursuant to one of the express, enumerated powers granted by the
Constitution need not comply with the Necessary and Proper Clause,
holding that the clause "purport[s] to enlarge, not to diminish the powers
vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a
restriction on those already granted."
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to
incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the
national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers.

Pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause(Art. I, Section 8), Chief

Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed powers not explicitly
outlined in the U.S. Constitution. Marshall redefined “necessary” to mean
“appropriate and legitimate,” covering all methods for furthering objectives
covered by the enumerated powers. Marshall also held that while the
states retained the power of taxation, the Constitution and the laws made in
pursuance thereof are supreme and cannot be controlled by the states.
 UNITED STATES VS NIXON
The case arose out of the Watergate scandal which began during the 1972
Presidential campaign between Democratic Senator George
McGovern of South Dakota and President Nixon. On June 17, 1972, about
five months before the general election, five burglars broke into Democratic
headquarters located in the Watergate building complex in Washington,
D.C.
In May 1973, Nixon's Attorney General, Elliot Richardson,
appointed Archibald Cox to the position of special prosecutor, charged with
investigating the break-in.[3] In October 1973, Nixon arranged to have Cox
fired in the Saturday Night Massacre. However, public outrage forced Nixon
to appoint a new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, who was charged with
conducting the Watergate investigation for the government.
In April 1974, Jaworski obtained a subpoena ordering Nixon to release
certain tapes and papers related to specific meetings between the
President and those indicted by the grand jury. Those tapes and the
conversations they revealed were believed to contain damaging evidence
involving the indicted men and perhaps the President himself.[4]
Hoping Jaworski and the public would be satisfied, Nixon turned over
edited transcripts of 43 conversations, including portions of 20
conversations demanded by the subpoena. James D. St. Clair, Nixon's
attorney, then requested Judge John Sirica of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia to quash the subpoena. While arguing before Sirica,
St. Clair stated that:
FACTS
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), was a landmark United
States Supreme Court case which resulted in a unanimous decision
against President Richard Nixon, ordering him to deliver tape recordings
and other subpoenaed materials to a federal district court. Issued on July
24, 1974, the decision was important to the late stages of the Watergate
scandal, when there was an ongoing impeachment process against
Richard Nixon. United States v. Nixon is considered a crucial precedent
limiting the power of any U.S. president to claim executive privilege.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the opinion for a unanimous court,
joined by Justices William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Potter
Stewart, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun and Lewis F.
Powell. Burger, Blackmun and Powell were appointed to the Court by Nixon
during his first term. Associate Justice William Rehnquist recused himself
as he had previously served in the Nixon administration as an Assistant
Attorney General.

A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard

Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor
appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of
conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he
was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the
right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve
confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the
national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.

ISSUES

Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his

"executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial
review?

Is the President’s Article II constitutional privilege absolute?

DECISION
Less than three weeks after oral arguments, the Court issued its decision.
Within the court, there was never much doubt about the general outcome,
as on July 9, the day following oral arguments, all eight justices indicated to
each other that they would rule against the president. However, the justices
struggled to write an opinion that all eight could agree to, the major issue
being how much of a constitutional standard for what executive
privilege did mean, could be established. Burger's first draft was deemed
problematic and insufficient, and multiple drafts ensued, with Associate
Justice Potter Stewart becoming a de facto co-author of the final decision.
The stakes were so high, in that the tapes most likely contained evidence
of criminal wrongdoing by the President and his men, that they wanted no
dissent. All contributed in some way to the opinion and a final version was
agreed to on July 23, the day before the decision was announced. Chief
Justice Burger delivered the decision from the bench and the very fact that
he was doing so meant that knowledgeable onlookers realized the decision
must be unanimous.
After ruling that the Court could indeed resolve the matter and that
Jaworski had proven a "sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes contains
conversations relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment," the Court
went to the main issue of executive privilege. The Court rejected Nixon's
claim to an "absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
judicial process under all circumstances." It held that a claim of Presidential
privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial cannot
override the needs of the judicial process, if that claim is based, not on the
ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the
ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality. Nixon was ordered to
deliver the subpoenaed materials to the District Court.

No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor
the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications,
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege.
The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of
military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice."
Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes
and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.
 Roe v. Wade

On January 22, 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its landmark
decision in the case of Roe v. Wade, which recognized that the
constitutional right to privacy extends to a woman’s right to make her own
personal medical decisions — including the decision to have an abortion
without interference from politicians. Over 40 years later, Americans are
still standing by this decision: 7 in 10 Americans believe Roe v.
Wade should remain the law of the land.

Abortion Access: Then & Now

In 1965, illegal abortions made up one-sixth of all pregnancy- and

childbirth-related deaths. A survey conducted between 1965 and 1967
found that 8 in 10 low-income women in New York City who had an
abortion attempted a dangerous self-induced procedure.

But now that abortion is legal, it has become one of the safest medical
procedures in the United States — with a safety record of over 99%.
Moreover, because it is legal, women who decide to have an abortion can
receive support throughout the process from medical professionals.

Nationwide Attacks on Roe v. Wade

The right to safe and legal abortion has been the law of the land for more
than 40 years, and is a part of the fabric of this country. This is clearly
established precedent, and shouldn’t be up for debate. And yet, opponents
of abortion have made it increasingly harder for women to access — and
these threats are not slowing down.

U.S. Supreme Court Justice: This year, the Supreme Court will rule on
challenges to Roe v. Wade that could strip women of the right to safe and
legal abortion. President Donald Trump's nominee for the Supreme Court,
Neil Gorsuch, has an alarming history of interfering with reproductive rights
and health. Speak out to say #NoRoeNoGo!

Looming Abortion Restrictions: As part of a broader effort to chip away

at Roe v. Wade and ultimately ban abortion nationwide, anti-abortion
politicians have been pushing a variety of bills in Congress that would
restrict access to abortion at any point in pregnancy nationwide. Anti-
abortion members of Congress also have been trying for years to pass
a nationwide ban all abortions at 20 weeks of pregnancy.

 Existing Federal Abortion Ban: An abortion ban that became law in

2003 and upheld by the Supreme Court in 2007 criminalizes certain
abortion procedures in the second trimester of pregnancy —
procedures that doctors say are often the safest and best to protect
women's health.

State Attacks on Roe v. Wade

In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the U.S.
Constitution protects a woman's right to make her own medical decisions,
including her decision to have an abortion. Therefore, a state may not ban
abortion prior to viability. In the more than 40 years following that landmark
ruling, in decisions including Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court has never wavered from this principle.

Despite this precedent and Americans' consistent support for Roe v .Wade,
anti-women’s health state legislators continue to attack abortion
access through ballot measures and legislative restrictions.

Americans Support Roe v. Wade and Don't Want It Overturned

Support for access to safe, legal abortion is at a record high. Here are the
stats:

 70% of Americans don’t want to see Roe V.

Wade overturned,according to surveys from Quinnipiac
University and Pew Research. That's the highest rate since the case
was decided more than 40 years ago, and it includes people who
voted for Donald Trump.
 Support for Roe v. Wade is on the rise: In the last three
years,opposition to overturning Roe V. Wade has gone up 6 points.
  Latinos in this country are very supportive of access to
reproductive health care, including safe and legal
abortion: Contrary to stereotypes, 67% of Latino/a voters do not
want to see Roe v. Wadeoverturned and 82% agree with women
making their own decision on abortion without political interference.

The vast majority of Americans have supported access to safe and legal
abortion for decades. Americans simply don't believe that politicians or
judges should be making decisions for women about their pregnancies.

Ensuring That Women Have Health Care, No Matter What

For almost a century, Planned Parenthood health centers have been

providing professional, nonjudgmental, and confidential health care and
information to keep women healthy and prevent unintended pregnancies.
As the nation’s leading women’s health care provider and advocate,
Planned Parenthood knows firsthand why it’s so critical that everyone have
access to a comprehensive range of reproductive health care services,
including abortion.

Bottom line: People must have access to safe, legal abortion services
without interference from politicians. From courthouses to statehouses
to Capitol Hill, Planned Parenthood works to protect that access — no
matter what.

Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion.

Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life.
After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first time,
Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the constitutional
hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd
-- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional
argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers --
came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood
Marshall.

Question

Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy

by abortion?
Conclusion

Sort:

by seniority

by ideology

7–2 DECISION FOR JANE ROE

MAJORITY OPINION BY HARRY A. BLACKMUN;

The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to
privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the
pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state
interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46
states were affected by the Court's ruling.

The right to bear arms, as stated in the 2nd Amendment and defined by
the SCOTUS in the Heller and McDonald cases, got a boost last week from
the most unlikely source — an abortion-rights case in Alabama where
Federal District Court Judge Myron Thompson struck down a 2013 law that
would have made it extremely difficult for women to receive abortion
services unless they were able to travel long distances from home, thereby
creating an undue burden and nullifying the right to an abortion guaranteed
by Roe Vs. Wade.

The new law, similar to a measure that was voided in Mississippi, required
physicians who performed abortions to be granted credentials in
neighboring hospitals, but such credentials are only granted to physicians
who live and practice within a limited distance of the particular hospital.
Three of the five abortion clinics in Alabama are currently staffed by
physicians who reside in other states and travel to Alabama for the purpose
of administering scheduled abortions. Hence, they could not receive
hospital credentials and therefore could not operate their abortion clinics.

Judge Thompson heard testimony from numerous witnesses representing

both the State of Alabama and the abortion providers, and nearly all of the
172-page decision is a very careful summary of what was said by parties
on both sides. Ultimately the weight of the testimony convinced the jurist
that by reducing the number of abortion clinics from five to just two, the
State was effectively blocking access to an abortion and therefore could not
be reconciled with the rights of women to terminate their pregnancies as
stipulated in Roe vs. Wade.

You have to wade through almost the entire decision, however, before you
come to the point where women in Alabama seeking an abortion find
themselves making common cause with Alabama residents who want to
own a gun. To quote Judge Thompson: “At its core, each protected right is
held by the individual: the right to decide to have an abortion and the right
to have and use firearms for self-defense. With this parallelism in mind, the
court poses the hypothetical that suppose the government the government
were to implement a new restriction on who may sell firearms and
ammunition, and further, only two vendors in the State of Alabama were
capable of complying with the restriction. The defenders of this law would
be called upon to do a heck of a lot of explaining — and rightly so in the
face of an effect so severe.”

Last year Alabama also passed a new gun law that made it easier for
residents to receive a concealed-carry license and also allowed for
concealed-carry of handguns into certain public events. Alabama has
always been a gun-rich state, with per capita gun ownership well above the
national norm. Now I can’t imagine there would ever be as many women in
Alabama seeking an abortion as there might be folks looking to buy guns.
But even though Judge Thompson was educated at Yale, he’s Crimson
Tide through and through. Abortion might not be a popular issue in an
evangelical state, but when explained as a parallel to the 2nd Amendment,
all those God-fearing, Bible-thumpin’ gun owners may just agree that what
works for one side should work for the other.

But Thompson’s decision is also a case in point for the folks who want
more controls over guns. Because ultimately in order to make their case for
more gun control, people who don’t own guns are going to have to figure
out how to talk to people who do. The last few pages of Judge Taylor’s
decision should be required reading for Brady, the NRA and all the
advocates for or against guns. Sometimes people who face off on opposite
sides of an issue may have more in common than they think.
 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Sullivan (Plaintiff) sued the Defendant,
the New York Times Co. (Defendant), for printing an advertisement about
the civil rights movement in the south that defamed the plaintiff.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees require a federal

rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

Facts
The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama,
who claimed that he was defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New
York Times. The advertisement was entitled, “Heed Their Rising Voices”
and it charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror had been
directed against those who participated in the civil rights movement in the
South. Some of the particulars of the advertisement were false. Although
the advertisement did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed that it
referred to him indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the
police. The Defendant claimed that it authorized publication of the
advertisement because it did not have any reason to believe that its
contents were false. There was no independent effort to check its accuracy.
The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant retract the advertisement. The
Defendant was puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the advertisement
reflected adversely on him. The jury found the ad libelous per se and
actionable without proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000
in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.
The Defendant appealed.

Issue
Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an advertisement, which
criticized a public official’s official conduct?
Reasoning: The Alabama law violates both the First and 14th
Amendment of theConstitution. In addition, a public official must establish
“Actua Malice” to recover damages is a defamation action.
The Alabama law is unconstitutional since it fails to safeguard the freedom
of speech and freedom of the press under the First and
14th Amendment. Precedent establishes the national commitment to this
country that debate concerning public issues should be uninhibited, robust
and wide-open which may sometimes include vehement, caustic and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government and public
officials. Treatment of African Americans during the Civil Right’s movement
qualify as an issue worthy of open public debate.

If New York Time Co.’s otherwise protected article forfeited protections

because it contained false and allegedly defamatory statements is the
question presented to this Court.

First Amendment protections do not turn on whether speech is true,

popular, or socially useful. Criticism of official conduct, which is an
important aspect of debate, does not lose constitutional protection because
it is defamatory. Because false and defamatory speech related to public
officials is protected individually, a combination of the two receives First
Amendment protection.
Historically, Congress demonstrated this through its conclusion that
the Sedition Act of 1798 (the Act) was unconstitutional since it prohibited
individuals to speak out against the government. Congress decided it was
inadequate to allow defendants accused of violating the Act to offer a
defense of truth, because it required an impermissible level of self-
censorship.
As a result, permitting New York Times Co. to offer truth as a defense
would be inadequate. The Court held that the only way to guarantee that
protections of freedom of speech and of the press are not ignored in libel
actions, is through the adoption of a federal rule barring a public official
from obtaining damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to official
conduct, unless the presence of actual malice when the statement was
made can be proven. The court further defined actual malice knowledge of
the statement’s falsity or acting with reckless disregard of the truth. The
presented evidence is insufficient to constitutionally support a judgment for
Sullivan, as there was no indication of actual malice.

Application: The laws applied in this case are the First Amendment of U.S
Constitution and 14th Amendment thereto.

Conclusion: This case is important because it established the requirement

of actual malice in defamation suits brought by public officials. To be clear,
this requirement of actual malice only applied to claims arising from speech
about the public officials the actual malice rule doesn’t apply to speech
directed towards private individuals. The significance of this case is only
grown in recent years, communication technology particularly the internet
has increase the scope of debates on public issues, so these debates are
protected and encouraged by the Courts Landmark decision in New York
Times V. L.B. Sullivan
 United States v. Virginia
Brief Fact Summary. Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was the only single-
sexed school in Virginia. VMI used a highly adversarial method to train
(male) leaders of the future. There was no equal educational opportunity to
that of VMI in the State for women.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Gender-based classifications of the government

can be defended only by exceedingly persuasive justifications. The State
must show that its classification serves important governmental objectives
and that the means employed are substantially related to those objectives.
The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized. And it must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the differences between males and
females.
Facts. VMI was the sole single-sexed school among Virginia’s 15 public
institutions. VMI’s mission is to produce “citizen soldiers”, (male) leaders of
the future. VMI achieves its mission through its “adversative method”,
which is characterized by physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of
treatment, absence of privacy, etc. At trial, the District Court acknowledged
that women were missing out on a unique educational opportunity, but
upheld the school’s policy on the rationale that admitting women could not
be done without compromising the school’s adversative method. Pursuant
to a decision by the Court of Appeals, the State established the Virginia
Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) for women. VWIL offered fewer
courses than VMI and was run without the adversative method.

Issue. Did VMI represent a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

Protection Clause?

Reasoning:

The Court set out that the gender classification must be reviewed under an
intermediate scrutiny level of review. This means that the government must
provide an exceedingly persuasive justification for implementing policies
that discriminate against a sex. The Court acknowledged the Inherent
differences which exist between men and women and state that they may
only be used to remedy a history of sex-based discrimination against
women and promoting equal opportunities in employment. The court
specifically pointed out that such discrimination based on sex is not to
denigrate members of either sex.
Here, Virginia has failed to show a persuasive justification for the exclusion
of women from its leadership program. The Court rejects the
school’s argument that constructing a single-sex school furthers the
important government purpose of keeping diverse public education
institutions

The school was not founded on the principles of promoting diversity, this is
clear through its policy of excluding women. In addition, the school claims
that the “adversative method” of training provides educational benefits
which cannot be made to women without modification.

The school fails to state a reason as to why their goal of training competent
leaders cannot extend to women. When considering the offered evidence,
the school falls short of establishing the “exceedingly persuasive
justification” standard which is required to sustain an implemented
classification based on gender.
The Court further points out that the school created specifically for women
is substandard when compared to the men’s program because it fails to
provide a meaningful educational alternative for women who want to attend
the men’s only Virginia Military Institute.
Application: The law applied in this case is the 14th Amendment of U.S
Constitution.
Conclusion: Gender-based classifications of the government can be
defended only by exceedingly persuasive justifications. The state must
show that its classification serves important government objectives. The
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized. It must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the differences between males and
females.
 Brown v. Board of Education

Facts: Multiple African American plaintiffs attempted to gain access to

various public schools in southern states and were denied on the basis of
their race. The plaintiffs specifically challenged the “separate but equal”
doctrine at trial, arguing that it was inherently unconstitutional and therefore
violated the equal protection clause. The trial court and lower federal
courts of appeal all denied access and cited the constitutional validity of the
Plessy v. Ferguson case, which originally established the separate but
equal doctrine.

Issue: Whether a law that establishes equal funding but separation on the
basis of race in schools violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution.

Reasoning: The Court held that looking to historical legislation and prior
cases could not yield a true meaning of the 14th Amendment because each
is inconclusive.
At the time the 14th Amendment was enacted, almost no African American
children were receiving an education. As such, trying to determine the
historical intentions surrounding the 14th Amendment is not helpful. In
addition, few public schools existed at the time the amendment was
adopted.

Analyzing the text of the amendment itself is necessary to determine its

true meaning. The Court held the basic language of the Amendment
suggests the intent to prohibit all discriminatory legislation against
minorities.
Despite the fact each facility is essentially the same, the Court held it was
necessary to examine the actual effect of segregation on education. Over
the past few years, public education has turned into one of the most
valuable public services both state and local governments have to offer.
Since education has a heavy bearing on the future success of each child,
the opportunity to be educated must be equal to each student.

The Court stated that the opportunity for education available to segregated
minorities has a profound and detrimental effect on both their hearts and
minds. Studies showed that segregated students felt less motivated,
inferior and have a lower standard of performance than non-minority
students. The Court explicitly overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), stating that segregation deprives African-American students of
equal protection under the 14th Amendment.

Application: Separating educational facilities based on racial

classifications is unequal in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment.

Conclusion: Brown v. Board of Education was the landmark case which

desegregated public schools in the United States. It abolished the idea of
“separate but equal.”
 Texas v. Johnson
Facts
While the Republican National Convention was taking place in Dallas
in1984 Johnson was participating in a political demonstration against
Reagan’s administration and some Dallas-based companies. During
protest Johnson burned an American flag. Some witnesses testified that
they were seriously offended by his action. The Court convicted Johnson
for desecration of a venerated object. After the Johnson was charged with
violating the Texas statute, Johnson was convicted in a Texas trial
court. This conviction led to a sentence of a year in prison as well as
a $2,000 fine. The State Court of Appeal affirmed the first decision.
However the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the
State consistent with the First Amendment could not punish Johnson in
these circumstances. The burning of the flag was expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment. The State could not criminally sanction
flag desecration in order to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity,
and the statute did not meet the State’s goal of preventing breaches of
peace.

Issue
Is Johnson’s conduct consistent with the First Amendment?
Does the State’s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity justify Johnson’s conviction?
Did the burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct permitting him to
invoke the First Amendment?
Held
The Supreme Court held many times before, the Court had already said
that speech is not limited to words. Conduct can also be “speech” if it is
intended to send a message. The fact that Johnson’s conduct involved an American
flag only made it more obvious that he was trying to send a message: “Johnson was
not…
Prosecuted for the expression of just any idea; he was prosecuted for his
expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of this country,” and that kind of
expression is “at the core of our First Amendment value
Ultimately, the Court said, “Johnson’s political expression was restricted because
of the content of the message he conveyed.”
This case reinforced citizens’ right to express ideas even if those ideas are
extremely upsetting to some people .The Constitution guarantees people
the freedom to hold and express whatever views they wish, about our
government or the flag or anything else
 Miranda vs United State
Facts
Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station
where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then
interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed,
written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented
to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was
sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession
Issue
Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to
custodial police interrogation” are admissible against him in a criminal trial
and whether “procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his
privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be
compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary.

Supreme Court holding

The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to
protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” As
such, “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-
custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so
freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New York Court of
Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court
of California in Stewart.