M i l i i Analysis Conference Call

.
Wednesday. Julv, 13.2005. Room 2E572 The Pentaaon
Host M
Brefers
S~bjeciFBI alegations of abuse at QTMO
Transcriber Murohv

Ms Barter Hi i t s A l f l o nBirMr, Dc . r, r tense T h a n k y o u f o r , o ~ n n g u s M a y f ~ M

-who
. wfll maw some opening rernaiKs and
b-.&i nà o iw "dings And then we It turn it bacx over to
results of that a m our actions and then we liopen @ up b Ir
questions

Just as a reminder,this is on background. We'realso Joined b m :'I1 be happy to

take your calls after we go through the opening remarks. So with thi hank
you for joining us today.

m ~ h a n you k Allison. Iappreciate it. lam going togive you a truncated version of M a t
we used this morning in the SASC Senate Armed ServicesCommittee) hearing with a M e
background,and I'll turn it overto^^^^^H and he'll talk about his findlws:
recommendations,and I'lldose with my decision on those recommendations..

The alkaations In the FBI emails came b lioM as a miin of a FOIA last vear. late in the
year ~ f t e review
r -
of the mails, following the, release 1believe II was in ~ecember-I
determumd mat me alkgadons m e n w a d g t a i ~ dexaminnon h order b nI8blnh the Irum. and
ascertain what if any actions needed to De taken

So I ordered a 15-6. h y Regulation 15-6 inveilinniion, and appointed Brigadier General John
F~rtowwho is the deputy -mander for U S A&y So& my componentcommandfor the
Army. as the nveswating offmr Itoto Jon" to address ugnt allegations that were drawn from
me FBI emails l will not art culam each of them if there's questions later on I can do that

Subsequent to that initialappointmentof Furrow. I directed John to nvestiw two addt onal
allegations that came ~p and were bmd~htto hghi One concerneda female military mteirogator
allegedly performing a lap dance on a detainee Second was tne w e o f red ink as take menstrual
bloodduring an intek&lbn.

Now those allegations came from a separate document. In my instructions to John Furtow, Idid
not limit him to just t h o u altegations.Igave him the flexibility to bling Into his invesllgatlon m y
additional allegations of detainee abuse that he might discover during the course of his work.

Now on 28 February. 2005. after two months of investination.John advised me that he neededto
interview officers who were senior In rank to mm As aiesult of that. Iappointee Lieutenant
General Mark Schmdt who n me commander of my Air Force componentcommand AFSoutft

J. - ,-r-- .
a L I 3 > I 19

General Schmiot submitted his initial report to me on the firm of April thn year After  mew.I
directed on the 5lh of May the invesifiabmbe reopened to consider two memo* from me
December 2004 m e frame tnat had bean recenlv discovered And thev wem Wn mwrd to a
special Interrogationplan on a detainee
Whib the team was comp.u nq that additionaltask. I further directed on the 2nd of June that
General Schm dl adaress a second sU of new allegations made by 8 detainee that also
concameo a swcol merrooafeon obn GeneralSchmlmmpetod h b nwtioatton on the 9th d
~une,and my staff judge advocate began a legal review of the report I nave completed my
w mo u h n mv m n n s wiin -rd to the findriot ana recommendation* Iwill inform you d

I
Imank you, sil I am going to go through the scope Of
ewandtrytogi 1truncatedversion of the briefing.

The mwsigation was0 reeled and accomplished under the Informal procedures provisions d
ireit regulation AR 15-6 And the AR 154 lnvesnaaboncentered on FBI aI.qed abuses occurring
dunnQmterroaatKin overations The team found Incidents d abne dunna dfnuon ooertlons
an ofivhkh were appiopriatelyaddressed by the command.

Die team conducted 8 comprehensive m a w d thouaanoi of documents and tatomente

pertainingto any allegation* d abdu occtrrlngat Guantanamo. to lnc4t.de the cofnpteto medical
racoros of me subject* of what we call tne first and -d specnl intfrooation plans

The team interviewed 30 FBI agents conducted interviews of over 100 personnel had aDxss to
hundreds of interviews conducted by several recent investiflations.These intervi&s induded
personnel assignedto Guantanamo US. Southern Command Office of ihe Secretay of
Defense all during the tenure of JTFS 160 170 and currently~uantanamo.It induded 76 Do0
personnel, to includeevery generalofficerwho commandedthe Joint Task Force 160,170 and
Guantanamo. Additionally, weconsidered abuse allegation: made by two high-valuedetainees
themselves.

m e inveitigalionteam attempted to determine If these allegatim In fact occurred, those

abgations made by the FBI. Duringthe courts of a follow-up invstigalion, the AR 15-6 also
consideredallegationsraised speoifcally by the detaineeswho were ihe subjectof those two
special interrogationplans. The investigatingteam applieda preponderance standard of Proof
consistentwith the guidance containedin the Army Regulation 15-6. Much of the testimony was
obtained from witnesses who had served as much as three years earlier, and sometimed for45
days or less. Civilian witnesses were not requiredto cooperate, nor under subpoena toanswer
questions.

The loam also applied gudanca c o n m a hthat regulation, Cunmandw U S. SOUTHCOM and
Secretary of Defense memorandumseuthonz rig spocd mlenugatmn lechniqu~ if decidingif 8
pTHc.~tarmterrogatorapproach fçpropÈn çitm en admonzed tachnque

In mow cases in which ttr team concluded tnm the allegationhad in (act occurred, the team
then consK.iwfJ whether the incidentwas n cutnplance with interrogation techniques that were
approvea either at the time of the nddent or subsequent to the incident

In those cases where it was determined that the allegationoccurredto not have been an
authorized technique, the team then reviewed whetherdisclpftaly action had already been taken
and the propftety of that action

on thezuh of arch,-asked me to determine accountabilityfa tho-

subsl~tietedvio!Alnns that had no m m a n d W o n teken.

We did not review the legal validity of thevariousnterrogatlon techniques outlhed in Amy F d d
Manual 34.52, or those approved by the Secretaryof Defense.

I'd like to cover the summary of findings,

There were nine FBI allegations.Two were unsubstantiated.Two were never authorized, and
corrective action was taken on those. And there were five that were authorized.

The detention and interrogationoperationsat JTF-Guantanamo cover a three-year period and

over 24,000 interrogations.This investigationfound only three interrogationacts to be conducted
in violation of interrogation techniquesauthorized by the Field Manual 34-52 and DoD guidance.
And Iwill cover those three

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The first one on at least two occasions between February 2002 and February2003 two
detainees were short shackled to the eye bolt on the floor of the interrogation room. And that was
an FBI allegation.

Secondly, some time in October 2002, duct tape was used to quiet a detainee.Also an FBI
Â¥negatio

Three - military interrogators threatened the subject of the second special interrogationand his
family, and that was discovered: that was not part of an FBI allegation.

The inspection team also found that the commander of JTF-Guantanamofailed to monitor the
interrogationof one high-valuedetainee, that is ISN-063. The team found that the individual
interrogationtechniques, while authorized, resulted in the persistent, cumulative effect of being
degrading and abusive treatment

Finally, the investigationfound that the communicationof a threat to the second high-value
detainee was in violation of SecM guMance and the UCMJ.

The team found no evidence of torture or inhumanetreatment at JTF Guantanamo.

Again, the investigationfocused on FBI allegations on aggressive Interrogationtactics. That was

our focus

I
~ h a n k s ~ d u n d e r ~ rRegulation
my 154, as the appointingauthority for the
investigation,my responsibilitywas to review the report and take action on the findings and
recommendations.In taking my action, Iacceptedor approved all the numbered findings and
recommendationsincluded in the written report which was provided to the Committeethis
momina both in. Ibelieve, unclass and classifiedformat, excaot for two recommendationsthat I
did notapprove.

First, I disapproved recommendationNo. 16which was that Major General (Geoffrey) Miller be
held accountablefor falling to supervise me interrogationof ISN-063 and that he be admonished
for that failure.

Now. in accordance with current orowdures and regulations. Iforwarded this report to the
Departmentof the Arm9 Inspector General for review and acton as he deems aPProPMle Even
thou~hI disapproved h under Army regulationsany allegation of wrongdoing must W forwardeo
to the Armv iG for nformamnand acton ax ne aaema aoomormta And as a Combatant
~ommander,I could not admonish someone not under hi&mmand at t histime anyway.
Secondly, 1modified recommendationNo. 22 to request that the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service conduct further investigation into the threat communicatedby an interrogator to a
particular high-value detainee before forwardingthe matter to the current commander of that
interrogator for action
The interrogator admitted communicatinga threat, but in his statement he said he believed he
ha0 auinonty to do so beca~sehe had aikm his servicing staff ,mge advocate and his
supervisor The ntervfewt with those two nd viduais were mconc Lsive W h regards to that
statement Inerefore rather than sand no to me c~mmrndartnat mtarroaator 1haw directed a
-
criminal investigative investigationbedone. then results of that provided to the Navy
commander

Iwill now explain the rational for mv decisions. Mv reason for disawrovins recommendation16 to
hoa Genera, M Her acco~ntaoleis ihal the interr&ation of IShC63d d not resiin In any violation
of any L S law or PO icy and that the degiee of supervisonprovided by General Milier aoes not
warrant admonishment .naer the c rcumstances

As the commander even in me early oafs of his assignment, General M ller was responsible for
the cono~clof n s sutiordnaies However as all commanoem m ~ ~ t to d an
o extent that TAEY
daterm ne aaoroonate General U i h r mhed on the i.aamant and ex~enenwof his m D l e lo
carry out their duties in a manner that was both profas~ionaland authorized. The evidence shows
that he was not misguided in this trust, since there was no finding that U.S. law or policy Was
violated.

Genera Miller aid supervise me interrogationin that ne was aware of the most s e ~ w aspects
~s of
ISN-063 s mterrogation-me lengtn of nterroganonsess ons the number of days over wmch R
was conoJCte0 an0 the lenatn of seamaation from other detaness The emence does snow thal
General Miller was NOT aware of certain other aspects of the interrogation However, since there
was no finding that u S law or polcy was violated, there is nott-ing for whch to hold him
accountable concerning the interrogationof 063 Therefore under me circumstances I do not
believe tnat those aspects of which ha was not aware warrant disc plinary actions

Again, of particular importance to my decision is the fact that there was no finding that the
interrogationof 063, albeit characterizedas creative, aggressive and persistent, violated U.S law
or policy.

With regard to the rationale for No. 22. again. I believe that further investigationby the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service may discover evidence In mitigation and extenuationthat should be
considered in determining whether disciplinary action is appropriatefor the Interrogator.

Finally of me recommendationsI approved, recommendations23 thtm.gh 27 are not wthm my

aAnonty to mplemeni Therefore. I forwaroedthose to me Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defensefor detainee affa rs for review and action as he deems appropriate

ndmer w l f we can provide that

cone JOGS my statement
=
I you are not ware or informed of a these findings and recommendationsas iney are lmsted
you've got that ana we can get that out to you And that

Ms. Barber: And w :h !ha: well take your questions.

Mr Maginms ^^B^^^^B Bob Maqmnis You are n-nning a great prcgram down at
G~antanamo.and I was o w n mere with thegroup that went down onme24th. so I can't say
anytfirng bad aooui what I saw I tnought x was great

Question with regard to the female allegation of a lap dance and red ink fake menstrual blood.
Can you respond to that?

Let me turn that over to- because they've got the details on that in their
report.
he -
substantiated ah. first of all the lap dance was not substantiated. We could find no
evidence thrcugh any witness that mere was ever a lap dance Them was n w w m m-mple
nstances of genoer coercion whew a fema e would invade the persona space of the deta nee to
ncliide touch no him straddlina h m wlno-n ounm wftaht an him mnn no her finaarsthrouan
- na
i arm with perfume, and thai sort of thing But no lap danm
hair, touching h
s
The incident concerning the fake menstrual blood. That incident was not authorized.The
occurrence haowned while the female lnterroaatorwas intematina this high-value detainee. He
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spit in her f a c i s h e left the room she was fairly distressed. Vihileihe waiout of the room she
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took a marking pen, marked it on her hand red went back in the room, approached the
detainee, touched his face or shoulders told him that that was menstrual blood and that she
was menstruatina.and that "What do vouthink of that?' and of course he went nuts. Then she left
the room That was an act of revenge'she lost control, lost control of the environment She was
admon shed She was taken off of intermgaton duly, retraned, and eventually retbmed after
about 30 days So that was corrected wnan it nappeneo Bi-t it was an incident mat was reported

Mr. Sheppard^^^^^^^J Don Sheppard

=~ey DO".

Mr Sheppard Much has been made in the media about confusion over changing rules, what's to
be done, el cetera, betweenAfghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo. Did you find that to be the case? Or
were the people clear on what they could do at all times?

Iwill tall you, Don -first of all, GuanlanamoBay Is a separate, closed-loop detention
interrogationoperation. The connection betweenany other operation really begins to open up a
basket of worms and it does not pertain.

-
At Gdantanamotne ules changed when they ha0 these res stance tramed particdlariy one
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hqn-fa de ISN-063- high-valuedetainee- mat was resistancetrained and they were getting
nowhere witn him An0 thev thouoht and later moved to be fairly accurate, Vial he had valuable
information on the Global war on~error.

The Jo.nt l a % Force requestedadditional nterrogatontechniques from a higher autnmv. and

they went up through the Office of me Secretaryof Defense may did ieeeve Vial authority on
the 2nd of December 03 fsk, 2002. see wlow wnh Craodock) to open up me envelope a l e e bit
with more aggressive techniques.

Now the techniques at that level ookfany benign The problem thai 1 encounteredWas they get
down to the appl.caton of those tech" ~ J O me S s ~ p w i s i o nand me tupervwry cham of now
yo4 translate a futility tecnnique down to wnat nappens n Vie Interrogationroom is where the
issues we nao son of resoeo An0 Id-o find that there was abusive and degrao ng techniques
applied So that was me problem However the aulnormes to open up interrogat on lecnn cues In
response to Guantanamo and tdid not mean it went anywhere else Guantanamounder the
closed crucible of me controls they nave down mere were approved on the 2nd of Decemoer
They were rescinded on the 15th of January A new set came out on the 16th 01JanJary through
16 Apnl an0 on the 16tn of April anoiner set camedownmat son of resolved it a1 and tor the
16tn of Ann that's what's in dace now now ~ n the n FbldManua 34 52 8s kind of meed as a
guide for'intenroaators SO it changed but it was not an out-of-contro~PBSS. and it wasn't a wild
3 ~ ' oanything
r either. So it was fairly controlled.

Let me just amplify, Don. Ithink said approved December

2.2003. I ~important
s irs actually December 2.2002.
I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Two thousand two
 But ifs importantfrom the perspective of 14 months afterg-11. Look, they found out
about end of summer,August- Juty, August, fingerprint matched up, Khatani, who he really was,
20th hijacker. And there was a lot of angst And they said this guy has resisted interrogation
techniques from the FBI for eight months; we think he's got information on ai Qaeda. If he's the
20th hijacker he's in the know; we havego to find out what he knows. Ithink the angst. the
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tension, theanxiety that another attack was going to happen and we still beikveit is, it's a
matter of when -was greater then. And the notion was, we have to do somethingto get inside his
head to find out what it is. That's the genesis of these interrogationtechniques.

Part two The techniques still approved on 2 December arelargelyeiiyed d m 34-52. Ego
down. futility Those techniques are a broad banner. And a aid, In the application
developed by the JTF-GTMO interrogationteams becomeswhere they actually then determine
what they aregoing todo in that interrogationbooth.

tsneppam?) Folow LP nere One of the obvious questions weregang to be asked is OK so

things cnanged ana aggressive -can yo^ maractem a imle for us or COL d yo^ give us
something that we can Lse to characterize*at changed, without revealing specific techniqd-?

well I think probably techniques are in theopen press now. Go ahead-

-yeah, they are. Let me,W to give you an example. 1 put two examples when we did our
-
testimony. The first one was. for instance, the field manual has 34-52 -has an example of
funny.

-
What that means at that level that broad t m c - the internator convinces the source that
resistance to questioning Is fume. Then that goes down throigh a process. If that tectinique!s
chosen by the JTF to be used against a particular detainee, then there's an interrogator, typically
an NCO, constructs a written interrogation plan. That plan now is vetted through a team chief or
intelliaence control element supervisor- that means it's either an 0-5 or a DIA GG14 level then-
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that'sapprovedor not adjusted then an interrogationis conductedwith a translator with this
NCO. and possibly with another analyst.

What that meant down in the application at Guantanamo- remember,the application is futility,
--
convince the source that resistance to questioning is futile that translates into tell the detainee
about how a1 Qaeda's failing apart; everyone's been killed or captured, and we know a lot about
this individual.

But it also translates to gender coercion via some domination. It's futile. I'm a female; I'm in your
face; you can do nothing about it. Start talking to us.

He was straddled, massaged, touched, that sort of thing. It could beas non-injurioustype of
touching.

Another example is wo down And this is the one where we start seeino a different sort of thing,
and a gets into possmiesexual humii alion Ego down. mars an approach oaseo on anackng the
$0-rce s sense of personal wonh Goes through me same process That NCO written Plan. vets
mmugn me 0 5 eve1 GG14 eve1 ana then cona~ctsme interrogation with translator
.l

In GTMO. that ego down translated down to telling the detainee that his mother and sister were
whores, he was forced to wear women's lingerie, multiple allegations of h e homosexuality,he
was forced to dance with a male interrogator, he was strip searched for control measures, and he
was forced to perform dog tricks on a leash.

how. the oas c line mere .-~ O say

L -
tnat sounds you know line i d d that sounds like oegraaing
Well we saia yes. it couh oe The base linethoi-gn in me cnanu lor those interrogatorswas
n-mane treatment And numanetreatment is spelçout by t w Presdent Ifs a safe. secure
 environmenttnat provides medical care food. water and the basics of that person's security Not
tnm Was lnis person inpiw. named? No Were they oemed any medical care. an@ ng? NO So
mere was a Ine there Ãm don't cross me ne between innumane and that's where 11went. Don

II So, those are some processeswe kind of had to wrestle wlm

Mr. Babbin: Jed Babbin-o rf General,we see General Miller's name having
popped up before, and 1 know exac1.y # h a 3 going to be in the New York Times tomorrow, Or
CBS News tonight You know, they reprimandedJanice Karpinski,even though Miller had been
at some point at Abu Ghraib and had helped developedinterrogationtechniques, now again, at
GTMO. I understandyour good answer about the fact that, you know, what happened at GTMO
d'dnt violate law or policy. But we are going to be bombardedtomorrow about why Miller wasn't
admonished.

Second queston I was at GTMOyesterday ana , saw area y very go- operaion. and Iha* no
reason to lnirx mat anything like tnis would ever happen at that point down @arenow, and I
would .ike to nave your view on that

But first. Karpinski versus Miller, please

1- can't make a comparisonwith Karpinski and Miller. Ionly dealt with this situation, with
Miller, at GTMO. And I am not read into the situation with Karpinski. The fact is that this s W l
interrogation plan was developed in advance of ~ e o f~illershowing
f up. He walked in to GTMO
early November. It was approved and went into place the and of that month. He did not develop
it. It was in staffing; it left, I believe it left GTMO the 11thof October, got up to SOUTHCOM,
SOUTHCOM forwarded it, then later on it was, you know, worked over and slattedin the
Pentagon. So he walked in and what he had todo was one, understandwhafsgoing on down
there.

He was told 'take these two task forces ' one JTF-160and the other JTF-170. one dealing W th
oeta nee oparai om the other wain mte ligence collection put tnem into one. me10 mem into a
common operating environmentthat s compatible, an0 thatlney are integrated an0 fully
fmction ng together

That kind of translated, based on some of the folks that my investigatorstalked to, Is bring order
out of chaos. Secondly, while you're there, coordinatethe inter-agency. Let's get all of the inter-
agency folks representeddown there on board and let's pull together, Instead of pulling apart.
Third, take a look at the facilities for the detainees and let's see what needs to be done and
enhance those. And also, last but not least, we want you to enhance and improve the quality of
life for our servicemembersdown there, commensuratewith what they would expect to have back
at their bases, camps, posts and Installationsin the States. So he had a lot of things he had to do.

My point to you is a difference between the investigatorsand myset on the degree of supervision
required. He did know certain things that Ifelt that were importantthat he knew about that
investigation, but hedld not know everything about what was going on.

I f a commanderIs required to know everything aboutwhat Is going on in a unit where there is no

violation of law, policy or regulation, I am afraid mat he is unable to command. So that's the point
-and the other thing, keep In mind only one SIP ever implemented,this one, he walked into it
essentially in progress

Babbin: Good. And Iappreciate that And I suspect that what Iam going to answer, at the risk Of
belaboringthe point Is you know your point about the fact that law and policy was not violated I
think is the most c&pelling one and that, you know, that's the difference between Abu Ghraib
and here. Second point though, sir, what assurancewould you say, what would you give us in
terms of what we saw yesterday?We saw a lot of things including all of the camps, including
some of the ongoing interrogations,we had a chance to observe briefly. Do you have confidence
that what's going on down there right now isali in accordancewith law and wiicy as well as it

~ k o k y Lw* Ieammg oqamzabon- the mMaw 1s We e m Them were

txtraom nary requirementsand needs on that S P oaseo up on the notion the be mi that the 20tn
h acka nad some informationwe needed to gel We had mm a one 1 ma What was cook ng we
needed to know.

Now. what we have done Is we've 001 new ouidelines,the 16 Aoril memo. they're in dace. We
understand,we know, that over time buiidi6 re~roachmentand rapport with these detainees and
then getting informationfrom them is a better way to go. And generally speaking, with this
populationthat's what we've done. We've gotten some successeswith that, as you were down
there, l a m sure vou heard. And Iam confident in the ornf~fuionalismof all of JTF-GTMO. Imean
that tea very, v& well run organization.

Mr. Babbln: Excellent,thank you.

Mr Valle r Paul Va le y One last quest on You know with a1 of me in ngs that have come awul
in the ( i n a ~ dble) down mere. do we really provide enougn flexibility now on interrogation
techn.qi.es that we can really get the miormanon from a l of these people which s so v tal?

m ~ 0 c - queston a ~ yod that based upon the procediires in place there are four
W O Jtell
techniques tnat if we feel l,ke we need to use have to De advance notification to me SecDet
There s also guidance that 1any of those or a1 of those we believe competent authority and -
that s the join1 ~ntenogationgrodp chiel and the JTF-GTMO would r e q d it of me if we-
klleve that we nave a situaton that we nave someone that is nonreaponslveto the current
tech" ques over time that there are proceise* wnereoy they can request specialized techniques
So I think the safeguards in place are adequate. Ithink that the interrogationtechniques am
working. But I also know that ifa peculiar situation arises, we have avenues to address that.

Mr. Valkiy Great Thank you.

Mr. McCausBnd. Sir. this is Jeff Mccausland. First of all. I'd like to say I'm delighted that Jed
knows what CBS is going to do, because Iwork for them and hell. I don't know what theyre going
to do (laughter).

But having said that, sir, first of all I would like to say I was also down in Guantanamoyesterday
and as an old soldier, I've got to say that's one of the most professional,well-disciplined, highly
motivated.well-ied units I have had the pleasure to visit, and they should be commended. Jay
Hood and his sergeant major and his guys are just doing a bang-up job under pretty tough
conditions.

do nave twoq~estionsfor ~ O Jand I th nx rs ~ i n of

d afollow up from Jm'sand that is. the
quest on of accountab ity ana will be one we're going to be Deal dp on And yoJ've answeredthat
with resoern10 Genera. Mil er o d e adeo~atev BLt n terms of anv mher accoLntabilitvaction
taken against any other soldieior for that matter any other FBI or any other civilian involved in
interrogation, from what I've heard, the only person I've heard who any action was taken against
was the one female interrogatorwhoyou rightfully described as having lost control, and therefore
was removed, retrained for her actions. And that's perfectly appropriate. But, were there any
other, based on what was discovered, any other actionsof accountability, be it admonishment, be
It reprimand, be < Ancle 15, UCMJ, any other action taken as part and parcel of this
investigation?
And secono of all. I'd jist IKB your readm as the regionalcomponent commander down them,
aoool oils id- now thai having done al ths B whal we d y need is a mUmd commission Id
w n t h a these types of investigations?

Let me turn It over-ot to address the (tot question about accountaMllty.

-Let me firststartoffwith the duct tam. he duct tarnwas an incidentthat's contained In

the report whem tgot out of control and they ended up ouct taping up a dela~nee'xhead And,
obviously went beyondthe Imite of wnat we expected And the interrooatorwas brought up and
oven an oral remmana Ann we'm in me D ~ C M K of m o m 0 a form on to his current suDefvwor
make that a k l e bit more official

On the interrogationside. whenever an Incident would come up, it was addressed by the chain of
command. it was documented and mev movedon with business. On the detention side. same
type of deal. If an Individualwas determined to exhibit misconduct, he would receive the
punishment thai was due to ffl the clime, and they moved on. As In any type of military
ofganlzatlmt h m a, you know, dealings that the supervision and the leadershiphat to deal with.
But those am tha main thim: them's acoountrtiilitvthare. As vou mantimed. w talked to the
sergeant major, the commandsergeant major and.Staff ~erg&ntMajor end& who Nnsthe
detention center runs and leads and supervises a very active N W chain and keeps the soldiers
l n l m e d and accountable far their actions m a dally basis, despitethe fact that they are in a very
arduous task and the feet that thevere often Insultedon a dalv basis. Thw are cussed at; they
are threatened they have feces and urinethrownon them. I mean they are doing a great Pb
down there And so for the accoumaoiily, the leadership them, especially at the middle
management is obviously commendabm. And Ithink you folks saw tnat

Lei me amplify that real quick. On ma rocammendens from the

the duct tape I n ~ The
a racommendftbonis that the individualwho told
d do that wà admonl~hadbiit theta not admirta. I mrwd Ihave 8mt that
t m o ~ u to
recinmendationto the director of the Joint Staff to ftxwa'rd to the'directa ofthe Defense
IntelligenceAgency because that Individualworked far him f a reprimand.

Secondly I think them was another one them concerning the death threat that was issued to a
detainee What I unaerstood d the a tuallon mere was Dialthe IKetrcflator thought he had top
-
cove* he said he do. the two indivkuds he (nought he got it from. when when we interviewed
nit ally and then went back a second time they refusedto talk. Iam not conv need. Iem skeptical
>
mat he acted on hb own, so Imid let a refer that and rw sent to N Ã ‘ a CriminalInveatwtive
Servttt for a cnminm Invesllgatm to compel UÈ Indivlduaisto talk B l a cnm nil hvettlgalon
in- lhçwtxildn t t i k to my infomrl investiguon under 15-6

Second part The commission issue. The nationalcommission. Some of the recommendations
ware we need to clarify procedures, how we coordinate with the interagency, at what point do the
combined efleets of interrogation application; crest the line Into abusive or degrading treatment?
I agreed with those,and Iapproved those. Idon't know how to go about that. Isent those
recommendationsthat Iapproved to the Assistant Secretary of DefenselorDetainee Affairs. Matt
Waxman, and said, 'here they am, Irecommendapproval, I've approved them, I recommendthat
you Initiate them.'
Then Matt,ASD DçtelneAffairs, will deal with it through the Policy OSD chamel

Iam skeptical,wncerned that a nationalwmmission- look, Idon't know that that's the right Way;
Idon't know that Ira the wrong way. But whatever we do ought to be sooner rather than later, if
wa'm going to do it and it oumt to be focused on me future, not the past We ought not tog0
back and headhunt, and try to hold people accountablewhen all these investigationshavedona
that and folks to a gnat extent it ain't them In myjudgnent. Whatwe need is we mod guidance
far the future that commanders can use either specifically a generally so the1without guidance
 they use their best miHary judgment and thm later on are hmd accountable or questionedlor It
because Ifs not In agreement with someone's perceptionof whafs right and wrong.
Now, I'm off my soapbox.

d a paper that shows you an the findings, recommendations,and the numbering

system.
Mr. Babbln: Alllson, Is there any way that wecan get the urnlass versionof the report teen?
Ms. Barber: Yes, we're going to send that to you Jed.
Voice: What were thedates of the allegedabuses that they covered? Can you give that real
quick? The time period.

i ~ h i 18-new. s Primarily the window of the FBI emails sna s c h started

somewtiere around August. Seplembef 02 m d ran to ago* the end fire1 calendar quarter 2003.
Now I aav that kind of tentativelybecause when w started oflttr inwtigation we wore only abte
to nail down some of mese al&ions ana events to months rather thanspecrfic date-time
-
groups So that was one of the things eat we haa a prob em with In going back Into a two three
wars into the oast What we mum do k v sk wdh an individualthat was down tfwe on a 45dW
tour They kn& It haooened white they were down there 45 days And what sometimes ç
ended upgelllng
- - (w&j II was toward the Iranior toward the tack oftheir45day tour.

-
Yean. this Is let me g b you one alibi.-
- The didbrence MMÈe Mllbr
and Kar~inxki.Kaminsk3ssituation the auantt malfrÑte d f n à § w w thw was a violation d
law. ~dtnn wÇ Miller. it was a lawfull&rrogaliin. Thsfs the difference.
if you have additionalquestions you can zap
you the briiifings and the papere.
thank you for your time today as well.
I ~ h a n you,k Alllwn.
Call ends:

I ~ o w o n thing
e (he?)juattold me, the end date was really like August 03.

-03, w.
Voice: It's In the report.