G.R. No. L-36402 March 16, 1987 Filipino Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, BENJAMIN TAN, Defendant-Appellee
G.R. No. L-36402 March 16, 1987 Filipino Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, BENJAMIN TAN, Defendant-Appellee
G.R. No. L-36402 March 16, 1987 Filipino Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, BENJAMIN TAN, Defendant-Appellee
PARAS, J.:
The Court of Appeals, finding that the case involves pure questions of law,
certified the same to the Supreme Court for final determination (Resolution,
CA-G.R. No. 46373-R, Rollo, p. 36; Resolution of the Supreme Court of
February 16, 1973 in L-36402, Rollo, p. 38).
The lower court, finding for the defendant, dismissed the complaint (Record
on Appeal, p. 25).
II
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAYING AND
SINGING OF COPYRIGHTED MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS IN THE SODA
FOUNTAIN AND RESTAURANT OF THE APPELLEE ARE NOT PUBLIC
PERFORMANCES FOR PROFIT OF THE SAID COMPOSITIONS WITHIN
THE MEANING AND CONTEMPLATION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW.
IV
The principal issues in this case are whether or not the playing and signing
of musical compositions which have been copyrighted under the provisions
of the Copyright Law (Act 3134) inside the establishment of the defendant-
appellee constitute a public performance for profit within the meaning and
contemplation of the Copyright Law of the Philippines; and assuming that
there were indeed public performances for profit, whether or not appellee
can be held liable therefor.
Appellant anchors its claim on Section 3(c) of the Copyright Law which
provides:
SEC. 3. The proprietor of a copyright or his heirs or assigns shall have the
exclusive right:
We concede that indeed there were "public performances for profit. "
The word "perform" as used in the Act has been applied to "One who plays
a musical composition on a piano, thereby producing in the air sound
waves which are heard as music ... and if the instrument he plays on is a
piano plus a broadcasting apparatus, so that waves are thrown out, not
only upon the air, but upon the other, then also he is performing the musical
composition." (Buck, et al. v. Duncan, et al.; Same Jewell La Salle Realty
Co., 32F. 2d. Series 367).
In relation thereto, it has been held that "The playing of music in dine and
dance establishment which was paid for by the public in purchases of food
and drink constituted "performance for profit" within a Copyright
Law." (Buck, et al. v. Russon No. 4489 25 F. Supp. 317). Thus, it has been
explained that while it is possible in such establishments for the patrons to
purchase their food and drinks and at the same time dance to the music of
the orchestra, the music is furnished and used by the orchestra for the
purpose of inducing the public to patronize the establishment and pay for
the entertainment in the purchase of food and drinks. The defendant
conducts his place of business for profit, and it is public; and the music is
performed for profit (Ibid, p. 319). In a similar case, the Court ruled that
"The Performance in a restaurant or hotel dining room, by persons
employed by the proprietor, of a copyrighted musical composition, for the
entertainment of patrons, without charge for admission to hear it, infringes
the exclusive right of the owner of the copyright." (Herbert v. Shanley Co.;
John Church Co. v. Hillard Hotel Co., et al., 242 U.S. 590-591). In
delivering the opinion of the Court in said two cases, Justice Holmes
elaborated thus:
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where
money is taken at the door, they are very imperfectly protected.
Performances not different in kind from those of the defendants could be
given that might compete with and even destroy the success of the
monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs to have. It is enough to say that
there is no need to construe the statute so narrowly. The defendants'
performances are not eleemosynary. They are part of a total for which the
public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed to a
particular item which those present are expected to order is not important.
It is true that the music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which
probably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The object is a repast in
surroundings that to people having limited power of conversation or
disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating
a silent meal. If music did not pay, it would be given up. If it pays, it pays
out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not, the purpose of employing
it is profit, and that is enough. (Ibid., p. 594).
A careful study of the records reveals that the song "Dahil Sa Iyo" which
was registered on April 20, 1956 (Brief for Appellant, p. 10) became popular
in radios, juke boxes, etc. long before registration (TSN, May 28, 1968, pp.
3-5; 25) while the song "The Nearness Of You" registered on January 14,
1955 (Brief for Appellant, p. 10) had become popular twenty five (25) years
prior to 1968, (the year of the hearing) or from 1943 (TSN, May 28, 1968, p.
27) and the songs "Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin" and "Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao
Lamang" both registered on July 10, 1966, appear to have been known and
sang by the witnesses as early as 1965 or three years before the hearing in
1968. The testimonies of the witnesses at the hearing of this case on this
subject were unrebutted by the appellant. (Ibid, pp. 28; 29 and 30).
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.