The Nyaya Darshana

The Nyaya Darshana
Translation and commentary by John Wells
Copyright 2012
Introduction
This translation reveals an interpretation of the Nyaya Darshana that is
substantially different from those done by Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1939) and S.C.
Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1913), both of whom follow the interpretation of the traditional
commentaries, especially that of Vātsyāyana (unknown date, but earlier than 5th
century C.E.) Opinions as to the exact identity of the author Gautama, and as to the
dates of composition of both the original and the early commentaries are widely
divergent. I have used Vidyābhūṣaṇa as one of my sources for the original text in
Devanagarī script, indicated by "Vb", the other source being that available from
Maharishi University of Management, indicated by "MUM", from their wonderful
and carefully prepared collection available online.
In the translation I have focused on a disciplined and faithful rendering of the

sentences exactly as they appear in the original, without paraphrasing, and adding
as few extra words as possible, although with the sparse and highly context-
dependent "sutra" style of writing, it is necessary to supply some extra words. One
example is reflexive pronouns—his, its, that, such, etc.—before nouns, the sense
of which would have been an integral part of an ancient reader's understanding of
the style. Verbs are almost nonexistent in this style and I, like all other translators,
take the liberty of reading some nouns-only sentences in a compatible subject-verb
format for clarity. I often supply extra words in parentheses to clarify the meaning,
and by this practice I have been able to avoid excessive explanatory commentary.
The resulting simplicity of presentation has been one of my primary goals.
I have thoroughly read and understood the intent of the other translations, but I
find them full of religious and school-oriented bias and technically deeply flawed.
In many sutras there is no attempt at a faithful translation at all, but instead an
imposition of the translator's own original work (unacknowledged as such), as if to
say, "Whatever the actual text, this is what he really means." Moreover, although
some passages in the Nyaya are clearly presented as a dialectic, Vātsyāyana etc.
mistakenly read nearly every phrase beginning with "na" (no), no matter how
short, as a counterargument, often with extremely shabby "reasons", reading every
ablative inflection as "because", while ignoring the many other possible uses of
that case. Besides missing the incisive and richly interesting observations of the
author that appear with a more thoughtful and disciplined translation, their
interpretation boggles the reader's mind with phony reasoning and petty irrelevant
squabbles, supposedly between various schools of thought, lined up against each
other like football teams. As a result, they have managed to completely obscure
what I consider to be one of the original expositions of the great Yoga philosophy.
Now some say that understanding this philosophy is not just a matter of reading
translations disciplined by a study of grammars and dictionaries, and that is true,
but neither does it help to ignore scholarship, hoping to absorb knowledge through
faith by sitting at the feet of a revered and supposedly "enlightened" master.
Obviously, one cannot do a translation by simply looking up the words in the
dictionary, one by one, and patching them together into a translation. Translation
from Sanskrit requires a thorough knowledge of how the language works, in all its
complex and fascinating aspects, and it must be accompanied by a knowledge of
syntax, roots, noun formations, secondary affixes, and noun cases, including
special uses of, e.g., the genitive to abbreviate, the ablatives of separation and
comparison, the locative absolute, etc. Still, for a student of the Yoga philosophy,
the necessary accompaniment to the examination of texts is a devoted private
examination of his consciousness itself, not devotion to a master.
The nineteenth-century scholars who brought the study of Sanskrit to the West
based their grammars on those developed by centuries of Indian scholarship rooted
in the great Aṣṭādhyāyī by Pāṇini (circa 500 BCE). Monier-Williams, Boehtlingk,
etc., produced their dictionaries with the aid and guidance of contemporary Indian
scholars, each in his own particular area of expertise. The enlightenment of these
masters was that of scholarship and organizational skill, not of mystical or
religious devotion. It is therefore entirely sufficient to learn the language from
them, and to verify our intuitive knowledge of the philosophical principles in the
Darshanas by knowledge of the language.
There are, however, some terms in the Monier-Williams dictionary that are
apparently unique to the Darshanas and to the philosophical compendium Sarva-
darśanasaṁgraha based on the early faulty interpretations. These are the only
sources he cites for such words, and in these, he had no choice but to defer to his
Indian Darshana experts, who in turn depended on the dubious traditional reading.
Vātsyāyana himself surely lived and breathed Sanskrit, but he did not grasp the
meaning of this work, the style and substance of which were probably centuries
out of date even in his day. He took undue liberties in creating many "technical"
meanings which bore no relation to the proper root-based meanings, all in order to
support his false vision of a "Nyaya" school of reasoning. This has never been
challenged by an independent translation, perhaps in part because of the stifling
effect of an entrenched culture where it is forbidden to challenge authority, and
where a reverence approaching worship toward spiritual leaders is encouraged.
Not being subject to this culture, I feel free to read the text according to its
obvious literal meaning. For example, arthāpatti means "arriving at a meaning" or
"interpretation", and jāti means birth-rank. Pravṛtti can mean a report or account,
prasaṅga "occupation with", and yugapat "simultaneous" with awareness, i.e.,
immediate or present, etc. Varṇa and suvarṇa in this work refer to caste, not color
or gold. Bhāva is used variously by the author as "being" (existence), or a human
"being", but also a way of being or thinking (see MW), i.e., a theory of being or
ontology. (For simplicity, I have used "view".) "Abhāva" is sometimes used as the
first element in bahuvrīhi compounds, meaning devoid of being or "empty".
As for the structure of the work, it is evident to me that the numbering of sutras
and so-called "books" in the Nyaya, as in the other Darshanas, was not part of the
author's original text, but rather added later as an editorial device. Many of these
incorrectly numbered divisions actually break up proper sentences and tend to
disrupt a sensible reading of the original. Like the other Darshanas, I read this
work as constructed of an orderly series of full statements (which I have
numbered), rather than a string of tiny "aphorisms". Most of these statements
consist of three connected ideas in the form of phrases or short sentences, arranged
eighteen to a "chapter", with nine chapters in all. This all becomes evident by the
distinctness of the statements and chapters, each with a clear beginning and end,
by their natural thematic progression, by the physical length of each statement,
which is remarkably consistent throughout the work; and by other clues, like the
many statements containing clustered repetitions of a word, and many where
"apratiṣedha" is the last word (the subject, whose predicate is stated in 1.2.14 to be
the opening premise (1.1.1), and implied in every instance thereafter.)
Hopefully, by the foregoing, one may understand my main motivations for

producing this translation (and the others) from a fresh perspective, unfettered by
any obligation to conform with a flawed tradition. I fully understand that the
fraction of the population that would be interested in this subject matter in the first
place is already very small, and of those, the number that would find their way to
this work would be even less. Still, anyone who has read my translations of the
Darshanas will understand the irony that the thesis of this author, which is
fundamentally the same as that of the authors of the other Darshanas, is inherently
inconsistent with its being popular. So perhaps our isolation in this reading, both
from tradition and from the general population, is as it should be, and we may now
proceed from justifications to the happy task of enlightening ourselves in this
philosophy.
John Wells
Chapter One 1
Chapter One - Introduction and pramāṇa-prameya
प्रममाणप्रममयससशयप्रययोजनदृषमान्तससदमान्तमावयवतरर सनणरयवमादजल्पसवतणणमाहमतमाभमासच
लजमासतसनग्रहसमानमानमास तत्त्वजमानमासनन्निःशयम समासधिगमन्निः। दन्निःखजन्मप्रववृसत्तिदयोषसमथमाजमानमा-
म रयोत्तिरमापमायम तदनन्तरमापमायमादपवग रन्निः।

नमामत्ति
(1.1.1) pramāṇa-prameya- the act of proving or validating vs. that which is to
be validated -saṁśaya-prayojana- uncertainty vs. motivation -dṛṣṭānta-
siddhānta- standard vs. doctrtine -avayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda- part(s) of the
formal syllogism – discussion, examination – (for the sake of) settlement –
dialectic -jalpa- prattle, gossip -hetu-ābhāsa- grounds for knowing – fallacious
-vitaṇḍā-chala- cavil, baseless argument for the sole purpose of winning – fraud,
trickery, false persuasion (e.g. equivocation) -jāti-nigraha-sthānānām class,
birth-rank – subjugation, domination – taking a stance (We are expected to
recognize the obvious dvandvas here. The author seems to have chosen his words
for that purpose. I have used "vs." to mean "considered against") tattva-jñānāt
(abl. by) essence – true comprehension niḥśreyasa-adhigamaḥ "without
superior", highest – attaining, finding (1.1.2) duḥkha-janman – pravṛtti-doṣa –
mithyā-jñānānām (gen. pl. belonging to, held or claimed by those) suffering –
born – account(s) – false – mistakenly – comprehending uttara-uttara-apāye
(loc. once there is) higher and higher advancement – withdrawal tat-anantara-
apāyāt (abl. by) that – uninterrupted, continuous – going away, withdrawal
apavargaḥ completion, fulfilment
1.1-2 Finding the highest (dharma) is by truly comprehending the essence:

1.) of our validation (of truth), vs. that (truth) which is to be validated, 2.) of
our uncertainty vs. our motivation, 3.) of our standard vs. our doctrine, and
4.) of the dialectic for settlement by discussion using the formal syllogism, vs.
prattle: fallacious grounds, false persuasion for the purpose of hitting back,
and taking a stance by dominating (the discussion) by virtue of (high) birth-
rank; (whereas) the fulfilment of that (dharma), once there is (initial)
withdrawal from the (dharma of) higher and higher advancement claimed by
those mistakenly comprehending the false account of being born in suffering,
is by (a state of) uninterrupted withdrawal from that.
2 The Nyaya Darshana
म
प्रत्यकमानममानयोपममानशबमान्निः प्रममाणमासन। इसन्द्रियमार रससनरषर्षोत्पनस जमानमव्यपदमशयमव्यसभ-
चमासर व्यवसमायमात्मरस प्रत्यकम।म

(1.1.3) pratyakśa – anumāna-apamāna-śabdāḥ (Pratyakśa is ibc (beginning
the compound), functioning like an indeclinable, and qualifying the other three
words in the compound.) "right before the eye(s)", directly perceived, based on
perception – inference – comparison – testimony pramāṇāni validations of truth
(1.1.4) indriya-artha-saṁnikarṣa-utpannam sense – object – "together-in-
drawing" – invested with jñānam true comprension // avyapadeśyam not to be
designated, named, represented, etc. avyabhicāri-vyavasāya-ātmakam not
deviating from – determination, resolve – characterized by pratyakṣam perception
1.3 Our ways of validating truth are: perception, inference, comparison,

and testimony, where "perception" is a true comprehension, as one invested
(only) with the drawing in together of his senses and their objects, not to be
represented (by name or explanation), characterized by one's (uninterrupted
1.1.2) determination not to deviate from that (by naming and explaining).
This is equivalent to YD 1.8, "Discipline is the resolve for staying in that state
(of yoga) … with earnest attention to long-term continuance." I have freely
supplied the pronouns "our" and "their" in the translation throughout the work, to
indicate the author's unique and controversial Yogic thesis, vs. the more customary
view of the would-be objector. Every translator does this in his own way. In some
Darshanas the authors do not use "iti cet" to indicate an opposing voice, but leave
it to the reader to recognize antithesis by the context.
अर तत्पतवर म
र स सत्रिसवधिम।नममानस पतववर चमषवतमाममान्यतयो दृषस च। प्रससदसमाधिरमारतमाध्यसमा-
म
धिनमपम ममानम।आपयोपदम
शन्निः शबन्निः।
(1.1.5) atha-tat_pūrvakam following on that as the basis trividham threefold
anumānam inference pūrvavat (vatup ind.) having (the nature of) the previous
śeṣavat (vatup ind.) having (the nature of) remaining after sāmānyataḥ_dṛṣṭam
commonly known, universally agreed to ca and (1.1.6) prasiddha-sādharmyāt
(abl. of comparison w/upamānam; apart from) well-known – conformity sādhya-
sādhanam to be established (the premise) – establishing upamānam comparison
(1.1.7) āpta-upadeśaḥ trusted authority – teaching śabdaḥ testimony
Chapter One 3
1.4 With that (perception) as the basis for it, there is our threefold
inference, 1.) that it (truth) has the nature of that previous thing (immediate
personal perception), (but also) 2.) that it has the nature of remaining after
(the perception) and 3.) that it is universally agreed to. Our "comparison"
establishes our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension) as
apart from conforming with a dharma that is well known. "Testimony"
means the teaching of a trusted authority.
म सन्द्रियमार रबसम दमनन्निः प्रववृसत्तिदयोषप्रमत्यभमावफलदन्निःखमाप-

र मात ।आत्मशररीरम
स सद्विसवधियो दृषमादृषमारत
वगमारस म प्रममयम।म
(1.1.8) sa that dvividhaḥ two ways dṛṣṭa-adṛṣṭa-artha-tvāt (abl. according to)
commonly known – not commonly known – meaning – being (1.1.9) ātma-śarīra
– indriya-artha – buddhi-manaḥ individual self – body – sense(s) – object(s) –
conceptual understanding pravṛtti-doṣa – pretyabhāva-phala-duḥkha –
apavargāḥ account – faulty, false – "state of existence having passed on",
afterlife – "fruit", consequence – suffering – having done with (Pravṛtti here takes
its secondary meaning, not the progress of life itself, but of the "news" or
accounting of it. It is always associated with 'telling' words, like śabda here, vāk in
1.1.17, and yathokta in 4.1.1)) tu but prameyam (meant) to be validated
1.5 That (testimony) can (also) be seen two ways according to its meaning
being either commonly known or not commonly known; but what we mean to
validate is (not the testimony but) the conceptual understanding of the
individual (ātman) with its body, and its senses with their objects, having done
with the false account (testimony) of its (the ātman's) existence after death, of
consequence (karma), and of suffering.
The author's prameya is literally what is "to be validated" by this examination,

and his definition of it here is actually a concise statement of the thesis of this
work. In the following pages he argues forcefully against the doctrines of karma
and reincarnation on the part of many souls, and in favor of profound
comprehension (jñāna) of the creation of the body, senses, and objects, through the
agency of the pervasive consciousness of the one individual self or soul. This
treatise is a comparison between a system based on faith and interpretation of
scripture against a personal examination based on immediate experience.
म खजमानमासन आत्मनन्निः सलङ्गम।म चमषसम न्द्रियमारमारशयन्निः शररीरम।म घ्रणरसन-

इचद्विमषप्रयत्नसखदन्निः
म भन्निः। पवृसरव्यमापसमजयो वमायरम मारमाशसमसत भततमासन। गन्धर-

म कयोत्रिमाणरीसन्द्रियमासण भतम
चकस्त्व
सरूपस्पशरशबमान्निः
(1.1.10) iccha-dveṣa-prayatna – sukha-duḥkha-jñānāni desire – aversion –
endeavor – happiness – suffering – conceptions ātmanaḥ (gen. of) individual self
liṅgam indicator (1.1.11) ceṣṭa-indriya-artha-āśrayaḥ physical behavior – senses
– object(s) – seat śarīram body (1.1.12) ghraṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvac-śrotrāṇi
smelling – tasting – seeing – skin – hearing (-ana=action noun) indriyāṇi senses
bhutebhyaḥ (abl. known by) gross elements (1.1.13) pṛthivī earth āpaḥ water
tejaḥ fire vāyuḥ air ākāśam ether iti called, known as bhūtāni gross elements
(1.1.14) gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdāḥ smell – taste – form – feel – sound
1.6-7 The indication of this 'individual' is (in) its endeavors associated with
desire vs. aversion, and (in) conceptions regarding happiness vs. suffering,
and its "body" is the seat of the objects of both physical behavior and the
senses. The senses, known by their gross elements—'gross elements' meaning
earth, water, fire, air, and the ether—are the (mental) acts of smelling, tasting,
seeing, feeling, and hearing, which are the (actual) smell, taste, form, feel, and
sound (of things).
Clearly here in 1.1.10 he draws from the Vaisheshika 3.2.4 (3.12 JW) viz., "The
indications of the individual are ... endeavors regarding happiness vs. suffering and
desire vs. aversion." The nouns in 1.1.12 indicate the mental "act" of smelling,
tasting, etc., rather than the fleshy physical organs. The word "tvac" refers to sense
of touch in the whole body, best translated in English as “feel”.
म न्निः। बसम दरुपलसब्धिजमारनसमत्यनरमारन्तरम ।म यगम पजमानमानत्पसत्तिमर

पवृसरव्यमासदगणमासदरमार म नसयो
म सत्तिवमारगबसदशररीरमारमन्निः
सलङ्गम।प्रववृ म ।
(1.1.14 cont.) pṛthivī-ādi-guṇāḥ earth – etc. – essential constituents tat-
arthāḥ those – meanings (1.1.15) buddhiḥ knowing upalabdhiḥ observation
jñānam true comprehension iti these words, quotes // an-artha-antaram without
– meaning – alternate (1.1.16) yugapat-jñāna-anutpattiḥ simultaneous (with
awareness), without passage of time, present, immediate – true comprehension –
lacking the coming into existence // manasaḥ (gen. of) mind liṅgam indicator
Chapter One 5
(1.1.17) pravṛttiḥ life activity; or news of, account of (see "gospel" etymology)
vāk declaration buddhi – śarīra-ārambhaḥ knowing – body – origination
1.8 The meanings of those (smell, etc.) is that they are the essential
constituents of earth and the others (water, fire, air, ether), which (principle)
is our "knowing", "observation", and "true comprehension". (But) without
that alternate (or "inner") meaning, the immediate true comprehension does
not come to exist. That (duality) is the indication of our mind. The declaration
that the origination of this 'body' is in the knowing of it, is our account of life.
Again he draws from the Vaisheshika 3.2.1 (3.10 JW): "The indication of mind
is the absence vs. presence of understanding regarding the drawing in together of
the objects, the senses, and the individual."
म
प्रवतरनमालकनमा दयोषमान्निः। पनरुत्पसत्तिन्निः प्रमत्यभमावन्निः। प्रववृसत्तिदयोषजसनतयोऽरन्निःर फलम।म बमाधिनमा-
लकनस दन्निःखम।म तदत्यन्तसवमयोकयोऽपवगन्निःर ।

(1.1.18) pravartanā-lakṣanā (√pravṛt, in "ā" fem. the causative sense,
imperative, inciting to action, cleverly used in contrast with pravṛtti in 1.1.17 from
the same root) commandment – f. ind. ifc ("in fine compositi", ending the
compound) having the mark of doṣāḥ faulty or false ones (1.1.19) punar_utpattiḥ
remanifestation, reincarnation pretya-bhāvaḥ after having passed on – state
(1.1.20) pravṛtti-doṣa-janitaḥ accounts – false – produced or induced by arthaḥ
meaning // phalam fruit, result, consequence (1.1.21) bādhanā-lakṣanam
affliction – (n. ind.) having the mark of duḥkham suffering (1.1.22) tat-atyanta-
vimokṣaḥ such – ultimate – final liberation apavargaḥ having done with
1.9 The false ones (accounts) have the mark of commandments. The
meaning that is induced by the false accounts is that there is reincarnation,
that there is an existence after having died, that marked by affliction, one's
suffering is a consequence (of something). Our 'having done with that'
(however) is the ultimate liberation from such (suffering).
म
सममानमान मरधिमर्षोपपत्तिमसवरप्रसतपत्तिमरुपलब्ध्यनपलब्ध्यव्यवसमातश्च सवशमषमापमकयो सवमशरन्निः ससश-
यन्निः।यमर रमसधिरवृत्य प्रवतरत म तत्प्रययोजनम।म ललौसररपररीकरमाणमास यसस्मिनरर बसम दसमारस स
दृषमान्तन्निः।
(1.1.23) samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatteḥ (gen. of) same – many – duty,
destiny – evidence vipratipatteḥ (abl. by) differing in understanding upalabdhi-
anupalabdhi – avyavasthātaḥ (tasil by) observing – not observing – not
persevering ca and viśeṣa-apekṣaḥ differences – consideration vimarśaḥ
examination, investigation saṁśayaḥ doubt, uncertainty (1.1.24) yam (acc. on)
which artham (acc. toward) goal adhikṛtya (ind.part.) having made it the priority
pravartate "he (one) proceeds" tat that prayojanam motive (1.1.25) laukika-
parīkṣakāṇām (gen. of) (This genitive compound has the same referent,
"vipratipatti", as the genitive compound at the beginning of 1.1.23.) living an
ordinary life – examining yasmin_arthe (loc. abs. = yatra) in such a way that the
goal is buddhi-sāmyam conceiving – equal in value sa it, such dṛṣṭāntaḥ the
"visualized goal", a standard, paragon or ideal; a vision or example of what is
desired. (In these early statements we find a predominance of terms in the
nominative case, whereas later there is heavy use of the ablative.)
1.10-11 Our 'uncertainty' is an investigation, a consideration of those

particular things (senses and objects 1.10-14) by differing in our
understanding of the evidence of the dharmas of the many all the same, and
by not persevering there, whether observing or not observing (our dharma).
Our "motive" is the thing on which we proceed toward that goal, having
made it the priority. That (differing in understanding of the dharmas) of
those just living life and those seeking to examine it, in such a way that the
goal is to conceive of them as equal in value, is our "standard".
Finding the investigation difficult, one may give up in frustration, but that is
not what the author means by "uncertainty" here. Conversely, giving up one's
perseverance in a rigid and exclusive belief system may lead to uncertainty, but a
contemplative investigation of that very uncertainty may lead to "liberation" (see
1.1.22 and 2.1.6). One's motivation then shifts from perseverance in ritual
practices and objective thinking to a determined (1.1.4) investigation of the
subjective reality.
Chapter One 7
म सससतन्निः ससदमान्तन्निः। स चतसम वरधिन्निः सवरतनप्रसततनमासधिररणमाभपम -

तनमासधिररणमाभपगमसस
गमससससत्यरमारन्तरभमावमात ।म
(1.1.26) tantra-adhikaraṇa-abhyupagama-saṁsthitiḥ framework, system,
model, theory – creating a priority – accepting – combined stance siddhāntaḥ
doctrine (1.1.27) sa this catur-vidhaḥ four ways sarva-tantra-prati-tantra -
adhikaraṇa-abhyupagama - saṁsthiti-artha-antara-bhāvāt (abl. according to)
everyone – system, framework (lit. "warp threads"), theory – opposing – theory –
putting at the head, creating a priority – going along with, accepting – coexistence
– meanings – separate – being, way or theory of "being" (MW), view
1.12 Our "doctrine" is the combined stance that we create that priority (as
opposed to equal value 1.1.25) as our theory and that we accept it. This can be
seen four ways according to a view of separate meanings in the coexistence of
a theory for everyone as an opposing theory, vs. creating the priority and
accepting it.
सवरतनमासवरुदसनमऽसधिरवृतयोऽरन्निःर सवरतनससदमान्तन्निः। सममानतनससदन्निः परतनससदन्निः
प्रसततनससदमान्तन्निः।
(1.1.28) sarva-tantra-aviruddhaḥ everyone – theory – no prohibition tantre
(loc. in) theory adhi-kṛtaḥ made the priority arthaḥ meaning sarva-tantra-
siddhāntaḥ everyone – theory – doctrine (1.1.29) samāna-tantra-siddhaḥ
equivalent – principal – established para-tantra-siddhaḥ others – theory –
established prati-tantra-siddhāntaḥ opposing – theory – doctrine
1.13 We do not prohibit a theory for everyone, (so) our doctrine of a theory
for everyone is that in that theory, our meaning ("artha" 1.1.14 and 1.1.15 as
opposed to 1.1.20) is made the priority, while our doctrine of an opposing
theory is established as an equivalent (see Chapter Nine) to that theory, which
is established as a theory for others.
म
यसतदमावन्यप्रररणसससदन्निः सयोऽसधिररणससदमान्तन्निः। अपररीसकतमाभपगममात्तिसद्विशम
षपररीक-
म
णमभपगमससदमान्तन्निः ।
(1.1.30) yat_siddhau (loc. upon) the establishment of which anya-
prakaraṇa-siddhiḥ other – subject – establishment saḥ the thing adhikaraṇa-
siddhāntaḥ creating a priority – doctrine (1.1.31) aparīkṣita-abhyupagamāt (abl.
apart from; aparīkṣita vs. parīkṣaṇam) who has not carefully examined –
acceptance. tat-viśeṣa-parīkṣaṇam that – particular(s) – carefully examining
abhyupagama-siddhāntaḥ agreeing, acceptance – doctrine
1.14 (Likewise,) our doctrine of creating a priority is the thing upon the
establishment of which there is (then) the establishment of the subject (of
dharma) for others, while our doctrine regarding acceptance is to carefully
examine the particulars of that (theory), as apart from the mere acceptance
on the part of one who has not carefully examined it.
प्रसतजमाहमतदत माहरणयोपनयसनगमनमान्यवयवमान्निः। समाध्यसनदरशन्निः प्रसतजमा। उदमाहरणसमाधिरमार-
तमाध्यसमाधिनस हमतन्निःम । तरमा ववैधिरमारत।म

(1.1.32) pratijñā-hetu-udāharaṇa-upanaya-nigamanāni assertion – grounds
– general rule – application – conclusion avayavāḥ subdivisions or parts of the
syllogism (1.1.33) sādhya-nirdeśaḥ "to be established", premise – dictating
(before proving it) pratijñā assertion (1.1.34) udāharaṇa-sādharmyāt (abl. by)
general rule – conformity sādhya-sādhanam premise – establishing hetuḥ
grounds (1.1.35) tathā similarly vaidharmyāt (abl. by) nonconformity
1.15 The (formal) subdivisions (of that examination) are: the assertion, the
grounds for it, the general rule (that applies to the assertion and the grounds),
the application (of the rule), and the conclusion. Our assertion (1.1.1) (simply)
dictates our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), and
our grounds establishes that premise by conformity with our general rule, and
similarly, by nonconformity (of the opposite).
Chapter One 9
समाध्यसमाधिरमारत्तिदमरभमावरीदृषमान्त उदमाहरणम।म तसद्विपयरयमाद्विमा सवपररीतम।म उदमाहरणमापमक-
म हमारयो न तरमसत वमा समाध्यसयोपनयन्निः।

सरमत्यपसस
(1.1.36) sādhya-sādharmyāt (abl. by) premise – conformity tat-dharma-
bhāvī his – duty – destined to dṛṣṭāntaḥ standard udāharaṇam general rule, the
conditional statement "if … then" (1.1.37) tat-viparyayāt (abl. by) it – opposition
vā or viparītam reverse (1.1.38) udāharaṇa-(inst.)-apekṣaḥ general rule –
consideration tathā so iti saying upasaṁhāraḥ conviction, conclusion na_tathā
not so iti saying vā or sādhyasya (gen. for) premise upanayaḥ application
1.16 Our general rule is our standard (1.1.25), that one is destined to his
dharma either by conformity with our premise, or the reverse, by opposition
to it; and the application (of the rule) for our premise, is our conviction,
considered by means of that rule, saying either, "It is so", or "It is not so."
म चनस सनगमनम।म असवजमाततत्त्वमऽरर रमारणयोपपसत्तितसत्त्वजमा-

हमतपदमशमात्प्रसतजमायमान्निः पनवर
नमार रमतहसरर न्निः।

(1.1.39) hetu-apadeśāt (abl. according to) reason – pointing out (as opposed to
nirdeśa in the assertion) pratijñāyāḥ (gen. of) assertion punar-vacanam re-
affirmation nigamanam conclusion (1.1.40) avijñāta-tattve_arthe (loc. absolute;
"given that") not understood – essence _ object kāraṇa-upapattitaḥ (tasil
resulting from) cause – becoming evident tattva-jñāna-artham essence –
comprehending – (ifc) for the purpose of ūhaḥ deliberation (see SD 12.7) tarkaḥ
discussion
1.17 The conclusion is the reaffirmation of our assertion (but this time) by
pointing out our grounds. The discussion of that (grounds), given that its
object is that essence which is not yet understood, is a deliberation for the
purpose of the true comprehension of that essence that results from our
'cause' (īśvara 4.1.19) becoming evident.
सवमवृशय पकप्रसतपकमाभमामरमारवधिमारणस सनणरयन्निः। प्रममाणतरर समाधिनयोपमालमन्निः ससदमान्तमासवरु-
दन्निः पञमावयवयोपपनन्निः पकप्रसतपकपसरग्रहयो वमादन्निः।

(1.1.41) vimṛśya (indeclinable participle) after having investigated pakṣa-
prati-pakṣābhyām (inst. dual; by means of) side – opposing – side artha-
avadhāraṇam object – confirmation nirṇayaḥ settlement (1.2.1) pramāṇa-
tarka-sādhana-upālambhaḥ (The inflection is singular, not the dual: "supporting
and condemning".) means of validation – discussing – establishment – criticizing
siddhānta-aviruddhaḥ doctrine – without prohibition pañca-avayava-
upapannaḥ five – members – invested pakṣa-prati-pakṣa-parigrahaḥ side –
opposing side – claiming as one's own vādaḥ dialectic
1.18 "Settlement" means confirmation of that object, after having

investigated by means of (comparing) the one side and the opposing side; and
the dialectic (presented in this treatise), claiming both the one side and the
opposing side as our own, criticizes the establishment (of our claim) by
discussing our means of validation as one invested with those five subdivisions
of analysis, but without prohibiting our doctrine.
The author is not inventing the formal five-part syllogism here. These
definitions of the five are only as they apply to his thesis of dharma. In fact, this
work is not a treatise on logic in general. He makes it clear throughout the work
that his thesis, like the Vaisheshika, is about dharma. There is no mistaking it.
1.) The assertion is his premise that if one is to find the highest dharma, then
there must be true comprehension of the essence of the principles given in the
opening sutra, considered against their complements, also given. (This is a
conditional "if A then B", not a simple subject/predicate assertion.) 2.) The reason
or grounds for knowing this is that one does comprehend this essence, because its
"cause" has become evident (see 1.1.40). The author explicitly declares in 4.1.19
that his cause (kāraṇa) is Īśvara, meaning not "God" as a religious concept, but
rather the supreme human spirit that can be identified in meditation and in activity
as one's own consciousness (See YD 2.1-6). Direct experience of this provides the
grounds, not dogma. The opposing side's cause ("nimitta") is karma. 3.) The
general rule is dual: that if either version of dharma is to be known, then it's cause
must be known (either Īśvara for the highest dharma, or karma for common
dharma). This rule is 4.) applied to our premise with a thorough examination, and
then the assertion is 5.) reaffirmed. Those are the five subdivisions.
Chapter Two 11
Chapter Two - Prattle
यरयोकयोपपनशश्छलजमासतसनग्रहसमानसमाधिनयोपमालमयो जल्पन्निः। स प्रसतपकसमापनमाहरीनयो
सवतणणमा।
(1.2.2) yathā-ukta – upapannaḥ so it has been declared (by scripture, not
"earlier in this text") – invested chala – jāti-nigraha-sthāna – sādhana-
upālambhaḥ false persuasion – birth-rank – dominating – standing firm, taking a
firm stance – way of establishing something (pairs with sādhya 1.2.4) – finding
fault, prohibition, discouragement (The word "jāti" means birth-rank, especially of
the high-born, and "sthāna" is their stance. These are key terms here and they
serve as the basis for the following material. The translation of jāti as a futility or
futile argument is unfounded and utterly wrong.) jalpaḥ idle talk, prattle, gossip
(1.2.3) sa it, this pratipakṣa-sthāpanā opposing side – causing to stand, propping
up hīnaḥ inadequate vitaṇḍā hitting back
2.1 Prattle, as one who is invested with the (traditional) 'so it has been
declared (by scripture)', is their prohibition (discouragement) of our way
through the false persuasion of taking a stance by dominating (the discussion)
by virtue of their high (scholarly, priestly) birth-rank, which is merely hitting
back, propping up an opposition that is (otherwise) inadequate.
सव्यसभचमारसवरुदप्रररणसमसमाध्यसमरमालमातरीतमा हमतमाभमासमान्निः। अनवैरसन्तर सव्यसभ-
चमारन्निः। ससदमान्तमभपमम त्य तसद्विरयोधिरी सवरुदन्निः।

(1.2.4) savyabhicāra-viruddha- having deviation from something (Adhering
to the context, the referent is sthāna 1.2.2.) – prohibited -prakaraṇa-sama-
subject – equivalent, substitute -sādhya-sama- premise – equivalent -kāla-atītāḥ
to be done – equivalent – time – past hetu-ābhāsāḥ reason or motive, grounds for
knowing – pretenses (1.2.5) anaikāntikaḥ not exclusively one way
savyabhicāraḥ deviation (1.2.6) siddha-antam (acc.) doctrine abhyupetya (ind.
part.) having agreed to (w/acc.) tat-virodhī it – in direct opposition to viruddhaḥ
prohibition
2.2 Their pretenses as to grounds are: that any deviation from that (stance)
is prohibited, that that (stance) is equivalent (see Chapter Nine) to our subject
(dharma), that it is equivalent to our premise (that the highest dharma is by
true comprehension), and that there is a time gone by (past life). Our
deviation is not just the one way, (and) having agreed to our doctrine (of
coexistence 1.1.26), such a prohibition (against deviation from their way)
would be in direct contradiction to it.
यस्मिमात्प्रररणसचन्तमा स सनणरयमारमर पसदषन्निः प्रररणसमन्निः। समाध्यमासवसशषन्निः समाध्यतमातमाध्य-
समन्निःरमालमात्ययमापसदषतन्निः रमालमातरीतन्निः।
(1.2.7) yasmāt (abl. ind.) whatever such prakaraṇa-cintā subject – anxious
thought sa that (functions as "tasmāt") nirṇaya-artham settlement – (ifc) with the
object of apadiṣṭaḥ offered as a pretext prakaraṇa-samaḥ subject – equivalent
(1.2.8) sādhya-aviśiṣṭaḥ premise – undistinguished sādhyatvāt (abl. because) yet
to be demonstrated sādhya-samaḥ premise – equivalent (1.2.9) kāla-atyaya-
apadiṣtaḥ time – lapsing – offered as a pretext kāla-atītaḥ time – lapsed
2.3 Whatever such anxious thought there may be about the subject
(dharma), that (method of prohibition and reproach see 2.1.65) is then offered
as an equivalent to our subject, as a pretext with the object of settlement (by
intimidation). That is an undistinguished premise because it has yet to be
demonstrated, (but is offered as) an equivalent of our premise (that the
highest dharma is by true comprehension). Their 'time gone by' is a pretext
about the lapsing of time.
वचनसवघमातयोऽर रसवरल्पयोपपतमा श्छलम।म (तसत्त्रिसवधिस वमाक्छलस समाममान्यचलमपम चमारचलस
च।) असवशमषमासभसहतमऽरर वकमरसभप्रमायमादरमारन्तररल्पनमा वमाक्छलम।म

(1.2.10) vacana-vighātaḥ statement, thesis – attack against artha-vikalpa-
upapattyā (inst. by) meaning – diversity – making evident, effecting chalam false
persuasion (1.2.11) (tat trividham vāk-chalam sāmānya-chalam upacāra-chalam
ca; It is of three kinds: false persuasion by speech, false persuasion by
generalization, and false persuasion by figure.) (1.2.12) aviśeṣa-abhihite (loc.
while) no distinction – it is held arthe (loc. in) meaning vaktuḥ (gen. of) speaker,
author abhiprāyāt (abl. w/antara; apart from) intended artha-antara-kalpanā
meaning – alternate – making up vāk-chalam speech – false persuasion
Chapter Two 13
2.4 "False persuasion" is an attack against our thesis by effecting this

diversity of meanings. False persuasion by speech (equivocation) is making up
an alternate meaning, apart from the author's intended one, while it is held
that there is no distinction in the meaning.
समवतयोऽर रसमासतसमाममान्यययोगमादसमततमार ररल्पनमा समाममान्यचलम।म धिमरसवरल्पसनदर-
शमऽर रसदमावप्रसतषमधि उपचमारचलम।म

(1.2.13) sambhavataḥ (tasil; because) possible arthasya (gen. of) meaning
ati-sāmānya-yogāt (abl. by) absolutely – universally agreed to – joining
asambhūta-artha – kalpanā (a karmadhāraya compound; ind. "where") not-
arisen-meaning – making up sāmānya-chalam generality – false persuasion
(1.2.14) dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe (loc. in) duties, roles in life – diversity –
dictating artha-sat-bhāva-pratiṣedhaḥ meaning – truly existent, true – denying
upacāra-chalam metaphor, figure – false persuasion
2.5 Where such making up of the meaning has not arisen, there is false
persuasion by universality, because it is possible by just joining along with a
meaning that is absolutely universally agreed to. False persuasion by figure,
in dictating a diversity of dharmas, denies the true meaning (of dharma).
वमाक्छलममवयोपचमारचलस तदसवशमषमात।म न तदरमारन्तरभमावमात।म असवशमष म वमा सरसञतमाधि-
म चलप्रसङ्गन्निः।
रमारदर
(1.2.15) vāk-chalam speech – false persuasion eva just as, the same upacāra-
chalam metaphor, figure – false persuasion tat-aviśeṣāt (abl. since) that – no
distinction (1.2.16) na not the case tat-artha-antara-bhāvāt (abl. because) (to)
that – meaning – alternate – view (1.2.17) aviśeṣe (loc. when) no distinction vā or
kiñcit some, a little // sādharmyāt (abl. because of) conformity eka-chala-
prasaṅgaḥ a certain – false persuasion – adhering to, occupied with
2.6 (One may say) that we falsely persuade by figure, just as there is false
persuasion by speech, because no distinction is held in that (meaning 1.2.12);
but there is no such (false persuasion) arising from our view of the alternate
meaning from that, or, there is a little when we don't make the distinction (as
to dharma). Because of our conformity (with dharma see 2.1.1-3), we are
occupied with a certain false persuasion (of our own).
समाधिर रववैधिरमारभमास प्रत्यवसमानस जमासतन्निः। सवप्रसतपसत्तिरप्रसतपसत्तिश्च सनग्रहसमानम।म तसद्विर-
ल्पमाजमासतसनग्रहसमानबहुतम।म
(1.2.18) sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām (inst. dual; established by)
conformity – conformity pratyavasthānam opposition of one's life-standing (In
this work, the author uses terms like "avasthā" and "dharma" and their
compounds in the higher sense of "life purpose", not in an overly general sense to
describe techniques of argument.) jātiḥ class-ranking by birth, caste (1.2.19)
vipratipattiḥ difference of understanding apratipattiḥ lack of understanding ca
indeed nigraha-sthānam (by) dominating – taking a stance (1.2.20) tat-vikalpāt
(abl. from) that – diversity jāti-nigraha-sthāna-bahu-tvam (high) birth-rank –
domination – standing, taking a stance – many – notion of
2.7 Ranking by birth (caste) is the mutual opposition of life standing as

established by conformity vs. nonconformity (with duty or personal quality
determined by birth), and taking a stance by dominating (the other classes) is
a difference of understanding, that is indeed a lack of understanding. From
the (notion of) diversity of that (dharma), there arises the notion of the many
taking a stance that results from domination by the high-born.
As in the Vaisheshika, sādharmya and vaidharmya here as "similarity vs.

dissimilarity" does not refer to the attributes of objects, but to inclusion and
exclusion of people by castes according to the qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas.
In traditional religious thinking, conformity vs. non-conformity with one's

natural born dharma or duty in past lives is the main cause of one's status in the
present life, for better or worse. Standing firm through domination by class is the
obstruction of independent thinking through the claim of intellectual superiority by
virtue of such birth-rank, or by training, title, reputation, veneration, or divine
inspiration.
It even extends to the fraudulent pretense to the possession of supernatural

abilities or to infallibility by virtue of "enlightenment" or sainthood, either by
direct claims on the part of spiritual leaders, or by their failure to deny any such
naive assumptions held by their followers. Too often a title earned by training
serves only as a formal sign that one has demonstrated a commitment not to think
independently but rather to follow and possibly attempt to build on a certain pre-
established line of thought. This works well enough for science, but not for
ontology or epistemology.
Chapter Two 15
सममानमान मरधिममारध्यवसमायमादन्यतरधिममारध्यवसमायमाद्विमा न ससशय। सवप्रसतपतव्यवसमाध्यव-
समायमाच्च। सवप्रसतपत्तिलौ च सम्प्रसतपत्तिमन्निः।(अव्यवसमात्मसन व्यवससततमाच्चमाव्यवसमायमान्निः।)

(2.1.1) samāna-aneka-dharma-adhyavasāyāt (abl. because) same – many –
dharma – firm resolve anyatara-dharma-adhyavasāyāt (abl. about) the other of
the two – dharma – firm resolve (See "absence of dispute, like it is with dharma"
SD 7.4.) vā or na no saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (This section recalls 1.1.23) (2.1.2) vi-
pratipatti – avyavasthā – adhyavasāyāt (abl. due to) considering a contrary
opinion – without perseverance – a state of resolve ca and (2.1.3) vipratipattau
(loc. even when) difference of opinion or understanding ca and sampratipatteḥ
(abl. due to) agreement (The vā clause followed by a ca clause indicates a one-to-
one relation between their respective terms, as it does in SD 8.13.) [(2.1.4)
avyavasthā ātmani / vyavasthitatvāt ca avyavasthāyāḥ; The failure to persevere
is within one's soul, and it results from being fixed in that situation, which
results (in turn) from one's (previous) failure to persevere.]
2.8 There is no uncertainty there, either because of the firm resolve that
there is a dharma for the many all the same, or (in our case) because of the
(contrary) firm resolve as to that other (inner) dharma (cf. 1.1.23); and this is
(in the first case) due to that firm resolve being without any perseverance in
considering the contrary opinion, and (in our case) due to agreement (with
that first) even when one does have a contrary opinion.
तरमात्यन्तससशयसदमरसमातत्ययोपपत्तिमन्निः। यरयोकमाध्यवसमायमादमव तसद्विशमषमापमकमातसशयमनमासस-
म रयोत्तिरप्रसङ्गन्निः।)
शययो नमात्यन्तससशययो वमा । (यत्रि ससशयसत्रिवैवमत्ति
(2.1.5) tathā in that way, that is how atyanta-saṁśayaḥ ultimate – uncertainty
tat-dharmaḥ tat (refers to anyatara in 2.1.1) ātatya-upapatteḥ (abl. known from)
(ṣyañ bhāvārtha form of ātata) being spread – evidence (2.1.6) yathā-ukta –
adhyavasāyāt (abl. from) declared so far – resolve eva indeed tat-viśeṣa-apekṣāt
(abl. arising from) them – difference – considering saṁśayena (inst. by means of)
uncertainty asaṁśayaḥ freedom from uncertainty na not atyanta-saṁśayaḥ
ultimate – uncertainty vā instead [(2.1.7) yatra saṁśayaḥ tatra evam uttara-
uttara-prasaṅgaḥ; Wherever there is doubt (of dharma), there it surely becomes
more and more advanced.] As in 2.1.4, the commenter says that we should accept
our dharma as prescribed by verbal authority, without examination.
2.9 That is how there arises the ultimate uncertainty that the dharma of
that (other way "anyatara" 2.1.1) is known from the evidence of its being
spread (among the many "aneka" 2.1.1). Indeed, from one's resolve
(motivation) upon what has been declared (here), it is rather by means of the
uncertainty that arises from considering the difference between them that
there is instead freedom from uncertainty, and not that ultimate uncertainty.
At this point, it should be clear to anyone that the Nyaya Darshana is not an
investigation of the science of reasoning or logic. It is an attempt to form a
reasoned reconciliation between two undeniable but seemingly mutually exclusive
ways of understanding the experience of life itself.
He ends this half of the chapter by mentioning uncertainty. Interestingly, he

appears to be saying that this uncertainty should never be resolved, and the
motivation to resolve it should never cease. Apparently it is the constant adventure
of the inner investigation itself, with the principles of the Darshanas in mind, that
is the important thing, as opposed to formulating a pat answer that can be
expressed by a few aphorisms and then forgotten, or as opposed to persisting in
religious rituals. The way of Yoga is the regular practice of investigation into one's
own consciousness, along with some awareness of these principles in daily life,
but not so that we might one day snap into a permanent state of "enlightenment"
and bliss. According to the Darshanas, Yoga (4.2.42) is both the way and the goal.
Pramāṇa and Prameya and Pratyakṣa

Pramāṇa (validation of knowledge)
प्रत्यकमादरीनमामप्रमाममाणयस त्रिवैरमालमाससदमन्निः। पतवर सह प्रममाणससदलौ नसम न्द्रियमार रसससनरषमारत्प्रत्य-
कयोत्पसत्तिन्निः।
(2.1.8) pratyakṣādīnām (gen. pl. of) perception etc. aprāmāṇyam lack of
credibility traikālya-asiddheḥ (abl. because) threefold time – no affirmation
(2.1.9) pūrvam before, past hi for pramāṇa-siddhau (loc. when) validation –
affirmation na no indriya – artha – saṁnikarṣāt (abl. through) sense – object –
together-in-drawing pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ perception – manifestation
2.10 There is a certain lack of credibility of perception and the others,

because we cannot affirm threefold time: for when we (try to) affirm our
validation for past (incarnations) there is no (present) manifestation (of
reality) by perception, through the drawing in together of sense and object.
Chapter Two 17
पश्चमासतदलौ न प्रममाणमभन्निः प्रममयसससदन्निः। यगम पसतदलौ प्रत्यर रसनयततमात्क्रमववृसत्तितमाभमावयो
बदम रीनमाम।म
(2.1.10) paścāt (abl. ind.) hereafter, future siddhau (loc. when) affirming na no
pramāṇebhyaḥ (abl. by) means of validation prameya-siddhiḥ to be validated –
affirmation (2.1.11) yugapat (ind.) simultaneous (with awareness), immediate,
present siddhau (loc. when) establishing pratyartha-niyatatvāt (abl. ind.) in
every case, each one – being fixed, defined krama-vṛttitva-abhāvaḥ stages –
modes of existence – no such thing buddhīnām (gen. of) intellects, minds
2.11 When we try to affirm that (validation) for future (incarnations),

there is no affirmation of our prameya ("to be validated") (including the
denial of future incarnation. See def. of prameya 1.1.9.) by those means of
validation. When (however) we affirm that (validation) as immediate
(present), there is no such thing as modes of life by stages (incarnations), on
the part of intellects (plural), each one being so defined (by his stage).
म
त्रिवैरलमाससदमन्निः प्रसतषमधिमानपपसत्तिन्निः म
। सवरप्रममाणप्रसतषमधिमाच्च प्रसतषमधिमानपपसत्तिन्निः । तत्प्रमाममाणयम वमा
न सवरप्रममाणसवप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.1.12) traikalya-asiddheḥ (abl. because) threefold time – not affirming
pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ denial – no evidence (2.1.13) sarva-pramāṇa-
pratiṣedhāt (abl. since) whole – process of validation – denial ca and also
pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ denial – no evidence (2.1.14) tat-prāmāṇye (loc.
considering) that (ref. is yugapat 2.1.11) – the existence of o validation vā or na no
sarva-pramāṇa-vipratiṣedhaḥ whole – means of validation – denial
2.12 There is no evidence for denying (our premise, the true meaning of
dharma 1.2.14), because there can be no affirmation of threefold time, and
there is also no evidence for that denial because it would be a denial of our
whole means of validation. Or, considering the existence of that (particular)
pramāṇa (immediate perception), one cannot deny our whole means of
validation (of dharma).
म माप्रमाममाणयवत।म प्रममाणतन्निः
त्रिवैरमालमाप्रसतषमधिश्च।शबमादमातयोद्यसससदप्रसङ्गन्निः। प्रममयमा च तल
ससदमन्निः प्रममाणमानमास प्रममाणमान्तरसससदप्रसङ्गन्निः।

(2.1.15) traikālya-apratiṣedhaḥ the threefold time – not denying ca and
(paired with the following ca) śabdāt (abl. by) sound ātodya-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ
"to be struck", a drum – establishing – a possibility becoming actual or evident
(2.1.16) prameyā (f. to match tulā) (the need) to be validated ca it is also true that
tulā-prāmāṇyavat (vatup as ind.) a balance scale – having validity (2.1.17)
pramāṇataḥ (tasil resulting from) validation siddheḥ (abl. by) affirmation
pramāṇānām (gen. of) various means of validation pramāṇa-antara-siddhi-
prasaṅgaḥ means of validation – inner – affirmation – occupation with life
2.13 (Even) without denying the threefold time, the affirmation of a drum
(for example) becomes evident by its (immediate) sound, but it is also true
that a measuring scale needs to be validated (calibrated) to have validity, (so)
the occupation with life that is affirmed by our inner means of validation is
(also affirmed) by the affirmation of the (three) means of validation, which
results from validation (of them as follows: see 2.15-3.18.)
Prameya ("to be validated")
तसद्विसनववृत्तिवम मार प्रममाणसससदवत्प्रममयसससदन्निः। नप्रदरीपप्ररमाशसससदवत्तिसतदमन्निः।क्वसचसनववृसत्तिद-
म मान्तन्निः।
शरनमादसनववृसत्तिदशरनमाच्च क्वसचदनर
(2.1.18) tat-vinivṛtteḥ (abl. by) those – turning away vā or pramāṇa-
siddhivat (vati just like) validation – affirmation prameya-siddhiḥ to be validated
– affirmation (2.1.19) na not pradīpa-prakāśa-siddhivat (vati like) lamp – light –
affirmation tat-siddheḥ (abl. through) those – affirmation (2.1.20) kvacit in one
nivṛtti-darśanāt (abl. ind.) cessation – seeing anivṛtti-darśanāt (abl. ind.) non-
cessation – seeing ca and kvacit in another anekāntaḥ not just one
2.14 Or (see "or" 2.12), by turning (one's attention) away from those
(means), there is, just like the affirmation by our means of validation, the
(immediate) affirmation of what is to be validated like the affirmation of a
lamp by its light, which is not through affirmation by those means of
validation. Seeing its cessation in the one case (perception), and seeing no
cessation in the other case (reasoning), there cannot be just the one way.
Chapter Two 19
If the light from a lamp is concealed by a pot, the normal view is that it still
exists, but according to the subjectivist philosophy, it does not. He assumes that we
are familiar with this example, which is similar to the well-known philosophical
question (the one that isn't satisfied by the obvious, yet so very obtuse, scientific
answer): "If a tree falls in a forest, without anyone to hear, does it make a sound?"
Pratyakṣa (Perception)
म
प्रत्यकलकणमानपपसत्तिरसमग्रवचनमात ।म नमात्ममनसयोन्निः सससनरशमारभमावम प्रत्यकयोत्पसत्तिन्निः।
सदगदमशरमालमारमाशमष्वपमव स प्रसङ्गन्निः।
(2.1.21) pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-anupapattiḥ perception – qualities – no evidence
asamagra-vacanāt (abl. ind) lack of a whole – asserting (2.1.22) na not ātma-
manasoḥ (gen. dual; of the two) individual self – mind saṁnikarśa-abhāve (loc.)
drawing-in-together – in/loc. in the absence of, without pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ (see
also 2.1.9) perception – coming into existence (2.1.23) dik-deśa – kāla – ākāśeṣu
(loc. with) direction and location – time – space api even evam exactly as it is
prasaṅgaḥ occupation with life
2.15 There can be no evidence of the qualities of a perception by asserting

the lack of (perception as) a whole. Without the drawing in together of the
individual self and the mind, perception would not even come to exist. That
(self) is our occupation with life, just as it is, even with (the qualities of)
direction and location, time, and space.
जमानसलङ्गतमादमात्मनयो नमानवरयोधिन्निः। तदयलौगपद्यसलङ्गतमाच्च न मनसन्निः। प्रत्यकसनसमत्तितमाच्चम-
र स्वशबमन वचनम।म
सन्द्रियमार रययोन्निः सससनरषस
(2.1.24) jñāna-liṅga-tvāt (abl. since) true comprehension – indicator(s) –
existing as ātmanaḥ (gen. of) individual self na not anavarodhaḥ without
separating out (see nirodha in YD) (The meaning here is very dependent on the
context.) (2.1.25) tat-ayaugapadya-liṅga-tvāt (abl. because) it – without
immediacy – indicator – the fact that ca_na but not manasaḥ (gen. of) mind (has
the same referent as ātmanaḥ) (2.1.26) pratyakṣa-nimitta-tvāt (abl. because)
perception – instrumental cause – would be ca and // indriya-arthayoḥ (gen. dual;
of) sense – object saṁnikarṣasya (gen. of) drawing in together svaśabdena (inst.
by way of) one's own testimony vacanam assertion
2.16 That (self) is not (known) without separating that (evidence) out, since
that (evidence) exists only as an indicator in the true comprehension of
oneself; but not of one's mind, because of the fact that without the immediacy
(of true comprehension) that (mind) is also just an indicator of it, and because
it would be the instrumental cause of perception. By way of our self-testimony,
that (statement about mind) is an assertion of the drawing in together (only)
of sense and object (not self).
म चसम न्द्रियमारयर योन्निः सससनरषसर नसमत्तितमात।म तवैश्चमापदमशयो जमानसवशमषमाणमाम।म

सपव्यमासकमनसमास
व्यमाहततमादहमतन्निःम ।
(2.1.27) supta-vyāsakta-manasām (gen. pl. of; ref. is the same as that of
saṁnikarṣasya) asleep – stuck – minds ca also indriya-arthayoḥ (gen. dual; of)
sense – object saṁnikarṣa-nimitta-tvāt (abl. arising from) perception –
instrumental cause – the notion (2.1.28) taiḥ (inst. with) those ca and apadeśaḥ
pointing out jñāna-viśeṣāṇām (gen. pl. of) comprehension – particulars (2.1.29)
vyāhatatvāt (abl. because) being in conflict ahetuḥ without grounds
2.17 There is also that (assertion) of minds that are asleep and attached,
arising from the notion of that (the object) being the instrumental cause in the
drawing in together of sense and object, and it is with those (minds) that we
would find their pointing out the particulars of their comprehension, which is
without (our) grounds for knowledge because of its being in conflict with
that..
नमार रसवशमषप्रमाबलमात।म प्रत्यकमनममानमम

म रदमशग्रहणमादपलब्धिमन्निः। न प्रत्यकमण यमावत्तिमावदप-म
पलममात।म
(2.1.30) na not artha-viśeṣa-(gen.)-prābalyāt (abl. following from) object –
particular – predominance, pre-existence (2.1.31) pratyakṣam perception //
anumānam inference ekadeśa-grahaṇāt (abl. by) single individual – grasp,
personal understanding or apprehension (Ekadeśa means a part of a whole. Here it
is a "single individual" as part of the whole of humanity. Grahaṇa is not sensory
perception like pratyakṣa.) upalabdheḥ (gen. of ref.=prābalya) observation
(2.1.32) na no pratyakṣeṇa (inst. by) perception yāvat_tāvat just as much as, just
as true as api either upalambhāt (abl. for) a matter of personal recognition
Chapter Two 21
2.18 (But) perception does not follow from the predominance of particular
objects. That (predominance) of observation by personal apprehension on the
part of each single individual is (only) inference (see 1.1.5). That (inference) is
not just as true as it would be by (direct) perception either, for that is a matter
of (personal) recognition.
One's own personal "grasp" of ideas is known by direct experience, but that of
others is inferred, which is obvious but of little importance outside the theories of
subjective idealism and solipsism. That there is sensory perception and mental
processing on the part of others is a solid inference within the scientific theory of
human beings (including oneself) as soulless purposeless particle-based life
machines, each representing a unique accidentally self-propagating species.
Moreover, the idea that others have a grasp of abstract ideas, or of a soul, or
indeed that they are souls or selves, as true as that may be, must be modeled after
one's own grasp. Anything beyond the idea of robotic data processing and sharing
through the interface of language begins to require a belief in "some kind of"
abstract higher being. But lets face it, this means God, a human-like being with
qualities like will, the capacity to discriminate or judge, to love, to be pleased,
displeased, appeased, etc. We imagine God as like us, but not limited in knowledge
or power, not mortal, and of course not visible, and not limited to being physically
present in any particular location, but these attributes of greatness are not truths
but only thoughtless boolean negations of our own perceived limitations.
Outside of the memorized, school-taught, explanation of humanity as soulless

life "forms", all one knows for sure, in the present, where all knowledge is found,
is one's own inner knowledge of what it feels like to be alive and aware and
human. It is an immediate, unmistakable, and as yet unexplained, sphere of
perception beginning with ethereal sound, breath, and feel. It is by that model that
we infer a similar inner humanity in others. This so-called "inference", as vital and
true as it must be, belongs neither to reason, science, or the philosophies of
solipsism, subjective idealism, or any other philosophy, but to religion.
Thoughtful religious people the world over find themselves compelled to

accept science, but the reverse is not the case. Even modern masters in philosophy
distance themselves from the issue of self or soul, as they would certainly distance
themselves from religion. It is, however, within the religious perspective that one
finds some acknowledgement of the inescapable duality of the two humanities, and
that is why I consider theism to be superior to atheism, but solely in the abstract,
for I have no affection for the antagonistic tribalism of institutional religion.
The teaching of the Darshanas, on the other hand, transcends that of science,
philosophy, and religion, even though it may be difficult to grasp. The problem
with understanding it is that the principles being revealed, as close as they are to
the intuitive intelligence of the sensitive reader, are necessarily foreign or even
hostile to his schooled or tribal mind. Therefore, the task at hand, for anyone who
is receptive and motivated to come to an understanding, is to earnestly and
persistently engage in an effort to reconcile the two opposing views in order to
bring them to union. This journey is called Yoga. It is not any kind of self-help. In
fact, all the authors agree that it is not a matter of seeking the ultimate happiness
but of seeking the ultimate dharma, which is the understanding itself.
Chapter Three - Inference, Comparison, and Testimony

Inference
र योपपत्तिमश्च। समनमावन-
समाध्यतमादवयसवसन ससदहम न्निः। सवमारग्रहणमवयव्यससदमन्निः। धिमारणमारषण
वद म ग्रहणसमसत चमत म
(2.1.33) sādhyatvāt (abl. because) having to be demonstrated avayavini (loc.
about) having parts, a subdivided whole saṁdehaḥ doubt (2.1.34) sarva-
agrahaṇam everyone (all things?) – no personal apprehension avayavi-asiddheḥ
(abl. because) possessor of parts – no affirmation (2.1.35) dhāraṇā - ākarṣaṇa-
upapatteḥ (abl. since) holding in mind, remembering – drawing in – evidence ca
and (2.1.36) senā-vanavat (vati like) army in battle array – forest grahaṇam
personal apprehension iti_cet to the objection: (This objection and reply format is
meant to be read, where appropriate, until 2.2.6, being refreshed in 2.2.9.)
3.1 To the objection that there is doubt about a subdivided whole (self),
because that would have to be demonstrated; that because there is no
affirmation of that subdivided whole, there can be no personal apprehension
of one being 'everyone' (implied in 2.1.30-32); and that because our evidence is
(only) a 'drawing in' of something we hold in mind, our personal
apprehension (of a whole) must be like a (figurative) forest of an army, …
Here the doubter in us leans toward the theory that the parts of a whole are the
prior reality, underlying the concepts of whole things. We consider, for example,
that we only know of a whole entity like an "army" from directly seeing the
soldiers as its parts, and that the concept of an army is learned and remembered,
not perceived.
Chapter Three 23
नमातरीसद्रियतमादणतनमाम।म रयोधियोपघमातसमादृशयमभयो व्यसभचमारमादनममानमप्रममाणम

म ।म नवैरदमशत्रिमा-
ससमादृशयमभयोऽरमारन्तरभमावमात।म
(2.1.36 cont.) na not the case ati-indriyatvāt (abl. because) being beyond the
senses aṇūnām (gen. of) minute things (2.1.37) rodha-upaghāta-sādṛśyebhyaḥ
(abl. by) blocked – struck – likenesses vyabhicārāt (abl. for) deviation
anumānam inference apramāṇam not means of validation (2.1.38) na not (just)
ekadeśa-trāsa-sādṛśyebhyaḥ (abl. by) single individual – fear – likenesses artha-
antara-bhāvāt (abl. according to) meaning – alternate – view
3.2 (the reply is:) That is not the case, because of the (most) minute things'
being beyond one's powers of sense. The inference of them is not our means of
validation (see 2.1.30-31), for our deviation would be by likenesses (of
soldiers) being blocked and struck, and not just by likenesses of the single
individuals' (soldiers') fear (of being blocked and struck), (this) according to
the view of our alternate meaning.
The mention of fear, blocking, striking, and falling, are obviously meant to flesh
out the analogy of an army in battle. The word "aṇūnām" (2.1.36) does not mean
"of atoms", or sub-atomic particles as we know them today. (We do infer them
now from empirical evidence.) It refers to the smaller and smaller parts that make
up any whole in general. The ancients must have guessed, as well as anyone
would, that what was visible to the naked eye was not the limit of minuteness.
While in a way it is true that one perceives the individual soldiers and not the
"army" as a whole, that doesn't really work, because it doesn't stop there. We could
just as easily say that the concept of the "whole" soldier is only secondary to
perceiving his limbs, which are in turn secondary to their parts, and so on down to
where the most minute parts of all must be imperceptible. That is the author's point
in his first remark.
The definition of inference for the purposes of this treatise is found early on, in
sutra 1.1.5b. Based on immediate perception, it is the affirmation that the thing
being perceived is something that remains after the perceiving is done and that the
perception of it may be commonly shared by others. The fact that the object
remains and the fact that others may share the experience are not known from the
direct experience itself but are a secondary knowledge. Those two criteria,
however, are not the case for all kinds of experience, but serve as a way of
confirming that the experience is real only in a physical objective sense. Things
like fantasy, pain, and fear, on the other hand, do not remain after one stops
thinking of them, nor are they available for others to perceive. Interestingly,
whereas "fear" here is a certain anticipation of possible future events, "being
blocked or struck" is expressed in the past passive participle, and "falling" is
expressed with the present participle.
वतरममानमाभमावन्निः पततन्निः पसततपसततव्यरमालयोपपत्तिमन्निः। तययोरपभमावयो वतरममानमाभमावम तदपमक-
तमात।म
(2.1.39) vartamānā-bhāvaḥ existing in the present patataḥ (gen. (of patat) of)
falling (ref.=trāsa 2.1.38) patita-patitavya-kāla-upapatteḥ (abl. because) fallen
– yet to have fallen (fut. pass. part.) – time – evidence (2.1.40) tayoḥ (gen. of)
those two api indeed abhāvaḥ no existence, absence vartamānā-bhāve (loc.
when) in the present – being tat-apekṣatvāt (abl. because) them – consideration
3.3 That (fear) of falling (dying in battle) would exist in the present,
because there is evidence of time (only) in his having already fallen or in his
having yet to fall. There is indeed a complete absence of those two things (past
and future) when being in the present moment, because that (evidence) is only
a (mental) consideration of them.
म
नमातरीतमानमागतययोसरतरमतरमापमकमासससदन्निः।वतरममानमाभमावम सवमारग्रहणम्प्रत्यकमानपपत्तिम
न्निः। रवृततमा-
त यरमा ग्रहणम।म
रतरव्यतयोपपत्तिमसभ
(2.1.41) na no atīta-anāgatayoḥ (gen dual; of) past – future itaretara-apekṣā-
siddhiḥ one against the other – (by) considering – proof (2.1.42) vartamānā-
bhāve (loc. as) (in) the present – existing sarva-agrahaṇam everyone – lack of
personal apprehension pratyakṣa-anupapatteḥ (abl. coming from) perception –
missing the evidence (2.1.43) kṛtatā-kartavyatā-upapatteḥ (abl. because) the
having done – the having yet to be done – evidence tu but, however ubhayathā
both ways grahaṇam personal apprehension
3.4 There is no proving past and future (incarnations) by considering one

(person) against another. The lack of personal apprehension of being
'everyone' comes from missing the evidence regarding perception as it exists
in the present. Our personal apprehension, however, is both ways, because
there is (also) the evidence of there being something done and something yet
to be done (our dharma).
Chapter Three 25
It is easy to think of time as a line that one can trace backward or forward in
opposite directions, and in that simplistic sense, the past might seem to be the
"opposite" of the future ("that which is not the future" cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa), but no
one thinks of past and future in that way. One thinks of the past as what one did
and what happened in the world as it might affect one's own health, wealth, status,
enjoyment, etc. One thinks of the future as what one intends to do or what will
probably happen as it might affect those things. In any case, memory, as well as
planning and anticipation, occupy the present—not the point on a timeline
designated as the present, but the only-time present of immediate awareness. For
the yogin in his solipsist mode, there does not exist a past, present, or future out
there in the universe, independent of his own contemplation of them, because there
does not even exist a universe "out there" independent of that contemplation.
The phrase "what has been done and what has to be done" (kṛtatā-kartavyatā) in
2.1.43 also recalls the phrase, "establishing the conclusion that is to be
established" (sādhya-sādhanam) in the definition of comparison in 1.1.6, and that
sets up the next topic in the series, comparison.
Comparison
अत्यन्तप्रमायवैरदमशसमाधिरमारदपममानमासससदन्निः। प्रससदसमाधिरमारदपममानससददमन्निःयरयोकदयो षमान-म
पपसत्तिन्निः प्रत्यकमणमाप्रत्यकससदमन्निः।
(2.1.44) atyanta-prāya-ekadeśa-sādharmyāt (abl. because) utterly –
prominent – single individual – conformity to dharma upamāna-asiddhiḥ
comparison – no proof (2.1.45) prasiddha-sādharmyāt (abl. coming from) well-
known by all – conformity with dharma upamāna-siddheḥ (abl. because)
comparison – proof // yathā-ukta-doṣa-anupapattiḥ previous assertion – false –
failure (2.1.46) pratyakṣeṇa (inst. by) direct perception apratyakṣa-siddheḥ
(gen. of) without direct perception – proof
3.5 (To the objection:) that there is no (valid) proof by our comparison
(defined in 1.1.6), because it is (rather) the conformity to dharma on the part
of single individuals that is utterly prominent (in society); that since the proof
by comparison must come from our conformity with the dharma that is well-
known by all, there is no evidence of fault in that which has been declared
(smṛti, law), for the proof of the unperceived (dharma) must be by perception
of those (single individuals).
नमाप्रत्यकम गवयम प्रममाणमारमर पम ममानस पशयमामन्निः। तरमसत उपससहमारमादपममानससदमनमारसवशमषन्निः।
म
शबयोऽनममानमर म
रसमानपलब्धिम म यतमात।म
रनमम
(2.1.47) na no apratyakṣe_gavaye (loc. abs. in the case of) unperceived – ox
"pramāṇa-artham validation – meaning upamānasya (gen. of) comparison
paśyāmaḥ (1st.pl.present) we see (actual verbs are rare in the Darshanas. This is
meant to stand out.) (2.1.48) tathā that way" iti saying // upasaṁhārāt (abl. by)
conclusion upamāna-siddheḥ (abl. because) comparison – affirmation na not
aviśeṣaḥ no difference, the same thing (2.1.49) śabdaḥ testimony anumānam
inference arthasya (gen.) an object's anupalabdheḥ (abl. resulting from) lack of
observation anumeyatvāt (abl. because) its having to be inferred
3.6 (The reply is:) There is no saying (testimony)—in the case of some
unperceived ox (for example)—that "the meaning of the validation of
comparison is that we (all) see it that way". It is not the same thing, because
the (true) affirmation by comparison is by that conclusion (of 1.1.6). That
testimony (about the ox) is an inference, because a thing's having to be
inferred results from the lack of actual observation of it.
This statement makes the transition from the discussion on inference and
comparison to the discussion on testimony. The idea that "we all" would see an ox
in the same way is a solid inference, but only within the paradigm of robotic
human beings, each with an identical sensory apparatus. On the other hand, for one
who considers his awareness to exist independently of the robot paradigm, the
assumption that another person has the identical experience or memory of an ox,
for example, indicated by his use of the words "brown ox", is not so solid. For him
it is a matter of the experience itself, in the present, as opposed to the subsequent
labeling, explanation, and prediction of experience. He could just as easily imagine
that, purely experientially, his "brown" is another person's "red". Now, one may
say that it is a matter of wavelengths of electro-magnetic radiation, receptors in the
retina, neural pathways, brain regions, etc., and it certainly is, neurologically
speaking; but there is a disconnect between the neurology and the experience, just
as there is a disconnect between the verbal explanation and the experience. One
might object that there is no disconnect when, for example, a surgeon probes a
brain a certain way and the patient reports a burning smell. Well, the patient may
report the sensation, but to anyone else it is only a report, really just a memory of a
story, and it falls completely within the scope of reasoned explanation, not
experience.
Chapter Three 27
Testimony
उपलब्धिमरसद्विप्रववृसत्तितमात।म सम्बन्धमाच्च।आपयोपदमशसमामथमारचबमादरस
र म्प्रत्ययन्निः। प्रममा-
म
णतन्निः अनपलब्धिम म
न्निः। Vb) पतरणप्रदमाहपमाटनमानपलब्धिम र वसमा-
श्च सम्बन्धमाभमावन्निः। शबमारव्य
नमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.1.50) upalabdheḥ (abl. according to) observation a-dvi-pravṛtti-tvāt (abl.
known from) not – two – accounts – their having (2.1.51) sambandhāt (abl. due
to) kinship ca and (2.1.52 ?) āpta-upadeśa-sāmarthyāt (abl. known from)
authorities – teaching – their having a common interest / śabdāt (abl. taken from)
testimony artha-sampratyayaḥ purpose – community of belief (2.1.53)
pramāṇataḥ (tasil based on) means of validation anupalabdheḥ (abl. because)
lack of observation (2.1.54) pūraṇa-pradāha-pāṭana-anupalabdheḥ (abl. just
because) satisfying – splitting – burning sambandha-abhāvaḥ kinship – not
existing (2.1.55) śabda-artha-vyavasthānāt (abl. just by) testimony – purpose –
persevering apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (refers to our premise, see 1.2.14, 2.12-14)
3.7-8 From their not having the two accounts (of life) according to our
observation, and from their having a common interest in the teaching of
authorities, due to their own kinship with them, we know this community of
belief in a purpose deriving from the word (Veda). Because of (their) lack of
observation based on our means of validation, (and) because of (our) lack of
observation of their satisfying (the gods), splitting (the wood), and burning
(the sacrifice), there exists no kinship (between us). There is no denying (our
premise) just by persevering in that (ritual) purpose of the 'word'.
न समामसयरतमाचबमार रसम्प्रत्ययस ।जमासतसवशमष म चमासनयममात।म तदप्रमाममाणयमनवृतव्यमा-
म
घमातपनरुकदयोषम
भन्निः।
(2.1.56) na not sāmayikatvāt (abl. deriving from) being according to formal
custom, ordination by tradition / śabda-artha-sampratyayasya (gen. on the part
of) word – purpose – community of belief (2.1.57) jāti-viśeṣe (loc. regarding)
birth-rank – distinguished ca indeed aniyamāt (abl. because) no rule (2.1.58) tat-
aprāmāyam their – lack of authority anṛta-vyāghāta-punarukta-doṣebhyaḥ
(abl. because of) untruth – absurdity – redundancy – faults
3.9 That (class kinship) does not derive from any ordination by (Vedic)
tradition on the part of that community of belief in that (ritual) purpose of the
'word', indeed because there is (actually) no such rule (in the Veda) regarding
their distinguished birth-rank. Their lack of authority is due to the faults of
that untruth, of absurdity, and of tautology.
The tautology is their proof of the validity of the karmic caste system merely by
pointing out the existence of people of various castes.
***
म
र माधिनववैगणयमात
न रमररतवृस ।म अभपमम त्य रमालभमद म दयोषवचनमात।म अनवमादयोपपत्तिम
म श्च।वमाक्यसव-
भमागस चमार रग्रहणमात।म

(2.1.59) na not karma-kartṛ-sādhana-vaiguṇyāt (abl. known by) rite –
performer – way – unvirtuous (2.1.60) abhyupetya having agreed on // kāla-
bhede (loc. regarding) time – division doṣa-vacanāt (abl. known by) false state-
ment (2.1.61) anuvāda-upapatteḥ (abl. known by) explanation – evidence ca and
(2.1.62) vākya-vibhāgasya (gen. of) spoken words – distribution (see pravibhāga
YD 7.3 JW) ca indeed artha-grahaṇāt (abl. by) meaning – personal apprehension
3.10 Those (faults) are not known by anything unvirtuous in their way of
'performer and rite' —(both sides) having agreed on that. They are known by
the (earlier 2.1.12-15a) false statement regarding the division of time (see also
SD 2.5-9 on time), known by the evidence of our explanation of that (2.1.15b-
19), and by personal apprehension of the meaning of distributing that
('word') into recited words.
Time and word distribution are also treated together in YD 3.16-17 (7.1-3 JW).
म
सवध्यरवर मादमानवमादवचनसवसनययोगमात ।म सवसधिसवरधिमायरन्निः। ससम तसन रनमा पररवृसतन्निः परमारल्प
म इ-
म
त्यर रवमादन्निः। सवसधिसवसहतसमानवचनमन म ।
वमादन्निः
(2.1.63) vidhi- arthavāda- anuvāda-vacana -viniyogāt (abl. by) injunction –
analysis of meaning, explanation – statement by reiteration – application (2.1.64)
vidhiḥ injunction vidhāyakaḥ containing injunction (2.1.65) stutiḥ praise nindā
reproach parakṛtiḥ action of another, example purā-kalpaḥ "(in) the olden time",
legend iti these arthavādaḥ explanation of the meaning (2.1.66) vidhi-vihitasya
(gen. of) injunction – ordered anuvacanam rephrasing anuvādaḥ reiteration
Chapter Three 29
3.11 By their application of the (Vedic) "vidhi", "arthavāda"

(explanation), and "anuvāda": the vidhi contains the injunction; the
arthavāda is the praise and reproach (of the smṛti), example, and legend; and
the anuvāda is a rephrasing of what has been ordered by the injunction.
This obliquely recalls the three main elements of the syllogism in terms of three
different kinds of Vedic texts. Injunction represents the initial assertion or theory,
analysis represents the reason, and rephrasing represents the conclusion.
म
नमानवमादप म शषम न्निः शबमाभमासयोपपत्तिमन्निः। शरीघ्रतरगमनयोपदमशवदभमासमानमासवशमषन्निः।
नरुकययोसवर
(मनमायवम दर प्रमाममाणयवच्च तत्प्रमाममाणयममापप्रमाममाणयमात।म Vb)

(2.1.67) na no anuvāda-punaruktayoḥ (loc. between) explanation –
redundancy viśeṣaḥ difference śabda-abhyāsa-upapatteḥ (abl. based on) words –
repetition – evidence (2.1.68) śīghratara-gamana-upadeśavat (vatup ind. having)
faster – going – teaching abhyāsāt (abl. because) repetition na not aviśeṣaḥ no
difference, the same (2.1.69) mantra-ayurveda-prāmāṇyavat (vati like) verses –
exposition on medical science – authority ca and tat-prāmāṇyam whose –
authority āpta-prāmāṇyāt (abl. deriving from) experts – authority
3.12 Based on the evidence of the (mere) repetition of the words, there
would be no difference between their explanation and redundancy, but there
is some difference because their repetition has the (smṛti's) teaching of going
more quickly (see 3.2.29) and it is like the authority of the mantras of the
Ayurveda, whose authority derives from the authority of experts.
न चतष्ट्वम मवैसतहमारमारपसत्तिसमवमाभमावप्रमाममाणयमात।म शब ऐसतहमानरमारन्तरभमावमात अन

म ममान
म ऽम -
रमारपसत्तिसमवमाभमावमानरमारन्तरभमावमाच्चमाप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.2.1) na not the case catuṣṭvam there being four aitihya – arthāpatti-
sambhava – abhāva-prāmāṇyāt (abl. by) tradition – "arriving at a meaning",
interpretation – (ifc) derived from – devoid of authority (a bahuvrīhi compound)
(2.2.2) śabde (loc. in) testimony aitihya -an-artha-antara-bhāvāt (abl. just
because) oral tradition – lack of – meaning – alternate – view / anumāne (loc.
with regard to) inference arthāpatti-sambhava – abhāva-an-artha-antara-
bhāvāt (abl. just because) interpretation – (ifc) derived from – devoid (=abhāva-
prāmāṇya 2.2.1 and 2.2.7) – lack of – meaning – alternate – view ca and
apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
3.13 There being four (expositions), by (the inclusion of) that one which is
devoid of that (Vedic) authority (the smṛti), derived from their interpretation
of the oral tradition (of the three 2.l.63), is not the case. There is no denying
(our premise) just because there is no (mention of our) view with an alternate
meaning in the word (itself), and just because there is no (mention of our)
view with an alternate meaning in the one that is devoid (of authority, the
smṛti), derived from their interpretation (of the word).
अरमारपसत्तिरप्रममाणमनवैरमासन्तरतमात।म अनरमारपत्तिवरमारपतसभममानमात।म प्रसतषमधिमाप्रमाममाणयस
चमानवैरमासन्तरतमात।म तत्प्रमाममाणयम वमा नमारमारपतप्रमाममाणयम।म

(2.2.3) arthāpattiḥ interpretation apramāṇam without authority
anaikāntikatvāt (abl. for) not being only one way (2.2.4) anarthāpattau (loc.
against) misinterpretation arthāpatti-abhimānāt (abl. on the basis of)
interpretation – ego involvement (2.2.5) pratiṣedha-aprāmāṇyam denial – no
authority ca moreover anaikāntikatvāt (abl. since) not being only one way (2.2.6)
tat-prāmāṇye (loc. if) such – authority vā on the other hand na not arthāpatti-
aprāmāṇyam interpretation – lacking authority
3.14 That is an interpretation without any authority, for there is not just
that one way. Moreover, since there is not just the one way, there should be no
authority to deny on the basis of an ego involvement in one's interpretation
against some 'misinterpretation'. If, on the other hand, one had the authority
for such (a denial), one's interpretation would not lack authority.
Prameya
नमाभमावप्रमाममाणयस प्रममयमाससदमन्निः। लसकतमष्वलकणलसकततमादलसकतमानमास तत्प्रममयसससदन्निः।
असत्यरर नमाभमाव इसत चमत म

(2.2.7) na no abhāva-prāmāṇyam devoid of authority (The referent of abhāva
is anaikāntikatva in 2.2.5.) prameya-(gen.)-asiddheḥ (abl. just because) to be
validated – no affirmation (2.2.8) lakṣiteṣu (loc. pl. when) things indicated
(Theses plural terms usually refer to people.) alakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvāt (abl. because)
without indication – the way of being indicated alakṣitānām (gen. "of") (ref. is
siddhi) things not indicated // tat such prameya-siddhiḥ to be validated – proof
(2.2.9) asati_arthe (loc. abs. given that when) not actually so – meaning na it does
not mean abhāvaḥ doesn't exist iti_cet to the objection
Chapter Three 31
3.15 To the objection that it is not 'devoid of authority' just because there
is no affirmation of our prameya; that that (affirmation) of all those (souls)
that are not (perceptually) indicated happens when they are indicated,
because that is the way of being indicated for something having no (sensory)
indication; that that is the affirmation of prameya, given that when something
is not actually so (indicated), that doesn't mean it doesn't exist, ...
म -
नमान्यलकणयोपपत्तिमन्निः।तसतदमरलसकतमष्वहमतन्निःम ।न लकणमावससतमापमकमाससदमन्निः। प्रमागत्पत्तिम
रभमावयोपपत्तिमश्च।
(2.2.9 cont.) na no such thing anya-lakṣaṇa-upapatteḥ (abl. known by)
different – indication – evidence (2.2.10) tat it is thus siddheḥ (abl. because) proof
alakṣiteṣu (loc. with) not indicated ahetuḥ grounds (2.2.11) na not lakṣaṇa-
avasthita-apekṣā-siddheḥ (abl. known by) indicator – stationed or abiding in –
considering – proof (2.2.12) prāñc-utpatteḥ (gen. of) prior – coming into
existence, birth abhāva-upapatteḥ (abl. because) not existing, empty – evidence
ca and
3.16 (The reply is:) No such (non-indicated) thing is known by evidence that
indicates a different thing. With things that are not (immediately) indicated,
(saying) 'it is thus because that (indication) is the proof', is no grounds. That
(soul) cannot be known by some (tautological) proof by considering how it is
'stationed' in its indicator (body), and by some empty evidence of a prior-to-
birth state. (as opposed to constancy)
आसदमत्त्वमादवैसन्द्रियरतमातवृ तरवदपचमारमाच्च। न घटमाभमावसमाममान्यसनत्यतमासनत्यमष्वपसन-
त्यवदपचमारमाच्च।
(2.2.13) ādimattvāt (abl. w/upacāra; compared to) "the having a beginning",
origination aindriyakatvāt (abl. from) a state consisting of the powers of sense
kṛtakavat (vatup ind.) having artificiality upacārāt (abl. ind.) taken figuratively
ca and (2.2.14) na not ghaṭa-abhāva -sāmānya-nityatvāt (abl. from) pot, vessel
– in the absence of – universal – constant state // nityeṣu_api (loc. pl. w/api) even
though they remain constant (The referent must be plural. Indriyas fits well.)
anityavat (vatup ind.) having inconstancy upacārāt (abl. ind.) figuratively ca and
3.17 That (indicator) has an artificial nature and is taken as a figure,

compared to our origination (also "birth") which arises out of a state consisting
(only) of the powers of sense, not out of any (supposed) constant state of that
(soul) which is universally agreed to, (even) in the absence of that 'vessel'
(body). Even while those (powers of sense) remain constant, that (physical
birth) has an inconstant nature and is taken as a figure.
He is not saying that one is right and the other wrong, but that there are two
complementary definitions of "origination" or "birth" in this teaching. Neither of
these, however, include the doctrines of karma, reincarnation, or caste.
म
तत्त्वभमाकययोनमारनमातस सवभमागमात अव्यसभचरन्निः म षणमात।म रमारणद्रिव्यस
।ससतमानमानममानसवशम
प्रदमशशबमनमासभधिमानमात।म
(2.2.15) tattva-bhāktayoḥ (loc. dual; when considering) essence – "fed",
subservient, secondary nānātvasya (gen. of) manifoldness vibhāgāt (abl. because)
disjunction avyabhicāraḥ not deviating (2.2.16) saṁtāna-anumāna-viśeṣaṇāt
(abl. since) continuous – inference – the act of distinguishing (2.2.17) kāraṇa-
dravyasya (gen. of) cause – physical pradeśa-śabdena (inst. by way of)
"pointing-out", expository – speech abhidhānāt (abl. for) telling, utterance
3.18 Because there is a disjunction of that manifoldness (of vessels) when

considering the essential vs. the secondary, we are not really deviating (from
the scholarly stance cf. 1.2.2-4), since we are just distinguishing between that
continuous thing (the essence) and that inference (the secondary) (cf YD), for
(after all) this very (audible) utterance (like the Veda) comes by way of an
expository speech whose cause is physical. (cf. 2.1.6-7 and BU I. 3.23.)
Chapter Four 33
Chapter Four - Hearing the Continuous Sound
म
प्रमागच्चमारणमादन म
पलब्धिम म
रमावरणमाद्यनपलब्धिम म
श्च। तदनपलब्धिम म
रनपलममादमावरणयोपपसत्तिन्निः ।
म
अनपलममादपन म
पलसब्धिसदमाववत म
(2.2.18) prāk-(prāñc)-uccāraṇāt (abl. developing from) first, just prior –

audible pronunciation, sounding audibly anupalabdheḥ (abl. stemming from)
failure to observe āvaraṇa-ādi-anupalabdheḥ (abl. from) concealing – at the
beginning – failure to observe ca and (2.2.19) tat-anupalabdheḥ (abl. arising
from) that (The referent is saṁtāna 2.2.16) – failure to observe anupalambhāt
(abl. coming from) lack of recognition āvaraṇa-upapattiḥ concealing – evidence
(2.2.20a) anupalambhāt (abl. because) lack of recognition api indeed
anupalabdhi-sat-bhāva-vat (vati like, as if) failure to observe – primary reality
4.1 There is evidence of a concealing effect of that (speech), which comes

from a certain lack of recognition that arises from failure to observe that
(continuous essence), stemming from the failure to observe which develops
from its first emergence into audible pronunciation, and from the failure to
observe the concealing effect itself, at the beginning (of language). Indeed,
because of that lack of recognition, it's as if that (state of) failure to observe
(the continuous) were the primary reality.
म
नमावरणमानपपसत्तिरन म
पलममात ।म अनपलममात्मरतमादन
म म रहमतन्निःम । अस्पशरतमात।म न
पलब्धिम
रममारसनत्यतमात।म
2.2.20b) na not āvaraṇa-anupapattiḥ concealing – lack of evidence
anupalambhāt (abl. just because) failing to recognize (2.2.21) anupalambha-
ātmakatvāt (abl. for) non-recognition – (ifc) being the very nature of
anupalabdheḥ (abl. due to) failure to observe ahetuḥ lack of grounds for
knowledge (2.2.22) asparśatvāt (abl. from) being without a feel for it (2.2.23) na
not karma-anityatvāt (abl. from) proper religious and civil acts – inconstancy
4.2 It's not that there is no evidence of the concealing effect, just because
one may fail to recognize it. The lack of grounds for knowledge is due to the
failure to observe (the continuous), for that (failure) is the very nature of the
failure to recognize. It results from not having the feel of it, not from
inconstancy in one's karmas.
नमाणसम नत्यतमात।म सम्प्रदमानमात।म तदन्तरमालमानपलब्धिम

म रहमतन्निःम ।अध्यमापनमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः। उभययोन्निः
पकययोरन्यतरसमाध्यमापनमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.2.24) na nor aṇu-nityatvāt (abl. coming from) minutiae – constancy
(2.2.25) sampradānāt (abl. for) tradition (2.2.26) tat-antarāla-anupalabdheḥ
(gen. of) that – inner domain – failure to observe ahetuḥ not grounds for
knowledge (2.2.27) adhyāpanāt (abl. by) teaching apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
(2.2.28) ubhayoḥ_pakṣayoḥ (loc. abs. given that) both wings anyatarasya (gen.
of) one or the other adhyāpanāt (abl. by) teaching apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
4.3 Nor does that (grounds for knowledge) come from constancy of the
minutiae (of karmas and recitations), for that is just handed down by
tradition. That (constancy) of not observing the inner domain of that (feel),
lacks our grounds for knowledge. There is no denying (our premise) just by
that teaching. Given that there are both wings (in our premise), there is no
denying it by the teaching of one or the other.
(अभमासमात।)म नमान्यतमऽपभमाससयोपचमारमात।म अन्यतन्यस्मिमादनन्यतमादनन्यसदत्यन्यतमा-
भमावन्निः। तदभमावम नमास्त्यनन्यतमा तययोसरतरमतरमापमकमाससदमन्निः।

[(2.2.29) abhyāsāt]* (2.2.30) na neither anyatve_api (loc. even though) its
being the other (side) abhyāsasya (gen. of) repetition (ref=apratiṣedhaḥ)
upacārāt (abl. because) a metaphor or figure (2.2.31) "anyat (that) other
anyasmāt (abl. of comparison w/anyatva; than) the other ananyatvāt (abl.
because) there being nothing other than (w/abl.) ananyat" not something other iti
to say (w/quotes) anyatā-abhāvaḥ otherness – missing the existence (2.2.32) tat-
abhāve (loc.) that – (in. loc.) without the existence na_asti (w/loc.) there could be
no ananyatā non-otherness tayoḥ (loc. dual; between) the two itaretara-apekṣā-
siddheḥ (abl. for) one against the other – considering – proof
4.4 Neither can there be that (denial) of repetition (of words), even
considering its being the other (side), because that (repetition) is a figure (of
the continuous). To say "that 'other' (of which you speak) is not something
other, because of there being nothing other than that (Vedic) other," misses
the existence of otherness (altogether) and without the existence of that, there
could be no 'non-otherness' (sameness) between the two (sides), for the proof
of that (sameness) is (also) by considering one side vs. the other. (cf 2.1.41).
Chapter Four 35
It is a reciprocating consideration of the two complementary world views

(saṁyama, as described in the Yoga) that constitutes the completeness of the
knowledge, not just consideration of one side or the other exclusively.
* The commenter offers a wry observation on the first part of this convoluted
statement by saying: "(Because of his own repetition, …" I agree. The author
first mentions abhyāsa (repetition) in 2.1.68, but he demonstrates the idea of
repetition of words by expanding it to almost comic proportions, for example:
pramāṇa/ prameya and siddhi in 2.1.16-20, arthāpatti in 2.2-6, lakṣana/ita in 2.2.7-
11, anupalabdh/lambh in 2.2.18-21, and anyat here.
म
सवनमाशरमारणमानपलब्धिम म न्निः सततशवणप्रसङ्गन्निः। उपलभममान म
न्निः। अशवणरमारणमानपलब्धिम
म
चमानपलब्धिम
रसत्त्वमादनपदमशन्निः।
(2.2.33) vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. ind.) completely doing away with
– cause, reason – without observing (2.2.34) aśravaṇa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ
(abl. ind.) not hearing the Veda (śravaṇa=śruti here) – cause, reason – not
observing satata-śravaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ the continuous – hearing – occupation with
(2.2.35) upalabhya-māne (loc. considering) comprehensible – considering ca and
again anupalabdheḥ (abl. just because) not observing asat-tvāt (abl. ind. that) its
not being real anapadeśaḥ no pointing out
4.5 (So) without observing any cause for not hearing the Veda, without
observing any cause for doing away with it, we are occupied with hearing the
continuous, and again (see also 2.2.20b), considering that it can be
comprehended, there is no pointing out that it isn't real just because one
doesn't observe it.
म
पमासणसनसमत्तिप्रशमषमाचबमाभमावम नमानपलसब्धिन्निः म श्चमावसमान म तसनत्य-
। सवनमाशरमारणमानपलब्धिम
तप्रसङ्गन्निः। अस्पशरतमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.2.36) pāṇi-nimitta-praśleṣāt (abl. w/nimitta caused by) hands – cause –
clapping śabda-abhāve (loc. even in) sound – absence na not anupalabdhiḥ
without observation (2.2.37) vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. since) doing
away with – cause, reason – not observing ca (w/neg.) either avasthāne (loc. even
within) life circumstance tat-nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ that (=satata-śravaṇa 2.2.34) –
constancy – occupation with (2.2.38) asparśatvāt (abl. just because) not having
the feel of apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
4.6 Even in the absence of any sound caused by (e.g.) clapping the hands,
we are still not without observation of that (continuous sound). Since
(however) we do not observe any cause for doing away with that (caused
sound) either, the occupation with the constancy of that (continuous sound)
must be within one's circumstance. There is no denying (our premise) just
because one does not have the feel (of the continuous).
The word for life-circumstance also means fixity or steadiness in living life the
way one is supposed to. In this lesson the author also points out two conflicting
notions of constancy (nityatva). He rejects the constancy of the minute atoms and
of the minutiae of Vedic karmas (aṇu-nityatva 2.2.23 and karma-nityatva 2.2.24) in
favor of hearing or feeling (very closely related in consciousness) the constancy of
the prime sound (satata-śravaṇa-nityatva (2.2.34 and 2.2.37).
Conflicting definitions of "transformation"
सवभक्त्यन्तरयोपपत्तिमश्च सममासम। सवरमारमादमशयोपदमशमातसशयन्निः। प्ररवृसतसवववृदलौ सवरमारसवववृदन्निःम ।
न्यतनसममासधिरयोपलब्धिमसवररमारमाणमामहमतन्निःम ।
(2.2.39) vibhakti-antara-upapatteḥ (abl. because) coming apart – inner –
becoming evident ca moreover samāse (loc. in) coming together (2.2.40) vikārāt
(abl. about) transformation eśa-upadeśāt (abl. from) this (stands out) – teaching
saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (2.2.41) prakṛti-vivṛddhau (loc. as) prime originator –
expansion vikāra-vivṛddheḥ (abl. for) transformation – expansion (2.2.42)
nyūna-sama-adhika-upalabdheḥ (abl. known by) deficient – balanced –
excessive – observing vikārāṇām (gen. of) transformations ahetuḥ not grounds
4.7 Moreover, because in the coming together of that (circumstance) an

inner coming apart becomes evident, uncertainty arises from this our
teaching, for (in this teaching) there is the expansion of the transformation (of
the continuous) as the expansion of the prime originator (prakṛti). Our
grounds for knowledge is not that of the 'transformations' (pl. =incarnations)
that are known by observing the deficient vs. the balanced vs. the excessive
(the three guṇas: tamas, sattva, and rajas; also three levels of incarnation).
The continuous sound is linked with the ether, which is always associated with
mahat. Mahat's expansion and transformation is through his prakṛti aspect. (see
SD)
Chapter Four 37
म प्ररवृतरीनमास सवरमारसवरल्पमात।म द्रिव्यसव-

सद्विसवधिसमासप हमतयोरभमावमादसमाधिनस दृषमान्तन्निः। नमातल
रमारववैषरवद्विणरसवरमारसवरल्पन्निः।
(2.2.43) dvividhasya (gen. on the part of) twofold api clearly hetoḥ (gen. of)
grounds for knowledge abhāvāt (abl. for) no existence asādhanam not the way
dṛṣṭāntaḥ paragon, standard (2.2.44) na not so atulya-prakṛtīnām (gen. pl. on
the part of) unequal – prime originators vikāra-vikalpāt (abl. because)
transformations – diversity (2.2.45) dravya-vikāra-vaiṣamyavat (vati like, just
as) physical – diversity – inequality varṇa- (varne Vb) -vikāra-vikalpaḥ caste –
transformations – diversity
4.8 (To the objection) that our (twofold) standard is not the way, for on the
part of something that is clearly twofold, there can be no existence of our
(clearly singular) grounds for knowledge; that it is not (the way), because
there would be a diversity of our 'transformation' (by expansion of the prime
originator, prakṛti) on the part of (many) 'prime originators' who are
unequal; that there is (instead) a diversity of transformations of people of
various castes, just as there is inequality in the diversity of physical things.
म
न सवरमारधिममारनपपत्तिम म
न्निः। सवरमारप्रमापमानमामपनरमापत्तिम म दरीनमास पनरमापत्तिम
न्निः। सवणमार म रहमतन्निःम (न
म भमावमाव्यसतरमरमात।म
MUM) तसद्विरमारमाणमास सवणर
(2.2.46) na no vikāra-dharma-anupapatteḥ (because) transformation –

dharma – unfitting, doesn't work (2.2.47) vikāra-prāptānām (gen. belonging to,
held by) transformation – authorities apunarāpatteḥ (-āvṛtteḥ in Vb) (abl.
because) without recurrence (2.2.48) suvarṇa-ādīnām (gen. on the part of) fine
(skin) color, fine appearance, good caste (not "gold" here) – and the like punar-
āpatteḥ (abl. known by) happening again, recurrence ahetuḥ not grounds for
knowledge (2.2.49) tat-vikārāṇām (gen. of) those – transformations (This recalls
the same term from 2.2.42, and tat recalls its qualifier compound.) suvarṇa-
bhāva-avyatirekāt (abl. for) good caste – view – lacks exclusion
4.9 (The reply is:) No, because our dharma doesn't work as that (kind of)
transformation, because it is without that recurrence (reincarnation) held by
the authorities on transformation. That is not our grounds, just because the
(theory of) recurrence belongs to people of good caste and their like, for it
(our grounds) lacks the exclusion of those transformations (lower castes),
which is the view of the good caste.
(वणरतमाव्यसतरमरमाद्विणरसवरमारमाणमामप्रसतषमधिन्निः। समाममान्यवतयो धिमरययोगयो न समाममान्यस। Vb)
सनत्यतमऽसवरमारमादसनत्यतम चमानवसमानमात।म सनत्यमानमामतरीसन्द्रियतमात्तिदमरसवरल्पमाच्च वणर-
तमाव्यसतरमरमाद्विणरसवरमारमाणमामप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.2.50) [varṇatva-avyatirekāt varṇa-vikārāṇām apratiṣedhaḥ (copied from
2.2.51) sāmānyavataḥ dharma-yogaḥ / na sāmānyasya; (Regarding this
passage,) the yoga of dharma results from its universality, but there is no such
(yoga) of the universal itself.] nityatve (loc. in the case of, with) constancy
avikārāt ("vikārāt" in Vb) (abl. since) no transformation / anityatve (loc.)
without constancy ca and anavasthānāt (abl. since) no steadiness (2.2.51)
nityānām (gen.pl. of) those who are constant (Finding this word in the plural
confirms that it it is not the usual "eternal"., but "constant in" or "devoted to".)
ati-indriyatvāt (abl. due to) being beyond their powers of sense tat-dharma-
vikalpāt (abl. since) their – duty – diversity ca (connecting a positive term to the
previous two negative terms) and yet / varṇatva-avyatirekāt (abl. just because)
caste system – exclusion varṇa-vikārāṇām (gen. of) caste – transformations
apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
4.10 1.) Since there is no such (recurring) transformation with our

constancy (of the continuous sound 2.2.37), and 2.) since there is no steadiness
without that constancy, and yet 3.) since, on the part of those who remain
constant (in their duty 2.2.24) due to that (continuous sound) being beyond
their power of sense, there is a diversity of roles; (we say) there is no denying
(our premise) just because there is exclusion of those transformations of
(lower) caste on the part of the caste system.
र म सनत्यतमाभमावमातमालमा-
अनवसमासयतम च वणर्षोपलसब्धिवत्तिसद्विरमारयोपपसत्तिन्निः। सवरमारधिसमत
न्तरम सवरमारयोपपत्तिमश्चमाप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.2.52) anavasthāyitve (loc. while) not being steady in life circumstance ca as
well varṇa-upalabdhivat (vati like) caste – observing // tat thus, in that way
vikāra-upapattiḥ transformation – evidence (2.2.53) vikāra-dharmitve (loc. in)
transformation – observing dharma nityatva-abhāvāt (abl. by) constancy – empty
kāla-antare (loc. across) time – interval vikāra-upapatteḥ (abl. by)
transformation – evidence ca and apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
Chapter Four 39
4.11 It is like observing (the reality of) caste, while not also having to be
steady in that life circumstance. Such is our evidence for transformation.
There is no denying (our premise) by their empty constancy in observing a
dharma of (karmic) transformation, and by their evidence of transformation
across a period of time.
The Rule of Prakṛti
म
प्ररवृत्यसनयममाद्विणरसवरमारमाणमाम।असनयमम सनयममानमासनयमन्निः।सनयममासनयमसवरयोधिमादसनयमम
सनयममाच्चमाप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.2.54) prakṛti-aniyamāt (abl. just because) prime originator – no rule (See
aniyamāt 2.1.57, also referring to caste.) varṇa-vikārāṇām (gen. pl. of) caste –
transformations (2.2.55) aniyame (loc. where) no rule niyamāt (abl. since) rule na
it is not the case aniyamaḥ no rule (2.2.56) niyama-aniyama-virodhāt (abl. by)
rule – no rule – logical contradiction aniyame (loc. where) no rule niyamāt (abl.
by) rule ca w/neg. nor apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
4.12 Just because there is no rule (definition) of a prime originator of

transformations by caste, since that is a rule (made up) where there is no rule
(3.9), it is not the case that there is no rule (of prakṛti) at all. There is no
denying (our premise) by a (seeming) logical contradiction between their rule
and what is not that rule, nor by (dictating) a rule where there is no rule.
Prakṛti (the three guṇas) remains the underlying subject right through to 3.1.27.
In this comparison he demonstrates again the idea of repetition of words, this time
by repeating the word "rule" eight times. I can't say that I understand what he
hoped to accomplish with this awkward technique.
म
गणमान्तरमापत म हमासववृसदलमशशमषभ
पमदर म स म सवरमारयोपपत्तिमवण
र सर वरमारन्निः।तम सवभक्त्यन्तमान्निः
म
(पदम।तदरर ) व्यक्त्यमारवृसतजमासतसससनधिमावपम चमारमातसशयन्निः।
(2.2.57) guṇa-antara-āpatti -(abl.)- upamarda-hrāsa – vṛddhi -(gen.)- leśa -
(inst.)- śleṣebhyaḥ (abl. pl. known through) guṇas (clearly plural in the context of
prakṛti) – other kind – happening, becoming, changing into – crushing decrease –
increase – a mere trace amount – double meanings, alternate meanings tu instead
(enclitic, referring to the whole clause) vikāra-upapatteḥ (abl. by)
transformations – evidence varṇa-vikāraḥ caste – transformation (2.2.58) te (pl.)
these (guṇas) (remember the context!) vibhakti-antāḥ partitions – ends (Reading
this compound as "grammatical terminations", because of its proximity to

"padam" is tempting but incorrect. The larger context must be adhered to, with
"padam" recognized as part of the interpolation with tadarthe. cf. interpolation of
pada-arthaḥ in 2.2.66.) // padam tat-arthe; where the meaning is that (vibhakti-
antāḥ), that (guṇa) is the word for it. Vb) vyakti-ākṛti-jāti-saṁnidhau (loc. as)
individual – physical form – birth or birth-rank – (ifc) in the context of upacārāt
(abl. ind.) meant figuratively saṁśayaḥ uncertainty
4.13 Transformation by caste (personal quality), according to our evidence

of transformation (of prakṛti see 2.2.41), is known instead through the
alternate meanings that have only a trace of the crushing decrease (tamas)
and the increase (rajas) that are known by the 'becoming' that happens on the
part of that other kind of guṇas (the threefold). (See "abounding in sattva…"
SD 12.10.) There is the uncertainty that these (guṇas) are the boundaries of
the (three) partitions (by caste cf SD 12.10), vs. the term (guṇa) taken
figuratively as in the context of our birth of the physical form of the
individual.
According to the author's thesis, the transformation or "becoming" of one's

personal quality from the prime originator (prakṛti) aspect happens when the
balance of the three guṇas is disturbed. The ideal state of this is one where sattva
predominates and rajas and tamas are diminished to a trace amount. The
opponent's three, on the other hand, delineate three dharmic social strata
representing the personal qualities of dullness, passion, and purity.
म
यमा शबसमतहत्यमागपसरग्रहससखमाववृदपचयवणर म
सममासमानबन्धमानमास व्यकवपम चमारमाद्व्यसकन्निः। न
तदनवसमानमात।म
(2.2.60) yā (fem.) whoever (referring to the fem. vyakti) śabda-samūha –
tyāga – parigraha – saṁkhyā-vṛddhi – upacaya-varṇa-samāsa –
anubandhānām (gen. plural; of the various) Vedic testimony – community –
abandoning or giving away – possessing wealth or receiving gifts – reckoning –
increase – growing – caste – aggregation – representatives vyaktau (loc. w/yā)
whoever the individual // upacārāt (abl. known by) figure vyaktiḥ (manifestation
of) an individual (2.2.61) na no tat such anavasthānāt (abl. arising out of)
absence of life circumstance
Chapter Four 41
4.14 (But) whoever the individual is—of the various representatives of the
aggregation of castes growing (in their dharma) with their increase reckoned
in the collective of the (Vedic) 'word' (priests), in giving (food) (rulers), or in
receiving it (renunciants)—that individual manifestation is known by the
figure (of the continuous; see 2.2.30). No such (manifestation) arises out of the
absence of any life circumstance (between incarnations).
Out of the various castes and stages of human life, he mentions only the "good"
ones—priest, ruler, and renunciant—referring to them by descriptions of their acts,
which was a very common technique for the ancient authors. The following
material reinforces these three examples, even explicitly naming two of the
particular life-circumstances. Interestingly, the words tyāga and parigraha can both
have double meanings here. Tyāga means either abandoning like a renunciant, or
giving away like a wealthy donor. Similarly, parigraha can mean either the
possession of wealth, family, and power, or "taking", as in receiving donations.
सहचरणसमानतमादथ रववृत्तिममानधिमारणसमामरीपययोगसमाधिनमासधिपत्यमभयो बमाह्मणमञरटरमाज-
सकमचननगङ्गमाशमाटरमानपरुषम
म षम
(2.2.62) saha-caraṇa-sthāna-tādarthya – vṛttamāna-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya –
yoga-sādhanā-ādhipatyebhyaḥ (abl. pl. known by) (Each three-word
subcompound ends with a ṣyañ bhāvārtha termination. Long compounds in close
proximity often have a respective correspondence of their internal subcompounds.)
collective-endeavor (cf samūha 2.2.60) – taking a stance – having the purpose of
–– life (See vartamāna MW. He has already used that variation to mean "the
present". cf 2.1.39-42) – maintaining – mukti of being near the divinity –– union –
way of accomplishing – supremacy, sovereignty, power brāhmaṇa-mañca-kaṭa –
rāja-saktu-candana – gaṅgā-śāṭaka-anna-puruṣeṣu (loc. referring to) brahmin –
(sacrificial?) platform – "twist of straw" (MW) (the straw brand for transferring
fire from the gārhapatya to the āhavanīya?), a straw mat or screen (possibly
referring to the śūrpa, which is a winnowing basket for rice, mentioned in
connection with the new and full moon sacrifice in Ś.Br. I. – king, ruler – grain –
sandalwood – Ganges – strip of cloth (loincloth?) – "food man", the food-
receiving man of 2.2.60, the renunciant
4.15 They are known (rather) by having the purpose of taking a stance in
the collective (brahminical) endeavor, or by being near to a divinity by
maintaining the life (of the kingdom), or by supremacy in the way of Yoga;
where those (three descriptions) refer to the priest with the twist of straw and
the platform, the ruler with grain and sandalwood, and the loinclothed 'food
man' (food-receiving man, renunciant, 2.2.60) on the Ganges (respectively).
म म ऽप-
अतदमावमऽसप तदपचमारन्निः।आरवृसतसदपमकतमातत्त्वव्यवसमानससदमन्निः। व्यक्त्यमारवृसतयक
प्रसङ्गमात्प्रयोकणमादरीनमास मवृद्गवरम जमासतन्निः।

atat-bhāve_api (loc. w/api even though) not that – existence tat that (vs. atat)
upacāraḥ figure (2.2.63) ākṛtiḥ form tat-apekṣatvāt (abl. because) that – its
being considered sattva-vyavasthāna-siddheḥ (abl. because) purity – persevering
– affirmation (2.2.64) vyakti-ākṛti-yukte_api (loc. w/api; even though) individual
– manifestation of – linking aprasaṅgāt (abl. ind.) without occupation (w/gen.)
prokṣaṇādīnām (gen.) consecration by sprinkling water – etc. mṛd-gavake (loc.
as it would be for) clay – cow figurine jātiḥ birth rank
4.16 Even though one's existence is not that, one's figure is that. It is one's
(outer) form, because that is what one considers it to be, because the
affirmation of that (existence) is known by perseverance in (the constant)
sattva (vs. the decrease and increase of tamas and rajas. cf. 2.2.57). And even
though one is linked with his manifestation as an individual (body), it is his
'birth rank' only as that would be so for a clay cow figurine, being unoccupied
with any rites of consecration etc. (for that).
नमारवृसतव्यक्त्यपमकतमाजमात्यसभव्यकम न्निः।व्यक्त्यमारवृसतजमातयस म पदमार रन्निः। व्यसकगणसवशम

रम षमाश-
ययो मतसतरन्निः। आरवृसतजमारसतसलङ्गमाखमा।

(2.2.65) na not so ākṛti-vyakti-apekṣatvāt (abl. because) manifestation –
individual – being considered // jāti-abhivyakteḥ (abl. since) birth rank –
appearance (2.2.66) vyakti-ākṛti-jātayaḥ individuals – manifestation – birth ranks
tu but, rather pada-arthaḥ word, term – meaning, referring to (2.2.67) vyaktiḥ
individual guṇa-viśeṣa-āśrayaḥ qualities – distinct, unequal – seat mūrtiḥ the
physical body (f.) (2.2.68) ākṛtiḥ manifestation jāti-liṅga-ākhyā birth rank –
indicator – called
Chapter Four 43
4.17 (To the objection) that it is not so, because of that manifestation being
considered as a single individual, and the meaning of the term (guṇas) here
referring rather to the (three) birth-ranks of the manifestation of single
individuals, since they do appear through birth-rank, and that the single
individual that is that body, the manifestation that is called the indicator of
his birth-rank is the seat of those distinct (unequal) guṇas (levels of caste).
Though the word mūrti can mean any physical form, they are talking
specifically about the form of a person and the sight of one's own body and those
of others sorted into three layers of human worth, vs. the purity, passion, or
crushing that are felt internally by a person, but not shared.
सममानप्रसवमासत्मरमा जमासतन्निः। दशरनस्पशरनमाभमाममरमार रग्रहणमात।म न सवषयव्यवसमानमात।म
तद्व्यवसमानमादमवमात्मसदमावमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(2.2.69) samāna-prasava-ātmikā equal, balanced – forces – consisting of
jātiḥ birth or birth rank (3.1.1) darśana-sparśanābhyām (abl. by) sight – feel
eka-artha-grahaṇāt (abl. through) same – meaning – personal apprehension
(3.1.2) na not viṣaya-vyavasthānāt (abl. through) physical sphere – perseverance
(3.1.3) tat-vyavasthānāt (abl. known by) that – perseverance eva alone ātma-sat-
bhāvāt (abl. apart from) (ibc) oneself – true – existence apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
4.18 (The reply is:) One's true birth consists of the (three) equal (balanced)
forces (of prakṛti, the three guṇas), through a personal apprehension that has
the same meaning, but through sight and feel, not through perseverance in
the physical sphere. There is no denying (our premise) just by the primary
reality of the self being known by perseverance in that (physical sphere)
alone.
Chapter Five -Body and Soul
शररीरदमाहम पमातरमाभमावमात।म तदभमावन्निः समात्मरप्रदमाहमऽसप तसनत्यतमात।म न रमायमारशयरतवृवर -
म तरमण प्रत्यसभजमानमात।म
धिमात।सव्यदृषसम
(3.1.4) śarīra-dāhe (loc. when) body – burning pātaka-abhāvāt (abl. since)
causing to fall away or die – no real existence, no substance (3.1.5) tat-abhāvaḥ
that – no substance // sātmaka-pradāhe_api (loc. w/api even though) having a
soul or self (see sātman MW) – burning away tat-nityatvāt (abl. because) its –
being constant or eternal (3.1.6) na it does not kārya-āśraya-kartṛ-vadhāt (abl.

caused by) made, done, performed – seat – maker, creator – killing or destruction
of a person (3.1.7) savya-dṛṣṭasya (gen. of) on the left (ibc) – what is seen itareṇa
(instr. by) the other pratyabhijñānāt (abl. for) recognition
5.1 Since there is no substance in (the notion of) its (the self) falling away
when the physical body is burned, there is (also) no substance in that
(perseverance). Because of its being eternal, even though the thing that
(supposedly) 'has' a soul burns away, such (a burning) is not caused by the
creator's act of destroying the seat (the body) of the performed (karma), for
the recognition of what is seen by the left (eye, the self) must be the same by
means of the other (eye, the creator).
He has mentioned both the individual self or "soul", and the creator. By left and
right he is referring to the eyes as symbols of the two complementary "views" of
reality. The creator is supposedly responsible for the physical world and the soul
for its awareness of it. He says again that both roles belong to one and the same
being, just as both eyes belong to the same face.
नवैरसस्मिनमासमाससव्यवसहतम सद्वितमासभममानमात।म एरसवनमाशम सद्वितरीयमासवनमाशमानवैरतम।म अवय-
म रहमतन्निःम । दृषमान्तसवरयोधिमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
वनमाशमऽपवयव्यपलब्धिम
(3.1.8) na not ekasmin (instr. by The referent is "itarena" 3.1.7.) the one nāsa-
asthi-vyavahite (loc. when) nose – bone (bridge) – separated dvitvā-abhimānāt
(abl. proved) that there are two – personal conviction (3.1.9) eka-vināśe (loc.
when) the one, the first – destruction dvitīya-avināśāt (abl. just because) the
second – no destruction na neither ekatvam oneness, the being one alone (3.1.10)
avayava-nāśe_api (loc. w/api even when) parts – destruction avayavi-
upalabdheḥ (abl. just because) having parts (whole) – observing ahetuḥ not (our)
grounds knowledge (3.1.11) dṛṣṭānta-virodhāt (abl. by) doctrine – logical
contradiction apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
5.2 (What is seen) by that one (eye, the self) is not proved by a personal
conviction that when separated by the bridge of the nose there are two, (but)
neither is there a oneness, since that non-destruction of the second is when
there is destruction of an (actual) first. That (oneness) is not our grounds for
knowledge, just because we observe the whole even when the parts are
destroyed; (so) there is no denying (our premise) just by the (seeming) logical
contradiction of our (twofold) doctrine.
Chapter Five 45
म स्मिवृतन्निःम स्मितरव्यसवषयतमात।म तदमात्मगणसदमावमादप्रसतषम

इसन्द्रियमान्तरसवरमारमात।न म धिन्निः।
(अपसरससखमानमाच्च स्मिवृसतसवषयस। Vb)

(3.1.12) indriya-antara-vikārāt (abl. since) sense(s) – inner – transformation
(3.1.13) na not smṛteḥ (abl. from) the law texts (smṛti) smartavya-viṣayatvāt
(abl. known from) having to be memorized – existence of the sphere, world
(3.1.14) tat that ātma-guṇa-sadbhāvāt (abl. by) individual(s) – qualities – real
truth apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (aparisaṁkhyānāt (abl. because) not reckoning
ca and smṛti-viṣayasya (gen. belonging to) law texts, or 'memory' – sphere Vb)
5.3 Since ours is a transformation (of prakṛti) through the inner senses (the
mind), it is not the one known from the existence of the sphere that has to be
memorized from the law texts. There is no denying (our premise) just by its
(smṛti's) 'actual truth' about the qualities of individual souls, and just because
we do not reckon everything around as belonging to the sphere of that law.
नमात्मप्रसतपसत्तिहमतनत मास मनसस समवमात।म जमातज

म मारनसमाधिनयोपपत्तिमन्निः। ससजमाभमदममात्रिम।म सनय-
म
मश्च सनरनममानन्निः ।
(3.1.15) na not the case ātma-pratipatti-hetūnām (gen. pl. of) individual
soul(s) – knowing – reasons manasi (loc. in) the mind sambhavāt (abl. because)
origin (3.1.16) jñātuḥ (gen. on the part of) one who truly comprehends jñāna-
sādhanā-upapatteḥ (abl. arising from) true comprehension – establishment –
evidence saṁjñā awareness // bheda-mātram partition, kind, sort, species (caste)
(In the darshanas this word always refers to the partition of one's perceived world
into individuals and classes.) – only (3.1.17) niyamaḥ rule (See prakṛti-aniyamāt
2.2.54-6 referring to caste.) ca and, while niranumānaḥ without inference,
leaving out inference
5.4 That ('actual truth') is not the case, because the origin of all those
reasons (given in the smṛti) for knowing about individual souls is in one's
mind, and the awareness of this arises from the evidence of the establishment
of true comprehension, on the part of one who truly comprehends, while the
rule (of prakṛti see 2.2.54) as merely the partition (of castes) leaves out (that it
is an) inference.
म
पतवमारभसस्मिवृत्यनबन्धमाजमातस हषभर यशयोरसम्प्रसतपत्तिमन्निः। पदमासदष म प्रबयोधिसमरीलनसवरमा-
रवत्तिसद्विरमारन्निः।
(3.1.18) pūrva-abhyasta-smṛti – anubandhāt (abl. known by) previously –
learned – remembering – outward sign, "facial expression" (in this context)
jātasya (gen. of) born harṣa-bhaya-śoka-sampratipatteḥ (abl. as opposed to)
excitement – fear – grief – mutual understanding (3.1.19) padma-ādiṣu (loc. pl.
in, of) lotus – and so on prabodha-sammīlana-vikāravat (vati like) opening,
awakening – closing (eyes or petals) obscuring – transformation tat-vikāraḥ that –
transfor-mation ( Here and in 3.1.12 vikāraḥ recalls prakṛti. See 2.2.41.)
5.5 As opposed to any (supposed) mutual understanding of the (e.g.)

excitement, fear, or grief of the born form, known (merely) by the (facial,
bodily) expression, based on remembering what has been learned previously,
the transformation of that (prakṛti) is like the transformation by the opening
and closing of lotus petals and the like (an analogy for mind, see 1.1.12).
नयोष्णशरीतवषमाररमालसनसमत्तितमात्पञमात्मरसवरमारमाणमाम।म प्रमत्यमाहमारमाभमासरवृतमात्स्तन्यमासभ-
लमाषमात।म
(3.1.20) na not so uṣṇa-śīta-varṣā-kāla-nimitta-tvāt (abl. because) hot – cold
– rainy – at the time – instrumental cause – would be pañca-ātmaka-vikārāṇām
(gen. pl. of) fivefold – transformations (3.1.21) pretya – āhāra-abhyāsa-kṛtāt
(abl. apart from; because of the contrast of meaning) having died – taking food –
repetition, habit – being done stanya-abhilāṣāt (abl. because) milk – craving
5.6 (To the objection) that it is not so, because its being hot, cold, or rainy at
the time (metaphors for rajas, tamas, and sattva?) would be the real cause of
those (opening and closing) transformations of the fivefold (lotus), (or)
because it is (rather like) one's craving for milk, as opposed to one's being
done with the habit of taking food, having died, …
The metaphor illustrates the blossoming of awareness from within vs. the outer
visual indication. During the uncertainty phase, the same analogy would mean that
awareness is caused by physical forces acting on or within a living physical body.
Chapter Five 47
अयसयोऽयसमान्तमासभगमनवत्तिदपसप रणम।म नमान्यत्रि प्रववृतभमावमात।म वरीतरमागजन्ममादशरनमा-
त।म सगणद्रिव्ययोत्पसत्तिवत्तिदत्पसत्तिन्निः
म ।
(3.1.22) ayasaḥ (gen.) lit. "iron's", but "iron" is more sensible ayaskānta-
abhigamanavat (vati like) lodestone, magnet – going close, approaching tat-
upasarpaṇam that (The referent is still prakṛti, the same as that of the previous
"tat" in 3.1.19.) – approaching (3.1.23) na not anyatra the other way pravṛtti-
abhāvāt (abl. known by) account – without substance, empty (3.1.24) vīta-rāga-
janmā (n.sg. of janman) gone away – passion – birth darśanāt (abl. known by)
seeing (3.1.25) saguṇa-dravya-utpattivat (vati as) comprised of essential
constituents – physical – manifestation tat-utpattiḥ that (prakṛti) – manifestation
5.7 (The reply is:) ... (whereas) the birth of one who is freed from passion,
known by seeing, is the act of approaching that (prakṛti, as sattva) like iron
pulling close to a magnet, not the other way that is known by the empty
account. The manifestation of that (prakṛti) exists as the manifestation of the
physical sphere comprised of it's essential constituents (guṇas).
न ससरल्पसनसमत्तितमाद्रिमागमादरीनमाम।म पमासरवर स गणमान्तरयोपलब्धिम

म न्निः। शसम तप्रमाममाणयमाच्च। रवृषनसमारम
म
सत्यपलममात ।म
(3.1.26) na not saṁkalpa-nimittatvāt (abl. known from) mental conception –
being the cause rāga-ādīnām (gen. of) passion – and the others (3.1.27)
parthivam consisting of pṛthivī, organic substance, "earth" guṇa-antara-
upalabdheḥ (abl. for) quality – inner – observation (A block of text had been
mistakenly transposed here and numbered 3.1.28-30.) (3.1.31) śruti-prāmāṇyāt
(abl. ind.) veda – accepting the authority ca as well as (3.1.32) kṛṣna-sāre_sati
(loc. in) the reality of the eyeball upalambhāt (abl. by) comprehending
5.8 That (the body) which consists of organic substance (earth) is not
known from its cause being a conception of passion and the others (the three
guṇas as planes of existence), for it is the observation of the inner guṇas, as
well as accepting the authority of śruti by comprehending it in the reality of
the eyeball.
(पमासर रवमापतवैजसस तद्ग मणयोपलब्धिन्निःम ।सनन्निःशमासयोचमासयोपलब्धिमश्चमातभम र्भौसतरम।म गन्धकम दपमारव्यत-
हमावरमाशदमान मभन्निः पमाञभलौसतरम।म MUM)

(3.1.28) pārthiva-āpya-taijasam the consisting of earth, water, and fire tat-
guṇa-upalabdheḥ (abl. known by) their – essntial constituents – observing
(3.1.29) niḥ-śvāsa – ut-śvāsa (ucchvasa) – upalabdheḥ (abl. known by) inhaling
– exhaling – observing cātur-bhautikam the consisting of four elements (3.1.30)
gandha-kleda-pāka-vyūha-avakāśa-dānebhyaḥ (abl. known by) smell –
moisture – cooking – arranging – space – offerings of food pāñca-bhautikam the
consisting of five elements
5.9 The consisting of (the three elements that are seen by the eyeball:) earth,
water, and fire, is known by observing their (inner) guṇas. (This is the world of
objects). The consisting of four elements is known by observing (air as well,
by) inhaling and exhaling. (This world includes the human). The consisting of
five elements is known by offerings of food, with the smell of it (earth), the
moisture of it (water), the cooking of it (fire), the arranging of it (touch, air),
and the space (provided) for it. (This world includes the gods.)
म
व्यसतसरच्य चयोपलममातसशयन्निः।महदणग्रम हणमात।रशरर रसससनरषसर वशमषमात्तिदग्रहणम।म
म रहमतन्निःम ।
तदनपलब्धिम
(3.1.32 cont.) vyatiricya (ind. part.) having excluded ca also upalambhāt (abl.
because) recognition saṁśayaḥ doubt, uncertainty (3.1.33) mahat-aṇu-grahaṇāt
(abl. since) great – minute – personal apprehension (3.1.34) raśmi – artha-
saṁnikarṣa-viśeṣāt (abl. just by) ray of light, straight line like a taut string –
object – drawing in together (of object and sense; 1.1.4) – (ifc) particular tat-
agrahaṇam that (jñāna 3.1.16) – no personal apprehension (3.1.35) tat-
anupalabdheḥ (abl. ind.) that – failing to observe ahetuḥ not grounds for
knowledge
5.10) (So,) there is uncertainty, because there is also a certain recognition

having excluded that, (but) since it is a matter of personal apprehension as
both the great and the minute, there is no such personal apprehension just
through the particular (visual) drawing-in of an object by line of sight.
Failure to observe that (great and minute together) is not our grounds for
knowledge.
Chapter Five 49
म
नमानमरीयममानस म म
तन्निःम । द्रिव्यगणधिमर
प्रत्यकतयोऽनपलसब्धिरभमावहम भदम माच्चयोपलसब्धिसनयमन्निः।
अन मरद्रिव्यसमवमायमाद्रितपसवशमषमाच्च
(3.1.36) na not the case anumīyamānasya (gen. of the pres. part. of the
passive; of) "being inferred" (MW) pratyakṣataḥ (tasil resulting from) direct
perception anupalabdhiḥ lack of observation abhāva-hetuḥ empty – grounds for
knowing (3.1.37) dravya-guṇa-dharma-bhedāt (abl. inferred from) physical –
qualities – duty – division ca both/and upalabdhi-niyamaḥ observation – rule
(3.1.38) aneka-dravya-samavāyāt (abl. known from) multiplicity – physical –
inherence rūpa-viśeṣāt (abl. inferred from) form – particular ca both/and
5.11 (To the objections:) that it is not the case that the lack of observation
that would result from direct perception of a thing that is being inferred,
constitutes 'empty' grounds for knowing it; (and) that the rule of observation
is satisfied both by the division of dharmas according to physical qualities
that are known from the inherence of multiplicity (of forms) in the physical
(sphere), and by one's own particular form, …
म परुषमार
रूपयोपलसब्धिन्निः। रमररमासरतश्चमसन्द्रियमाणमास व्यहन्निः म तर नन्निः।(अव्यसभचमारमाच्च प्रसतघमातयो भलौ-
म
सतरधिमरन्निः।Vb) मध्यसननयोलमाप्ररमाशमानपलसब्धिवत्तिदन म
पलसब्धिन्निः ।
(3.1.38 cont.) rūpa-upalabdhiḥ forms – observation (3.1.39) karma-kāritaḥ
caused to be made or done ca and indriyāṇām (gen. of) senses vyuhaḥ
arrangement, ordering puruṣa-artha-tantraḥ human – purpose – principle
(avyabhicārāt (abl. known by) not deviating ca and pratighātaḥ dismissed
bhautika-dharmaḥ gross elements – duty; and the dharma of that (body) which
consists of gross elements, known by not deviating, is dismissed. Vb) (3.1.40)
madhyaṁdina-ulkā-prakāśa-anupalabdhivat (vati like) midday – shooting stars
– light – not observing tat-anupalabdhiḥ them – not observing
5.12 (The reply is:) The observation of (human) forms and the karmas they
are made to do, as a principle of 'human purpose', is just an ordering of one's
senses. If one doesn't observe them, it is only like not observing the light of
shooting stars at midday.
He says that in the bright daylight of immediate self-awareness, the little

comings and goings of temporary lives are not that noticeable.
म
न रमात्रिमावपनपलब्धिम म
न्निः। वमाहप्ररमाशमानग्रहमासद्विषययोपलब्धिम म
न्निः अनसभव्यसकतयोऽनपलसब्धिन्निः ।
असभव्यकलौ चमासभभवमात।म
(3.1.41) na not the case rātrau (loc. at) night api surely anupalabdheḥ (abl.
since) no observation (3.1.42) vāhya-prakāśa-anugrahāt (abl. through) borne –
light – aid viṣaya-upalabdheḥ (abl. since) sphere – observation //
anabhivyaktitaḥ (tasil due to) no manifestation anupalabdhiḥ lack of
observation (3.1.43) abhivyaktau (loc. when) manifestation ca indeed
abhibhavāt (abl. because) predominance
5.13 (To the objection) that it is not so, because one does observe them at
night, since the observation of that sphere is through the aid of the lights that
belong to those (souls) being borne (across the sky); that any lack of
observation of them is due to there being no (bodily) manifestation of them,
indeed because when there is manifestation, that is the predominant thing.
नकञरनयनरसशमदशरनमाच्च। अप्रमापग्रहणस रमाचमाभ्रपटलस्फसटरमान्तसरतयोपलब्धिन्निःम ।रमडमा-
म
न्तसरतमानपलब्धिम
रप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(3.1.44) naktaṁcara-nayana-raśmi-darśanāt (abl. by) nocturnal prowlers –
leading – straight lines or "rays" of light – seeing ca also (3.1.45) aprāpya-
grahaṇam imperceptible – personal apprehension // kāca-abhra-paṭala-
sphaṭika-antarita-upalabdheḥ (abl. for) glass – cloud – veil – crystal – hidden –
observing (3.1.46) kuḍya-antarita-anupalabdheḥ (abl. just because) barrier –
obscured – no observing apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
5.14 (The reply is:) There is also a personal apprehension of that which is
imperceptible (by day) by seeing by line of sight the light leading from (the
eyes of) nocturnal creatures. There is no denying (our premise) just because
one cannot observe something obscured by a barrier, for one can observe
what is screened by (e.g.) glass, (thin) cloud cover, a veil, or … a crystal.
A tiger camouflaged in the jungle may be unseen by day, but seen at night by
the light from its eyes, which is known to be reflected, not produced like starlight.
He develops this theme of reflection further in 5.16, possibly referring to the
scripture: BU 1.4.10 “seeing this and that (god 1.4.6), the rishi Vāmadeva affirmed
'I am the original man, and I became the god Sūrya'
Chapter Five 51
अप्रसतघमातमातससनरषर्षोपपसत्तिन्निः। आसदत्यरशममन्निः स्फसटरमान्तरमऽसप दमाहमऽसवघमातमात।म नतम रम-
तरधिमरप्रसङ्गमात।म
(3.1.47) apratighātāt (abl. for) no dismissing saṁnikarṣa-upapattiḥ drawing
together – evidence (3.1.48) āditya-raśmeḥ (gen. of) a name of Sūrya, the sun god
– line of sight sphaṭika-antare_api (loc. w/api even if) crystal – in between
dāhye (loc. to) flammable avighātāt (abl. since) no obstruction (3.1.49) na neither
is there itaretara-dharma-prasaṅgāt (abl. by) respective – duty – being devoted
5.15 (To the objection) that such (a line of sight) is the evidence of drawing-
in-together, for there is no dismissing it; that since there is no obstruction of
(the god) Sūrya's line of sight to the flammable (sacrifice to him), even if there
is a crystal (a human soul) in between, neither is there any (obstacle) by being
devoted to one's respective dharma (of sacrificing).
म
आदशर्षोदरययोन्निः प्रसमादस्वमाभमाव्यमाद्रितपयोपलसब्धिवत्तिदपलसब्धिन्निः। दृषमानसमतमानमास सनययोगप्रसतषम-
म
धिमानपपसत्तिन्निः ।
(3.1.50) ādarśa-udakayoḥ (loc. in) mirror – water prasāda-svābhāvyāt (abl.
through) clarity, serenity – state of self-existence rūpa-upalabdhivat (vati like)
form – observation tat-upalabdhiḥ him – observation (3.1.51) dṛṣṭa-
anumitānām (gen. pl. of things) learned – inferred niyoga-pratiṣedha-
anupapattiḥ necessity – denial – unfitting, doesn't work
5.16 (The reply is:) The observation of him (Sūrya) is like the observation of
one's form (reflected like 3.1.44) in a mirror or water, through the state of
self-existence in its clarity, (so indeed) it doesn't work to deny the necessity of
(all) the things that are learned and inferred (from scripture, e.g., BU 1.4.10.)
समानमान्यतम नमानमातमादवयसवनमानमासमानतमाच्च ससशयन्निः। तगव्यसतरमरमात।म (नसम न्द्रियमान्तरमा-
म
रमारनपलब्धिम
न्निः। Vb)
(3.1.52) sthāna-anyatve (loc. in) stance – the other nānātvāt (abl. arising
from) multiplicity avayavi-nānā-sthānatvāt (abl. because) having parts –
multiplicity – the stance ca and also saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (3.1.53) tvac-
avyatirekāt (abl. known by) feel – not excluding na not indriya-antara-artha-
anupalabdheḥ (abl. known by) senses – inner – objects – failure to observe
5.17 There is uncertainty, because there is a multiplicity (of parts) in the

other stance, and because there is also the stance that the multiplicity belongs
to the one who has the parts, which is known by not excluding (the sphere of)
feel, not by failure to observe objects as the inner sense.
न यगम पदरमारनपलब्धिम
म न्निः। (तगवयवसवशमषणधितमयोपलसब्धिवत्तिदपलसब्धिन्निः। व्यमाहततमादहमतन्निःम
Vb) सवप्रसतषमधिमाच्च
(3.1.54) na neither yugapat_artha-anupalabdheḥ (abl. by) immediate –
object – failing to observe tvac-avayava-viśeṣaṇa-dhūma-upalabdhivat (vati
like) feel – part, subdivision – the act of distinguishing – smoke – observing tat-
upalabdhiḥ such – observation vyāhatatvāt (abl. because) absurdity ahetuḥ no
grounds (3.1.55) vipratiṣedhāt (abl. because) general denial ca and
5.18 (On the other hand,) neither is it by failing to observe that there is an
immediate (physical) object. Such an observation would be like observing
smoke by distinguishing it as a subdivision of feel. That is not our grounds for
knowledge, because of its absurdity and because it would be generally denied.
Chapter Six
न तगमरमा। इसन्द्रियमार रपञतमात।म न तदरबर हुतमात।म गन्धतमाद्यव्यसतरमरमात गन्धमादरीनमामप्र-

म
सतषमधिन्निः ।
na and not tvac-ekā feel (f.) – as only one (f.) (3.1.56) indriya-artha-
pañcatvāt (abl. since) those (senses) – objects – being five in number (3.1.57) na
not tat-artha-bahu-tvāt (abl. known by) their – objects – multiplicity (3.1.58)
gandha-tva-ādi-avyatirekāt (abl. just because) smell – abstract essence of – and
the others – not excluding gandha-ādīnām (gen. pl. belonging to) smell – and the
others apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
6.1) It is not a matter of feel as only one (sense), because of the objects of
sense being five, (but) those (senses) are not known just by the multiplicity of
their objects. That (multiplicity) is no denial (of our premise) just because we
do not exclude the abstract essence of smell and the others that belongs to
(physical) smell and the others.
Chapter Six 53
सवषयतमाव्यसतरमरमादमरतम।म न बसदलकणमासधिषमानगत्यमारवृ
म म
सतजमासतपञतमभन्निः। (भततगण-
सवशमषयोपलब्धिमसमादमात्म्यम।म MUM) (गन्धरसरूपस्पशरशबमानमास। स्पशरपयरन्तमान्निः
पवृसरव्यमान्निः। अपमजयोवमायतनमाम पतम वर पतवमर पयोहमारमाशसयोत्तिरन्निः। MUM)

(3.1.59) viṣaya-tva-avyatirekāt (abl. known by) sphere of objects – the
abstract essence of – not excluding ekatvam wholeness (3.1.60) na not buddhi-
lakṣaṇa – adhiṣṭhāna – gati-ākṛti-jāti – pañca-tvebhyaḥ (abl. pl. known by)
possessed of wisdom – ruler – transmigration, incarnation – physical form – birth
rank – five – the existence (3.1.61-3) bhūta-guṇa-viśeṣa-upalabdheḥ (gen. of)
gross elements – essential constituents – particular – observation tādātmyam
affinity in the character (gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdānām sparśa-paryantāḥ /
pṛthivyāḥ ap-tejo-vāyūnām // pūrvam pūrvam apas hi ākāśasya uttaraḥ; That
(affinity) of smell, taste, form, feel, and sound (?), is that they are encompassed
by feel. That (affinity) of water, fire, and air, is by earth. Because water is
(syntactically) previous to the first, the higher place would belong to ether.) The
commenter tries to explain the strange idea of not reaching beyond feel, by
referring to Vaisheshika 2.1-5, which describes the encompassing role of feel In
any case, this enumeration of senses and elements is out of place here in the
broader context of the opposing dharmas of subjectivism vs. class divisions.
6.2 The wholeness that is known by not excluding the essence of that
sphere is not known by the existence of those five in the birth-rank of some
physical form as (for example) an incarnation of one possessed of wisdom (a
priest), or of a ruler. It is rather an affinity in the character of observation of
their particular gross elements and that of their essential constituents (guṇas).
म पलब्धिम
न सवरगणमान म म
न्निः। एरवैरशयमनयोत्तिरयोत्तिरगणसदमावमादत्तिरयोत्तिरमाणमास म
तदनपलसब्धिन्निः । (ससस-
म
गमारच्च अन मरगणग्रहणम ।म Vb)
(3.1.64) na not the case sarva – guṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. since) all together –
levels of merit (the opponent's definition) – no observation (3.1.65) ekaikaśyena
(ind.) severally, one by one uttara-uttara – guṇa-sadbhāvāt (abl. since) "higher
and higher", progression, hierarchy (both apply here) – merit – reality uttara-
uttarāṇām (gen. of) more and more advanced things tat-anupalabdhiḥ that, such
– no observation (saṁsargāt (abl. coming from) combination ca and, whereas
aneka-guṇa-grahaṇam several – qualities – personal apprehension Vb)
6.3 (To the objection) that that (wholeness) is not the case, because one
cannot observe guṇas as a totality; that there is no observation of that
(totality) of more and more advanced beings, since the reality of the guṇas as
more and more advanced must be one at a time, whereas our personal
apprehension as the several guṇas (prakṛti) would come from a combination
of them ...
सवषस हपरम्परमण। न पमासर रवमापययोन्निः प्रत्यकतमात।म पतवपर वत ग म त्तित्तित्प्रधिमानम।म तद्व्यव-

र णयोतषमार
समानस त म भतयस्त्वमात।म सगणमानमाम

म म
(3.1.66) viṣṭam (n.) that which encompasses (cf. √veṣṭ/veṣṭa (n.) MW, not a
past participle) hi because a-param-pareṇa (ind.) without – one following
another (3.1.67) na there is no pārthiva-āpyayoḥ (gen. dual of) consisting of
earth – consisting of water pratyakṣatvāt (abl. since) perception (The abstract
form is for emphasis.) (3.1.68) pūrva-pūrva – guṇa-utkarṣāt (abl. due to) one
thing over the previous thing – merit (He cleverly uses a third meaning of guṇa.) –
superiority tat-tat-pradhānam one over another – principal (3.1.69) tat-
vyavasthānam that (the referent is pratyakṣatva) – perseverance tu rather
bhūyastvāt (abl. w/tu apart from, opposed to) the becoming more advanced (This
is the sense of superiority or importance rather than size or abundance.) (3.1.70)
sa-guṇānām (gen. pl. on the part of) possessed of – quality, merit, virtue
6.4 (The reply is:) Because it (prakṛti) is that which encompasses

(everything), without the one (incarnation) following the other, because of its
being a perception of those (bodies) consisting of earth and water, it's not that
one is chief over the other due to the superiority in merit of one (incarnation)
over the previous. It is rather a matter of perseverance in that ('being' a
perception), as opposed to the becoming more advanced on the part of those
possessed of merit.
(इसन्द्रियभमावमात।म तमनवैव तसमाग्रहणमाच्च। न शबगणयोपलब्धिम

म न्निः।) तदपलसब्धिसरतरमतरद्रिव्यग म
णववैधिरमारत ।म रममाररमाशसमाधिरमारतश
स यन्निः।सवषयप्रत्यसभजमानमात।म समाध्यसमतमादहमतन्निःम ।
indriya-bhāvāt (3.1.71) tena eva tasya (The author would have used "tat" in
compound) agrahaṇāt ca (3.1.72) na śabda-guṇa-upalabdheḥ; That (abstract
perception) would not result from observation of the essential constituent of
sound (the ether), because there exists a sense organ for that (the ear), and
surely there is no personal apprehension by that means. (The practical-minded
Chapter Six 55
commenter doesn't get the abstraction of sound into ether, mentioned here by the
author. (3.1.73) tat-upalabdhiḥ it – observation itara-itara-dravya-guṇa-
vaidharmyāt (abl.) (As the opposite (sa vs. vi) of the following term in the
ablative without "ca", this ablative sense is "apart from", or "as opposed to".)
respective – tangible, physical thing – merit – inconsistency (3.2.1) karma-ākāśa-
sādharmyāt (abl. according to) the performance of proper actions – ether (This
refers obliquely to satata, the continuous sound 2.2.34.) – consistency with dharma
saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (3.2.2) viṣaya-pratyabhijñānāt (abl. by) sphere of objects
– recognition (3.2.3) sādhya-samatvāt (abl. from) premise – substitution ahetuḥ
no true grounds or basis for knowledge
6.5 The uncertainty is the observation of it according to our (thesis of)

consistency of both the karmas and the ether, as opposed to the inconsistency
of the (three dharmic) guṇas as the respective physical forms. No true grounds
for knowledge can come from any 'equivalent' of our premise (that the
highest dharma is by true comprehension), by recognizing only that sphere (of
physical forms).
The karmas are the repetitions of daily rituals, and the ether is the element
associated with hearing the continuous sound. The author clearly states in 2.2.30-
38 that these two realities are to be taken together.
न यगम पदग्रहणमात।म अप्रत्यसभजमान म च सवनमाशप्रसङ्गन्निः। क्रमववृसत्तितमादयगम पद्ग्रहणम।म अप्र-
त्यसभजमानञ सवषयमान्तरव्यमासङ्गमात।म
(3.2.4) na not the case yugapat_agrahaṇāt (abl. because) immediate – no
personal apprehension (3.2.5) apratyabhijñāne (loc. if) no recognition at all (The
referent is viṣaya 3.2.2) ca and vināśa-prasaṅgaḥ passing out of existence –
occupation with life (3.2.6) krama-vṛttitvāt (abl. because) stages – modes of
existence ayugapat not simultaneous grahaṇam personal apprehension (3.2.7)
apratyabhijñānam failure to recognize ca moreover viṣaya-antara-vyāsaṅgāt
(abl. due to) sphere – inner – ardent devotion to
6.6 (To the objection) that it is not the case, because there is no such
immediate personal apprehension, and if there were no recognition of those
(physical forms) at all, then we are occupied with passing out of existence;
that the personal apprehension is not immediate, because there are modes of
existence by stages (incarnations), and that the failure to recognize it is due to
our own ardent devotion to our 'inner' sphere, ...
म स्फटरम -
न गत्यभमावमात।म स्फसटरमान्यतमासभममानवत्तिदन्यतमासभममानन्निः। (न हमतभमावमात Vb)
ऽपपरमापरयोत्पत्तिमन्निः कमासणरतमाद्व्यकरीनमामहमतन्निःम ।
(3.2.8) na not so gati-abhāvāt (abl. because) transmigration – without
existence or substance, empty (3.2.9) sphaṭika-anyatva-abhimānavat (vati just
like) crystal – being something other – self-conception tat-anyatva-abhimānaḥ
that (referent = viṣaya-antara 3.2.7) the being something other – self-conception
(na hetu-abhāvāt Vb) (3.2.10) sphaṭake_api crystal – even though apara-apara-
utpatteḥ (abl. by) one following the other – birth, incarnation kṣāṇikatvāt (abl.
through) ephemerality vyaktīnām (gen. of) individuals ahetuḥ no grounds
6.7 (The reply is:) No, because that (notion of) transmigration
(reincarnation) is without substance. Any self-conception of being something
other than just that (inner sphere) is just like the self-conception of being
something other than the crystal. Even though one is the crystal (figuratively),
there can be no true grounds for knowledge through (the notion of) the
ephemerality of individuals by one birth following another.
म ) नयोत्पसत्तिसवनमाशररणयोपलब्धिमन्निः। करीरसवनमाशम रमार-

(सनयमहमतभमावमाद्यरमादशरनमभनजमा।
म
णमानपलब्धिवद्दध्य म
त्पसत्तिवच्च म
तदपपसत्तिन्निः। सलङ्गतयो ग्रहणमानमानपलसब्धिन्निः।
((3.2.11) niyama-hetu-abhāvāt yathā darśanam abhyanujñā; Because he
gives no reason for this rule, it is a matter of seeing whatever he permits.)
(3.2.12) na not utpatti-vināśa-karaṇa-upalabdheḥ (abl. according to) birth,
coming into existence – annihilation (intrans.), passing out of existence – cause(s)
– observation (3.2.13) kṣīra-vināśe (loc. when) milk – passing out of existence
kāraṇa-anupalabdhavat (vatup having) cause – not observed / dadhi-utpattivat
(vati like) curds – coming into existence ca and tat-upapattiḥ those – evidence
(3.2.14) liṅgataḥ (tasil: resulting from) indicator (body) grahaṇāt (abl. because)
personal apprehension na not anupalabdhiḥ without observation
6.8 (To the objection) that it is not so, according to the observation of causes
of coming into existence and passing out of existence; that when milk passes
out of existence (by curdling), this has a cause, which is (however) not
observed, and that the evidence of those (individuals) is like the coming into
existence of the curds, because personal apprehension results from (seeing)
one's (physical) indicator, which does not go without observation.
Chapter Six 57
म वमात।)म व्यतहमान्तरमाद्द्रव्यमान्तरयोत्पसत्तिदशरन स पतवद्रिर व्यसनववृत्ति-म

(न पयसन्निः पसरणमामगणमान्तरप्रमादभमार
म
रनममानम ।म क्वसचसद्विनमाशरमारणमानपलब्धिम
म म मान्तन्निः।
न्निः क्वसचच्चयोपलब्धिमरनर
((3.2.15) na payasaḥ pariṇāma-guṇa-antara-prādurbhāvāt; (He says) no,
because it is a matter of manifestation on the part of the inner guṇas in the
transformation of the milk. This seems to be interpolation, probably meant to
explain the terms vyūha-antara and dravya-antara. The commenter uses
terminology from YD 6.15: "abhibhava-prādurbhāvau nirodha-kṣaṇa-citta-
anvayaḥ nirodha-pariṇāmaḥ" He uses the YD word for transformation, rather
than this author's, and he even uses a different word for milk.) (3.2.16) vyūha-
antarāt (abl. according to) arrangement – inner dravya-antara-utpatti-
darśanam the physical (reality) – inner – coming into existence – seeing // pūrva-
dravya-nivṛtteḥ (gen. of) existing previously – physical (reality) – cessation
anumānam inference (3.2.17) (see the similar 2.1.19-20) kvacit in one case
vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. since) passing out of existence – cause – non-
observance kvacit in the other case ca and upalabdheḥ (abl. since) observation
anekāntaḥ not just the one way exclusively
6.9 (The reply is:) According to the inner arrangement, one sees the coming
into existence of what is inner to its (milk's) physical reality, (but) of the
cessation of a physical reality previous (to its curdling) there is only inference
(see śeṣavat 1.1.5), since in that case there is no observation of a cause of (the
previous thing) passing out of existence. Moreover, since in the other case (the
coming into existence) there is observation, it cannot be just the one way.
न मसन्द्रियमार रययोससद्विनमाशमऽसप जमानमावसमानमात।म यगम पजमयमानपलब्धिम

म श्च न मनसन्निः। तदमात्मग-म
म म।म
णतमऽसप तल
(3.2.18) na not indriya-arthayoḥ (gen. dual; of) sense – object tat-vināśe (loc.
where; The usual "even though" w/api doesn't work here.) that – passing out of
existence api (emphatic) surely must jñāna-avasthānāt (abl. known by)
comprehension – life condition (3.2.19) yugapat in the immediate present jñeya-
anupalabdheḥ (abl. known by) to be comprehended – failure to observe ca_na
and not manasaḥ (gen. on the part of, by) the mind's (3.2.20) tat-ātma-guṇatve
(loc. where) that – essence – guṇa-state api surely must tulyam (ind.) equally,
w/cana, not any more than
6.10 That (inner arrangement) is not known (exclusively) by a life of

comprehension of (only) the sense and its physical object where that (object)
surely must pass out of existence, any more than it is known (exclusively) in
the immediate present by non-observation of that (physical object) which
would be comprehended by the mind where it surely must be (only) the guṇa-
state as the essence of that (object).
म
इसन्द्रियवैमनर सन्निः सससनरषमारभमावमात्तिदनत्पसत्तिन्निः । नयोत्पसत्तिरमारणमानपदमशमात।म सवनमाशरमारणमानप-
म
लब्धिमश्चमावसमान म
(3.2.21) indriyaiḥ (inst. with) senses manasaḥ (gen. of) mind saṁnikarṣa-
abhāvāt (abl. ind.) drawing in together – in the absence of tat-anutpattiḥ that –
no coming into existence (3.2.22) na cannot be utpatti-kāraṇa-anapadeśāt (ind.)
coming into existence – cause – without assigning (3.2.23a) vināśa-kāraṇa-
anupalabdheḥ (abl. ind.) passing out of existence – cause – without observing ca
moreover avasthāne (loc. in) life circumstance, situation
6.11 There is no coming into existence of that (object) in the absence of the
drawing-in-together of mind with the senses (not just object and senses 3.2.18),
which (mind) cannot be without assigning a cause of its coming into existence,
and this is without observing a cause of its passing out of existence in real life.
रम न्तरमासद्विनमाशन्निः शबवत।म जमानसमवमतमात्मप्रदमश-

म बम द
तसनत्यतप्रसङ्गन्निः। असनत्यतग्रहमादद
सससनरषमारन्मनसन्निः
(2.3.23b) tat thus nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ as a constancy – occupation with life //
(3.2.24) anityatva-grahāt (abl. by) inconstancy – grasping buddheḥ (abl. than)
understanding buddhi-antarāt (abl. known by) understanding – other vināśaḥ
passing out of existence śabdavat possessed of the sound (3.2.25) jñāna-
samaveta – ātma-pradeśa – saṁnikarṣāt (abl. known by) one who has come to
true comprehension – self-realm – drawing-in-together manasaḥ (gen. for) mind
6.12 Thus, it (ours) is an occupation with life as a constancy. Our passing

out of existence, (while still) possessed of the (continuous) sound, is known by
an understanding that is something other than any understanding that comes
about by grasping the idea of inconstancy (of objects). This is the case for a
mind that is known by the drawing-in-together within the realm of the
individual self of one who has come to true comprehension.
Chapter Six 59
म न र यगम पदत्पसत्तिन्निः। नमान्तन्निःशररीरववृसत्तितमान्मनसन्निः। समाध्यतमादहमतन्निःम । स्मिरतन्निः

स्मिवृत्यत्पत्तिम
शररीरधिमारणयोपपत्तिमरप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(3.2.25 cont.) smṛti-utpatteḥ (abl. according to) law – coming into existence
na not the case yugapat immediate utpattiḥ coming into existence (3.2.26) na not
the case antaḥ-śarīra – vṛttitvāt (abl. known by) inner – body – mode of
existence manasaḥ (gen. for) mind (3.2.27) sādhyatvāt (abl. from) (meant) to be
demonstrated (cf. 2.1.33) – the existence of ahetuḥ not basis of knowledge
(3.2.28) smarataḥ (tasil; resulting from) fondness, physical intimacy (This is a
euphemism for sex and a play on other √smṛ words nearby.) śarīra-dhāraṇa-
upapatteḥ (abl. by) body – holding, maintaining – evidence apratiṣedhaḥ no
denying
6.13 According to the smṛti's (teaching of) 'coming into existence', our
immediate coming into existence is not the case. It is not the case for a mind
known (only) by its mode of existence as the inner aspect of a (preexisting)
body, (but) that is without our grounds for knowledge, because it would have
to be demonstrated. There is no denying (our premise) just by their evidence
of that (mind) being contained by a body that results from 'physical intimacy'.
म
न तदमाशगसततमान्मनसन्निः । न स्मिरणरमालमासनयममात।म आत्मप्रमरणयदृचमाजतमासभश्च न
ससययोगसवशमषन्निः।
(3.2.29) na not the case tat-āśu-gati-tvāt (abl. known by) quickly – moving –
tendency of manasaḥ (gen. for) mind (3.2.30) na cannot be smaraṇa-kāla-
aniyamāt (abl. ind. w/na + privative alpha) remembering (the smṛti MW) – time –
without fixing (3.2.31) ātma-preraṇa -yadṛcchā -jñatābhiḥ (f. inst. pl. with)
individual self – deliberate action – spontaneous nature – (jñatā) "wise and
learned" MW ca_na nor saṁyoga-viśeṣaḥ conjunction – special
6.14 It is not the case for a mind that is known by its tendency of quick
movement in that (recitation of smṛti, literally, "remembering")—which itself
cannot be without fixing the actual time of remembering (the present). Nor is
its special conjunction with that individual's deliberate (proper) action, his
spontaneous (pure) nature, and his being wise and learned, the case.
म सममानम।म प्रसणधिमानसलङ्गमासदजमानमानमामयगम प-
व्यमासकमनसन्निः पमादव्यरन मन ससययोगसवशमषण
दमावमात म
(3.2.32) vyāsakta-manasaḥ (gen. for) preoccupied – mind pāda-vyathanena
(inst. with) feet – hurting saṁyoga-viśeṣeṇa (inst. with) conjunction – special
samānam same (3.2.33) praṇidhāna-liṅga-ādi-jñānānām (gen. pl. for) attention
– indicator – beginning with (not "etc." here) – those whose comprehension
ayugapat not immediate bhāvāt (abl. according to) view
6.15 For a mind thus preoccupied (3.2.31), it is the same with foot pain (for
example) as it is with that special conjunction. For those whose
comprehension begins with the indicator of that attention (the foot), according
to that view, that (conjunction) is not immediate.
अयगम पत्स्मरणम।म जसमचमाद्विमषसनसमत्तितमादमारमसनववृतयोन्निः। तसल्लिङ्गतमासदचमाद्विमषययोन्निः
पसरवर माद्यमष्वप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(3.2.33 cont.) ayugapat not immediate smaraṇam the act of remembering
(3.2.34) jñasya (gen.) the comprehender's icchā-dveṣa-nimittatvāt (abl. caused
by) desire – aversion – its being instrumental cause ārambha-nivṛttyoḥ (gen. of)
beginning – cessation (3.2.35) tat-liṅgatvāt (abl. by) his – the being an indication
icchā-dveṣayoḥ (gen. dual on the part of) desire – aversion parthiva-ādyeṣu (loc.
pl. within) consisting of organic substance etc. apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
6.16 The memory of the comprehender's origination and cessation, being

caused by his (previous) desire and aversion, cannot be immediate either.
There is no denying (our premise) by (asserting) the desire and aversion being
his indicator, (residing) within that which consists of organic substance and
the others (his body).
परशमासदष्वमारमसनववृसत्तिदशरनमात।म (रमममासदष्वनपलब्धिम
म रहमतन्निःम । Vb) सनयममासनयमलौ त म
म मात म
तसद्वि-शमषरलौ यरयोकहमतत
(3.2.36) paraśu-ādiṣu (loc. in) axes and the like ārambha-nivṛtti-darśanāt
(abl. known from) origination – cessation – seeing / kumbha-ādiṣu (loc. in)
pitchers and the like anupalabdheḥ (abl. since) no observation ahetuḥ no grounds
for knowledge (3.2.37) niyama-aniyamau rule – lack of rule tu however tat-
Chapter Six 61
viśeṣakau on that (point) – petty distinctions (a kan kamārtha taddhita form;

"only resembling a valid distinction") (3.2.38) yathā-ukta-hetu-tvāt (abl. for) has
been declared – motivation (a different use for hetu) – being a matter of
6.17 From seeing origination (impulse) and cessation (letting go) in

(wielding) axes and such (like pestles and arrows; see the Vaisheshika Chapter
Five on karma), we know that (body as indicator) is no grounds for knowledge,
since there is no observation of it in pitchers and the like. That rule (of
karma) and the lack of it, however, are petty distinctions on the point, that
being a matter of the motivation (toward proper behavior) supplied by that
(law) which has been declared.
पमारतनमादरवृतमाभमागममाच्च न मनसन्निः। पसरशमषमाद्यरयोकहमतपत पत्तिमश्च। स्मिरणस तमात्मनयो
जस्वमाभमाव्यमात।म
pāratantryāt (abl. according to) (See paratantra 1.1.29.) being a theory for
others akṛta-abhyāgamāt (abl. known by) (recalls "aparīkṣita-abhyupagamāt"
1.1.31) who has not done – accepting ca_na nor is it the case manasaḥ (gen. for)
mind (3.2.39) pariśeṣāt (abl. ind.) left over yathā-ukta-hetu-upapatteḥ (abl.
from) has been declared – motive – evidence ca even (3.2.40) smaraṇam the act
of remembering tu but ātmanaḥ (gen. belonging to) individual self jña-
svābhāvyāt (abl. emerging from) comprehender – state of self-existence
6.18 Nor is it the case for a mind known by that which we accept without
having done (the examination), according to our 'theory for others' (see
1.1.29); but even our act of remembering that (before-state), left over from
our evidence of the motive supplied by 'that which has been declared' (law,
smṛti), belongs to our individual self emerging from the state of self-existence
of the comprehender.
(प्रसणधिमानसनबन्धमाभमाससलङ्गलकणसमादृशयपसरग्रहमाशयमासशतसम्बन्धमानन्तयसर वययोगवैररमायर-
म खच
सवरयोधिमासतशयप्रमासपव्यवधिमानसखदन्निः र सक्रयमारमागधिममारधिमरसनसमत्तिमभन्निः।
म माद्विमषभमायमासरत
म
रममारनवसमासयग्रहणमात।अव्यकग्रहणम म तम्पमातमरूपमाव्यकग्रहण-
अनवसमासयतमात सवद्यम
वत।)म
((3.2.41) praṇidhāna -nibandha -abhyāsa -liṅga -lakṣaṇa -sādṛśya

-parigraha -aśraya -aśrita -sambandha -ānantarya -viyoga -ekakārya -virodha
-atiśaya -prāpti -vyavadhāna -sukha -duḥkha -icchā -dveṣa -bhāya -arthitva
-kriyā -rāga -dharma -adharma -nimittebhyaḥ (3.2.42) karma-anavasthāyi-
grahaṇāt (3.2.43) avyakta-grahaṇam / an-avasthāyitvāt vidyut-sampāte rūpa-
avyakta-grahaṇavat; The causes (of karmic 'memories') are: (as stated in
3.2.41). The idea of being unmanifest arises from the personal apprehension of
being without any karmic circumstance, like the personal apprehension of the
unmanifest (leftover) visual image after lightning strikes, without the condition
of having the actual circumstance (of lightning).
This interpolation, between chapters, and identifiable by the long compound,

seems to be inspired by the mention of memory (smaraṇa) and soul (ātman). The
commenter attempts to explain how residual karma exists as 'memories' while the
soul is unmanifest between incarnations. But he misunderstands the author's thesis,
as religious commentators to the Darshanas are apt to do, so instead of any sign of
comprehension, we see just another list of words to be memorized and recited by
the students of his school. The lightning example is nice though.
Chapter Seven
हमतपत मादमानमात्प्रसतषमधिव्यमाभनजमा। म
म प्रदरीपमासच रन्निःसतस त्यसभव्यकग्रहणवत्तिद्ग्रहणम।द्रिव्यम म
स्वगण-
म
परगणयोपलब्धिम
न्निः ससशयन्निः।
(3.2.44) hetu-upādānāt (abl. since) grounds – accepting unto oneself
pratiṣedha-vyābhyanujñā denial – comprehensive admittance (3.2.45) pradīpa-
arciḥ illumination, exposition – light saṁtati-abhivyakta-grahaṇavat (vati like)
continuity – become manifest – self-perception tat-grahaṇam in it – personal
apprehension (3.2.46) dravye (loc. when it comes to) physical svaguṇa-paraguṇa
-(gen.)- upalabdheḥ (gen. of, about) one's own essential constituents – another's
essential constituents -(gen. of)- observation saṁśayaḥ uncertainty
7.1 (Therefore,) since one must accept any grounds for knowledge unto
oneself, there should be comprehensive admittance of the denials (as well).
(So) there is the light of our exposition, in which personal apprehension is like
perceiving oneself as the continuity (of sound) become manifest, (but) there is
(also) the uncertainty about the observation of one's own essential
constituents vs. those of another, when it comes to the physical (world).
Chapter Seven 63
The term "accepting unto oneself" (upādāna cf. SD) means that, for a person
who comprehends that truth, any idea he entertains or understands must be owned,
even if rejected. He is certainly not advising that we hold to the truth of some
assertion and to the truth of its logical opposite in the same universe of discourse.
यमावचररीरभमासवतमाद्रितपमादरीनमाम।म न पमारजगणमान्तरयोत्पत्तिम
म न्निः। प्रसतद्विससद्विससदमन्निः पमारजमानमाम-
प्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(3.2.47) yāvat to whatever extent śarīra-bhāvitvāt (abl. stemming from) body
– inevitability rūpādīnām (gen. of ref.=upalabdhi 3.2.46) form and the others
(3.2.48) na not the case pākaja-guṇa-antara-utpatteḥ (gen. of; ref.=upalabdhi
3.2.46) born of development – essential constituents – inner – coming into
existence (3.2.49) pratidvaṁdvi-siddheḥ (abl. by) opposition – affirmation
pākajānām (gen. of) born of development apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
7.2 To whatever extent that (observation) of visual form and the other
(essential constituents) stems from the inevitability of a (pre-existing) body,
that (observation) of the coming into existence through inner essential
constituents on the part of one born out of their development, is not the case,
(but) there is no denying (our premise) just by our opposition's affirmation of
being born out of (karmic) development.
(शररीरव्यमासपतमात।म न रम शनखमासदष्वनपलब्धिम
म न्निः। तक्पयरन्ततमाचररीरस ) रम शनखमासद-
म धिरमारत।म न रूपमादरीनमासमतरमतरववैधिरमारत ।म ऐसन्द्रियरतमाद्रितपमादरीनमा-

ष्वप्रसङ्गन्निः। शररीरगणववै
मप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
[(3.2.50) śarīra-vyāpitvāt (3.2.51) na keśa-nakhādiṣu anupalabdheḥ (3.2.52)
tvac-paryantatvāt śarīrasya; This (following material) is according to his theory
of pervasion of those (guṇas) in the body, but they are not known from the
body's being encompassed by feel, because there would be no observation (of
guṇas) in hair and nails and so on. "Hair and nails" stands out, so he comments
on it.] keśa-nakhādiṣu (loc. in) hair – nails – etc. aprasaṅgaḥ no occupation with
(life) (3.2.53) śarīra-guṇa-vaidharmyāt (abl. because) body – essential
constituents – inconsistency (3.2.54) na not rūpādīnām (gen. of) visual form and
the others itaretara-vaidharmyāt (abl. because) one vs. another – inconsistency
(3.2.55) aindriyakatvāt (abl. by) being related to the senses rūpādīnām (gen. of)
visual form etc. apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
7.3 There is no occupation (with life) in the hair and nails and so on,
because of the inconsistency of that with our (thesis of) essential constituents
of the body. It is not (however) because of a lack of consistency with the visual
form etc. of one (person's body) vs. another's, (so) there is no denying (our
premise) just by that form and the others' being related to the physical senses.
Obviously, the body is not made of air, fire, water, and earth, in the sense that
one could examine it under magnification and find tiny bits of those things held
together somehow. Notwithstanding the reality of the body that we all know as
made of molecules, the authors of the Darshanas describe another equally true
reality where the body is not just an object that is experienced and then explained,
but the very experience itself. The experience is the thing that can be realized as
the essential constituents, first of feel, and developing out of that, visual form,
taste, and smell, corresponding respectively to the four elements mentioned. Those
four essential constituents are pervaded by a constant ethereal spatial substance
(ākāśa), which manifests as the subtlest comprehension of sound. Interestingly, the
author's choice of hair and nails to illustrate this point has the additional charm
that those are most obvious parts of the body in which there is no sensation of feel.
जमानमायलौगपद्यमादमरस मनन्निः। न यगम पदनर

म सक्रययोपलब्धिमन्निः। अलमातचक्रदशरनवत्तिदपलसब्धिरमाश-म
ससचमारमात।म यरयोकहमतत
म माच्चमाण।म
(3.2.56) jñāna-ayaugapadyāt (abl. for) true comprehension – not having
immediacy (The author's yugapat in compound doesn't require the determinative
complement to be "simultaneous with something".) ekam alone solitary, on its own
manaḥ mind (3.2.57) na not yugapat immediate / aneka-kriya-upalabdheḥ (abl.
for) many – activities – observation (3.2..58) alāta-cakra-darśanavat (vati like)
firebrand ("unsconced" torch?) – circle – seeing tat-upalabdhiḥ it – observation //
āśu-saṁcārāt (abl. ind.) quickly – moving (3.2.59) yathā-ukta-hetutvāt (abl.
ind.) that which has been declared (not "as stated above") – with the motivation of
ca and aṇu finely divided
7.4 (In fact,) not having the immediacy of true comprehension, that 'mind'
(the "aindriyaka") on its own (without comprehension) is not immediate, for
one does observe its manifold activity. Observation of it is like seeing a
(whole) circle made by (swinging) a burning stick. Moving quickly and with
the motivation of that (law, smṛti) which has been declared, that (karma
which is the object of this metaphor) is finely divided.
Chapter Seven 65
He gives an example of the relationship of a sense impression as one of a series

progressing through time, and the impression as it exists in the present. With the
swinging firebrand, what is seen as a whole orange circle in the dark is considered
to be an innumerable series of positions of the burning tip, in time and space, as
parts of the whole. (Of course, the physiological explanation of this phenomenon,
as interesting as it may be, is not really the point here.)
म
र वृतफलमानबन्धमात्तिदत्पसत्तिन्निः
पतवर मर
म यो मतत्यपमादमानवत्तिदपमादमानम
। भततभ ।म न समाध्यसमतमात।म
नयोत्पसत्तिसनसमत्तितमान्ममातमासपत्रियोन्निः
(3.2.60) pūrva-kṛta – phala-anubandhāt (abl. known by) previous action –
consequence – incidental attachment tat-utpattiḥ those – coming into existence
(3.2.61) bhūtebhyaḥ (abl. from) gross elements mūrti-upādānavat (vati like)
physical form – accepting unto oneself tat-upādānam it – accepting unto oneself
(3.2.62) na not sādhya-samatvāt (abl. by) premise – its being an equivalent
(3.2.63) na not utpatti-nimittatvāt coming into existence – being the instrumental
cause mātā-pitroḥ (loc. having to do with) mother – father
7.5 The coming into existence of that (mind) is known by its incidental
attachment as the maturation of the previously created (individual self,
"ātman" 3.2.40). Accepting that unto oneself is like accepting one's own
physical form, (made) from the gross elements, unto oneself; (but) not by its
being an equivalent for our premise (that the highest dharma is by true
comprehension), (that is,) not because of that (pūrva-kṛta) being the
instrumental cause of the coming into existence (bodily incarnation) that has
to do with a mother and father.
This could just as easily be read as a declaration of karma and re-incarnation. I

think, however, that the author meant to use these same words to express his own
quite different thesis, perhaps even with the dual meaning in mind. The language is
clear and precise for the task: Phala "fruit" from √phal meaning to "burst open", as
a ripened pod, is the perfect description of the development of the subtle senses
"rūpādi" (=tanmātrāni) through the mind, out of the individual self "ātman"
(=ahaṁkāra SD, =ahaṁnāman BU), which is made (not "done") previously
"pūrva-kṛta" in the series, out of the constant self (jña-svābhāvya in 3.2.40,
=Brahman in BS, =Mahat in VD, SD). All of this is consistent with the series as
outlined in both the Vaisheshika and Sankhya Darshanas.
म
तरमाहमारस। प्रमापलौ चमासनयममात।शररीरयोत्पसत्तिसनसमत्तिवत म ययोगयोत्पसत्तिसनसमत्तिस रमर। एतम-
(सस
म ।) तददृषरमासरतसमसत चमत्पनसत्प्रसङ्गयोऽपवगर
नमासनयमन्निः प्रत्यकन्निः म । (न ररणमाररणययोगमा-
रमदशरनमात।म Vb)
(3.2.64) tathā the same way āhārasya (gen. of) livelihood (not "food" here)
(3.2.65) prāptau (loc. with) acquisition ca in addition to that aniyamāt (abl. ind.)
without the rule (3.2.66) śarīra-utpatti-nimittavat (vati like it is with) body –
coming into existence – instrumental cause // (saṁyoga-utpatti-nimittam karma
(3.2.67) etena aniyamaḥ pratyuktaḥ; One's karma is the instrumental cause of
the manifestation of one's connection (with body and livelihood). Thereby his
lawless (doctrine) is refuted. (3.2.68) tat-adṛṣṭa-kāritam those – unseen – caused
iti_cet to the objection that: punar again, repeatedly tat-prasaṅgaḥ him –
occupation with life apavarge (loc. until) final release (an opponent's definition) /
na no karaṇa-akaraṇa-yoga-ārambha-darśanāt (abl. because) making – not
making – union – origination – seeing
7.6 In addition to that (body), it is the same way with the acquisition of
one's livelihood (life-circumstance)—without our rule (of "coming into
existence")—as it is with the (rule of the) instrumental cause of the coming
into existence of one's body (from 3.1.63; i.e., not the case). To the objection
that those (body and livelihood) are caused by an unseen force, and our
occupation (with life) is repeated until final release; the reply is: no, for we see
its origination as a union (yoga) of creator and non-creator.
म दन्निः। सनत्यतप्रसङ्गश्च प्रमायणमानपपत्तिम

मनन्निःरमरसनसमत्तितमाच्च ससययोगमानचम म न्निः। अण म (शयमाम-
म नमारवृतमाभमागमप्रसङ्गमात।म प्रववृसत्तियररयोकमा। तरमा दयोषमान्निः।

तमासनत्यतवदमततमात।)
(3.2.69) manas-karma-nimitta-tvāt (abl. because) mind – activity –
instrumental cause – the fact that ca moreover saṁyoga-anucchedaḥ conjunction
(cf. saṁyoga 3.2.31-32) – not cut off (3.2.70) nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ constancy –
occupation ca and so prāyaṇa-anupapatteḥ (abl. since) going away – no
evidence ((3.2.71) aṇu śyāmatā-nityatvavat etat syāt; Perhaps that (constancy) is
atomic, like the constancy of the blackness (of space.) (3.2.72) na not akṛta-
abhyāgama-prasaṅgāt (abl. known from) by one who has not done (the
examination) – accepted – occupation (4.1.1) pravṛttiḥ true account yathā-uktā
already stated (4.1.2) tathā likewise doṣāḥ faulty or false ones
Chapter Seven 67
7.7 Moreover, because of the fact that the (body and livelihoods')
instrumental cause is the activity of one's mind, its (the mind's) conjunction
(with objects see saṁyoga 3.2.31-32) is never cut off and so we know that
occupation as a constancy, since there is no evidence that it ever goes away.
This (constancy) is not the one that is known from the kind of occupation that
is accepted by one who hasn't done (the examination). This (3.2.69) is the
(true) account we have already declared (in 1.1.17), and likewise (shall we
speak of) the false ones, as follows:
The overall cause (kāraṇa) is the "supreme being" level of consciousness

(4.1.19), whereas the subordinate "instrumental cause" (nimitta) is the mind. This
is consistent with the outline presented in chapter three of the Sankhya. Here the
author says that one's experience of some kind of body and some kind of life never
goes away.
तत्त्रिवैरमाशयस रमागद्विमषमयोहमारमारन्तरभमावमात।म नवैरप्रत्यनरीरभमावमात।म व्यसभचमारमादहमतन्निःम । तमषमास
मयोहन्निः पमापरीयमानमामतढसमतरयोत्पत्तिमन्निः।
(4.1.3) tat (ind.) as follows (The translation of this is appended to the previous
sentence. See also 5.1.2.) trairāśyam a group of three rāga-dveṣa-moha-artha-
antara-bhāvāt (abl. known by) passion – aversion (=vairagya) – mindlessness –
meanings – alternate – view (4.1.4) na it doesn't mean eka-pratyanīka-bhāvāt
(abl. from) singular, pre-eminent, excellent (MW) – adversaries – view (4.1.5)
vyabhicārāt (abl. just because) deviation ahetuḥ lack of grounds for knowledge
(4.1.6) teṣām (gen. of) those mohaḥ mindlessness pāpīyāt (abl. for) worst // na
not amūḍhasya (gen. of) non-mindless itara-utpatteḥ (abl. known by) as a
counter – creation of, creating a
7.8 There is a (certain) group of three things known by a view of alternate

meanings of passion, aversion (to passion), and mindlessness (representing
rajas, sattva, and tamas). Just because this is a deviation from the view of our
most excellent adversaries (the 'sattvic' priest/scholar class), that doesn't mean
we lack grounds for knowledge. Of those (three), that (lack of grounds) is
rather the mindlessness itself, for it is the worst, (but) this (mindlessness) is
not known by creating the non-mindless (scholar class) as a counter to it.
सनसमत्तिनवैसमसत्तिरभमावमादरमारन्तरभमावयो दयोषमभन्निः। न दयोषलकणमावरयोधिमान्मयोहस। सनसमत्तिनवै-
म जमातरीयमानमामप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
समसत्तिरयोपपत्तिमश्च तल
(4.1.7) nimitta-naimittika-bhāvāt (abl. coming from) instrumental cause and
effect relation artha-antara -(gen.)- bhāvaḥ meaning – alternate – view (The
connection with bhāva is always gen. but translated as "with".) doṣebhyaḥ (abl.
w/antara apart from) false ones (4.1.8) na not doṣa-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt (abl. just
because) the false (accounts) – those characterized by – separating from mohasya
(gen. of) mindlessness (ref.=bhāva 4.1.7) (4.1.9) nimitta-naimittika-upapatteḥ
(abl. just by) instrumental cause – effect – evidence ca and again tulya-jātīyānām
(gen. belonging to, held by) equals, peers – those of some class apratiṣedhaḥ no
denying
7.9 From our instrumental cause and effect relation (of 3.2.69) comes our
view of those alternate meanings, apart from the false (accounts). Ours is not
one (a view) of mindlessness, just because we separate ourselves from those
(scholars) who are characterized by the false (accounts), and so there is no
denying (our premise) just by the evidence of the instrumental cause and
effect (karma) held by those who are of that class of our (highborn) peers.
आत्मसनत्यतम प्रमत्यभमावसससदन्निः। व्यकमाद्व्यकमानमास प्रत्यकप्रमाममाणयमात।म न घटमाद्घटमासनष्पत्तिमन्निः।
व्यकमाद्घटसनष्पत्तिमरप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(4.1.10) ātma-nityatve (loc. as) individual soul – constancy, perpetuity
pretyabhāva-siddhiḥ state of existence having passed on – affirmation (4.1.11)
vyaktāt (abl. from) manifestation vyaktānām (gen. of) manifestations pratyakṣa-
prāmāṇyāt (abl. because) perception – validity (4.1.12) na not the case ghaṭāt
(abl. following from) pot, vessel (metaphor for body) ghaṭa – aniṣpatteḥ (abl. for)
vessel – (caus. sense) no fashioning (4.1.13) vyaktāt (abl. by) manifestation
ghaṭa-niṣpatteḥ (gen. of) vessel – fashioning apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
7.10 There is their affirmation that there is a 'state of existence having

passed on' (1.1.9, 19) as a (kind of) perpetuity of the soul, because from its
manifestation they validate their perception of (past) manifestations; but this
is not the case, for there is no such fashioning of a (soul's) vessel following
from a (previous) vessel. There is no denying (our premise) just by their
manifestation by fashioning a vessel.
Chapter Seven 69
म द्य (प्रमादभमारवमात।म व्यमाघमातमादप्रययोगन्निः।) नमातरीतमानमागतययोन्निः रमार-

अभमावमादमावयोत्पसत्तिनमारनपमवृ
रशबप्रययोगमात।म न सवनषमभयोऽसनष्पत्तिमन्निः। क्रमसनदरशमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।

(4.1.14) abhāvāt (abl. arising out of) state of non-presence bhāva-utpattiḥ
view – arising / na not such that anupamṛdya (fut. pass. part.) never to be
crushed, depressed (destroyed) (prādur-bhāvāt (see interpolation 3.2.15) (4.1.15)
vyāghātāt aprayogaḥ; That (anupamṛdya) does not apply, being absurd because
it is a manifestation (and therefore destructible). (4.1.16) na not atīta-
anāgatayoḥ (loc. dual; in the sense of) past – future kāraka-śabda -prayogāt
(abl. understood by) action words – applying (4.1.17) na not vinaṣṭebhyaḥ (abl.
pl. out of) things destroyed aniṣpatteḥ (abl. because) no fashioning (4.1.18)
krama-nirdeśāt (abl. by) series – dictating apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
7.11 Our view (4.1.7) does arise out of a state where it is not present, but
not such that it could never again be depressed (by tamas)—which is not to be
understood by applying those action words (utpatti and upamṛdya) in the sense
of past and future. This is not because there is no fashioning something anew
out of (the atoms of) things that have previously been destroyed. There is no
denying (our premise) just by their dictating a series (of incarnations).
म
ईशरन्निः रमारणस परुषरममार म परुषरममार
फलदशरनमात।न म भमावम फलमासनष्पत्तिमन्निः। ततमासरततमाद-
हमतन्निःम । असनसमत्तितयो भमावयोत्पसत्तिन्निः

(4.1.19) īśvaraḥ supreme governor, (not "God") kāraṇam cause puruṣa-
karma-aphalya-(gen.)-darśanāt (abl. according to) personal karma – (fut.p.p.
>caus.√phal) not to be brought to fruition – understanding (4.1.20) na not puruṣa-
karma - abhāve (loc.) personal karma – without phala-aniṣpatteḥ (gen. of
ref.=darśana 4.1.19) fruit – no fashioning (4.1.21) tat-kāritatvāt (abl. for) by that
– would be caused ahetuḥ without grounds for knowledge (4.1.22) animittataḥ
(ind.) without instrumental cause bhāva-utpattiḥ a being – coming into existence
7.12 The supreme being (Īśvara) is our cause. This is according to our
understanding of 'not brought to fruition by personal karma', not that
(understanding) of 'no fashioning of fruit without personal karma'. That is
without our grounds for knowledge, for then one would be caused by that
(karma, and not Īśvara). The coming into existence of a (human) being
happens without that instrumental cause (karma 4.1.9).
रणटरतवैकमासददशरनमात।म असनसमत्तिसनसमत्तितमानत नमासनसमत्तितन्निः

म । सनसमत्तिमासनसमत्तिययोररमार-
न्तरभमावमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(4.1.22 cont.) kaṇṭaka-taikṣṇya-ādi-darśanāt (abl. according to) thorns –
sharpness – etc. – understanding (4.1.23) animitta-nimitta-tvāt (abl. just because)
without cause – cause – being na not animittataḥ (ind.) no instrumental cause
(4.1.24) nimitta-animittayoḥ (gen. dual; of) cause – no cause artha-antara-
bhāvāt (abl. by) meaning – other – view apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (Again we see
the confounded repetition, this time of the word "nimitta".)
7.13 According to our understanding of the sharpness of thorns and the

like, it is not a matter of no instrumental cause (of the pain), just because of
the instrumental cause (of pain, the thorn) being without that instrumental
cause (karma). There is no denying (our premise) just by the view of that
other meaning of both instrumental cause (karma) and then no such
instrumental cause (liberation).
म सत्तिसवनमाशधिमररतमात।म नमासनत्यतमासनत्यतमात।म तदसनत्यतमगमदमारहम सव-

सवरमसनत्यमत्प म
म
नमाशयमानसवनमाशवत ।म सनत्यसमाप्रत्यमाखमानम म
(4.1.25) sarvam everyone anityam inconstant utpatti-vināśa-dharmakatvāt
(abl. because) coming into existence – passing out of existence, extinction – its
being the nature (4.1.26) na not the case anityatā-nityatvāt (abl. because)
inconstancy – constancy (4.1.27) tat-anityatvam his – inconstancy agneḥ (gen.
of) fire "Agni's" dāhyam "burning-ness", tendency to burn / vināśya-
anuvināśavat (vati like) to be extinguished – after extinction (as little flames on a
bed of burning coals will intermittently go out and re-ignite.) (4.1.28) nityasya
(gen. of) (in the gen.) the constant one apratyākhyānam no refutation
7.14 That the 'everyone' is inconstant, because of its being their nature to
come into existence and then to pass out of existence, is not the case either,
because of the very constancy of their inconstancy. Like that which remains to
be extinguished (embers) even after extinguishing him, Agni's (constant)
tendency to burn is (ironically) his inconstancy (as he consumes his own fuel),
but there is no such refutation of the constant one (Īśvara).
Chapter Seven 71
यरयोपलसब्धिव्यवसमानमात।म सवर सनत्यम्पञभततसनत्यतमात।म नयोत्पसत्तिसवनमाशरमारणयोपलब्धिमन्निः।
तल्लिकणमावरयोधिमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः। (नयोत्पसत्तिततमारणयोपलब्धिमन्निः।)
(4.1.28 cont.) yathā whatever (ref.=pratyākhyāna) upalabdhi-vyavasthānāt
(abl. inferred or admitted by) observation – persevering (4.1.29) sarvam all
nityam constant pañca-bhūta-nityatvāt (abl. because, "the reason is that") five –
gross elements – constancy (4.1.30) na not valid utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇa-
upalabdheḥ (abl. for) coming into existence – passing out of existence – cause
(recalls īśvaraḥ kāraṇam in 4.1.19) – observing (4.1.31) tat-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt
(abl. by) their – personal qualities – disallowing apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (4.1.32)
(na utpatti-tat-kāraṇa-upalabdheḥ) (This is a repetition of 4.1.30. Tat would
represent vināśa, but its position in the compound is odd.)
7.15 Whatever (refutation) there might be that by our perseverance in that

observation that the 'everyone' is constant, we admit to constancy of the five
gross elements; that (refutation) is not valid, for we observe our cause (īśvara
4.1.19) of their coming into existence and passing out of existence, (so) it is not
a denial (of our own premise) by disallowing personal qualities on their part.
The idea is that the constancy of one's own awareness, as the awareness of the
supreme governor, pervades all notions of creation and destruction, including birth
and death. He allows that physical objects, said to consist of gross elements, come
and go, but the awareness that gives rise to them through the sensory powers is
constant. According to this observation, it is not the actual physical flame, but
one's awareness of "burning" that is the real nature of fire and thus its cause.
Again it may be emphasized that this is philosophy and not science. Everyone
knows the scientific explanation of combustion, but a devoted reader of material
like this must surely be one who wishes to delve into a deeper examination of the
essential truth of what it really means to say there is such a thing as knowledge or
a knower of it. Indeed, any paradigm like that of pure scientific reasoning that
dismisses the value of such an examination out of hand wouldn't even count as
philosophical knowledge. Nor should it be expected to, for this examination is
outside the scope of scientific investigation.
न व्यवसमानयोपपत्तिमन्निः।सवर पवृरगमावलकण पवृरकमात।म नमानमरलकणवैरर

म भमावसनष्पत्तिमन्निः। लक-
णव्यवसमानमादमवमाप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(4.1.33) na not vyavasthāna-upapatteḥ (abl. known by) perseverance –
evidence (4.1.34) sarvam everyone pṛthak-bhāva-lakṣaṇa-pṛthaktvāt (abl.
known from) distinct individual – view – qualities – individuality (4.1.35) na not
aneka-lakṣaṇaiḥ (inst. pl. assessed by means of) several – qualities eka-bhāva-
niṣpatteḥ (abl. for) one – view – fashioning (4.1.36) lakṣaṇa-vyavasthānāt (abl.
by) qualities – persevering eva only apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
7.16 The 'everyone' known from the individuality of human qualities

(found) in the view of (many) distinct individuals is not known by the
evidence of our perseverance. That (individuality) is not assessed by means of
its several qualities, for it is a matter of the 'fashioning' (4.1.13) found in our
view of the one (being). There is no denying (our premise) just by persevering
only in the (division of human) qualities.
सवरमभमावयो भमावमसष्वतरमतरमाभमावससदमन्निः। न स्वभमावससदमभमारवमानमाम।म न स्वभमावससदमरमापमसकर-
तमात।म व्यमाहततमादयक
म म।म
(4.1.37) sarvam the everyone (Some of these terms read best as labels for the
concepts being discussed, so I have used single quotes to emphasize that sense,
without indicating an actual "iti" quotation.) abhāvaḥ not existent (Any
translation like "all are non-entities" is absurd.) bhāveṣu (loc. in the sense of)
beings / itaretara -abhāva-siddheḥ (abl. for) one with respect to the other –
empty affirmation (4.1.38) na not svabhāva-siddheḥ (abl. by) self-existence –
affirming bhāvānām (gen. belonging to) beings (4.1.39) na nor svabhāva-
siddheḥ (abl. inferring from) self-existence – affirmation āpekṣikatvāt (abl. by)
tendency of "looking around", considering (others) (4.1.40) vyāhatatvāt (abl.
because) an idea "struck aside" as nonsense, absurdity ayuktam incompatible
7.17 Our 'everyone' does not exist in the sense of 'beings' (plural), for that
is just the empty affirmation of the 'one (soul) with respect to another' (view).
It is not by any affirmation that one's own self-existence belongs (also) to
those beings, nor by a tendency to see that (self-existence) all around,
inferring it from the affirmation of one's own self-existence. Because of its
absurdity, this is incompatible with that (concept of "self-existence").
Chapter Eight 73
म
ससखवैरमान्तमासससदन्निः रमारणमानपपत पम पसत्तिभमाम।म न रमारणमावयवभमावमात।म सनरवयवतमाद-
हमतन्निःम ।
(4.1.41) saṁkhyā-ekānta-asiddhiḥ reckoning numbers – exclusive – no
affirmation kāraṇa-anupapatti-upapattibhyām (abl. known by) cause – not
evident –evident (4.1.42) na not kāraṇa-avayava-bhāvāt (abl. known by) cause –
subdivisions – view (4.1.43) niravayavatvāt (abl. known from) state of being
without subdivisions ahetuḥ lacking grounds
7.18 There can be no affirmation of their reckoning of numbers (of souls)

as the only way. That (self-existence) is known by our cause (īśvara 4.1.19, 30
being evident vs. not being evident, not by the view of subdivisions of that
cause. We know from the state of being without any subdivisions, that such (a
view) lacks our grounds for knowledge.
The view of the self-existence of others fades to nothing, deep into the
examination of one's own self-existence, but only there. That place is a profound
and very real dimension of existence, but it is ultimately private and has no
practical application in ordinary life. This must have been just as clear to the
authors of the Darshanas as it is to us. One doesn't proceed through daily life
thinking about the souls of others. Both self-examination and the examination of
scientific explanations for things require special deliberate attention in their own
time, apart from the daily routine of life.
Chapter Eight
सद्यन्निः रमालमान्तरम च फलसनष्पत्तिमन्निः ससशयन्निः। न सद्यन्निः रमालमान्तरयोपभयोगयतमात।म रमालमान्तरम-
णमासनष्पसत्तिहरतसम वनमाशमात।म प्रमासङ्निष्पत्तिमन्निः (ववृकफलवत्तितमात।)म

(4.1.44) sadyaḥ right away, at the very moment kāla-antare (ind.) after a
period of time ca and phala-niṣpatteḥ (abl. because) fruit – fashioning saṁśayaḥ
uncertainty (4.1.45) na not sadyaḥ in the moment kāla-antara-upabhogyatvāt
(abl. because) time – period – to be enjoyed (4.1.46) kāla-antareṇa (inst. ind.)
after a period of time aniṣpattiḥ no fashioning hetu-vināśāt (abl. because)
grounds for knowledge – nullification (4.1.47) prāṅc-niṣpatteḥ (abl. by) ahead of
time – fashioning (vṛkṣa-phalavat tat syāt; vati+tat+syāt like the interp. 3.2.71)
8.1 There is uncertainty because any fashioning (incarnation) as the fruit

of that (cause) must be in the moment, and after a period of time. That
(incarnation) cannot be in the moment, because (the expectation of) what is to
be enjoyed would be after a period of time, (yet) one does not fashion it after a
period of time, because one's whole grounds for knowledge would be nullified
by (the corollary) fashioning ahead of time (in the cycle).
नमासन सन सदसतदसतयोवरधिरमारत।म उत्पमादव्ययदशरनमात।म बसम दससदस ततम दसत।म आशय-
व्यसतरमरमाद म ववृकफलयोत्पसत्तिवसदत्यहमतन्निःम । प्ररीतमरमात्ममाशयतमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।

(4.1.48) na not asat non-enduring na not sat enduring na neither sat-asat both
enduring and non-enduring sat-asatoḥ (loc. dual between) enduring – non-
enduring vaidharmyāt (abl. because) inconsistency (4.1.49) utpāda-vyaya-
darśanāt (abl. from) coming forth – passing away – seeing (4.1.50) buddhi-
siddham understanding – affirmation tu but tat after all asat not enduring (4.1.51)
āśraya-vyatirekāt (abl. because) seat – exclusion, separation vṛkṣa-phala-
utpattivat (vati like) tree – fruit – coming into existence iti to say that ahetuḥ
without grounds for knowledge (4.1.52) prīteḥ (abl. by) satisfaction, joy ātma-
āśrayatvāt (abl. due to) soul – its being the seat apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
8.2 (We say:) 'That (incarnation) is not non-enduring, yet it is not

enduring, (but) neither can it be both enduring and non-enduring, because of
the inconsistency between enduring and not enduring', but by seeing both its
coming forth and its passing away one would affirm his understanding that it
is, after all, not enduring. (But) the saying, "It is like the coming into existence
of the fruit of a tree"—because there would be separation of the seat (the
bodily incarnation "fruit", from the soul "tree")—is not our grounds for
knowledge. There is no denying (our premise) just by the notion that its (the
incarnation's) joy is due to its being the (temporary) seat of one's soul.
म
न पत्रिपश म शमात ।म ततम्बन्धमात्फलसनष्पत्तिमसषम म फलवद-
सरीपसरचदसहरणयमानमासदफलसनदर
पचमारन्निः। सवसवधिबमाधिनमाययोगमाद्दन्निःम खममव जन्मयोत्पसत्तिन्निः।

(4.1.53) na not the case putra-paśu-strī-paricchada-hiraṇya-anna-ādi-
phala-nirdeśāt (abl. just because) sons – cattle – wives – household – money –
food – etc. – fruits – dictating (4.1.54) tat it is so sambandhāt (abl. according to)
their – kinship / phala-niṣpatteḥ (abl. by) fruit – fashioning teṣu (loc. if) those
Chapter Eight 75
phalavat (vati like) upacāraḥ figuratively (4.1.55) vividha-bādhanā-(gen.)-

yogāt (abl. because) various – frustrations – association duḥkham suffering eva
indeed, actually janma-utpattiḥ birth – coming into existence
8.3 That (notion of joy as 'fruit') is not the case, just because they dictate
that sons, cattle, wives, household, money, food, etc. are fruits (of karma). It is
so, according to the (religious) kinship, (but) if those things are by some
'fashioning' of fruit, it means only like fruit, figuratively. Indeed, because of
the association of various frustrations, the coming into existence by birth is
actually suffering.
म
न सखस र वम दर यतन्निः पयरषणदयोषमादप्रसत-
(असप MUM) आन्तरमालसनष्पत्तिमन्निः। बमाधिनमासनववृत्ति
म
षमधिन्निः। दन्निःखसवरल्पम सखमासभममानमाच्च।
(4.1.56) na not sukhasya (gen. abbr; of ref.=yogāt) happiness api even
āntarāla-niṣpatteḥ (abl. by) being related to one's inner realm – fashioning
(4.1.57) bādhanā-nirvṛtteḥ (abl. since) frustration – cessation (=nivṛtteḥ)
vedayataḥ (√vid (transitive) caus.pres.3rd.dual) those two cause one to find them,
i.e., "show themselves" (=darśayataḥ in BS 9.18) // paryeṣaṇa-doṣāt (abl. by)
striving after – fault, mistake apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (4.1.58) duḥkha-vikalpe
(loc. in the midst of) suffering – diversity sukha-abhimānāt (abl. by) happiness –
mistaken conception ca and
8.4 There is not even any (association) of happiness by the fashioning being
related to one's inner realm, (but) since that is just the cessation of one's
frustration, both show themselves. There is no denying (our premise) by the
false (account of) striving after that (happiness), and by the false conception
of happiness in the midst of all the diversity of suffering.
म
ऋणकम षप्रववृतनबन्धमात म
(अपवगमार म
भमावन्निः।) प्रधिमानशबमानपपत्तिम
गणरम शबमनमानवमादयो
म सननमाप्र-
शससयोपपत्तिमन्निः। (असधिरमारमाच्च सवधिमानस सवद्यमान्तरवत।म Vb) सममारयोपणमादमात्मन्यप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
म श्च MUM) (फलमाभमावन्निः। MUM)

(पमात्रिचयमान्तमानपपत्तिम
(4.1.59) ṛṇa-kleṣa-pravṛtti-anubandhāt (abl. since) the three obligations –
struggle – account – incidental attachment (apavarga-abhāvaḥ) (4.1.60)
pradhāna-śabda-anupapatteḥ (abl. due to) principal, prime – word, sound – not
evident guṇa-śabdena (inst. through) secondary, subordinate – word, teaching
(like guṇakarman MW) anuvādaḥ explanation nindā-praśaṁsā-upapatteḥ (abl.)

reproach – praise – evident by (adhikārāt ca vidhānam vidyā-antaravat) (4.1.61)
samāropaṇāt (abl. by) (fr. caus. of √ruḥ to grow) causing to ascend, having an
advancing effect ātmani (loc. on) individual self, soul apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
(4.1.62) pātra-caya – anta – anupapatteḥ (abl. by) masters – assemblage (This
pun also reads, "a bunch of (soul) vessels".) – boundaries (See vibhakti-antāḥ in
2.2.58.) – without evidence ca and (phala-abhāvaḥ)
8.5 Since that (frustration) is just an incidental attachment to the account

of struggle through the (three) obligations (outlined in the smṛti), that
('struggle') explanation by evidence of the reproach vs. praise (method)
through the subordinate 'word' (the smṛti), is due to the prime word (oṁ) not
being evident. There is no denying (our premise) by (the view of) that
(obligation) having an advancing effect on one's soul, and by the 'boundaries'
(of souls, see 2.2.58) held by the assemblage of masters, without any evidence.
म
सषम पस स्वपमादशरन म कम शमाभमाववदपवगन्निःर । न प्रववृसत्तिन्निः प्रसतससधिमानमाय हरीनकम शस। न कम श-
ससततमन्निः स्वमाभमासवरतमात।म प्रमागत्पत्तिम

म रभमावमासनत्यतवतमाभमासवरम ऽपसनत्यतम।म
(4.1.63) suṣuptasya (gen. for) one who is asleep (a pun on svapna) svapna-
adarśane (loc. where) dreaming – no experience of kleśa-abhāvavat (vati as if)
struggle – absence apavargaḥ state after final release (4.1.64) na not pravṛttiḥ
account of life pratisaṁdhānāya (dat. for the purpose of) "back-together-putting",
rebuilding hīna-kleśasya (gen. on the part of) inadequacy – one who struggles
(4.1.65) na nor kleśa-saṁtateḥ (gen. of) struggle – continuous svābhāvikatvāt
(abl. ind) as being the nature of one's existence (4.1.66) prāñc-utpatteḥ (gen. of)
before-birth state (see 2.2.12) abhāva-anityatvavat (vati like, as if) absence –
impermanence svābhāvike_api (loc. w/api even though) nature of existence
anityatvam impermanence
8.6 For one who is asleep (to the truth), there is (the notion of) a state after
final release, as if there were a (permanent) absence of struggle, where one
doesn't even experience dreaming, (but) our account of life is not for the
purpose of a 'rebuilding' on the part of one who struggles through his
inadequacy, nor of the continuous struggle (itself) as being the very nature of
one's existence. (Conversely,) there would be impermanence of one's before-
birth state (see 2.2.12), as if that absence (of struggle) were not permanent,
even though that (absence) should then be the very nature of one's existence.
Chapter Eight 77
(अणशम यमामतमासनत्यतवद्विमा।) न ससरल्पसनसमत्तितमाच्च रमागमादरीनमाम।म दयोषसनसमत्तिमानमास तत्त्व-
जमानमादहसरमारसनववृसत्तिन्निः। दयोषसनसमत्तिस रूपमादययो सवषयमान्निः ससरल्परवृतमान्निः। तसनसमत्तिस तवयव्य-
सभममानन्निः।
[(4.1.67) aṇu śyāmatā-nityatvavat vā; The alternative is that like the
constancy of the blackness (of space,) so is the atomic (constant). (see
interpolation 3.2.71] (4.1.68) na not saṁkalpa-nimittatvāt (abl. due to)
deliberate acts – instrumental cause ca also rāgādīnām (gen. of) passion etc.
(4.2.1) doṣa-nimittānām (gen. of) faults – instrumental causes tattva-jñānāt (abl.
by) essence – true comprehension ahaṁkāra-nivṛttiḥ personal identity, ego –
turning away from (4.2.2) doṣa-nimittam fault – instrumental cause rūpādayaḥ
forms etc. viṣayāḥ spheres of experience saṁkalpa-kṛtāḥ things deliberately
done (4.2.3) tat-nimittam_tu those – instrumental cause – but really, "the true"
avayavi-abhimānaḥ having parts, subdivided but whole – mistaken conception
8.7 That (nature of one's existence) is not also due to that (struggle) being
the instrumental cause of one's deliberate acts of passion etc. It is by true
comprehension of the essence of the instrumental causes of such faults that
one turns away from that (passion etc.) of his personal identity (ego). This
instrumental cause of his fault would be the forms etc. (he has taken), the
spheres (of life) he has experienced, and the acts he has deliberately done; but
the true instrumental cause of it is rather his mistaken ('everyone' 7.16)
conception about the subdivided whole (of humanity)
म शयन्निः। तदससशयन्निः पतवहर त

सवद्यमासवद्यमाद्विवैसवध्यमात सस म प्रम ससदतमात।म ववृतनपपत्तिम
म रसप तसहर्हि न
ससशयन्निः। रवृतवैरदमशमाववृसत्तितमादवयवमानमामवयव्यभमावन्निः।
(4.2.4) vidyā-avidyā-dvaividhyāt (abl. due to) profound knowledge – lacking
profound knowledge – twofold nature saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (4.2.5) tat then
asaṁśayaḥ no uncertainty pūrva-hetu-prasiddhatvāt (abl. ind. as) as before,
again – basis of knowledge – being (becoming) well-established (4.2.6) vṛtti-
anupapatteḥ (abl. since) pursuit of life – lacking evidence api surely tarhi when
it is / na no saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (4.2.7) kṛtsna-ekadeśa-avṛttitvāt (ind.)
entirety – single individual – there being no such life avayavānām (gen. on the
part of) subdivisions avayavi-abhāvaḥ subdivided whole – no such thing
8.8 Due to the twofold nature of having the profound knowledge and then
not having the profound knowledge, there is uncertainty about it, and then no
uncertainty, as our grounds for knowledge becomes thoroughly established
again. When it is (established), since that (grounds of knowledge) is surely
lacking any evidence of such a (faulty) life, one has no uncertainty that there
is no such thing as that ('everyone' 7.16) subdivided whole, there being no
such (faulty) life on the part of (human) subdivisions as single individuals
within the entirety (of humanity).
तमष म चमाववृत्तिरम वयव्यभमावन्निः। पवृरर म चमावयवमभयोऽववृत्तिन्निःम । न चमावयव्यवयवमान्निः। एरसस्मिनदम मा-
म
भमावमादमदशबप्रययोगमानपपत्तिम
रप्रशन्निः।
(4.2.8) teṣu (instr. along with) those ca and avṛtteḥ (abl. since) without such
life avayavi-abhāvaḥ subdivided whole – no (4.2.9) pṛthak (ind. as) an
individual ca and avayavebhyaḥ (abl. apart from) subdivisions avṛtteḥ (abl.
because) no way of life (4.2.10) na_ca indeed not avayavi-avayavāḥ subdivided
whole – subdivisions (4.2.11) ekasmin (inst. along with) the one bheda-abhāvāt
(abl. since) partition – not existing bheda-śabda-prayoga-anupapatteḥ (abl. for)
partition – scripture – applying – not evidence apraśnaḥ in the absence of inquiry
8.9 Since one is without any such (faulty) life along with those
(subdivisions), and since one is without any such (faulty) life even as an
individual apart from any subdivisions, it is indeed not that (kind of)
subdivisions of a subdivided whole. Since the partition does not exist along
with the one (being), that (theory of subdivisions) appears in the absence of
our (private) inquiry, for that (inquiry) is not considered to be (proper)
evidence when applying the scripture on partition (the smṛti).
अवयवमान्तरमाभमावमऽपववृत्तिरम हमतन्निःम । रम शसमतहम तवैसमसररयोपलसब्धिवत्तिदपलसब्धिन्निः। स्वसवषयमान-
सतक्रममणसम न्द्रियस पटममनभमावमासद्विषयग्रहणस

(4.2.12) avayava-antara-abhāve_api (loc. w/api even … still) subdivision –
inner – without considering the view avṛtteḥ (abl. because) no such life ahetuḥ no
grounds for knowledge (4.2.13) keśa-samūhe (loc. in) (dark) hairs – bunch
(assuming the author and his audience had dark hair) taimirika-upalabdhivat
(vati like) dark-colored (one of the miscellaneous hak terminations, "colored") –
observing tat-upalabdhiḥ of whichch – observation (4.2.14) svaviṣaya-
Chapter Eight 79
anatikrameṇa (instr. ind.) self-sphere – without stepping beyond (=vyatireka)

indriyasya (gen. belonging to) sense paṭu-manda-bhāvāt (abl. according to)
sharp – dull – view viṣaya-grahaṇasya (gen. belonging to) object sphere –
personal apprehension
8.10 Even without considering the view of our inner subdivision (of
essential constituents, etc.) that (scripture) is still no grounds for knowledge,
because there is no such (faulty) life, the observation of which would be like
observing, in a bunch of (dark-colored) hair, a dark-colored one. Without
stepping beyond the self-sphere, that (observation) belongs to one's sense (of
sight), but according to the view of the sharp vs. the dull (non-mindless vs.
mindless 4.1.6), it belongs only to one's (limited) personal apprehension in the
object sphere.
तरमाभमावयो नमासवषयम प्रववृसत्तिन्निः। अवयवमावयसवप्रसङ्गश्चवैवममाप्रलयमात।म न प्रयलयोऽणस

म दमावमात।म
(परस वमा त्रिटम म न्निः।) आरमाशव्यसतभमदमात्तिदनपपसत्तिन्निः

म ।
(4.2.14 cont.) tathā according to that abhāvaḥ without substance / na neither
aviṣaye (loc. ind.) without the object sphere pravṛttiḥ account of life (4.2.15)
avayava-avayavi-prasaṅgaḥ subdivisions – whole – occupation ca moreover
evam just as it is ā-pralayāt (abl. ind.) up to the point of – dissolution (4.2.16) na
not prayalaḥ dissolution aṇu-sat-bhāvāt (abl. according to) atoms – primary
reality ((4.2.17) param_vā truṭeḥ; the alternative being that it is of the atom. see
interpolations 3.2.71, 4.1.67) (4.2.18) ākāśa-(gen.)-vyati-bhedāt (abl. because)
ether – going beyond – partition tat-anupapattiḥ that – failure of evidence
8.11 According to that (object sphere), that (self sphere) has no substance,
(but) neither does our account of life without the object sphere. Moreover, our
occupation with that (life) as a whole with its subdivisions, just as it is, only
happens up to the point of its dissolution, and that dissolution can not happen
according to the view of the (primary) reality of atoms. That (view) fails
because, going beyond that, there would then be partition of the ether.
आरमाशमासवरगततस वमा। अन्तबरसहश्च रमायरद्रिव्यस रमारणमान्तरवचनमादरमायर। तदभमावन्निः।
शबससययोगसवभवमाच्च सवरगतम।म
(4.2.19) ākāśa -(gen.)- asarvagatatvam for the ether – no universality,
'everyone' not "going" (applying) vā alternatively (4.2.20) antaḥ inner bahiḥ outer
ca and kārya-dravyasya (gen. for) effect – physical reality // kāraṇa-antara-
vacanāt (abl. according to) cause – inner – teaching akārye (loc. ind.) with
nothing to be caused tat-abhāvaḥ that (Tat has the same referent as it did in
4.2.18, "aṇu-sat-bhāva".) without (4.2.21) śabda-saṁyoga-vibhavāt (abl.
according to) scripture – joining together – preeminence (śabda refers to bheda-
śabda of 4.2.11.) ca and sarva-gatam going for everyone
8.12 The (third see 4.2.35-38) alternative is that the 'everyone' does not
apply for the ether, (but rather) for the physical reality as its effect, both inner
and outer, (i.e.) both according to the teaching that that (ether) is the inner
cause, yet with nothing to be caused, which is without that (atomic) view, and
according to the preeminent authority joining together in the scripture that
that (view of the primacy of atoms) applies for everyone; …
म
अव्यतहमासवषमसवभतमासन चमारमाशधिममारन्निः। मतसतरमतमास च सससमानयोपपत्तिमरवयवसदमावन्निः।
म
(ससययोगयोपपत्तिमश्च) अनवसमारमासरतमादनवसमानपपत्तिम
श्चमाप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(4.2.22) avyūha-aviṣṭambha-vibhutvāni without structure – being causative
of what is manifest ca both/and ākāśa-dharmāḥ ether – essential qualities
(4.2.23) mūrtimatām (gen. of) incarnations ca both/and saṁsthāna-upapatteḥ
(abl. known by) physical forms – evidence avayava-sat-bhāvaḥ subdivisions –
primary reality – view [(4.2.24) saṁyoga-upapatteḥ ca] (4.2.25) anavasthā-
kāritvāt (abl. by) transience – the notion of an agent anavasthā-anupapatteḥ
(abl. by) transience – failed evidence ca and apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
8.13 … (i.e.) both that those essential qualities of the ether are its being
without an ordered structure, without external support, and causative of
whatever is manifest, and that those (essential qualities) of incarnations are
known by the evidence of their physical forms, which is the view of the
primary reality of subdivisions. There is no denying (our premise) by (the
notion of) being the agent of one's own transience, and by the failed evidence
that there even is transience.
Chapter Eight 81
म मा सववमचनमात्ति म भमावमानमास यमारमात्म्यमानपलसबसन्त्वपरष

बद म म
रणम पटसदमावमानपलसब्धिवत्तिदन म
प-
लसब्धिन्निः। व्यमाहततमादहमतन्निःम ।
(4.2.26) buddhyā (inst.) by intellect, intellectual vivecanāt (abl. by) discussion
tu but bhāvānām (gen of) beings yāthātmya-anupalabdiḥ true nature – direct
observation // tantu-apakarṣaṇe (loc. when) warp threads (in this context of paṭa
and apakarṣaṇa taken literally, it is not "web fibers") – pulling out paṭa-sat-
bhāva-anupalabdhivat (vati like) woven material – primary reality – failure to
observe tat-anupalabdhiḥ that – failure to observe (4.2.27) vyāhatatvāt (abl.
because) absurdity ahetuḥ without grounds
8.14 But there is no direct observation of the true nature of those beings by
such an intellectual discussion. The failure to observe that (true nature) is like
the failure to observe the primary reality in cloth (on the loom) when pulling
out the warp threads (the foundation). Because of it's absurdity, that (failure to
observe) is not our grounds for knowledge.
तदमाशयतमादपवृरगग्रहणम।म प्रममाणतश्चमारप्रर सतपत्तिमन्निः। प्रममाणमानपपत

म पम पसत्तिभमाम।म
(4.2.28) tat-āśrayatvāt (abl. arising from) that – being the seat apṛthak (ind.)
without separation (I do not read this as compounded with grahana: "no separate
understanding".) grahaṇam personal apprehension (4.2.29) pramāṇataḥ (tasil
according to) validation ca and artha-pratipatteḥ (abl. arising from) meaning –
understanding (4.2.30) pramāṇa-anupapatti-upapattibhyām (abl dual by)
validation – missing the evidence – having evidence (Perhaps there is some text
missing here.)
8.15 There is the personal apprehension both arising from being the seat
(body) of that (intellect) without separation from it, and arising from
understanding the meaning according to our validation, (i.e.,) by either
missing the evidence or having the evidence of our validation (respectively).
स्वपसवषयमासभममानवदयस प्रममाणप्रममयमासभममानन्निः। ममायमागन्धवरनगरमवृगतवृसष्णरमावद्विमा। हमत-
भमावमादसससदन्निः। स्मिवृसतससरल्पवच्च स्वपसवषयमासभममानन्निः।

(4.2.31) svapna-viṣaya-abhimānavat (vati like) dream – sphere, world – self-
conception ayam (w/vati) this too (ayam stands out here. It has the sense of "this"
reality right here before our eyes.) pramāṇa-prameya-abhimānaḥ validation – to

be validated – self-conception (4.2.32) māyā -gandharva-nagara- mṛga-
tṛṣṇikāvat (vati like) (ibc) illusory image of: – heavenly singers – city – a
"seeking" (water) thirst, a mirage vā on the other hand (4.2.33) hetu-abhāvāt (abl.
due to) grounds for knowledge – absence asiddhiḥ no affirmation (4.2.34) smṛti-
saṁkalpavat (vati like) memory – imagination ca and then svapna-viṣaya-
abhimānaḥ dream – sphere, world – self-conception
8.16 Like a self-conception in a dream world, this (world) too is a self-

conception that arises according to our (definition of) 'validation and what is
to be validated'. On the other hand, 'like the illusory image of the city of the
Gandharvas, or a mirage', there may be no affirmation (of our validation)
due to the absence of our grounds for knowledge, and then it (actually) is just
a self-conception in a dream world, just like memory or imagination.
म
समथयोपलब्धिमसवरनमाशसत्त्वजमानमात स्वपसवषयमासभममानप्रणमाशवत म । बदम श्च
प्रसतबयोधिम म वैव स सनसम-
त्तिसदमावयोपलममात।म तत्त्वप्रधिमानभमदमाच्च समथमाबदम द्विम रसवध्ययोपपसत्तिन्निः।

(4.2.35) mithyā_upalabdheḥ (gen. of, with) observing wrongly vināśaḥ
destruction of (w/gen.), doing away with tattva-jñānāt (abl. by) essence – true
comprehension / svapna-viṣaya-abhimāna-praṇāśavat (vati like) dream – world
– self-conception – disappearance pratibodhe (loc. upon) waking (4.2.36)
buddheḥ (abl. by) understanding ca and evam the way it actually is nimitta-sat-
bhāva-upalambhāt (abl. by) instrumental cause – primary reality – observation
(4.2.37) tattva-pradhāna – bhedāt (abl. because) essence – (ifc) having as its
head – partition ca and mithyā_buddheḥ (abl. since) understanding wrongly
dvaividhya-upapattiḥ dual nature – evidence
8.17 One does away with observing wrongly (like that) 1.) by true
comprehension of the essence, and, 2.) like the disappearance of one's dream-
world self-conception upon waking, by understanding the way things actually
are by the observation that that primary ('waking') reality is the instrumental
cause; and, 3.) since that (alone) is understanding wrongly, because that
partition has our essence as its head, that the evidence is of a dual nature.
These three clearly correspond to the threefold "sāṁyama" of YD 6.7, 6.9, and
6.8 respectively.
Chapter Nine 83
सममासधिसवशमषमाभमासमात।म नमारसर वशमषप्रमाबलमात।म कदम मासदसभन्निः प्रवतरनमाच्च। पतवर

र वृतफलमान-म
म सलनमासदष
बन्धमात्तिदत्पसत्तिन्निः। अरणयगहमाप म म ययोगमाभमासयोपदमशन्निः।
(4.2.38) samādhi-viśeṣa-abhyāsāt (abl. accomplished by) contemplation –

particular kind of – discipline, repetition (4.2.39) na not artha-viśeṣa-prābalyāt
(abl. by) particular – object – predominance (4.2.40) kṣud-ādibhiḥ (inst.
including) hunger etc. pravartanāt (abl. by) proceeding with life ca and also
(4.2.41) pūrva-kṛta-phala-anubandhāt (abl. known by) previously – created –
development – incidental attachment tat-utpattiḥ that – evidence (4.2.42) araṇya-
guhā-pulinādiṣu (loc. in) forests – caves – river banks yoga-abhyāsa-upadeśaḥ
union – discipline – teaching
8.18 By the discipline of repeating this particular (threefold)

contemplation, and also by proceeding with life as usual, including (attending
to) hunger, etc., (but) not by the predominance of particular objects, the
evidence of that (life) becomes known by its incidental attachment as an
outward development of the previously created (individual self). This is the
discipline of Yoga they teach in the forest, in the caves, and on the banks of
the river (Ganges). (See gaṅgā and yoga sādhanā 2.2.62.)
Chapter Nine - Equivalents
अपवगरऽपमव स प्रसङ्गन्निः। न सनष्पनमावशयममासवतमात।म तदभमावश्चमापवगर। तदरर यमसनयममा-
म न्निः।
भमाममात्मसससमारयो ययोगमाच्चमाध्यमात्मसवध्यपमायवै
(4.2.43) apavarge_api (loc. with api; hypothetical, "even though … it would
be") done with evam exactly as it is prasaṅgaḥ occupation (4.2.44) na not the
case niṣpanna-avaśyam fashioned – not according to will (Avaśyam as an
indeclinable adverb means "necessarily", which is derived from its literal
meaning, "not by will", something predetermined as opposed to being by free will.)
bhāvitvāt (abl. just because) inevitability (4.2.45) tat-abhāvaḥ it – not existing ca
also apavarge (loc. when) done with (4.2.46) tat-artham to that end yama-
niyamābhyām (abl. according to) prohibitions – rules, vows ātma-saṁskāraḥ
soul – (constructing) the perfect / yogāt (abl. according to) the yoga teaching ca
even adhyātma-vidhi-upāyaiḥ (inst. by means of) supreme spirit – (√vidhā seems
more likely than √vidh with adhyātma.) worshipping – methods
9.1 Even though one would be done with it, there is the occupation with life
exactly as it is, (but) it is not the case that, just because of it's inevitability,
that (life) which is thus fashioned is not according to one's will. There is also
(the notion) that it would not exist when one is done with it. To that end, one
would construct the perfect (karmic) soul according to prohibitions and vows,
and even, according to the Yoga (cf. īśvara, obstacles YD), by methods of
worshipping a supreme human spirit.
म ययोऽसरसर भरन-
जमानग्रहणमाभमासन्निः तसद्विद्यवैश्च सह ससवमादन्निः। तस सशष्यगरुसबह्मचमासरसवसशषशम
म मात।म प्रसतपकहरीनमसप वमा

सतयसम भरभपम त्य
(4.2.47) jñāna-grahaṇa-abhyāsaḥ true comprehension – personal
apprehension – discipline tat thus vidyaiḥ (inst. within) paths of higher
knowledge, philosophies ca in addition to saha-saṁvādaḥ in community –
conversation with (among) (4.2.48) tam (acc.) such śiṣya-guru-sabrahmacāri –
viśiṣṭa-śreyas-arthibhiḥ (instr. with, in the company of) students – "heavies"
masters – fellow brahmacarins – distinguished – the better (life) – those who
desire anasūyubhiḥ not disdainful abhyupeyāt to be approached or taken up
(4.2.49) pratipakṣa-hīnam (ind.) in the absence of an adversary api even vā or
9.2 That discipline of personal apprehension through true comprehension

is thus in addition to a discussion within the community of these philosophies,
for such is to be taken up in the company of students, masters, or fellow
brahmacarins, whether distinguished or just desiring something better; with
any who are not disdainful; or even in the absence of an adversary.
प्रययोजनमार रमसर रतम। तत्त्वमाध्यवसमायससरकणमारर जल्पसवतणणम वरीजप्ररयोहससरकनमारर रणटर-
शमाखमावरणवत।म (तमाभमास सवगवृह ररनम।म MUM) उपससहमारम

(4.2.49 cont.) prayojana-artham motivation – for the purpose of arthitve (loc.
when) state of desire (4.2.50) tattva-adhyavasāya-saṁrakṣaṇa-artham essence
– firm resolve – safeguarding, preservation, protection – for the purpose of jalpa-
vitaṇḍe (loc. when) prattle – pointlessly argumentative vīja-praroha-
saṁrakṣana-artham (=bīja) seed – sprouting, sprout – safeguarding – purpose
kaṇṭaka-śākhā-āvaraṇavat thorn – branch – concealing (4.2.50) tābhyām (inst.
dual) those two vigṛhya (ind. part.) having disengaged kathanam telling, relating
upasaṁhāre (loc. when) conclusion, end
Chapter Nine 85
9.3 When there is the state of desire (for something better), that
(discussion) is for the purpose of motivation. When there is just
argumentative prattle (by the disdainful adversary), that (our discussion) is
for the purpose of the protection of our firm resolve toward the essence (of
knowledge), like a screen of thorny branches for the purpose of protecting the
sprouting seed (of knowledge). When that (discussion) is at a conclusion, with
those two (factions) having disengaged, there is the telling (of the argument),
as follows:
Again, he obliquely recalls the threefold process: the declaration without proof,
the proof by examination, and the conclusion on the basis of the examination.
म
(समाधिरवर वैधिरर्षोतषमारपरषरवणयमारवणयरसवरल्पसमाध्यप्रमाप्त्यप्रमासपप्रसङ्गप्रसतदृषमान्तमानत्पसत्तिसस
शयप्रररणहमतरमारपतसवशमषयोपपतपम लब्ध्यनपलसब्धिसनत्यमासनत्यरमायर
म सममान्निः। समाधिरवर -वै
धिरमारभमाम )म
[(5.1.1) sādharmya-vaidharmya-utkarṣa-apakarṣa-varṇya-avarṇya-vikalpa-
sādhya-prāpti-aprāpti-prasaṅga-pratidṛṣṭānta-anutpatti-saṁśaya-prakaraṇa-
hetu-arthāpatti-aviśeṣa-upapatti-upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-nitya-anitya-kārya-
samāḥ (5.1.2) sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām (This is just another list, the last
two "sama"s of which are made up by the commenter! The commenter to the Yoga
does the same thing in its opening sutras.)
तदमरसवपयरययोपपत्तिमन्निः समाधिरवर वैधिरस

र मलौ। गयोतमाद्गयोसससदवत्तिसतसदन्निः। समाध्यदृषमान्तययोधि-र
म
मरसवरल्पमादभयसमाध्यतमात च
(5.1.2 cont.) tat thus, as follows (The translation of this is appended to the
previous sentence.) dharma-viparyaya-upapatteḥ (gen. of) their – roles, duties –
alternate – evidence sādharmya-vaidharmya-samau conformity – nonconformity
– equivalents (5.1.3) gotvāt (abl. by) its being a cow go-siddhivat (vati like) cow
– affirmation tat-siddhiḥ it (each) – affirmation (5.1.4) sādhya-dṛṣṭāntayoḥ (loc.)
premise – a standard dharma-vikalpāt (abl. apart from) (The comparative, with
"equivalent of" or "substitute for", similar but "rather than". The context makes
this use of the ablative obvious.) duty – diversity ubhaya-sādhyatvāt (abl. apart
from) both – being the premise ca and
9.4 Of our evidence of an opposing version of dharma, there are the

(adversaries') equivalents as conformity and nonconformity with (their)
dharma, the affirmation of each like the affirmation of a cow just by its being
a cow—as apart from our diversity of dharmas in terms of both our premise
(that the highest dharma is by true comprehension) and our standard (equal
value of the diversity of dharmas), and apart from both being the premise.
उतषमारपरषवर णयमारवणयरसवरल्पसमाध्यसममान्निः। सरस सचतमाधिरमारदपससहमारससदमवधि

र रमारदप्रसतषम-
धिन्निः। समाध्यमासतदमशमाच्च दृषमान्तयोपपत्तिमन्निः।

(5.1.4 cont.) utkarṣa-apakarṣa -varṇya-avarṇya -vikalpa -sādhya-samāḥ
superior – inferior – of a certain varṇa caste – not of that caste – diversity –
premise – equivalents (5.1.5) kiṁcid_sādharmyāt (abl. since) a little –
conformity upasaṁhāra-siddheḥ (abl. because) conclusion – affirming
vaidharmyāt (abl. from) not conforming apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (5.1.6)
sādhya-atideśāt (abl. apart from) premise – placing beyond reach ca and
dṛṣṭānta-upapatteḥ (abl. by) standard – evidence
9.5 There are their equivalents of that premise (that the highest dharma is
by true comprehension), as the diversity of the superior, the inferior, those of
their (and our) caste, and those not of that caste. Since there is a little
conformity (of our own see 1.2.17), we would not deny (our own premise) by
refusing to conform with our dharma just because that would affirm our
conclusion, or by overruling our premise (dharma=comprehension), by the
evidence of our standard (equal value of daily life and the examination of it).
प्रमाप समाध्यमप्रमाप वमा हमतयोन्निः प्रमाप्त्यमासवसशषतमादप्रमाप्त्यमासमाधिरतमाच्च प्रमाप्त्यप्रमासपसमलौ। घटमा-
सदसनष्पसत्तिदशरनमात्परीणन म चमाव्यसभचमारमादप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(5.1.7) prāpya (ind. part. √ pra-āp) having attained, reached, or arived (after
some time) sādhyam (acc.) premise aprāpya (ind. part.) not having attained vā
or / hetoḥ (gen. of) grounds prāptyā (inst. by) gaining, achieving viśiṣṭatvāt (abl.
since) becoming distinguished aprāptyā (inst. by) failure to earn asādhakatvāt
(abl. since) not becoming accomplished ca and prāpti-aprāpti-samau attaining –
not attaining – equivalents (5.1.8) ghaṭa-ādi-niṣpatti-darśanāt (abl. since) vessels
–to begin with – fashioning – seeing pīḍane (loc. regarding) molding ca and
avyabhicārāt (abl. apart from) not deviating apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
Chapter Nine 87
9.6 Of our grounds for knowledge—having either attained (arrived at) our
premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), or having not yet
attained it—there are the (adversaries') equivalents as attaining and not
attaining (knowledge), being distinguished by attaining it, and being
unaccomplished by failure to attain it. There is no denying (our premise) by
seeing 'fashioning' as of a (soul) vessel to begin with, and by (simply) not
deviating from that (adversaries' learned knowledge) regarding the molding
(of the vessel).
दृषमान्तस रमारणमानपदमशमात्प्रत्यवसमानमाच्च प्रसतदृषमान्तमन प्रसङ्गप्रसतदृषमान्तसमलौ प्रदरीपयोपमादमा-
नप्रसङ्गसवसनववृसत्तिवत्तिसद्विसनववृसत्तिन्निः।
(5.1.9) dṛṣṭāntasya (gen. of) standard kāraṇa-anapadeśāt cause – failure to
indicate (see utpatti-kāraṇa-anapadeśāt 3.2.23) pratyavasthānāt (abl. because)
opposition of life standing ca and prati-dṛṣṭāntena (inst. by way of, as)
counterpart – standard / prasaṅga-prati-dṛṣṭānta-samau life occurrence –
counterpart – standard – equivalent pradīpa-upādāna-prasaṅga-vinivṛttivat
(vati like) lamp, illumination of a thesis, a treatise – accepting unto oneself –
occurrence of life – turning away tat-vinivṛttiḥ that – turning away
9.7 Of our standard—due to their failure to indicate the (proper) cause

(īśvara 4.1.19) and due to their opposition of life-standing as a counterpart to
our standard—there are the (adversaries') equivalents as that life-occupation
(of opposition) and as that counterpart to our standard. Turning away from
that (cause) is like turning away from a life-occupation in the self-acceptance
(taught) by our treatise.
म न्निः रमारणमाभमावमादनत्पसत्तिसमन्निः
म म च नमाहमतदृम षमान्तन्निः। प्रमागत्पत्तिम
प्रसतदृषमान्तहमतत म । तरमाभमावमाद-
त्पनस रमारणयोपपत्तिमन र रमारणप्रसतषमधिन्निः।

(5.1.10) prati-dṛṣṭānta-hetu-tve (loc. even with) counterpart – standard –
grounds – there being ca_na not (never) even a-hetu-dṛṣṭāntaḥ without – grounds
– standard (5.1.11) prāñc-utpatteḥ (gen. of) before birth state kāraṇa-abhāvāt
(abl. according to) cause – empty anutpatti-samaḥ non-birth – equivalent (5.1.12)
tathā similarly bhāvāt (abl. according to) theory of being, view // utpannasya
(gen. of) born, having come into existence kāraṇa-upapatteḥ (abl. because) cause
– evidence na no kāraṇa-pratiṣedhaḥ cause – denial
9.9 Even with there being (two) counterparts within the grounds for our
standard, we are never without that (dual) standard (including the existence
of life) in our grounds. Of our pre-existent (unmanifest see avyakta 3.2.43)
state, there is the (adversaries') equivalent of (a liberation of) not coming into
existence at all, according to their empty cause (karma). Similarly, according
to our view, there can be no denying of our cause (īśvara), because of our
evidence that it is the cause of whatever has come into existence.
म शयसमन्निः। समाधिरमारतश
समाममान्यदृषमान्तययोरवैसन्द्रियरतम सममान म सनत्यमासनत्यसमाधिरमारत सस स यम
म
(न ससशययो ववैधिरमारदभयरमा वमा ससशयमऽत्यन्तससशयप्रसङ्गयो ) सनत्यतमानभपगममाच्च समाममा-
न्यसमाप्रसतषमधिन्निः।
(5.1.13) sāmānya-dṛṣṭāntayoḥ (gen. dual of) common truth – standard
aindriyakatve (loc. in that) existing in that which consists of the powers of sense
samāne (loc. considering) same nitya-anitya-sādharmyāt (abl. due to) constant –
inconstant saṁśaya-samaḥ uncertainty – equivalent (5.1.14) sādharmyāt (abl.
just because) conformity saṁśaye (loc. in) uncertainty [na saṁśayaḥ // vaidharm-
yāt ubhayathā vā saṁśaye atyanta-saṁśaya-prasaṅgaḥ; One must not doubt. In
his nonconformity or in his 'both ways', whenever he doubts, it becomes his
'ultimate doubt'.] nityatva-anabhyupagamāt (abl. just because) constancy –
disagreement ca and sāmānyasya (gen. of) the common apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
9.10 Of (the uncertainty as to) the universally agreed (dharma) vs. our
standard (equal value of the diverse dharmas of those just living life and those
seeking to examine it)—considering that they are (both) the same in that they
exist only in the mind ("that which consists of the powers of sense")—there is
the (adversaries') equivalent, as the uncertainty that arises from constant vs.
inconstant conformity. There is no denying (of our premise) just because there
is conformity in that uncertainty, and just because there is disagreement with
our constancy on the part of the common (man).
The adversary's uncertainty would cause him to lapse in his adherence to

proper civil and religious behaviors, which in their belief system would result in a
certain bad karma that would in turn cause further doubt and further lapsing in
future incarnations. This is the interpretation of the commenter in 2.1.7 and 5.1.14.
Chapter Nine 89
म
उभयसमाधिरमारत्प्रसक्रयमाससदमन्निः प्रररणसमन्निः।प्रसतपकमात्प्रररणससदमन्निः प्रसतषमधिमानपपसत्तिन्निः प्रसत-
म म मन्निः
हरतयोरहमतस
पकयोपपत्तिमन्निः। त्रिवैरमालमानपपत्तिम
(5.1.15) ubhaya-sādharmyāt (abl. ind.) both ways – conformity prakriyā-
siddheḥ (gen. of) positive action to some end, a formal procedure, or its officiant
prakaraṇa-samaḥ the subject (ultimate knowledge) – equivalent (5.1.16)
pratipakṣāt (abl. ind.) against an adversary prakaraṇa-siddheḥ (abl. by) subject
– proving // pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ denial – lacking evidence pratipakṣa-
upapatteḥ (abl. because) adversary – evidence (5.1.17) traikālya-anupapatteḥ
(abl. ind.) threefold time paradigm – without evidence hetoḥ (gen. of) grounds for
knowledge ahetu-samaḥ without grounds – equivalent
9.11 Of our affirmation by our formal practice (of contemplation 4.2.38-

42), with our conformity being both ways, there is the (adversaries')
equivalent to the subject (of dharma), by (the practice of) proving that subject
against an adversary (4.2.47-50). We lack the evidence to deny that (existence
of an adversary) because that (denial) would be the very evidence of an
adversary. (see the "other … other … other" passage in 2.1.30-32) Of our
grounds for knowledge, without any evidence of a threefold time paradigm,
there is the (adversaries') equivalent that is without our grounds (i.e., with a
karmic past and future).
म
न हमततम न्निः समाध्यससदमसवैरमालमासससदन्निः। प्रसतषमधिमानपपत्तिम
श्च प्रसतषमदव्यमाप्रसतषमधिन्निः। अरमारपसत्ति-
तन्निः प्रसतपकससदमररमारपसत्तिसमन्निः।
(5.1.18) na not (referring to the nom. "asiddhi") hetutaḥ (tasil resulting from)
grounds sādhya-siddheḥ (abl. because) premise – affirmation traikālya-asiddhiḥ
threefold time paradigm – without affirmation (5.1.19) pratiṣedha-anupapatteḥ
(abl. since) denial – lacking evidence ca w/na either pratiṣeddhavya-
apratiṣedhaḥ to be denied – no denying (5.1.20) arthāpattitaḥ (tasil according
to) interpretation pratipakṣa-siddheḥ (gen. of) adversaries – affirmation
arthāpatti-samaḥ interpretation – equivalent
9.12 We are not without any affirmation of the threefold time paradigm
(cf. 2.1.12-14), because the affirmation of our premise (that the highest
dharma is by true comprehension) results (only) from our grounds for
knowledge (our 'cause'). They cannot deny anything which (they say) is to be
denied either, since they lack the evidence to deny it. Of the affirmation of
adversaries according to our interpretation (of traditional texts), there is the
(adversaries') equivalent interpretation.
म म
पत्तिमन्निः पकहमानरुम पपसत्तिरनकतमादनवै
अनकसमारमार रमासन्तरतमाच्चमारमारपत्तिमन्निः। एरधिमर्षोपपत्तिमरसव-
शमष म सवमारसवशमषप्रसङ्गमातदमावयोपपत्तिमरसवशमषसमन्निः।
(5.1.21) anuktasya (gen. of) not declared arthāpatteḥ (abl. coming about
through) interpretation pakṣa-hāneḥ (gen. of) side – rejection upapattiḥ evidence
/ anuktatvāt (because) not being declared anaikāntikatvāt (abl. because) not
being exclusive ca and arthāpatteḥ (gen. of; same referent as anuktasya)
interpretation (5.1.22) eka-dharma-upapatteḥ (abl. known by) singular (as
opposed to "aneka-dharma" in 1.1.23 and 2.1.1) – duty – evidence aviśeṣe (loc.
where) absence of distinction sarva-aviśeṣa-prasaṅgāt (abl. known by) everyone
– without distinguishing – occupation with life sat-bhāva-upapatteḥ (gen. of)
primary reality – evidence aviśeṣa-samaḥ not distinguishing (This approaches the
meaning of "aviveka" in SD and YD) – equivalent
9.13 Their evidence is by rejection of some side that comes about through
an interpretation of anything not declared (in the smṛti). Such (a rejection) of
our interpretation is because of its not being declared (in the smṛti), and
because of its not being their exclusive way. Of our evidence of a primary
reality known by occupation with life without distinguishing an 'everyone',
that absence of distinction being known by the evidence of the singular
dharma (as opposed to "for the many" 1.1.23, 2.1.1), there is the (adversaries')
equivalent of not distinguishing.
The "singular dharma" here is the dharma "without superior" given in the first
sutra as the subject of the entire treatise. Here it is stated anew as the subject and
subsequently recalled with or without pronouns in every sutra up to the conclusion
of the work.
Chapter Nine 91
म
क्वसचत्तिदमर्षोपपत्तिमन्निः क्वसचच्चमानपपत्तिम
न्निः प्रसतषमधिमाभमावन्निः।उभयरमारणयोपपत्तिमरुपपसत्तिसमन्निः। उप-
म
पसत्तिरमारणमाभनजमानमादप्रसतषम
धिन्निः।
(5.1.23) kvacit in the one case tat-dharma-upapatteḥ (gen. of) that (=eka
5.1.22) – duty – evidence kvacit in the other case ca and anupapatteḥ (gen. of)
failed evidence pratiṣedha-abhāvaḥ denial – lack of existence or substance,
empty (= the bahuvrīhi "abhāva- pratiṣedha") (5.1.24) ubhaya-kāraṇa-
upapatteḥ (gen. of) in both – cause – evidence upapatti-samaḥ evidence –
equivalent (5.1.25) upapatti-kāraṇa-abhyanujñānāt (abl. by) evidence – cause –
permitting apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
9.14 Their empty denial is, in the one (our) case, of the evidence of that
(singular) dharma, and in the other (their) case, of their (own) failed evidence.
That (tautological) evidence is their equivalent of our evidence that there is
'cause' in both (dharmas), (but) they cannot deny (our premise) just because
we permit a 'cause' in our evidence (cf. 3.2.7).
म
सनसदर्हिषरमारणमाभमावमऽपपलममादपलसब्धिसमन्निः । रमारणमान्तरमादसप तदमर्षोपपत्तिमरप्रसतषमधिन्निः। त-
म
दनपलब्धिम म
रनपलममात म
(5.1.26) nirdiṣṭa-kāraṇa-abhāve_api (loc. w/api; even though) dictated –

cause – empty upalambhāt (abl. arising out of) recognition upalabdhi-samaḥ
observation – equivalent (5.1.27) kāraṇa-antarāt (abl. by) cause – different api
so very tat-dharma-upapatteḥ (abl. of comparison w/antara; from) that (=eka
5.1.22) – duty – evidence apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (5.1.28) tat-anupalabdheḥ
(abl. for) that – lack of observation anupalambhāt (abl. arising out of) lack of
recognition
9.15 Even though there is no substance to their dictated cause (karma), out
of their recognition of that (karma) there arises their equivalent observation
(of dharma), (but) they cannot deny (our premise) by (asserting) that 'cause'
(karma) that is so very different from our evidence of that (singular 5.1.22)
dharma, for out of their non-recognition (of our cause), arises their lack of
observation of that (singular dharma).
म
अभमावससदलौ तसद्विपररीतयोपपत्तिमरनपलसब्धिसमन्निः म
। अनपलममात्मरतमादन म रहमतन्निःम ।
पलब्धिम
जमानसवरल्पमानमास च भमावमाभमावससवदम नमादध्यमात्मम।म

abhāva-siddhau (loc. regarding) without substance – affirmation tat-viparīta-
upapatteḥ (arising out of) that (This has the same referent as the tats in 5.1.23
and 5.1.27, and 5.1.28, i.e., "eka-(dharma)" 5.1.22.) – reverse, opposition –
evidence anupalabdhi-samaḥ lack of observation – equivalent (5.1.29)(identical
to 2.2.21) anupalambha-(gen.)-ātmakatvāt (abl. for) lack of recognition – the
very nature of anupalabdheḥ (abl. due to) lack of observation ahetuḥ lack of
grounds (5.1.30) jñāna-vikalpānām (gen. of) true comprehension – diversities,
different kinds ca and // bhāva-abhāva-saṁvedanāt (abl. coming from) presence
– absence – internal feel adhyātmam (ind.) concerning one's individual self
9.16 Out of the evidence in opposition to that (unique dharma) in their

empty affirmation, there arises their equivalent lack of observation. Their
lack of grounds for knowledge is due to the lack of observation (of the unique
dharma), for that is the very nature of their lack of recognition and of their
'comprehension' of (three) kinds (castes of individuals), (but) when it comes to
the individual self, that (comprehension) must come from the presence vs.
absence of the internal feel of it.
He is speaking here about the two different views of dharma that have been
thoroughly discussed earlier. The adversary (within us) denies, without distinction,
both the immediate evidence of his "unique" dharma and the weakness of his own
tautological evidence for the scheme of caste, karma, reincarnation, etc. It seems to
me that the author uses the term "aviśeṣa" in the same sense that "aviveka" is used
by the Sankhya and Yoga, to mean "non-distinguishing"as causing bondage.
म
समाधिरमारत्तिलधिमर्षो पपत्तिमन्निः सवमारसनत्यतप्रसङ्गमादसनत्यसमन्निः। समाधिरमारदससदमन्निः प्रसतषमधिमासस-
सदन्निः प्रसतषमध्यसमामथमारत।म
(5.1.31) sādharmyāt (abl. known by) conformity tulya-dharma-upapatteḥ
(gen. of) equals, peers – duty – evidence sarva-anityatva-prasaṅgāt (abl. due to)
everyone – inconstancy – occupation anitya-samaḥ inconstant – equivalent
(5.1.32) sādharmyāt (abl. apart from, other than) conformity with dharma
asiddheḥ (abl. since) no affirmation pratiṣedha-asiddhiḥ denial – no affirmation
pratiṣedhya-sāmarthyāt (abl. because) to be denied – having common interest
Chapter Nine 93
9.17 Of our evidence of the dharma of the peers, which we know by our
own conformity with it, since that is our occupation with the inconstancy of
the 'everyone'; there is the (adversaries') equivalent of what is 'inconstant'
(our deviation). Since there is no affirmation of that, apart from their own
conformity (with dharma), there can be no affirmation of their denial (of our
deviation) just because they have common interest in what should be denied.
म मात्तिस चयोभयरमाभमावमानसवशमषन्निः।
दृषन्तम च समाध्यसमाधिनभमावमन प्रजमातस धिमरस हमतत
(5.1.33) dṛṣṭante (loc. when it comes to) standard ca moreover sādhya-
sādhana-bhāvena (inst. known by means of) premise – established – view //
prajñā true knowledge, wisdom tasya (gen. of) that dharmasya (gen. of) duty,
right hetutvāt (abl. resulting from) motivation tasya (gen. of) that ca indeed /
ubhayathā both ways bhāvāt (abl. for) view na no viśeṣaḥ difference
9.18 Moreover, when it comes to our standard, that is known by means of

the view established by our premise. True knowledge of that (view) is that
(true knowledge) of dharma, and (true knowledge) of that (dharma) is the
result of one's motivation. There is no difference (between motivation towards
true knowledge and dharma), for our view is both ways.
End of the Nyaya Darshana
It is clear to me that the Nyaya Darshana ends here and that the remaining
material is something else, even though the style looks similar:
सनत्यमसनत्यभमावमादसनत्यम सनत्यतयोपपत्तिमसन रत्यसमन्निः॥५।१।३४॥ प्रसतषमध्य म सनत्यमसनत्य-
म तमातमायरसमन्निः॥३६॥
भमावमादसनत्यमऽसनत्यतयोपपत्तिमन्निः प्रसतषमधिमाभमावन्निः॥३५॥प्रयत्नरमायमारनर
रमायमारन्यतम प्रयत्नमाहमतत म
म मनपलसब्धिरमारणयोपपत्तिम
न्निः॥३७॥प्रसतषमधिऽम सप सममानयो दयोषन्निः॥३८॥
म धिसवप्रसतषमधि म प्रसतषमधिदयोषवद्दयोषन्निः॥४०॥प्रसतषमधि स सदयोषमभपम त्य

सवरत्रिवैवम॥३९॥प्रसतषम म
म स्वपकलकणमापमकयोपपतपम ससहमारम हमतसम नदरश म

प्रसतषमधिसवप्रसतषमधि म सममानयो दयोषप्रसङ्गयो मतमानजमा
म
परपकदयोषमाभपगममातममानयो दयोषन्निः॥४१॥
(इसत प्ररममासधिरन्निः)
(पञमयोऽध्यमायन्निः सद्वितरीयमासधिरन्निः )
र मसव-
प्रसतजमाहमासनन्निः प्रसतजमान्तरस प्रसतजमासवरयोधिन्निः प्रसतजमाससन्यमासयो हमतन्तरमरमारन्तरस सनररर
जमातमारमर पमारर म
र मप्रमापरमालस न्यतनमसधिरस पनरुकमनन म
भमाषणमजमानमप्रसतभमा सवकमपयो मतमान-म
म
जमा पयरनययोजयोपम म
कणस सनरनययोजमान म
ययोगयोऽपससदमान्तयो हमतमाभमासमाश्च सनग्रहसमानमासन॥१॥
म स्वदृषमान्तम प्रसतजमाहमासनन्निः॥२॥प्रसतजमातमारप्रर सतषमधि म धिमरसवरल्पमात्ति-

प्रसतदृषमान्तधिममारभनजमा
म
दर रसनदरशन्निः प्रसतजमान्तरम॥३॥प्रसतजमाहम
तयोसवररयोधिन्निः प्रसतजमासवरयोधिन्निः॥४॥पकप्रसतषमधि म प्रसत-
जमातमारमारपनयनस प्रसतजमाससन्यमासन्निः॥५॥असवशमषयोकम हमतलौ प्रसतसषदम सवशमषसमचतयो हमतन्त-
म
रम॥६॥प्ररवृ म
तमादरमारदप्रसतसम्बदमार रमरमारन्तरम॥७॥वणर म
र म॥८॥
क्रमसनदरशवसनररर
म
पसरषत्प्रसतवमासदभमास सत्रिरसभसहतमपसवजमातमसवजमातमार रम॥१०॥ पलौवमारपयमारययोगमादप्रसतस-
म्बदमार रमपमार ररम।म अवयवसवपयमारसवचनमप्रमापरमालम॥११॥हरीनमन्यतमम

म नमापवयवमन
म म
तदत माहरणमासधिरमसधिरम॥१३॥शबमार
न्यतनम॥१२॥हम म चनस पनरुकमन्यत्रिमान
रययोन्निः पनवर म म
वमा-
म
दमात ॥१४॥अरमार म चनस पनरुकम
दमापनस स्वशबमन पनवर म म
॥१५॥सवजमातस पसरषदमा
95
म
सत्रिरसभसहतसमापप्रत्यच्चमारणमनन म
भमाषणम म
॥१६॥असवजमातस म
चमाजमानम॥१७॥ उत्तिरसमा-
र मासङ्गमातरमासवचमदयो सवकमपन्निः॥१९॥स्वपकम दयोषमाभपम -

प्रसतपसत्तिरप्रसतभमा॥१८॥रमायव्य
म
गममात्परपकम दयोषप्रसङ्गयो मतमानजमा॥२०॥सनग्रहसमानप्रमापसमासनग्रहन्निः म
पयनर ययोजयोपम
क-
म
णम॥२१॥असनग्रहसमान म
म सनग्रहसमानमासभययोगयो सनरनययोजमान म
ययोगन्निः ॥२२॥ ससदमान्त-
मभपमम त्यमासनयममातरमाप्रसङ्गयोऽपससदमान्तन्निः ॥२३॥हमतमाभमासमाश्च यरयोकमान्निः॥२४॥

(5.1.34) nityam anitya-bhāvāt anitye nityatva-upapatteḥ nitya-samaḥ
(5.1.35) pratiṣedhye nityam anitya-bhāvāt anitye anityatva-upapatteḥ
pratiṣedha-abhāvaḥ (5.1.36) prayatna-kārya-anekatvāt kārya-samaḥ (5.1.37)
kārya-anyatve prayatna-ahetutvam anupalabdhi-kāraṇa-upapatteḥ (5.1.38)
pratiṣedhe_api samānaḥ doṣaḥ (5.1.39) sarvatra evam (5.1.40) pratiṣedha-
vipratiṣedhe pratiṣedha-doṣavat doṣaḥ (5.1.41) pratiṣedham sadoṣam
abhyupetya pratiṣedha-vipratiṣedhe samānaḥ doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ mata-anujñā
svapakṣa-lakṣaṇa-apekṣa-upapatti-upasaṁhāre hetu-nirdeśe parapakṣa-doṣa-
abhyupagamāt samānaḥ doṣaḥ (5.2.1) pratijñā-hāniḥ pratijñā-antaram
pratijñā-virodhaḥ pratijñā-saṁnyāsaḥ hetu-antaram arthāntaram
nirarthakam avijñāta-artham apārthakam aprāpta-kālam nyūnam adhikam
punar-uktam ananubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā vikṣepaḥ mata-anujñā
paryanuyojya-upekṣaṇa niranuyojya-anuyogaḥ apasiddhāntaḥ hetu-ābhāsāḥ
ca nigraha-sthānāni (5.2.2) pratidṛṣṭānta-dharma-abhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānte
pratijñā-ahāniḥ (5.2.3) pratijñāta-artha-pratiṣedhe dharma-vikalpāt tat-
artha-nirdeśaḥ pratijñā-antaram (5.2.4) pratijñā-ahetvoḥ virodhaḥ pratijñā-
avirodhaḥ (5.2.5) pakṣa-pratiṣedhe pratijñāta-artha-apanayanam pratijñā-
saṁnyāsaḥ (5.2.6) aviśeṣa-ukte hetau pratiṣiddhe viśeṣam icchataḥ hetu-
antaram (5.2.7) prakṛtāt arthāt apratisambaddha-artham artha-antaram
(5.2.8) varṇa-krama-nirdeśavat nirarthakam (5.2.9) pari-ṣat-prativādibhyām
tris-abhihitam api avijñātam avijñāta-artham (5.2.10) paurvāparya-ayogāt
apratisambaddha-artham apārthakam (5.2.11) avayava-viparyāsa-vacanam
aprāpta-kālam (5.2.12) hīnam anya-tamena api avayavena nyūnam (5.2.13)
hetu-udāharaṇa-adhikam adhikam (5.2.14) śabda-arthayoḥ punar vacanam
punar-uktam anyatra anuvādāt (5.2.15) arthāt āpannasya svaśabdena punar-
vacanam punaruktam (5.2.16) vijñātasya pariṣadā tris-abhihitasya api
apratyuccāraṇam ananubhāṣaṇam (5.2.17) avijñātam ca ajñānam (5.2.18)
uttarasya-apratipattiḥ apratibhā (5.2.19) kārya-vyāsaṅgāt kathā vicchedaḥ
vikṣepaḥ (5.2.20) svapakṣe doṣa-abhyupagamāt parapakṣe doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ

mata-anujñā (5.2.21) nigrahasthāna-prāptasya anigrahaḥ paryanuyojya-
upekṣaṇam (5.2.22) anigrahasthāne nigrahasthāna-abhiyogaḥ niranuyojya-
anuyogaḥ (5.2.23) siddhāntam abhyupetya aniyamāt kathā prasaṅgaḥ
apasiddhāntaḥ (5.2.24) hetu-ābhāsāḥ ca yathā-uktāḥ

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The Nyaya Darshana

Translation and commentary by John Wells

In the translation I have focused on a disciplined and faithful rendering of the

Hopefully, by the foregoing, one may understand my main motivations for

Chapter One - Introduction and pramāṇa-prameya

लजमासतसनग्रहसमानमानमास तत्त्वजमानमासनन्निःशयम समासधिगमन्निः। दन्निःखजन्मप्रववृसत्तिदयोषसमथमाजमानमा-

म रयोत्तिरमापमायम तदनन्तरमापमायमादपवग रन्निः।

1.1-2 Finding the highest (dharma) is by truly comprehending the essence:

चमासर व्यवसमायमात्मरस प्रत्यकम।म

1.3 Our ways of validating truth are: perception, inference, comparison,

म सन्द्रियमार रबसम दमनन्निः प्रववृसत्तिदयोषप्रमत्यभमावफलदन्निःखमाप-

The author's prameya is literally what is "to be validated" by this examination,

म खजमानमासन आत्मनन्निः सलङ्गम।म चमषसम न्द्रियमारमारशयन्निः शररीरम।म घ्रणरसन-

म भन्निः। पवृसरव्यमापसमजयो वमायरम मारमाशसमसत भततमासन। गन्धर-

म न्निः। बसम दरुपलसब्धिजमारनसमत्यनरमारन्तरम ।म यगम पजमानमानत्पसत्तिमर

लकनस दन्निःखम।म तदत्यन्तसवमयोकयोऽपवगन्निःर ।

यन्निः।यमर रमसधिरवृत्य प्रवतरत म तत्प्रययोजनम।म ललौसररपररीकरमाणमास यसस्मिनरर बसम दसमारस स

1.10-11 Our 'uncertainty' is an investigation, a consideration of those

म सससतन्निः ससदमान्तन्निः। स चतसम वरधिन्निः सवरतनप्रसततनमासधिररणमाभपम -

सवरतनमासवरुदसनमऽसधिरवृतयोऽरन्निःर सवरतनससदमान्तन्निः। सममानतनससदन्निः परतनससदन्निः

प्रसतजमाहमतदत माहरणयोपनयसनगमनमान्यवयवमान्निः। समाध्यसनदरशन्निः प्रसतजमा। उदमाहरणसमाधिरमार-

तमाध्यसमाधिनस हमतन्निःम । तरमा ववैधिरमारत।म

समाध्यसमाधिरमारत्तिदमरभमावरीदृषमान्त उदमाहरणम।म तसद्विपयरयमाद्विमा सवपररीतम।म उदमाहरणमापमक-

म हमारयो न तरमसत वमा समाध्यसयोपनयन्निः।

म चनस सनगमनम।म असवजमाततत्त्वमऽरर रमारणयोपपसत्तितसत्त्वजमा-

नमार रमतहसरर न्निः।

सवमवृशय पकप्रसतपकमाभमामरमारवधिमारणस सनणरयन्निः। प्रममाणतरर समाधिनयोपमालमन्निः ससदमान्तमासवरु-

दन्निः पञमावयवयोपपनन्निः पकप्रसतपकपसरग्रहयो वमादन्निः।

1.18 "Settlement" means confirmation of that object, after having

Chapter Two - Prattle

यरयोकयोपपनशश्छलजमासतसनग्रहसमानसमाधिनयोपमालमयो जल्पन्निः। स प्रसतपकसमापनमाहरीनयो

सव्यसभचमारसवरुदप्रररणसमसमाध्यसमरमालमातरीतमा हमतमाभमासमान्निः। अनवैरसन्तर सव्यसभ-

चमारन्निः। ससदमान्तमभपमम त्य तसद्विरयोधिरी सवरुदन्निः।

यस्मिमात्प्रररणसचन्तमा स सनणरयमारमर पसदषन्निः प्रररणसमन्निः। समाध्यमासवसशषन्निः समाध्यतमातमाध्य-

वचनसवघमातयोऽर रसवरल्पयोपपतमा श्छलम।म (तसत्त्रिसवधिस वमाक्छलस समाममान्यचलमपम चमारचलस

च।) असवशमषमासभसहतमऽरर वकमरसभप्रमायमादरमारन्तररल्पनमा वमाक्छलम।म

2.4 "False persuasion" is an attack against our thesis by effecting this

समवतयोऽर रसमासतसमाममान्यययोगमादसमततमार ररल्पनमा समाममान्यचलम।म धिमरसवरल्पसनदर-

शमऽर रसदमावप्रसतषमधि उपचमारचलम।म

वमाक्छलममवयोपचमारचलस तदसवशमषमात।म न तदरमारन्तरभमावमात।म असवशमष म वमा सरसञतमाधि-

समाधिर रववैधिरमारभमास प्रत्यवसमानस जमासतन्निः। सवप्रसतपसत्तिरप्रसतपसत्तिश्च सनग्रहसमानम।म तसद्विर-

2.7 Ranking by birth (caste) is the mutual opposition of life standing as

As in the Vaisheshika, sādharmya and vaidharmya here as "similarity vs.

In traditional religious thinking, conformity vs. non-conformity with one's

It even extends to the fraudulent pretense to the possession of supernatural

सममानमान मरधिममारध्यवसमायमादन्यतरधिममारध्यवसमायमाद्विमा न ससशय। सवप्रसतपतव्यवसमाध्यव-

समायमाच्च। सवप्रसतपत्तिलौ च सम्प्रसतपत्तिमन्निः।(अव्यवसमात्मसन व्यवससततमाच्चमाव्यवसमायमान्निः।)

तरमात्यन्तससशयसदमरसमातत्ययोपपत्तिमन्निः। यरयोकमाध्यवसमायमादमव तसद्विशमषमापमकमातसशयमनमासस-

He ends this half of the chapter by mentioning uncertainty. Interestingly, he

Pramāṇa and Prameya and Pratyakṣa

2.10 There is a certain lack of credibility of perception and the others,

पश्चमासतदलौ न प्रममाणमभन्निः प्रममयसससदन्निः। यगम पसतदलौ प्रत्यर रसनयततमात्क्रमववृसत्तितमाभमावयो

2.11 When we try to affirm that (validation) for future (incarnations),

ससदमन्निः प्रममाणमानमास प्रममाणमान्तरसससदप्रसङ्गन्निः।

Prameya ("to be validated")

2.15 There can be no evidence of the qualities of a perception by asserting

जमानसलङ्गतमादमात्मनयो नमानवरयोधिन्निः। तदयलौगपद्यसलङ्गतमाच्च न मनसन्निः। प्रत्यकसनसमत्तितमाच्चम-

म चसम न्द्रियमारयर योन्निः सससनरषसर नसमत्तितमात।म तवैश्चमापदमशयो जमानसवशमषमाणमाम।म

नमार रसवशमषप्रमाबलमात।म प्रत्यकमनममानमम

Outside of the memorized, school-taught, explanation of humanity as soulless