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LAW AND PROCEDURE IN DEFICIT STAMP DUTY

AND IMPOUNDING OF DOCUMENTS EXPLAINED
JUSTICE S. Abdul Nazeer in the case of Sri J. Prakash
vs Smt. M.T. Kamalamma And Anr. Reported in
AIR 2008 Kant 26, ILR 2007 KAR 4752, 2008 (2)
KarLJ 202 has clarified the law on the subject of
Stamp Duty and Duty penalty and procedure:-
“Section 33 of the Act deals with examination and
impounding of instruments. It states that every person
having by law or consent of parties authority to receive
evidence, and every person incharge of a public office,
except an officer of police, before whom any
instrument, chargeable in his opinion, with duty, is
produced or comes in the performance of his
functions, shall, if it appears to him that such
instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same.
To impound means, to keep in the custody of the law.
Section 34 of the Act deals with a different situation. It
states that instruments not duly stamped are
inadmissible in evidence. However, such document
may be admitted in evidence on payment of duty with
which the same is chargeable, or in the case of an
instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount
required to make up such duty, together with a
penalty of rupees five, or, when ten times the amount
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of proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five

rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or
portion. Section 37 of the Act lays down the procedure
to deal with the instruments impounded under Section
33, or the instruments admitted in evidence upon
payment of duty and penalty under Section 34; or the
documents dealt with under Section 36 of the Act. In
respect of the documents admitted in evidence upon
payment of duty and penalty as provided under
Section 34, Section 37 mandates the authority who
receives the instrument in evidence and admits such
instrument in evidence, to send an authenticated copy
of such instrument together with a certificate in
writing stating the amount of duty and penalty levied
in respect of the said document and send such amount
to the Deputy Commissioner or to such person as he
may appoint in this behalf. In so far as the impounded
document under Section 33 is concerned, Sub-section
(2) of Section 37 mandates that the person so
impounding an instrument has to send it in original to
the Deputy Commissioner.
Section 38 of the Act deals with the power to refund
the penalty paid under Sub-section (1) of Section 37 of
the Act. It states that when a copy of an instrument is
sent to the Deputy Commissioner under Sub-section
Sridhara babu. N

(1) of Section 37, he may, if he thinks fit, refund any

portion of the penalty in excess of five rupees which
has been paid in respect of such instrument.
Section 39 of the Act deals with the power of the
Deputy Commissioner to stamp instruments
impounded under Section 33 of the Act. It states that
when the Deputy Commissioner impounds any
instrument under Section 33, or receives any
instrument sent to him under Sub-section (2) of
Section 37, not being an instrument chargeable with
duty of not exceeding fifteen naye paise only or
mortgage of crop chargeable under clause (a) or (b) of
Section 3 with a duty of twenty-five paise, he shall
adopt the following procedures:
(a) if he is of opinion that such instrument is duly
stamped or is not chargeable with duty, he shall certify
by endorsement therein that it is duly stamped, or that
is not so chargeable, as the case may be;
(b) if he is of the opinion that such instrument is
chargeable with duty and is not duly stamped he shall
require the payment of the proper duty or the amount
required to make up the same, together with a penalty
of five rupees; or if he thinks fit; an amount not
exceeding ten times the amount of the proper duty or
Sridhara babu. N

of the deficient portion thereof, whether such amount

exceeds or falls short of five rupees.”

DOCUMENT INSUFFICIENTLY STAMPED CANNOT

BE PERMITTED TO BE USED EVEN FOR
COLLATERAL PURPOSE
JUSTICE B. Padmaraj, of Karnataka High Court, in
the case of Jayalakshmi Reddy vs Thippanna And
Ors. Reported in ILR 2002 KAR 5163, 2003 (5)
KarLJ 263 “……..Document, which is insufficiently
stamped, cannot be permitted to be used for collateral
purpose in view of Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp
Act which clearly prescribes that no instrument
chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for
any purpose. The instrument in question is an
agreement of sale dated 4-11-1995 between the parties
viz., the vendor and vendee, whereunder the vendor
agreed to sell his immovable property for a
consideration of Rs. 15,000/- and received thereunder
a sum of Rs. 14,500/- and where in part performance
of the contract, possession of the immovable property
is delivered. Thus, the instrument in question fully
satisfies the conditions of Article 5(e)(i) and hence, the
stamp duty payable on conveyance is to be demanded
and paid in view of the said Article 5(e)(i). The
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instrument covered by Article 5(e)(i) is treated as a

conveyance and the proper stamp duty payable
thereon is the same as a conveyance (No. 20) on the
market value of the property and the Expla7 nation (II)
only says that where subsequently, conveyance is
executed, the stamp duty already paid or recovered on
the agreement shall be adjusted and it does not in any
way gives an option to the party to pay the stamp duty
subsequently. On the other hand Article 5(e)(i) clearly
indicates that the proper duty is to be paid at the stage
of agreement itself if it satisfies the conditions thereof.
Having considered the agreement as a whole in the
light of Article 5(e)(i) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, I am
of the view that it can be regarded as a conveyance as
the instrument in question is covered by Article 5(e)(i)
for which the proper duty payable under the
Karnataka Stamp Act is the same duty as a
conveyance (No. 20) on the market value of the
property. In the instant case, the proper stamp duty
payable under the Karnataka Stamp Act being not paid
and when the document was sought to be used in
evidence, the Court below was justified in passing the
impugned order which cannot be found fault with.
Hence, it needs no interference.”
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DOCUMENT WHICH IS REGISTRABLE AND NOT

TRANSACTION

Deb Dutt Seal v. Raman Lal, AIR 1970 SC 659

wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is
on the construction of the document wherein it
requires registration or not. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed that in order to require registration,
document must contain all the essentials of
transaction and one essential is that the title deeds
contain all essential of transaction. According to the
Hon'ble Supreme Court it is a document which is
registrable under the Registration Act and not a
transaction.

Government of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Amir

Ahmad Khan AIR 1961 SC 787. That was a case
where the question arose whether the Collector had
any power to impound an instrument sent to him for
adjudication under Section 31 of the Stamp Act. The
Supreme Court held that under that section, the
Collector had no such power, as under Section 31 of
the Stamp Act, the Collector could only give his
opinion as regards the duty, with which, in his
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judgment, the instrument was chargeable and once

that duty was performed by the Collector, he would
become functus officio.

GPA EXECUTED BEFORE NOTARY IS IN-VALID FOR

EXECUTING SALE DEED – GPA EXECUTED AND
AUTHENTICATED BEFORE REGISTRAR OR SUB-
REGISTRAR IS ONLY VALID

That Section 32 of the Registration act makes it

imperative that every document to be registered shall
be presented at the proper registration office by some
person executing or claiming under the same or by the
representative or assign of such person, agent,
representative or assign duly authorised by power-of-
attorney executed and authenticated in the manner
provided by Section 33. In case a document is
presented for registration by a person other than a
party to it or his legal representative or assign or by a
person who is not an agent authorised in the manner
prescribed under Section 33 such presentation is
wholly imperative and presentation of such a
document is void. That the object of Sections 32 to 35
Is to avoid commission of frauds by means of
registration under the Act by a person not duly
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authorised and it is the duty of the Court In India not

to allow the imperative provisions of the Act to be
defeated when it is proved that an agent who presented
a document for registration had not been duly
authorised in the manner prescribed by the Act to be
presented. A Registrar has no jurisdiction to register a
document unless he is moved to do so by a person who
has executed it, or claims under it. or by the
representative of such a person. That the object of the
Legislature in enacting Section 32 is to prevent a mere
outsider from presenting for registration a document
with which he has no concern, and in which he has no
interest. To allow all and sundry to present documents
for registration would be to open a door to fraud and
forgery and the Legislature, therefore. Intended to
provide that the registration should be initiated by the
document being presented for registration by a person
"having a direct relation to the deed". If the
presentation for registration was ab initio defective, in
that it did not conform to the requirements of the
provisions of the Indian Registration Act in that regard,
then, such initial defect in presentation for registration
affected the jurisdiction of the registering officer' to
effect the registration of the document.
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Further technical objection may be taken to such

power of attorney. The Section 28 of the Registration
Act, as is relevant in the context, provides that a
document affecting immovable property shall be
presented for registration in the office of a sub-
registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some
portion of the property to which such document relates
is situate.

CASE LAWS ON THE POINT

Justice Pratibha Bonnerjea, of Calcutta High Court in
the case of Goswami Malti Vahuji Maharaj vs
Purushottam Lal Poddar AIR 1984 Cal 297 Quotes
following case laws:- In AIR 1928 Pat 304
(Elizabeth" May Toomey v. Bhupendra Nath Bose) a
document was executed and registered under Sections
32 and 33 of the Registration Act on the strength of a
Power of attorney which was challenged as invalid
inter alia on the ground that in the Registrar's
certificate on the document, the concerned power-of-
attorney was described as a general power of attorney.
It was contended that it did not authorise the agent
Mr. Kennedy to admit execution or to present the same
for registration. It was held at page 313:-- "The
document purports to have been properly registered in
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accordance with the provisions of Sections 32 and 33,

Registration Act. It was the duty of the Sub-Registrar
to satisfy himself that the power-of-attorney gave Mr.
Kennedy the necessary authority and it must he
assumed until contrary is proved that he so satisfied
himself' before he admitted the document for
registration and signed the endorsement. I am
certainly not prepared to find merely because the
power-of- attorney is described as a general power in
the Sub-Registrar's endorsement that it did not
authorise Mr. Kennedy to admit execution or present
the document for registration."

Justice Prabir Kumar Samanta, of Calcutta High

Court in the case of Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar
vs Rajani Tandon And Anr. 2004 (1) CHN 517 held
“Section 32 of the said Act primarily stipulates that
every document to be registered shall be presented at
the proper Registration Office by some person
executing the same. Section 33(1)(a) of the said Act
provides that for the purpose of Section 32 i.e., for the
purpose of presentation of a document for registration,
only such Power of Attorney shall be recognised for
such presentation which has been executed by the
principal before and authenticated by the Registrar or
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Sub-Registrar within whose District or Sub-District the

principal resides. Thus upon conjoint reading of
Section 32 and Section 33(1)(a) of the said Act it
appears that while Section 32 empowers the
executants of a document to present the same for
registration without any reservation, but requires the
Power of Attorney to be executed before and
authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within
whose District or Sub-District the principal resides for
valid presentation for registration by the constituted
attorney on behalf of the principal. ….. These two
clauses read together make it clear that the agent,
representative or assignee of the principal whether
authorised or not to execute the document on behalf of
the principal will be entitled to validly present the
documents for registration only when such agent,
representative or assignee has been duly authorised by
Power of Attorney executed and authenticated in the
manner provided under Section 33(1)(a). If that
position is accepted, and it has to be accepted as such
in view of the provisions contained therein, can it be
said that only for the purpose of presentation of
document for registration which has been executed by
the principal himself such requirements would be
necessary but for the purpose of execution of the
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document on behalf of the principal such requirements

would not be necessary? Such interpretation would
make the said provisions otiose, because by a Power of
Attorney which is neither executed nor authenticated
in the manner as provided under Section 33(1)(a) of
said Act, an agent, representative or assignee of the
principal who will not be entitled to validly present a
document for registration would then be entitled not
only to present for registration but also to execute the
same on behalf of the principal. In other words each
Clauses of Section 32 has its independent application
and meaning and one has not the effect of substituted
application over the other. Therefore, Section 32 read
as a whole along with Section 33(1)(a) of the said Act
would imply that whenever by a Power of Attorney a
principal authorises his agent, representative or
assignee to execute a document on his behalf, such
Power of Attorney would be required to be
authenticated in the manner provided under Section
33(1)(a) of the said Act.”

The following privy council case laws are quoted on the

point By Justice Ratnam of Madras High Court
Judgement in the case of Sekar Mudaliar And Etc vs
Sridhara babu. N

Shajathi Bi And Anr. Reported in AIR 1987 Mad

239,

Mujibunnissa v. Abdul Rahim (1901) I.L.R. 23 A11.

233 (P.C.) : 288415 the Privy Council pointed out that
the principle in that decision would apply to that case
as well and that the principle is that a Registrar or a
Sub Registrar has no jurisdiction to register a
document, unless he is moved to do so by a person
who has executed or claims under it or by the
representative or assign duly authorised by a power of
attorney executed and authenticated in manner
prescribed in Section 33 of that Act. It was also further
pointed out that the executants of a deed attending the
Registrar or a Sub Registrar merely for the purpose of
admitting the execution, cannot be treated for the
purposes of Section 32 of Act III of 1877, as presenting
the deed for registration and their assent to the
registration will not be sufficient to give the Registrar
jurisdiction. The object of Sections 32, 33, 34 and 35
of Act III of 1877 was pointed out to be to make it
difficult for persons to commit frauds by means of
registration under the Act. The Privy Council further
pointed out the duty of the courts in this connection
and stated that Courts ought not to allow the
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imperative provisions of the Act to be defeated when as

in that case, it was proved that an agent who
presented a document for registration had not been
duly authorised in a manner prescribed by the Act to
present it.

In Dottie Karan v. Lachmi Prasad A.I.R. 1931 P.C.

52 : 33 L.W. 566 : 589 A 58 : 60 M.L.J. 441, the
validity for presentation of a document for regulation
by a power of attorney agent, the power in whose
favour contained an alteration in the date, came to be
considered. The Privy Council pointed out that the date
in the power of attorney was altered and the
registration of the mortgage was not effected in
accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act
and that the deed was not properly registered, not
being presented for registration by an authorised
agent. It was also further laid down that such a defect
was not one merely of procedure, but one of
jurisdiction in the registering officer.

In a Single Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh

High Court reported in AIR 1958 Andh Pra 107, D.
Sardar Singh v. Pissumal H. Bankers, it was held that
where a person holding a power-of-attorney executes a
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sale-deed he cannot present it for registration unless

he holds a power-or-attorney satisfying the
requirements of Section 33.

In AIR 1927 Bom 487 (FB), Sitaram v. Dharma-

sukhram, held that a person executing a document on
behalf of himself and another under a power-of-
attorney from the latter, which power does not comply
with Section 33 or the Indian Registration Act is
competent to appear before the Registrar to admit the
execution of that document.

NOTARISED GPA WHERE ITS IS ACCEPTED

Jugraj Singh & Anr vs Jaswant Singh & Ors 1971

AIR 761, 1971 SCR (1) 38 The first power of attorney
was not authenticated as required by s; 33 of the
Indian Registration Act which in the case of an Indian
residing abroad, requires that the document should be
authenticated by a Notary Public. The document only
bore the signature of a witness without anythingto
show that he was a Notary Public. In any event there
was no authentication by the Notary Public (if he was
one) in the manner which the law would consider
adequate. The second power of attorney however did
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show that it was executed before a proper Notary

Public who complied with the laws of California and
authenticated the document as required by that law,
and was also duly authenticated in accordance with
our laws. The only complaint was that the Notary
Public did not say in his endorsement that V had been
identified to his satisfaction. But that flows from the
fact that he endorsed on the document that it had
been subscribed and sworn before him. There is a
presumption of regularity of official acts and he must
have satisfied himself in the discharge of his duties
that the person who was executing it was the proper
person. This made the second power of attorney valid
and effective both under s. 85 of the Indian Evidence
Act and s. 33 of the Indian Registration Act.

BHATORI VS RAM PIARI 1996 AIR 2754 = 1996 ( 4

) Suppl. SCR 180 = 1996 (11 ) SCC 655 = 1996 ( 7 )
JT 210 = 1996 ( 5 ) SCALE 752 POWER OF
ATTORNEY HOLDER ALIENATING THE LANDS IN THE
NAME OF HIS WIFE DEFRAUDING THE LAND
OWNER – FRAUD UNRAVELS EVERYTHING 1996 SC

WHEN AGENT WANTS TO SELL PROPERTY BASED

ON POWER OF ATTORNEY IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
Sridhara babu. N

EXECUTED AND AUTHENTICATED AS DISCLOSED

SECTION 33 REGISTRATION ACT 2009 SC
RAJNI TANDON VS DULAL RANJAN GHOSH
DASTIDAR & ANR 2009 (11 ) SCR 686 = 2009 (14 )
SCC 782 = 2009 (11 ) JT 666 = 2009 (10 ) SCALE
402
Clause (a) of Section 32 specifies that a document can
be presented for registration (i) by the person executing
the document; (ii) any person claiming under the
document presented for registration and (iii) in the
case the said document is a copy of a decree or order,
any person claiming under the decree or order.

Clause (b) and (c) deal with cases where the document
is presented not by any person mentioned in (i), (ii) and
(iii) of sub clause (a) but by their agent, representative
or assign.

This is so because the use of the words "such person"

in clause (b) and (c) can be understood to mean only
persons as referred to in (i), (ii) and (iii) above. In so far
as clause (c) of Section 32 is concerned, the agents,
representative or assigns of the persons referred to in
(i), (ii) and (iii) can present the said document for
registration only if they are duly authorized by power-
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of-attorney and executed and authenticated. The

words "executed and authenticated in Section 32 (c)
would mean the procedure specified in Section 33.

The object of registration is designed to guard against

fraud by obtaining a contemporaneous publication and
an unimpeachable record of each document. The
instant case is one where no allegation of fraud was
raised. In view thereof the duty cast on the Registering
Officer under Section 32 of the Act was only to satisfy
himself that the document was executed by the person
by whom it purports to have been signed. The
Registrar upon being so satisfied and upon being
presented with a document to be registered had to
proceed with the registration of the same.
……………….. Where a deed is executed by an agent for
a principal and the same agent signs, appears and
presents the deed or admits execution before the
Registering Officer, that is not a case of presentation
under Section 32 (c) of the Act. The provisions of
Section 33 will come into play only in cases where
presentation is in terms of Section 32 (c) of the Act. In
other words, only in cases where the person signing
the document cannot present the document before the
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registering officer and gives a power of attorney to

another to present the document that the provisions of
Section 33 get attracted. It is only in such a case, that
the said power of attorney has to be necessarily
executed and authenticated in the manner provided
under Section 33 (1) (a) of the Act.

Case Law Reference:

AIR 1915 Nagpur 18 referred to Para 16

AIR 1920 Calcutta 316 referred to Para 16
AIR 1924 Allahabad 148 referred to Para 16
AIR 1938 ALL 170 referred to Para 16
AIR 1960 Punjab 226 referred to Para 16
AIR 1984 Calcutta 297 referred to Para 16
AIR 1958 A.P. 107 referred to Para 17
AIR 1961 Calcutta 540 referred to Para 17
(2006) 9 SCC 591 relied on Para 20
AIR 1950 Bombay 326 referred to Para 23

CONCLUSION:- When a person residing in india where

the registration act applies, if he executes GPA to sell
his property, in order to have legality it should be
Sridhara babu. N

executed before Registrar or Subregistrar of the place

where he resides. Without such valid GPA, notary GPA
is not valid.

In City Bank, N.A. v. Standard Chartered Bank and

othersreported in (2004) 1 SCC 12, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court holds "novation, recession or
alteration of a contract under Section 62 of the Indian
Contract Act can only be done with the agreement of
both the parties to the contract. Both the parties have
to agree to set aside the original contract with the new
contract or for recession or for alteration". Thus,
it is now too well settled that a cancellation deed,
which is executed unilaterally by one party to the
contract is illegal.
Court in Smt. Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh &
Ors. [AIR 1990 SC 1173], wherein Supreme Court held
that when a representation has been made in regard to
the character of a document, the deed would be totally
void.
WHEN SOME ONE REGISTERS SALE DEED OF
REAL OWNERS PROPERTY-WITHOUT
AUTHORISATION, CONSEQUENCES AND OPTIONS
LEFT TO REAL OWNER
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JUSTICE R Raveendran in the case of M.

Ramakrishna Reddy vs Sub-Registrar, Rajajinagar,
AIR 2000 Kant 46, ILR 1999 KAR 2033 In view of
the above, when a person who claims to be the owner
or a person interested in an immovable property, finds
that someone else has executed and registered a sale
deed or other deed in regard to his property, claiming
to be the owner or a person interested in the property,
the appropriate course for him is to file a suit for
declaration and consequential reliefs. If he is satisfied
such sale deed is executed by a person without any
title and that the deed is void ab initio, he may even
choose to ignore the same and leave it to the person
claiming title under such deed to establish his title in
appropriate proceedings. A Court of Law has the
jurisdiction to declare a document to be void or even
cancel a document. But under no circumstances, a
person claiming to be the owner of a property or a
holder of a property, can require the Registering
Authority to cancel the registration of a document or to
cancel the entry made in Book No. 1 in regard to a
registered document or to delete or remove the entry
made in the indexes relating to Book No. 1. The
Registering Officer has no such power. Consequently,
the question of the Registering Officer deleting any
Sridhara babu. N

entry either from the Indexes of Book No. 1 or the

extracts therefrom contained in the Encumbrance
Certificate by holding transaction covered by a
registered instrument is illegal or void, does not arise.
THE REGISTERED DOCUMENT WILL OPERATE,
NOT FROM THE DATE OF ACTUAL REGISTRATION,
BUT FROM THE DATE WHEN THE DEED WAS
EXECUTED

JUSTICE R Raveendran, JUSTICE K Manjunath in

the case of Veerabhadrappa And Anr. vs
Jagadishgouda ILR 2003 KAR 3042, 2002 (5) KarLJ
55 It is well-settled that when a document is duly
presented for registration (within the time prescribed),
if its registration is refused or if its registration is kept
pending, and thereafter the document is registered
either on the direction of the Registrar or competent
Court or on the Sub-Registrar satisfying himself that
there is no impediment for registration, the registered
document will operate, not from the date of actual
registration, but from the date when the deed was
executed. This principle can be gathered from the
provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 (Sections 47
and 75) and several decisions the earliest of which are
that of the Madras High Court in the case of
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Venkatarama Reddi v. Pillati Rama Reddy, ILR

1916(40) Mad. 204 and of the Privy Council in the case
of Chhotey Lal v. Collector of Moradabad, AIR 1922 PC
279 : ILR 1922(44) All. 514. A learned Single Judge of
this Court in the case of Azeezulla Sheriff alias Anwar
Pasha and Ors. v. Bhab-huthimul, 1972(2) Mys. L.J.
408 : AIR 1973 Mys. 276, held thus: "Sub-section (3) of
Section 75, only determines the deemed date of
registration in respect of documents compulsorily
registered in pursuance of an order made under
Section 75(1). Sub-section (3) of Section 75 does not
deal with the effect of registration of a document. That
topic is dealt with by Section 47 which states that once
a document is registered, it shall operate from the time
from which it would have commenced to operate if no
registration thereof had been required or made, and
not from the time of its -registration. The expression
"not from the time of its registration" used in Section
47 makes it clear that the date of registration, whether
actual or the deemed date under Section 75(3), has no
relevance whatsoever for determining the time from
which the registered document operates. Once the
document is registered, whether it is on admission of
execution under Section 35 or by way of compulsory
registration under Part XII of the Act, the provisions of
Sridhara babu. N

Section 47 are attracted for the purpose of determining

the time from which the registered document
operates". This was reiterated in the case of Rathnakar
v. H.S. Madhava Rao and Ors., 1990(4) Kar. L.J. 541 :
ILR 1991 Kar. 2190

JUSTICE R Raveendran, JUSTICE K Manjunath in

the case of Veerabhadrappa And Anr. vs
Jagadishgouda ILR 2003 KAR 3042, 2002 (5) KarLJ
55 When registration of a document is ordered to be
kept pending, or when registration of a document is
refused, and subsequently such document is ordered
to be registered, such registration takes effect as if the
document had been registered when it was first duly
presented for registration. That would mean that the
registration relates back to the date of execution. The
well-settled principle is that if there is a competition
between registered documents relating to the same
property, the document first in order of time has
priority over the other, though the former document
may not have been registered until after the latter.

JUSTICE R Raveendran, JUSTICE K Manjunath in

the case of Veerabhadrappa And Anr. vs
Sridhara babu. N

Jagadishgouda ILR 2003 KAR 3042, 2002 (5) KarLJ

55 The role played by the Sub-Registrar in registering
a document is rather limited. He has no power or
authority to examine the rival claims as to whether a
sale deed presented for registration is really a sale
deed or not, nor is he empowered to grant any
declarations in regard to binding nature of documents.
NO DIRECTION CAN BE ISSUED TO THE SUB-
REGISTRAR NOT TO REGISTER THE DOCUMENT
Justice B Singh, Justice J Shety In S. Sreenivasa
Rao v. The Sub-Registrar (Headquarters), Mysore, ILR
1990 KAR 3740, 1990 (2) KarLJ 258 Court held
that if the provisions of the Registration Act and Rules
and other laws are complied with, the Sub-Registrar is
bound to register the document and no direction can
be issued to the Sub-Registrar not to register the
document. It was also held that if any person is
interested in contending that the registered document
is invalid or illegal for any reason, he has to question
the validity before the proper forum in appropriate
proceedings. …. We also find no provision in the
Registration Act, 1908 which obliges the Sub-Registrar
to act upon any such direction and/or to investigate at
the stage of registration of a document itself, the title
of the party executing the document. We are, therefore
Sridhara babu. N

of the view that if a document is presented for

registration by the executant, and in doing so, the
executant complies with all the provisions of
Registration Act, 1908, it is not open to the Sub-
Registrar to refuse registration of the document unless
he exercises that discretion pursuant to any provision
in the Registration Act, 1908 or any other law or Rule
having the force of law. The mere registration of a
document is by itself not a proof of its validity, neither
does it follow that the executant had title to the
property, he seeks to dispose of under the document.
Matters such as relating to title have to be decided
before the appropriate forum. If any person is
interested in contending that any particular document
executed and registered under the Registration Act,
1908 is invalid or illegal for any reason whatsoever, he
!s certainly at liberty to question the validity of the
document, the title of the executant, and such other
questions before the proper forum in an appropriate
proceeding.”

Rule 145 of the Karnataka Registration Rules, provides

thus: "Protests against registration of documents.--The
Registering Officer should not entertain any petition
protesting against registration of document. Such
Sridhara babu. N

petitions, when insisted should be received and

returned immediately with an appropriate endorse
ment and no record should be kept in the office. Since
these petitions are not to be filed, their copies cannot
be granted".

LIMITATION RUN FROM THE DATE OF THE

KNOWLEDGE

Justice K.L. Manjunath, J. in the case of Leelavathi

vs M. Neelakanta Naidu, Reported in ILR 2006 KAR
4637, 2006 (6) KarLJ 617 …….if any document is
registered behind the back of the true owner in a
clandestine manner, owner of a property is not
expected to go before the Sub-Register' s Office and
verify whether any third party has executed a
document in respect of his property to a third party. In
other words, owner of the property cannot keep a
watch or stand before the Sub-Register like a Watch-
dog to verify whether any parson has executed any
document conveying his property to a third party.
From reading of Article 59, the Court has to hold that
the limitation run from the date of the knowledge.
Therefore, in order to find out the actual date of
knowledge, the evidence is required to be recorded by
Sridhara babu. N

the Trial Court as it is a mixed question of fact and

law. The date of knowledge is a question of fact and
without there being an evidence, the Trial Court was
not justified in dismissing the suit as barred by
limitation.
SUB-REGISTRAR CANNOT GO INTO QUESTION OF
TITLE AND GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS
Justice V G Gowda in the case of Sulochanamma
vs H. Nanjundaswamy 2001 (1) KarLJ 215 The Sub-
Registrar was entrusted with the duty of registering
the documents in accordance with the provisions of
the Act and he was not authorised to go into the
genuineness or otherwise of the documents presented
before him. If the documents are bogus or false, the
party affected by it will have the right to initiate both
civil and criminal proceedings to prosecute the party
who tries to have benefit from such document and also
to safeguard his right, title and interest. It was not for
either the Tahsildar or the Sub-Registrar to express
opinion as to the genuineness or otherwise of the
documents unless called upon by the Court of law or
any other authorised investigating agency. There was
no occassion for the Sub-Registrar to refer the
document to the Tahsildar when presented for the
purpose of registration. Thus, both the Tahsildar and
Sridhara babu. N

the Sub-Registrar have exceeded their jurisdiction in

the matter in submitting his report regarding
registration of the document and upon such report the
second respondent should not have made an
endorsement on the document and refused to register
the document by him.
PROOF OF REGISTERED WILL
Rani Purnima Devi And Another vs Kumar
Khagendra Narayan Dev 1962 AIR 567, 1962 SCR
Supl. (3) 195 The mere fact that the will was
registered was not by itself sufficient to dispel the
suspicions without scrutiny of the evidence of
registration. Registration would dispel the doubt as to
the genuineness of the will only if it was made in such
a manner that it was brought home to the testator that
the document of which he was admitting execution
was a will disposing of his property and the testator
thereafter admitted its execution and signed in token
thereof. In the present case, the regis- tration was
done in a perfunctory manner and the evidence did not
establish that the testator knew that the document the
execution of which he admitted before the sub-
registrar's clerk was his will. The witnesses produced
to prove registration, even if they are treated as
Sridhara babu. N

attesting witnesses, failed to prove due execution and

attestation of the will.

PRESUMPTION OF REGISTERED DOCUMENT

Prem Singh vs. Birbal (2006) 5 SCC 353 the Apex
Court has held that there is a presumption that a
register document is validly executed. A registered
document, therefore, prima facie could be valid in law.
The onus of proof thus would be on a person who
leads evidence to rebut the presumption.

NOTARIES ARE ABSOLUTELY MISUSING THE

LICENCE GRANTED TO THEM
In (Dy. General Manager, Re-designated As
Dy.Director, Isb Etc., v. Sudarshan Kumari and
Ors., .), 1996 AIR 1894, 1996 SCC (3) 763 the
Supreme Court has noticed Section 8 of the Notaries
Act. After noticing, the Supreme Court has ruled as
under: "We have seen original rejoinder affidavit filed
in this Court. They have approached one Notary who
had initially attested it and later he had cancelled it
without even verifying- the valid ground on which the
earlier attestation came to be cancelled, same was
again attestation came to be cancelled, same was again
Sridhara babu. N

attested by one Sundersham Kumar on November 1,

1994. In view of the admitted position that she herself
had not signed and asked someone who had signed it,
it would be obvious that the person who had signed
before him was not the respondent nor even the person
was known to the Notary. None identified her before
the Notary, yet he attested the affidavit. This would
show that some Notaries are absolutely misusing the
licence granted to them without any proper verification
of the persons who has signed the document and are
attesting false affidavits of impersonators."

KNOW MORE ABOUT NOTARY BEFORE

SEEKING/DOING HIS WORK
In Prataprai Trumbaklal Mehta v. Jayant Nemchand
Shah and Anr., , AIR 1992 Bom 149, the Bombay
High Court has considered once again Section 8 of the
Notaries Act, This is what the Bombay High Court
says: "A notary has to make entry in the notarial
register in respect of the notarial act of certifying copy
of document as true copy of the original. Even if one or
two columns of the said form is not applicable, entries
must be made in the said register filling up remaining
columns as are applicable and adapting the format
accordingly. He has to place his signature and seal on
Sridhara babu. N

the copy of the document and keep the copy on his

record. It is the responsibility of a notary to satisfy
himself that the original document intended to be
executed before him was executed by the person
concerned and not by someone else in the name of a
different person i.e, about the identity of the executant
of the original document by making all reasonable
inquiries including insistence of identification of a
member of the public by a legal practitioner known to
the notary. Unless the executant is known to the
notary personally, the notary must insist on written
identification of the executant by an advocate and take
signatures of both of them in token thereof in the
notarial register in order to minimise the possibility of
cheating by personification. Negligence of a notary in
the discharge of his notarial functions may jeopardise
the interest of third parties and public interest itself.
Notaries enjoy high status throughout the country and
the Courts take judicial notice of the seal of the notary
and presume that the document in question must have
been certified as true copy after taking of all possible
care by the notary in comparing the copy with its
original and due verification of the identity of the
executant and the person appearing before the notary
for the certification."
Sridhara babu. N

On 9th August 1952, the President of India granted

assent to the Notaries Act, 1952 passed by our
Parliament. The said Act came into force on 14th
December 1956 on issue of necessary notification and
publication thereof in the Government Gazette. Prior to
the passing of the said Act, the Government of India
was empowered to appoint Notary-Public under
Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act for the limited purpose of functioning of Notaries
under the said Act. Prior to the passing of the said Act,
the Master of Faculties in England also used to
appoint Notaries Public in India for performing all
notarial functions. Section 3 of the said Act empowers
the Central Government to appoint any legal
practitioner or any other person as a notary for the
whole of India or part thereof. The said Section also
empowers the State Government to appoint any legal
practitioner or other person who possess prescribed
qualifications as a notary for functioning as such
within the State. The notarial functions include
"certifying copies of documents" as true copies of the
original. Section 15 of the Notaries Act, 1952
empowers the Central Government to make rules to
carry out the purposes of the Act including prescribing
of fees payable to a notary for doing any notarial act
Sridhara babu. N

and prescribing of form of registers required to be

maintained by a notary, and particulars to be entered
therein. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section
15 of the Notaries Act, 1952, the Central Government
has framed the necessary rules. Rule 10(1) of the
Notaries Rules, 1956 prescribes that every notary shall
charge a fees for certifying copies of documents as true
copies of the original at the rate prescribed therein.
Rule 11(9) of the said Rules provides that every notary
shall grant a receipt for the fees and charges realised
by him and maintain a register showing all the fees
and charges realised for every single notarial act. Rule
12 of the said Rules prescribes for use of seal of
notary. Rule 11(2) of the said Rules in terms provides
that every notary shall maintain notarial register in
prescribed Form No. 15. The prescribed form of the
register provides for entry of every notarial act in the
notarial register and taking of signature of the person
concerned in the register and entry in respect of fees
charged. …….. Even if one or two column of the said
form is not applicable, entries must be made in the
said register filling up remaining columns as are
applicable and adapting the format accordingly. It is
the responsibility of a notary to satisfy himself that the
original document intended to be executed before him
Sridhara babu. N

was executed by the person concerned and not by

someone else in the name of a different person. It is
the responsibility of the notary to satisfy himself about
the identity of the execution of the original document
by making all reasonable inquiries including insistence
of identification of a member of the public by a legal
practitioner known to the notary. Unless the executant
is known to the notary personally, the notary must
insist on written identification of the executant by an
advocate in order to minimise the possibility of
cheating by personification. Negligence of a notary in
the discharge of his notarial functions may jeopardise
the interest of third parties and public interest itself. If
the work of comparison of copy of the document with
the original and the prima facie scrutiny of
authenticating the original involves labour for too little
a fee, the person concerned need not opt to become a
notary. Notaries, formerly known as Notary-Public,
enjoy high status throughout the couniry and the
Courts take judicial notice of the seal of the notary and
presume that the document in question must have
been certified as true copy by the notary after taking of
all possible care by the notary in comparing the copy
with its original and due verification of the identity of
Sridhara babu. N

the executant and the person appearing before the

notary for the certification.

CERTIFIED COPY OF A DOCUMENT NEED NOT BE

PROVED BY CALLING WITNESS
The document being a certified copy of a public
document need not proved by calling a witness
(vide Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojjappa
AIR 1963 SC 1633).

MODE OF PROOF OF WILL

In Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi v. Mrudula Jyoti
Rao 2007 AIR 614 = 2006 (10
) Suppl. SCR 1214 = 2006 (13 ) SCC 433 Court
held: "32. Section 63 of the Succession Act lays down
the mode and manner of execution of an unprivileged
will. Section 68 of the Evidence Act postulates the
mode and manner of which proof of execution of
document which is required by law to be attested. It in
unequivocal terms states that execution of will must be
proved at least by one attesting witness, if an attesting
witness is alive subject to the process of the court and
capable of giving evidence. A will is to prove what is
loosely called as primary evidence, except where proof
is permitted by leading secondary evidence. Unlike
Sridhara babu. N

other documents, proof of execution of any other

document under the Act would not be sufficient as in
terms of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, execution
must be proved at least by one of the attesting
witnesses. While making attestation, there must be an
animus attestandi, on the part of the attesting witness,
meaning thereby, he must intend to attest and
extrinsic evidence on this point is receivable.
33. The burden of proof that the will has been validly
executed and is a genuine document is on the
propounder. The propounder is also required to prove
that the testator has signed the will and that he had
put his signature out of his own free will having a
sound disposition of mind and understood the nature
and effect thereof. If sufficient evidence in this behalf is
brought on record, the onus of the propounder may be
held to have been discharged. But, the onus would be
on the applicant to remove the suspicion by leading
sufficient and cogent evidence if there exists any. In
the case of proof of will, a signature of a testator alone
would not prove the execution thereof, if his mind may
appear to be very feeble and debilitated. However, if a
defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised,
the burden would be on the caveator. Subject to
Sridhara babu. N

above, proof of a will does not ordinarily differ from

that of proving any other document."

In Ramabai Padmakar Patil v. Rukminibai Vishnu

Vekhande 2003 AIR 3109 = 2003 (2
) Suppl. SCR 583 = 2003 (8 ) SCC 537 Court
held: "8. A will is executed to alter the mode of
succession and by the very nature of things it is bound
to result in either reducing or depriving the share of a
natural heir. If a person intends his property to pass to
his natural heirs, there is no necessity at all of
executing a will. It is true that a propounder of the will
has to remove all suspicious circumstances. Suspicion
means doubt, conjecture or mistrust. But the fact that
natural heirs have either been excluded or a lesser
share has been given to them, by itself without
anything more, cannot be held to be a suspicious
circumstance, especially in a case where the bequest
has been made in favour of an offspring."

Madhukar D. Shende Vs. Tarabai Aba Shedage AIR

2002 SC 637 and more particularly paragraphs 8 and
9, which read as under: “8. The requirement of proof of
Sridhara babu. N

a will is the same as any other document excepting

that the evidence tendered in proof of a will should
additionally satisfy the requirement of Section 63 of
the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. If after considering the
matters before it, that is, the facts and circumstances
as emanating from the material available on record of a
given case, the court either believes that the will was
duly executed by the testator or considers the
existence of such fact so probable that any prudent
person ought, under the circumstances of that
particular case, to act upon the supposition that the
will was duly executed by the testator, then the factum
of execution of will shall be said to have been proved.
The delicate structure of proof framed by a judicially
trained mind cannot stand on weak foundation nor
survive any inherent defects therein but at the same
time ought not to be permitted to be demolished by
wayward pelting of stones of suspicion and supposition
by wayfarers and waylayers. What was told by Baron
Alderson to the jury in R. v. Hodge, 1838, 2 Lewis CC
227 may be apposite to some extent:
"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting
circumstances to one another and even in straining
them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of
Sridhara babu. N

one connected whole, and the more ingenuous the

mind of the individual, the more likely was it,
considering such matters, to overreach and mislead
itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take
for granted some fact consistent with its previous
theories and necessary to render them complete."
The conscience of the court has to be satisfied by the
propounder of will adducing evidence so as to dispel
any suspicions or unnatural circumstances attaching
to a will provided that there is something unnatural or
suspicious about the will. The law of evidence does not
permit conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal
proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise
proved by legal and convincing evidence. Well-founded
suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of
evidence but suspicion alone cannot form the
foundation of a judicial verdict -- positive or negative.
9. It is well settled that one who propounds a will must
establish the competence of the testator to make the
will at the time when it was executed. The onus is
discharged by the propounder adducing prima facie
evidence proving the competence of the testator and
execution of the will in the manner contemplated by
law. The contestant opposing the will may bring
material on record meeting such prima facie case in
Sridhara babu. N

which event the onus would shift back on the

propounder to satisfy the court affirmatively that the
testator did know well the contents of the will and in
sound disposing capacity executed the same. The
factors, such as the will being a natural one or being
registered or executed in such circumstances and
ambience, as would leave no room for suspicion,
assume significance. If there is nothing unnatural
about the transaction and the evidence adduced
satisfies the requirement of proving a will, the court
would not return a finding of "not proved" merely on
account of certain assumed suspicion or supposition.
Who are the persons propounding and supporting a
will as against the person disputing the will and the
pleadings of the parties would be relevant and of
significance.

GIFT DEED AND ITS LEGAL EFFECTS

In the case of Pankajakshy Amma v. Chandramathy

Amma reported in (2001) 1 Kerala Law Journal 438,
the Kerala High Court has dealt with the issue as to
what constitute a valid transfer as gift. The Court has
observed that "Section 123 of the Transfer of Property
Sridhara babu. N

Act deals with the manner of execution of gift deed. If

the purpose is for making a gift of immovable property,
the transfer must be effected by a registered
instrument signed by on or behalf of the donor and
attested by atleast two witnesses. By a reading of
Section 122 and 123, it can be seen that in order to
execute a valid gift, the following elements are to be
proved:-
(i) It must be a voluntary transfer.
(ii) The gift must be accepted by the donee during the
lifetime of donor.
(iii) The gift must be effected by a registered document.
It must be attested by two attestors.
If all the elements are fulfilled, there will be a valid gift,
if not, it will have no legal consequence."

As per the commentary of Sanjiva Row on Transfer of

Property Act 6th Edition - page 126 para 13),
"mutation or change of name in the revenue records
does not itself operate as a transfer. It is only evidence
of transfer".
Sridhara babu. N

OWNERSHIP CAN BE GIFTED WITHOUT ITS

POSSESSION AND RIGHT OF ENJOYMENT
K. Balakrishnan v. K.Kamalam (AIR 2004 SC 1257) It
was open to the donor to transfer by gift title and
ownership in the property and at the same time
reserve its possession and enjoyment to herself during
her lifetime. There is no prohibition in law that
ownership in property cannot be gifted without its
possession and right of enjoyment. Under Section 6 of
the Transfer of Property Act "property of any kind may
be transferred" except those mentioned in clauses (a)
to (i). Section 6 in relevant part reads thus :-
"6. What may be transferred.- Property of any kind
may be transferred, except as otherwise provided by
this Act or by any other law for the time being in
force,-
(a) ..............
(b) A mere right to re-entry for breach of a condition
subsequent cannot be transferred to any one except
the owner of the property affected thereby.
(c) ...........
(d) All interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to
the owner personally cannot be transferred by him.
(e) A mere right to sue [***] cannot be transferred.
Sridhara babu. N

CANCELLATION OF GIFT DEED IS ONLY BY WAY

OF SUIT

In Narayanamma and Anr.v. Papanna, 1988 (1 ) Kar.

LJ. 80 : ILR 1987 Kar. 3892, it was held that
cancellation of gift deed by 3rd defendant by another
registered deed was not legal and valid as per the
aforesaid decision, the remedy was to file a suit
seeking cancellation of the gift deed.

ACCEPTANCE OF GIFT

The Supreme Court in K.Balakrishnan v.

Kamalam [AIR 2004 SC 1257] held that when the gift
is in favour of a minor created by the mother, natural
guardian and she retained possession and the right of
enjoyment, ownership of property by minor can be
presumed by silent acceptance.

SUIT FOR CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENT BY A

PERSON WHO DID NOT EXECUTE THE DOCUMENT
WOULD NOT LIE
Sridhara babu. N

A Full Bench of Madras High Court in Muppudathi v.

Krishnaswami AIR 1960 Madras 1 (F.B.) when the
instrument/document is not executed by the plaintiff,
the same does not create a cloud upon the title of the
true owner nor does it create apprehension that it may
be a source of danger. Accordingly, a suit for
cancellation of instrument by a person who did not
execute the document would not lie. However, there
could be cases where instruments are executed or
purported to be executed by a party or by any person
who can bind him in certain circumstances. As pointed
out by the Madras High Court, these are : a party
executing the document or principal in respect of a
document executed by his agent, or a minor in respect
of document executed by his guardian de jure or de
facto, the reversioner in respect of a document
executed by the holder of the anterior limited estate, a
real owner in respect of a document executed by a
benamidar. In these cases, though the party may not
have executed document, if those are allowed to stand,
it may become a potential source of mischief and
danger to the title and a suit would, therefore, be
maintainable for cancellation of such document. When
the document itself is not executed by the plaintiff,
there is no necessity to have the document cancelled
Sridhara babu. N

by a Court decree, for it has no effect on the title of

true owner.

GIFT UNDER MUSLIM LAW

Transfer of Property Act are not applicable in the case
of a gift in Muslim Law. In Muslim Law there can be an
oral gift also. There are five types of gifts as per Muslim
personal law, they are:
(i) Hiba
(ii) Ariat
(iii) Sadaqa
(iv) Hiba-bil.iwaz
(v) Hiba-ba-sharat-ul-iwaz.

As far as the Muslim gift is concerned, conditions

necessary for a valid disposition is;
(i) majority
(ii) understanding
(iii) freedom
(iv) ownership of subject matter of disposition.

Hiba is a bilateral transaction, which takes effect when

the donor declares the Hiba and the donee signifies his
Sridhara babu. N

or her acceptance of the same. The ingredients to

constitute Hiba are as follows: (i) disposition must be
gratuitous.
(ii) it must effect mere transfer of the corpus of a
property by one person to another.
(iii) Transfer should be unconditional. (iv) The property
transferred must be in existence and should be
specified.

The three essential conditions to constitute the gift are

(i) declaration of gift by the donor (Igde)
(ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on
behalf of the donee (Quabul)
(iii) delivery of the subject matter of the gift by the
donor to the donee (Quada).

Hiba is an immediate and unconditional transfer of the

corpus of the property without any return. Every
Muslim, who has attained majority and has a sound
mind can make a gift. The gift is complete not on the
declaration of the date of acceptance, but on the date
on which possession is delivered. It is also essential
that for validity of a gift the donor should divest
Sridhara babu. N

himself completely of all ownership and domain over

the subject of gift. What is essential is that there
should be a gift of the corpus. If the donor reserves to
himself the right to be in possession of the corpus and
the right to enjoy the same, there cannot be a valid gift
as per the Muslim Law. But reservation of life interest
and right of residence stand on a different footing.

Katheessa Umma v. Narayanath Kunhambu (AIR 1964

SC 275) "Where a husband, a Hanafi, makes a
gift of properties, including immovable property, by a
registered deed, to his minor wife who had attained
puberty and discretion, and the gift is accepted on her
behalf by her mother in whose house the husband and
wife were residing, when the minor's father and
father's father are not alive and there is no executor of
the one or the other, such a gift must be accepted as
valid and complete although the deed is handed over to
the minor's mother and possession of the property is
not given to a guardian specially appointed for the
purpose by the civil Court. There can be no question
that there was a complete intention to divest
ownership, on the part of the husband of the donor,
and to transfer the property to the donee. If the
husband had handed over the deed to his wife, the gift
Sridhara babu. N

would have been complete under Muhammadan law

and it is impossible to hold that by handing over the
deed to his mother- in-law, in whose charge his wife
was, the husband did not complete the gift."

The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (26

of 1937) came into existence on 07.10.1937. The clear
prescription of the said Act is that in a case of gift
involving a donor and donee being Muslims, the law
applicable to them shall be the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat). Section 2 of the said Act is extracted herein
for better appreciation: "2.Application of Personal
Law to Muslims.- Notwithstanding any customs or
usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions
relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate
succession, special property of females, including
personal property inherited or obtained under contract
or gift or any other provision of Personal Law,
marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila,
zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower,
guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and
wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions
and charitable and religion endowments) the rule of
decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall
be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
Sridhara babu. N

Going by the Muslim personal law the natural

guardians are father, grand father, executor appointed
by the father or executor appointed by the grand
father. Mother was never considered to be the natural
guardian except in case of girl child till certain age.

There cannot be any quarrel about the principle of

Mahommedan Law that a gift to a person not yet in
existence is void.
Even under paragraph 141 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law
it is observed that a gift does not fail in its entirity if it
is made in favour of living persons and also in favour
of unborn persons and that it would be void only to the
extent to which interest is created in favour of unborn
persons. The Muslim law does not recognise a gift in
favour of an unborn person through the medium of
trust. (Vide paragraph 151 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law)
. Under the general law governed by the provisions of
the T.P.Act , however, gifts to unborn persons through
the medium of trust is recognised.
The normal rule of Mahomedan Law is that a gift can
be revoked at any time before delivery of possession,
subject, of course, to certain exceptions where a gift
can be revoked even after delivery of possession. But
where the donee is related to the donor within the
Sridhara babu. N

prohibited degrees, the aforesaid exception does not

apply.

GIFT IN FAVOUR OF UNBORN PERSON UNDER

HINDU LAW
In F.M. Devaru Ganapati Bhat v. Prabhakar Ganapati
Bhat - AIR 2004 SC 2665 - It was held that where a
gift was made by a woman in favour of her brother's
son then living with a stipulation that if other male
children were later born to her brother they shall also
be joint holders with the donee who was living at the
time of gift, the stipulation would not be hit by Sec. 13
of T.P. Act but would be permissible and valid in view
of Sec. 20 of T.P. Act.

GIFT IS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION

In Smt. SHAKUNTALA v. STATE OF HARYANA,
AIR 1979 SC 843, their Lordships of the Supreme
Court's observations as under: "It is therefore one of
the essential requirements of a gift that it should be
made by the donor 'without consideration'. The word
'consideration' has not been defined in the Transfer of
Property Act, but we have no doubt that it has been
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used in that Act in the same sense as in the Indian

Contract Act and excludes natural love and affection. If
it were to be otherwise, a transfer would really amount
to a sale within the meaning of Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act, or to an exchange within the
meaning of Section 118 for each party will have the
rights and be subject to the liabilities of a seller as to
what he gives and have the rights and be subject to the
liabilities of a buyer as to that which he takes."

ONCE A GIFT IS COMPLETE, THE SAME CANNOT

BE RESCINDED
Judgment reported in (2007)13 SCC 210, in the case
of Asokan vs. Lakshmikutty and others, when a
registered document was executed and the parties are
close relatives, a presumption of the correctness of the
averments in the document has to be taken and the
onus of proof would lie not on the donee but on the
donor and it was the donor to prove that the document
was not acted upon. ……. ...It is, however, beyond any
doubt or dispute that in order to constitute a valid gift
acceptance thereof is essential. The Transfer of
Property Act does not prescribe any particular mode of
acceptance. It is the circumstances attending to the
transaction which may be relevant for determining the
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question. There may be various means to prove

acceptance of a gift. The document may be handed
over to a donee, which in a given situation may also
amount to a valid acceptance. The fact that possession
had been given to the donee also raises a presumption
of acceptance. ..In the present case it is not a case that
the appellant was not aware of the recitals contained
in deeds of gift which recite the factum of handling
over of possession of the properties which were the
subject-matter of the gift. The very fact that the
defendant donors contend that the donee was to
perform certain obligations in lieu of the gift is itself
indicative of the fact that the parties were aware
thereabout. Even a silence may sometimes indicate
acceptance. It is not necessary to prove any overt act
in respect thereof as an express acceptance is not
necessary for completing the transaction of gift. ...Once
a gift is complete, the same cannot be rescinded. For
any reason whatsoever, the subsequent conduct of a
donee cannot be a ground for rescission of a valid gift.
The said deeds of gift were executed out of love an
affection as well as on the ground that the donee is the
son and successor of the denor and so as to enable
him to live a good family life. The donors cannot later
turn round and say that he was to fulfil a promise. It is
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one thing to say that the execution of the deed is based

on a aspiration or belief, but it is another thing to say
that the same constituted an onerous gift. What,
however, was necessary is to prove undue influence so
as to bring the case within the purview of Section 16 of
the Contract Act. It was not done. ...It has been
submitted by the donors that it would be open to them
to prove that in fact no possession had been handed
over. This case is concerned with the construction of
recitals made in a registered document. When a
registered document is executed and the executors are
aware of the terms and nature of the document, a
presumption arises in regard to the correctness
thereof. When such a presumption is raised coupled
with the recitals in regard to putting the donee in
possession of the property, the onus is on the donor
and not on the done.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DEBT

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syndicate Bank

v. R. Veeranna and Ors., [2003] 2 Supreme Court
Cases 15 wherein it is held that unqualified
acknowledgment of liability by a party not only saves
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the period of limitation but also gives a cause of action

to the plaintiff to base its claim.

EFFECT OF REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENT

Honourable Apex Court in SURAJ LAMP &
INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. vs. STATE OF HARAYANA
[(2009) 7 SCC 363]. The following passage is apposite:
"18.Registration provides safety and security to
transactions relating to immovable property, even if
the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity
and public exposure to documents thereby preventing
forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and
execution of documents. Registration provides
information to people who may deal with a property, as
to the nature and extent of the rights which persons
may have, affecting that property. In other words, it
enables people to find out whether any particular
property with which they are concerned, has been
subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is
or are the person(s) presently having right, title, and
interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and
perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or
relevance by recording them, where people may see the
record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars
are and as far as land is concerned what obligations
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exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person

dealing with immovable property can rely with
confidence upon the statements contained in the
registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and
complete account of all transactions by which the title
to the property may be affected and secure
extracts/copies duly certified."

ONEROUS CONTRACTS

In M/s Alopi Parshad and Sons. Ltd. Vs. Union of

India - (1960) 2 SCR 793, Court clarified that the
courts have no power to absolve a party from liability
to perform a contract merely because the performance
becomes onerous; the expressed covenants in a
contract cannot be ignored only on account of
unexpected and uncontemplated turn of events after
the contract. However, a consideration of the terms of
the contract in the light of circumstances, when it was
made, shows that the parties never agreed to be bound
in a fundamentally different situation which
unexpectedly emerges, the contract ceases to bind at
that point, not because the Court in its discretion
considers it just and reasonable to qualify the terms of
the contract but because on its true construction it
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does not apply in that situation. Here again, it has to

be noted that the doctrine of frustration can only apply
to executory contracts and not the transactions which
have created a demise in praesenti (See, H.V. Rajan Vs.
C.N. Gopal and Ors. - AIR 1975 SC 261, 265).

In Raja Dhruv Dev Chand Vs. Harmohinder Singh &

Anr., (1968) 3 SCR 339, their Lordships held - "There
is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance
and an executory contract, and events which discharge
a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer".

SETTLEMENT DEED

A.Sreenivasa Pai and another v. Saraswathi Ammal

alias G. Kamala Bai, AIR 1965 SC 1359 in which the
Supreme Court considered the document to be a
settlement deed and held that the death of the ultimate
beneficiary during the life time of the life estate holder
will not have the effect of defeating the right which had
already vested on the beneficiary.
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PLEA OF UNDUE INFLUENCE TO BE

SPECIFFICALLY PLEADED

Ku. Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 1274

wherein it was held that absence of consideration in a
gift is an essential element. In Afsar Sheikh v. Soleman
Bibi, (1976) 2 SCC 142 : (AIR 1976 SC 163) it was held
that plea of undue influence cannot be made out from
the general allegations in the plaint if not specifically
pleaded.

In Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das

Mushib, AIR 1967 SC 878 it was held that no
presumption of undue influence can arise merely
because parties were nearly related to each other or
merely because donor was an old or of weak
character.

FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AS TO THE

CHARACTER OF THE DOCUMENT

Smt. Dularia Devi vs Janardan Singh & Ors 1990

AIR 1173, 1990 SCR (1) 799 In the instant case, the
plaintiff-appellant was totally ignorant of the mischief
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played upon her. She hon- estly believed that the

instrument which she executed and got registered was
a gift deed in favour of her daughter. She believed that
the thumb impressions taken from her were in respect
of that single document. She did not know that she
had executed two documents, one of which alone was
the gift deed, but the other was a sale of the property
in favour of the defendants. This was, therefore, a case
of fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of
the document executed by her and not merely as to its
contents or as to its legal effect. The plaintiff-appellant
never intended to sign what she did sign. She never
intended to enter into the contract to which she
unknowingly became a party. Her mind did not
accompany her thumb impressions. It was thus a
totally void transaction.

In Ningawwa v. Byrappa, 1968 AIR 956, 1968 SCR

(2) 797, Court referred to the well established
principle that a contract or other transaction induced
or tendered by fraud is not void, but only voidable at
the option of the party defrauded. The transaction
remains valid until it was avoid. This Court then said:
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(SCR p.801) "The legal position will be different if there

is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the
contents of the document but as to its character. The
authorities make a clear distinction between
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents
thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held
that the transaction is void, while in the case of the
latter, it is merely voidable. In Foster v. Mackinon, the
action was by the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The
defendant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a
fraudulent representation by the acceptor that he was
signing a guarantee. In holding that such a plea was
admissible, the court observed: It (signature) is invalid
not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists,
but on the ground that the mind of the sign did not
accompany the signature; in other words, that he
never intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation
of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is
appended... The defendant never intended to sign that
contract or any such contract. He never intended to
put his name to any instrument that then was or
thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived,
not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the 'actual
contents' of the instrument."
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REGISTRATION MAY TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THE

EXECUTANT REALLY KNOWING WHAT HE WAS
REGISTERING
In Purnima Devi v. Khagendra Narayan, 1962 AIR
567, 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 195 was a case of Will
wherein also the effect of registration came for
consideration. In paragraph 23 of the Judgment their
Lordships held thus. .... the mere fact that a will is
registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all
suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without
submitting the evidence of registration to a close
examination. If the evidence as to registration on a
close examination reveals that the registration was
made in such a manner that it was brought home to
the testator that the document of which he was
admitting execution was a Will disposing of his
property and thereafter he admitted its execution and
signed it in token thereof, the registration will dispel
the doubt as to the genuineness of the Will. But if the
evidence as to registration shows that is was done in a
perfunctory manner, that the office registering the Will
did not read it over to the testator or did not bring
home to him that he was admitting the execution of a
Will or did not satisfy himself in some other way (as,
for example, by seeing the testator reading the Will)
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that the testator knew that it was a Will the execution

of which he was admitting, the fact that the Will was
registered would not be of much value. It is not
unknown that registration may take place without the
executant really knowing what he was registering."

VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS

The transaction may be void if not enforceable at law

as being destitute to legal effect. It has no legal
existence and, thus, ceases to be enforceable by law,
as defined under Section 2(g) of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 and such, transactions are dealt with under
the provisions of Sections 20, 23, 26, 27. 28 and 29 of
the Contract Act. A transaction or document may be
voidable but it remains enforceable at law at the option
of one or more party thereto, but not at the option of
any other stranger. It may include where an agreement
is arrived at by coercion, undue influence, by playing
fraud or misrepresentation and in such a case it is for
the party seeking to avoid it to set up the defence and
if it is not done, the agreement would be a binding
contract, A document may be unenforceable for
procedural reasons, i.e.. for deficiency of stamps, for
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want of registration or not being executed within the

limitation; but in all such cases it does not become
void, it may be merely voidable. Where an agreement in
substance owing to flaws in the contract or incapacity
of the parties or want of free consented., such
agreements are valid unless they are impeached by the
said party. (Vide : Shibha Prasad Singh v. Srish
Chandra, AIR 1949 PC 297; Kalyanpur Lime Works
Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 SC 165;
and Dhanyalakshmi Rice Mills v. Commissioner of
Civil Supplies, AIR 1976 SC 2243).

In Immani Appa Rao v. G. Ramahngamurthi, AIR 1962

SC 370, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that
while considering a case where a plea of fraud has
been raised, the Court must be conditioned solely by
consideration of public policy.

In Ammathyee alias Perumalakkal v. Kumaresan. AIR

1967 SC 569, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that the power of gift is much more circumscribed in
case of ancestral property. A Hindu father or any other
Managing Member has power to make a gift of
ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits
for pious purposes. In such a case where the gift is
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challenged on the ground of capacity to alienate by

gift, it was found that it was beyond the capacity of the
father-in-law to make a gift of such a share of
immovable property in favour of the daughter-in-law
specially when the father-in-law himself could not
make such a gift and, therefore, the transaction was
found to be invalid.

Any agreement which is opposed to Personal Law of

the parties or opposed to public policy, is void
(Vide: C.N. Arunachala Mudaliyar v. C.A. Muruganatha
Mudaliar, AIR 1953 SC 495 and S.R. Nayak v. Union of
India, AIR 1991 SC 1420).

In Yamuna Bai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantarao Shivram

Adhav, (1988) 1 SCC 530 : (AIR 1988 SC 644), the
term "void" was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in reference to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956
and it was held that a marriage, which is void under
Section 11, can be held to be so without a formal
declaration by a Court in a proceeding for the reason
that the marriage can be treated as null and void from
its very inception. In that case, the marriage was
nullity as it was found to be in contravention of the
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provisions and conditions, specified in Clause (1)(iv)

and (v) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Any agreement providing for wagering is void as it is

hit by public policy and would be hit by the provisions
of Section 23 of the Contract Act. In Firm of
Pratapchand Nopaji v. Firm of Kotrike Venkata Setty &
Sons, AIR 1975 SC 1223, the Supreme Court has held
as under :-- "If an agreement is merely collateral to
another or constitutes an aid facilitating the carrying
out of the object of other agreement, which, though
void, is not in itself prohibited within the meaning of
Section 23 of the Contract Act, it may be enforced as a
collateral agreement. If, on the other hand, it is part of
a mechanism meant to defeat what the law has
actually prohibited, the Courts will not countenance a
claim based upon the agreement because it will be
tainted with an illegality of the object sought to be
achieved which is hit by Section 23 of the Contract
Act. It is well established that the object of an
agreement cannot be said to be forbidden or unlawful
merely because the agreement results in what is
known as a "void contract." A void agreement, when
coupled with other facts, may become part of a
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transaction which creates legal rights, but this is not

so if the object is prohibited or "mala in se."

In Raghubachamani Prasad Naraih Singh v. Ambica

Prasad Singh, AIR 1971 SC 776, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that in any event a alienation by the
Manager of the Joint Hindu Family even without legal
necessity, is voidable and not void.

In Nawab Khan Abbas Khan v. State of Gujarat, AIR

1974 SC 1471, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
referred to and relied upon the judgment of the House
of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwind (1963) 2 All ER 66,
wherein it has been observed as under (para 10 of
AIR):-- "Voidable acts are those which can be
invalidated in certain proceedings; these proceedings
are specially formulated for the purpose of directly
challenging such act....... On the other hand, when an
act is not merely voidable but void, it is a nullity and
can be discarded and impeached in any proceeding,
before any Court or Tribunal and whenever it is relied
upon. In other words, it is subject to collateral
attack..... When Court holds an act a nullity, is that it
is not a declaration of nullity; it is a true annulment,
an annulment with retroactive force."
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Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in G. Annamalai Pillai v. District Revenue
Officer (1993) 2 SCC 402 : (1993 AIR SCW 2618),
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance
upon a catena of judgments and held that a void
agreement must fail to receive legal recognition or
sanction for the reason that the agreement was wholly
destitute of legal efficacy. A voidable agreement stands
on a different footing as it is not a nullity but its
operation is conditional and not absolute.

The same view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in State of Kerala v. ML K. Kunhikannan, (1996)
1 SCC 435 : (AIR 1996 SC 906), wherein the Supreme
Court has held that there are no degrees in nullity.

The issue of applicability of this Rule 7, Order 11,

C.P.C. was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, AIR 1977 SC
2421, and it was observed that the Court must give a
meaningful reading to the plaint and if it is manifestly
vexatious or merit less and in the sense of not
disclosing a clear right to sue, the Court may exercise
its power under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. However, the
Court has to take care that the grounds mentioned
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therein must be fulfilled and while doing so, the Court

does not have to decide the legal issues. However, in a
case where the validity of a particular document itself
is under challenge, the same cannot be considered and
decided. The application under Order 7, Rule 11,
C.P.C. cannot be allowed.

REQUIREMENT OF ONE ATTESTING WITNESS TO

PROVE A DOCUMENT

Rosammal Issetheenammal Fernandez (dead) by Lrs

and others v. Joosa Mariyan Fernandez and others )
AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2857 wherein the Apex
Court has held '9. ... The main Part of Section 68 of the
Indian Evidence Act puts on obligation on the party
tendering any document that unless at lest one
attesting witness has been called for proving such
execution the same shall not be used in evidence'.

ONCE DOCUMENT IS ADMITTED SUCH ORDER IS

FINAL

Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 1655 (Javer

Chand v. Pukhraj Surana) that; “Once a document has
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been marked as an exhibit in the case and has been

used by the parties in examination and cross-
examination of their witnesses, S.36 comes into
operation. Once a document has been admitted in
evidence, as aforesaid, it is not open either to the trial
court itself or to a Court of Appeal or Revision to go
behind that order. Such an order is not one of those
judicial orders which are liable to be reviewed or
revised by the same Court or a Court of superior
jurisdiction.”

DUTY OF COURT TO EXAMINE PROBATIVE VALUE

OF EVERY DOCUMENT

Apex Court in H.Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam (2011 (4)

SC 240) `Admissibility of a document is one thing and
its positive value quite another these two aspects
cannot be combined. A document may be admissible
and yet may not carry any conviction and the weight of
its probative value may be nil .......... Therefore, it is
the duty of the Court to examine whether documents
produced in the Court or contents thereof have any
probative value.
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In State of Bihar and Ors. v. Sri Radha Krishna Singh

& Ors., AIR 1983 SC 684, held as under: “Admissibility
of a document is one thing and its probative value
quite another - these two aspects cannot be combined.
A document may be admissible and yet may not carry
any conviction and the weight of its probative value
may be nil.” ………….Where a report is given by a
responsible officer, which is based on evidence of
witnesses and documents and has “a statutory flavour
in that it is given not merely by an administrative
officer but under the authority of a Statute, its
probative value would indeed be very high so as to be
entitled to great weight. The probative value of
documents which, however ancient they may be, do
not disclose sources of their information or have not
achieved sufficient notoriety is precious little.”

In Madan Mohan Singh & Ors. v. Rajni Kant

& Anr., AIR 2010 SC 2933, Court examined a
case as a court of fifth instance. The statutory
authorities and the High Court has determined the
issues taking into consideration a large number of
documents including electoral rolls and school leaving
certificates and held that such documents were
admissible in evidence. This Court examined the
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documents and contents thereof and reached the

conclusion that if the contents of the said documents
are examined making mere arithmetical exercise it
would lead not only to improbabilities and
impossibilities but also to absurdity. This Court
examined the probative value of the contents of the
said documents and came to the conclusion that Smt.
Shakuntala, second wife of the father of the contesting
parties therein had given birth to the first child two
years prior to her own birth. The second child was
born when she was 6 years of age; the third child was
born at the age of 8 years; the fourth child was born at
the age of 10 years; and she gave birth to the fifth child
when she was 12 years of age. Therefore, it is the duty
of the court to examine whether documents produced
in the Court or contents thereof have any probative
value.

PRESUMTIVE AND PROBATIVE VALUE OF ENTRIES

MADE IN OFFICIAL RECORD

(2010) 9 SCC 209 [ Madan Mohan Singh and others vs.

Rajni Kant and another “Therefore, a document may
be admissible, but as to whether the entry contained
therein has any probative value may still be required to
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be examined in the facts and circumstances of a

particular case. The aforesaid legal proposition stands
fortified by the judgments of this Court in Ram Prasad
Sharma Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 326; Ram
Murti Vs. State of Haryana AIR 1970 SC 1029;
Dayaram & Ors. Vs. Dawalatshah & Anr.
AIR 1971 SC 681; Harpal Singh & Anr. Vs. State
of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 361; Ravinder Singh
Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584; Babloo Pasi
Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2008) 13 SCC
133; Desh Raj Vs. Bodh Raj AIR 2008 SC 632; and
Ram Suresh Singh Vs. Prabhat Singh @Chhotu Singh
& Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 681. In these cases, it has
been held that even if the entry was made in an official
record by the concerned official in the discharge of his
official duty, it may have weight but still may require
corroboration by the person on whose information the
entry has been made and as to whether the entry so
made has been exhibited and proved. The standard of
proof required herein is the same as in other civil and
criminal cases. …………….. Such entries may be in any
public document, i.e. school register, voter list or
family register prepared under the Rules and
Regulations etc. in force, and may be admissible under
Section 35 of the Evidence Act as held in Mohd. Ikram
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Hussain Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1964 SC

1625; and Santenu Mitra Vs. State of West Bengal AIR
1999 SC 1587. …………….. So far as the entries made
in the official record by an official or person authorised
in performance of official duties are concerned, they
may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence
Act but the court has a right to examine their
probative value. The authenticity of the entries would
depend on whose information such entries stood
recorded and what was his source of information. The
entry in School Register/School Leaving Certificate
require to be proved in accordance with law and the
standard of proof required in such cases remained the
same as in any other civil or criminal cases.
……………. For determining the age of a person, the
best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported
by un-impeccable documents. In case the date of birth
depicted in the school register/certificate stands belied
by the un-impeccable evidence of reliable persons and
contemporaneous documents like the date of birth
register of the Municipal Corporation, Government
Hospital/Nursing Home etc, the entry in the school
register is to be discarded. (Vide: Brij Mohan Singh Vs.
Priya Brat Narain Sinha & Ors. AIR 1965 SC 282;
Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit AIR 1988 SC
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1796; Vishnu Vs. State of Maharashtra (2006) 1 SCC

283; and Satpal Singh Vs. State of Haryana JT 2010
(7) SC 500). …………………. If a person wants to rely on
a particular date of birth and wants to press a
document in service, he has to prove its authenticity in
terms of Section 32(5) of the Evidence Act by
examining the person having special means of
knowledge, authenticity of date, time etc. mentioned
therein. (Vide: Updesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Prithvi
Singh & Ors., (2001) 2 SCC 524; and State of
Punjab Vs. Mohinder Singh, AIR 2005 SC 1868).
…………………. In S. Khushboo Vs. Kanniammal
& Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 600, this Court, placing
reliance upon its earlier decision in Lata Singh Vs.
State of U.P. & Anr. AIR 2006 SC 2522, held that
live-in-relationship is permissible only in unmarried
major persons of heterogeneous sex. …………….. In
S.P.S. Balasubramanyam Vs. Suruttayan @ Andali
Padayachi & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 756, this Court
held that if man and woman are living under the same
roof and cohabiting for a number of years, there will be
a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act,
that they live as husband and wife and the children
born to them will not be illegitimate. …………… The
courts have consistently held that the law presumes in
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favour of marriage and against concubinage, when a

man and woman have cohabited continuously for a
number of years. However, such presumption can be
rebutted by leading unimpeachable evidence. (Vide:
Mohabbat Ali Khan Vs. Mohd. Ibrahim Khan, AIR 1929
PC 135; Gokalchand Vs.. Parvin Kumar, AIR 1952 SC
231; S.P.S. Balasubramanyam Vs. Suruttayan, (1994)
1 SCC 460; Ranganath Parmeshwar Panditrao Mali Vs.
Eknath Gajanan Kulkarni, (1996) 7 SCC 681; and
Sobha Hymavathi Devi Vs. Setti Gangadhara Swamy
& Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 244).

AGREEMENT CAN BE SPELT OUT FROM MUTUAL

CORRESPONDENCE OF PARTIES

AIR 1999 SC 504 [M/s.Rickmers Verwaltung Gimb H

v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.]; An agreement, even if
not signed by the parties, can be spelt out from
correspondence exchanged between the parties: "... it
is the duty of the Court to construe correspondence
with a view to arrive at a conclusion whether there was
any meeting of mind between the parties, which could
create a binding contract between them but the Court
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is not empowered to create a contract for the parties by

going outside the clear language used in the
correspondence, except insofar as there are some
appropriate implications of law to be drawn. Unless
from the correspondence, it can unequivocally and
clearly emerge that the parties were ad idem to the
terms, it cannot be said that an agreement had come
into existence between them through correspondence.
The Court is required to review what the parties wrote
and how they acted and from that material to infer
whether the intention as expressed in correspondence
was to bring into existence a mutually binding
contract. The intention of the parties is to be gathered
only from the expressions used in the correspondence
and the meaning it conveys and in case it shows that
there had been meeting of mind between the parties
and they had actually reached an agreement, upon all
material terms, then and then alone can it be said that
a binding contract was capable of being spelt out from
the correspondence".

GIFT DEED
Sridhara babu. N

2007 (13) SCR 901 ASOKAN VS LAKSHMIKUTTY

& ORS.

Transfer of Property Act; Ss.122 & 123: Gift-Donor-

parents executed a deed of gift transferring possession
of property gifted in favour of his son-donee-Averment
in a deed of gift in regard to handing over of
possession-Whether amounts to sufficient proof of
acceptance thereof by donee-Held:-

In order to constitute a valid gift, acceptance thereof is

essential-Even a silence may sometimes indicate
acceptance-Overt act not necessary as express
acceptance need not be required for completing the
transaction of gift-When a registered document is
executed, presumption arises in regard to the
correctness thereof -Onus lies on the donor and not on
the donee-The fact that possession had been given to
donee raises a presumption of acceptance-Thus, the
gift in question is a valid gift-Once a gift is complete, it
cannot be rescinded on the ground of subsequent
conduct of the donee.

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:

Sridhara babu. N

Gifts do not contemplate payment of any consideration

or compensation. It is, however, beyond any doubt or
dispute that in order to constitute a valid gift
acceptance thereof is essential. However, the Transfer
of Property Act does not prescribe any particular mode
of acceptance. It is the circumstances attending to the
transaction which may be relevant for determining the
question. There may be various means to prove
acceptance of a gift. The document may be handed
over to a donee, which in a given situation may also
amount to a valid acceptance. The fact that possession
had been given to the donee also raises a presumption
of acceptance.

While determining the question as to whether delivery

of possession would constitute acceptance of a gift or
not, the relationship between the parties plays an
important role. It is not a case that the appellant was
not aware of the recitals contained in deeds of gift. The
very fact that the parents-donor contended that the
donee, son, was to perform certain obligations, is itself
indicative of the fact that the parties were aware
thereabout. Even a silence may sometime indicate
acceptance. It is not necessary to prove any overt act
Sridhara babu. N

in respect thereof as an express acceptance is not

necessary for completing the transaction of gift.

When a registered document is executed and the

executors are aware of the terms and nature of the
document, a presumption arises in regard to the
correctness thereof. When such a presumption is
raised coupled with the recitals in regard to putting the
donee in possession of the property, the onus should
be on the donor and not on the donee.

The deeds of gift categorically state, as an ingredient

for a valid transaction, that the property had been
handed over to the donee and he had accepted the
same. Even assuming that the legal presumption
therefore may be raised, the same is a rebuttable one
but in a case of this nature, a heavy onus would lie on
the donors.

Once a gift is complete, the same cannot be rescinded.

For any reason whatsoever, the subsequent conduct of
a donee cannot be a ground for rescission of a valid
gift.
Sridhara babu. N

Pandit Chunchun Jha vs Sheikh Ebadat Ali And Anr.

AIR 1954 SC 345, The question whether a given
transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale
outright with a condition of repurchase is a vexed one
which invariably gives rise to trouble and litigation.
There are numerous decision on the point and much
industry has been expended in some of the High
Courts in collating and analysing them. We think that
is a fruitless task because two documents are seldom
expressed in identical terms and when it is necessary
to consider the attendant circumstances the
imponderable variables which that brings in its train
make it impossible to compare one case with another.
Each must be decided on its own facts. But certain
broad principles remain. ….. The first is that the
intention of the parties is the determining factor
………….. But there is nothing special about that in
this class of cases and here, as in every other case
where a document has to be construed, the intention
must be gathered, in the first place, from the
document itself. If the words are express and clear,
effect must be given to them and any extraneous
enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled
out. The real question in such a case is not what the
Sridhara babu. N

parties intended or meant but what is the legal effect of

the words which they used. If, however, there is
ambiguity in the language employed, then it is
permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances
to determine that was intended.

Hanumappa Bhimappa Koujageri vs Bhimappa

Sangappa Asari ILR 1996 KAR 1517, 1996 (5)
KarLJ 67 It is clear from the just above observations
of the Supreme Court that the intention of the parties
is to be gathered from the document itself, an
extraneous enquiry of what was thought is ruled out.
Sometimes, there may be a cause extraneous enquiry
where a claim is made that the document is void or
illegal on the ground that a different document than
the document which was intended was got executed.
But, this is not so here in the present case. Here even
in the written statement, it is admitted that the Sale
Deed was executed. It was also stated that it was
otherwise agreed or intended, it will operate as
security.

Harichand Mancharam v. Govind Luxman Gokhale,

AIR 1923 PC 47. Whether an agreement is a completed
Sridhara babu. N

bargain or merely a provisional arrangement depends

on the intention of the parties as deducible from the
language used by the parties on the occasion when the
negotiations take a concrete shape.... The fact of a
subsequent agreement being prepared may be evidence
that the previous negotiation did not amount to an
agreement, but the mere fact that persons wish to have
a formal agreement drawn up does not establish the
proposition that they cannot be bound by a previous
agreement.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT AFTER

OBTAINING REQUISITE PERMISSION AND
LIMITATION

Rojasara Ramjibhai Dahyabhai v. Jani Narottamdas

Lallubhai (dead) by L.Rs and Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1912 :
(1986)3 SCC 300. Under an agreement of sale there
was a precondition to obtain the permission of the
authorities to use the subject property as a village site,
for the execution of a sale deed. The Court held that
such a contract was not a contingent contract and that
a suit for specific performance filed within 3 years after
obtaining permission was not barred by limitation.
Sridhara babu. N

‘AGREEMENT TO LEASE’ AND ‘AGREEMENT OF

LEASE’

State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Atur India Private

Limited, 1994 SCC (2) 497, JT 1994 (1) 640 . While
considering the distinction between an agreement to
lease and an agreement of lease has held as follows.--
"We will now turn to Indian law. Mulla in the Transfer
of Property Act (7th Edition), at page 647 dealing with
agreement to lease states as under "An agreement to
lease may effect an actual demise in which case it is a
lease. On the other hand, the agreement to lease may
be a merely executory instrument binding the parties,
the one, to grant, and the other, to accept a lease in
the future. As to such an executory agreement the law
in England differs from that in India. An agreement to
lease not creating a present demise is not a lease and
requires neither writing nor registration. As to an
executory agreement to lease, it was at one time
supposed that an intending lessee, who had taken
possession under an agreement to lease capable of
specific performance, was in the same position as if the
lease had been executed and registered. These cases
Sridhara babu. N

have, however, been rendered obsolete by the decisions

of the Privy Council that the equity in Walsh v.
Lonsdale does not apply in India".

DOCUMENT AND ITS LEGAL CONSTRUCTION

Supreme Court in the case of Subbegowda (Dead) by

Lr. v. Thimmegowda (Dead)by Lrs., JT 2004 (5) SC
274, has held that the question of considering
construction of a document is to be decided by finding
out the intention of the executant, firstly from a
comprehensive reading of the terms of the document
itself, and the other circumstances on the basis of
which the document is executed. It has been held by
the Supreme Court that when the intention is clear
then the construction of the document has to be done
in such a manner that the intention of the parties are
given effect to. If the document in hand is considered
in the light of the aforesaid, it has to be held that it is a
conveyance transferring right of the property and
possession to the petitioner.

Mushir Mohammed Khan v. Sajida Bano AIR 2000 SC

1085 was not the case related to one composite
Sridhara babu. N

document. It was a case of three documents viz. Sale

Deed, Agreement of recovenyance and Rent Note.
In Tamboli Raman Lal Moti Lal v. Ghanchi Chiman Lal
Keshavlal AIR 1992 SC 1236, there was no
relationship of debtor and creditor between the parties
as is existed in the instant case.

INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENT - WHERE AN

ABSOLUTE TITLE IS GIVEN IN CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS AND THE LATER
PROVISIONS TRENCH ON THE SAME, THAT THE
LATER-PROVISIONS HAVE TO BE HELD TO BE
VOID
Decision reported in A.I.R 1963 S.C 890 1.
Ramakishorelal and Anr. v. Kamalnarayan, which was
followed in . The principle settled therein reads thus:
"The golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to
ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument
after considering all the words in their ordinary,
natural sense. To ascertain his intention, a Court has
to consider the relevant portion of the document as a
whole and also to take into account the circumstances
under which the particular words were used. Very
Sridhara babu. N

often the status and the training of the parties using

the words have to be taken into consideration. It has to
be borne in mind that very many words are used in
more than one sense and that sense differs in different
circumstances. Again, even where a particular word
has, to a trained conveyancer a clear and definite
significance and one can be sure about the sense in
which such conveyancer would use it, it may not be
reasonable and proper to give the same strict
interpretation of the word when used by one who is not
so equally skilled in the art of conveyancing.
Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as
regards disposition of properties, whether they are
testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that
there is clear conflict between what is stated in one
part of the document and in another. In cases of such
a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should
prevail and the later direction of disposition should be
disregarded as unsuccessful attempt to restrict the
title already given. It is clear, however that an attempt
should always be made to read the two parts of the
document harmoniously, if possible; it is only when
this is not possible e.g. where an absolute title is given
in clear and unambiguous terms and the later
Sridhara babu. N

provisions trench on the same, that the later-

provisions have to be held to be void."

RELEASE DEED RELEASES RIGHTS WHICH WERE

CONTEMPLATED IN THE DEED

In CHINNATHAYI v. KULASEKHARA PANDIYA

NAICKER AND ORS. 1952 AIR 29, 1952 SCR 241 , the
Supreme Court has stated the principle “It is well
settled that general words of a release do not mean
release of rights other than those then put up and
have to be limited to the circumstances which were in
the contemplation of the parties when it was
executed.”

CONSTRUCTION OF COMPROMISE DECREE

In HABIB MIAN AND ANR. v. MUKHTAR AHMAD AND

ANR. AIR 1969 All 296. (FB), a Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court has stated the principle thus: "I
think it necessary at the outset to examine the
provisions of the compromise decree and to ascertain
how the several rights and liabilities between the
parties have been distributed under the decree. In
Sridhara babu. N

doing so, the principles of construction of a

compromise decree must be borne in mind. There is
authority for the proposition that a compromise decree
is a creature of the agreement on which it is based and
is subject to all the incidents of such agreement, that it
is but a contract with the command of a Judge
superadded to it and in construing its provisions the
fundamental principles governing the construction of
contracts are applicable." "One of the cardinal
principles in the construction of contracts is that the
entire contract must be taken as constituting an
organic synthesis, embodying provisions which
balance in the sum of reciprocal rights and obligations.
It is through the prism of that principle that the terms
of the compromise decree must be analysed."

In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. Vs. Assistant

Charity Commissioner and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 137,
this Court held thus: "15. There cannot be any
compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and
inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the
plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run
counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation
Sridhara babu. N

according to which a pleading has to be read as a

whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible
to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of
the context in isolation. Although it is the substance
and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the
pleading has to be construed as it stands without
addition or subtraction or words or change of its
apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party
concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor
and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the
same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic
approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-
splitting technicalities."

SUIT FOR CANCELLATION OF DOCUMENT

Prem Singh and Others vs. Birbal and Others, (2006) 5

SCC 353. In this case, while writing the Judgment on
behalf of the Division Bench, His Lordship the Hon'ble
Mr.JUSTICE S.B.SINHA at Paragraph Nos.14 to 16 has
held as under: 14. A suit for cancellation of instrument
is based on the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific
Relief Act, which reads as under: “31. When
cancellation may be ordered.-(1) Any person against
whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and
Sridhara babu. N

who has reasonable apprehension that such

instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious
injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable
and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and
order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the
instrument has been registered under the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall
also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose
office the instrument has been so registered; and such
officer shall note on the copy of the instrument
contained in his books the fact of its
cancellation.”…….15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidable
documents. It provides for a discretionary relief. ……
16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its
cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a
decree for setting aside the same would not be
necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the law,
as it would be a nullity.”

SALE AGREEMENT IS NOT AN ENCUMBRANCE ON

PROPERTY 2011 JULY SC
Sridhara babu. N

JUSTICE R.V. Raveendran, & JUSTICE K.S. Panicker

Radhakrishnan in Saradamani Kandappan vs S.
Rajalakshmi & Ors 2011 JULY SC An `encumbrance'
is a charge or burden created by transfer of any
interest in a property. It is a liability attached to the
property that runs with the land. [See National Textile
Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra - AIR 1977 SC
1566 and State of H.P. vs. Tarsem Singh - 2001 (8)
SCC 104]. Mere execution of an MOU, agreeing to
enter into an agreement to sell the property, does not
amount to encumbering a property. Receiving
advances or amounts in pursuance of an MOU would
not also amount to creating an encumbrance.

REGISTRAR OF DEEDS IS NOT AN ATTESTING

WITNESS 2004 SC

Bhagat Ram And Anr. vs Suresh And Ors. AIR 2004

SC 436, The Registrar of Deeds who had registered a
document in discharge of his statutory duty, does not
become an attesting witness to the deed solely on
account of his having discharged the statutory duties
relating to the registration of a document. Registration
Sridhara babu. N

of any will, and the endorsements made by the

Registrar of Deeds in discharge of his statutory duties
do not elevate him to the status of a 'statutory
attesting witness'. However, a registrar can be treated
as having attested to a will if his signature or mark
appears on the document akin to the one placed by an
attesting witness and he has seen the testator sign or
affix his mark to the will or codicil or has received from
the testator a personal acknowledgement of his
signature or mark and he has also signed in the
presence of the testator. In other words, to be an
attesting witness, the registrar should have attested
the signature of the testator in the manner
contemplated by Clause (c) of Section 63 of the
Succession Act. No particular form of attestation is
provided. It will all depend on the facts and
circumstances of a case by reference to which it will
have to be answered if the registrar of deeds fulfils the
character of an attesting witness also by looking at the
manner in which the events have actually taken place
at the time of registration and the part played therein
by the Registrar. .. A Registrar of Deeds before he be
termed an attesting witness, shall have to be called in
the witness box. The court must feel satisfied by his
testimony that what he did satisfies the requirement of
Sridhara babu. N

being an attesting witness. ….. Registration of a

document does not dispense with the need of proving
the execution and attestation of a document which is
required by law to be proved in one manner as
provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Under
Section 68 of the Registration Act the Registrar shall
endorse the following particulars on every document
admitted to registration:
(1) the date, hour and place of presentation of the
document for registration;
(2) the signature and addition of every person
admitting the execution of the document, and, if such
execution has been admitted by the representative,
assign of agent of any person, the signature and
addition of such representative, assign or agent;
(3) the signature and addition of every person
examined in reference to such document under any of
the provisions of this Act, and
(4) any payment of money or delivery of goods made in
the presence of the registering officer in reference to
the execution of the document, and any admission of
receipt of consideration, in whole or in part, made in
his presence in reference to such execution.
Such particulars as are referred to in Sections 52 and
58 of the Registration Act are required to be endorsed
Sridhara babu. N

by Registrar alongwith his signature and date on

document under Section 59 and then certified under
Section 60. A presumption by reference to Section 114
(Illustration (e)) of the Evidence Act shall arise to the
effect that the events containing in the endorsement of
registration, were regularly and duly performed and
are correctly recorded. None of the endorsements,
require to be made by the Registrar of Deeds under the
Registration Act, contemplates the factum of
attestation within the meaning of Section 63(c) of the
Succession Act or Section 68 of the Evidence Act being
endorsed or certified by the Registrar of Deeds. The
endorsements made at the time of registration are
relevant to the matters of the registration only (See:
Kunwar Surendra Bhadur Singh and Ors. v. Thakur
Behari Singh and Ors., . On account of registration of
a document, including a will or codicil, a presumption
as to correctness or regularity of attestation cannot be
drawn. Where in the facts and circumstances of a
given case the Registrar of Deeds satisfies the
requirement of an attesting witness, he must be called
in the witness box to depose to the attestation. His
evidence would be liable to be appreciated and
evaluated like the testimony of any other attesting
witness.
Sridhara babu. N

ADMISSIBILITY OF A DOCUMENT

R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu

Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple & Another reported in
[(2003) 8 SCC 752] "20. The learned counsel for the
defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic
Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1457] in
support of his submission that a document not
admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has
to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any
dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the
abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case
which calls for the correct position of law being made
precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of
evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not
subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of
documents in evidence may be classified into two
classes: (i) an objection that the document which is
sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence;
and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the
admissibility of the document in evidence but is
directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to
be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely
because a document has been marked as "an exhibit",
Sridhara babu. N

an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and

is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in
appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection
should be taken when the evidence is tendered and
once the document has been admitted in evidence and
marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not
have been admitted in evidence or that the mode
adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot
be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the
marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter
proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is
whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point
of time, would have enabled the party tendering the
evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of
proof as would be regular. The omission to object
becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled
to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act
on an assumption that the opposite party is not
serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a
prompt objection does not prejudice the party
tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it
enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its
decision on the question of admissibility then and
there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court
on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going
Sridhara babu. N

against the party tendering the evidence, the

opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for
permitting a regular mode or method of proof and
thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite
party, is available to the party leading the evidence.
Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties.
Out of the two types of objections, referred to
hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a
prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the
necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document,
the document itself which is sought to be proved being
admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence
would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior
court."

In a decision reported in Bipin Shantilal Panchal vs.

State of Gujarat and another (2001 (3) SCC 1), the
Apex Court was pleased to consider the delay in
disposal of a criminal case, where the Trial Court
disallowed the objections of admissibility of certain
documents, It is an archaic practice that during the
evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is
raised regarding admissibility of any material in
evidence the court does not proceed further without
Sridhara babu. N

passing order on such objection. But the fall out of the

above practice is this: Suppose the trial court, in a
case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the
material from being admitted in evidence and then
proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally.
If the appellate or revisional court, when the same
question is re-canvassed, could take a different view on
the admissibility of that material in such cases the
appellate court would be deprived of the benefit of that
evidence, because that was not put on record by the
trial court. In such a situation the higher court may
have to send the case back to the trial court for
recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case
afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that
unnecessarily on account of practices created by
ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the
course of long period to be hindrances which impede
steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be
recast or re-moulded to give way for better substitutes
which would help acceleration of trial
proceedings. .... When so recast, the practice which
can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an
objection is raised during evidence taking stage
regarding the admissibility of any material or item of
oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such
Sridhara babu. N

objection and mark the objected document tentatively

as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of
the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be
decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the
court finds at the final stage that the objection so
raised is sustainable the judge or magistrate can keep
such evidence excluded from consideration. In our
view there is no illegality in adopting such a course.
(However, we make it clear that if the objection relates
to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court
has to decide the objection before proceeding further.
For all other objections the procedure suggested above
can be followed.)

ADMISSIBILITY OF A DOCUMENT

In State of Bihar and Ors. v. Sri Radha Krishna Singh

& Ors., AIR 1983 SC 684, this Court considered
the issue in respect of admissibility of documents or
contents thereof and held as under: "Admissibility of a
document is one thing and its probative value quite
another - these two aspects cannot be combined. A
document may be admissible and yet may not carry
Sridhara babu. N

any conviction and the weight of its probative value

may be nil."

In Madan Mohan Singh & Ors. v. Rajni Kant

& Anr., AIR 2010 SC 2933, Court examined a
case as a court of fifth instance. The statutory
authorities and the High Court has determined the
issues taking into consideration a large number of
documents including electoral rolls and school leaving
certificates and held that such documents were
admissible in evidence. The Court examined the
documents and contents thereof and reached the
conclusion that if the contents of the said documents
are examined making mere arithmetical exercise it
would lead not only to improbabilities and
impossibilities but also to absurdity.

ORAL AGREEMENT CONTRARY TO WRITTEN

CONTRACT IS NOT AN EVIDENCE

S. Saktivel (Dead) by LRs v. M. Venugopal Pillai and

others AIR 2000 S.C. 2633 in which it has been held
by the Apex Court that modification by oral contract
Sridhara babu. N

against the written document is excluded in terms of

Section 92 of the Evidence Act.

Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Through LRs v. Sohan Lal

(Dead) by LRs AIR 2000 SC 426 in which the Apex
Court has held that oral evidence is admissible under
Section 92 (1) of the Evidence Act to prove that the
document, though executed, was not intended to be
acted upon and that it was a sham document,
executed only as a collateral security.

SHAM SALE DEED ALLEGATION - CONTENDING TO

HAVE NOT ACTED UPON

Sadasivam v. K. Doraisamy AIR 1996 SC 1724, JT

1996 (2) SC 400 in which the Apex Court has held
that sale deed kept in the custody of the plaintiff
alleging that the sale deed was sham and was not
acted upon, and it was an invalid document being
executed without any consideration on an
understanding between the parties that it would not be
acted upon, is a sham document.
Sridhara babu. N

CASE LAW ON MORTGAGE BY DEPOSIT OF TITLE

DEEDS
JUSTICE SUBBARAO, K. AND JUSTICE MUDHOLKAR,
J.R. of The Supreme Court of India in the case of
K.J.Nathan vs S. V. Maruty Reddy And Others 1965
AIR 430, 1964 SCR (6) 727

1. Under the Transfer of the Property Act, a

mortgage by deposit of title deeds is one of the forms of
mortgages whereunder there is a transfer of interest in
specific immovable property for the purpose of
securing payment of money advanced or to be
advanced by way of loan. Therefore, such a mortgage
of property takes effect against a mortgage deed
subsequently executed and registered in respect of the
same property under Section 58(f) of the Transfer of
Property Act. The three requisites of a mortgage by
deposit of title deeds are, (i) debt, (ii) deposit of title
deeds, and (iii) an intention than the deeds shall be
security for the debt. Whether there is an intention
that the deeds shall be security for the debt is a
question of fact in each case. The said fact will have to
be decided on the basis of the evidence. There is no
Sridhara babu. N

presumption of law that the mere deposit of title deeds

constitutes a mortgage, for no such presumption has
been laid down either in the Evidence Act or in the
Transfer of Property Act. But a court may presume
under section 114 of the Evidence Act that under
certain circumstances a loan and a deposit of title
deeds constitute a mortgage. But that is really an
inference as to the existence of one fact from the
existence of some other fact or facts. Nor the fact that
at the time the title deeds were deposited there was an
intention to execute a mortgage deed in itself
negatives, or is inconsistent with, the intention to
create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds to be in
force till the mortgage deed was executed.
2. Physical delivery of documents by the debtor to
the creditor is not the only mode of deposit. There may
be a constructive deposit. A court will have to
ascertain in each case whether in substance there is a
delivery of the title deeds by the debtor to the creditor.
If the creditor was already in possession of the title
deeds, it would be hypertechnical to insist upon the
formality of the creditor delivering the title deeds to the
debtor, and the debtor re- delivering them to the
creditor. What would be necessary in these
circumstances is whether the parties agreed to treat
Sridhara babu. N

the documents in the possession of the creditor or his

agent as delivery to him for the purpose of the
transaction.
QUOTED CITATIONS
WHAT IS DOCUMENTS OF TITLE AND TITLE
DEEDS
V.E.R.M.A.R. Chettyar Firm v. Ma Joo Teen ((1933)
I.L.R. 11 Rang. 239, 253.). The main question decided
in that case was, what did the terms "documents of
title" and "title-deeds" denote? The Court held that
they denoted such a document or documents as show
a prima facie or apparent title in the depositor to the
property or to some interest therein. But what is
relevant for the present purpose is that the learned
Chief Justice, who spoke for the Court, after
considering the leading judgments on the subject,
observed: "If the form of the documents of title that
have been delivered to the creditor is such that from
the deposit of such documents alone the Court would
be entitled to conclude that the documents were
deposited with the intention of creating a security for
the repayment of the debt, prima facie a mortgage by
deposit of title-deeds would be proved; although, of
course, such an inference would not be irrebuttable,
Sridhara babu. N

and would not be drawn if the weight of the evidence

as a whole told against it."

IMPORTANT CASE LAW OBSERVATIONS

JUSTICE SUBBARAO, K. AND JUSTICE MUDHOLKAR,

J.R. of The Supreme Court of India in the case of
K.J.Nathan vs S. V. Maruty Reddy And Others 1965
AIR 430, 1964 SCR (6) 727 “……..under the Transfer
of Property Act a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is
one of the modes of creating a legal mortgage
whereunder there will be transfer of interest in the
property mortgaged to the mortgagee. This distinction
will have to be borne in mind in appreciating the scope
of the English decisions cited at the Bar. This
distinction is also the basis for the view that for the
purpose of priority it stood on the same footing as a
mortgage by deed. Indeed a proviso has been added to
s. 48 of the Registration Act by Amending Act 21 of
1929. It says: "Provided that a mortgage by deposit of
title deeds as defined in section 58 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, shall take effect against any
mortgage-deed subsequently executed and registered
which relates to the same property."”
Sridhara babu. N

JUSTICE SUBBARAO, K. AND JUSTICE MUDHOLKAR,

J.R. of The Supreme Court of India in the case of
K.J.Nathan vs S. V. Maruty Reddy And Others 1965
AIR 430, 1964 SCR (6) 727 “……Transfer of Property
Act a mortagage by deposit of title- deeds is one of the
forms of mortgages whereunder there is a transfer of
interest in specific immovable property for the purpose
of securing payment of money advanced or to be
advanced by way of loan. Therefore, such a mortgaae
of property takes effect against a mortgage deed
subsequently executed and registered in respect of the
same property. The three requisites for such a
mortality are, (1) debt, (ii) deposit of title-deeds; and
(iii) an intention that the deeds shall be security for the
debt.”

JUSTICE SUBBARAO, K. AND JUSTICE MUDHOLKAR,

J.R. of The Supreme Court of India in the case of
K.J.Nathan vs S. V. Maruty Reddy And Others 1965
AIR 430, 1964 SCR (6) 727 “10. ......Whether there is
an intention that the deeds shall be security for the
debt is a question of fact in each case. The said fact
will have to be decided just like any other fact on
presumptions and on oral, documentary or
circumstantial evidence. There is no presumption of
Sridhara babu. N

law that the mere deposit of title deeds constitutes a

mortgage, for no such presumption has been laid down
either in the Evidence Act or in the Transfer of
Property Act. But a court may presume under S.114 of
the Evidence Act that under certain circumstances a
loan and a deposit of title deeds constitute a mortgage.
But that is really an inference as to the existence of
one fact from the existence of some other fact or facts.
Nor the fact that at the time the title deeds were
deposited there was an intention to execute a mortgage
deed in itself negatives, or is inconsistent with, the
intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds
to be in force till the mortgage deed was executed.......”

Justice G Mitter, Justice P J Reddy, Justice

S.M.Sikri of Supreme Court of India in the case of
Deb Dutta Seal vs Ramanlal Phumra And
Ors. Reported in AIR 1970 SC 659, (1969) 3 SCC
821, The cases on this point are legion but the
principles of law have been stated over and over again
in various decisions of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council and of this Court, not to speak of the
innumerable decisions of various High Courts. The
principles of law are quite clear and were summarised
Sridhara babu. N

as follows in Pranjivandas Mehta v. Chan Ma Phee, 43

Ind App 122 at p. 125 : AIR 1916 PC 115 at p. 116:
(1) Where titles of property are handed over with
nothing said except that they are to be security, the
law supposes that the scope of the security is the
scope of the title.
(2) Where, however, titles are handed over
accompanied by a bargain, that bargain must Rule.
(3) Lastly, when the bargain is a written bargain, it,
and it alone, must determine what is the scope and
extent of the security.

Justice G Mitter, Justice P J Reddy, Justice

S.M.Sikri of Supreme Court of India in the case of
Deb Dutta Seal vs Ramanlal Phumra And
Ors. Reported in AIR 1970 SC 659, (1969) 3 SCC
821, the judges have evolved following propositions of
law after citing so many precedents:-
(a) The facts and circumstances attendant on the
deposit of title deeds and the execution of the
memorandum must be considered as a whole.
Sridhara babu. N

(b) If the transaction of deposit of title deeds with

intent to create a security be completed before the
parties have a memorandum, registration of the
document is not required unless as in Hari Sankar
Paul's case (supra) the parties proceed to create a
mortgage over again in writing.
(c) The form and text of the memorandum although of
paramount importance are not conclusive.
(d) If the memorandum does not contain all the terms
necessary to give it efficacy as a contract of mortgage
no registration is necessary.
(e) If the evidence shows that the memorandum was
executed with the intention that it should be the
repository of the bargain between the parties then the
document alone can be looked into. In the absence of
registration, the bargain cannot be proved.
(f) The deposit of title deeds contemporaneously with
the execution of the memorandum containing the
terms of mortgage gives a strong indication of the
document being considered as the bar gain between
the parties.

MORTGAGE WHEN ORIGINAL IS LOST

Even though S.58(1) of the Transfer of Property Act
contemplates deposit of the original title deeds for
Sridhara babu. N

creation of equitable mortgage, when the original

document is lost or not forthcoming, equitable
mortgage can be created by depositing certified copy of
the document. In the decision reported in Assiamma
v. State Bank of Mysore (ILR 1992 Kerala 43, AIR
1990 Ker 157 ), a Division Bench of this Court has
held that when the original documents are not
forthcoming or lost, equitable mortgage can be created
by depositing copies of the document.

WHAT IS MEANT BY DOCUMENTS OF TITLE

Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Syndicate Bank

v. Modern Tile and Clay Works, 1980 Ker LT 550. In
that case, Janaki Amma J. speaking for the Bench
said as follows: "By "documents of title" we mean the
legal instruments which prove the right of a person in
a particular property. Evidence supplied by documents
may in some Cases be conclusive while in other cases
it may be insufficient in proving the title or the right
claimed. When a person who is acclaimed and
recognised by law as the owner of property transfers
his rights by an instrument which satisfies all the
requirements of law, the instrument of transfer is a
title deed in respect of the property so far as the
Sridhara babu. N

transferee is concerned. The document may amount to

conclusive proof of such transfer. Oh the other hand a
document may be of such a kind that it tends to prove
such transfer of right but is not conclusive of a
transfer of ownership. Thus a receipt for payment of
revenue may not be conclusive proof of the ownership
of the person in whose name it is issued even though
the liability to pay revenue is on the owner. This is
because in practice revenue is received by the
concerned authorities from a person even without an
enquiry whether he is the owner of the property. A
revenue receipt is therefore insufficient evidence to
prove title to property and is therefore not by itself a
document of title.....................A parity of reasoning
applies in the case of a copy of deed of transfer. A copy
of a deed of transfer is not ordinarily a document of
title for the purposes of an equitable mortgage. It is the
original deed of transfer that is the document of title.
This is because the rules for the issue of copies permit
the obtaining of copies by an owner even while he is in
possession of the original document of title. To hold
that a copy of a deed of transfer is also a document of
title for purposes of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of
Property Act would amount to giving facilities to the
owner to misuse the provision. He may get an advance
Sridhara babu. N

from one person by delivering the original document of

title and then use the copy of the document for getting
an advance from some other who may riot be aware of
the earlier equitable mortgage. It should be the policy
of law to see that such contingencies are avoided. At
the same time there may be cases where the original
document is lost and there are no chances of that
document being made use of for any purpose . In the
absence of the original deed of transfer the next best
evidence of the owner's title to the property is a
certified copy of that document. A certified copy in
such cases may with sufficient safeguards be received
as a document of title. The essential prerequisite for
the use of a certified copy as a document of title is the
loss of the original deed. Unless and until it is made
out that the original is lost, a certified copy of a
document cannot be considered to be a document of
title for the purpose of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of
Properly Act.

WHAT DOCUMENTS OF TITLE NEED TO BE

DEPOSITED

A Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court considered

the question in K.L.C.T. Chidambaram Chettiyar v.
Sridhara babu. N

Aziz Meah, AIR 1938 Rang 149. Justice Dunkley, who

delivered the main judgment observed as follows: "In
our opinion the correct statement of the law is that in
order to create a valid mortgage by deposit of title
deeds under Section 58(f), T.P. Act, it is not necessary
that the whole, or even the most material of the
documents of title to the property should be deposited,
nor that the documents deposited should show a
complete or good title in the deposition. It is sufficient
if the deeds deposited bona fide relate to the property
or are material evidence of title or are shown to have
been deposited with the intention of creating a security
thereon" Roberts C.J. agreed with the main judgment
and Mya Bu J added as follows : "The documents
enumerated in my learned brother's judgment, in my
opinion, show prima facie or apparent title of the
mortgagors to the land covered by those documents.
The grant shows that the original owner of the property
was the mortgagors' vendor. The certificate of transfer
shows the factum of the transfer having taken place
about 14 years before the alleged mortgage. Although
it is not a valid document of conveyance, yet it is
useful as showing that a transfer as a matter of fact
had taken place. Then there were tax tickets or
revenue receipts, which showed that during the years
Sridhara babu. N

that elapsed between the transfer and the alleged

mortgage the mortgagors were paying the revenue as
persons who owned the land ........... In these
circumstances in my opinion, the documents
enumerated in my learned brother's judgment are
sufficient to show that there was prima facie title in
the mortgagors to the property mentioned in the
documents."

DEEDS DEPOSITED SHOULD BONAFIDE RELATED

TO PROPERTY IS ENOUGH

The same question came up for consideration of a

Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Angu Pillai
v. M.S.M. Kasiviswanathan Chettiar, AIR 1974 Mad
16. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision of the
Rangoon High Court in Chidambaram Chettiar's case
(supra) and held that it was not necessary that the
whole, or even the most material of the documents of
title to the property should be deposited; nor that the
documents deposited should show a complete or good
title in the depositor and it is sufficient if the deeds
deposited bona fide, relate to the property or are
material evidence of title or are shown to have been
Sridhara babu. N

deposited with the intention of creating a security

thereon.

IN WRITTEN CONTRACT - IMPLIED NOTIONS ARE

EXCLUDED – DOCUMENTARY VERSION THROWS
OUT ORAL EVIDENCE

In 'United Bank of India Ltd. V. M/s Lekharam

Sonaram & Co. and others AIR 1965 SC 1591 ' the
Apex Court held as follows: "A mortgage by deposit of
title deeds is a form of mortgage recognized by S.58(f)
of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that it
may be effected in, certain towns (including Calcutta)
where a person "delivers to a creditor of his agent
documents of title to immovable property with intent to
create a security the law implies a contract between
the parties to create a mortgage and no registered
instrument is required under S.59 as in other classes
of mortgage. It is essential to bear in mind that the
essence of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is the
actual handing over by a borrower to the lender of
documents of title to immovable property with in the
intention that those documents shall constitute a
security which will enable the creditor ultimately to
recover the, money which he has lent. But if the
Sridhara babu. N

parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, this

implication of law is excluded by their express bargain,
and the document will be the sole evidence of its
terms. In such a case the deposit and the document
both form integral parts of the transaction and are
essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage. It
follows that in such a case the document which
constitutes the bargain regarding securing require
registration under S.17 of the Indian Registration Act,
1908as a non-testamentary instrument creating an
interest in immoveable property, where the value of
such property is one hundred rupees and upwards. If
a document of this character is not registered it cannot
be used in the evidence at all and the transaction itself
cannot be proved by oral evidence either".

WHETHER REGISTRATION OF MORTGAGE DEED/

MEMORANDUM NECESSARY

In Rachpal Mahraj v. Bhagwandas Daruka and

others 1950 AIR 272, 1950 SCR 548 the Supreme
Court dealt with the question of registration of the
memorandum given along with the title deeds.
Patanjali Sastri, J., (as his Lordship then was) who
Sridhara babu. N

spoke for the court, stated the law as under :

"......WHEN the debtor deposits with the creditor the
title deeds of his property with intent to create a
security, the law implies a contract between the parties
to create a mortgage, and no registered instrument is
required under section 59 as in other forms of
mortgage. But if the parties choose to reduce the
contract to writing, the implication is excluded by their
express bargain, and the document will be the sole
evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and
the document both form integral parts of the
transaction and are essential ingredients in the
creating of the mortgage. As the deposit alone is not
intended to create the charge and the document,
which constitutes the bargain regarding the security,
is also necessary and operates to create the charge in
conjunction with the deposit, it requires registration
under section 17, Registration Act, 1908, as a non-
testamentary instrument creating an interest in
immovable property, where the value of such property
is one hundred rupees and upwards. The time factor is
not decisive. The document may be handed over to the
creditor along with the title deeds and yet may not be
registrable, .........".
Sridhara babu. N

In United Bank of India v. Lakharam S. & Co. (AIR

1965 Sc 159) the Supreme Court examined the
question as to whether the memorandum required
registration. It held that: "APPLYING the principle to
the present case, we consider that the letter at Ex. 7(a)
was not meant to be an integral part of the transaction
between the parties. The letter does not mention what
was the principal amount borrowed or to be borrowed.
Neither does it refer to rate of interest for the loan. It is
important to notice that the letter does not mention
details of title deeds which are to be deposited with the
plaintiff-bank. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
the view of the High Court with regard to the
construction of Ex. 7(a) is erroneous and the document
was not intended to be an integral part of the
transaction and did not, by itself, operate to create an
interest in the immovable property. It follows,
therefore, that the document-Ex. 7(a)-did not require
registration under Section 17 of the Indian
Registration Act."
In V.G. Rao v. Andhra Bank , AIR 1971 SC 1613
Hegde, J., while dealing with the law relating to the
nature of a memorandum given along with the deposit
of title deeds or one filed thereafter, held as under :
"THEREFORE, the crucial question is : Did the parties
Sridhara babu. N

intend to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit of

the title deeds to the form of a document ? If so, the
document requires registration. If on the other hand,
its proper construction and the surrounding
circumstances lead to the conclusion that the parties
did not intend to do so, then, there being no express
bargain, the contract to create the mortgage arises by
implication of the law from the deposit itself with the
requisite intention, and the document being merely
evidential does not require registration………. If the
parties intend to reduce their bargain:
regarding the deposit of title deeds to the
form of a document the document requires
registration. If on the otherhand its proper
construction and the surrounding
circumstances lead to the. conclusion that the
parties did not intend to do so, then, there
being no express. Bargain the contract to create a
mortgage arises by implication of
the law from the deposit itself with the requisite
intention, and the document being merely evidential
does not require registration. "

In United Bank of India, Ltd. V. Lekharam Sonaram

and Co., AIR 1965 SC 1591, , Ramaswami J.,
Sridhara babu. N

speaking for the Court, observed- "When the debtor

deposits with the creditor title deeds of his property
with an intent to create a security the law implies a
contract between the parties to create a mortgage and
no registered instrument is required under section 59
as in other classes of mortgage. It is essential to bear
in mind that the essence of a mortgage by deposit of
title deeds is the actual handing over by a borrower to
the lender of documents of title to immovable property
with the intention that those documents shall
constitute a security which will enable the creditor
ultimately to recover the money which he has lent. But
if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing,
this implication of law is excluded by their express
bargain, and the document will be sole evidence of its
terms. In such a case the deposit and the document
both form integral parts of the transaction and are
essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage. It
follows that in such a case the document which
constitutes the bargain regarding security requires
registration under section 17 of the Indian Registration
Act, 1908, as a non-testamentary instrument creating
an interest in immovable property, where the value of
such property is one hundred rupees and upwards, If
a document of this character is not registered it cannot
Sridhara babu. N

be used in the evidence at all and the transaction itself

cannot be proved by oral evidence either."

In the decision reported in Veeramachineni

Ganghadhara Rao v. Andhra Bank Ltd (AIR 1971 SC
1613), it was held as follows : “From the recitals of
Ext.A6, it is seen that the memorandum in question
was intended to 'put on record' the terms already
agreed upon. That being the case, the document
cannot be considered as a contract entered into
between the parties. If the parties intended that it
should embody the contract between them, it would
have been necessary to register the same under
Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.”

WHAT LAW APPLICABLE TO DEPOSIT OF TITLE

DEEDS

MRS. ROSY GEORGE -vs.- STATE BANK OF INDIA

AND OTHERS, A.I.R. 1993 KERALA 184(D.B.) wherein
it was held as follows:- “By virtue of Section 96 of
Transfer of Property Act the provisions of simple
mortgage are applicable to a mortgage by the deposit of
title deeds.”
Sridhara babu. N

Section 58F of the Transfer of Property Act, a person

may create an equitable mortgage by delivering the
title deeds to a creditor or to his agent in respect of the
documents of title to immovable property with an
intent to create a security thereon.
Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as follows:
“68. Proof of execution of document required by law to
be attested.--If a document is required by law to be
attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one
attesting witness at least has been called for the
purpose of proving its execution, if there be an
attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of
the Court and capable of giving evidence”.
Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as
follows: “59. Mortgage when to be by assurance.--
Where the principal money secured is one hundred
rupees or upwards, a mortgage [other than a mortgage
by deposit of title deeds] can be effected only by a
registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and
attested by at least two witnesses.
Where the principal money secured is less than one
hundred rupees, a mortgage may be effected either by
[a registered instrument] signed and attested as
aforesaid or [except in the case of a simple mortgage]
by delivery of the property”.
Sridhara babu. N

WHETHER PROPERTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN

ACQUIRED WITH REGISTERED DOCUMENT TO
CREATE VALID MORTGAGE – REFERRED TO
LARGER BENCH

Honourable Supreme Court Syndicate Bank v. Estate

Officer & amp; Manager, APIIC Ltd. and others, (2007)
8 Supreme Court Cases 361, at Page 364 wherein it is
among other things observed as follows: The requisites
of an equitable mortgage are : (i) a debt; (ii) a deposit of
title deeds; and (iii) an intention that the deeds shall be
security for the debt. The territorial restrictions
contained in Section 58(f) Transfer of Property Act also
do not stand as a bar in creating an equitable
mortgage. whereas a deposit of title deeds by itself
does not require a document in writing, but in the
event a mortgage is created thereby, it will require
registration. It is one thing to say that a person cannot
convey any title which he himself does not possess,
but it is another thing to say that no mortgage can be
created unless he obtains a title by reason of a
registered conveyance. Various High Courts have also
Sridhara babu. N

held that for the purpose of creating mortgage by

depositing title deeds in terms of Section 58 of the
Transfer of Property Act, it is not necessary that the
mortgagor would have forfeit complete title over the
property. Even if the mortgagor derives some interest
which can be subject-matter of mortgage, a mortgage
by deposit of title deeds can be created. If insistence on
the original document of title is laid, it may give rise to
the conclusion that once the document of title is lost,
no mortgage by deposit of title deed can be created at
all. The existence of ingredients (i) and (iii) of an
equitable mortgage as set out above is not in dispute
in the present case. The principal question, which,
requires consideration in the present case is as to
whether for satisfying the requirements of Section 58(f)
of the Transfer of Property Act, it is necessary to
deposit documents showing complete title or good title
and whether all the documents of title to the property
are required to be deposited. A fortiori the question
which would arise for consideration is as to whether in
all such cases, the property should have been acquired
by reason of a registered document.
Sridhara babu. N

MORTGAGE EXTENDS TO FUTURE ADDITIONS TO

PROPERTY

Umesh Kumar Gupta vs State Of U.P. AIR 2006 All

30, Now it is well settled that a mortgage by deposit of
title deeds: in absence of any special terms of bargain,
extends to secure the property to which the title deeds
relate. The portion of the instrument which has been
quoted above, covers not only the existing property to
which the title deeds relate namely those in Schedule
I-B but all constructions and additions to the property
as may be made in future. Whether constructions to be
made future upon the land mortgaged have also been
mortgaged is a matter to he "decided on the intention
of the parties. The. instrument makes it explicit that
future constructions have also been given in security.
The act of deposit of title deeds and the instrument are
therefore integral parts of the same transaction.

GUARANTOR IS ALSO A DEBTOR ENTITLED TO

CREATE A MORTGAGE

S. 58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act defines what is

mortgage as under: "A mortgage is the transfer of an
interest in specific immovable property for the purpose
Sridhara babu. N

of securing the payment of money advanced or to be

advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt or
the performance of an engagement which may give rise
to a pecuniary liability."
In Mulla's Commentary of Transfer of Property Act at
Page 361, it is stated that, a mortgage may not only be
for a specific sum, but to secure a current account
between the parties upto a limit. At page 362 it is
stated that, the future debt referred to in the section
may be a contingent liability, e.g., a mortgage to secure
the payment of the respondent's costs in an appeal (a)
or to further secure a mortgage against the loss of his
existing security (b). The author refers to the decisions
in Girindra v. Bejoy (1898) 26 Cal. 246, Tokhan Singh
v. Girwar, (1905) 32 Cal. 494 and Nand Lal v.
Dharamdeo,(1925) 78 IC 457. In this context, it is
pertinent to note that the definition refers to an
existing or a future debt. A contract of guarantee is
defined under S. 126 of the Indian Contract Act, as
under: - "A contract of guarantee is a document to
perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a
third person in case of his default. The person who
gives the guarantee is called the "surety"; the person in
respect of whose default the guarantee is given is
Sridhara babu. N

called the "principal debtor", and the person to whom

the guarantee is given is called the "creditor".
In Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC
1265, it has been held that debt includes any liability
in respect of any obligation to repay capital sums of
annuities and liabilities to any guarantee.
It may be true that, the liability of a guarantor exists
only in the event of the Principal Debtor committing
default. But, nevertheless, that is an obligation created
by the document for the guarantor to discharge the
debt in case default is committed. It is a debt arising in
future. It may not be a debt in praesenti. But the
definition takes into account both the debts in
praesenti and the debts in future. The definition of
debt in Webb v. Stenton, (1883) 11 QBD 518 of Lord
Lindley, J. is as follows: ".....a debt is a sum of money
which is now payable or will become payable in the
future by reason of a present obligation". There must
be debitum in praesenti; solvendum may be in
praesenti or in future that is immaterial. There must
be, an existing obligation to pay a sum of money now
or in future. In Kesoram Industries v. Commissioner of
Wealth Tax, (1966) 2 SCR 688 = AIR 1966 SC 1370,
the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Standing
alone, the word 'debt' is as applicable to a sum of
Sridhara babu. N

money which has been promised at a future day as to

a sum now due and payable, if we wish to distinguish
between the two, we say of the former that it is a debt
owing, and of the latter that it is a debt due."
If we read in that context, a guarantor is also a debtor
and, hence, entitled to create a mortgage by deposit of
title deeds.

EQUITABLE MORTGAGE BY DEPOSIT OF TITLE

DEEDS MAY BE CREATED BY THE MERE ACT OF
DEPOSITING DEEDS OF TITLE OR EVEN EVIDENCE
OF TITLE LIKE TAX RECEIPTS

Justice M C Urs, Justice S R Murthy, Justice M

Ramakrishna Chief Controlling Revenue ... vs
Manager, State Bank Of Mysore AIR 1988 Kant
1 Equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds may be
created by the mere act of depositing deeds of title or
even evidence of title like tax receipts evidencing
payment of property tax on immovable properties. It is
not necessary to reduce to writing the transfer of
interest in the immovable property by way of security
as in the case of other forms of mortgage. If reduced to
writing, the creation of equitable mortgage would also
attract the same rigour as other mortgages, the stamp
Sridhara babu. N

duty payment and compulsory registration under the

Registration Act. .. Merely because there is a recital
about the creation on the same day, viz., March 23,
1982, of a joint mortgage by deposit of title deeds along
with other documents in favour of certain institutions
including the bank (para. 11 of the instrument under
reference), the instrument under reference cannot be
construed as a deed of mortgage. ……. Are the
securities, the mortgage by deposit of title deeds and
the deed of hypothecation both of which do not give
possession of the properties to the bank capable of
being held as properties ? The answer seems to be in
the affirmative. ……Mortgage of any kind under the
Transfer of Property Act is an acquisition of interest in
immovable property capable of being transferred in like
manner to others and, therefore, the mortgage
acquired by the bank jointly constitutes its property
and that of the other mortgagees who apparently have
agreed that the bank shall hold the title deeds in its
possession and as the bank ranks pari passu with the
other institutions, it is capable of realising its
securities in its own right. This is obvious to any
reader of the instrument in question.
Sridhara babu. N

Murugharajendra Co. v. Chief Controlling Revenue

Authority [1974] 1 Kar LJ 177 ; AIR 1974 Kar 60, has
explained when exactly an instrument of equitable
mortgage, if at all, is liable to be charged to stamp duty
under the Act. After adverting to the definition of the
term "instrument" in Section 2(j) of the Act and the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case ofUnited
Bank of India Ltd. v. Lekharam Sonaram and
Co. [1965] 35 Comp Cas 471 (SC), this court ruled as
follows (at page 62 of AIR 1974 Kar) : " It is clear, from
the opinion of the Supreme Court extracted above that
a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be created by
handing over the title deeds by the borrower to the
lender with the intention that these documents shall
constitute the security for the debt. But if the parties
choose to reduce the contract to writing, that
document alone would be the sole evidence of its
terms. In the latter case, the document shall have to
be treated as an instrument creating a rigtit in favour
of the mortgagee to recover the loan from the
properties to which the title deeds relate. Such an
instrument requires to be registered under Section 17
of the Registration Act, as a non-testamentary
instrument creating an interest of the value of Rs. 100
and upwards in immovable property. It would also
Sridhara babu. N

become liable for stamp duty under Article 6 of the

Schedule to the Act. Hence, the essential factor which
determines whether a document is one by which an
equitable mortgage is created is the intention of the
parties. The existence or otherwise of such intention
can be established either by the documents produced
by the parties or by oral evidence or by both."

BANKERS LIEN EXPLAINED

In Syndicate Bank v. Vijay Kumar and others, AIR

1992 SC 1066, while considering the scope of 'general
lien', the Apex Court quoted the Halsbury's Laws of
England as follows: "Lien in its primary sense is
a right in one man to retain that which is in his
possession belonging to another until certain demands
of the person in possession are satisfied. In this
primary sense it is given by law and not by
contract." The Apex Court has also quoted
'Chalmers on Bills of Exchange' as to the meaning of
'Banker's lien', which reads as follows:- “A banker's
lien on negotiable securities has been judicially defined
as 'an implied pledge.' A banker has, in the absence of
agreement to the contrary, a lien on all bills received
from a customer in the ordinary course of banking
Sridhara babu. N

business in respect of any balance that may be due

from such customer.” The Apex Court has also quoted
'Chitty on Contract' as to the general lien, which reads
as follows:- “By mercantile custom the banker has a
general lien over all forms of commercial paper
deposited by or on behalf of a customer in the ordinary
course of banking business. The custom does not
extend to valuables lodged for the purpose of safe
custody and may in any event be displaced by either
an express contract or circumstances which show an
implied agreement inconsistent with the lien.... The
lien is applicable to negotiable instruments which are
remitted to the banker from the customer for the
purpose of collection. When collection has been made
the proceeds may be used by the banker in reduction
of the customer's debit balance unless otherwise
earmarked.”

MODE OF PROOF OF MEMORANDUM OF DEPOSIT

OF TITLE DEED WHEN DISPUTED

Justice Chandrashekaraiah of Karnataka High

Court in Syndicate Bank vs M. Sivarudrappa AIR
2003 Kant 210, No doubt, the deposit of title deeds
need not be in writing. The deed of mortgage other
Sridhara babu. N

than the mortgage of deposit of title deeds is required

to be attested by two witnesses. In the instant case, as
the mortgage is by depositing of title deeds under
Section 58(f), there is no need to execute any
document in order to create a charge in respect of an
immovable property, as delivery of the title deeds itself
is sufficient to create a charge in respect of an
immovable property for the money borrowed. But, in
the instant case, the list of documents referred to in
Ex. P. 8, said to have been delivered by the 2nd
defendant to the Bank was not accepted by the Bank,
since the title deed delivered is only a certified copy
and not the original. As delivery of certified copy since
has not been accepted by the Bank, the memorandum
of deposit of title deed was got executed and registered.
As the memorandum of title deed is a registered
document and when that document has been
specifically denied by the 2nd defendant in his reply
notice and in the written statement filed by the L.Rs of
the 2nd defendant, the plaintiff-Bank ought to have
examined one of the attesting witnesses to the said
deed. In the instant case, no attesting witness has
been examined in order to prove the execution of the
document by the 2nd defendant. Further, the
signature found on Exs. P. 8 and P. 9 is disputed and
Sridhara babu. N

as there is discrepancy in the spelling of the name of

Shivarudrappa as observed earlier, the Bank ought to
have examined one of the attestors of the document.
The Bank Manager who has been examined as P.W. 1
has not stated anywhere in his evidence that the 2nd
defendant has signed Exs. P. 8 and P. 9 in his
presence. If that is so, in the absence of any such
positive evidence adduced by the plaintiff to prove the
documents, Ex. P, 9, I am of the view that the Trial
Court is justified in dismissing the suit insofar as the
2nd defendant is concerned.

WHEN ORIGINAL DEEDS ARE LOST

AIR 1982 Andhra Pradesh 272 (Kanigalla Prakasa Rao

vs. Nanduri Ramakrishna Rao and others) “…………….
The owners of property who have so their documents
of title will, therefore, be not in a position to deliver
such original documents with intent to create an
equitable mortgage. It will be rather anomalous if such
persons can validly execute registered documents of
sale, lease and mortgage, but will not be entitled to
raise any monies by creating an equitable mortgage. If
the original title deeds are lost, we do not see why the
owner of the property should not be in a position to an
Sridhara babu. N

equitable mortgage. The mortgagee in such cases has

only to be vigilant in accepting such representation
made to him and should make the necessary enquiries
before agreeing to advance any monies on the basis of
registration extracts of documents of title or copies of
documents. That seems to be the underlying principle
behind S.78 of the Transfer of Property Act which
provided that if the conduct of a prior mortgagee
amounted to gross neglect, the mortgage in his favour
will be postponed to the subsequent mortgagee.”

AIR 1974 Madras 16 (V.61, C.8) (Angu Pillai and others

vs. M.S.M.Kasiviswanathan Chettiar and others
"16. The decision of the Rangoon High Court in
AIR 1933 Rang 299 upon which the trial Judge relied
was overruled by a Full Bench of the Rangoon High
Court in Chidambaram Chettyar v. Aiz Mean, AIR 1938
Rang 149 (FB). This Full Bench decision unfortunately
does not appear to have been brought to the notice of
the trial Judge. The Full Bench has reviewed the
English and Indian authorities and has pointed put
that in order to create a valid mortgage, it is not
necessary that the whole, or even the most material of
the documents of title to the property should be
deposited; nor that the documents deposited should
Sridhara babu. N

show a complete or good title in the depositor and it is

sufficient if the deeds deposited bona fide relate to the
property or are material evidence of title or are shown
to have been deposited with the intention of creating a
security thereon.

Venkataramayya v. Narasinga Rao (1911) 21 Mad LJ

454 in support of his argument that even the deposit
of sale deed in certain circumstances would not be
sufficient to create an equitable mortgage. In that case,
the debtor deposited a sale deed in the name of his
father who had made a gift of the property in favour of
his grandson by a deceased son. The property was
admittedly the self acquired property of the father of
the first defendant in that case. The question arose
whether the deposit of that sale deed was sufficient to
constitute a valid equitable mortgage. The Bench
pointed out that the only document that was deposited
did not show any kind of title in the depositor to the
property as it was not a sale deed in his name but was
a sale deed in the name of his father and that,
therefore, no valid equitable mortgage was created.

AIR 2002 Madras 378 (M.M.T.C.limited vs.

S.Mohamed Gani and another) “........................ In
Sridhara babu. N

order to prove the existence of an equitable mortgage,

the following requisites are necessary: 1. A debt, 2. a
deposit of title deeds and 3. an intention that the
deeds shall be security for the debt. The debt may be
an existing debt or a future debt. The debt may be an
existing debt or a future debt. Insofar as the deposit of
title deeds is concerned, physical delivery of document
is not the only mode of deposit and even the
constructive delivery has been held sufficient. It is
sufficient if the deeds deposited bona fide relate to the
property or are any material evidence of title and are
shown to have been deposited with an intention to
create a security thereon. The essence of the whole
transaction of equitable mortgage by deposit of title
deeds is the intention that the title deeds shall be the
security for the debt. Whether the said requisite
intention is available in a given case is a question of
fact and has to be ascertained after considering the
oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence. It is
true the mere fact of deposit does not raise the
presumption that such an intention existed. Such an
intention cannot be presumed from the possession
since the mere possession of the deeds is not enough
without evidence as to the manner in which the
possession originated, so that an agreement may be
Sridhara babu. N

inferred. Even the mere possession of the deeds by the

creditor coupled with the existence of a debt need not
necessarily lead to the presumption of a mortgage. The
mere fact that the documents were coming from the
custody of the plaintiff is not by itself sufficient to
prove an intent to create a security. But in a given
case unless and until the defendants satisfactorily
explain how the documents came to the plaintiffs
custody the said fact would be insignificant and have a
great bearing”.

WHEN ORIGINALS OF TITLE DEED LOST HOW

BEST MORTGAGE BE CREATED

JUSTICE G. RAJASURIA of Madras High Court in case

of Compendiously And Concisely vs Unknown
Decided on 26 October, 2009 after citing many
decisions stated that “A mere reading and poring over
of those precedents, would ex facie and prima facie,
make the point clear, that in order to create a valid
equitable mortgage by deposit of title deed, there
should be deposit of original title deed or if certified
copy is deposited for creation of such mortgage, there
should be clear declaration that the originals got lost,
etc………….I would also like to point out that even if
Sridhara babu. N

there is any prior creation of mortgage by deposit of

title deeds with some other creditor then that fact
should be disclosed to the subsequent lender of money
and accordingly, second equitable mortgage can be
created. But, my above discussion supra and also a
plain poring over of the records available, would
disclose that the Bank, it appears has not followed
such a procedure. Even the copy of the CBI charge
sheet as enclosed in the typed set of papers, would
reveal that by furnishing false and forged title deeds of
the suit properties, the alleged equitable mortgages
were created. When the finding of the Investigating
Agency itself is that by furnishing false and forged title
deeds, such equitable mortgages were created, the
question arises as to whether the bank de hors
initiating criminal action, also by relying on such
equitable mortgages, initiate civil proceedings for
recovering the debt.”
“……. At this juncture, I recollect and call up the
following maxims:
(i) Ex turpi causa non oritur actio (Out of a base (illegal
or immoral) consideration, an action does (can) not
arise.
(ii) Ex dolo malo non aritur actio - (Out of fraud no
action arises; fraud never gives a right of action. No
Sridhara babu. N

court will lends its aid to a man who founds his cause
of action upon an immoral or illegal act.
(iii) Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio : No action can
arise from a bare agreement.”
“These three maxims would highlight and spotlight the
fact that out of illegal act no legal cause of action
arises for filing suits. If the agreements or the
documents turned out to be void ones, the party to it
cannot enforce them. While holding so, I also recollect
up and call up the following maxims in favour of the
bank.
1. Nemo allegans suam turpitudinem audiendus est
- No one testifying to his own way is to be heard as a
witness.
2. Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua
propria: No one can take advantage by his own wrong.
3. Nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne: No one
shall take advantage of his own wrong.
The gist and kernel of the above maxims are that the
person who committed fraud cannot capitalise his own
fraud.”
“15. No doubt on the plaintiffs' side, there are
jurisprudential points to the effect that out of a void
contract or illegal contract no legal cause of action
would arise, but on the other hand the jurisprudential
Sridhara babu. N

view in favour of the defendants, is that the person

who committed fraud cannot capitalize his own fraud.
These are all serious issues, which could be dealt with
at the time of considering the one other application for
rejection of plaint,”

QUOTED CITATIONS

2005 (11) SCC 520 (Bank of India vs. Abhay

D.Narottam and others) “ It is not necessary for us to
determine the import of Section 125 of the Companies
Act as we are of the opinion that the appeal must be
dismissed on a much more basic ground.
"Mortgage" has been defined in Section
58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as a transfer
of an interest in specific immovable property for the
purpose of securing the payment of money advanced
or to be advanced by way of loan, etc. Without a
transfer of interest there is no question of there being a
mortgage. The same principle would apply to charge
under section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Section 100 provides that all the provisions which
apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be,
apply to such charge. The definition of simple
mortgage in Section 58(b) of the Act merely speaks of
Sridhara babu. N

the procedure and describes that species of mortgage.

………..As far as the land is concerned, we agree with
the learned Judge that a mere undertaking to create a
mortgage is not sufficient to create any interest in any
immovable property.”

2006 (1) SCC 697 (R.Janakiraman vs. State rep.by

Inspector of Police, CBI, SPE, Madras) “………..It is
clear to us that the bar imposed by sub-section (1) of
Section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely
upon the document embodying the terms of the
transaction. In that event, the law declares that the
nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered
from the terms of the document itself and no evidence
of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as
between the parties to such document for the purpose
of contradicting or modifying its terms. The sub-
section is not attracted when the case of a party is that
the transaction recorded in the document was never
intended to be acted upon at all between the parties
and that the document is a sham. Such a question
arises when the party asserts that there was a different
transaction altogether and what is recorded in the
document was intended to be of no consequence
whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible
Sridhara babu. N

to show that the document executed was never

intended to operate as an agreement but that some
other agreement altogether, not recorded in the
document, was entered into between the parties”.

2007(8) SCC 361 (Syndicate Bank vs. Estate Officer

& Manager, APIIC Ltd., and others) “29. Each
case will have to be considered on its own facts. A
jurisprudential title to a property may not be a title of
an owner. A title which is subordinate to an owner and
which need not be created by reason of a registered
deed of conveyance may at times create title. The title
which is created in a person may be a limited one,
although conferment of full title may be governed upon
fulfilment of certain conditions. Whether all such
conditions have been fulfilled or not would essentially
be a question of fact in each case. In this case a right
appears to have been conferred on the allottee by
issuance of a valid letter of allotment coupled with
possession as also licence to make construction and
run a factory thereon, together with a right to take
advances from banks and financial institutions
subject, of course, to its fulfilment of condition may
confer a title upon it in terms of Section 58(f) of the
Sridhara babu. N

Transfer of Property Act, but the question would be

whether such a right is assignable”

IMPOUNDING OF DOCUMENTS BY COURT AND

PROCEDURE INVOLVED THEREIN

Chilakuri Gangulappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer,

Madanapalli, AIR 2001 S.C. 1321 “Instruments
impounded how dealt with.- (1) Where the person
impounding an instrument under section 33 has by
law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence
and admits, such instrument in evidence upon
payment of a penalty as provided by section 35 or of
duty as provided by section 37, he shall send to the
Collector an authenticated copy of such instrument,
together with a certificate in writing, stating the
amount of duty and penalty levied in respect thereof,
and shall send such amount to the Collector, or to
such person as he may appoint in this behalf. (2) In
every other case, the person so impounding an
instrument shall send it in original to the Collector. It
is clear from the first sub-section extracted above that
the court has a power to admit the document in
evidence if the party producing the same would pay
the stamp duty together with a penalty amounting to
Sridhara babu. N

ten times the deficiency of the stamp duty. When the

court chooses to admit the document on compliance of
such condition the court need forward only a copy of
the document to the Collector, together with the
amount collected from the party for taking
adjudicatory steps. But if the party refuses to pay the
amount aforesaid the Collector has no other option
except to impound the document and forward the
same to the Collector. On receipt of the document
through either of the said avenues the Collector has to
adjudicate on the question of the deficiency of the
stamp duty. If the Collector is of the opinion that such
instrument is chargeable with duty and is not duly
stamped he shall require the payment of the proper
duty or the amount required to make up the same
together with a penalty of an amount not exceeding ten
times the amount of the proper duty or of the deficient
portion thereof. ……… In the present case the trial
court should have asked the appellant, if it finds that
the instrument is insufficiently stamped, as to whether
he would remit the deficient portion of the stamp duty
together with a penalty amounting to ten times the
deficiency. If the appellant agrees to remit the said
amount the court has to proceed with the trial after
admitting the document in evidence. In the meanwhile,
Sridhara babu. N

the court has to forward a copy of the document to the

Collector for the purpose of adjudicating on the
question of deficiency of the stamp duty as provided in
Section 40(1)(b) of the Act. Only if the appellant is
unwilling to remit the amount the court is to forward
the original of the document itself to the Collector for
the purpose of adjudicating on the question of
deficiency of the stamp duty. The penalty of ten times
indicated therein is the upper limit and the Collector
shall take into account all factors concerned in
deciding as to what should be the proper amount of
penalty to be imposed.”

ADMISSIBILITY OF UNREGISTERED PARTITION

DEED

Siromani v. Hemkumar, A.I.R.1968 S.C.1299: Of

course, the document is admissible to prove an
intention on the part of the coparceners to become
divided in status; in other words, to prove that the
parties ceased to be joint from the date of the
instrument . .
Sridhara babu. N

Roshan Singh v. Zile Singh, A.I.R.1988 S.C.881 : It

is well-settled that the document though unregistered
can however be looked into for the limited purpose of
establishing a severance in status, though that
severance would ultimately affect the nature of the
possession held by the members of the separated
family co-tenants. . . . .

DOCUMENT SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE FOR

ITS INTERPRETATION

Syed Abdulkhader vs Rami Reddy & Ors 1979 AIR

553, 1979 SCC (2) 601 A document will be considered
as a whole for interpretation of particular words or
directions. An ordinary authority given in one part of
the instrument will not be cut down because there are
ambiguous and uncertain expressions elsewhere. A
power of wide amplitude conferring wide authority
cannot by construction be narrowed down to deny an
authority which the donor expressly wanted to confer.

Gurubasappa And Ors. vs Gurulingappa AIR 1962

Mys 246, ILR 1961 KAR 878 In deciding this
Sridhara babu. N

question, it would be necessary to consider the true

scope and effect of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence
Act. Chapter VI of the Evidence Act which begins with
section 91 deals with the exclusion of oral evidence by
documentary evidence, section 91 of the Act provides:
"When the terms of a contract, or a grant, or of any
other disposition of property, have been reduced to the
form of a document, and in all cases in which any
matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a
document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the
terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of
property, or of such matter, except the document itself,
or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which
secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions
herein before contained". The normal rule is that the
contents of a document must be proved by primary
evidence which is the document itself in original.
Section 91 is based on what is described as best
evidence rule. The best evidence about the contents of
a document is the document itself and it is the
production of the document that is required by section
91 in proof of its contents. In a sense the rule
enumerated by section 91 can be said to be an
exclusive rule inasmuch as it excludes the admission
of oral evidence for proving the contents of a document
Sridhara babu. N

except in cases where secondary evidence is allowed to

be led under the relevant provisions of the Evidence
Act. Section 92 of the Evidence Act runs as follows:
"When the terms of any such contract, grant or other
disposition of property, or any matter required by law
to be reduced to the form of a document, have been
proved according to the last section, no evidence of any
oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as
between the parties to any such instrument or their
representatives in interest, for the purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from,
its terms". It is manifest that section 92 excludes the
evidence of oral agreement and it applies to cases
where the terms of a contract, grant or other
disposition of property have been proved by the
production of the relevant documents themselves
under section 91 of the Act. In other words, after the
document had been produced to prove its terms under
section 91, the provisions of section 92 of the Act come
into operation for the purposes of excluding the
evidence of any oral agreement or the statement for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or
subtracting from its terms. It would be noticed that
sections 91 and 92 are in effect supplementary to each
other. Section 91 would be frustrated without the aid
Sridhara babu. N

of section 92 and section 92 would be inoperative

without the aid of section 91. Since section 92
excludes the admission of oral evidence for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or
subtracting from the terms of the document properly
proved under section 91, it may be said that it makes
the proof of the document conclusive of its contents.
Like section 91, section 92 can be said to be based on
best evidence rule.

Bhinka And Others vs Charan Singh 1959 AIR 960,

1959 SCR Supl. (2) 798 " The Court shall presume to
be genuine every document purporting to be a
certificate.......... which is by law declared to be
admissible as evidence of any particular fact, and
which purports to be duly certified by any officer -of
the Central Government or of a State
Government................................................ Provided
that such document is substantially in the form and
purports to be executed in the manner directed by law
in that behalf. The Court shall also presume that any
officer by whom any such document purports to be
signed or certified, held, when he signed it, the official
character which he claims in such paper ". Under this
section a Court is bound to draw the presumption that
Sridhara babu. N

a certified copy of a document is genuine and also that

the officer signed it in the official character which he
claimed in the said document. But such a presumption
is permissible only if the, certified copy is substantially
in the form and purported to be executed in the
manner provided by law in that behalf.

C.H. Shah vs S.S. Malpathak And Ors. AIR 1973 Bom

14, Section 79 only raises a rebuttable presumption
with regard to the genuineness of certified copies and
that too only if they are executed substantially in the
form and in the manner provided by law.
……………………..Section 79, as laid down by the
Supreme Court in Bhinka's case already referred to
above it must be shown that the certified copy was
executed substantially in the form and in the manner
provided by law. There would, therefore, be a check or
safeguard in so far as the officer certifying it in the
manner required by law would have to satisfy himself
in regard to the authenticity of the original and in
regard to the accuracy of the copy which he certifies to
be a true copy thereof. On the other hand if the
original of a public document is to be admitted in
evidence without proof of its genuineness, there would
be no check whatever either by way of scrutiny or
Sridhara babu. N

examination of that document by an officer or by the

Court.

GIFT DEED AND ITS VALIDITY

ASOKAN VS LAKSHMI KUTTY 2007(13) SCR 901, It is
settled law that where the deed of gift itself recites that
the donor has given possession of the properties gifted
to the donee, such a recital is binding on the heirs of
the donor. It is an admission binding on the donor and
those claiming under him. Such a recital raised a
rebuttable presumption and is ordinarily sufficient to
hold that there was delivery of possession. Therefore,
the burden lies on those who allege or claim the
contrary to prove affirmatively that in spite of the
recitals in the gift deed to the effect that possession
has been delivered over, in fact, the subject matter of
the gift was not delivered over to the donees. When a
registered document is executed and the executors are
aware of the terms and nature of the document, a
presumption arises in regard to the correctness
thereof. Once a gift is complete, the same cannot be
rescinded. For any reason whatsoever, the subsequent
conduct of a donee cannot be a ground for rescission
of a valid gift.
Sridhara babu. N

The definition of gift contained in Section 122 of the

Transfer of Property Act provides that the essential
elements thereof are:
(i) the absence of consideration;
(ii) the donor;
(iii) the donee;
(iv) the subject matter
(v) the transfer; and
(vi) the acceptance.

Gifts do not contemplate payment of any consideration

or compensation. It is, however, beyond any doubt or
dispute that in order to constitute a valid gift
acceptance thereof is essential. We must, however,
notice that the Transfer of Property Act does not
prescribe any particular mode of acceptance. It is the
circumstances attending to the transaction which may
be relevant for determining the question. There may be
various means to prove acceptance of a gift. The
document may be handed over to a donee, which in a
given situation may also amount to a valid acceptance.
The fact that possession had been given to the donee
also raises a presumption of acceptance.
Sridhara babu. N

THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS HEAVY ON A PERSON

QUESTIONING THE SALE DEED AND CLAIMING
THE SAME TO BE NOMINAL

In Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain V. Ramakant

Eknath Jajoo (2009(2) CTC 858), the Supreme Court
had held as follows: The burden of proof is heavy on a
person questioning the sale deed and claiming the
same to be nominal. He should adduce proper
extrinsic evidence to establish his case. A distinction
must be borne in mind in regard to the nominal nature
of a transaction which is no transaction in the eye of
law at all and the nature and character of a
transaction as reflected in a deed of conveyance. The
deed of sale was a registered one. It, therefore, carries
a presumption that the transaction was a genuine one.
The pleadings were required to be considered provided
any evidence in support thereof had been adduced. No
cogent evidence had been adduced by the respondent
to show that the deed of sale was a sham transaction
and/or the same was executed by way of a security.
The deed of sale being a registered one and apparently
containing stipulations of transfer of right, title and
interest by the vendor in favour of the vendee, the
onus of proof was upon the defendant to show that the
Sridhara babu. N

said deed was, in fact, not executed or otherwise does

not reflect the true nature of transaction. Evidently,
with a view to avoid confrontation in regard to his
signature as an attesting witness as also that of his
father as vendor in the said sale deed, he did not
examine himself. An adverse inference, thus, should
have been drawn against him. When a true character
of a document is questioned, extrinsic evidence by way
of oral evidence is admissible. Therefore, it was open to
the respondent to adduce oral evidence in regard to the
nature of the document. The document in question
was not only a registered one but also the title deeds in
respect of the properties have also been handed over.
Symbolical possession if not actual physical
possession, thus, must be held to have been handed
over. It was acted upon. Appellants started paying rent
in respect of the said property. No objection thereto
has been raised by the respondent. Pleadings of the
parties, it is trite, are required to be read as a whole.
Defendants, although are entitled to raise alternative
and inconsistent plea but should not be permitted to
raise pleas which are mutually destructive of each
other. It is also a cardinal principle of appreciation of
evidence that the court in considering as to whether
the deposition of a witness and/or a party is truthful
Sridhara babu. N

or not may consider his conduct. Equally well settled is

the principle of law that an admission made by a party
in his pleadings is admissible against him proprio
vigore. Therefore, the deed of sale was required to be
construed in proper perspective. Indisputably, the
deed of sale contained stipulations as regards passing
of the consideration, lawful title of the vendor, full
description of the vended property, conveyance of the
right, title, interest, use, inheritance, property,
possession, benefits, claims and demands at law and
in equity of the vendor. A document, must be
construed in its entirety. Reading the document in
question in its entirety, there cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that it was a deed of sale. It satisfies all the
requirements of a conveyance of sale as envisaged u/s.
54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Right of possession
over a property is a facet of title. As soon as a deed of
sale is registered, the title passes to the vendee. The
vendor, in terms of the stipulations made in the deed
of sale, is bound to deliver possession of the property
sold. If he does not do so, he makes him liable for
damages. The indemnity clause should have been
construed keeping in view that legal principle in mind.
The stipulation with regard to payment of
compensation in the event appellants are dispossessed
Sridhara babu. N

was by way of an indemnity and did not affect the real

nature of transaction. In any event, the said
stipulation could not have been read in isolation. Such
a case had never been made out and hence cannot be
allowed to be raised for the first time before this court.
In any event, in view of the conduct of the respondent,
he cannot claim equity. An equitable relief can be
prayed for by a party who approaches the court with
clean hands.

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N KUMAR of Karnataka

High Court in Sheik Mehamood vs Mohammed
Sabder Decided on 25 September, 2012 Strangely,
the relinquishment deed is executed in favour of a
person who is not a member of the family. The
relinquishment deed presupposes antecedent title. If
more than one person has the antecedent title to the
property, it is open to one person to relinquish his title
in favour of the person who is having the antecedent
title. The relinquishment deed cannot be in favour of a
person who has not title at all. ……. It is compulsorily
registrable. It is not registered. Therefore the effect is,
no right, title or interest of the executant is transferred
to the person in whose favour the property is released.
Sridhara babu. N

Unfortunately, the trial Court in the first place did not

take the trouble of looking into the document. If only it
had looked into the document, it would have known
that there is no signature of the executant on the said
document. Therefore the said document cannot be
held against the plaintiffs. It also failed to notice that it
is not a registered document. Unless the document is
registered, the transfer of right in an immovable
property cannot take place. Therefore under the said
document there cannot be any transfer of right of
Basheer Sab in favour of any person. Strangely, the
trial Court relies on Section 90 of the Evidence Act.
Section 90 of the Evidence Act states about the
presumption as to documents thirty years old. It states
that: "90. Presumption as to documents thirty years
old- Whether any document, purporting or proved to
be thirty years old, is produced from any custody
which the Court in the particular case considers
proper, the Court may presume that the signature and
every other part of such document, which purports to
be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in
that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a
document executed or attested, that if was duly
executed and attested by the persons by whom it
purports to be executed and attested." ……… The
Sridhara babu. N

condition precedent for application of Section 90 is

that the said document should bear the signature of
the person who is said to have executed the document.
If there is no signature at all on the document, Section
90 of the Act is attracted. Section 90 does not have the
effect to nullifying the requirement of registration of
the document under the Indian Registration Act. If a
document is compulsorily registrable and it is not
registered and if that document is produced before the
Court and the if the document is 30 years old, any
presumption in so far as registration cannot be drawn.
All that Section 90 says is because of lapse of time of
30 years, if a document is produced from a proper
custody if that document bears the signature and if
attestation is required, it bears attestation, the Court
may presume that the document when it was executed
was duly executed by the person whose signature is
found thereon and if it is a case of proof of attestation,
the signature of the attesting witnesses were duly
executed. When the document is not executed at all,
Section 90 has no application.
Sridhara babu. N

Vidhyadhar vs Manikrao & Anr. AIR 1999 SC 1441,

1999 (3) ALT 1 SC, JT 1999 (2) SC 183 The
definition indicates that in order to constitute a sale,
there must be a transfer of ownership from one person
to another, i.e., transfer of all rights and interests in
the properties which are possessed by that person are
transferred by him to another person. The transferor
cannot retain any part of his interest or right in that
property or else it would not be a sale. The definition
further says that the transfer of ownership has to be
for a "price paid or promised or part-paid and part-
promised". Price thus constitutes an essential
ingredient of the transaction of sale. The words "price
paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised"
indicate that actual payment of whole of the price at
the time of the execution of sale deed is not sine qua
non to the completion of the sale. Even if the whole of
the price is not paid but the document is executed and
thereafter registered, if the property is of the value of
more than Rs. 100/-, the sale would be complete.
………… The real test is the intention of the parties. In
order to constitute a "sale", the parties must intend to
transfer the ownership of the property and they must
also intend that the price would be paid either in
presenti or in future. The intention is to be gathered
Sridhara babu. N

from the recital in the sale deed, conduct of the parties

and the evidence on record………….. The basic
principle is that the form of transaction is not the final
test and the true test is the intention of the parties in
entering into the transaction. If the intention of the
parties was that the transfer was by way of security, it
would be a mortgage.

(2007) 13 SUPREME COURT CASES 210 ASOKAN V.

LAKSHMIJKUTTY AND OTHERS, certain excerpts
from it would run thus: "16. While determining
the question as to whether delivery of possession
would constitute acceptance of a gift or not, the
relationship between the parties plays an important
role. It is not a case that the appellant was not aware
of the recitals contained in deeds of gift. The very fact
that the defendants contend that the donee was to
perform certain obligations, is itself indicative of the
fact that the parties were aware thereabout. Even a
silence may sometimes indicate acceptance. It is not
necessary to prove any overt act in respect thereof as
an express acceptance is not necessary for completing
the transaction of gift.
Sridhara babu. N

SOME BRIEF CITATION POINTS ON DOCUMENTS

 Non mentioning of survey number will not render

the mother document void so also the area of the
subject matter. Mithukhan case: AIR 1986 MP
39.

 If the language employed has ambiguities to enter

into it, then intention of the parties has to be
gathered by overall survey of the contents of the
document in question. P.L.Bapuswami case: AIR
1966 SC 902.

 If a document is relatively 30 years old and was

obtained from proper custody, then its contents
have to be presumed genuine. Smt Anika B. case:
AIR 2005 MP 64.

 Just by name true nature of document cannot be

disguised nor be treated otherwise. AIR 1958 SC
532.

 For clear identification of any immoveable

property, the deed should be very clear about the
schedule or boundaries of the property. If the
Sridhara babu. N

boundaries are disputed, their description

resolves the dispute. M. Dhondusa Religious and
Charitable Trust case: ILR 2002 Kar 4832.

 If one interpretation could give effect to all parts

of the deed and other renders some clauses
nugatory, then, the interpretation that gives effect
to all clauses should be preferred. Radha Sundar
Dutta case: AIR 1959 SC 24. D.D.A. case: AIR
1973 SC 2609.

 In case of contradictions in statements of

document about area and boundaries the
boundaries shall prevail. M/S Roy &co case: AIR
1979 Cal 50.

 In case of contradictions between the map and

mother deed, the mother deed should prevail.
Narain Prasad Singh case: AIR 1983 Pat 244.

 In case of ambiguity with regard to description of

property, description as can be ascertained from
the boundaries will settle the issue. Babji Dehuri
case: AIR 1996 Ori 183.
Sridhara babu. N

 In case of contradictions between description and

boundaries regarding location of the property, the
boundaries shall prevail. Tranglaobi pisiculture
co-op soc ltd case: AIR 1969 Mani 84.

 Plan appended to a document forms part of that

document. If a plan is so appended, extent cannot
be determined solely based on measurements
ignoring the map. Sumathy Amma case: AIR 1987
Ker 84.

 Ownership of surface of the land confers

ownership of every thing beneath the land unless
a reservation was made by transferor while
transferring the ownership. Raja Anand Brahma
Shah case: AIR 1967 SC 1081. Sukhdeo Singh
case: AIR 1951 SC 288.

 Unless other wise provided by the recitals, trees

standing on the land will also pass along with the
land. DFO sarahan forest division H.P.case: AIR
1968 SC 612.
Sridhara babu. N

 In construing a contract the court must look at

the words used in the contract unless they are
such that one may suspect that they do not
convey the intention correctly. ONGC ltd case:
AIR 2003 SC 2629.

 Where there is a documentary evidence, oral

evidence is not entitled to any weight. Murarka
Properties (p) ltd AIR 1978 SC 360.

 While interpreting the document the document in

question should be read as a whole. Therefore , if
one clause of the document is invalid or
otherwise, that one clause itself will not render
the whole document invalid. AIR 1956 SC 46.

 It is common knowledge that laymen do not know

nor care about the niceties of drafting. They
cannot be expected to possess the expertise of a
professional. Therefore, techinical rules that are
generally applied to the provisions of law and
exceptions should not be applied while
interpreting such documents or deeds. AIR 1951
SC 293.
Sridhara babu. N

 The cardinal rule of construction is that a

document must be read as a whole, each clause
being read in relation to the other parts of the
document, and an attempt should be made to
arrive at an interpretation which will harmonize
and give effect to other clauses thereof. It is not
legitimate to pick out an expression torn from its
context and try to interpret the document as a
whole in the light of that expression. Such a
forced construction on the document in question
cannot defeat the very object which its executants
had in view. Shri Digambar Jain and others case:
AIR 1970 MP 23(26) [FB].

 Where an absolute title is given in clear and

unambiguous terms and the later provisions
trench on the same, the later provisions have to
be held to be void. Ramkishorelal case: AIR 1963
SC 890.

 It is well settled that general words of release do

not mean release of rights other than those put
up and have to be limited to the circumstances
which were in the contemplation of the parties
Sridhara babu. N

when it was executed. Rajagopal Pillai and

another case AIR 1975 SC 895.(897).

 In construing documents usefulness of the

precedents is usually of a limited character, after
all the courts have to consider the material and
relevant terms of the document with which they
are concerned and it is on a fair and reasonable
construction of the terms that the nature and
character of the transaction evidenced by it has
to be determined. Trivenibai case: AIR 1959 SC
620(622).

 The obligations in the deed which is in the nature

of trust is an obligation which can be specifically
enforced. Bai Dosabai Mathurdas Govinddas and
others case: AIR 1980 SC 1334.

A PARTY TO AN INSTRUMENT CANNOT BE A VALID

ATTESTING WITNESS TO THE SAID INSTRUMENT

Laxmibai (Dead) Thru Lrs. & Anr. vs

Bhagwanthbuva (Dead) Thru Lrs 2013 (2
) JT 362 = 2013 (2 ) SCALE 106 A party to an
instrument cannot be a valid attesting witness to the
Sridhara babu. N

said instrument, for the reason, that such party

cannot attest its own signature. (Vide: Kumar Harish
Chandra Singh Deo & Anr. v. Bansidhar Mohanty
& Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1738). … A document
must be construed, taking into consideration the real
intention of the parties. The substance, and not the
form of a document, must be seen in order to
determine its real purport.

INTENTION MUST PRIMARILY BE GATHERED

FROM THE MEANING OF THE WORDS USED IN
THE DOCUMENT

In Delta International Limited v. Shyam Sundar

Ganeriwalla & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 2607, this Court
held that the intention of the parties is to be gathered
from the document itself. Intention must primarily be
gathered from the meaning of the words used in the
document, except where it is alleged and proved that
the document itself is a camouflage. If the terms of the
document are not clear, the surrounding
circumstances and the conduct of the parties have also
to be borne in mind for the purpose of ascertaining the
real relationship between the parties. If a dispute
arises between the very parties to the written
Sridhara babu. N

instrument, then intention of the parties must be

gathered from the document by reading the same as a
whole.

In Vodafone International Holdings B.V v. Union of

India & Anr., (2012) 6 SCC 613, while dealing
with a similar situation, this Court held: “The Court
must look at a document or a transaction in a
context to which it properly belongs to. While obliging
the court to accept documents or transactions, found
to be genuine, as such, it does not compel the court to
look at a document or a transaction in blinkers,
isolated from any context to which it properly belongs.
If it can be seen that a document or transaction was
intended to have effect as part of a nexus or series of
transactions, or as an ingredient of a wider transaction
intended as a whole, there is nothing in the doctrine to
prevent it being so regarded; to do so in not to prefer
form to substance, or substance to form. It is the task
of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any
transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax or a
tax consequence and if that emerges from a series or
combination of transactions intended to operate as
such, it is that series or combination which may be
regarded.”
Sridhara babu. N

T.L. Nagendra Babu vs Manohar Rao Pawar ILR

2005 KAR 884 Presumption operates in favour of the
party relying on a document, provided he must prove
that the document is duly executed and authenticated.

INTERPRETATION OF A DOCUMENT

The principle of interpretation of a document is laid

down by the Apex Court in its judgment in the case
of Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal and another, reported in
AIR 1964 SC 859. The relevant portion contained in
para 8 of the said judgment is reproduced below : "8.
... Section 94 of the Evidence Act lays down a rule of
interpretation of the language of a document when it is
plain and applies accurately to existing facts. It says
that evidence may be given to show that it was not
meant to apply to such facts. When a Court is asked to
interpret a document, it looks at its language. If the
language is clear and unambiguous and applies
accurately to existing facts, it shall accept the ordinary
meaning, for the duty of the Court is not to delve deep
into the intricacies of the human mind to a certain
one's undisclosed intention, but only to take the
Sridhara babu. N

meaning of the words used by him, that is to say his

expressed intentions. Sometimes when it is said that a
Court should look into all the circumstances to find an
author's intention, it is only for the purpose of finding
out whether the words apply, accurately to existing
facts. But if the words are clear in the context of the
surrounding circumstances, the Court cannot rely on
them to attribute to the author an intention contrary
to the plain meaning of the words used in the
document. ..."

JOINT FAMILY AND DOCUMENTS UNDER

EVIDENCE ACT

Section 92 of the Evidence Act states that when the

terms of any disposition of properties required by law
to be reduced to the form of a document have been
proved, according to Section 91 of the said Act, no
evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be
admitted, as between the parties to any such
instrument or their representatives in interest, for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or
subtracting from its terms. If the documents are the
registered documents relating to disposition of
properties, which may have been proved. If the
Sridhara babu. N

documents being 30 years' old, the same would carry

presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. In
view of this, no evidence of any oral agreement or
statement can be admitted in evidence from the parties
to any such instrument or their representatives in
interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying,
adding to, or subtracting from the terms of the
documents.

FAILURE TO RAISE A PROMPT AND TIMELY

OBJECTION AMOUNTS TO WAIVER OF THE
NECESSITY FOR INSISTING ON FORMAL PROOF
OF A DOCUMENT

Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu

Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple & Another reported in
[(2003) 8 SCC 752] to which one of us, Bhan, J., was a
party vide para 20: "20. The learned counsel for the
defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic
Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1457] in
support of his submission that a document not
admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has
to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any
dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the
Sridhara babu. N

abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case

which calls for the correct position of law being made
precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of
evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not
subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of
documents in evidence may be classified into two
classes: (i) an objection that the document which is
sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence;
and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the
admissibility of the document in evidence but is
directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to
be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely
because a document has been marked as "an exhibit",
an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and
is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in
appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection
should be taken when the evidence is tendered and
once the document has been admitted in evidence and
marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not
have been admitted in evidence or that the mode
adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot
be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the
marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter
proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is
whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point
Sridhara babu. N

of time, would have enabled the party tendering the

evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of
proof as would be regular. The omission to object
becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled
to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act
on an assumption that the opposite party is not
serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a
prompt objection does not prejudice the party
tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it
enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its
decision on the question of admissibility then and
there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court
on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going
against the party tendering the evidence, the
opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for
permitting a regular mode or method of proof and
thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite
party, is available to the party leading the evidence.
Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties.
Out of the two types of objections, referred to
hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a
prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the
necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document,
the document itself which is sought to be proved being
admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence
Sridhara babu. N

would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior

court."

To the same effect is the judgment of the Privy Council

in the case of Gopal Das & Anr. v. Sri Thakurji & Ors.
reported in [AIR 1943 PC 83], in which it has been held
that when the objection to the mode of proof is not
taken, the party cannot lie by until the case comes
before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first
time of the mode of proof. That when the objection to
be taken is not that the document is in itself
inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular,
it is essential that the objection should be taken at the
trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and
admitted to the record. Similarly, in Sarkar on
Evidence, 15th Edition, page 1084, it has been stated
that where copies of the documents are admitted
without objection in the trial Court, no objection to
their admissibility can be taken afterwards in the court
of appeal. When a party gives in evidence a certified
copy, without proving the circumstances entitling him
to give secondary evidence, objection must be taken at
the time of admission and such objection will not be
allowed at a later stage.
Sridhara babu. N

Court in Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai (AIR 1982

SC 20) and Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) thr.Lrs. v. Sohan
Lal (dead) by Lrs.(AIR 2000 SC 426) with reference to
Section 92(1) held that it is permissible to a party to a
deed to contend that the deed was not intended to be
acted upon, but was only a sham document. The bar
arises only when the document is relied upon and its
terms are sought to be varied and contradicted. Oral
evidence is admissible to show that document
executed was never intended to operate as an
agreement but that some other agreement altogether,
not recorded in the document, was entered into
between the parties.

It is impermissible for the Defendant to lead oral

evidence which contradicts what is stated in the
documents which admittedly were executed by the
Defendant. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Roop
Kumar v. Mohan Thedani AIR 2003 SC 2418; Gurdial
Singh v. Raj Kumar Aneja (2002) 2 SCC 445
Sridhara babu. N

PRESUMPTION OF OLD DOCUMENTS UNDER

SECTION 90 – DISCRETION OF COURT TO ACCEPT
IT SHALL BE EXCERCISED WITH REASONS

Sri Lakni Baruan And Others vs Sri Padma Kanta

Kalita & Ors 1996 AIR 1253, JT 1996 (3) 268
Section 90 of the Evidence Act is founded on necessity
and convenience because it is extremely difficult and
sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove
handwriting, signature or execution of old documents
after lapse of thirty years. In order to obviate such
difficulties or improbabilities to prove execution of an
old document, Section 90 has been incorporated in the
Evidence Act, which does away with the strict rule of
proof of private documents. Presumption of
genuineness may be raised if the documents in
question is produced from proper custody. It is,
however, the discretion of the Court to accept the
presumption flowing from Section 90. There is,
however, no manner of doubt that judicial discretion
under Section 90 should not be exercised arbitrarily
and not being informed by reasons.

WHEN SOURCE OF TITLE IS NOT DISCLOSED –

MERE STATEMENT WITHOUT PROOF OF
Sridhara babu. N

DOCUMENT AS TO SOURCE OF TITLE IS NOT

RELEVANT

Prabhakar Adsule vs State Of M.P. & Anr 2004 AIR

3557 = 2004 (11 ) SCC 249 In the plaint the source
of Somaji's title was not disclosed and it was merely
stated that he was owner of the disputed land and the
same was coming in his possession since 1918. In his
statement in Court, the plaintiff came out with a case
that the land had been given by way of grant. However,
the plaintiff did not lead any kind of evidence to prove
the factum of grant. No document was produced to
show that the land had been given by way of grant
either to Somaji or to his ancestors.

Bench: N Kumar in M.A. Sreenivasan vs H.V.

Gowthama And Anr. ILR 2005 KAR 1138 Therefore
the law on the point is well settled. The probate Court
will not go into question of title of the property which is
bequeathed under the will. It is totally outside the
scope of enquiry in a probate proceedings. If the
testator has a right in the property the beneficiary gets
that right on the death of the testator under the will.
Grant of probate do not divest any person of his title to
the property not vest title in the beneficiary under the
Sridhara babu. N

Will. The scope of enquiry in a probate proceedings is

only to find out whether the will sought to be probated
has been duly executed by the testator and is proved
in accordance with law and the statutory requirements
under the Act have been complied with. Therefore
grant of probate in no way affects the right of the
person who claims title to the property independently
or adverse to the interest of the testator. It does not
decide any question of title or the existence of the
property itself.

Hon'ble Supreme Court as reported in Chandradhar

Goswami & Ors. v. The Gauhati Bank Ltd., ,... 1967
AIR 816, 1967 SCR (1) 921" Section 4 of the Bankers'
Books Evidence Act (18 of 1891) certainly gives a
special privilege to banks and allows certified copies of
their accounts to be produced by them and those
certified copies become prima facie evidence of the
existence of the original entries in the accounts and
are admitted as evidence of matters, transactions, and
accounts therein. But such admission is only where
and to the extent as the original entry itself would be
admissible by law and not further or otherwise.
Original entries alone under S.34 of the Evidence Act
Sridhara babu. N

would not be sufficient to charge any person with

liability and as such, copies produced under s.4 of the
Bankers' Books Evidence Act could not charge any
person with liability. ……….. Original entries alone
under s. 34 of the Evidence Act would not be sufficient
to charge any person with liability and as such copies
produced under s. 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence
Act obviously cannot charge any person with liability.
Therefore, where the entries are not admitted it is the
duty of the bank if it relies on such entries to charge
any person with liability, to produce evidence in
support of the entries to show that the money was
advanced as indicated therein and thereafter the
entries would be of use as corroborative evidence. But
no person can be charged with liability on the basis of
mere entries whether the entries produced are the
original entries or copies under s. 4 of the Banker's
Books Evidence Act. "

In Zenna Sorabji and others Vs. Mirabelle Hotel

Co.(Pvt.) Ltd. and others, AIR 1981 Bom 446 ,
........"In order that a document could be relied upon as
a book of account, it must have the characteristic of
being fool-proof. A bundle of sheets detachable and
Sridhara babu. N

replaceable at a moment's pleasure can hardly be

characterised as a book of account. Moreover what
Section 34 demands is a book of account regularly
maintained in the course of business. A ledger by itself
could not be a book of account of the character
contemplated by Section 34."

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P)

Ltd. v. Invest Import, 1981 AIR 2085, 1981 SCR (1)
899, ......" Undoubtedly, mere proof of the handwriting
of a document would not tantamount to a proof of all
the contents or the facts stated in the document, if the
truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere
proof of the handwriting and execution of the
document would not furnish evidence of the truth of
the facts or contents of the document. The truth or
otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have
to be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the
evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the
truth of the facts in issue."

A party cannot claim anything more than what is

covered by the terms of contract, for the reason that
Sridhara babu. N

contract is a transaction between the two parties and

has been entered into with open eyes and
understanding the nature of contract. Thus, contract
being a creature of an agreement between two or more
parties, has to be interpreted giving literal meanings
unless, there is some ambiguity therein. The contract
is to be interpreted giving the actual meaning to the
words contained in the contract and it is not
permissible for the court to make a new contract,
however is reasonable, if the parties have not made it
themselves. It is to be interpreted in such a way that
its terms may not be varied. The contract has to be
interpreted without giving any outside aid. The terms
of the contract have to be construed strictly without
altering the nature of the contract, as it may affect the
interest of either of the parties adversely. (Vide: United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harchand Rai Chandan
Lal, AIR 2004 SC 4794; Polymat India P. Ltd. &
Anr. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., AIR
2005 SC 286).

In DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr. v. Director, T. and

C. Planning Department Haryana & Ors., AIR
2011 SC 1463, this court held:
Sridhara babu. N

“It is a settled principle in law that a contract is

interpreted according to its purpose. The purpose of a
contract is the interests, objectives, values, policy that
the contract is designed to actualise. ?It comprises
joint intent of the parties. Every such contract
expresses the autonomy of the contractual parties’
private will. It creates reasonable, legally protected
expectations between the parties and reliance on its
results. Consistent with the character of purposive
interpretation, the court is required to determine the
ultimate purpose of a contract primarily by the joint
intent of the parties at the time the contract so formed.
It is not the intent of a single party; it is the joint intent
of both parties and the joint intent of the parties is to
be discovered from the entirety of the contract and the
circumstances surrounding its formation. As is stated
in Anson's Law of Contract, "a basic principle of
the Common Law of Contract is that the parties are
free to determine for themselves what primary
obligations they will accept...Today, the position is
seen in a different light. Freedom of contract is
generally regarded as a reasonable, social, ideal only to
the extent that equality of bargaining power between
the contracting parties can be assumed and no injury
is done to the interests of the community at
Sridhara babu. N

large." The Court assumes "that the parties

to the contract are reasonable persons who seek to
achieve reasonable results, fairness and efficiency...In
a contract between the joint intent of the parties and
the intent of the reasonable person, joint intent
trumps, and the Judge should interpret the contract
accordingly.”

The phrase, “as is-where-is”, has been explained by

this Court in Punjab Urban Planning &
Development Authority & Ors. v. Raghu Nath
Gupta & Ors., (2012) 8 SCC 197, holding as
under: “We notice that the respondents had accepted
the commercial plots with open eyes, subject to the
abovementioned conditions. Evidently, the commercial
plots were allotted on “as-is-where-is” basis. The
allottees would have ascertained the facilities available
at the time of auction and after having accepted the
commercial plots on “as-is- where-is” basis, they
cannot be heard to contend that PUDA had not
provided the basic amenities like parking, lights,
roads, water, sewerage, etc. If the allottees were not
interested in taking the commercial plots on “as-is-
where- is” basis, they should not have accepted the
Sridhara babu. N

allotment and after having accepted the allotment on

“as-is-where-is” basis, they are estopped from
contending that the basic amenities like parking,
lights, roads, water, sewerage, etc. were not provided
by PUDA when the plots were allotted…”

BOUNDARIES SHALL PREVAIL

Bhagawandas vs Roasene Jerome D' Souza ILR

1995 KAR 440, 1995 (4) KarLJ 582 That in reply to
the submission of the appellant's Counsel that entire
House including the disputed property has not been
sold in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by the
vendors and the Court below have wrongly held that
property measuring 1392 sq, ft. instead of area of 928
sq.ft., learned Counsel for the respondent Sri Rao
submitted that there was no error committed by
Courts below and the Courts below have followed the
correct principle of law while deciding the question of
identity and extent of property sold by applying the
doctrine to the effect that in case of description of the
property in suit by area and the boundaries if there is
a conflict between the two, the description by
boundaries is to prevail over that area. In this
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connection, reliance had been placed on behalf of the

respondent on Privy Council's Decision in PALESTINE
PUPAT CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY v. GOVERNMENT OF
PALESTINE, AIR 1948 PC 207 as well as on a Decision
in SHIV DHANASINGH v. SACHINDRA KUMAR, AIR
1963 SC 18. Shri Rao has submitted that in this view
of the matter the Second Appeal deserves to be
dismissed. …….. I have applied my mind to the above
arguments of Counsel for both the parties. That as
regard the finding of the Courts below to the effect that
property that has been sold is the same as claimed by
plaintiff in plaint and description by area is wrong and
that the Courts below have rightly held that in case of
conflict of description of property by area and by
boundaries, the description by boundaries is to prevail,
…………. In my opinion, he has rightly and fairly acted
in submitting that no serious challenge can be made to
the finding of Court on the question of identity of
property sold as it is well settled that in case of
description of property by area and boundaries and
there being conflict in the two, the description of
property by the boundaries is to prevail, if boundaries
are specific and well defined. Thus considered the
finding of Courts below is upheld.
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Mathai Mathai vs Joseph Mary As per the Indian

Contract Act,1872 it is clearly stated that for an
agreement to become a contract, the parties must be
competent to contract, wherein age of majority is a
condition for competency. A deed of mortgage is a
contract and we cannot hold that a mortgage in the
name of a minor is valid, simply because it is in the
interests of the minor unless she is represented by her
natural guardian or guardian appointed by the court.
The law cannot be read differently for a minor who is a
mortgagor and a minor who is a mortgagee as there
are rights and liabilities in respect of the immovable
property would flow out of such a contract on both of
them. Therefore, this Court has to hold that the
mortgage deed-Ex.A1 is void ab initio in law and the
appellant cannot claim any rights under it.