7thcpc Allowance Gazette
7thcpc Allowance Gazette
7thcpc Allowance Gazette
October 2005
Note
Matthew Gianni (matthewgianni@netscape.net) and Walt Simpson (walt@oceansnetwork.org) are independent consult-
ants on fisheries and oceans issues. Mr. Gianni has over 25 years experience in fisheries and marine conservation. He
worked for 10 years as a commercial fisherman and for the past 16 years as an advocate for fisheries and marine
conservation as an NGO participant in various conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations and related
fora. He was an active participant in the negotiation of the UN FAO International Plan of Action on IUU Fishing, amongst
other international agreements. Mr. Simpson has a 30-year maritime background including 21 years at sea on research,
cargo and fishing vessels and holds Master Mariner qualifications from both the United States and the United Kingdom.
Over the years he has developed ship tracking techniques and equipment and organized a number of expeditions at sea
to locate, track and document vessels engaged in IUU fishing, transportation of toxic waste, and illegally harvested forest
products.
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations
for whom the report was produced or the individuals who contributed to the production of the report.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following people for their help in gathering and/or reviewing the information in the
report: Dr. Juan Carlos Cardenas, Oscar Galli, Cristian Perez Muñoz, Jon Whitlow, Katie Higginbottom, Katherine Short,
Sarah Bladen, Simon Cripps, Ray Nias, Margaret Moore.
The authors are solely responsible for the accuracy of the content and the views expressed in the report.
Citation
This document should be cited as: Gianni, M. and Simpson, W. (2005). The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: how
flags of convenience provide cover for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Australian Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry, International Transport Workers’ Federation, and WWF International.
Total Pages: 83. Please note that not all photos used in this report illustrate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU)
fishing. Where it is known that the image is documenting IUU fishing, it is noted in the caption.
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 6
Section 2: Trends in flagging and rights abuses in the IUU fisheries .................. 26
for Patagonian toothfish
Section 4: Tankers and resupply vessels servicing high seas and ..................... 51
distant water fishing fleets
ANNEX II: Sample of port visits and itineraries of refrigerated cargo ................. 79
vessels transshipping high value tuna at sea for delivery
to Japan. 2001-2003.
1
Executive Summary
The report The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: how Flags of Convenience provide
cover for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is the culmination of over a year of investi-
gation and research funded by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Forestry, the International Transport Workers’ Federation and WWF International, on Flags
of Convenience and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing on the high seas. IUU
fishing is one of the most serious threats to the health of the world’s fisheries and oceans. This
report:
I documents trends in the use of Flags of Convenience (FOCs) which allow for extensive
IUU fishing operations on the high seas;
I identifies major components of the global infrastructure supporting high seas fishing and
companies that could be enlisted to address the IUU challenge;
I describes the impact of free-riding FOC fishing States on resource management, human
rights and marine conservation;
I recommends solutions or steps to be taken to eliminate IUU fishing and the FOC system.
Australian
Customs and
Fisheries patrol
boat in pursuit
of the IUU boat,
Viarsa, on the
Southern
Ocean.
© Australian
Fisheries
Management
Authority
2
Confiscated illegal catch of
Patagonian toothfish (also
known as Chilean Sea Bass
or Miro). © Australian
Customs Service
The study analyzed information available from the Lloyd’s Register of Ships between 1999 and
2005 on fishing vessels registered to the top 14 countries that operate open registries or ‘Flags
of Convenience’ for large-scale fishing vessels. Over 1,000 large-scale fishing vessels continue
to fly Flags of Convenience (FOCs) as of July 2005, in spite of significant global and regional
efforts over recent years to combat IUU fishing on the high seas, primarily by FOC fishing
fleets. The FOC system provides cover to a truly globalized fishing fleet engaged in what is
largely illegal or unregulated fishing activity on the high seas, to the detriment of international
efforts to conserve fisheries and protect other species in the marine environment. Many, if not
most, of these vessels deliberately register with FOC countries to evade conservation and
management regulations for high seas fisheries. The countries which issue FOCs are ultimately
responsible for the activities of these vessels on the high seas, but turn a blind eye and
exercise little or no control over the vessels concerned. It costs only a few hundred dollars to
buy an FOC, and with that FOC vessels and fishing companies are free to catch millions of
dollars worth of fish and threaten other forms of marine life on the high seas with impunity.
It is important to distinguish the three elements of IUU fishing: illegal, unregulated and unre-
ported fishing. All three serve to undermine the conservation of fisheries and the protection of
the marine environment although, by definition, unregulated or unreported fishing on the high
seas may not always be illegal.
I The FOC system is a thriving business: Over 1,200 large-scale fishing vessels were
registered to FOC countries in 2005, only slightly less than the number in 1999. At the
same time, the number of large-scale fishing vessels on the Lloyd’s Register of Ships
whose flag is listed as ‘unknown’ has grown by 50% since 1999 to over 1,600 in 2004.
The result is that a high percentage – approximately 15% – of the world’s large-scale
fishing fleet is flying FOCs or listed as flag unknown. While not all of these vessels are
necessarily involved in IUU fishing, the large number of FOC fishing vessels severely
impairs the ability of responsible countries and regional fisheries management organiza-
tions (RFMOs) to monitor, control and manage fisheries on the high seas and eliminate
IUU fishing. The irony is that while the FOC fishing business on the high seas may be
worth a billion dollars or more per year, the top four FOC fishing countries only take in a
few million dollars per year in fishing vessel registration fees. The FOC system serves as a
very inexpensive and often deliberate means for vessels fishing on the high seas to evade
the rules and make enormous profits.
3
I The top FOC fishing countries: Belize, Honduras, Panama, and St Vincent and the
Grenadines have consistently topped the list of FOC countries with the largest number of
large-scale fishing vessels registered to fly their flag. These four countries alone have
accounted for 75% or more of the fishing vessels flying the flag of the FOC countries
listed between the years 1999-2005 and which are analyzed in this report. Of the FOC
countries identified in the report, Bolivia, one of the top 14, and Mongolia, a new entrant
in the FOC business, are entirely landlocked countries.
I Deliberately built to fly an FOC: About 14 per cent of large-scale fishing vessels built
between 2001 and 2003 were flying FOCs by the end of 2003. This is a real problem as a
significant portion of new large-scale fishing vessels appear to be built with a view to
engaging in IUU fishing. Of the 51 fishing vessels over 24 metres built in Taiwan during the
same period, 50 were flagged in FOC countries by the end of 2003 – only one was
flagged in Taiwan. Altogether, over 100 large-scale fishing vessels built since 2000 were
flagged to FOC countries as soon as they rolled out of the shipyard.
I Human rights abuses: Not only is FOC fishing causing damage to ocean life, there is a
deadly human cost also. The report highlights these abuses using examples associated
with IUU fisheries in the Southern Ocean, including the abandonment of crew members
in foreign ports, forced labour and safety issues. In one case, a fishing vessel, the Amur,
sank in the sub-Antarctic waters off Kerguelen Island. The life saving equipment did not
function and, as a result, many of the crew died.
I The infrastructure supporting high seas fishing fleets is well-organised and largely
unregulated: Many high seas fishing vessels, in particular fleets fishing high value tunas,
transship their catches to refrigerated cargo vessels while at sea and depend on at-sea
refuelling and resupply vessels to allow them to fish longer and at lower cost. The at-sea
transshipment, resupply and refuelling fleets are not, for the most part, operating illegally,
but they are almost entirely unregulated. At least some vessels in these fleets provide
services to IUU fishing fleets as well as legitimate fishing fleets. The report profiles the
4
Australian
Customs
officers in a
rigid inflatable
vessel on a
Southern
Ocean
operation.
© Australian
Customs
Service
at-sea infrastructure servicing high seas and distant water fleets and provides specific
recommendations for regulating the companies and vessels providing these services.
The report provides a series of specific and practical recommendations that, if adopted by
countries, regional fisheries management organizations and the international community as a
whole would greatly enhance the implementation of the landmark agreement adopted by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in 2001 – the UN FAO International Plan of
Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU fishing. Amongst these, the single most effective
means to implement the agreement, which highlights the FOC role in perpetuating IUU
Fishing, is to eliminate the FOC system; a system which allows an exceptionally large fleet of
high seas fishing vessels to roam the world’s oceans in search of high value species of fish and
operate completely outside the rule of international law. It is a system that needs to be
dismantled forthwith.
5
Introduction
Many of the world’s fisheries and marine and sharks in the high seas longline fisheries
ecosystems are being exploited at rates far in for tunas and Patagonian toothfish.
excess of sustainable levels. Fishing on the
high seas has increased over recent decades The overall extent and value of IUU fishing on
as a result of the overfishing of coastal waters the high seas is very difficult to estimate with
and in response to growing market demand any real degree of accuracy given the nature
for seafood products.1 of such fisheries and the complex corporate
structures used to hide these realities. Even
Unfortunately, with some exceptions, the in cases where catches may be reported in
international community is losing the battle to unregulated fisheries, there is no global
effectively conserve and manage fisheries on database of fish catches on the high seas.
the high seas.2 A major reason for this is the The UN Food and Agriculture Organization
prevalence of illegal, unreported and unregu- (FAO), in its 2002 Report on the State of
lated (IUU) fishing. While some progress has World Fisheries and Aquaculture, states “It is
been made in combating IUU fishing in the difficult to assess the development of fishing
region, nowhere is this more evident than in on the high seas because reports to the FAO
the fisheries for Patagonian toothfish in the of marine catches make no distinction
Southern Ocean around Antarctica. Else- between those taken within Exclusive Eco-
where the level of IUU fishing for tunas in the nomic Zones (EEZs) and those taken on the
Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans has high seas”.3
become an issue of serious concern. The
concern over IUU fishing is not only focused Nonetheless, a recent report by the Marine
on management and overfishing but also the Resources Assessment Group roughly
broader ecosystem impacts of IUU fishing, estimated that the annual value of IUU fishing
such as the bycatch of sea turtles, seabirds on the high seas could be in the vicinity of
Silky shark
caught by the
fin on a
longline hook.
© Cat Holloway
6
Box 1. Definition of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
(IUU) Fishing7
(Definition from the UN FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing, Articles 3.1 – 3.3. FAO,
Rome 2001)
$1.2 billion USD.4 The figure is based on There has been a concerted and productive
estimates, from a variety of sources, of the international political effort over recent years
extent of IUU fishing on the high seas for to identify and address the problem of IUU
tunas (primarily bluefin, yellowfin, albacore and fishing – most notably the adoption in 2001
big eye), sharks, toothfish, cod, redfish, of the UN FAO International Plan of Action
alfonsino, orange roughy, and squid. The to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Environment Justice Foundation, in a report Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Re-
published in 2005, cites an estimate of the gional fisheries management organizations
cost of IUU fishing to developing countries have adopted a variety of measures to
alone at $2 - $15 billion dollars (US) per year.5 prevent or deter IUU fishing and there have
7
been a number of UN related resolutions and prevented or eliminated. In reviewing the
declarations committing States to take more effectiveness of the Plan of Action in 2004,
effective action. More recently, the UN the FAO stated “information available to FAO
Secretary General established a Consultative indicates that IUU fishing is increasing in both
Group on Flag State Implementation and the intensity and scope and that it is continuing to
Fisheries Ministers of several countries jointly undermine national and regional efforts to
established the Ministerially-led High Seas sustainably manage fisheries”.6
Task Force on Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing on the High Seas. Deficiencies in the governance of fisheries on
However, this political effort must prompt the high seas also play a major role in allow-
more effective action if IUU fishing is to be ing or failing to prevent IUU fishing. Numerous
8
these vulnerable fish populations and the
Illegal toothfish
longliner Grand Prince fragile environments in which they are ex-
from Belize, Indian ploited within their EEZs and, to a lesser
Ocean. extent, on the high seas. Where regional
© Greenpeace/
Daniel Beltra fisheries management organizations (RFMOs)
do exist, many have failed to establish or
effectively enforce regulations sufficiently
stringent to prevent overfishing on the high
seas by both member countries and FOC/
IUU countries and fleets.
9
have adopted measures to ensure more publicly available information. It highlights the
effective flag State compliance, much more fact that the number of large-scale fishing
action by non-FOC countries is required.8 vessels flying Flags of Convenience continues
to be a significant portion of the world’s
Nonetheless, improvements in the perform- industrial fishing fleet. This Section also
ance of flag States and RFMOs will be includes information on countries where the
enormously difficult to put into place or simply owners or operators of FOC fishing vessels
will fail to have the intended effect if the are based, the use of FOCs by newly built
problem of high seas fishing by vessels flying vessels, and the growing number of fishing
Flags of Convenience continues at anywhere vessels listed as flag ‘unknown’ on the
near the scope and intensity of current Lloyd’s Register of Ships.
practice.
Section 2 uses the example of IUU fishing for
This report uses the commitment made by all Patagonian toothfish (‘Chilean sea bass’) in
countries to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU the Southern Ocean to review developments
fishing through the UN FAO Plan of Action on in the use of FOCs such as flag hopping. An
IUU fishing and reinforced by numerous apparent and more recent trend by compa-
declarations and resolutions, including several nies and vessels with a history of IUU fishing
adopted by the United Nations General to ‘legitimize’ their IUU activities by moving
Assembly, as the basis for evaluating the from the use of Flags of Convenience to
effectiveness of international efforts to combat registering their vessels to fly the flag of
IUU fishing, in particular FOC fishing, on the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic
high seas. Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) member
countries is also examined. This section also
In Section 1, the report reviews recent trends provides some very disturbing information on
in the use of FOCs by large-scale fishing the abuse of human and workers’ rights in
vessels, particularly since the adoption of the these fisheries, a situation which has on
UN FAO Plan of Action in 2001, based on occasion resulted in the deaths of seafarers.
Australian
Customs
National Marine
Unit officer in
Southern
Operation.
© Australian
Customs
Service
10
The Uruguayan-flagged, Viarsa 1,
suspected of fishing illegally for
Patagonian toothfish in Australian
Antarctic waters, was apprehended
in August 2003 after a marathon hot
pursuit across the Southern Ocean.
The vessel was apprehended with
assistance from the South African
and United Kingdom authorities,
and brought back to Australia.
© Australian Fisheries Management
Authority
Sections 3 and 4 provide detailed information and the adoption by a number of RFMOs of
on the global infrastructure for at-sea trans- more stringent conservation and manage-
shipment of fish catches and the refuelling ment measures as well as measures de-
and resupply of distant water fishing vessels signed to tackle IUU fishing – IUU fishing on
operating on the high seas – both IUU and the high seas is increasingly becoming ‘illegal’
legitimate fishing vessels. This section identi- as opposed to ‘unregulated’ fishing. This
fies opportunities to regulate transshipment at section explores options for using the Interna-
sea, which provides a major avenue for the tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and
movement of high value IUU caught fish such other international arbitration mechanisms to
as tunas to market. These regulations would provide legally binding incentives to flag States
strongly enhance the effectiveness of meas- to desist from failing to prevent their flagged
ures to prevent or eliminate IUU fishing, vessels from engaging in IUU fishing. It
particularly for high value species of tuna as identifies gaps in international law – in particu-
well as other high seas fisheries that depend lar the need to define the ‘genuine link’ in
on at-sea infrastructure to support their Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law
operations. of the Sea to mean that a vessel is benefi-
cially owned and controlled in the flag State.
Section 5 reviews several additional industries
and sectors providing support for distant The report concludes, in Section 7, with a set
water fleets fishing on the high seas and of recommendations designed to give specific
identifies a number of actions to enlist their and practical effect to the implementation of
support and help combat IUU fishing. the UN FAO International Plan of Action on
IUU fishing covering the issues identified in
Section 6 describes several economic issues previous sections.
behind the FOC system for fishing vessels
and explores potential legal means of ad-
dressing the problem. With the strengthening
of international fisheries law – through, for
example, the entry into force of the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement in 2001, the movement to
create new RFMOs and upgrade existing
RFMOs in conformity with international law,
11
Section One
Global review of recent trends in the use of Flags
of Convenience by large-scale fishing vessels
12
Table 1.1. Number of vessels, total tonnage, average tonnage and average age of fishing vessels ≥ 24
metres in length registered to 14 countries with open registries (FOCs) comparing data from 1999, 2001,
2003 and 2005. Source: Lloyd's Register of Ships
Flag State Data Vessels As % of All Total Flag Average As % of All Average
Year Registered FOC Gross Tonnage FOCGross Vessel
in Flag State Vessels Tonnage Per Vessel Tonnage Age
Belize 1999 402 29.4 % 329,397 819.4 31.6 % 24
2001 443 33.8 % 329,285 743.3 29.4 % 24
2003 261 20.4 % 301,885 1156.6 29.3 % 23
2005 241 19.0 % 259,119 1075.2 26.9 % 22
continued...
13
Table 1.1, continued
Flag State Data Vessels As % of All Total Flag Average As % of All Average
Year Registered FOC Gross Tonnage FOC Gross Vessel
in Flag State Vessels Tonnage Per Vessel Tonnage Age
Marshall 1999 11 0.8 % 18,701 1700.1 1.8 % 21
Islands 2001 9 0.7 % 14,787 1643.0 1.3 % 21
2003 10 0.8 % 13,544 1354.4 1.3 % 17
2005 7 0.6 % 11,434 1633.4 1.2 % 17
14
Table 1.2. Fishing vessels (fishing vessels, trawlers and fish factory ships) ≥ 24 metres registered to all
countries, combining the 14 FOC countries (from Table 1.1) and fishing vessels whose flag State is
listed as 'Unknown' on the Lloyd's Register of Ships Database. Table lists number of vessels; FOC and
flag 'unknown' vessels as a percentage of total number of fishing vessels, total Gross Tonnage (GT),
average Gross Tonnage, and average age of the vessels. Source: Lloyd's Register of Ships.
Year Flag States Number of Number Gross Tonnage G.T. as Average Average
Fishing Vessels as % of (G.T.) of Vessels % of G.T. Age
≥ 24 m Total Total
1,650 vessels in 2005. Altogether, Lloyd’s countries on Table 1.1 are listed as residing in
Register of Ships lists approximately 20,000 European Union countries, Taiwan and
large-scale (≥ 24m) fishing vessels for each of several other countries not generally consid-
the years 1999 – 2005. ered to be FOC countries. Taiwan, Honduras,
Panama, Spain, and Belize are the top five
Country of Residence of owners countries where companies that own or
of FOC fishing vessels operate fishing vessels flagged to one of the
top FOC fishing countries are based. The
Most FOC vessels are registered to fictitious European Union countries as a whole top the
or shell companies, often ‘located’ in the list of countries of residence of FOC fishing
country that has issued the flag. Since the vessels with Spain/Canary Islands comprising
owners of FOC vessels often deliberately try approximately one-half the EU total. Annex I
to maintain a ‘legally invisible link’ between lists the names of the companies (registered
themselves – the ‘beneficial owner’ – and the owners) and vessels whose owners reside in
company publicly listed as the registered Taiwan and Spain (including the Canary
owner of a vessel, the name, nationality and Islands).
country of residence of the true owner is
usually carefully hidden. However, this is not
always the case. Many of the companies
identified as the owners or managers of
fishing vessels on the Lloyd’s Register of
Ships that are flagged to one of the 14 FOC
15
Table 1.3. Top 20 Countries Listed as Country of Residence of Owner, Operator, Fleet Manager or
Group Manager of Fishing Vessels Flagged to One of the 14 FOC Countries on Table 1.1. Source:
Lloyd's Register of Ships, July 2005.
Country of Residence of Owner, Number of fishing vessels Percentage of all fishing vessels
Manager, or Group15 ≥ 24 m ≥ 24 m flagged to 14 FOC
countries in 2005
Taiwan 142 11.2
Honduras 111 8.8
Panama 96 7.6
Spain 87 6.9
Belize 74 5.8
Korea (South) 43 3.4
Singapore 34 2.7
Japan 32 2.5
Vanuatu 31 2.4
United States of America 29 2.3
Russia 29 2.3
Hong Kong 27 2.1
Georgia 25 2.0
Mauritius 22 1.7
Russia 19 1.5
Saint Vincent & Grenadines 19 1.5
Cyprus 18 1.4
Greece 16 1.3
Equatorial Guinea 15 1.2
Cambodia 15 1.2
Summary of trends in the use of authorized to fish in the area of one or more
FOCs by large-scale fishing RFMOs – the figure could be as high as 15%,
vessels 1999-2005 as discussed later in Section I. Nevertheless,
with these caveats, a number of notable
The information derived from Lloyd’s data- trends emerge from the information on the
bases cannot be considered as 100% Lloyd’s database and are described below.
accurate or up to date as there are often
delays in registering the transfer of flag from i. Top four Flag of Convenience
one country to another country. Information countries
on the flag, ownership and overall numbers of
large-scale fishing vessels flagged to FOCs The same four countries – Belize, Panama,
can change significantly during the course of Honduras, and St Vincent and the
a year. In addition, at least some of the Grenadines – topped the list of FOC countries
vessels flagged to one or another of the 14 on Table 1.1 for fishing vessels throughout the
FOC countries were on recent lists of vessels period 1999-2005. Over the same period the
16
Australian
Customs
Service staff
board the IUU
boat, Viarsa,
caught stealing
Patagonian
toothfish in the
Southern
Ocean in 2003.
© Australian
Customs
Service
number of vessels flagged to all four countries July 2005, only 106 were listed as being
combined fell from over 1,117 to 953, a owned by a company registered in Honduras,
decrease of approximately 15% (Belize with 195 vessels owned by companies
declined by approximately 40%). Neverthe- registered in 25 other countries. The owner-
less, all four countries remained at the top of ship of the remaining 106 vessels registered
the list of FOC countries in terms of the to Honduras is listed as ‘unknown’.17
numbers of large-scale fishing vessels on their
registries, with over 950 large-scale fishing There have been a number of measures
vessels on their registries combined in 2005. adopted over recent years by ICCAT,
CCAMLR, IOTC and other regional fisheries
Honduras tops the list on Table 1.1 with the management organizations, including, in
highest number of fishing vessels on its some cases, trade measures and import
registry in 2005. While the number of large- bans directed specifically at all four countries.
scale fishing vessels flagged to Honduras While these measures apparently have
declined between 1999 and 2001, the resulted in some deregistration of fishing
number rose by over 100 between 2001 and vessels from the registries of one or more
2003, with 416 vessels on the registry in July countries (e.g. Panama, Belize), which may
2005 according to the Lloyd’s Register of explain some of the decrease in the numbers
Ships. In general terms, a change of this mentioned above, they have not prevented
magnitude in the numbers of fishing vessels any of these States from continuing to
on the Honduran registry would appear to be maintain large numbers of fishing vessels on
an ongoing indication of the relative ease with their registries, based on the information from
which fishing vessels are able to ‘hop’ from Lloyd’s. Nor have the measures adopted by
flag to flag. These changes can occur simply the regional fisheries management organiza-
with the aid of a fax machine whilst the vessel tions discouraged large numbers of fishing
is at sea, more likely than not actually fishing. vessel owners interested in flying FOCs from
Of the 406 vessels registered to Honduras in continuing to register their ships to Panama,
17
Belize, Honduras, and St Vincent and the iii. FOC vessels as a percentage of
Grenadines. world’s industrial fishing fleet
New Australian
Southern
Oceans patrol
vessel Oceanic
Viking (photo
courtesy P&O
Maritime
Services).
© Australian
Customs
Service
18
Dead Puffin
found by
Greenpeace in
illegal driftnet.
Kuril Islands,
Russia.
©Greenpeace
19
owners do not feel any need to hide their trends in the FOC registries, from a global
country of residence or establish fictitious perspective the adoption of the UN FAO
vessel ownership companies in an FOC IPOA on IUU fishing combined with the
State to hide their activities. Articles 18 efforts of regional fisheries management
and 19 of the UN FAO IPOA on IUU Fishing organizations and some States20 to combat
explicitly call on States to ensure that their IUU fishing to date have had limited effect in
nationals and companies within their discouraging the use of Flags of Convenience
jurisdiction do not engage in IUU fishing, by large-scale fishing vessels worldwide.
and that they discourage their citizens from
flagging fishing vessels to FOC States (e.g. New vessel construction
States that do not abide by flag State
responsibilities). According to Lloyd’s Register of Ships, 478
fishing vessels over 24 metres in length were
v. Effectiveness of UN FAO IPOA in built between 2001 and 2003 and flagged to
eliminating FOC fishing one of the 14 FOC countries listed on Table
1.1 or listed as flag ‘unknown’ by the end of
Finally, the most obvious trend from the 2003. This represents a real problem in that a
information contained in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 is substantial number of new large-scale fishing
that the number of fishing vessels on the vessels may have been built specifically to
Lloyd’s Register of Ships database that were engage in IUU fishing.
registered to the 14 FOC countries analysed
has declined relatively little, by only 149 As mentioned previously, most of the vessels
vessels, between 1999 and 2005, four years registered to an FOC country or listed as flag
after the adoption of the UN FAO IPOA on ‘unknown’ were built in Taiwan. Furthermore,
IUU fishing. by the end of 2003, of the 51 vessels, ≥ 24 m
built in Taiwan during this period, only one
Assuming the information on the Lloyd’s was flagged to Taiwan; the remainder were
database is reasonably indicative of overall flagged in FOC countries.
Table 1.4. Summary: New Fishing Vessel Construction 2001, 2002, 2003
20
Table 1.5. Vessels built by Lien Cherng Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. of Kaohsiung, Taiwan which have appeared
at one time or another on COLTO’s list of suspect vessels.22
Original Name / Flag Past Name / Flag Current Name / Flag Vessel Manager Nationality
Austin Bolivia Koko Georgia South Ocean Belize Kando Maritime Taiwan
Boston Bolivia Jian Yuan Georgia Kando Maritime Taiwan
Champion Bolivia Kang Yuan Georgia Kando Maritime Taiwan
Darwin Bolivia Kiev Georgia Kando Maritime Taiwan
Eva Bolivia Monas Georgia Mellas Ukraine Chuan-Chuan Yoo Taiwan
Florence Bolivia Nantai Georgia Simeiz Ukraine Chuan-Chuan Yoo Taiwan
Georgia Bolivia Zarya Russia Globalpesca I* Chile Kando Maritime Taiwan
Hunter Bolivia Strela Russia Globalpesca II* Chile Kando Maritime Taiwan
Isabel Bolivia Volna Russia Chuan-Chuan Yoo Taiwan
Jackson Bolivia Yantar Russia Chuan-Chuan Yoo Taiwan
* The Globalpesca I & II were sold in January 2005 to Globalpesca SA of Santiago, Chile, and may no longer be managed by Kando
Maritime.
Reviewing new vessel construction in the Some Taiwanese shipyards have a large
period 2000 – 2005, the authors found that percentage of the vessels they build adopt
over 100 of the large-scale fishing vessels Flags of Convenience immediately when
built during this period were initially flagged to launched. The Lien Cherng Shipbuilding Co.
one of the 14 FOC countries immediately Ltd. of Kaohsiung, for example, launched 18
after being launched. Approximately one- vessels in the last five years, all flying FOCs
quarter of these vessels eventually reflagged when they left the shipyard. Ten of these 18
to a country other than one of the 14 listed in vessels have been implicated in IUU fishing for
Table 1.1 by 2005. Patagonian toothfish. These include the so-
called ‘Alphabet’ fleet of IUU toothfish vessels
Eighty four large-scale fishing vessels were identified in a report published by the Coalition
built in Taiwan over the past five years. of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) in 2002
Further investigation may determine whether entitled The Alphabet Boats, A Case Study of
any of the companies in Taiwan involved in Toothfish Poaching in the Southern Ocean.21
building new vessels flagged to FOCs have
benefited from funds for the joint Japan/ New vessel construction
Taiwan programme designed to decom- under 24 metres in length
mission large-scale tuna longline vessels.
There appears to be an increase in the
Further, given the status of Taiwan as a construction, primarily by Taiwanese compa-
‘Cooperating Fishing Entity’ of ICCAT the nies, of vessels just under 24 metres in length
government should be encouraged to ensure to fish for tuna and other highly migratory
that no vessels built in Taiwanese shipyards species. There are International Maritime
are allowed to register to FOC countries. Organization (IMO) and national regulations
According to the Organization for Promotion dealing with crewing and safety requirements
of Responsible Tuna Fisheries and a number that apply differently to vessels above and
of other sources, many of the Taiwanese below the internationally agreed definition of
large-scale tuna longline vessels have re- large-scale (≥ 24 m), which may provide a
cently reflagged to Taiwan, although this has reason in some cases for why some vessels
not yet been fully reflected on the Lloyd’s are being built just below the 24 metre limit. It
Register of Ships. is also possible that some of these vessels
21
Onboard the
Oceanic Viking.
© Australian
Customs
Service
were built to be less than 24 metres in length appears to be occurring in the tuna fisheries
to avoid conservation measures applicable to in the Southwest Pacific. In 2003, Korean
‘large-scale’ vessels as promulgated by and Chinese shipyards delivered 10 longliners
ICCAT and other RFMOs. of 23.8 to 23.9 metres length overall to a
fishing enterprise based in Papeete, Tahiti.
In 2003, the U.S. Commissioner to ICCAT This was the first delivery of 32 longliners in
stated in testimony before the U.S. Congress the 23.8 to 23.9 metre range ordered by the
that company.
22
area but as of July 2005 all vessels authorized Table 1.1 and authorized to fish for tunas and
by Brazil appear to be now flagged to Brazil.24 other highly migratory species in either the
Atlantic Ocean (including the Mediterranean
The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and Caribbean Seas), Indian Ocean, South-
(IATTC) listed three Panamanian flagged west Pacific Ocean, or the Eastern Tropical
longline vessels and twenty-one purse seiners Pacific Ocean amounts to 188 vessels as of
authorized by Panama to fish in the Eastern July 2005. However, there is likely to be
Pacific Ocean in 2005. Honduras and some duplication of vessels on these lists as a
Vanuatu had an additional 58 vessels com- number of them are likely to be authorized to
bined on the IATTC list of active purse seine fish in more than one ocean region. Moreo-
vessels and longline vessels authorized to fish ver, the numbers of vessels, in some cases,
in the area. Interestingly, the IATTC identifies are likely to vary over the course of the year.
45 longline vessels flagged to, and authorized Even assuming that there is no duplication of
by, Bolivia to fish in the IATTC area even vessels on the lists of vessels authorized to
though Bolivia is neither a contracting party, a fish in the above mentioned RFMO areas, the
‘Cooperating Non Party’ nor a ‘Cooperating figure of 188 vessels only represents approxi-
Fishing Entity’ of the IATTC, nor are Bolivia’s mately 15% of the total number of vessels
vessels listed on the IATTC lists of purse seine flagged to the 14 FOC countries listed on
or longline vessels authorized to fish in the Table 1.1.
area.25
Given that many of the vessels flagged to the
The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency’s 14 countries on Table 1.1 are longline vessels
Vessel Register of Vessels in Good Standing targeting tuna and other highly migratory
authorized to fish in the EEZs of Pacific Forum species, an important question arises: aside
countries, which includes bunker and trans- from the relatively small percentage of vessels
shipment/fish carriers, lists 58 longliners, 31 authorized to fish as indicated above, where
purse seiners, and four pole and line vessels do these vessels actually fish?
flagged to Belize, Cambodia, Marshall Islands,
Panama and Vanuatu combined, in addition Honduras, for example, had 416 fishing
to 46 fish carriers, two ‘mother ships’ and vessels over 24 metres registered in 2005.
three bunker vessels authorized to operate in On the ICCAT list, there were three Honduran
the fisheries overseen by South Pacific Forum flagged vessels authorized to fish in the ICCAT
member States as of July 2005.26 Of the 46 area.29 An additional eight Honduras flagged
fish carriers, 43 are flagged to Panama and vessels were authorized to fish for tuna in the
the remaining three to Belize. Eastern Pacific in the IATTC area. No Hondu-
ran flagged vessels were listed as authorized
The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) to fish for tuna in the Indian Ocean or in the
does not list any vessels flagged to these 14 area of the South Pacific Forum countries. Of
countries as being amongst the 1,973 vessels the remaining 405 large-scale fishing vessels
authorized by contracting or cooperating on the Honduran registry in 2005, many, if not
parties to fish tunas and tuna-like species in most, are likely to be tuna fishing vessels (for
the Indian Ocean.27 Of note also is the lack of example, 90 Honduran flagged fishing vessels
vessels flagged to Taiwan on the IOTC list of ≥ 24 metres are listed on the Lloyd’s Register
vessels authorized to fish in the IOTC area. of Ships as owned and/or operated by
However, a relatively large fleet of Taiwanese companies based in Taiwan). If not the
flagged longline vessels is likely to be fishing in Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, South Pacific,
the Indian Ocean area.28 Only one vessel Eastern Pacific, Mediterranean or Caribbean
authorized to fish in the CCAMLR area for the Sea tuna fisheries, where are the remaining
2003-2004 season flew the flag (Vanuatu) of longline and purse seine vessels flagged to
one of the 14 FOC countries. Honduras operating and authorized to fish?
The website for the Honduras General
Altogether, the total number of fishing vessels Directorate of the Merchant Marine states
flagged to one of the 14 countries listed in that, as a condition for obtaining the
23
Bycatch of Billfish (Treptarus audax) and sharks. © WWF-Canon / Hélène Petit
Honduran flag, fishing vessels that intend to and the true ownership is often hidden behind
fish on the high seas need the “Authorization fictitious companies.
of the General Directorate of Fisheries and
Aquiculture (sic); Legalized document that The information reviewed in this section
shows evidence of the installation of the clearly demonstrates the need for far more
satellite monitoring system;” and an “Affidavit accurate, comprehensive, centralized, and
that states the non intention of fishing for timely information on numbers of vessels
tuna.”30 capable of fishing on the high seas, their
movements, changes in flag and registration
Conclusions over time, history of fishing including areas
fished and any citations or violations for
While the discussion above draws on a failure to abide by relevant conservation and
number of sources and has been extensively management measures. Greater
cross-checked, it is by no means complete, consistency in the various lists by RFMOs of
up to date or entirely accurate. Among other vessels authorized to fish would help and,
things, there are numerous deficiencies and most importantly, information on the true
lag times associated with the information on ownership of these vessels is needed to
the current flag and previous flag(s) of vessels, assist in compliance and enforcement
a large number of fishing vessels on the actions. All of this information is essential
Lloyd’s registry are listed as flag ‘unknown’, to the international effort to prevent, deter
24
nd eliminate IUU fishing. Unfortunately, I allow countries to better review the
this information is lacking in many previous history of fishing vessels
key respects. seeking to enter their registries,
25
Section Two
Trends in flagging and human rights abuses in the
IUU fisheries for Patagonian toothfish
The Southern Ocean is one of the world’s Vessels engaged in IUU fishing for toothfish
oceans worst hit by IUU fishing. Although the continue to change flags to obscure their
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic identity, minimize costs and avoid any restric-
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) has tions on their fishing activities. The latest FOC
adopted a number of measures to combat country to join the IUU flagging business for
IUU fishing, the problem continues to plague Southern Ocean fisheries is Togo. As the
the fisheries for Patagonian toothfish in following table illustrates, Togo appears to be
the region. the current flag of choice for some of the
Table 2.1. Vessels with a history of IUU fishing for Patagonian toothfish recently reflagged to Togo
26
Patagonian
toothfish (also
known as
Chilean Sea
Bass or Miro).
© Australian
Fisheries
Management
Authority
most egregious offenders amongst the IUU are owned by companies based in Spain,
operators in the Southern Ocean. according to Lloyd’s Register of Ships. An
additional eight large-scale fishing vessels on
Articles 18 and 19 of the FAO Plan of Action the Register were flagged to Togo as of July
call on States to take action to prevent their 2005 and two are listed as owned or oper-
nationals from engaging in IUU as owners or ated by Spanish companies, whilst the
operators of the vessels concerned: ownership of the remainder is unknown.
18. In the light of relevant provisions of While flag hopping from one FOC to another
the 1982 UN Convention, and without continues to occur, there also appears be a
prejudice to the primary responsibility of trend of former FOC IUU fishing vessels
the flag State on the high seas, each reflagging to a country which is a member of
State should, to the greatest extent CCAMLR, in order to obtain a CCAMLR
possible, take measures or cooperate to licence to fish. Companies associated with
ensure that nationals subject to their IUU fishing have received licences from
jurisdiction do not support or engage in CCAMLR member States in a number of
IUU fishing. All States should cooperate cases. Arguably the most serious problem in
to identify those nationals who are the this regard in recent years has been with
operators or beneficial owners of vessels former FOC vessels reflagging to Uruguay, a
involved in IUU fishing. CCAMLR member country, and continuing to
engage in IUU fishing for toothfish and related
19. States should discourage their activities with the apparent complicity of the
nationals from flagging fishing vessels government in many instances. It remains to
under the jurisdiction of a State that be seen whether the recent change of
does not meet its flag State government in Uruguay in March 2005 will
responsibilities. result in a change of policy by the govern-
ment to no longer allow vessels and compa-
In light of these provisions it is interesting to nies to use the Uruguayan flag and govern-
note that most of the toothfish fishing vessels ment complicity to obtain licences to ‘legally’
recently flagged to Togo listed on Table 2.1 engage in IUU fishing.44
27
Confiscated
illegal catch of
Patagonian
toothfish (also
known as
Chilean Sea
Bass or Miro)
from Viarsa 1.
© Australian
Fisheries
Management
Authority
More generally, of the 42 long-line vessels 38. Flag States should deter vessels
licensed to fish the CCAMLR area in the from reflagging for the purposes of non-
2003-2004 season, at least 14 have been compliance with conservation and
identified by various government and NGO management measures or provisions
sources as having been involved in IUU fishing adopted at a national, regional or global
in the past. Another two vessels were at one level.
time registered to FOC countries.
39. States should take all practicable
It is important to recall Articles 36 and 38 of steps, including denial to a vessel of an
the UN FAO Plan of Action on IUU fishing authorization to fish and the entitlement
which state as follows: to fly that State’s flag, to prevent ‘flag
hopping’; that is to say, the practice of
36. Flag States should avoid flagging repeated and rapid changes of a
vessels with a history of non-compliance vessel’s flag for the purposes of circum-
except where: venting conservation and management
measures or provisions adopted at a
36.1 the ownership of the vessel has national, regional or global level or of
subsequently changed and the new facilitating non-compliance with such
owner has provided sufficient evidence measures or provisions.
demonstrating that the previous owner
or operator has no further legal, benefi- In light of these provisions of the Plan of
cial or financial interest in, or control of, Action as well as those highlighted at the
the vessel; or beginning of this Section, both flag States and
countries within whose jurisdiction the nation-
36.2 having taken into account all als and companies engaged in fishing on the
relevant facts, the flag State determines high seas reside have a clear responsibility to
that flagging the vessel would not result prevent companies and nationals from
in IUU fishing. flagging their fishing vessels to FOC countries
28
Table 2.2. Vessels previously flagged to an FOC country and/or with a history of IUU fishing for
Patagonian toothfish recently reflagged to a CCAMLR member country
Other individuals and companies reported to In addition, other former FOC vessels have
be closely associated with IUU fishing have reflagged to CCAMLR member States as
also been able to obtain permission to fish in indicated on Table 2.2. Amongst these, two
the CCAMLR area. The Spanish company former IUU vessels, the Caroline Glacial and
29
the Cristina Glacial, were licensed by the IUU fishing within the French EEZ around
United States to fish the 2003/04 season Kerguelen Island. The American Warrior also
under the names America No. 1 and Ameri- reflagged to Honduras in 2004 and is now
can Warrior. These vessels were purchased named the Mochicano; its whereabouts are
by the American company Seaport Manage- unknown (see Box 1 – Case Study: Seaport
ment Services LLC in 2003 and reflagged to Management Services LLC – Pac-Fish, Inc.
the United States. However, they were and American No. 1).
reportedly still 50% owned by Vidal
Armadores of Spain while under the U.S. It would seem that as CCAMLR establishes
flag.64 increasingly restrictive measures to combat
IUU fishing, at least some IUU vessels
The Caroline Glacial and the Cristina Glacial formerly flagged to FOC countries have
were built in 1997 and, according to the ITF, reflagged to CCAMLR member countries to
citing information from ISOFISH, were sus- be able to continue to fish for toothfish.
pected of engaging in IUU fishing for Where this is done properly it can help ensure
toothfish.65 In 2003, both vessels were that the vessels no longer engage in IUU
flagged to St Vincent and the Grenadines (at activities. However, amongst other things, the
that time the Caroline Glacial was named the flag State must ensure that the vessels are
Caroline H). In the same year they were no longer owned or operated by companies
renamed the America No. 1 and the Ameri- with a history of IUU fishing activities. In this
can Warrior and reflagged to the United regard, it is interesting to note that four of the
States. In 2004, the America no.1 was toothfish vessels that have reflagged from
renamed the Apache, reflagged to Honduras FOCs to CCAMLR member countries – the
and subsequently arrested by the French for Volna, the Yantar (both flagged to Russia), the
30
2003.5 The America No. 1 left Spain in October 2003 for CCAMLR waters
near the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, but was unable to fish because of
delays in obtaining an authorization to fish from the US. In November 2003,
the America No. 1 met the Vidal Armadores owned toothfish vessel
Galaecia at sea near CCAMLR area 48.1 and transferred bait and fuel.6 The
Galaecia was not licensed to fish CCAMLR waters in 2003 and has been
closely linked with well known toothfish poaching vessels including the
Carran, Viarsa 1, Dorita, and Maya V.7
The America No. 1 finally received a permit from the United States to fish in
the Ross Sea but was only able to fish for 21 days due to ice conditions.
She sailed to Dunedin, New Zealand to offload toothfish, then sailed again
for the Ross Sea. Since the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the Ross Sea
was almost fully caught, Seaport Management Services asked the US for a
permit to fish the Banzare Bank. The America No. 1 left the Ross Sea and
sailed for the Banzare Bank but permission to fish there was delayed. A
decision was made to end fishing and the America No. 1 sailed to Mauri-
tius arriving in Port Louis on 2 April 2004. She had fished only 21 days in 6
months.
The America No. 1 was next seen in Montevideo, Uruguay in May flying the
Honduran flag, renamed Apache, and reportedly under new ownership.
However, both Lloyd’s register of Ships and Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit
continue to list US based Seaport Management Service as the company
with the controlling interest in the Apache.8
In June 2004 Apache was detected by the French patrol vessel Albatross
fishing illegally within the EEZ of the Kurguelen Islands. She was placed
under arrest and taken to Reunion where she is still being held. In Septem-
ber a French court convicted the captain and crew of illegal fishing.
In a response to the authors’ request for comments, Mr. Lawrence Lasarow,
President of Pac-Fish Inc., stated on 15 February 2005 that:
“We are not and never have been a part of the so-called “Galician
Syndicate”. “It is correct that NOAA impounded 33 tones of toothfish
even though Pac – Fish Inc. was in possession of certified docu-
ments. These documents included the DCD documents of legal
necessity signed by Dr H Neon of DINARA (The ministry of fisheries in
Uruguay) as well as CCAMLR. This matter was resolved by negotia-
tion with N.O.A.A. in order to clarify Pac-Fish Inc.’s situation.”
“When we were offered the opportunity to participate in a joint
venture with a Spanish company, we believed that it would be a way
of securing supplies on a regular basis. (Pac-Fish Inc. is a trading
company that imports/exports Tooth-fish). The transaction through
Seaport Management Services LLC gave the partners management
control and the vessels were flagged in the USA with U.S. skippers
and engineers and monitored by the U.S. coastguard by way of the
vms system in conformity with the rules of CCAMLR and the U.S.
Coastguard. There were U.S. and International observers on board
each vessel.”
The U.S. observer onboard the America No. 1 while the vessel was flagged
to the U.S. stated that she met Antonio Vidal, head of Vidal Armadores
together with Mr. Lasarow when she flew to Vigo, Spain to board the
vessel. 74
It is interesting to note that Mr. Lasarow, President and an owner of both
Seaport Management Services LLC and Pac-Fish, Inc., was a member of
the US delegation to CCAMLR XXII and XXIII in 2003 and 2004.75
31
Fisheries and
Customs Patrol
vessel Southern
Supporter brings in
Viarsa 1.
© Australian
Fisheries
Management
Authority
Mellas and the Simeiz (both flagged to According to the Australian Government,
Ukraine) – are managed by Chuan-Chuan Pacific Andes, based in Hong Kong, is
Yoo, a company based in Taiwan. Chuan- believed to be the parent company of Sun
Chuan Yoo and an associated company, Hope Investments in Jakarta.79 All of these
Kando Maritime, also manage several other companies appeared to be interconnected
toothfish vessels, including the Ukranian and each, at one point or another over the
flagged Sonrisa, the Belize flagged South past several years, has been associated with
Ocean, and the Georgia flagged Jian Yuan, vessels suspected of engaging in IUU fishing.
Kang Yuan and Kiev. Chuan-Chuan Yoo This is consistent with the findings of the
appears to be associated with the Taiwanese Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators
company Sun Hope Investments, as well as (COLTO), an international coalition of compa-
with two other companies of the same name nies legally engaged in fishing for Patagonian
based in Jakarta and Hong Kong, based on toothfish.80
information found onboard the Sonrisa when
it was inspected in port by French authorities Pacific Andes has consistently denied direct
in New Caledonia in 2004.76 Documents involvement with IUU fishing. In October 2002
submitted by France at CCAMLR XXIII also Pacific Andes’ Managing Director, Mr. Ng Joo
indicate that Sun Hope is a subsidiary of Siang, issued a statement saying, in part,
Pacific Andes International Limited of Hong that:
Kong.77
“Pacific Andes categorically states that:
According to Lloyd’s Register of Ships, the
address of the company ‘Sun Hope Invest- (a) neither Pacific Andes and its subsidi-
ments’ based in Taiwan is the same as the aries, nor P.T. Sun Hope Investments,
address listed for the office of Kando Mari- owns, operates or controls any of the
time. Furthermore, a document submitted by fishing vessels referred to by the Media
New Zealand to the 23rd meeting of CCAMLR Reports, or any other fishing vessels;
stated that information provided by the
European Community confirmed that the (b) Pacific Andes sold all its fishing
management company for the Simeiz has the vessels in 1998. Since then Pacific
same address as Kando Maritime in Taiwan.78 Andes at no time has had any control
32
over the fishing activities of any fishing Bolivia and Russia and port states like
vessel; Indonesia to generate ‘appropriate’
paperwork. There are a number of
(c) every consignment of fish purchased measures under ongoing discussion
by Pacific Andes is legal and supported among CCAMLR governments aimed at
by proper certification and closing loopholes in their toothfish Catch
documentations issued by the relevant Documentation Scheme and at making
governmental or appropriate it easier to detect bogus documenta-
authorities.” tion.”82
33
contracts are signed by fictitious compa- cases means only four hours per day to
nies which are impossible to find in cases rest and sleep. This contributes to the
where there are violations of labor or high rate of accidents onboard IUU
human rights, or in cases where crew vessels.
are arrested or vessels sink. Often
agreements regarding crew’s salaries, 7. There are often inadequate medical
the crew’s share of the catch, working services, equipment or facilities onboard
conditions, length of the time at sea, for treatment when accidents happen.84
food and onboard accommodation are
unilaterally changed/modified by vessel 8. In some cases, Asian crew members
managers or officers once the ship is at have been known to work onboard IUU
sea. fishing vessels as forced labor and are
locked in their quarters or placed in
2. Crew that are considered ‘inefficient’ or chains from time to time while at sea or
who ‘cause problems’ onboard IUU in port.
vessels are sometimes abandoned in
foreign ports and must themselves seek Clearly these are gross violations of labor and
help from their embassies, local fisher- human rights, all the more so given the harsh
men’s unions, churches, or aid organiza- and dangerous weather conditions fishing
tions to get home. vessels are likely to meet in the Southern
Ocean. Every effort should be made to
3. Physical and/or psychological mistreat- prevent vessels from fishing under these
ment of crew onboard IUU vessels often conditions. Regardless of where these
occurs. vessels fish, workers’ and safety conditions
must be respected and upheld. Earlier this
4. Crew are sometimes subject to prosecu- year the Ukrainian flagged vessel Simeiz
tion under local laws for illegal fishing (mentioned previously) caught fire in suspi-
activities even though they are obliged to cious circumstances in the port of Montevi-
obey, while on ship, all orders from the deo, Uruguay and 11 crew members, nine
company, captain or ships’ officers. Chinese, one Indonesian, and the Ukrainian
captain, reportedly died in the blaze. Monte-
5. Poor safety conditions are common video port authorities were reported to believe
onboard IUU vessels. An example is the that nine of the crew members who died
case of the fishing vessel Amur that sunk were probably locked in their cabins at the
in the sub-Antarctic waters of Kerguelen. time of the fire.85
Problems included the fact that struc-
tural modifications had made the vessel Recommendation
unseaworthy which led to its sinking; the
life saving equipment did not function In March 2002, the Governing Body of the
which led to the drowning or death by International Labour Organization (ILO) took a
hypothermia for many of the crew; there decision to move forward on negotiating both
were no fire extinguishers onboard; and a Convention concerning work in the fishing
bunks for sleeping were located in sector and a related Recommendation. This
dangerous areas of the ship or areas was on the agenda for discussion at the 92nd
which made it difficult for crew to escape and 93rd sessions of the ILO Conference in
the ship in case of emergency. These 2004 and 2005, however, for various reasons
types of working conditions and faulty the Convention was not adopted at this
equipment are not uncommon onboard stage, but the Recommendation was. The
IUU or FOC fishing vessels operating in draft Convention is scheduled for further
the region. discussion at the International Labour
Conference in 2007, and given the inter-
6. Long working shifts with little time to rest relationship between the Convention and the
are often demanded, which in some Recommendation, the Recommendation will
34
also need to be revisited. Assuming that they RFMOs to consider making adherence to the
are adopted, one option for enhancing standards and working conditions in these
international efforts to combat poor working instruments a criteria for vessels to receive
conditions in the fisheries sector operating on authorization to fish within the area of
the high seas would be for States and competence of the RFMO.
The Australian Customs medical team transfers a sick fisherman onto the Oceanic Viking mid-
Southern Ocean from the Arnela, a licensed Spanish-flagged fishing vessel operating legally
in international waters approximately 200 nautical miles south of the Australian fishing zone
in the Southern Ocean. © Australian Customs Service
35
Section Three
Refrigerated cargo vessels, the transshipment
of fish at sea and IUU fishing
IUU fishing vessels operating on the high fisheries administration or other desig-
seas, like legal fishing vessels, require infra- nated institution:
structure and support services as well as
access to market. A number of the provisions 49.1 the date and location of all of their
of the UN FAO International Plan of Action on transshipments of fish at sea;
IUU fishing recognize this fact. Paragraphs 73
and 74 of the IPOA call upon States to deter 49.2 the weight by species and catch
importers, transshippers, buyers, consumers, area of the catch transshipped;
equipment suppliers, bankers, insurers and
other services suppliers within their jurisdiction 49.3 the name, registration, flag and
from doing business with vessels engaged in other information related to the identifi-
IUU fishing, including adopting laws to make cation of the vessels involved in the
such business illegal. transshipment; and
A major element of the supporting infrastruc- 49.4 the port of landing of the trans-
ture for distant water fleet fishing on the high shipped catch.
seas consists of at-sea transshipment and
resupply vessels. Many high seas distant 50. Flag States should make information
water fishing vessels stay at sea for long from catch and transshipment reports
periods of time, transshipping their catches, available, aggregated according to areas
refuelling, rotating crews, and resupplying and species, in a full, timely and regular
bait, food, and water through transshipment manner and, as appropriate, to relevant
and resupply vessels servicing the fishing national, regional and international organi-
fleets at sea. In recognition of the essential zations, including FAO, taking into account
role played by at-sea transshipment and applicable confidentiality requirements.
resupply vessels to the operation of IUU
fleets, the IPOA states: The importance of regulating transshipment
at sea was further emphasized by the UN
48. Flag States should ensure that their General Assembly in its resolution on fisheries
fishing, transport and support vessels do adopted in November 2004. The resolution
not support or engage in IUU fishing. To states:
this end, flag States should ensure that
none of their vessels re-supply fishing 34. Recognizes that common means of
vessels engaged in such activities or conducting illegal, unreported and unregu-
transship fish to or from these lated fishing involves the unreported or
vessels… misreported transshipments of fish at sea
and urges States, either directly or
49. Flag States should ensure that, to through relevant subregional and regional
the greatest extent possible, all of their fisheries management organisations and
fishing, transport and support vessels arrangements, to establish comprehensive
involved in transshipment at sea have a systems, where appropriate, for monitor-
prior authorization to transship issued by ing and control of transshipments on the
the flag State, and report to the national high seas 86
36
Marked and
labelled bluefin
tunas Tokyo
fishmarket,
Japan.
© WWF-Canon /
Michael Sutton
37
Table 3.1. List of refrigerated cargo vessels likely to be transshipping at sea and delivering sashimi
grade tuna to Japan.
Vessel Name Flag Owner or Manager Nationality of Principle Areas
Owner/Manager of Operation
38
Table 3.1, continued
39
Table 3.1, continued
40
Table 3.1, continued
124 Win Far No.101 Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Pacific
125 Win King Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Pacific
126 Win Master Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Pacific
127 Win Sheng Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Atlantic-Pacific
128 Win Shing 1 Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Pacific
129 Win Shun Shing Taiwan Win Shu Fishery Taiwan Pacific
130 Win Terng Far Taiwan Shin Ho Sing Ocean Ent. Taiwan Pacific
131 Yuan Da 1 China China National Fisheries China Pacific
132 Yuh Fa 302 Panama Yuh Fa Marine Panama Pacific
41
Box 2. Transshipment of IUU caught tuna at sea:
the Lung Yuin and the Suruga No. 1
In 2004, two of the reefers on Table 3.1 – the Lung Yuin and the Suruga No.
1 – were inspected in port by Japanese authorities and discovered to be
offloading laundered IUU high-grade tuna. The fish were falsely reported as
being caught in different ocean areas and/or by vessels that were 'legally'
authorized to fish for tuna in the area where the tuna were transshipped.
42
September, 2004. Based on dates of port visits listed by Lloyd's Marine
Intelligence Unit, in the intervening period the vessel made a straight transit
through the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea into the Atlantic Ocean
where it spent 53 days, apparently engaged in transshipment operations,
before returning to the Mediterranean Sea. It spent three weeks in the
Mediterranean, then sailed back into the Atlantic where it spent 39 days
before reaching the Panama Canal. A straight trip to the Panama Canal from
Gibraltar would be expected to take approximately 14 days (sailing at 13
knots – the standard transit speed for the Suraga No. 1), thus meaning that
the Suraga No. 1 would have spent an extra 25 days engaged in transship-
ping (including transiting to and from transshipment rendezvous points).
From the Panama Canal, the vessel spent 42 days sailing to Shimizu, a
voyage that would take only between 24 and 25 days at 13 knots, indicat-
ing the vessel is likely to have spent an extra 17 days engaged in trans-
shipment activities. Altogether it appears that the Suraga No. I spent
approximately 78 days in the Atlantic and 17 days in the Pacific above and
beyond transit times engaged in transshipment operations. In addition, it
seems to have spent up to an extra two weeks in the Mediterranean Sea,
possibly to pick up 'farmed' bluefin tuna in the region.
According to Lloyd's Register of Ships, Tachibana Kaiun based in Imabari,
Japan currently manages the Suruga No. 1. Tachibana Kaiun also manages
the Corona Reefer and Satsuma 1. The former appears to be engaged
primarily in transshipping farmed tuna from the Mediterranean and Australia
to Japan while over the past couple of years the latter has done the same
run into the South Pacific from Shimizu to Papeete and back as the Lung
Yuin. Neither the Suraga No. I nor the Satsuma I are on the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency's Regional Register of Fishing Vessels. The com-
pany Tachibana Kaiun is identified as the operator of seven ships alto-
gether.
Assuming that both ICCAT and the IATTC species such as toothfish, consistent with the
were to establish an observer programme need to prevent, deter and eliminate all types
programme and transshipment documenta- of IUU fishing on the high seas.
tion scheme, it should not be difficult to do
the same for the Western and Central Pacific Other fish transshipment vessels
and Indian Ocean tuna fisheries through the
relevant RFMOs. Many other fish products are transshipped at
sea aside from high-grade tuna. As such, at-
Other relevant RFMOS could establish similar sea transshipment vessels provide a vital
schemes for at-sea transshipment of other service to distant water fishing vessels
43
Box 3. Transshipping IUU caught tuna at sea:
the tuna reefer M/V Hatsukari
The case of the M/V Hatsukari, a vessel documented by Greenpeace International transship-
ping sashimi grade tuna in the South Atlantic from both IUU and legal longline vessels in May
2000 in the international waters in the South Atlantic, provides another practical illustration of
the typical operation of a vessel involved in at-sea transshipment of high grade tuna des-
tined for market in Japan.
On the 3rd of March, 2000, the M/V Hatsukari sailed from her homeport of Shimizu in Japan.
The Hatsukari is a Japanese owned and Panamanian flagged refrigerated cargo ship, 94
metres long, displacing 3,029 tons, with a crew of Japanese officers and Philippine sailors.
After stopping in Busan, South Korea on the 12th and 13th of March and in Kaohsiung,
Taiwan on the 16th and 17th of March where she most likely took on supplies for Korean and
Taiwanese fishing vessels to add to those already on board for the Japanese fleet, she
sailed to Singapore to take on fuel.
The Hatsukari departed Singapore on the 24th of March for the 5,700 mile voyage to Cape
Town. This voyage would normally take about 18 days, but the Hatsukari arrived in Cape
Town on the 26th of April, 33 days after leaving Singapore. Given this passage time, it is
likely that she made several rendezvous with vessels fishing in the western Indian Ocean to
collect their catch of frozen tuna. After servicing this fleet, the Hatsukari proceeded to Cape
Town where more supplies and spare parts were loaded for the long line fleets fishing for
bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean off West Africa.
Companies that own or manage the long line tuna fishing vessels working the Eastern Atlantic
Ocean had prearranged with the owners of the Hatsukari to have their catch picked up at sea
and delivered to markets in Japan. Contact by radio was made between the Hatsukari and
the fishing vessels, and a position and time for the rendezvous was arranged. As the
Hatsukari entered the area, the long line fishing vessels pulled up their fishing gear and one
by one came along side the Hatsukari to discharge their cargo of frozen tuna and collected
their supplies and spare parts.
On the 6th of May near position 9° 00 S - 5° 00 W, several hundred kilometres off the coast
of Angola, the Greenpeace vessel M/V Greenpeace encountered the Hatsukari. The Hatsukari
was observed meeting the Chien Chun No. 8, a Belize flagged longliner, and transferring bait
and receiving frozen tuna from the longline vessel. Soon afterward two more Belize flagged
vessels, the Jeffrey nr. 816 and the Jackie nr. 11 came alongside the Hatsukari. Later the
same day, the Cambodian flagged Benny nr. 87 and two Taiwanese vessels, Yu I Hsiang and
Jiln Horng 206, also offloaded their catch.
Almost a month after leaving Cape Town, on the 25th of May, the Hatsukari made a brief stop
at St Vincents in the Cape Verde Islands. The Hatsukari arrived back in Cape Town on the
20th of June where it reportedly offloaded 72 tons of tuna of indeterminate species. She
departed Cape Town on the 21st of June for the return voyage to Japan via Singapore. Again,
this voyage, which would normally take approximately 18 days, took over a month due most
likely to stops to service and transship from fishing vessels at-sea in the Indian Ocean. The
Hatsukari arrived in Singapore on the 26th of July, departing the 29th to sail back to Japan.
The Hatsukari arrived in Shimuzu on the 8th August where the transshipped cargo of high
grade tuna was offloaded for market.
The M/V Hatsukari is one of a fleet of refrigerated cargo vessels or 'reefers' that regularly
travel from the ports of Shimuzu and Yokosuka in Japan, stopping at Busan, South Korea,
Kaohsiung, Taiwan and Singapore, then continuing to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, with
stops in Cape Town, South Africa, Las Palmas in the Canary Islands and occasionally other
Atlantic or Indian Ocean ports. These vessels spend relatively long periods of time at sea,
transshipping sashimi grade tuna and resupplying high seas tuna longline fleets.
44
Close view of
the crew aboard
vessel in poor
condition with
visible evidence
of rust and
decay.
©Greenpeace/
Kate Davison
operating both on the high seas and within listed on Table 3.2 should be encouraged to
other countries’ EEZs. verify that their vessels are not engaged in
supporting IUU fishing activities.
The following is a representative sample of
vessels that are likely to be transshipping Methodology
other fish at sea. This is by no means a
complete or exhaustive list of vessels involved The methodology used to compile the list of
in transshipping fish at sea. However, the vessels on the following Table was similar to
authors believe that the vessels on the list that used for Table 3.1 (see ‘Methodology’
represent a substantial portion of vessels Section 3.1) except that instead of checking
involved in the at-sea transshipment of fish, reefers going into Shimizu, the authors
together with the vessels on Table 3.1. Again, searched for reefers going to other major fish
it must be emphasized that not all or any of ports such as Dutch Harbor, Berkeley Sound,
the vessels listed on Table 3.2 are necessarily Pago Pago, etc. Once reefer vessels regularly
engaged in transshipping IUU catches at sea. stopping in these ports were identified, the list
However, given the widespread nature of IUU was compiled by identifying the vessels most
fishing on the high seas, it is important to likely engaged in transshipping fish at sea by
ensure that refrigerated cargo vessels are not reviewing their schedules and transit times,
transshipping IUU catches at sea and the how long they stayed at sea, the ocean
companies listed as owners of the vessels areas in which they operated over recent
45
Table 3.2. List of refrigerated cargo vessels that may transship fish (other than Sashimi grade tuna) at
sea from time to time: flag, company names, nationalities and areas of operation.
Vessel Name Flag Owner or Manager Nationality of Principle Areas
Owner/Manager of Operation
46
Table 3.2, continued
47
Table 3.2, continued
48
Table 3.2, continued
124 Win Far No.101 Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Pacific
125 Win King Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Pacific
126 Win Master Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Pacific
127 Win Sheng Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Atlantic-Pacific
128 Win Shing 1 Panama Win Far Fishery Taiwan Pacific
129 Win Shun Shing Taiwan Win Shu Fishery Taiwan Pacific
130 Win Terng Far Taiwan Shin Ho Sing Ocean Ent. Taiwan Pacific
131 Yuan Da 1 China China National Fisheries China Pacific
132 Yuh Fa 302 Panama Yuh Fa Marine Panama Pacific
years, their owners, and other vessels owned refrigerated cargo ships which carry fish,
or managed by the same companies. meat, poultry and frozen fruit juice. The site
also states that Eastwind Transport charters
These vessels appear to be general fish or operates through joint venture arrange-
haulers, which on some voyages transship at ments another 40 reefer or freezer ships.
sea, working in a variety of regions and
fisheries, transshipping fish or fish products Dongwon Industries, with three reefers on
such as whitefish, squid and lower grade tuna Table 3.2 claims to also own 43 fishing
for use by canneries. Unlike the vessels used vessels, most of which either purse seine
to transship high-grade tuna, none of them (‘round haul netters’) for tunas in the South
appear to have been built to transship/ Pacific or longline in the Atlantic, Pacific and
transport only one type of fish product. Indian Oceans.95 Another one of the twelve
companies – Laskaridas, with 18 vessels on
It is worth noting on Table 3.2 that only Table 3.2 – also runs a fleet of bunkering and
twelve companies account for over half of the resupply vessels servicing distant water fishing
vessels on the list. These are Laskaridas fleets (discussed in Section 4).
(Greece), China National Fisheries (China),
Boyang LTD (S. Korea), Del Norte (Spain), Assuming that all of these companies operate
Kyoei Kaiun Kaisha (Japan), Ji Sung Shipping transshipment vessels in areas and fisheries
(S. Korea), Win Far Fisheries (Taiwan), where IUU fishing is a problem and/or where
Eastwind Ship Management (Japan), RFMOs have established conservation
Shandong Zhonglu (China), Dongwan Indus- measures for fisheries on the high seas,
tries (S. Korea), Frabelle Fishing (Philippines), engaging just these twelve companies could
and Wu Pioneers Sea Foods (Taiwan). result in substantial progress in the effort to
combat IUU fishing and ensuring effective
Although listed as a Japanese company on compliance with high seas conservation
the Lloyd’s Register of Ships, Eastwind is measures.
based in the United States (headquartered in
New York) with subsidiaries or branches in Recommendations
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, UK, Japan,
Korea, Singapore and Greece.94 The com- In the same way that ICCAT, IOTC, the
pany states on its website that “Eastwind has IATTC and the South Pacific Forum have
become very active in carrying fish from high developed lists of vessels authorized to fish in
seas locations to West Africa and the Far their respective areas of competence, the
East” and that the company owns around 30 authors would argue that these and other
49
at sea or in port (as is currently the case
in the FFA).
50
Section Four
Tankers and resupply vessels servicing high seas
and distant water fishing fleets
Fleets of vessels that refuel and resupply high resupply and bunkering industry could be
seas fishing vessels are also an essential enlisted to support efforts to combat IUU
element of the infrastructure that allows fishing.
fishing vessels, both legitimate and IUU, to
operate for long periods of time on the high Methodology
seas. A sample list of vessels most likely to be
servicing distant water fishing vessels operat- The methodology used to produce the list of
ing on the high seas and, in some cases vessels on Table 4.1 included:
within other countries’ EEZs, is contained in
Table 4.1. The authors wish to emphasize I an internet search yielding several
that we have found no evidence to suggest companies that specialize in refuelling
that any of the companies or vessels listed on (bunkering) vessels at sea,
Table 4.1. are engaged in resupplying IUU
fishing vessels operating on the high seas. I investigating tankers belonging to these
Rather, this list was compiled to identify the companies and producing a profile of the
structure and means by which the at-sea vessels engaged in this type of work,
The Arnela, a
licensed
Spanish-
flagged fishing
vessel
operating
legally in
international
waters
approximately
200 nautical
miles south of
the Australian
fishing zone in
the Southern
Ocean.
© Australian
Customs
Service
51
finding tankers fitting this profile using the by no means complete, and it may be that
Lloyd’s Register database, some of the vessels listed are not currently
engaged in servicing fishing vessels operating
I reviewing the voyage history of each on the high seas.
tanker to find those making regular
voyages into areas known to be fre- At least some the companies that own or
quented by distant water fishing vessels manage vessels listed in Table 4.1 are
and spending significantly longer time at involved in a variety of at-sea services sup-
sea than would have been required for a porting the operations of distant water fishing
routine transit. fleets. For example, Sekwang (SK) Shipping,
a Korean multinational, operates a fleet of
This research produced a list of over 100 over 20 bunkering tankers that “provides a
tankers that was narrowed down to approxi- comprehensive, high-quality, low-cost service
mately 60 vessels that, for at least part of the to fishing vessels, throughout the world’s
year, are likely to be engaged in refuelling and major fishing areas…supplying fuel and
resupplying fishing vessels at sea. This list is supplies to fishing fleets, worldwide” accord-
Table 4.1. Tankers and resupply vessels servicing fishing vessels at sea; flag, company names,
nationalities and principal areas of operation. Sample list.
Vessel Name Flag Owner or Manager Nationality of Principle Areas
Owner/Manager of Operation
52
Table 4.1, continued
Vessel Name Flag Owner or Manager Nationality of Principle Areas
Owner/Manager of Operation
25 Hai Soon XV Singapore Hai Soon Diesel Singapore Atlantic
26 Hl Moogal Singapore Hong Lam Marine Singapore Pacific
27 Hl Tauras Singapore Hong Lam Marine Singapore Pacific
28 Hobi Maru Ecuador Toko Kaiun Japan Pacific
29 Hosei Maru Japan Toko Kaiun Japan Indian
30 Hozen Maru Japan Toko Kaiun Japan Pacific
31 Iballa G. Panama Penn World Panama Atlantic
32 Japan Tuna No.2 Panama Kyokko Tanker Japan Pacific
33 Japan Tuna No.3 Panama Kyokko Tanker Japan Pacific-Indian
34 Kamensk-Uralskiy Russia Primorsk Shipping Corp. Russia W.Pacific
35 Kansa Tanker Singapore Sm Lito Ship Mngt. Singapore Atlantic-Indian
36 Katie Liberia Aquasips Latvia Atlantic
37 Kosiam Singapore Kosiam Trading Singapore Pacific
38 Kosiam Singapore Kosiam Trading Ltd. Singapore Pacific
39 L. Star Singapore Sekwang Shipping Singapore Indian
40 Libra Panama Laskaridis Greece Atlantic
41 Linsa Singapore Sm Lito Ship Mngt. Singapore Pacific
42 Luchegorsk Russia Primorsk Shipping Russia Atlantic-Indian
43 Mighty 7 Panama Sekwang Shipping Korea Pacific-Indian
44 Minsa Singapore Sm Lito Ship Mngt. Singapore Pacific
45 Miri Bolivia Ocean Tankers Singapore Pacific-Indian
46 Nagayevo Cyprus Primorsk Shipping Corp. Russia Atlantic
47 Nansa Singapore Sm Lito Ship Mngt. Singapore Pacific
48 New Kopex Korea Sekwang Shipping Korea Pacific
49 Nipayia Panama Lotus Shipping Greece Indian
50 Onyx Bolivia Ocean Tankers Singapore Pacific-Indian
51 Oriental Bluebird Panama New Shipping Kaisha Japan Pacific
52 Orion Singapore Sk Shipping Korea Pacific
53 Pacific Trader Panama Laskaridis Greece Atlantic-Indian
54 Sea Angel Panama Prime Tankers UAE Indian
55 Sea Pearl Seychelles Al Dawood Shipping Nigeria Atlantic
56 Shin Co-Op Maru Panama Kumazawa Japan Pacific
57 Smile No.3 Korea Sekwang Shipping Korea Pacific
58 Soyang Korea Sekwang Shipping Korea Pacific
59 Star Tuna Panama Korea Ship Managers Korea Pacific
60 Starry Singapore Honglam Shipping Singapore Pacific-Indian
61 Tetauu Singapore Kosiam Trading Singapore Pacific
62 Toyotaka Maru Japan Toko Kaiun Japan Pacific
63 Vanino Cyprus Primorsk Shipping Corp Russia Atlantic
64 Vesta 7 Panama Sekwang Shipping Korea Pacific
65 Zalgiris Panama Laskaridis Greece Atlantic
53
Tokyo fish market
where Bluefin
and Yellowfin
tuna are being
processed for
sale. Tokyo, Japan.
© WWF-Canon /
Jason Dewey
ing to its website. SK specifically provides reported to have been involved at one point in
“…port bunkering and bunker-trading serv- transshipping toothfish at sea.98
ices in the North and South Pacific, the
Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, PNG, At least two additional companies not listed in
Guam, and the Arafura Sea. We have also Table 4.1 also operate fleets of vessels
diversified our business to offer comprehen- servicing distant water fishing vessels at
sive fishing-vessel services that include crew sea.99 One, ADDAX Bunkering Services,
repatriation, spare parts, and bait. In addition, owns or charters a fleet of 10-12 tankers that
we bring integrated logistics services to the resupply fishing vessels off both the Atlantic
fishing industry, including reefer service and and Indian Ocean coasts of Africa. This fleet
fish trading”. SK has offices in Japan, Korea, also supplies offshore mining operations, oil
China, the UK, Australia, Singapore and platforms and seismic survey vessels.
Brazil. Ocean bunkering (refuelling) accounted Amongst the services it provides are fuelling,
for approximately 16% of SK’s revenue of provisions and fresh water. ADDAX is a
$924 million USD in 2002. SK is a subsidiary subsidiary of the Geneva based transnational,
of SK Group, the 3rd largest conglomerate in ADDAX & ORYX group.100 The other com-
Korea.96 pany, Sunmar Shipping, is based in the U.S.
and services distant water fishing fleets
In addition to the six vessels on the list, operating in the Russian Far East. According
Laskaridas, a Greek owned company to its website, the company operates 20
operates in total a fleet of some 58 vessels, vessels which trans-ship “frozen fish and fish
including fish carriers, refrigerated cargo meal products” at sea from vessels fishing in
vessels (a number of which transport fish as Russia’s Far East zone and deliver the fish to
discussed in the previous Section), as well as markets in Europe, the United States, China,
refuelling ships (“oil products tankers”). Many Korea, Japan and elsewhere. Sunmar also
of these vessels appear to operate in the delivers provisions and supplies directly to the
South Atlantic Ocean providing multiple fishing fleets.101
services to distant water fishing operations in
the region.97 At least one of the vessels The ownership and registered flags of the
belonging to Laskaridas, the Seafrost, was vessels involved in bunkering and resupplying
54
fishing vessels at sea involves a greater Recommendations
number of countries than does the fleet of
vessels transshipping high value tuna (See It is difficult to overstate the importance of
Table 3.1). Furthermore, many of these tankers and resupply vessels to the opera-
vessels are likely to be servicing distant-water tions of high seas fishing fleets, including IUU
vessels involved in a variety of fisheries, both vessels. Given the size, scope, visibility and
within EEZs and/or on the high seas, as well the diversity of the operations of major
as other vessels operating at sea. Nonethe- companies involved in the business, individual
less, altogether, only five companies in Table States within whose jurisdiction the owners or
4.1 – Laskaridas, Sekwang Shipping, managers of these vessels reside, as well as
Primorsk Shipping, Toko Kaiun, and Hai Soon RFMOs within whose areas these vessels
Diesel – own or manage over one-half of the operate, should directly engage the compa-
bunker vessels on the list. Furthermore, nies involved. They may well be amenable to
several of these companies own additional cooperating in international efforts to prevent,
vessels (not on the list) that are likely to be deter and eliminate IUU fishing, whether
servicing fishing vessels at sea. Even engag- through observer programs, bringing com-
ing just these five companies plus ADDAX pany policies and business practices into line
Bunkering Services and Sunmar in the with RFMO recommendations, and/or by
international effort to prevent, deter and other means. Integrating tankers and
eliminate IUU fishing would likely prove very resupply vessels and the companies that
beneficial in combating IUU fishing in a wide own, manage or charter these vessels into
variety of fisheries worldwide, including regional efforts to ensure effective compliance
fisheries conducted by distant water fleets with RFMO measures is a necessary and
operating in a number of countries’ EEZs as potentially very effective means of combating
well as fisheries on the high seas. IUU fishing.
Australian Customs Service staff board the IUU boat Viarsa, caught stealing Patagonian
toothfish in the Southern Ocean in 2003. © Australian Customs Service
55
Section Five
Other support businesses
At-sea transshipment, refuelling and resupply IUU fishing, whether by the State under
operations are not the only services central to whose jurisdiction the vessel is operating
the operation of FOC/IUU fishing vessels. In or by the relevant regional fisheries
addition many other services are required to management organization in accord-
support IUU fishing vessels and companies, ance with its agreed procedures, and
not the least being able to sell their catch. should consider measures to deter such
business. Such measures could include,
The UN FAO IPOA on IUU fishing also ac- to the extent possible under national
knowledges the role that a number of indus- law, legislation that makes it a violation
tries play and addresses this particular issue to conduct such business or to trade in
in paragraphs 73 and 74: fish or fish products derived from IUU
fishing. All identifications of vessels
73. States should take measures to engaged in IUU fishing should be made
ensure that their importers, in a fair, transparent and non-
transshippers, buyers, consumers, discriminatory manner.
equipment suppliers, bankers, insurers,
other services suppliers and the public Investment and financial services
are aware of the detrimental effects of companies
doing business with vessels identified as
engaged in IUU fishing, whether by the As indicated in Section 2, Pacific Andes is a
State under whose jurisdiction the multinational company with extensive inter-
vessel is operating or by the relevant ests in fishing, processing and trading fish
regional fisheries management organiza- products worldwide. Of note is the fact that
tions in accordance with its agreed amongst the twenty largest shareholders of
procedures, and should consider Pacific Andes are: HSBC (Singapore) Nomi-
measures to deter such business. Such nees Pte Ltd, Morgan Stanley Asia (Singa-
measures could include, to the extent pore) Securities Pte Ltd, Merrill Lynch (Singa-
possible under national law, legislation pore) Pte Ltd, and Citibank Consumer
that makes it a violation to conduct Nominees Pte Ltd.102
such business or to trade in fish or fish
products derived from IUU fishing. All These and other companies in the investment
identifications of vessels engaged in IUU and financial services fields should be ap-
fishing should be made in a fair, proached to consider reviewing and possibly
transparent and non-discriminatory refraining from investing in companies known
manner. or likely to be engaged in high seas fisheries
and/or related support services until they
74. States should take measures to are provided with clear guarantees by the
ensure that their fishers are aware of fishing businesses they wish to invest in that
the detrimental effects of doing business such companies are not involved in IUU
with importers, transshippers, buyers, fishing, trading in IUU caught fish or
consumers, equipment suppliers, otherwise providing support services to IUU
bankers, insurers and other services fleets.103 Again, this would be entirely
suppliers identified as doing business consistent with the UN FAO Plan of Action on
with vessels identified as engaged in IUU fishing.
56
Ice on the
Southern Ocean.
© Australian
Customs Service
57
to provide information on IUU fishing vessels. sell their fish they would soon be out of
These companies could be approached to business) and companies involved in such
determine their ability and willingness to assist initiatives should be actively engaged in the
with providing information on the wherea- effort to combat IUU fishing, wherever
bouts of IUU vessels, the beneficial owners of possible engaging wholesalers and retailers
such vessels, and other information that and consumers in the process.
could be of use in the effort to identify and
prevent IUU fishing.104 Initiatives such as the Seafood Choices
Alliance, Marine Stewardship Council and
Seafood trading and retailing campaigns by environmental organizations
industries such as the US based National Environment
Trust’s campaign “Take a pass on Chilean
The seafood trade globally amounts to some sea bass” raise awareness and enlist the help
$60 billion USD per year (export value).105 of the seafood industry to collectively combat
Over the past decade a number of market IUU fishing. Industry initiatives such as the
based initiatives involving the seafood industry, campaigns by the All Japan Seamen’s Union
in some cases together with environmental and the Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries
organizations and producer organizations, Cooperative Associations to persuade tuna
have been established to promote sustainable importers and retailers not to buy FOC caught
fisheries. Ultimately it is the market that tuna are also positive private sector and trade
sustains IUU fishing (if IUU vessels could not union initiatives to combat IUU fishing.
58
More importantly, for the future ability of the Coalition of Fisheries Associations (ICFA) –
seafood industry as a whole to stay in busi- adopted a resolution on IUU fishing several
ness, it needs to take far more responsibility years ago calling on governments and the
in ensuring that the products it buys, sells and private sector to prevent FOC fishing vessels
trades are not IUU caught and therefore do from gaining access to international markets.
not undermine international efforts to con- They further called on freighter companies to
serve and manage fisheries for sustainability refrain from transporting any fish caught by
and to protect other species in the marine FOC fishing vessels and trading and
environment. distribution companies to refrain from dealing
in fish caught by FOC fishing vessels.106
Far more stringent accountability in the ICFA could work more closely with
seafood industry should be established governments and its members to establish
together with a rigorous chain of custody national legislation and market pressure in
requirements by all seafood dealers in the key countries to prohibit the import of IUU
European Union, Japan, the United States, caught fish and promote seafood industry
China, and other major markets for high value initiatives to deny market access to IUU
seafood products (as are already in place for caught fish.
health reasons). National Associations of
seafood importers, wholesalers and retailers Conclusion
should be enlisted. The largest fishing industry
association in the world – the International There is a wide range of businesses that
provide support services to large-scale fishing
vessels and this section is not meant to
provide an exhaustive list. In addition to the
abovementioned industries, it is worth men-
tioning the important role of equipment
manufacturers and retailers selling engines,
machinery, fishing gear (nets, lines etc),
communications and navigation equipment.
Insurance companies as well provide essen-
tial services, as do banks and lending institu-
tions, particularly in the case of new vessel
construction. Port agents and ship’s chan-
dlers are also important providers of services
to high seas fleets by arranging to supply
food, equipment and other services needed
by fishing vessels whether resupplying in port
or at sea. National and international associa-
tions of these businesses, and individual
companies involved, should be approached
and encouraged to join the effort to combat
IUU fishing.
59
Section Six
Financial and legal considerations related to
Flag of Convenience fishing
Given the large number of IUU fishing vessels and oversight system in terms of flag State
flying Flags of Convenience and the ease with compliance is a major weakness under the
which vessels ‘hop’ from one flag to another, UNCLOS regime. There is a clear need to
it seems obvious that one of the most balance flag State sovereignty with flag State
effective means of eliminating the problem of responsibility – the exercise of effective
IUU fishing on the high seas would be to oversight over vessels which fly its flag,
eliminate the Flag of Convenience system. meaning compliance with the duties, obliga-
Countries which cannot or will not exercise tions and responsibilities established by
control over fishing vessels operating outside international law and the treaties to which the
of their EEZs should be discouraged from flag State is party to. It is hard to see how a
registering large-scale fishing vessels except flag State can exercise effective oversight
under strictly defined circumstances or over the vessels that fly its flag and, where
criteria. Similar consideration should apply to necessary, impose sanctions to discourage
merchant ships involved in fisheries related violations in the absence of a genuine link
activities. between the vessel and the flag it flies. This
genuine link requires that the vessel be
Ultimately, what is required is the imposition of beneficially owned and controlled in the flag
a system to ensure that flag States give full State and that there is a substantial eco-
and complete effect to their duties and nomic entity and assets with the territory of
obligations. The absence of an enforcement the flag State.
Work deck of a
Russian trawler.
© WWF-Canon /
Terry Domico
60
Legal considerations: genuine link Sea and numerous related agreements and
= real interest? upsetting the balance established between
the interests of coastal States and high seas
However legal issues are addressed, it is fishing States. Amongst other things, the
important to consider the risks involved in systematic failure to eliminate FOC fishing on
maintaining the status quo. Aside from the the high seas may ultimately serve as a
threat posed to the conservation and sustain- rationale for some coastal States to seek to
able management of fisheries in international extend their jurisdiction further into high seas
waters, the FOC system in fisheries funda- areas.
mentally distorts international efforts to
address the issue of equitable access to A clear set of internationally agreed criteria for
fisheries on the high seas and results in the effective exercise of flag State jurisdiction
human rights abuses continuing behind a veil and responsibility – criteria such as those
of secrecy. contained in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement,
the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible
For example, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Fisheries, the FAO Compliance Agreement
Agreement, in Article 8.3, requires regional and the IPOA on IUU Fishing – could serve
fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) as a means of designating the systematic
to allow States with a ‘real interest’ in the failure of a flag State to exercise control over
fisheries of the region to become parties to the fishing vessels on its registry as an
the RFMO. If ‘genuine link’ is defined as a de absence of flag State jurisdiction, potentially
facto link created by virtue of the registration rendering the legal status of any high seas
by a flag State of a fishing vessel to fly its flag, fishing vessels flying the State’s flag as
then does this mean that an FOC country effectively stateless.
with several hundred large-scale fishing
vessels on its registry has a legally recognized While a number of FOC fishing countries have
“real interest” in the fisheries of a region, to some extent responded to international
regardless of the economic link between the pressure, the proliferation of FOC States and
vessels and the flag State, or the nationalities the ease with which a fishing vessel can
of the owners of the vessels? Is there a risk ‘hop’ or move from flag to flag urgently
that ‘real interest’ could be defined as loosely require a new and comprehensive approach
as ‘genuine link’ is currently defined? If so, to the FOC system in fisheries as a whole.
what implications does this have for the
constitution of the membership of RFMOs One option worth exploring is the possibility of
and the allocation of access and quota to the bringing a case or cases before the Interna-
fisheries they govern? Should an FOC State tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea de-
be given access to the fisheries in a region signed to further strengthen the definition of
commensurate with the capacity of its fleet? flag State responsibility under international law
A resolution of the definition of the genuine with respect to fishing vessels operating on
link by the international community would go the high seas. A creative but judicious
a long way to bringing legal clarity to the term approach to using the International Tribunal
‘real interest’ in the fisheries of a particular for the Law of the Sea as a means to estab-
region, and clarify the obligations of parties to lish clear definitions, obligations, and courses
an RFMO in relation to new entrants into the of legal action with respect to flag State
fisheries under the competence of the failure to exercise jurisdiction over high fishing
RFMO. vessels may well be an expeditious and/or
complementary means to continue to
The widespread and pervasive failure of so strengthen international efforts to combat IUU
many States to uphold their fundamental fishing.
duties as flag States arguably makes a
mockery of the notion of flag State sover- It is evident that the measures taken to date
eignty. It risks undermining the integrity of the have not effectively addressed IUU and FOC
United Nations Convention on the Law of the fishing activities. Many of the measures
61
adopted thus far fall within the realm of “soft A UN FAO report on countries operating open
law” and it is clear that the international registries (FOCs) and registering fishing
community must find the political will neces- vessels, published in 2002, suggests that the
sary to fully address the fundamental aspects benefits derived by FOC States in flagging
of the problem and institutional weakness of large-scale fishing vessels are relatively
the UNCLOS regime. The international insignificant.107 Based on information in the
community should consider adopting an report, the total revenue derived from
implementing agreement to UNCLOS which registering fishing vessels by 20 countries
would, in practice, ensure that flag States operating open registries was slightly more
meet their duties and responsibilities. In the than 3 million USD per year in recent years.
absence of an effective mechanism to ensure The report states that the top four FOC
compliance, the concept of flag State sover- countries – Belize, Honduras, Panama, and
eignty can be used to sanction non-compli- St Vincent and the Grenadines – had a
ance and evasion. Such an agreement needs combined total of 1,148 large-scale fishing
to include a transparent oversight system vessels registered to fly their flags. These
and to permit the use of a range of measures same four countries generated approximately
which will ensure that flag States comply $2,625,000 USD in revenue from registration
with all of their duties, obligations and fees and related charges from the fishing
responsibilities. vessels on their registries. They earned, on
average, less than $2,500 USD per year for
Compensation for flag State each fishing vessel registered to fly their
flag.108
failure?
In the meantime, until the FOC ‘loophole’ in The report states that the figures are almost
international law is closed, another option certainly underestimates of the total revenue
available to responsible flag States may be to derived from registering fishing vessels,
explore the possibility of seeking compensa- although it is not clear whether this refers to
tion from free riding FOC States for the costs all income (both private and public sector) or
incurred as a result of IUU/FOC fishing by State revenue only. Regardless, even if the
vessels flying their flag. Many of the measures figures are off by 100% or more of gross
implemented to date have centred on taking revenue to the State, it is clear that the
action to deter individual vessels from engag- income derived by FOC countries from
ing in IUU fishing through, for example, raising flagging fishing vessels is still quite small
the cost of doing business to IUU operators. compared with the value of the catch. More
However, given the enormous economic recently, the Head of the Maritime Adminis-
advantage that IUU fishing vessels gain tration of Mongolia – a relatively new entrant
through the use of FOCs, it would be worth in the FOC business – was quoted in the
exploring whether there are opportunities to New York Times as stating that the Mongo-
raise the cost of flagging fishing vessels to lian ship registry earned the country approxi-
FOC countries themselves. mately $200,000 USD in 2003. The registry,
which opened for business in February 2003,
First of all, it is worth asking the question – already had 260 ships registered to fly the flag
how much do FOC States actually benefit of Mongolia by mid-2004.109 Most of these
from flagging fishing vessels? Clearly unscru- were merchant shipping vessels; the income
pulous operators themselves benefit financially derived by Mongolia for registering fishing
from the freedom to engage in IUU fishing on vessels is likely to be a small fraction of total
the high seas with the impunity conferred by revenue.
the FOC system. But are there financial
benefits to FOC States themselves, particu- By contrast the cost, to a responsible flag
larly to small developing countries that might State, of effective regulation of large-scale
at least provide an economic argument for fishing vessels registered to fly its flag and
some degree of legitimacy of the FOC operating beyond its EEZ, including costs
system? associated with ensuring proper safety
62
By-catch entangled in the net of a tuna purse-seiner. © WWF-Canon / Hélène Petit
standards and working conditions on board The actual costs could be measured in a
the vessels, are certain to be far higher than number of ways, including the annual costs
the revenue generated by the FOC system. to legal operators in the fishing industry such
Beyond this, the systematic failure of an as lost revenue as a result of lower quotas,
FOC State to prevent its vessels from fishing higher catch per unit effort costs (brought on
in a region substantially increases the by overfishing caused by IUU operators), and
costs to responsible States of conservation lower prices as a result of the supply of IUU
and management of the fisheries of the caught fish on the market. The costs incurred
region. by governments could be calculated on the
63
basis of factors such as the additional cost of monitoring, compliance and enforcement
research resulting from scientific uncertainties entail substantial financial costs in relation to
arising from lack of good information on the meeting the State’s treaty obligations.
catch and data on the species caught in IUU
fisheries, the increased cost of monitoring, Conversely, a State whose vessels consist-
surveillance and enforcement at sea, and the ently operate in a region in contravention of
extra cost of port and market based inspec- the rules adopted by the relevant regional
tion schemes needed to combat IUU fishing. fisheries management organization should be
Longer-term costs could include the loss of liable for ‘damages’ to responsible parties of
long-term benefits to the economy due to the the RFMO. While an FOC State may not be
lower productivity of overfished stocks as a compelled to join a regional management
result of IUU fishing, and the loss of tax organization, it does have a clear duty under
revenue or income to the State. UNCLOS Part VII to cooperate with other
states in the conservation and management
Clearly, States that operate Flags of Conven- of the fisheries in the region. Should it fail to
ience in the fisheries sector externalize the do so while consistently allowing, either wilfully
costs of the failure to regulate ‘their’ fishing or by clear negligence, its vessels to fish in
fleets. Other countries must pay these costs, the region, then the FOC/IUU State should
as measured in terms of scientific uncertainty be subject to legal action, including some
in stock assessments, reduced quotas and degree of liability for the additional costs
lost revenue for legitimate operators, the incurred by responsible fishing States associ-
additional costs of enforcement, and the ated with the failure of the FOC State to
depletion of fish stocks and supporting exercise control over the activities of its fishing
ecosystems associated with FOC fishing. The fleets operating in the area of competence of
costs to legitimate operators and responsible the organization.
flag States are certain to far outweigh the
revenue derived by FOC States in fisheries for The flag State bears responsibility for the
high value species such as toothfish, bluefin activities of the vessels. If an FOC State is
and big eye tuna. faced with prospect of paying substantial
compensation to other States for its failure to
An important legal question arises: Does a regulate its fishing fleets, this could act as a
State have the right to enjoy the privileges of disincentive to the registration of fishing
being a flag State, however little these vessels by the FOC State. The prospect of
privileges may confer to the State in terms of paying potentially large sums in compensation
economic benefits, while evading most, if not for the failure to exercise control over fishing
all, of the responsibilities associated with vessels could serve as a significant disincen-
being a flag State, no matter how costly this tive to countries to get into the FOC/IUU
evasion of flag State responsibility may be to fishing business in ways that could comple-
other States and the international community ment port State controls, market restrictions,
as a whole? enhanced monitoring, control and surveillance
and other measures adopted thus far by
One could argue that flag States that are States and regional fisheries management
members of, participate in, and contribute to organizations.
the activities of a regional fisheries manage-
ment organization, should have the right to There are currently no international mecha-
derive long-term benefit from sustainably nisms that would appear to allow States to
managed fishing in the region, commensurate either seek compensation or be held liable for
with the effectiveness of conservation meas- such damages; nonetheless, the huge
ures agreed by the organization, provided disparity between the costs to the interna-
they ensure that vessels under their jurisdic- tional community from FOC/IUU fishing and
tion abide by the rules. The conservation and the gains derived by FOC States from regis-
management of the fisheries and the meas- tering fishing vessels suggest that this may be
ures undertaken by a State with respect to an avenue worth exploring.
64
Section Seven
Recommendations
There has been a concerted international vigorously inspect, identify and take action
political effort over recent years to identify and against IUU fishing vessels, and for the reform
address the problem of IUU fisheries on the of the system of regional fisheries manage-
high seas but this effort has not yet been fully ment as briefly discussed in the introduction,
translated into effective action in practice to the key recommendations of this report
combat IUU fishing on the high seas. based are as follows:
Flag States must establish more effective Global fishing vessel identification
control over vessels flying their flag to ensure
scheme
compliance with conservation and manage-
ment measures for high seas fisheries. A 1. A standardized global vessel marking
genuine link needs to exist between the flag system should be established which
State and the vessel registered to fly its flag allows for the permanent marking and
to ensure that the flag State is capable of clear identification of a fishing vessel
exercising effective control. Flag States must regardless of any changes in the flag or
also be much more vigilant in ensuring that name of the vessel.
vessels seeking to enter their registries are
not affiliated with or operated by companies 2. A global database of large-scale fishing
with a history of IUU fishing. vessels and vessels authorized to fish
beyond the area of national jurisdiction of
Market States must make it illegal the flag State of the vessel should be
for importers, wholesalers and established. The database should include
retailers to buy and sell IUU all vessels capable of fishing on the high
seas, including those under 24 metres
caught fish
(particularly those fishing on straddling or
This is absolutely critical – the ease with highly migratory stocks), along with
which IUU caught fish finds its way into the technical information on the vessels,
marketplace severely undermines the effec- including type of fishing gear, flag history,
tiveness and enforceability of regulations current and previous ownership history.
established for the conservation and manage-
ment of fisheries on the high seas. 3. A global database of vessels with a
history of IUU fishing should also be
It is essential that countries take all measures established to help port authorities
necessary to prevent their nationals or identify and exercise greater scrutiny and
companies residing within their jurisdiction inspection of these vessels during port
from engaging in IUU fishing or related visits, allow countries to better review
activities on the high seas. The situation the previous history of fishing vessels
which currently exists whereby ‘responsible’ seeking to enter their registries, allow
countries allow citizens or companies within RFMOs to work together to identify the
their jurisdiction to own and operate FOC movements of IUU vessels from region
fishing vessels should no longer be considered to region (and amongst fisheries), help
acceptable. identify companies and flag States
consistently involved in IUU fishing, and
Within the context of the actions outlined potentially reduce the resale value of
above plus the need for port States to more IUU fishing vessels through denial of
65
authorization to fish to vessels previously
engaged in IUU fishing.
At-sea transshipment
RFMOs with competence over fisheries on
the high seas should:
66
Illegal
toothfish
longliner
Grand Prince
from Belize,
Indian Ocean.
©Greenpeace/
Daniel Beltra
67
parties to relevant RFMOs and other 10. Companies in the investment and
cooperating countries. financial services fields should be ap-
proached and persuaded to refrain from
At-sea resupply vessels investing in companies engaged in high
seas fisheries and related services until
and tankers
they are provided clear guarantees that
6. States within whose jurisdiction the such companies are not involved in IUU
owners or managers of at-sea resupply fishing, trading in IUU caught fish or
and tankers reside, as well as RFMOs otherwise providing support services to
within whose areas these vessels IUU fleets.
operate, should directly engage the
companies in international efforts to The seafood industry, including importers,
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, wholesalers and retailers, has a special
whether through observer programs, responsibility to take action to prevent, deter
bringing company policies and business and eliminate IUU fishing by working to deny
practices into line with RFMO recom- market access to IUU caught fish. Seafood
mendations, and/or by other means. industry associations in key market countries
such as Japan, EU, the USA and China
should work with governments to adopt and
Working conditions at sea
enforce legislation to make it illegal to trade in
7. Assuming that a ‘Work in Fishing’ IUU caught fish and fish products.
Convention and a set of ‘Work in Fish-
ing’ Recommendations are adopted at
the International Labour Conference in
2007, States and RFMOs should con-
sider making adherence to the stand-
ards and working conditions in these
instruments a criterion for vessels to
receive authorization to fish and trans-
ship fish within the area of competence
of the RFMO.
68
Footnotes
[1] Garibaldi, L.; Limongelli, L. Trends in Oceanic authorities, in contravention of international laws and
Captures and Clustering of Large Marine regulations.
Ecosystems:Two Studies Based on the FAO Capture
Database. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 435. www.high-seas.org/
Rome, FAO. 2002. 71p. [8] op cit footnote 6. Action taken by FAO Members
[2] See for example Pauly, D. et al. Fishing Down and FAO to implement the International Plan of Action
Marine Food Webs. Science 279, 860-863 (1998) and to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Pauly, D. et al. Towards Sustainability in World Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). Paragraphs 13-18.
Fisheries. Nature 418, 689-695 (2002); Myers, R.A. [9] Database from Lloyd’s Register of Ships: June
and Worm, B.. Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Preda- 1999, October 2001, December 2003, July 2005
tory Fish Communities. Nature 423, 280-283 (2003);
Gianni, M. High Seas Bottom Trawl Fisheries and Their [10] Swann, J. Fishing Vessels Operating Under Open
Impacts on the Biodiversity of Vulnerable Deep-Sea Registers And The Exercise Of Flag State Responsibili-
Ecosystems: Options for International Action. IUCN ties: Information And Options. FAO Fisheries Circular
Gland, Switzerland (2004). For a good general read of No. 980, Rome 2002.
the current status of fisheries in many parts of the
world including open ocean and high seas fisheries [11] Consultative Group on Flag State Implementation.
see Clover, Charles The End of the Line: How Advance, unedited text. Oceans and the Law of the
Overfishing is Changing the World and What We Eat. Sea. United Nations, 5 March 2004
Ebury Press, London. 2004. [12] Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados,
[3] The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia,
2002. UN FAO, Rome 2002. Page 13, Box 3. Cayman Islands, Comoros, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea,
France (French International Ship Register), Germany
[4] Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and (second register), Georgia, Gibraltar, Honduras,
Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries. FINAL Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands,
REPORT. Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd. Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands Antilles, North Korea,
London, United Kingdom. June 2005 Panama, Sao Tome e Principe, Sri Lanka, St Vincent
and the Grenadines, Tonga, Vanuatu. The primary
[5] EJF, 2005, Pirates and Profiteers: How Pirate criteria the ITF uses in making such a designation is
Fishing Fleets are Robbing People and Oceans. the extent to which there is a genuine link between
Environmental Justice Foundation, London, UK). the flag State and the owners of the vessels on its
[6] Action Taken by FAO Members and FAO to registry; that is, the extent to which vessels on the
Implement the International Plan of Action to Prevent, registry are foreign-owned. In classifying States as
Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregu- FOC countries, the ITF also takes into consideration a
lated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). Document TC IUU-CAP/ State’s ability and/or willingness to enforce interna-
2004/2 prepared for the UN FAO Technical Consulta- tional minimum social standards on its vessels,
tion on the Implementation of the IPOA to Prevent, including respect for basic human and trade union
Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the rights, freedom of association and the right to
Management of Fishing Capacity. FAO Rome 24-29 collective bargaining with bona fide trade unions; its
June 2004. This document provides a very good social record as determined by the degree of ratifica-
overview of the implementation of the FAO Plan of tion and enforcement of ILO Conventions and
Action based on information collected from 64 Recommendations; and safety and environmental
countries which responded to a questionnaire sent to record as revealed by the ratification and enforcement
FAO Member Countries. of IMO Conventions and revealed by port State control
inspections, deficiencies and detentions. Source:
[7] This definition of IUU fishing is taken verbatim from International Transport Workers’ Federation, Steering
the UN FAO International Plan of Action on IUU fishing the Right Course: Towards an Era of Responsible Flag
and applies to fishing in all areas. Using the UN FAO States and Effective International Governance of
definition, the High Seas Task Force defines IUU Oceans and Seas. June 2003. http://www.itf.org.uk/
fishing on the high seas as: english/fisheries/pdfs/steeringrightcourse.pdf
1. Fishing in violation of international laws and [13] http://www.flagsofconvenience.com/ List of
obligations; 2. Fishing of high seas fish stocks where countries under the heading ‘International Ship
there are no formal management arrangements in Registrations’: Belize, Cambodia, Cyprus, Dominica,
place but which remains in contravention of the Georgia, Honduras, Jamaica, Malta, Mongolia,
broader responsibilities of States under the law of the Panama, Slovak Republic, St Vincent and the
sea to conserve and manage the marine living Grenadines, Union of Comoros, Vanuatu. (accessed
resources of the high seas; 3. Fishing conducted by August 2005)
vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of
a State not party to a relevant regional fishery [14] Swann, J. Fishing Vessels Operating Under Open
management organization (RFMO), or by a fishing Registers And The Exercise Of Flag State Responsibili-
entity, in a manner inconsistent with, or which ties: Information And Options. FAO Fisheries Circular
contravenes, the conservation and management No. 980, Rome 2002. Appendix I
measures adopted by the RFMO or broader interna- [15] ‘Group’ is defined by Lloyd’s to mean the owner of
tional obligations; 4. Fishing conducted by nationals of a group of maritime companies or fleets, and responsi-
or vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a ble for major financial or organizational decisions
relevant RFMO in contravention of the conservation regarding the group, i.e. the controlling interest (Parent
and management measures adopted by that organiza- Company) behind a fleet.
tion or relevant provisions of the applicable interna-
tional law; 5. Fishing, including fishing within the area [16] European Union: Belgium (3), Cyprus (18),
of an RFMO, which has not been reported, or has Denmark (3), Estonia (1), France (4), Germany (1),
been misreported, to the relevant national/international Gibraltar (3), Greece (16), Irish Republic (2), Lithuania
69
(5), Malta (2), Netherlands (10), Portugal (5), Spain change significantly in a relatively short period of time,
(46)/ Canary Islands (41), Sweden (2), United Kingdom adding to the difficulties in tracking authorized and IUU
(8). This number does not include vessels whose vessels. For example, when the authors accessed the
owners are listed as residing in overseas territories (or same databases in February 200552
countries) of EU member States or British Crown Panamanianflagged longline vessels and 19 purse
Dependencies. In the case of the latter, the country of seiners were on the list of vessels authorized by
residence of the Owner, Manager or Group (owner) of Panama to fish in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
15 vessels flagged to the list of FOC countries on Honduras, Belize, Bolivia, and Vanuatu had an
Table 1.1 are listed as either the British Virgin Islands additional 18 vessels combined on the IATTC list of
(10), Isle of Man (1), Turks and Caicos Islands (2), or active purse seine vessels.
Channel Islands (2).
[26] Forum Fisheries Agency Vessel Register of vessels
[17] Belize (1), British Virgin Islands (1), Canary Islands in Good Standing. Updated 2 July 2005. http://
(16), China (4), Taiwan (90), Ecuador (1), Egypt (1), www.ffa.int/ffa_rreg (accessed 18 July 2005).
Eritrea (1), Gibraltar (1), Greece (2), Haiti (2), Hong
Kong (5), Japan (15), South Korea (11), Liberia (1), [27] IOTC Record of vessels over 24 metres authorized
Maldives (1), Mauritius (1), Panama (11), Russia (1), to operate in the IOTC area. Updated 2005-07-11.
Singapore (16), Spain (3), Thailand (3) , Turks and http://www.iotc.org/English/record/
Caicos Islands (1), United Kingdom (1), United States search.php?PHPSESSID=2588d4a776929c3d505f9b6a5cb300c0
(4), Unknown (115). (accessed 18 July 2005).
[18] More Troubled Waters: Fishing, Pollution and [28] According to P.M. Miyake, in 2003 there were 173
FOCs. International Confederation of Free Trade large-scale longline vessels registered to Taiwan
Unions, Trade Union Advisory Committee to the ‘authorized’ to fish in the Indian Ocean. Source:
OECD, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Miyake, P.M. Abstract from “Review of longline fleet
Greenpeace International. August 2002. capacity of the world” SCTB17 Working Paper INF-
FTWG-1b, 17th Meeting of the Standing Committee
[19] Further investigation into the vessels registered to on Tuna and Billfish, Majuro, Marshall Islands 9-18
Flags of Convenience in the ‘unknown’ category, and August 2004.
the reasons why these and others vessels are listed as
such on the Lloyd’s database, is necessary to provide [29] ICCAT record of vessels over 24m LOA authorized
a clearer picture of trends in the flagging of fishing to operate in the ICCAT Convention Area. http://
vessels over recent years. www.iccat.org/vessel2/vessels.aspx (accessed 25
July 2005)
[20] A number of positive measures have been taken
by States individually to discourage nationals and [30] General Directorate of the Merchant Marine of
companies within their jurisdiction from engaging in Honduras http://www.marinamercante.hn/
IUU fishing. Amongst the most effective are measures Services.html (accessed 27 July 2005)
adopted by Norway which preclude any vessel with a [31] A number of these recommendations are similar
previous history of IUU fishing from obtaining a licence to those contained in the UN FAO IPOA on IUU
to fish in Norwegian waters. This appears, for example, Fishing and put forward by the High Seas Task Force.
to have been an effective means of deterring Norwe- For example, the first of the recommendations mirrors
gian owned vessels from engaging in IUU fishing in the paragraph 47.10 of the UN FAO IPOA which calls for
Southern Ocean See: http://www.fiskeridir.no/ all large-scale fishing vessels to have a unique,
fiskeridir/ressursforvaltning/blacklisted_vessels/ internationally recognized identification number,
[21] COLTO Report – The Alphabet Boats, A case wherever possible, that enables it to be identified
study of Toothfish Poaching in the Southern Ocean regardless of changes in registration or name over
http://www.colto.org/Case_Study.htm time.
[22] Vessels known or suspected of having been [32] First Meeting of the High Seas Task Force:
engaged in IUU fishing for Patagonian toothfish Summary Outcomes. Meeting of the High Seas Task
according to the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators Force, Paris, 9 March 2005. HTSF/10. 14 March
(Colto). http://www.colto.org/vessels.htm (accessed 2005. www.high-seas.org
17 July 2005) [33] CCAMLR XXIII-40 13 September 2004 Draft List of
[23] Statement of Glenn Roger Delaney, U.S. IUU Vessels
Commissioner to ICCAT before the Committee on [34] http://www.colto.org/PDFs/RoguesGallery.pdf
Resources, Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation,
Wildlife and Oceans, U.S House of Representatives, [35] CCAMLR XXIII-40 13 September 2004 Draft List of
October 30, 2003. Washington, DC. http:// IUU Vessels
resourcescommittee.house.gov/108cong/fish/
2003oct30/delaney.htm [36] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/vess_Carran.htm
[24] ICCAT record of vessels as per the 2002 Recom- [37] http://www.colto.org/PDFs/RoguesGallery.pdf
mendation by ICCAT Concerning the Establishment of [38] http://archive.greenpeace.org/oceans/
an ICCAT Record of Vessels over 24 m Authorized to southernoceans/expedition2000/gallery/
Operate in the Convention Area. Updated 7 July 2005. pirates.html#lua
http://www.iccat.org/vessel2/vessels.aspx (accessed
18 July 2005). Altogether there are 30 vessels flagged [39] CCAMLR XXIII-40 13 September 2004 Draft List of
to Panama on the ICCAT list but 20 are less than 24 IUU Vessels
metres in length and therefore would not appear on
Table 1.1. Earlier in the year, (3 February 2005), there [40] http://www.colto.org/PDFs/RoguesGallery.pdf
were a total of 36 vessels authorized to fish in the [41] http://www.colto.org/PDFs/RoguesGallery.pdf
ICCAT area flagged to one of the 14 FOC countries
listed on Table 1 - 31 vessels flagged to Panama, 3 to [42] CCAMLR XXIII-40 13 September 2004 Draft List of
Honduras, and 2 flagged to Cyprus. IUU Vessels
[25] Source: IATTC Vessel databases: ‘Regional Vessel [43] CCAMLR XXIII-40 13 September 2004 Draft List of
Register List’, ‘Authorized Large Longline Vessels List’, IUU Vessels
and ‘Active purse-seine capacity list’. http://
www.iattc.org/VesselListsENG.htm Inter-American [44] The delegation of Uruguay made a clear state-
Tropical Tuna Commission. Updated 11 July 2005. ment to the 26th Session of the UN FAO Committee
(accessed 18 July 2005). The numbers of vessels can on Fisheries signaling the new government’s break
70
with the policies of the previous government and [72] COLTO http://www.colto.org/Vessels/
committing Uruguay to forcefully tackling the problem vess_Carran.htm
of IUU fishing.
[73] Lloyd’s Register of Ships CD July 2005. Lloyd’s
[45] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/ Marine Intelligence – http://www.seasearcher.com/
vess_ChristinaGlacial.htm
[74] Elizabeth Mitchell, personal communication. Ms.
[46] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/ Mitchell was the NOAA observer aboard the America
vess_ChristinaGlacial.htm No. 1 and described her experience leading up to and
during her time as an observer onboard the America
[47] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/vess_Zarya.htm No. 1 in a letter posted on the ObserverNet Forums on
[48] http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index- 18 February 2005. see www.observernet.org/
press-releases/1996/msg00050.html obsforum/showthread.php?p=1786 (accessed 26 July
2005)
[49] http://www.asoc.org/Documents/
XXCCAMLR_2001/CDS_Analysis_2001_FINAL.doc [75] Report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the
Commission, CCAMLR XXII, Annex I, List of Partici-
[50] http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index- pants, 2003; and Report of the Twenty-Third Meeting
press-releases/1996/msg00050.html of the Commission, CCAMLR XXII, Annex I, List of
Participants, 2004.
[51] Lloyd’s Register of Ships – October 2004
[76] Evaluation de la Peche Illicite Dans le Eaux
[52] http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index- Francaises Adjacentes Aux Iles Kerguelen et Crozet
press-releases/1996/msg00050.html Pour la Saison 2003/2004 (1er Julliet 2003 – 30 Juin
[53] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/vess_Mellas.htm 2004). Informations Generales sur la Zone 58 de la
CCAMLR. CCAMLR-XXIII/BG/19, 27 septembre 2004
[54] http://www.colto.org/PDFs/RoguesGallery.pdf
[77] COMMISSION POUR LA CONSERVATION DE LA
[55] http://www.colto.org/PDFs/RoguesGallery.pdf FAUNE ET LA FLORE MARINES DE L’ANTARCTIQUE
[56] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/vess_Piscis.htm RAPPORT DE LA VINGT-TROISIÈME RÉUNION DE
LA COMMISSION, HOBART, AUSTRALIE, 25
[57] Lloyd’s Register of Ships – October 2004 OCTOBRE – 5 NOVEMBRE 2004 CCAMLR-XXIII,
[58] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/vess_Simiez.htm Page 37.
[59] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/vess_Volna.htm [78] Report on the vessels Florens (Simeiz) and Eva I
(Mellas). Delegation of New Zealand. CCAMLR XXIII-
[60] http://www.colto.org/Vessels/vess_Jackson.htm BG-30. 22 October 2004.
[61] Report On The Vessels Florens 1(Simeiz) and Eva [79] Statement in Response of Australia in the Volga
1 (Mellas) CCAMLR-XXIII/BG/30 22 October 2004 by Case, Russian Federation v. Australia, International
the Delegation of New Zealand Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 7 December 2002.
[62] Notification of Spain’s Proposal to Conduct [80] Rogues Gallery: the new face of IUU fishing for
Exploratory Fisheries for Toothfish in CCAMLR Sub toothfish. COLTO October 2003. http://www.colto.org/
Area 88.1 and Divisions 54.4.1, 58.4.2, 58.4.3a and PDFs/RoguesGallery.pdf
58.4.3b in the 2004/05 Season. CCAMLR XXIII 17 July
2004 [81] http://www.quamnet.com.cn/eng/
readnews.jsp?nid=10530
[63] http://www.colto.org/PDFs/RoguesGallery.pdf
[82]COLTO Report – The Alphabet Boats, A case
[64] La Republica Newspaper, Uruguay 22 April, 2004. study of Toothfish Poaching in the Southern Ocean
http://www.diariolarepublica.com/2004/auto/plantillas/ http://www.colto.org/Case_Study.htm
4/22/plantilla_a.mv?registro=87
[83] Source: Jorge Cofré, President of the Sindicato
[65] Troubled Waters: Fishing, Pollution and FOCs. de Tripulantes de Naves Pesqueras y Especiales,
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, SITONERS. Punta Arenas, Chile. Personal Communi-
Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD, cation.
International Transport Workers’ Federation,
Greenpeace International. March 1999. [84] In addition to this point, in late 2004 Australia had
to divert a patrol vessel to provide emergency medical
[66] The ‘Galician Syndicate’ associated with illegal assistance to a crew member on board a Spanish
fishing of toothfish forms an economic group in flagged vessel fishing on the high seas in the Southern
Uruguay – La Republica April 2004 http:// Ocean. (Sachi Wimmer, Manager, IUU Fishing & Policy
www.colto.org/ Review Section, Fisheries and Aquaculture, Depart-
LaRepublica_Galician_Syndicate_Apr04_SPA.htm ment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Australia –
personal communication). While Spain is not an FOC
[67] Rogues Gallery, Coalition of Legal Toothfish flag country, this nonetheless highlights the issue of
Operators, 2003. adequate medical services on board and the issue of
http://www.falkland-malvinas.com/ proper medical checks of crew members before they
Detalle.asp?NUM=2790 commence long fishing trips. It also raises the issue of
significant costs being incurred by non-flag States
[68] Boston Globe, May 18, 2003. “With Fish Piracy on responding to SOLAS requests.
Rise, Agents Cast Worldwide Net”, By Beth Daley
http://www.asoc.org/Press/Fisheries/Pirates/Piracy- [85] “11 dead in fishing vessel fire in Uruguay” Agence
agents.htm France Presse, 24 June 2005.
71
through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of involved in fishing or fish trading industries. http://
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on www.citigroup.com/citigroup/environment/
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to gcibpolicy.htm
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related [104] Inmarsat Ltd: 99 City Road, London EC1Y 1AX,
instruments”. United Kingdom, Tel: +44 (0)20 7728 1000 Fax: +44
(0)20 7728 1044; Iridium: Corporate Headquarters,
[87] Tuna: the Political Fish Japanese Love. Japan 6701 Democracy Boulevard Suite 500, Bethesda, MD
International Cooperation Agency newsletter Network/ 20817 USA, Phone: +1.301.571.6200, Fax:
No Escape – July 2001. http://www.jica.go.jp/english/ +1.301.571.6250
publication/network/2001/net_vol12/food01.html
[105] UN FAO State of World Fisheries and
[88] INFORMATION PAPER ON FISH LAUNDERING Aquaculture 2004. UN FAO Rome 2005. The report
ACTIVITIES BY LARGE-SCALE TUNA LONGLINE provides the figure of $58.2 billion USD as the ‘export
VESSELS Submitted by the delegation of Japan to value’ of the world trade in fisheries products in 2002.
the Seventh session of the Preparatory Conference for
the Commission for the Conservation and Manage- [106] “ICFA Calls for Elimination of Flag-of-Conven-
ment of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western ience (FOC) Fishing Vessels”. Press Release, Interna-
and Central Pacific; WCPFC/PrepCon/DP.34, 29 tional Coalition of Fisheries Associations, 5 January
November 2004. 2000. “ICFA Resolution in Support of OPRT’s Initiative
to Eliminate IUU/FOC Fishing”; Resolution adopted by
[89] Bours H., Gianni M., Mather D., Pirate Fishing International Coalition of Fisheries Associations 2001
Plundering the Oceans. Greenpeace International Annual Meeting. Tokyo, Japan. http://www.icfa.net/
February 2001. ICFA Members include the Asian Fisheries Federation,
Australia Seafood Industry Council, China Fisheries
[90] Op cit. 82, Fisheries Agency of Japan Association of the Republic of China in Taiwan,
[91] Op cit. 83, Pirate Fishing Plundering the Oceans. Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries Co-Operative
Greenpeace International. Associations, Fisheries Council of Canada, Fisheries
Association of Iceland, Japan Fisheries Association,
[92] For example Recommendation 02-23 adopted by Korea Deep Sea Fisheries Association, National
ICCAT in 2002: Recommendation By ICCAT To Fisheries Institute (USA), New Zealand Fishing Industry
Establish A List Of Vessels Presumed To Have Carried Association, The Norwegian Fisherman’s Association
Out Illegal, Unreported And Unregulated Fishing and the All Russia Association of Fisheries Enterprises,
Activities In The ICCAT Convention Area – Paragraph Entrepreneurs, and Exporters (VARPE).
9 “Contracting Parties and Cooperating non-Contract-
ing Parties, Entities or Fishing Entities shall take all [107] Swann, J. Fishing Vessels Operating Under
necessary measures, under their applicable legislation: Open Registers And The Exercise Of Flag State
e) To prohibit the imports, or landing and/or Responsibilities: Information And Options. FAO
transshiptrans-shipment, of tuna and tuna-like species Fisheries Circular No. 980, Rome 2002.
from vessels included in the IUU list”. See also ICCAT [108] It is interesting to note, in the FAO report
Resolution 01-18: Scope of IUU Fishing. Adopted by footnoted above, the frequency and type of enforce-
ICCAT in 2001. ment actions taken by the government of Belize
[93] IATTC website: www.iattc.org against fishing vessels flying its flag operating outside
of Belize waters. From the period 1997 through 2001,
[94] http://www.eastwindgroup.com/Eastwind.htm Belize reported that it took enforcement action 17
(accessed 24 July 2005). Other companies affiliated times against fishing vessels on its registry. In only five
with refrigerated cargo services provided by Eastwind instances were the fishing vessels actually fined. Most
include Eastwind Ship Management based in of the fines levied were in the vicinity of $20,000 USD
Singapore, Norbulk Shipping UK Ltd of Glasgow, but only one of these vessels was actually reported to
Korea Marine Ltd of Pusan, and Norbulk (Hellas) S.A. have paid the fine. Belize reported that the most
of Piraeus. common means of penalizing an offending vessel was
to delete (deflag) the vessel from the Belize registry.
[95] http://fishery.dw.co.kr/english/fleet_intro/ This, however, would have been at best a minor
ships.htm (accessed 24 July 2005) inconvenience for the vessels concerned. A fishing
[96] http://www.skshipping.com/jsp/eng/company/ vessel can obtain a FOC easily, with provisional
overview.jsp registration being granted by some flag States within
24 hours of application. Belize’s history of enforcement
[97] Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Ships and Lloyd’s is remarkably limited and virtually ineffective consider-
Marine Intelligence Unit ing that several hundred large-scale fishing vessels
flew the flag of Belize during the same period of time.
[98] CCAMLR document SCIC 04/4, Agenda Item No. According to the FAO report, Belize flagged vessels
2, Provisional And Proposed IUU Vessel List, Page 5. were reported by RFMOs to be engaged in IUU fishing
[99] ADDAX and Sunmar are both management in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian and Southern Oceans.
companies and whereas Table 4.1 consists of To its credit, the government of Belize at least provided
companies identified as owners of the vessels on the information on enforcement actions to the author of
Lloyd’s database the FAO report – most of the other countries identified
as operating open registries did not, suggesting that
[100] http://www.addax-oryx.com/media/pdf/ they took little if any enforcement action whatsoever.
bunkers.pdf
[109] James Brooke “Landlocked Mongolia’s
[101] http://www.sunmar.com/ssi/default.htm Seafaring Tradition”. New York Times, July 2, 2004.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/flags/2004/
[102] Pacific Andes (Holdings) Limited, Annual Report 0702landlocked.htm
2004. Page 66.
[103] Citigroup, for example, in 2003, adopted what it
calls the Global Corporate and Investment Banking
group’s (GCIB) Environmental and Social Policy.
Among other things, this policy commits Citigroup to
refrain from investing in illegal logging operations.
Citigroup and other investors could be convinced to
apply a similar policy to investments in companies
72
Annexes
FOC vessels listed as owned by companies based in Taiwan and Spain/
ANNEX I Canary Islands. Source: Lloyd’s Register of Ships (July 2005)
Taiwan
73
Taiwan, continued
74
Taiwan, continued
75
Taiwan, continued
76
Spain
77
Canary Islands
78
Annex III. Sample itineraries of tankers refueling fishing vessels at sea. 2001-2003
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
2001 CP - JPN SH YK - SH - KA SI - CP E & W. ATL. (LA - ALG - COL) PC - JPN YK - TO - SH - YK - KA SI - CP E. & W. ATLANTIC PC - YK
ANNEX II
M/V CHIKUMA
2002 MED (CRO) MED - JPN TO - SH SI - SZC MEDITERRANEAN SZC - SI TO - SH - BU KOR - MED MEDITERRANEAN
2003 MED-JPN TO - SH JPN - MED MEDITERRANEAN MED - JPN SH - TO - SH - KA JPN - MED MEDITERRANEAN
M/V HARIMA 2
2001 EAST ATLANTIC CP - SH SH - YK - SH - YK - KA - BU SOUTH CHINA SEA - INDONESIA SH - YK - SH - YK - KA - BU S. CHINA SEA - IND
M/V HARU
79
80
Annex II. Sample of port visits and itineraries of refrigerated cargo vessels transshipping high value tuna at sea for delivery to Japan. 2001-2003
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
ANNEX II
M/V HATSUKARI
2002 JPN - PC WEST ATLANTIC (LA - CVI) PC - JPN BU - SH SI - CP EAST ATLANTIC (CP - SVI) CP - SI SH - YK
2001 SH - HA SI - CP EAST ATLANTIC (LAS PALMAS) CP - SI SH - YK - SH - YK - SH - YK JPN - PER W. & E. PACIFIC (CA) PER - JPN SH - BU - SH - HA - BU
2001 W. PAC YK - SH - YK - SH - TO - KE JPN - PER EAST PACIFIC (CA) PER - JPN SH - BU - TO - YK - BU - SH SI - CP EAST ATLANTIC (CP - WB) CP-SI
2002 SH -YK - SH - BU - KA W. PAC (SU-PA) YK - SH - TO - YK - SH - YK - SH JPN - PER E. PACIFIC (PERU) PER - JAP YK - SH - HA - KA
M/V SHOFU
2003 WEST PACIFIC YK - SH SH SI - MED E. ATL- MED (LA-ESP) MED - SI SH - TO - BU - KA SI - PC WEST & EAST ATLANTIC (LA)
2001 EAST PACIFIC SH -YK - SH SI - SZC MED - E. ATLANTIC (LA - ESP) SZC - SI SH YK - SH - YK E.PAC (MA) SH
2002 W.PAC SH -YK - SH - TO - SH - KA SI - SZC ME. E. ATLANTIC (LA - ESP) SZ - SI BU - TO - SH - KA - BU - SH W. PACIFIC (PAPEETE)
M/V TUNASTATES
2002 INDIAN OCEAN (SY) SH BU - KA SI - LA E. ATLANTIC LA - COL - PC - JPN BU -SH - TO SH - SU - KA INDIAN O. (SY)
M/V YAMATO 2
2003 YK - SH - KA S. CHINA SEA - INDONESIA SH - YK - SH - BU - KA S. CHINA SEA - INDONESIA SH - TO - SH - KA - SH JPN - TRN WEST AND EAST ATLANTIC
= LOADING FISH AT SEA OR IN PORT = VESSEL IN TRANSIT = VESSEL IN PORT DISCHARGING CATCH OR STANDING BY
ALG ALGERIA
ATL ATLANTIC OCEAN MED MEDITERRANEAN
BU BUSAN, S. KOREA MN MANTA, ECUADOR
CA CALLAO, PERU PA PAPEETE, TAHITI
CO COLUMBIA PAC PACIFIC OCEAN
CP CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA PC PANAMA CANAL
CRO CROATIA PER PERU
CVI CAPE VERDE ISLANDS PL PORT LINCOLN, AUSTRALIA
DU DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA TRN TRINIDAD
ESP SPAIN SH SHIMUZU, JAPAN
FR FREMANTLE, AUSTRALIA SI SINGAPORE
HA HAHINOHE, JAPAN SU SUAO, TAIWAN
IN INDONESIA SV SUVA, FIJI
INO INDIAN OCEAN SY SEYCHELLES
JPN JAPAN SZC SUEZ CANAL
KA KAOSHUING, TAIWAN TAI TAIWAN
KE KESENNUMA, JAPAN TO TOKYO, JAPAN
KOR KOREA TUN TUNESIA
LA LAS PALMAS, CANARY ISLANDS WB WALVIS BAY, NAMIBIA
MA MAURITIUS YK YOKOSUKA, JAPAN
MAL MALTA
81
82
Annex III. Sample itineraries of tankers refueling fishing vessels at sea. 2001-2003
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
2001 HI NORTH EAST PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC HI NORTH WEST PACIFIC HI WEST PACIFIC SH
2002 UL-BU WEST PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC HI WEST PACIFIC BU EAST PACIFIC HI EAST PAC
M/T B. CUPID
2001 E.ATL LP E.TL LP E.ATL E.ATL LP E.ATL AB E.ATL AB E. ATLANTIC TE E. ATLANTIC LP EAST ATLANTIC LP EAST ATLANTIC AB
2002 E.ATL LP EAST ATLANTIC AB E.ATL TE AB EAST ATLANTIC TE E. ATLANTIC LO E. ATL LO E.ATL LO LO E. ATLANTIC LO E.ATL
2003 TE TE EAST ATLANTIC LP EAST ATLANTIC LP E.ATL TE TE E.ATL LP EAST ATLANTIC LP EAST ATLANTIC
M/T ATOM 7
2003 UL W. PACIFIC UL PACIFIC BA E.PAC BA EAST PACIFIC BA EAST PACIFIC BA EAST PACIFIC BA E.PAC BA
M/T VESTA 7
Sample itineraries of tankers refueling fishing vessels at sea.
2002 W.PAC BU WEST PACIFIC UL W. PACIFIC UL WEAT PACIFIC UL WEST PACIFIC GU WEST PACIFIC BU-BL
2001 HI PACIFIC HI E. PACIFIC BA-CA E. PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC BA EAST PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC BA
2003 HI PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC CA E.PAC CA E. PACIFIC HI EAST PACIFIC BA EAST PACIFIC HI
2001 SI S.W.PAC NC SI S.W.PAC NC S.W.PACIFIC AK S.W.PACIFIC GE S. AUSTRALIA SI E. INDIAN O. FR E.INDIAN OCEAN SI INDIAN O.
2002 INDIAN OCEAN SI S.W. PACIFIC AK S.W. PACIFIC AK SOUTH AUSTRALIA GE INDIAN O. SI INDIAN O. FR INDIAN OCEAN SI WEST PACIFIC
2003 HI N. PACIFIC HI S.W. PACIFIC AK SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AK S.W. PACIFIC AK S.W. PACIFIC SI S.W. PACIFIC SI WESTERN PACIFIC HI
2002 WEST PACIFIC GU WEST PACIFIC GU WEST PACIFIC GU NORT PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI N.PACIFIC HI W.PACIFIC GU
2003 GU W.PAC GU W.PACIFIC GU WEST PACIFIC BU WEST PACIFIC GU W. PAC YS WEST PACIFIC GU WEST PACIFIC
M/T KOSIAM
2001 N. PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI NORTH PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI NORTH PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC
2003 N. PACIFIC HI WEST PACIFIC BU WEST PACIFIC HI NORTH PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI NORTH PACIFIC HI N. PACIFIC HI
= TANKERS AT SEA - IN TRANSIT TO, OR SERVICING FISHING VESSELS. = TANKERS IN PORT REFUELING AND LOADING SUPPLIES
83
ANNEX III
84
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