(1986) Cottingham - Partiality, Favouritism and Morality

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Scots Philosophical Association
Partiality, Favouritism and Morality

Author(s): John Cottingham
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 36, No. 144 (Jul., 1986), pp. 357-373
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and
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The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 144
ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00
PARTIALITY, FAVOURITISM AND MORALITY
BY JOHN COTTINGHAM
Many philosophers are impartialists: they maintain that morality requires

us to allocate our time and resources without according special preference to
our own goals and interests and without displaying favouritism or partiality
towards those to whom we happen to be in some way specially related.
Despite its widespread support from various versions of utilitarianism,
socialism, Christianity and other creeds, impartialism is untenable. First, the
practical feasibility of impartialism is very much in doubt. All of us accord
massive priority to our own plans and projects, careers, families, loved ones,
friends; it is not easy to see how any normal human being could seriously
attempt to set about dividing up his time and resources in a way which
ignored self-referential categories such as 'mine' and 'ours'. Second, and
more important, reflection reveals that it is very doubtful whether we should
even try to adopt an impartialist ethic; for when applied to actual cases,
impartialism, so far from being a shining ideal at which to aim, is exposed as
morally suspect. To choose to save one's own child from a burning building
when an impartial consideration of the balance of general utility would
favour rescuing someone else first, is not (as impartialists must claim) a
perhaps understandable but nonetheless regrettable lapse from the highest
moral standards; on the contrary, it is the morally correct course - it is
precisely what a good parent ought to do. A parent who leaves his child to
burn, on the grounds that the building contains someone else whose future
contribution to the general welfare promises to be greater, is not a hero; he is
(rightly) an object of moral contempt, a moral leper.'
This much has been established in recent attacks on impartialism.2 But if
impartialism is untenable, are there not equal problems with its contrary,
partialism? That is the subject of this paper. I shall argue that the partialist
faces serious difficulties but that these can be overcome. As a crude first
shot, I define partialism as the thesis that it is (not merely psychologically
1 The phrase 'moral leper' suggests that the parent who fails to save his own child is in breach
of a moral duty. I believe we are sometimes under such positive duties to be partial; but in what
follows I shall restrict myself to the lesser claim that partiality is sometimes morally correct (i.e.
at least permissible).
2 See J. Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality", Philosophical Studies 43 (1983) 83-99;
A. Oldenquist, "Loyalties", Journal of Philosophy 49 (1982) 173-94.
358 JOHN COTTINGHAM
understandable but) morally correct to favou

those to whom the agent has some spe
(though this will need refining shortly).
NEPOTISM AND CORRUPTION
To say without qualification that it is morally correct to favour

clearly will not do. A civil servant who in placing a contract shows f
to his friends or relations is (rightly) liable to be dismissed. Nor is
the public official the only type of case where partiality is imper
The personnel manager of a privately owned company may be cen
cronyism or nepotism even though he has sworn no oath of office t
public impartially. The reason why the manager is not permitted
partiality seems to derive from the fact that he is, in view of his jo
to do all in his power to promote the interests of the company
deciding promotions, he passes over an able candidate in favour of
indolent and inefficient nephew, he is failing in his duty - a
requires him to appoint staff on their merits (given the premise th
based system serves the company's interests best). A similar case is
examiner in a school or college (whether public or private). The nat
examiner's job imposes a duty to assess students' work fairly, in a
with the appropriate criteria ('he's produced a well-argued term p
relevant consideration; 'she is my cousin's niece' just isn't). The sit
these various different cases, then, is that either, in what I shall
"direct" case, (such as that of the public official) the agent is under
duty to be impartial; or, in the "indirect" case (such as that of the
manager) the agent is under a duty to perform an activity o
requirements of which involve a duty to make non-biased assessm
on a range of objectively determined criteria. To take account
complications, we need to redefine partialism as the thesis that unl
under a direct or indirect duty to be impartial, it is morally correct to fa
own.
FAVOURING OUR OWN: CIRCLES OF PREFERENCE
But what exactly is meant by the vague phrase 'one's own'? The phr
implies that those picked out for special treatment are specified not in
of some descriptive (and therefore universalizable) quality or feature
they possess, but in terms of some particular relationship which they
the agent. Thus, in the fire case, my decision to favour my child is b
3 This (erroneous) impression was given by the exclusive focus on "public" exam
Cottingham, op. cit., p. 96.
PARTIALITY, FAVOURITISM AND MORALITY 359
simply on the fact that she is my daughter: there is a non-

particular, self-referential element in my rationale for selecting
rather than some other.
[This last point perhaps needs filling out, lest the contrast
particularity and universalizability should mislead here. The reas
selecting this child is not some universalizable feature that she p
such that I ought to prefer any child with this feature; for
descriptively similar to this one will not do, if she is not related
note that although there is a non-eliminable reference to a singu
involved in the specification of the reason for action here, the p
principle of action is, of course, universalizable in the sense that
perfectly prepared to prescribe that any parent in a similar situati
favour his own child. So there is nothing inherently contra-rati
partialist's position: he need not be open to the charge of arbitrar
for himself some privilege that he would not be prepared to grant
The above remarks about self-referentiality still leave the scop
phrase 'one's own' very unclear. My child counts as one of "my ow
may legitimately favour, since she is one of my family. But if X's
my family is a legitimate reason for my favouring X, what
belonging to my nation? What about X's belonging to my rac
walking down the street, I come across two beggars, both equally
assistance, and I have only a single banknote, so that I cannot ass
(Assume that there are no complications connected with my job
sional duties: I am merely a private citizen, going for a walk in my
so that there are no ex officio duties of impartiality upon me.) May
case legitimately give the money to X because X is, like me, a Cauc
if one of the beggars is an Anglo-Saxon, and one a Hispa
legitimately favour the Anglo-Saxon on the grounds that he is o
lot"? These questions suggest that partialism has a serious challen
It appears to license chauvinist and racist behaviour of the kind
serious moral thinkers would unreservedly condemn. Partialism
lead us down the road to accepting all sorts of arbitrary and unfair
discrimination.
With this difficulty in mind, let us draw up a list (not intende
complete) of various forms of partialism:
(1) Familism (S favours X over Y because X is a memb
family.)
(2) Kinshipism (Wider than familism: S favours X because X is
related to S by some bond of kinship.)
(3) Clanism (In the two beggars case, a Scotsman might favour
a member of his own clan, e.g. give to a MacDo-
nald if he was himself of that clan.)
360 JOHN COTTINGHAM
(4) Patriotism
(5) Racism
(6) Sexism
(7) Planetism (S favours X because X is a creature from S's own
planet.)
The final item in the above list belongs in the realm of science fiction, but in
a futuristic setting one might imagine having to make a choice between an
earthman and a creature such as one of Asimov's "Chloros" - repulsive
looking creatures who have stalk-heads (their brains are in their abdomens)
and breathe chlorine gas, but who are intelligent, sensitive and respectful of
others, and thus from an impartial standpoint as worthy of moral considera-
tion as we are. In Asimov's story, an Earth-patriot known as Colonel
Windham displays unashamedly "planetist" behaviour. He has little time for
"the blasted green fellas", and when a member of his party agrees to mount
an attack on them, hails him as a fellow patriot: "Dash it, let me shake your
hand. I like you. You're an Earthman, by heaven. Do this and, win or die, I'll
bear witness for you."4
Even planetism does not exhaust the scope of ever widening partialisms.
One could presumably imagine "galaxism" - the policy of giving preferential
treatment to members of one's own galaxy. Or one could go even wider. A
well known joke-button worn at astronomy conferences reads 'Support your
local group'. The term refers not to some particular faction of astronomy
departments, but to what astronomers, with mind-numbing matter-of-
factness, refer to as our "local" group of galaxies (the group to which our
own Milky Way galaxy and the Andromeda galaxy belong).
In the above list of partialisms, racism is the "leading" term: it controls the
dynamic of our moral response, functioning as a paradigm of moral inde-
fensibility. It is striking, for example, that the liberation movements of recent
history - the Women's Movement and the Animal Rights Movement - have
been able to exert great pressure by comparing the male chauvinist and the
speciesist with the racist. The central argument of the liberationists here is
that for me to favour X over Y just because he's one of "my lot" (my gender,
my species, my race), is, in the absence of some further morally relevant
difference between X and Y, a piece of purely arbitrary, and hence improper,
discrimination. The case of patriotism at first sight seems rather different
from that of speciesism and sexism. For one thing, the two latter "isms" have
never in the past been regarded as virtues; the terms were coined to denote
unconscious, or at least unreflective, patterns of conduct which had largely
gone unchallenged. To challenge them, to exhibit them as cases of arbitrary
discrimination, was eo ipso to expose them as vices. 'Patriotism', by contrast,
I. Asimov, "C Chute" in Nightfall One (London, 1971), p. 161.
so far from being a label coined by a liberation movement to tag a lurkin

vice, was and still is widely regarded as denoting a positive virtue; to hav
special preferential concern for one's own nation is probably taken by m
people to be a good thing, and the label 'patriotic' has, on the whol
favourable connotations. But even here there are increasing doubts. T
horror of two world wars, both embarked on with considerable nationalist
fervour, has to some extent checked the traditional extolling of amor patr
and, more recently, doubts about the legitimacy of patriotic partiality h
been generated by the rise of ecological awareness and the recognition th
the fate of all the inhabitants of our planet is inextricably linked. In this m
reflective climate there have appeared a number of "globalist" writers,5 wh
have cast serious doubt on the extent to which, in distributing our resourc
we are morally entitled to favour our own fellow countrymen (at least to t
extent that we normally do).
All these considerations appear to point towards the conclusion that the
careful and reflective moral thinker ought to regard our list of partialisms
something of a black list. It begins to look (as indeed is suggested b
Asimov's caricature of the blinkered "Earth-patriot") as if adherence
these partialisms is the mark of a narrow, unliberated mind. Familism, it
true, does not arouse such reactions, but in the light of the doubts now rais
about the other members of the list, it appears that it will not do to adopt t
strategy of one recent philosophical defender of patriotism who proposes t
"defend the easier case of family loyalty and assume that... whatever we ca
conclude about the one case we can conclude in principle about the other"
Rather, the boot seems to be on the other foot: the onus appears to be on t
defender of familism to show how it does not bear the taint of arbitrary
discrimination that seems to infect the other kinds of partialism.
TWO STRATEGIES
The partialist seems to have two possible ways of meeting this c

One would be to try to construct a blanket defence of all the memb
list, by arguing that we are within our rights as free moral agents in
preferential treatment to the members of any group we choose to
The other strategy would be to provide some principle of selec
differentiating between various types of partialism and explaining
could be defensible even though others are unacceptable.
5 See, for example, J. Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth,
and P. Singer Practical Ethics (Cambridge, 1979) chs. 1, 2.
6 Oldenquist, op. cit., p. 186.
362 JOHN COTTINGHAM
The argument from bald preference

The first of these strategies, I will argue,
appear offensive even to discuss the possibilit
enough to include, for example, racial partial
Clark has observed, in another context, "to
detachment questions which hardly seem
than foolish, it seems disgusting".7 Nonethe
where a "bald preference" for one's own (
sex) seems at first sight to be at least per
beggar case, if one of the mendicants is whit
black passer-by legitimately choose to give h
other reason than "he's one of my race"? Per
complicated by a past history of oppression
surely, so ready to accept that a white man m
over a black beggar. But take a slightly
passer-by is a British emigre to the U.S., and
one of the beggars ("Spare the price of a cup
asked for money by a fellow expatriate. May
favour his fellow-countryman? Does he h
searching for some non-self-referential cha
recipient to favourable consideration? (Am
consult their intuitions with regard to the c
Europe: may he not legitimately favour a fe
It may be thought that favouritism in suc
universalizable difference between the two r
sentimentality and caprice, not on sound mor
capricious "bald preference" could not be th
choice may be question-begging. Assuming a
indirect duty to be impartial, is he not m
preferences as he wishes? Can he not justifiab
parable, "Is it not lawful for me to do what
This argument, which hinges on the notion
think, a certain persuasiveness; but it will n
would have to be done to provide a blanket de
"it's my money" does indeed provide a strong
the rationale for the distribution of the mon
rather than imposed on me from outside. Bu
choices, and the reasons that I provide to su
moral criticism. True, from the legal point o
7 S. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford, 197
8 The Labourers in the Vineyard: Matthew 20:14.
entitled to specify quite arbitrarily and capriciously who should be the

beneficiaries of that charity; but from the moral point of view her choice may
still be open to censure. The old lady who leaves her entire million dollars
for the promotion of an institute for the raising of tailless cats with blue eyes
may legally be entitled to have her bequest upheld; but morally she is open to
criticism that she should have left her money to some worthier cause. Even
the free bestowers of charity have some duty to reflect on the moral
congequences of their bequests and the worthiness of alternative recipients.
The upshot is that the autonomy argument, though creating a presumption
in favour of people's being allowed to distribute their resources as they wish,
is not strong enough to guarantee the partialist immunity from moral censure
if his choices turn out to be based on arbitrary and capricious criteria; and
the charge against him is, precisely, that "X belongs to my group" is, in the
absence of further argument, an arbitrary and capricious reason for favour-
ing X.
The argument from "bald preference", then, does not seem enough to
provide a moral justification for the acts of favouritism of racists and other
partialists. Hence, if some partialisms (e.g. familism) are to be defended, we
are thrown back on the second strategy mentioned above: instead of trying to
construct a general justification of any and all partiality, the aim will be to
provide some principle which will drive a wedge between acceptable partial-
isms, such as familism, and unacceptable partialisms, such as racism.
The argument from the life-plan

The starting point for developing such a principle is the thought that
ethical judgements are not simply arbitrary prescriptions. It does not suffice,
in order to make an ethical judgement, that I simply ordain some course of
action for myself and others (e.g. that one should twiddle one's thumbs five
hundred times a day). Moral judgements cannot be isolated "fiats" of this
kind; if I am to count as making a moral judgement I must be prepared, at
least in principle, to show how my prescription contributes to some overall
blueprint for the good life - how it forms part of, or connects with, my vision
of how life should be lived if it is to be worthwhile. This requirement is
simply a consequence of putting the point, familiar from Aristotle, that the
object of ethics is eudaimonia, generally translated 'happiness', but perhaps
better explicated in terms of the notion of a fulfilled or "flourishing" life.
[A brief digression. The connection between ethics and eudaimonia is
sometimes, wrongly, taken to show that the supposed logical "gap" between
description and evaluation does not after all exist. This is a confusion which
has been amply disposed of elsewhere,9 so here I will simply note that while
the connection between ethics and eudaimonia does indeed put certain
' See J. Cottingham, "Neonaturalism and its Pitfalls", Philosophy 58 (1983) pp. 445-70.
364 JOHN COTTINGHAM
systematic constraints on what can count a

prescription, it still leaves open the possi
people may disagree, "after all the facts are
right to do. Thus ifA's conception of huma
organic vision of social cooperation, he may
case of self-indulgent timewasting; B, o
blueprint specifying detachment and withdr
which case he may extol prayer and fasting
well be a large number of plausible recipes
thumb-twiddling case, the constraints unde
'twiddle your thumbs five hundred tim
circumstances count as a moral judgement; t
to count, there would have to be some explan
(e.g. perhaps it soothes tension, or promote
is the first step to Nirvana).]
Returning now to the partialist, it will fol
plausible ethical stance, it cannot simply co
certain kinds of self-referential favouring
the partialist must show how the principle o
related in a certain way contributes to a fu
dimension - which may be called the dim
play, it becomes possible to make import
various kinds of partialism.
AGENT-RELATED PARTIALISM
Perhaps the simplest and clearest case of a kind of partiality th

defended by reference to the notion of a life-plan is the partiality
human agents accord to their own plans and projects. Legitimate p
for one's own projects, or "agent-related partialism", involves the n
in deciding whether to support X's goals or Y's goals, the fact tha
may legitimately carry a certain degree of moral weight. (Note: a
degree, not an overwhelming or an infinite degree. It is quite com
with the principle of agent-related partialism to recognise that
occasions my own projects, even when accorded suitable extr
because they are mine, may rightly be overriden because they con
more important projects of others.) Now the fundamental point i
principle of accqrding a special extra weight to one's own con
because they are one's own, is not only a principle which all of us a
of fact follow; it is one which seems an essential prerequisite for th
oneself as a human agent, as an individual, as a person with a d
identity. To be a person - one who has continuing desires, plans, p
is to have commitments, to be involved; and this in turn necessarily entails

that, in our evaluations, we accord a certain threshold weight to the
particular plans and projects that we have decided to pursue. If each day I
was to consider how each moment could best be spent furthering, for
example, global utility, without according any special priority to the fact that
certain projects are the ones in which I am involved, it seems that I would
disintegrate as an individual. For I would be obliged to drop any activity or
project in which I was engaged whenever another project presented itself
whose contribution to the general utility was marginally greater. In such a
case, it seems that I would have no real character - there would be no
distinctive pattern to my life. I would simply be, to adapt a phrase of Bernard
Williams, a cog in a "satisfaction system" which "happened to be near
certain causal levers at a certain time".'? Thus, agent-related partialism is not
a matter of arbitrarily or capriciously favouring the projects of a particular
individual - me; rather, a degree of preference for one's own projects turns
out to be an essential prerequisite for any plausible blueprint for human
welfare. It seems that any ethic which requires people to be agents, to pursue
any plans or projects - and that means any ethic whatsoever - must on pain
of absurdity permit agent-related partialism.
If this argument is correct, it is a very powerful one, since it suggests that
the principle of agent-related partialism is not just defensible but is an
essential pillar of any conceivable ethical system. But the very sweepingness
of this conclusion may give rise to certain misgivings. Can one not imagine
possible ethical systems - certain kinds of Buddhist ethic perhaps - that
attempt to transcend the notion of individual agenthood, and even to
eliminate the very sense of 'self?
Such an ethic does indeed seem conceivable; but without in any way
denigrating it, one may observe that it has the following paradoxical feature.
Although the Buddhist type of ideal proposes an eventual endstate where all
sense of self will be eliminated, it seems that embarking on the road to such
an endstate requires determination and tenacity. Thus the aspiring novice
must resolutely hold on to certain aims which he makes his own, and to which
he assigns a certain priority, refusing to be distracted from them by other
demands, worthy though they may appear, that may claim his attention. So
the very pursuit of the Buddhist goal appears to require, at least in its early
stages, a considerable degree of agent-related partialism.
But however that may be, and even if it turned out that the claims of
agent-related partiality to a universal place in all lifeplans had to be
abandoned, any lifeplan that dispensed with agent-related partialism would
still be subject to a number of more mundane objections. First, even if
10 B. Williams Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981), p. 4.
366 JOHN COTTINGHAM
conceivable, the life devoid of agent-relate

few will ever find psychologically feasible.
to live as a human being simply is to li
commitments and projects. Second, there
agent-related commitments has something
goal of detachment from self, and cuttin
related ties, the wandering monk in search
and other necessities on others who are no
engaged on exactly those continuing perso
house building) and determinedly comm
personal ties (to their families, to their f
rejects. Hence it seems that the life devoi
necessarily remain a blueprint for a fairly
SELF-DIRECTED PARTIALISM
It is important to realise that the principle so far introduced, tha

related partialism, relates merely to the general structure of our c
human agents; it says nothing specific about the content of thos
Human agenthood may indeed require the identification of certa
to which the agent must assign some special weight, but it does no
follow that the content of such concerns must be specified in
egocentric as opposed to altruistic terms. To be a person I m
certain projects which I make "my own"; but my own project
necessarily involve the assignment of special weight to my ow
welfare. This latter kind of weighting is much more controversial
the idea that I may assign special weight to my own private inte
satisfactions (as against those of others) simply because they are
convenience we may call this the principle of self-favouritism
directed partialism".
The claim that the principle of self-directed partialism can be
ethically is a complicated one which I shall not attempt to defend
tively here. I will merely make what seem to me to be a number o
suggestive points in its defence. First, though impartialists often
equate self-favouritism with selfishness, it is far from clear that
certain special weighting to my own interests and satisfactions is
tically to be condemned as selfish. The selfish person accords an
weight to his own satisfactions and pursues them regardless of t
does to others; but there may be a legitimate level of self-pr
weighting that falls short of this. For Aristotle, philautia, or aff
oneself, can, if not carried to excess, be a genuine ethical virtue;
that natural and perfectly proper sense of special concern and regard for
oneself that is essential to human flourishing."
The second point to be made about self-favouritism is that some degree of
self-directed partiality is so deeply ingrained into the psychological make-up
of most of us that it is not easy to see how any ethic which outlawed it
completely could survive. How many times does each of us, every day, give
special preferential attention to his own private interests? Consider the cost,
in terms of time and resources, merely of our everyday recreational and
leisure activities. If we weighed our own interests no higher than anyone
else's, could we justify such activities? From a strictly impartial standpoint
would not these resources be better devoted to more deserving or more
needy recipients? If the impartialist replies that indeed we should eliminate
such self-favouring uses of time and resources, then he would seem to be
proposing what Mackie called a "fantasy" ethic - an ethic which people may
pay lip service to as a shining ideal, but which they do not and will never in
practice subscribe to, in the sense of incorporating it into their actual strategy
for living.12
The third point to be made about self-favouritism is that it may well have a
valuable role to play in the promotion of non-self-interested goals. For most
of us, it is very difficult to embark wholeheartedly on some committed course
of action unless the chosen project, either in its fulfilment, or in the progress
towards it, involves at least some element of personal enrichment. It is
important not to misunderstand this point by interpreting it as a piece of
cynicism. Clearly people can and do "devote their lives to the cause" without
its being the case that the cause necessarily involves some reference to their
own interests. But experience suggests that continuing devotion to the cause
is nearly always accompanied by some degree of what may loosely be called
'ego-satisfaction'. Thus the Christian works to promote the Kingdom of
God not just because of an impersonal recognition that this is a morally
desirable goal, but also because he finds, or expects to find, that he can "live
life more abundantly" as a result. Again, devotees of revolutionary causes
characteristically report that their own lives are enriched or given meaning by
the struggle on which they have embarked. From a historical perspective
there seems little doubt that ego-satisfaction is the motor that has powered
most moral projects, irrespective of whether the projects themselves have a
self-directed content. So it seems possible that a further defence of self-
directed partiality may be developed by reference to the thought that even
the most worthy ideal is unlikely to gain many adherents or to progress very
" See Nicomachean Ethics, bk IX, ch. 8 (1168 b).

12 See J. Mackie, Ethics (Harmondsworth, 1977) pp. 129ff; cf. Cottingham, op. cit. (note 1)
p. 86f.
368 JOHN COTTINGHAM
far, unless it is able to draw to a greater

preferential concern which all of us as a m
wellbeing. An ethic which finds a legitimat
may well survive better, and hence pro
effectively, than one which attempts to out
PHILOPHILIC PARTIALISM
There is another and less controversial type of partialism whi

highly promising candidate for justification by reference to the
the ethical blueprint or lifeplan. A pillar of all, or certainly mo
ethical systems is the principle of partiality to loved ones or "p
partialism": the adjective is coined from the Greek philophilo
loves his friends.13 (The term philos is usefully wider than the co
Latin amicus, which survives as French ami, Spanish amigo etc. Fo
term and its derivatives suggest merely a "friend", whereas the G
includes not just one's friends, but one's children, siblings, spou
are beloved or "dear" to the agent.) The principle of philophilic
unlike that of agent-related partialism but like that of self-direc
ism, has to do not with the logical status of our concerns as hum
but with the specific content of those concerns. The principle ass
deciding whether to promote the interests of X or Y, I may leg
assign a certain moral weight to the fact that X is my loved-one
non-eliminable reference to a particular - myself - involved
would be a confusion to suppose (as is sometimes done) that this
there is some selfish or narrowly self-interested element involv
lophilic partiality. To love someone is to desire his/her happiness
sake, and in this sense the emotion involved is genuinely altruisti
desire that his child should flourish and be happy is not just a de
glow of pleasure this will produce in the parental breast; for it in
example, the desire that the child shall continue to flourish after t
dead. Indeed, one of the most awesome dimensions of parental lo
the parent may actually weigh the welfare of the child higher th
welfare. Sexual love, romantic love and marital love, though in som
more dynamic and more significant in terms of individual devel
psychological equilibrium, do not typically have this remarkable
ficial element; and most people would say that it is right that they
But though different from parental love, these other kinds
nonetheless genuinely altruistic. The loving spouse desires the wel
or her marital partner for its own sake (and not just because happ
13 The philophilos, observes Aristotle, is worthy of praise. Nicomachean Ethics
a35.
people are easier to live with). All genuine love, then, is altruistic; but it also
has a non-eliminably self-referential aspect. As we noted earlier (p. 359), the
reason for showing partiality to one's own children is not that they possess
some universalizable feature or set of features that merit special recognition
(otherwise we would not have an example of partialism but of impartial
evaluation); rather, a parent should give extra (again: extra, not infinite)
weight to his children's interests precisely because they are his. And the
same goes for relationships with wives, husbands, brothers, sisters, close
friends and lovers, and for other relationships involving what has been called
"self-referential altruism".'4 In each case the partiality is exercised towards
the philos, the loved-one, precisely in virtue of the special relationship which
the loved one has to the agent. (Interestingly, Aristotle calls the philos an allos
autos, a "second self', implying that the agent exercises the same kind of
special concern towards the loved one as he does towards himself).'5
Now the principle of philophilic partiality cannot be regarded simply as a
case of arbitrary or capricious favouritism. Its ethical plausibility flows from
the fact that genuine love finds a place in almost all viable blueprints for
human welfare. Special concern towards particular human beings is essential
to the functioning of those close relationships which the overwhelming mass
of mankind seek as a major source of psychological enrichment. And if such
concern has a successful outcome, so that the agent is able to witness the
flourishing of the loved one, and if, further, it is reciprocated, so that the
parties are bound together in mutual ties of affection, then the resulting
situation constitutes what is one of the principal satisfactions of human life.
The justification of philophilic partialism is thus extremely simple. If I give
no extra weight to the fact that this is my lover, my friend, my spouse, my
child, if I assess these people's needs purely on their merits (in such a way as
an impartial observer might do), then that special concern which constitutes
the essence of love and friendship will be eliminated. Partiality to loved ones
is justified because it is an essential ingredient in one of the highest of
human goods.
A natural question to raise by way of a footnote to the above argument is
whether it rests on some supposed conceptual truth about what it is to be a
human being, or simply on a psychological generalisation about the way most
humans are constituted. A decisive objection to resting the argument on a
supposed conceptual truth is that clearly there have been human beings
(hermits, wandering friars, and so on) who have managed to live without the
ties of special affection. Such non-philophilic lives, particularly when they
are devoted to some worthy end (helping the poor, tending the sick) are
regarded as morally praiseworthy. So philophilic partiality evidently cannot
14 J. Mackie, op. cit., p. 132.
15 Nicomachean Ethics 1166 a32.
370 JOHN COTTINGHAM
be regarded as a necessary condition for an

conclusion which accords with the point mad
many possible blueprints for the good life). But
possible, and even capable of being worthwhile,
certain practical drawbacks of an analogous kind
of the life devoid of agent-related partiality. Fir
simply not a feasible option for most people. M
commonly report that, even from among the tin
some desire for the monastic life, many have to
are simply not capable of living without the supp
and the other close ties on which most of u
philophilic life shares with the non-agent-relat
somewhat parasitic. Those who lead it have i
devoted partialism of those who brought them u
the future of institutions like the monastic orde
to draw recruits from the "normal" philophilic w
blueprint, though by no means an incoherent one
an ethic that cannot provide a plausible lifeplan
its survival depends on its not being adopted by
OTHER PARTIALISMS
The following conclusions should have emerged about the partiali

far discussed. First, the principle of agent-related partialism s
essential one for all, or at least nearly all, conceivable ethical s
further, a non-agent-related ethic, if it could exist, would be parasit
existence of a prevailing agent-related ethic in the world at large. S
the principle of self-directed partialism appears to be deeply and p
ineradicably ingrained into our psychological makeup, to the extent
ethic which finds no place for it is unlikely to survive except as a fa
addition the principle may possibly have some useful subservient rol
in the promotion of other moral ideals. Third, and finally, the prin
philophilic partialism, has a central structural importance for the we
the vast majority of mankind; it is a sine qua non for the achievement o
the most valuable goods which human beings are capable of attainin
three kinds of partiality thus seem to rest on an unassailable moral
tion in so far as any ethical blueprint which attempted to eliminate th
the world altogether would be self-defeating.
It now only remains to inquire whether similarly powerful justif
can be advanced for the other partialisms on our list. In many c
answer (a welcome one considering the character of many items on
seems to be firmly negative. In the case of racial partiality, for examp
appears to be no remotely plausible case for arguing that it must fin

in all or most plausible blueprints for human welfare. And yet it m
admitted that there are racists (e.g. in South Africa) who claim tha
better" under institutions which systematically favour one race over
and one still hears some male chauvinists claiming that institutiona
favour of males makes for a "better society". Might not such partial
to have a "lifeplan" argument to support their favouritism towards t
sex or race?
The answer to this must be that, like all ethical reasoning, such ar
are sensitive to empirical evidence. Advocates of the pro-racist
sexist arguments that we are considering here must be committed
proposition that societies and individuals which have abandoned, or
towards abandoning, racism and sexism, will find that there is a re
diminution in the prospects for humans to lead worthwhile lives. Bu
evidence points in the opposite direction, and suggests that aba
racial and sexual partialities leads to richer, more fulfilling human
ships and institutions, an increase in respect for persons, a greater s
self-development - in short, greater prospects for the achievem
eudaimonia.
The case of kinshipism is harder to assess. Kinshipists presu
maintain that one should give preferential treatment to indivi
proportion to their degree of genetic kinship to oneself- a view whic
be thought to account rather neatly for family partiality, and also
feeling, shared by many, that species which are genetically closer to
as apes, have a higher moral claim on our concern than say rats, or
generally, that it is legitimate for us to favour mammals over, say
Reflection reveals, however, that kinshipism has some counter-i
consequences. It has recently been discovered that chimpanzees
closely related to us indeed (in terms of DNA structure); yet it
implausible to maintain that this fact, in and of itself, is enough to
moral difference to how we should treat them. Again, in the burning
case, it is surely implausible to claim, as the kinshipist presumably m
S has, ceteris paribus, less of an obligation to give preference to X if
adopted child than if X is his natural child (sharing half of his
makeup). Indeed, if genetic relationships are construed strictl
mathematically, the kinshipist seems lumbered with all sorts of
results - for example that my sister is twice as entitled as my grandp
my special consideration, (since the sister shares half of my genetic
while the grandparent shares only a quarter). Recent sociobiological
ists have sometimes seemed prepared to embrace this sort of conseq
suggesting that it is somehow in my interests or "in my genes' intere
as much as possible of my genetic material should survive, and t
372 JOHN COTTINGHAM
calculated degrees of preference are there

manifold confusions here. My genes, not
can have no interests. As for me, the fact
DNA will be around that are approximate
me, does not of itself affect my interests o
This is not to deny that a man or woman m
of, for example, his or her children or
ensure such survival. But what gives such
is the close emotional bonding which peopl
and the role which such bonding plays in
those involved. It is this, not the mere fa
provides the moral foundation for any pa
kin.
In the case of wider partialisms such as clanism and patriotism, assess-
ment is more complicated.16 What seems evident is that no one of these can
claim to have crucial importance for human welfare. Clanism, for example,
has largely disappeared in many modem societies without any noticeable
impoverishment of human life as a result. But it is, I think, plausible to argue
that human beings, or at least most of them, find it difficult to flourish unless
they can integrate their lives into at least some network of partiality, some
structure of mutual dependence and loyalty, that operates on a wider scale
than self-directed partiality and philophilic partiality. Complaints about
"rootlessness" among modem city dwellers, and the rise of separatist
movements within large nation-states or federations, provide at least some
evidence that, in order to live happy lives, human beings may require,
beyond self-concern and family concern, wider partialist structures of
interdependence within which the concern accorded to them will not be
limited to that which an impartial observer might assign on the basis of
purely objective criteria.17
The question of how far partialisms such as patriotism can be justified
along these lines is a complex one, and the answer would depend on careful
evaluation of a mass of psychological and sociological data (much of it
probably not readily available). The purpose of this paper has been the more
limited one of providing a framework for evaluating the general moral status
of partialism. Two results should have emerged. In the first place, a moral
agent who is under no direct or indirect duty to be impartial may legitimately
exercise first, agent-related partiality (giving some degree of preference
towards his own chosen goals and projects); second a limited degree of self-
16 I avoid any general comments on speciesism since this has been extensively discussed in
recent literature, and raises special issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.
17 For a development of this point in connection with urban "alienation", cf. Oldenquist,
op. cit., pp. 187ff.
directed partiality (preferential assigning of time and resources to his own

private welfare); and thirdly philophilic partiality (according special favoured
consideration to his loved ones). In the second place, defending such
partiality need not provide a blank cheque for supporting the kinds of unfair
discrimination associated with racism and sexism. To say that a moral system
designed for human beings could not function without some partialist
principles clearly does not entail that all partialisms are justified. And - to
end on a note of concession to the impartialist - since the fact that X and Y
are qualitatively similar in all respects is always a prima facie reason for
treating X and Y alike, the onus will always be on the partialist to justify his
favouring of X over Y. To sketch a route which such justification could take,
is not to say that it will always be successful.
A final point. If partialists maintain that under some circumstances one
may, in distributing one's time and resources, legitimately assign a certain
weight to self-referential characteristics, this leaves open the question of how
much weight it is morally appropriate to assign. Impartialists, it has been
argued, are wrong to suggest that in deciding between X and Y, I should
assign no weight to the fact that X is one of "my own"; but it may still be true
that many of us assign too much weight to this fact. There is, I think, no easy
answer to the problem of deciding exactly what is the right amount of weight
to assign to any given self-referential characteristic. But almost every
difficult moral question depends on the balancing and weighing of con-
flicting moral principles and values. So the fact that the partialistic ethic is
subject to such difficulties is neither surprising nor an objection to partialism
as such.'8
University of Reading
18 I am indebted to Professor Roy Sorensen, whose valued comments on an earlier paper

stimulated some of the above arguments, and to Dr Sheldon Leader and Mrs Martha Klein for
perceptive criticism of an earlier version of the present paper.

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University of St.

Partiality, Favouritism and Morality

University of St. Andrews, Oxford University Press, Scots Philosophical Association

PARTIALITY, FAVOURITISM AND MORALITY

Many philosophers are impartialists: they maintain that morality requires

understandable but) morally correct to favou

NEPOTISM AND CORRUPTION

To say without qualification that it is morally correct to favour

FAVOURING OUR OWN: CIRCLES OF PREFERENCE

simply on the fact that she is my daughter: there is a non-

I. Asimov, "C Chute" in Nightfall One (London, 1971), p. 161.

so far from being a label coined by a liberation movement to tag a lurkin

The partialist seems to have two possible ways of meeting this c

The argument from bald preference

entitled to specify quite arbitrarily and capriciously who should be the

The argument from the life-plan

systematic constraints on what can count a

Perhaps the simplest and clearest case of a kind of partiality th

is to have commitments, to be involved; and this in turn necessarily entails

10 B. Williams Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981), p. 4.

conceivable, the life devoid of agent-relate

It is important to realise that the principle so far introduced, tha

" See Nicomachean Ethics, bk IX, ch. 8 (1168 b).

far, unless it is able to draw to a greater

There is another and less controversial type of partialism whi

be regarded as a necessary condition for an

The following conclusions should have emerged about the partiali

appears to be no remotely plausible case for arguing that it must fin

calculated degrees of preference are there

directed partiality (preferential assigning of time and resources to his own

18 I am indebted to Professor Roy Sorensen, whose valued comments on an earlier paper

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